JPRS ID: 9062 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070055-2
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• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 55
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9062
30 April 1980 =
Ne~r Ea / '
st Narth Afric~ Re ort
p
iF0U0 15/80~ -
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JPR5 L/9062
30 April 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPQRT
~
(F.OU4 15%8a)
- CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Tripoli ~iewa Gafsa Incident as Internal Revolt
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET !%~DITERRANEENS, 29 Feb 80~ 1
Unfair Aspecte of Gafsa Tria1 Criticized
(Ibrahim Tobal; AFRIQUE-ASiB~ 17 Mar 80) 7
Leaeone To Be Learned From Gafsa Rebellion Noted
_ (Khemais Chamari; JEUNE ~FRIQUE, 19 Mar 80) 9
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
' Iu?pact of Saharan War Analyzed
_ (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Mar 80~) 13
Introductory Commenta
Improved Moroccan Military Positiion, -
by Raphlsel Mergui
War's Effect on Moroccan Economy,
by Philippe Simonnot _
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
Ielamic Conference Aide on Probleme Facing World's Muslima -
(Habib Chatti Interview; JEUNE t1FRIQUE, 16 Apr ~0) 21
AFGHANISTAN
Eyewitneas Report Fro~? Rabul
fJos~tte Alia; LE NOUVEL OB3ERVATEUR, 11-17 Feb 80) 24
ALGERIA
1980 Budget To Launch Next 5-Year Plan ~
(MARCHE3 TROPZCAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Feb 80i 28 "
- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO) `
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~ CONTENTS (Continued)
, New Petr~leum Policy Reported
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~EENS, 7 Mar 80) 33 -
Briefe
- Threat to France 40
IRAN
Bani-Sadr Ponders Way Out of Economic Ruin
(Bani-Sadr Interview; IL MONDO, 28 Mar SO) 41
LEBANOIv -
Death of Publieher Makes Future of Magazine Uncertain
_ (AL-WATAN AL-'p.RABI, 14-20 Mar 80) 45' -
MOROCCO
Worried King Gets U.S. Arme, French Security Advice
(Ali Gharbi; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Feb 80) 49
TUNISIA
_ Prospecte Regarding Succeaeor to Bourguiba Analyzed -
_ (Adel Wahid; AFR~QUE-ASIE, 17 Mar 80) 51
Reaeone for Nouira Visit to Paria Diecusaed
- (Francoise Hubscher; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Mar 80) 54
_ Improved Coverage of Importa Reported
(MARCAES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80) 57
Srief~
Arma Contracte ~ 60
Petroleum Proapecting 60
- b -
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
TRIPOLI VIEWS GAFSA INCIDENT AS INTERNAL REVOLT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 476-77
[Article: "For Tripoli the Gafsa Incident Is On the Order of a Generalized
- Revolutionary Action]
[Text] The events in Gafsa, which have just created a very serious dispute
between Tunisia and Libya unquestionably destined to be lasting, must be
placed within the framework of the ,Iamahiriya general policy, which is
revolutionary abroad as well as at home. It also seems to be of interest
to retrace the debates of the Genera~ Congresa of the Libyan People, held -
last January, particularly as far as tne Jamahiriya's action beyond its
borders is concerned. And although the commentaries of the Libyan high
officiala were fairly long, it would also seem to be very important to note
- these po3itions, taken after the Libyan news media had given a picture of _
the facts themselves and their repercussions in Tunisia which the foreign
press has been practically unanimous in calling fantastic.
_ Libya's foreign policy wsa mentioned at length during the session of the
Generel Congress of the Libyan Peopl~ (1-6 January), particularly at the
hearinga of AI.i Abdeselam Triki and Ahmed Chehati, the secretari~s of foreign
affairs and foreign relations, reapectively.
First Triki observed that any foreign policy reflects the home policy of
the country conducting it; thus, "the Jamahiriya's policy directly reflects
the revolution." The people of the Jamahiriya "are leading the Arab Nation`a
struggle against the Zionist enemy, imperialism and the reaction represented
by the Egyptian regime which has betrayed its cause...."
The secretary of foreign affairs next recalled the visit of the leader of
the revolution to Algeria, which marked "the beginning of a unionist dialog,"
the Jamahiriya's action in Central Africa and in Chad, the support for
Zimbabwe and Namibia's liberation movements, the Yais~ng of the question
of the Island of Reunion before the OAU, the support given to Malta and
finally Marshall Tito's meeting with Colonel Qadhdhafi, an event which, he
asserts, helped the attainment of positive results at the conference of the
nonalined countries in Havana.
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After having expressed delight at the fact that Chad is fin~lly governed by
Moslems, Triki declared that "the Moslem world has experienced a great
- awakening" sin.ce the Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969, of which "the
Revolution of the Islamic Iranian people is a continuation." He added
"Today, thanks to God, minarets are being built and hundreds of Moslem . -
preacherc~ are acour~g,the world; Africa alone has received 422;...soon
the first complete Islamic~Center will be built in Rwanda... After the
visit of the leader of the revolution to Central Africa more than 30,040
persons converted to Islam1�... But "even more than the Moslems who are
propagating Islam and building mosques, the moud~ahidin like the Moslems
of the South of the Philippines, who are fighting their enemies" with Libya's _
help must be supported.
To Destroy the Traditional Forms of Power in the Worid
"Again this year," said Triki, "the Jamahiriya is tha Mecca of the free men
- and revolutionaries of the entire world." -
In 1979, 40 heads of state, 5 vice presidents, 10 prime ministers and 111 -
, ministerial delegations paid official visits to the Jamahiriya. Twenty-
_ two ~o`.nt commissions established between the Jamahiriys and friendly countries -
met at the ministerial level; 423 cooperation conventions with other states -
were in existence. Syria received 60 million dinars ~n aid; Jordan, 10,
_ and che Palestinian resistance, 50. _
Next taking the floor, Ahmed Chehati, the secretary of the Office of Foreign
Kelations recalled that this organization had beer~ created in 1975 in order
to propag~te the Libyan revolutionary spirit "on tre Arab, Islamic and inter-
national scenes," for "the charter establishing the people's authority com-
mita us to support peoples who are struggling for their liberty and to destroy
the traditional forma of power in the world... Despite colossal achievementa
_ in foreign policy, there are certain commitments in foreign policy with regard
to others who expect the support and help of the glorious revolution of 1
September."
Finally, the transformation of the Jamahiriya's embassies into popular
conanitt~es in Federal Germany, Spain, the United States, France, Great
= Britain, Gr~ece, Italy and Malta was reported.
The Congress ratified the decision to proceed with aid to "Arab countries
of confrontation" on the condition that they "open their frontiers to the -
armed action of the fedayin and stand fast against the enemy."
- The Congress declared that the great majorit;~ of popular congresses had
decided in favor of breaking off or terminating relations with China bec~use
the latter is supplying arms to the present Egyptian regime. It the.:
_ examined Libya's relations with the Palestinian movement el Fatah, suspected
of tendencies toward compromise with Israel; 145 popular congresses, or
83 percent, decided in favor of breaking off relations; the others adopted
more complex solutions.
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Allusior~ to Soviet Action in Afghanistan
, The aecretary of foxeign relations explained the position taken ir~ favor of
Former President Idi Ami~ Dada because of his "support for the Arab cause
and for liberation mov~menta;" the Jamahiriya had also helped him "when
hia country was the object of foreign aggree~sion." As for relations with "
forsner Emperor Bokassa, they cor~esponded to "the latter's ~esi�re to open
an era of Arab-African cooFeration and to propaggte Islam in his country."
In Chad it was a question "of a ma~ority of Moslems governed by a minority
without any democracy b~ing taken int~ account. We helped the FROLINAT ~
revolu~tionaries because they have a~ust cause... Our elementary principles
require sacrifices, ~nd it is not enough to protest or be indignant, as was
- the case formerly with certain neighboring countries."
An alluaion by Chehati to the USSR was reported in the following terms by
the ,7ANA agency to which we owe this account of the sAssion: "He alluded
to what the Soviet Union h~d done recently, knowing the danger that sending
= soldiers into a neighboring country represents. We do not approve all its
positions, in this case the aggression of one state ag3inst another."
Triki took the f.'.~or again to mention cooperation between the Jamahiriya
and African states; 51 joint companies (agricLltural, commercial, etc.)
link t:~~m concretely. "The enemy must be given no chance to return to the
' Af rican Continent." ~
Toward An "International Popular Revolution"
During the seyeral weeks which separated the opening of the General Congress
of the Peo~le and the start of the Gafsa incident, Colonel Qadhdhafi did not
change his usual attitude in any way but continued to explain on various
ocCasions his conce~ption of the "era of the masses" and of the Jamahiriya's
popular policy, a conceptiorr which involves th.e expansion of this syatem
abroad�m-by revolution. The only allusion made to the disputes with Tunisia
consisted of a mention of the Libyan-Tunisian declaration of union (12 -
_ January 1974~ and of Colonel. Qadhsihafi's already old commentaries on this
- sub~eci.: "This declaration is inscribed in the hearts of thousands of
young people... Its enforcem2nt has been delayed, but no one can oppose
- the generation of unity in Tunisia and in the Jam.~hiriya." This anniversary
_ reminder is a sort of rit~al in Libya.
Colone:. Qadhdhafi did not part?.cipate in the work ot the Congress. He
explained himself on 13 Januar~ at a press conference: hQnceforth the
Libyan Feople know that they are in power, and they are exercising it very
' fitly; "pow~r will hanceforth be in the. ~ands of the p~pular masses; the ~
leader (of the revolution) has the r~1~~ of. inciting the papular masses to ~
revolt against all the bases, all the political, economic and social relatlo*.?s
of oppression, to consolidate the people's authority and to announce the -
_ era of the masses at home and abroad." But he deplored the fact that it
was possibZe to detect a certain absenteeism during this assembly's seasion;
he explained to the periodical AL OUSBOUH ATH THAQAFI (4 January) that
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peoplE cannot for one instant lose the habit or considering whether the
government ~s making decisions f~r them; he added that the popular committees
are still not completely capable of mobilizing the masses.
During his press conference in Benhazi Colone~ Qadhdhafi gave a significant
_ explanation of his attitude with respect to the Paleatinian revolution;
- he supports it because it pursues armed struggle; h~ recalled that his =
- speech crn the occasion of the Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People
urged the Palestinian revolution "not to adapt itself to the present Arab
reality which ia only a politiCal and governmental reality... The Palestiniane -
- should remain frpe in their action, should accept no pressure on the part
of the Arab regimes si:a should have only the law of the revolution for 1aw."
It will be recalled, however, ~hat the Jamahiriya had had a violent dispute
. with al Fatah whose expulsion it had declared, but according to Colonel
Qadhdhafi this dispute is "unilateral and constitutes al Fatah's act alone."
Triki corroborated these declarations in Damascus on 19 January, declaring
- that "the 1 September revolution is the permanent catalyst of Arab and inter-
national action for the Palestinian Revolution" and that "the ;;amahiriya -
~ is fully determined to liberate the entire Palestj.nian territory by armed
combat." -
Ir.terviewed by the Iranian daily newspaper ETTEL2,'AT (26 January), Colonel
Qadhdhafi saw "the continuation of the Green Book�� in the Iranian revolu- -
tion which con~ointly with ti;e Libya~z revolution is capable of "creating a
wor11 of the masses and an international popular revolution." And congratu-
lating Ayatollah Khomeyni o~n 1 February, Colonel Qadhdhafi affirmed that -
"the Iranian revolution, whose fundamental principle is Islam, whose goal
is liberty and which has a religious leadership, is the new mudel for the
state of Islam," while "the parliamentary state, the professional army,
capitalism and the power of one or several parties were born of Christianity
' in its dec`line and from the Western bourgeoisie of the colonial era." -
"Where There Is Reaction There Is No Islam!"
At first the Gafsa incident was mentioned only very summarily and through
foreign sources by the Libyan press. The secretary of foreign affairs
took a position only on 1 February, refuting the official Tunisian communiques
_ and affirming that the 3amahiriya had no co-nection, direct or indirect,
witih the events taking place in Gafsa. He added, "If the Tunisian authorities
are suffering from a Libyan intervention in the form of the passage of the
- revolut3onary spirit to the Tunisian mrisses, the Libyan people do not bear
responsibility for it." He denied any participation by a Libyan in the
"popular revolt in Gafsa" and blamed the Tunisian Gov~~rnment for its inten-
tion to resort to colonial and foreign forces, thus humiliating the Tunisian
- people.
Colonel Qadhdhafi mentioned "the French invasion of Tunisia" on 7 February
to the Venezuelan president whom he was then receiving in Tripoli and affirmed
- "the Libyan people's solidarity with the popular revolution in Tunisia,"
but this aubject would not be broached in the ~oint communique. Afterward
- he explained himself at length in an 11 February interview granted to AFP.
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But it was Commander Abdesselm Jalloud who on 7 February before the General
Congress of Libyan Students in Syrte made the first detailed statement by -
an important Libyan offic~al. Four-fifths of his speech was devoted to the
' Tuniso-Libyan dispute, which was discussed with a vehemence which up to then -
had been unusual for Colonel Qadhdhafi's "first officer."
- "If Brother Colonel," he exclaimed, addressing the Tunisian leaders, "has
set forth a theory which poisons your life and threatens your power, your
tyranny and your dictatorship, the theses of this theory have been inspired
not only by the Libyan popular masses but also by thoae of Tunisia and of
the Arab nation, the Islamic community and the community of the peoples of -
the entire world."
_ Commander Jalloud blamed the Tunisian minister of education for having talked
of the "Tunisianness of education" whereas Tunisia cannot be an entity
separated from the Arab nation;" but "the band which governs the Tunisian
people...(and) trembles with fear...has the sole goal of isolating the
Tunisian people from its Arab nation and of linking it to France and the
West;" it is a collaborationist, reactionary, dictatorial, bourgeois and
corrupt power" with which conflict will continue without any mediRtion being
accepted.
"How are we at fault," Commander Jalloud further said, "who are a revolution -
endowed with a theory, a popular revolution, if the Tunisian masses respond
to this theory and to this popular revoluti~n?"
The Libyan first officer complained about the fact that the Islamic Confer-
ence had not responded to the request for convocation made by Libya: the
United States had not allowed it. "Islam," he said, "is revolution. Where
there is reaction there is no Islam... Where there is a true Islamic and
progressive revolution, there is Islam... The 3anger for Islam ie a new
Christian crueade supported by capitalist monopolism and direct or indirect
colonialism...".
- The "French invasion" denounced at that time by Commander Jalloud constituted
the principal theme of the interview given by Colonel Qadhdhafi on 11 February
to the AFP. "From now on," he says, "any foreign intervention in the Arab
world will provoke a popular reaction there, and we are determined to supply
the spark of this revolution." He reaffirmed that Libya had not sent any -
commandoes to Gafsa: "The interviews broadcast by the Tunisian regime were
in fact put together by intelligence agenta instructed to say that they
had been trained in Libya." He concluded by saying that "the Tunisian
regime is antagonistic to the popular revolution in Libya... [W]e must
fight until the antagonist, which has lost its sense of history and its
~ustification for its existence, disappears... [N]o mediation, no mediation
or truce will be accepted...".
_ Moreover, no foreign attempt at conciliation seems to have been sketched
out yet. It will be recalled that the chief secretary of the Islamic con-
ference is a former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, Habib Chatti, _
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who while maintaining or reestablishing correct Tuniso-Libyan relations
_ seemed scarcely to believe in the possibility of developing them much...
The chief secr~tary of the Arab League, Chedli Klibi is also a fox~mer Tunisian
minister and hae not been mixed up in any Maghreb dispute.
- Algeria has been eager to have the Tunisian Government state that it was
not involved in the Gafsa incident in any way; through ita preaident, epeaking -
- in Conetantine on 9 February it made it known without dwelling that it
would not appreciate the presence of foreign troope in a neighboring
country. Ite obliging press has reserved very littl~e space for the Tuniso-
Li~yan tension and has refrained from bringiag the grievancea raiaed on
both sides up again. Algeria would be one of the beat placed Arab states -
to work in view of a lull which, to be sure, it arbently desires.
COPXRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 19E30
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,
- INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
UNFAIR ASPECTS OF GAFSA TRIAL CRITICIZED
- Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 17 Mar 80 p 20 ' .
[Article by Ibrahim Tobal: "The So-Called Gafsa Z~rial"]
[Text] It was on Monday 10 March that the 110 defendants in the Gafsa
_ affair were to appear before the state aecurit~ court in Tunis. They are
threatened with the death penalty. The investigations puraued high-
_ handedly, in the greatest of secYecy and in an atmoephere of mounting
tension encouraged by the Bourguiba regime provide a foretaste of the pro-
; cedures the Tunisian courta intend to use. These are the procedurea which =
Mr Ibrahim Tobal, preaident of the Tunisian National Opposition Movement
(I~NT) hae announced in a message addressed to the democratic organizations
(including Amneaty International in London, the Internat~onal Asaociation
of Democratic Jurists in Belgi~, the International Federation on the
Rights of Man in Geneva, the presidents of the Arab bar associations in
Iraq, Syria, Sordan, Lebanon, I~orocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, as well
as the secrerary-general of the Union of Arab Lawyers, Mr Zouheir el Madani).
In hia message, Mr Tobal demanda "the eatsblishment of a committee of
democrati~ lawyere to provide the defendanta charged following the popular -
uprising in Gafsa with a defenge," ae wel'1 as the "appointmen� af an inter-
national committee to investigate the assassination, su~ary execution and
disappesiance of a number of militants." He says that "according to the .
firat reports from the families, more than 300 militants and citizens :_~ve -
disappeared since 28 and 29 January 1980."
"Allow me," the president of the 1~ON'~ goes on to say, "to insist on the
urgency of your action to aid the defendants in the Gafsa case in Timisia.
Following the events of 26 January 1980r 110 defendants have been ordered to
appear on Monday, 10 March 1980, be~ore the state security court in Tunis."
His message continued as follawa:
"The speedy investigation by m~ana of torture was ~carried out with no
_ lawyera present. The defense was excluded and the appointment of any
- lawyer re~ected.
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- At the hearing on 10 March 1980, only the 60 officially appointed clerk
lawyers can be present.
- This ~udicial farce was prepared earlier by a statement made by
- Bourguiba in Nefta, Tuniaia, announcing the immediate execution of two of
~he key defendants: Mergheni and Cherif Azzeddine.
As to the Tunisfa*~ national asgembly, it has demanded the death penalty for
all tt~e defendants. One deputy, Hasaen Kassem, has even demanded their
- ex~cution in their home town.
. You cannot remain insensitive and inactive in view of the executions b eing
_ planned. This is why the MONT is addressing itse~f to you and reminding
you of the following facts.
The Bourguiba regime was established by force and with the aid of the French
army in 19~6, within the framewnrk of the formal independence granted.
- Alined with French policy and having betrayed the goal of national indepen-
dence and unity for the liberation of the Arab Maghrib, the Bourguiba regime
has not cea~ed to repress and assassinate consistent Tunisian Arab national-
ists, including Salah Ben Youssef, who was murdered in Frankfort in 1961 and
whose assassins were decorated by Bourguiba himself in 1974. After a quarter _
of a century, the many facats of the violence of the Bourguiba regime are
manifesting themseZves constantly. The most important trials were held in ~
1958, 1959, 1962 and 196~, leading to the conviction of several hundred
militants in the I~DONT. Sixty-nine of them were executed by hanging. To -
' this must be added 620 sentences of impr3sonment and forced labor ranging
from 10 years to life.
The national revolutionary explosion in Gafss comes within this continuing _
conflict in which today our movement and its revolutionary, progreasive
- and democratic youth oppose the autocrats in Tunis.
The n~ture af this conflict has not changed. It is still a matter of
national independence, national sovereignty and particj.pation in the North
_ African and Arab community.
There is no interference by any Arab state whatsoever in this domestic -
conflict in Tunisia. On the contrary, those in power in Tunis, seized with
panic, have asked for foreigYt intervention, as in 1956, by the French and -
the Americans. It was thus that the revolutionary national uprising in
martyred Gafsa was crushed. ~
The MONT also asks yau to organize a contribution to the court defense ~
as soor, as possible, as well as support of that defense within the frame-
work of the defense of the rights of man.
Please inform the minister of Tunisian ~ustice of your contribution to
this defense."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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INTER-ARAB pFFAIRS
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FRAM GAFSA REBELLION NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Mar 80 pp 48-49
.
- [Article by Kt:emais Chamari, Tunisian opposition ~ournalist: "The Lessons
_ of ~afsa"] -
[Text] It is in Timisia itself, an~ not b~yond its frontiexs, that the
main search for the roots of the revolt must be pursL+.ed. The first
question ie as to the reasons which pushed Tunisians, in the ma~ority uri- -
deniably patriotic, to choose the path of rebellion--auicidal, in ~y view--
and to take the risk of launching a process they would nQt, by ~qrce of
circumstance, be abls to ~ontrol.
The economic and eocial blind alleys ~hich are the results of a clasa
- policy based on business interests and dependence, the instftutional block-
age of the "Destour state," the frustratione, the hopes expressed, the
~ anger of the people, and firat and foremoat the youth of the governorates ~
_ in tne interior (thoae in the Genter-South in particular) neglected to the
benefit of "coastal expanaion"--this is the terrain in which the fearf.ul -
_ evil in the grip of which our country finds itself, and which the Gafsa -
- abcese brought to light, developed.
- Iranian Shock Waves -
- DF..kIOCRATIE, the organ of the Movement r~f Socialist Denwcrats, say5 that
"no one, domestically or abroad, would have dared challenge the regime and
attempt the venture if the government had responded to the advice and appeal.s
fr~m all sides, if it had bound up the wounds of 26 January 1978."
To thia diagnosis I would like to add the following remarks.
1. At ~ time when the framework is being set up for a new inquisition
which will etrike at more than 10~ Tunisian citizens "legally," it must be
, reiterated that nothing cculd ~ustify the televised questioning of those
charged "with their faces swollen from earlier blows," the massive raids, .
or above all, the hasty excepticaal court ~uriadictions, in the eyes of a
free man. Whatever the nature of the crime, whatever the ideoingical and
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pclitical options of the persons tried, there is no reason, even reasons
~ of state, which can ~ustify failure to respect the principles which ~
guarantee the right to a court defenae free of all constraint.
2. There is a legitimate and necessary use of violence, precisely when all
meana of legal action, all legal recourse, is denied. There is also a
legitimate principle of the right to reaist oppression. I know this, but i
say that it is dangerous for intellectuals, of which I am one--except in a
situation of commitment to the physical risks this entails--to put forth
those convictiona which may launch, atrengthen or legitimize the terrible
_ and ineidious machinery of civil war. I do not think that such confrontations
are the inevitable producta of the clasa struggle, and I think that we must
: spare our country such tragic tests.
3. The question which should be raised after Gafsa is the option for armed
struggle and the circumstances which ha~~e made it foreseeable, not the
- axistence of sanctuaries or foreign aid without which it has never had any
- chance of success anywhere. Permaner~tly repressed, undermined by its ideolog-
- ical qua.rrels (in which the crumbling heritage of "Maoism" does battle with
the donations inter vivos of pan-Arabism), the opposition has not been able,
despite the effective existence of trade union battles in the field, to
' offer a political alternative. The Gafsa affair has served to cast a harsh
and pitiless light an thie lack for which each of us is res~onsible. Put
- forth by ultra-minority groups at the beginning of the last decade, the
option of "nrmed s+truggle" has under these conditions seeped away. It has
fo:ind new sustenance in the eruptian of an Islamic movement carried along un
~ the Iranian shock wave, and the continued existence of a Youssefist faction
exacerbated by th~ bitter stubbornnesa and the defiance of the regime.
A Clear Attitude
- Suddenly, the concepts of "peopl.e's war" have left both the realm of
_ ideologlcal debate where they were kept by the groups of the revolutionary
intelligentsia and tihe limited circles of foreign conspiracy, to take on `
' flesh and blood. Thanks to Palestinian, Saharan and above a11 Libyan con-
- tributions, they have become the practice of inen ready to make any sacrifice
and the possible sub~ects of all kinds of manipulations. It must be said
again that the Gafsa operation was certainly not the signal or the det.onator -
expected by its authore. However its failure will not, any more than the
~ extent of the repression will, convince those who saw in this acti~n its
lack of adagtation to the potential and the need~ of the hour. Exasperated
despair has nothing to do with the arguments of reason and strict analysis.
Only~ the prospect of a profcund democratic change in the country could
raise a believable hope and cause the future alteration of these con-
victions and these attitudes. _
4. We are urged today to adopt a"clear" attitude with regard to the
"Libyan manipulation and intervention." Well, so be it! More than anyone, -
tr,e partisans of democracy and national independence must vigorously re~ect
any political interference or foreign tutelage, whatever the source.
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T1Ye deetiny of our country should be exclusively the bueineas of
- Tunisiana, but we muet also avoid ~aalking blindly into the trapa which may -
be set for us.
Saered Ur~ion
The refrain of "sacred union" has unfortunateZy been widely accepted in a
Third World ir~ which the leadin~ tea~s have mastered the consummiate art of
playing upon chauviniem. Let us say firat of all that the errors or the -
~ excesses of others have never conatituted gooc~ arguments for ~ustifying
~ one's own slips. This is equally true for the dElirious radio battle being
waged between Tunis and Tripoli, for the fal~.out of the confl3.~t on the
civilian population, particu"larly the Tunisian emigre workers in Libya, or -
- the continental shelf affair in the Gulf of Gabes in connection with which
' w2 should adhere to the terms of the Hague court arbitration agreement,
Th~ Libyan leaders, in their des~re to take up the challenges of the West
and in particular of Sadat, are it is true unpredictable, and their cho3ces
_ are not always the best. But it is not passible to blame them for all the
disordera on this planet nor t+o reduce the 27 January operati.on solely to
~ the results of their effarts to 3estroy stability. The aspiration for .
unity between our ~wo brotherly peoples (which is not synonymous with
fusion) cannot be regarded as a teaporary fact. The important thing then -
is nat to yield tn the incitement to a warlike attitude while promoting
mediation by international bodies capable of leading to reconciliation pro-
" cedures.
S. To say this, asserting our firm determination to safeguard the real
territorial integrity and national independence of our country, is not,
certainly, an easy thing. Above all at a t~me when chauvinist intoleranc~
prevails.
There ia a lack of proper measure, in any case, in the fact that leaders _
so ordinarily insensitive on basic matters shouTd act out this acene of
patriotic indignance for us. No, not them ~nd not thatl ForteuLately the -
public has a nemory and it cannot, in trie long run, despite the necessary
vigilance aroused by any flare-up on the frontiers, be daluded by abusive
ar~uments seeking to ~ustify hasty recourse to Western military support in
the name of tha "Soviet-I.ibyan peril."
_ The Imperial Chain
The aggravation of ~East-West tensions does indeed give rise to a worrisome
situation, and it leads to a fresh debate among the anti-imperialist
forces about the methods of nonalinement.
But today, from naval diaplays to "instinctive" military aid, we are risking
in reality making our country, already so integrated in the world capitalist
system, an important link in the imperial chain which is being reorganized _
all along this "crieis curve" of which we never cease to hear.
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" To underestimate thie danger would seem to me to be moving toward
- reprehensible blindness. ~
COPYRIGH~: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
- 5157 -
- CSO: 4400
~
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NdRTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~ IMPACT OF SAHARAN WAR ANALYZED
Introductory Comments
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 22-23 -
[Article: "Sahara: The Price of War")
[Text] Oscar Wilde uaed to say that one had to be superficial not to see -
appearances. Effectively, appearances fool only those who wish to be fooled.
The Sahara af�air, however, is an example of a confl3ct in which it ia not
easy to differentiate between the naivete of some and the bluff of others.
. Naivete consists in saying that the POLISARIO is rushing from one victory to
anbther, that the Moroccan monarchy is at the edge of the abyss and that the
kindgom's econamy is bankrupt. Bluff conaists in maintaining that the
POLISARIO is nothing more than a passing Libyan outgrowth. When one goes
to the scene, whEn one reads the com~tuniques of the two parties, with the -
customs~ry reservations, one must recognize that although the Moroccan army
- suffered serious setbacks, because of ~he initial absence of strategy, at
present it is no longer in such a poor situation. At the diplomatic level,
Washington has taken the side of the Moroccans. With a aingle condition: ~
that the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, Mr Boucetta, from time to time
inake an apparent display of his country's goodwill. That is the initial
political and military reality which Raphael Mergui describes in the first
article. Philippe Simmonot describes a second reality, the econamic reality,
after an on-site investigation. He presents figures to support the fact that -
the war, unfortunately, has only had dramatic financial and social conse-
quences which make the Saudi oxygen tank necessary. The war is also a moment
of truth for the people. It is beginning *o force the Moroccans to give their
conscience a general examination.
There is a third reality which these articles do not describe: the POLISARIO,
everything considered, has become a respected military force and a broadly _
- recognized political movement. Is it in the procese of pulling back defini-
tively or temporaril~;i? What is to become of it? It is not easy to anewer
these questions because when it comes to war things develop so quickly and,
- at times, very bizarrely.
~
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Improved Moroccan Military Position
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 23, 25, 26
(Article by Raphael Mergui]
[Text] For 5 years now, there has been a confrontation on 1/4 million
square kilometers of desert--abandoned by Mauritsnia in August 1979--between
Morocco and the POLISARIO, whic.h was organized by Algeria and financed by
Libya. Which of the two parties can feel that it has attained its ob~ectives
or has come close to dofng so? That is, provided these n*~~o.ctives are clear-
ly defined by one or the other party....
For Rabat, things are apparently simple. It is a question of oc~:upying
_ terrain without paying for it with the stability of the country. Evidently .
unable to win a military victory over the Royal Arme3 Forces (FAR), *_he
POLISARIO does not know too well whether 3ts interests are ordering it ef-
fectively to destabilize Morocco or to utilize the spectrum of destabiliza-
tion to cause Hassan II to pull back. The "prime miniater" of the SDAR
[Saharan vemocratic Arab Republic], Mohamed Lamine, recently assured Andrew
Young that his objective was not to overthrow the king of Morocco. Several
days later, a~oint POLISARIO and FPLP (Popular Front for the Liberatian af `
= PaZestine) co~nunique called for the overthraw of the monarchy as forcefully -
as it could. This contradiction does not only ref lect a show of diplonatic ~
"cleverness" (the language changes with the speaker) or a division of the
Front into "moderaLe" pro-Algerians and "extremist" pro-Libyans, but a real
imprecision of strategy: what is the ideal degree of destabilization? Is
a change of government in Mor~cco desirable? The strategic fuzziness of the
_ POLISARIO is revelatory of the very character of the war in the Sahara--not -
comparable to other conflicts ~f the same kind.
Economic Attrition
In the first place, guerrilla warfare is not demoralizing the Moroccan army
because the latter is convinced that it ~s fighting on its own territory and
is not participating i.n any kind of colonial adventure.
Second, no 3uerrilla warfare is victorioi.is on mi.litary terrain but in the
sector of public opinion of the country which it is fighting. Algeria and
the POLISARIA are obtaining paradoxical results: the more they strike, the
more the unity of the Moroccans is solidified with respect to their having
the right on their side.
Third, the economic attrition of Mc?rocco is of concern. However, it has not
- (yet?) reached unbearable limits. This country is probably devoting nearly
- 20 percent of its national revenue to the war (see the article by Philippe
Simonnot on p 26). The countries of the Middle East have been living with
- rates of 40-50 percent for a quarter of a century. And Rabat has a ma~or
trump card in reserve: it has not decreed a war economy. Such a measure
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moreover would not necessarily be a catastrophe: it could cause ~ioroccans
to adopt healthy habits of discipline and would teach them more rational
economic behavior.
In the meantime, Morocco is experiencing serious foreign exchange problems.
The ambaseador of France to Rabat ie even pressing for aettlement of the
bill for Mirages (3 billion francs). However, Hassan II brought back from -
his trip to Saudi Arabia enough [funds] to make 1980 a relatively peaceful
year as regards foreign payments.
Fourth, the POLISARIO seems to have won a diplomatic victory without which
it would be unable to have an outright victory: it has isolated Rabat in
the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the UN. However, if we take a
closer look at them, these successes are more moral than political. For how
do we explain the fact that Hassan II was able to recover--or annex, as you
will--Rio de Oro (for~mer Mauritanian part) without aggravating his ca~e? At
the tiir.e there was no government to protest. It was necessary for a French
_ ~ournalist to bother the Spanish minister of foreign affairs in his pool to
elicit from him a vague statement of a reproof.
The Moroccan diplomatic sector has brought about a certain amount of recovery.
First in the United States, where it succeeded in "selling a bill of goods"
to Carter, from whom it Qbtained reconnaissance planes and combat helicopters.
Next in the A~rab and Moslem world whpre Hassan II claims to be a rallier.
Evidence gathered in Washington, Paris and Rabat lead to the same conclusion:
the Algerian president, Chadli Ben~edid, is seeking an honorable way out. He
is a party to secret contacts with the Moroccans the ob~ectivs c+f which re-
portedly is a meeting with Hassan II. Condemned to a profound change [recon-
version] in its economy--at least a reversal of the present trend--Algeria is
forced to seek a kind of detente with the West and Morocco.
Finally, let us recall that the world environment has become favorable to
_ Morocco. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and the attack against
Gafsa are divine s~irprises for Hassan II.
Social Problems...
The fi~st social problem confirmed the king's conzinuing thesis: the
existence of a worldwide Soviet plot of which the Sahara is only one element.
' Did not the king on the eve of his trip to the United States say that he was
carrying with him maps to explain the political situation to Carter? The
second pr~blem--the attack against Gafsa--arrived at the right moment to
demonstrate that th~ POLISARIO, whose ties with the co~ando force formed in
- Libya was now knowuu, is one of the elements of the Qadhdhafian effort to
destabilize North Africa and the Sahel. The Front's deal with Tripoli
- threatens to ruin 5 years of patient efforts to acquire international credi-
bility. Chze Moroccan noted with humor that Qadhdhafi is Rabat's best agent....
In the final analysis, although the POLISARIO seems to be seriously bothering
Morocco, it is not shaking that country. The war in the Sahara--added to the
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world economic crisis--is responsible :Ln that area for many of the sg~n- -
taneous reactions of discantent. However, the protests are essentially
social. It would be a mistake to read into this demonstr3tions against the
war. Recent strikes by students and workers stiow that the social climate
- is deteri,orating. Arrests and sentences to long prison terms (5 yeara) are
astonishing: does thi~,mean limited, preventive repression or is the country
at the threshhold--as s.ome leaders of the opposition believe--af once again
questioni~lg the process of ~emocratization?
- In any event, the only ones showing their conEern over conti}~uation of the
war are members of the middle class--with many carefully phrased remarks,
it is true. That is because the war is going to cost them in regular, if
not supplementary taxes.
They are frightened because they are going to be asked to do something they
are not accustomed to doing. A curiously Pou~adist spirit of revolt is
developing in the posh salons of Casablanca. In any event, if a general -
explosion of discontent is to take place there, it probably would not bene- F
fit the POLISARIO, so true is it that Hassan II, in.his own words, is "the
most unflappable" of Moroccans.
What is proceeding best in Morocco is military recovery, which continues
to be essential. Army morale was at its lowest at the time of the Smara
attack, at the beginning of October 1979, which capped the su~aner offensive
' of the POLI6ARI0. After that Morocco rose cut of a long military lethargy
. to establish a mobile group called Ohoud, to be followed by two others,
which are destined to make of the Western Sahara, in the words of a superior
officer, "a region of total insecurity for the POLISARIO."
This demonatration of force was not long in producing politica' dividenda. _
_ A diplomat told ua recently, "I tried to be a friend a` Moroa,:o; bur_ I could _
not commit myself to a country which did not seem able to win po?.itically or
militarily. Today, the situation is changing. The Moroccans seem to have
understood that diplomatic action is in vain if it is not supported by mili-
tary determination."
....and Military Successes
The score card of the first 4 months of "operatien Ohoud" is easy to prepare.
= The FAR combed the former Tiris el-Gharbia (Rio de Oro) without finding a
- living enemy there. it is true that this is not the most difficult region.
, The Moroccans are even frustrated at not having been able to occupy the small
city of La Guera, in the extreme south, as was their intention. France -
dissuaded them from doing so. However, they are said to have received
appreciable compensation: Paris seems to be surveilling the Mauritanian
- border. Gen~ral Dlimi's forces were all the more easily able to prevent the
rebels from installing themselves in a region which Mauritania had ~ust aban-
doned. These forces also contributed to alleviating the burden of troops
stationed further to the north, by disrupting POLISARIO logistics.
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It is probably for this reason that the POLISARIO was unabl~e to nullify the -
_ psychological and poiitical effects of Ohoud by intensifying its operations =
further to the north. It attempted to do so but without tangible results.
_ The aiege of the Zag fortress (at tre end of November-beginning of L~ecember)
wae certainly the responae to Ohoud. Hciwever, the eiege failed. The recent
attack on Bou~dour also resulted in a setback.
In a general way, during the last few months, the POLISARIO has directed its
efforts against the "grey" areas; i.e., areas situated on the periphery of
the large military concentrations. Thus Boujdour was located too far north
for Ohoud and too far south for the forces encircling Ouarkziz. Fro~ Novem-
- ber to February, the Front refrained from attacking in the south, in Tiris
el-Gharbia which is being surveilled by Ohoud and, in the east, in Saqia el-
Hamra where the FAR, wishing to avoid a repetition of the October raid on
Smara, are on the alert. The Front has concentrated its raids--generally
of small scale--in uncontested territory (Akka, Zag) and in the center-west
(Laayoun, Lemsied, Bou~dour, BoL~crad).
- The task of the POLISARIO a fortiori will be more difficult in the future
with the imminent entry into operation of the second group, Zellaqa, commanded i
by Colonel-Major Abrouk., former head of the southern front. The logistics of
the group have already been set in place. The group will peck away precisely
at this "soft underbelly" which is ~he center-west. Its mission in particular
wi11 consiat in diaengaging Tarfaya, which is connected to the reat of the
country by Laayoun. Colonel-Ma,jor Abrouk will have more sophieticated equip-
ment; however, he will probably suffer from a relative ahortage of high-rank-
ing ~afficers.
A third and last unit is to be put in place in about 3 months., Contrary to
what was thought at on~e time, the unit will not be commanded by Colonel-Ma~or _
Loubaris, the hero of the two Shabas, but probably by Col Ben Othman (victor
- over the Algerians at Amgala), who reportedly will be relieved of noncommand
duties. His radius of action purportedly will extend to Saqia el-Hamra, a
region chosen by the POLISARIO, backed up against Algeria.
War's Effect on Moroccan Economy
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 26-28
[Article by Philippe Simonnot]
[Text) "War sets everything in movement; it purges peccant humors, and it
- charms to a degree the vivacity of a nation that does not naturally like
repose which is often harmful to it." Having reached the end of this in-
vestigation of the cost of the war to Morocco, i.t is natural to think of
this sentence which was written by Boisguilbert in 1707 in his "Traite."
All t~e more so since what is resplendent here, in this city of Marrakeah -
out of the Middle A,ges, is a flamboyant market economy, similar to that which
flourished in France at the beginning of the 18th century. Mercantilist
France, but also warlike France--just like Morocco today.
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Moreover, what Boisguilbert teaches us, better than many contemporary eco-
- nomists, is to Uring the costs and advantages of armed conflict into rapport.
The "peccant humors" of the sharifian kingdom purged by war? How can one "
doubt it whex? one observes the evidence of the national consensus which hae
formed around Hassan II in the Saharan affair. What brings the left nearer
to the chief ~of~state.in ~thfs sector is rather not engaging in total war....
_ . � ,
'fhe commenta we heard in the most varied quarters are hardly peaceful. The;
cause one to think that, seen from Morocco, the Sahara affair is ~nly an epi-~
sode: "In any event, we will be involved with P.lgeria for 20 years." Th~t
is equal to saying that one day or another it will be necessary to do battle
with this neighbor whom the Moroccans freely admit is detested. -
Nationalist Awakening
The war in the Sahara is also credited with awakening this old kingdom which
- was inclined to bask in the glory of its thousands-of-years-old past and to -
consider the Algerian state as decidedly too young, too new, to really be
dangerous. The initial re~~erses of the Royal Armed Force demonstrated that -
the patina of the centuries was not a good enough rampart against enemies com-
ing from the east...as was the case before 1~30, we might add. _
_ Finally, account must bs taken of the fallout of the war with regard to edu- _
cation, training and familiarization with the most modern technology. The
war "sets everything in movement," including men and customs. It is not be-
: ing a warmonger to observe that in this hard school the Moroccan nation has
retempered its soul and that, with the return of peace, the economy could
_ benefit from this resurgence. It can even be noted that all of this "move- ~
ment" ie making those on the scene fearful of a return to peace, which could
be a dangerous moment for the regime.
- It is in the light of these "advantages" of the war that we muct try to
evaluate its costs. This is a difficult evaluation because, as we were told
by a man well-versed in Moroccan official statistics, this cost is "hidden." _
This is, moreover, a way of admitting that the cost is higher than is shown
_ in state accounts.
Added to the management errors in 1974-1977, war expenditures have become
- such that they serious~y endanger the foreign credibility of the Moroccan
economy. From our own calculation3, we have drawn the conclusion that Morocco
~.:ill go bankrupt in the next 2 years without large supplementary foreign aid.
_ In this connection, financial aid from France is at its peak (1-]_.2 billion
francs worth of credit a year at a good in;erest rate). Morocco is the coun-
tr~y to which France gives the most aid. The:-efore, nothing was left to do
but once again knock on the door of Saudi Arabia. That was the reason for
the king's trip to Riyadh at the beginning of February. Hassan did not come
back with empty hands--far fram itl We have even been assured that the
coeffers were filled to such a point that Morocco will not have foreign pay-
_ ment problems in 1980. The figure most often cited for the new Saudi loan is -
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$1 billion; i.e., 4 billion dirhams (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 999). To appre-
ciate the size of this figure, it must be compared with the estimation we
can make of the costs of the war.
_ Expenditures which are properly military in the budget have increased at a
rapid rate: from 1.2 billion dirhams in 1973 to 4.4 billion dirliams in
1978. Everything indicates that they continued to increase in 1979. How-
ever, these figures do not tell the whole story. They should be complemented
first by the "transfers" made by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of defense.
In their confidential report, World Bank experts eszimate these transfers at
1.5 billion dirhams for 1977 alone. This means that ae recently as 3 years
ago the budgetary share of defense had reached 10 perc~nt of the Moroccan
- gross national product. Officially, the figure given for that year was less
than 7 percent (6.1 percent according to the ~IPRI [expansion unknown]).
Saudi Bail C~ut
What is more, the latest purchases have added considerably to the cost of
- the war. Considering only the 50 Mirages, most of whose cost is to be paid
in 1980--a payout of 3 billion dirhams, according to top Moroccan officials--
_ and the purchase of American materiel (20 F 5 E fighter planes, 24 helicop-
ters armed with antitank missiles and 6 OV-10 Bronco reconnaissance planes)
- for $250 million--that is, another billion dirhams--we come up with a supple-
mentary cos.t of 4 billion dirhams. If we add these sums to current expendi-
- tures, we come cloae to 10 billion dirhams; i.e., 20 percent of the gross
national product.
Of course, such purchases will not be repeated every year. Of course, pay- _
ment extensiona have been obtained from France. However, we must also take
into occount other military supplies and al~o coate of maintenance, replace-
ment parts for these expensive marvels of military air technology: according
to the experts, these costs total 1/2 of their purchase prices. Conserva-
tively, that adds 1 billion dirhams to regular costs in the coming years.
Ix~ other words, after the 1980 peak, it is not unreasonable to think that, -
other things being equal, of course, the cast of the war will range from 10
to 15 percent of the GNP. -
- Until the king's trip, 1980 looked like a very bad year; and the Saudi bail
out came at the right time. In the past, foreign aid had already been far
from negligible. World Bank experts have estimated that thzse "gratuitous
transfers" had totaled $106 million in 1979, $588 million in 1976 and $512
million in 1977. These figures lend credibility to the estimate put forward
for 1980 ($1 billion). -
Once again; this does not only entail the direct cost of the war. We must
also take into account the indirect, negative effects of the war, prir.cipally
the renunciation by the state of a certain number of civilian equipment pro- ~
grams, a renunciation that in itself has a ripple effect on the entire eco- _
nomic life of the country, which has been in the doldrums since 1978.
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- Morocco, still according to the World Bank, has over 7 million persona
- living on the absolute threshhold of poverty.
The slawdown in economic growth engendered at one and the same time by the
war and the stagnation of world trade can only aggravate a potentially
explosive social situation.
Complex Scorecard
We know that in many Third World countries the economy is ex*_roverted. The
same thing ie true of the war. The Saharan coi~flict is very ~rofitable for
foreign "Rrms merchants" and has had no industrial fallout in Morocco.
This causes an increased deficit in the balance of payments that is financed
by growing indebtedness which, at the beginning of 1980, was 25 billion dir- -
hams (half the GNP). The annu~l service on the foreign debt has doubled in
2 years and now totals 3 billion dirhams; i.e., over 1/3 of the worth of ex-
ports. Such a percentage cannot be increased without danger.
Here, then, is an economy seriously hurt by the war, at a time when the
world crisis had already placed it in a bad situation, an economy forced to
malce wagers, which are perhaps too risky, on aid and good fortune, particular-
ly as regards the price of phosphates. Of course, we could consider that, in
,
any event, Morocco must equip itself to balance Al.~erian military power and
that the urgency created by the POLISARIO permitted the financing of a large
part of this necessary arms effort by its allies.
In short, the overall scorecard of the war in the Sahara is complex and
perhaps can be evaluated differently, depending upon the point from which
one viewa the situation. However, for his part, the economis[ cannot but
be concerned by the deterioration of an economy whose potential is nonethe-
- lesa considerable.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af~ique GRUPJIA 1980
8143
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
= ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AIDE ON PROBLEMS FACING WORLD'S MUSLIMS
I.D210653 Paris JEUNE AFI~IQUE in French 16 Apr 80 pp 26-27 -
- [Intervi~ew with Islamic Conference Secretary General Aabib Chatti by
Abdelaziz Dahmani: "For a Neutral Afghaniatan"; date aad place not
s~eCified] ,
[Text] Some 40 foreign miniaters from Islamic ~ountriea are to meet in
_ Islamabad (Pakietan) in a few weeks' time. On~the agenda: Afghaniatan, -
Jerusalem, the Muelim world's econanic situation, boycott of Olympic gamea
and the Philippine Muslima. ~ ,
Making It Eaey for the 5oviete
T~e upcoming llth meeting of Islamic Conference foreign ministers will have
been.preceded by an iaformation campaign in Europe waged by King Hassan II~
of Morocco; ae Jeruealem ca~itteE chairman, and former (1974-1977) Tunisian _
Foreign Miniater Habib Chatti who has been Islamic Conference eecretary
general aince October 1979. Among other people, Mr Chatti met French head
of state Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and Pope J'ahn Paul II in the Vatican ~ ~
2 April. We diecuesed theee problems with him.
_ JEUNE AFRIQUE: In your view, can Europe play a role in the Middle East?
Habib Chatti: Yes, and a very important one. Since Egypt signed its sepa-
rate peace�agreemeat, any attempt to recover Arab lande by military meane
would be doomed, while Israel is doing everything in ita power to prevent
the creation of a Palestinian state. We nmw appeal to Europe to support
more emphatically the Paleetinian people's right to a state and, at the
eame time to safeguaxd the interests~of the Muelim Arab countries. This
ie the best way not to make things easy for the Soviets, aince the Americane
do not seem willing to opt for ~uet solutione.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: In al-Nasir's tfine, the Arab League was accused of being -
in Egypt's pay. Can the same not be said about the Islamic Conference with -
reference to Saudi Arabia?
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" Habib Chatti: It is true that, while hiding behind the slogan "poaitive -
neutraliem," al-Naeir's Egypt often tried to use the Arab League in sup-
_ port of an expansioniat policy, but Saudi Arabia now enjoya no dominant -
pos,ition. No preeeure at all on ite part can be felt even though the
headquartere pf the.conference is in Jidda and even though Saudi Arabia .
ia our principal financiai backer.
_ ,
Thie Is a Very Serious Probl'em .
J'EUNE AFRIQUE: And cahat about your relations with the Arab League?
Habib Chatti: They show a certain lack of coordination even though our
- objectives are complementary. aur field ~f action is broader. We may even
be more effective at present because members of the conference are not
quite so bogged down in Arab internal quarrels.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: You have been taken to task fo~ being mainly interested in
politica.
Habib Chatti: This is unjuat. In the econamic aphere, for instance, the
conference has already created an Islamic Development Bank and a statistical
and economic atudies center in Ankara (Turkey), while an Islamic countries'
tra.de center will be establiahed in Tangier (Morocco). We have also con-
- cluded a draft agreement for cooperation among Muslim atates. And all thie
ie merely a beginning.
In the cultural ephere, we plan to create a univeraity in Niger and (later)
another one in Uganda. We also cooperate extensively in the educational
aphere with many Muelim countries and help to organize aeminara and con-
ferencee. We directly support a number of cultural mo~?2ments. We feel,
however, that, for lack of adequate funda, we do not do.enough.
JEUNE AF~IQ'JE; The future of Muslims in the Philippinea is on the ager.da
of the Islamabad meeting.... ~
_ Habib Chatti: This is a~very serious problem. Intervention by the Islamic -
� Conference made posaible the conclua~ion of an agreement with Preaident
Marcos' regime. According to this agreement, the 13 provinces in which
Muslims are in the majority were gradually to achieve a certain degree of
autonomy and, eventually, be merged into one province. However, the Manila
government saw fit to disregarci this and organize a referendum. Reeult:
3 of the 13 provinces have been deprived of the right to autonomy. Further-
- m~re, rhe Philippine authorities decided to organize the 10 remaining pro- -
vinces into 2 provinces (inatead of 1 provinc2) in order to be able to
take advantage of any dissenaion. R~sult: The Moro National Liberation
- Front has resumed its underground activiCies and atronger than ever repres-
_ sive measures have been taken againet Musline,
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Have aome other Muslim minorities not found themaelves in
a aimilar situation? . _
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Habib Chatti: No, not in ae bad a situation ae this one. However,
certain Muslim minoritiea--in the Soviet Union and China, for inetance--
_ have been confrnnted with many probleme. In Africa, strong represaive
- meaeures have been taken aga~net the Ugandan Muslim minority following
Idi Amin's downfall. In that iastance too the world hae looked the other -
way....
Fait Accompli
JEUNE AFRIQUE: And what about Afghaniatan?
Habib Chatti: We do not accept the fait accompli of S~viet occupation.
We muet etrive to insure that Afghanistan embarka on the path of strict
neutrality which would reasaure the USSR, the West and the Muslim world.
A ne~:trality which would be guaranteed simultaneously by Brezhnev, Carter
and adjacent Muslim countrfes, eapecially Iran and Pakistan.
- JEUNE AFRIQUE: Should the Moscow Olympic games be boycottpd?
- Habib Chatti: There are so many opiniona,~ro many "pros" and "cons"....
Our advice~. is: Do not blindly follow the big powers. Each of ~ur coun-
_ tries ahould follow its own ~udgment or, if neceseary, follow tine advice
, of,its Olympic committee, provided that committee is really independent....
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
CSO: 4800
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AFGHANISTAN
J
_ , EYEWITNESS REPORT FROM KABt~I.
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Feb 80 pp 36-37
[Article by Josette Alia]
[Text] The city is sad ,~.nd the snow is red in Kabul. In the "Street of
Chickens," poor shops are half open, half closed. A complete, shabby oriental
bazaar can be diacerned behind the dirty windows: Chinese hardware, electric
lamps, plastic flowers. There are few customers. It is Friday and the
weather is cold, everyone is staying home. If or.ly there were tourists!
But they don't come anymore, they are afraid. So carpet ~prices are tumbling:
this ald Baluchi rug, with faded rose huea and purchased for 20,000 afghanis,
can be had for 7,000. No? A Belgian merchant couple carries away the finest
- pieces. "I know them, they are importers from Brussels," the ealesman sigha.
"Qh, if I had a passport, if I~~ould leave, I would be the ~ne making the
- money, not th~m. But now we have the Russians, those curs
- The silence is deafening when a scalding cup of tea is served by a amall
boy wearing an oversized coat. In the back of the store, at the foot of
_ two large rolls of carpets, two other boys are sleeping under dirty limp
quilts. Why do people sleep so often in the orient? In India because it
_ is too hot, here because it is too cold, and everywhere becauae they are
hungry. Suddenly one of the boys wakes up, raises a shaggy head and stares
wide-eyed: What's this, a tourist, and a woman? He sits up suddenly, wide
- awake, straightening his old coat. Suspicious, he a~ks: "Russki2" ~No,
French. Oh goodl... They talk. They say good-bye warmly, r.aising the blanket
that serves as a door.
A Bl~ck Limousine
~
_ Uutside, it is cold again, the mud frozen. Shop windows, pauses, antiques: -
all those old things thrown into a corner, thoae old copper d~shes, those -
_ dented samovars, whe.re do they come from? From what villages perched high
in the mountains? From what blaek felt tent lost in the yellow steppe?
Old, torn embroidered ~iresses flutter ~nd flap in the iey wind. Some are
marvelous, triuuaed with veivet, old lace, fine silk. Who wore them, far
what marriage, for what celebratiox~s? The wind rages and the hem of a sleeve
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= unravels, losing its pearls. The shopkeeper doesn't care. Crouched near '
- r~ portable stove, he bends his long-bearded head crowned with a huge turban.
He looks at the street gloomily. Three Russian soldiers are wading in the
mud at the intersection.
They are diacreet, it's true. They are seen little, but felt everywhere.
- The military~apparatus ~has been reinforced since yesterday. There are more
tanks behind the post office, ttie Ministry of the Interior and around the i
"House of the People." Why? It seems that they too are afraid. An attack -
on the telegraph exchange started a huge fire that lasted 2 days. Nc.~t long
ago, a large black Soviet limousine full of officers was passing through
= a street in the center of Kabul. A young man on the sidewalk took out a
- pistol and ~ired. Inside the car, someone appeared hit. The young man
fled; but two soldiers had already opened the doors and ~umped out, firing =
in turn. Among the passersby, there were one dead and two woutided, including -
a woman. True? False? In Kabul, everyone believes it: the story came -
_ from someone who met someone who saw it.
How is it possible to find out? Kabul has become the capital of rumors.
It was said last ureek that Babrak Kaxmal had disappeared and that the Soviets
- were vainly searching ~or a possible successor among Afghan politicians
decimated by purges. But from purge to purge, the circle of loyal followers-- _
i.e., members of Parsham or Khalq, the two Afghsn communist parties--has
conspicuously shrunk: at the Ministry of Information, one high offici.al
is a communist student who was still in Grenoble 3 weeks ago. The official
version of events is reported every day on the radio or in th~ KABUL NEW TIMES.
The "beloved Amin" has become the "butcher Amin" and the "executioner Taraki"
has ~ust been crowned a"martyr of the revolution" by the same commentators -
in less than 2 weeks. But another version is being concocted clandestinely
and in whispers: Amin, it is true, knew at the end that he had been sen-
tenced to death by Moscow. He reportedly contacted the Amerieans, asking -
them to intervene before it was too late. But the American Government,
traumatized by the assassination of its ambassadar in Kabul on 14 February
1979, turned a deaf ear. So with a heavy heart, Amin continued to receive
his Moscow viaitors, kissing them at the airport and wondering each time
� which one would carry out his death sentence -
- The Man frcm the KGB ~
Naturally, none of this can be ~verified. This is not at a11 surpr~.sing
in a country where information no longer circulates, where a eloak of silence
thickens from day to day. Journalists can no longer enter: an official
directive issued to all embassies. Those who have beEn there since the -
beginning have received a list of their "obligations": they cannot leave
_ the city, cannot make contacts or hold interviews, cannot film or photograph -
without prior authorization from.the Ministry of Information, to which.the
texts, films and photos must then be submitted. "In short, everything not
forbidden is authorized," one of my colleagues sneered, exasperated~ Down-
- stairs at the hotel, a poster in~orms the "dear ~ournalists" that "legal
revolutionary regulations are finally in effect." "Oh., I remember, I remember
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the way it was in Prague!... Well, I'll go pack my bag," a British reporter
soberly remarked. Are they afraid already? No, not yet. But already cau-
tious: "Don't talk about that on the telephone, dear friend. Come see
me instead." I too remember: winter 1969 in Prague, at the hotel switch-
board, the telephone operator who rolled her terrified eyes, indicating
tc+ me that the man sitting behind her, the man in the black raincoat, was
a KGB agent.
Are the men in black already there? For the time being, only Russian soldiers
and Rueaian, Bulgarian and East Genaan military draftees aerving in a civilian
capacity are visible. The Soviets come directly from Moscow by Aeroflot.
The others arrive from everywhere: on my flight there were East Germans,
probably engineers, with suitcases stuffed witti sweaters, socks, documents--
everything needed to spPnd the long Afghan win.ter. For they will stay,
they will definitely stay. The civiliai~s are at the "Kabul" hotel, where
they speak Russian, eat Russian and aing in.a choir in the evening. During
the day, they are gradually taking over the Afghan Government.
It must be said that the average Afghan civil servant, weary of political
purges and rightly apprehensive about the sudden reversals of history, has
adopted a low profile. Which justifies what President Babrak Karmal calls -
- "the fraternal, important and dis:Lnterested aid" of Soviet friends. The
soldiers are m~ich mor~e conspicuous: around the city, b.yond the airport,
they are building permanent installations for their new encampments. The
muffled rumbling of "Antonovs," which continue to bring in men and material,
can be heard every night. How many are there? At least eight divisions,
mostly installed along the Iranian border toward Herat and along the Pakistani
border in Nuristan and Paktia, where guerrilla wgrfare is still going on, _
according to a Western military expert. Another expert claims that "they"
are installing missile-launching ramps in Seistan in the south. How is
it poseible to find out?
One thing is certain: the Soviet army is there for a long time. It is
taking up its winter quarters in Kabul discreetly and slowly--like the "T35" -
tank passing unhurriedly, transporting long tree trunks tied.behind its
~ turret. You almost feel like telling the Afghans that it's ov~r, tha.t they
must become resiRned, that Afo be an Outer Mongolia at best
- and a new Uzbekistan at worst.
You feel like telling them, but don't dare. For here you do not feel resig- _
nation, but hatred, the massive depth of a collective refusal. It is evident
- everywhere. In the wounded look of a young Pashtoon, with a nose like an
_ eagle's beak, ragged and somber, draped in an old blanket and rolled in .
an endlesa turban. In the robust spittle of an old Mongol in a caftan and
felt cap. In the hissing insults that my taxi driver makes under his breath--
driving his old jalopy without chains over the snow as if it were a galloping
horse. The street climbs, skirting.a mountainside that drops almost strai~ht
down to the middle of the city. Women go by, ghostlike, fighting the wir.u
in their long veil tucked in from head to toe,.barely open at the eyes.
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Here is the Sikh quarter of the city, sad, so sad; the men are numb, gray
with cold, and their pink, purple and green turbans, so beautiful under
the light of India, here resemble tropical island birds dying in the snow.
The Terrible Mountain
- We have to leave this strange and fascinating city, this city-prison where
- people are already smothering. At the airport, the snowplough clears the
runways. An Aeroflot plane flies off, rising vertically before the high
circle of mountains, turning at the last moment and finally pulling out
toward the sky. As we pass by, there is the Soviet base with its large
kaki helicopters, some large "Antonov" transport planes, trucks and tanks.
A black Soviet limousine follows along the runway for a moment. ~cao soldiers
in schapska make their way through the snow, hampered by their long gray :
overcoats. Then the soldiers become very small and the tanks look like -
_ toys. Straight ahead, standing like a white wall, is Hindu Kush, the terrible
_ mountain, ~agged, gleaming, frozen, Hindu Kush, whose name means "killer
of Hindus," because it was from its heights that Afghan warriors formerly
deacended, quickly and deadly, to devastate and pillage India, mired in
its luxury and muggy climate. Afterwards, they would return to their mountain
_ grottos and lay in wait in the high narrow passes, always free, never con-
_ quered, never vanquished.
Today, it is no longer enough to have courage and guns. Today, the snow
ia ead and the city is red. Love from Kabul.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11915
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ALGERIA -
1980 BUDGET TO LAUNCH NEXT 5-YEAR PLAN
Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Feb 80 pp 432-33
[TextJ Th~e Algerian budget for 1980 expresses perfectly Algeria's new
concerns on the economic plane, which were defined 2 months ago at the -
country's ~?ighest political levels, on the eve of adoption of the next -
5-year plan by the special congreas of the FLN.
~ The year 1980 being, for the third con$ecutive year, a transition period
- between the last 4-year plan (1974-1977~ and the next 5-year plan, the
budget for this year remains nevertheleas conap~cuous for the impetus
given to equipment expenditurea favoring the aectors which will receive
priority in the next plan, i.e., education, houaing, hydraulics and
agriculture. It express~s also the Algerian suthoritiea' concern for
preparing in the field for launching of the 5-year plan, while completing
the major pro~ects begun during the last few years, and, by mas8ive
investment in~ections and reforms of the structure of the productive
- apparatus, to endow the priority sectors with the means to tackle more
_ eaeily the giant inveatments from which they ~re called upon to profit.
The country's general budget for 1980 is increased to 50,900 million dinars
(1 dinar ~ about 1.10 F), ae compared witih 36,77~J million dinars ia 1979,
or an increase of 38.4 percent. Operating expenses, which ahow an increase -
of 33 percent this year, mainly because of increases in civil servants'
salaries, amount to 27.8 billion, of which a quarter (6.82 billion dinara)
is earmarlced, as it has been since the country's independence, for the
educational sector (education and training). Expenditures for personnel,
which represent more than 42 percent of the total operating allocations,
- show an increase of 28 percent. The governmental policy toward operating
expenses will, however, remain marked by the same resolve to favor educa- -
tion, training amd health while holding down as much ~s possible expendi- _
- tures relating to the administrative apparatus, which has grown considerably
in the last few years since the rise of crude oil prices. A series of -
social measures in favor of Moud~ahidines (veterans of the Algerian war) -
and of Moud~ahidine widows also explains the increase in opersting expenses. -
It was in fact decided to increase by 50 percent to 1~0 percent the pensiona _
of these Moudjahidines and their beneficiaries, as well as the pensions
of civilian victims of the o~ar and its eff'ects; this led to a 60.9-percent
= increase over 1979 in the budget allocated to the ministry for Moud~ahidines.
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Moreover, the national defense operating budget has been increased by
46.7 percent, from 1.84 billion dinars to 2.7 billion ciinars. However,
- the defense operating expenditures for 1980 constitute only 9.7 percent of
the total operating allocations, as compared with 10.4 percent in 1979.
Another sector which has benefited from ma~or allocationa: the government's
share in au~~orting the prices of ataple producta has more than doubled -
(1.9 bfllion din'ars, as compared with 900 million in 1979). This expresaes
the authoritiea' concern for safeguarding the purchaeing power of the -
poorest se~cent of the population whic:i, paralleling the increases in
_ civil aervants' salar.ies, profita this year from a seriea of fiscal relief
measures in addition to the increase of the SMIG [expaneion not known] -
_ from 800 to 1,000 dinars, fres of all tax.
With the exception of certain specific expenditures (national defense, for
example), more than 80 percent of the operating allocations are assigned -
- to social and educational sectors (training, education, health, price
support, pensions, etc.).
One Half of the Equipment Expenditures Dedicated to Priority Sec~tors
Concerning the equipment budget, up 42 percent over 1979 (as compared with
a 14.5-percent increase for 1979 over the previous year), it is going up
to 23,122 million dinars (as compared with 14,200 million in 1978 and -
16,260 milLion in 1979). The overall investment program for 1980 (budgetary
- and short-term asaistance) is going up to 75,829 million dinars, i.e., -
an incrsase of 16.4 percent with respect to the 1979 fiscal law and 27
percent with respect to the estimated expenditures for the same year.
Equipment expenditures relating to planned investments financed by short-
- term asaistance are set at 52,050 million dinars.
Their breakdown is established as follows (in millions of dinars):
Budgetary
Expenditures Assistance -
Industry 35,000 630
Tourism 260 150
~ Agriculture 2,000 1,217 ~1~
Transportation 2,000 500
Storage and distribution 2,680 50
Fishing 70 80
Communications 30
Telecoaanunications 900
Industrial zones 320
Contracting firms 2,700 70
Housing 6,000 2,350
PMU-PCD ~2~ 60 3,200
Administrative equipment 60
(1) Plus hydraulics: 2,000 , _
(2) Urban modernization plans and communal development plans
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_ One half of the equipment expenditures is dedicated to sectors which w{11
receive priority during the next 5-year period in the country's economic
and social life: education and training (5.12 billion dinars), hydraullce
(2 billion), houaing (2.35 bi111on dinars) and economic and social infra-
- atructures. The funds assigned to agriculture (1,217 million) seem lese
than foreaeen, but with the exceptionally high amount authorized for
hydraulics (whose allocation has more than doubled in 1980 over 1979),
agriculture's meane are reinforced. Further, agriculture being the principal
subject which will be examined next March by the central committee--which
during its December sesaion studied the three other priority aectors,
i.e., education and training, hydraulics and housing--it is certain that
it is intended to benefit from definitely higher allocations. Moreover,
this year's fiscal law provides that the increase in the equipment budget
is sub~ect to revision--and the revision would then provide increases for
agriculture--in conformance with the sims of the S-year plan expected to -
be adopted without doubt next June.
In addition to the equipment expenditures, there is good reason to note
_ in the plaaned investments of the enterprises that it is the same sectors, _
in addition to industry which takes the lion's share (more than half of the
52 billion of these investments), which benefit from the highest alloca-
tions; houaing (6,00 million dinars [as printed]), which, with the 2,700
- million dinars assigned to contracting firms (who have construction pro~ects
as their principal activitq); agriculture (2,000 million); transportation
(2,000 million), a sector which, together with teleco~?unications (900
million), is thus intended to benefit more and more from large allocations;
storage and dietribution means, another area on which the daily life of
- the population depends and which encounters enormous difficulties. According
to the report of the National Assembly's co~ission for finance and the
plan, the balance to be realized from preceding investment programs at
_ the end of 1979 is evaluated at about 65.1 billion dinars, including
3.7 billion dinars for special programs of the south ~assed in June 1978.
The main sectors concerned are education and trsining, with a remainder
to be realized of about 32 billion dinars, i.e., 34 percent of the alloca-
tions concerned, the infrastructures of communication (including railroads)
and adminiatration (10 billion dinars, i.e., 12 percent), communal plans
(6 billion, or 7 percent), rural housing (7 billion), hydraulics (6.4 =
billion), special programs (10 billion dinaxs). As for the temporary
assistance, the remainder to be realized at the end of 1979 is estimated
at 125 billion dinars and the sectors concerned are industry (78 billion
- d~nars, or 62 percent of the remainders to be realized), rural housing
(2.~ billion, or 20 percent).
Completior. of programs in progress thus constitutes the Algerian author~- _
ties' basic concern for this year and without doubt this will be the highest
priority which will be set down in the next plan, together with the
exceptional efforts which the government intends to undertake in the social
sector.
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'I~ao Thirds of Receipts Come from Crude Oil Revenues
The government's definitive receipts, set at 51.183 billion dinars, which
- i~ a little more than the operating and equipment expenditures, come
essentially from crude oil revenuea; these are valued at 31,750 million
dinare, and take care of 65 percent of budgetary expenditures. Crude oil
- taxes on pipeline transport and on gaeeous hydrocarbons have been aligned
on crude: 85 percent of the profit realized by the.operating companies,
as against 70 percerit. -
- The quantity,of.~hese oil revenues does not take into accout the read~ust-
ment decided by Algeria on 4 February, which raises the price of Algerian
_ crude from 30 to 34.21 dollars a barrel. The caleulations of the new
amount of the oi1 revenues for 1980 have been m~de, in fact, on the basis
of a production of 50 million metric tons of crude and a price of 30 dollars
a barrel, and of 23.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas, taking into
account 1979 prices.
Ordinary revenues contribute some 35 percent of the budget (17.79 billion -
dinars, i.e., 13.7 percent with respect to 1979). While numerous measures _
of tax abatement or relief have been taken for the lowest salaries and
for certain sectora (salaries below 1,000 dinars are free of taxes, as
are turnovers of amall businessss between 36,000 and 60,000 dinars a year
- and construction materials for industrial housing up to the amount of
150,000 dinars), certain indirect taxes have in turn been increased:
modest increase in motor fuel prices (3 centimes per liter for regular
gasoline and 10 for high-octane), a.~ma~or increase in the customs duties
on imported vehicles (149.57 percent for vehicles of 7 horsepower or ].ess,
229 percent up to 10 horsepower and SOQ percent for those over 10 horse-
- power). Qn the other hand, prices of foad staples, supported through a
special fund whose amount has increased from 900 million to 1,900 million
dinars, will not go up in price in 1980, in conformance with the govern-
mental policy of preserving the population's purcLhasing power. Other
abatements are also anticipated, notably for books and works published
in foreign Ianguages (schoolbooks and university publications have already -
been exempt for several years), educational materials and cultural films
imported or produced by Algerian r.adio-television or the film distrtbution
center.
The budgetary debate in the National Assembly, very animated--several
ministers who came to present their ministries' budgets to the deputies ~
were cross-examined--was ma~ked hy critical interjections by the deputies,
who considered that the oil revenues were asswning too important a place
_ in the country's receipts with respect to the basic revenues.
They insisted that the country's operating expenses be held down better. ~
The National Assembly's commission for finance and the plan, which ,aas
- also active during these debates, stressed tn its report that the state
and socialist sector (national companies, notably) was far from producin~
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the anticipated tax revenues, while for a long time it has monopolized
almost all of the public investments. According to this commission, this
sector should, as the driver of the country's economic and social develop-
ment, produce more of a aurplus to asaure the accumulation of capital
necessary to support development. _
The critics in the National Assembly of such a state of affairs were
even more vehement when it was establiahed that the oil profits, which
all the deputies demanded be assigned wholly to the productive apparatus,
are to contribute--exceptionally it is true--toward settling the debte _
of certain state enterprises. 3ix of these companies are unable to pay
back their loans; these are the National Iron and Steel Company (1.4 billion
dinars), the SN Metal (250 million dinars), the Sagedia (food products:
350 million), the Scaic (chemical iadustries: 600 million), the Sonelgaz -
(electricity and gas: 400 million) and the SNMC (construction materials:
440 millio~s dinars). Thi~ situation explains the government's decision
to creat~ an ad hoc commiasion charged with studying the restructuring
of the state enterprises, where excessive size renders management more
and more complex and difficult.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Parie 19~0 -
5586 ~
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= r
- ALGERIA
NEW PETROLEUM POLICY REPORTED
Paris MARCHES ^'ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 pp 557-559
[Article: "Algeria's New Petroleum Policy"]
[Text] Algerian leaders face a th~rny.problem in attempting to reconcile two
apparently contradictory political and ecanomic imperatives--how to ensure
Algeria's long-terrn energy independen~e by a policy of preserving its limited
oil resources, while pursuing industrialization which is still heavily
dependent upon the revenue from oi1 exports.
Debate was begun last December by president Chadli Bend~edid who opened a
session of the FLN Central Committee by calling this high political authority
of the regime to seriously reflect on the question. After a particularly
oetentatious decad~, marked by huge investments in the industrial sector,
thanks to the petroleum "moneylender," Algeria seems to be recovering its
sel�-control. The energy crisis, coupled with a worldwide economic crisis,
seems to have played a fund~mental role in Algeria's sudden awareness of
the difficulties which aw~it it 20 years from now when its oil wells will
run dry.
_ Limited Petroleum Reserves .
Algerian leaders have long been aware of their country's limited petroleum
- reserves. At their present export rate, varying yearly from SO to 55 mil- -
lion metric ~ons (52 million in 1979), Algerian oil reser~~es, estimated at -
1.1 billion metric tons, will be exhausted in some 20 years, precisely at -
the moment when ~he industri3l apparatus which it is settin$ up progreasively
wil.l ~Cach the height of its consumption of energy products.
These forecasts do not take into account the constant increase in ciomestic
- consumption in the next 20 years. Presently estimated at 5 million metric
tons, this should grow at an annual rate of 15 percent, reaching 14 million
metric tons in 5 years and over 20 million at the end of the decade. Thia
reduces the longevity af tlle country's petroleum reserves to less than 15
- years, assuning that the country's consumption of energy products plus
crude oil exports of 50 million metric tons per year doubled every 5 years
until the year 2000.
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The queation is not new, already dating from the 1970's, but Algerian con-
cerns at that time were of an entirley different order, making the question
_ more or lesa acad~mic.
_ However, with ite economic recovery well underway and having reflected uppn
the leasons of a decade of accelerated development for over a year, it se~ms
that Algeria, fearing a worsening of the worldwide energy crfais, has become
more acutely aware of the progressively fragile future of its energy inde- _
pendence as its internal needs grow, carried along by the dynamics of develop- -
ment.
Now the fundav~ental principle upon which the country's development effort
is based responds to a sacred goal for the Algerian leaders--assuring their
country's independence.
Assuming stabilizatior~ of petroleum exports at their present level and
accelerated growth of domestic consumption of energy products and taking
into account the country's 1~mited petroleum reserves, Algeria would become
an importer of crude oil in less than 20 years. Such a situation would
weigh tragically upon its economic independence and would wipe out decades
of work to ensure this very independence.
Reexamining the Valhyd Plan
This not-too-promieing vision of Algeria's future explains the December call
by the FLN Central Committee in view of preserving "the strategic national
oil reserves guaranteeing the country's long-term supply." The highest
political body in the country thus echoed the proposal of President Chadli
Bendjedid, in opening the work of the CenCral Committee, "to safeguard
Algeria's petroleum resources, inetead of converting them into multi-colored
bills."
~or observers, these two high-level stands constitute a reexamination of -
the Valhyd Plan (Oil Valorization Plan], formulated just 2 years ago by an
American research group at the request of Sonatrach [Algerian National Oil
Company]. This plan predicted, by the year 2005, the construction of seven
natural gas liquefaction plants and seven giant refineries in addition to
the drilling of 2000 new oil wells in the Sahara, for a total of $36 billion.
Part of this ambitious program, necessitating international.loans on the _
order of $Z7.5 billion, is already unden;ay, since the first giant lique-
, faction plant was set up at Skikda 4 years ago, while another plant (GNL 1)
[LNG 1] was built 2 years ago at Arzew, where a third plant (GNL 2) [LNG2]
is being completed.
~ Development of this plan, which was presented to the ma~or international
banks over a year ago, gave riae to a heated dispute between its promoters,
= the "oilmen" led by Belaid Abdesselam, then "boss" of the whole economic
= sector and currenCly president of the FLN economic committee, and other
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state economic agents who feared the financial implications of such a pro-
ject and the allotment of such enormous credits to s sector dominated mainly
by "multinationals," as much on the financial ~evel as on tha technological
level.
Neceseary Revenue
Despite the opinion of the highest Algerian political bodies that "the
utilization of oil exclusively as a means of foreign financing" for the
development of the country has become an "unsettling" factor in the national
economy and that these resources should be p:Pserved to ensure the country`s
long-term energy independence, it remains that the industrialization effort
~ begun over 10 years ago could not have been pursued without the essential,
and vital, contributior~ of petroleum revenue. Thus, the other half of the
problem facing Algerian leaders appears insoluble insofar as it conditions
the country's economic future, which is more dependent tha*~ ever, and will ~
be for a long time, upon the income fr~m its petroleum ex~orts (nearly
$10 billion in 1979, compared to barely $6 milli~n in 1978).
Almost all the purchases of hard goods necessary for industrialization and
even, in recent years, of certain current consumer's goods have been financed
by this income which increases aiong with the price of Algerian oil. T'he _
- leaders may assume that Algeria ia in a position to satisfy its own supply
needs, and may take action to this effect, but it still would take only a
moderate braking of petroleum exports to slow the rate of development of
the country without pre~udicing the repayment of international loans signed
during the preceding decade. Heavily indebted for the set-up of its induatrial
equipment, especially the petrochemical complexes, Algeria yearly devotes -
from 20 to 25 percent of its exports td the repayment of its loans.
_ Reduction of C'rude Oil Exports
While waiting to find a solution to the double imperative which conditions
the long-term future profile of its petroleum production and which has been _
the topic af discussion at the higheat political level for several monChs,
Algeria seems to be opting for a temporary step--that of reducing its crude _
oll exports as its refining capability increases.
The largest refinery in the country, ~ust completed at Skikda, should produce
7.5 million metric tons for export in 1980, which will entail an identical
reduction in the volume of crude oil. This refinery is larger than the -
four older onea in the north and south of the country, and will reach its �
capacity, 15 million metric tons per year, next year. Another refinery of =
this size was to have been built in the Bed3aia area, nearly 200 km east
of Algiers. But, since the land whEre it was to have been located has finally
been ~udged impractical and since the country's petroleum policy is being
revised, it is likely that construcCion of this refinery will be delayed
indefinitely. _
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Costly Investments for Gas
' Because of limited reserves, crude oil exports may be most affected by the
preaervation policy Algeria intends to apply during this decade. But the
future of natural gas, ioith reserves estimated at over 3000 billion cubic
meters, clearly appears more secure. Unlike oil consumption, which, even -
internally, may become progressively more restricted, domestic and indus-
_ trial gas consumption, estim~ted at 3 billion cubic meters and increasing
_ at a rate of 16 percent (greater than oil), is definitely encouraged to
; spare the crude oil reserves as much as possible.
However, exploitation of gas reserves for export, chiefly in liquif ied form,
- appe~rs to be running into complex problems, both economic and financial.
_ The expected exports of liquified natura.l. gas [LNG], object of the ambitious
Valhyd Plan 2 years ago, risk being profoundly affected by the FLN Central -
Committee steps to preserve the country's energy resources.
_ LNG exports increased to 14 billion cubic meters in 19'19, corresponding to
barely 10 percent of oil income, compared to 75 perc.ent for crude oil and -
15 perc:ent for condensate.
Although Algerian reserves of natural gas are enormoas, their export neces- _
sitates considerable investments an3 very costly advance:d technology
_ facilities, compared to the prices, considered too loor'oy Algiers, at which
the Saharan gas is sold, mainly to Americans.
Determinant Price =
It is precisely the gas export pricea, tlle raiaing of which has been the
subJect ~f negotiations for several weelca between Sonatrach and its .A~erica~.
and European clients, which will no doubt rule Algerian choices concerning
massive exports of ltquifiQd or gaseous natural gas.
Accordiag to Sonatrach, Saharan gas prices for the Aiuericans and Europeans
- (essentially France, Germany and the Netherlands, which have ordered nearly
15 billion cubic meters from Algeria for a period of 20 years, beginning
in 1983) are markedly low compared to the3r equivalent in oil (in terms of
thermal units). Presently, France imports 4 billion cubic meters per years,
_ at a price of $3 per million BTU (1 British Thermal Unit equals 252 calories),
while Canads sells its gas to the United States at $4.5 per million BTU.
According to information from another source, Sonatrach wishes to revise
the price, increasing it to $6 per million BTU.
_ For Algiers, then, it is a question of insuring, through renegotiating
_ gas export prices and taking the energy market into account, a certain
parfty between petroleum and natur.al gas by a better formula of peggtng
the price of gas to a wider range of energy substitutes. -
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Sophisticated Technology
For the Algerian leaders, the present natural gas prices do not allow for
- a profit on the heavy investmenta necessary to set up advanced technology
.liquefaction plants envisioned by the Valhyd Plan.
~ lrr
Already, th~ constructio'~'�of two liquefaction plants, one at Skikda, the
other at Arzew (GPJL ~),'is'far from having achieved its ob~ectives. Three
years sfter construction, the first plant';.~ bu~.lt.~~by the French company
_ Technip, has had miahaps which an i.mpressive nuinber of~ technicians of all
naCionalities are finding difficult to resolve. Constructian o~� the lique-
- faction plant at Arzew by the American firm Bechtel, then by Chemical, has
also had its ups and downs, insofar as it cost Algeria four times what was ,
estimated. This caused a political stir in the National Assembly, which
called in the minister of energy and petrochemical industries and established
a parliamentary commission of inquiry.
Uncertainty over GNL 3[LNG 3] -
_ Despite these bitter experiences, construction is continuing on GNL 2, which,
with a production capacity equal to GNL 1(10.5 billion cubic meters), will ~
~ permit an increase in August 1981 from 16 billion to 30 billion cubic meters
(gaseous in Algerian production of liquified natural gas.
_ However, the future of GNL 3, which is to deliver liquifi.ed natur~l gas to
France, Germany and Holland, is now uncertain. The Algerians no lor~gar wi~h
to take an the enormous investment necessary for establishment of this new
- liquefaction plant with such unprofitable export prices. _
6
The GNL 3 liquefaction plant was to have been built by the firm Fuster
Wheeler and equipped with cryogenic exchangers furnished by the French com- ~
pany Technip. Contracts with these two companies for the construction of
- this plant were signed over a year ago. If construction goes ahead, this
- plant, with a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters, will essentially
deliver its production to Germany and Holland, according to the terms of
contrECts signed with Rhurgas-Gasunie (8 billion cubic meters per year for -
20 years) and Brigitta Thyssengas (4 billion per year), and negotiated by
- Sonattach, but not yet signed, with Gaz de France (5 billion cubic meters).
Gas Pipeline Preference
Topics of current negotiations between Sonatrach and its European customers
:aill include, in addition to the increase in price of natural gas, an examina-
tion of the possibility of delivering this gas in gaseous form, carried via
, isnisia by the Algeria-Italy gas pipeline which is currently under construc-
tion, r~ther than in liquified fornt, as planned 2 years ago. In 1983, this
"transmediterranean" gas pipeline will deliver 12 billion cubic meters of
_ natural gas to Italy. However, its carrying capacity could be increased ~
to 1S billion cubic meters deliverable to other European customers of
Sonatrach.
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This plan appears to be more advantageous for Algeria, insofar as it elimi-
_ natea the establishment of giant liquefaction plants in its country and
- the purchase of equally gigantic methane tankers, all necessitating the
investment of several billions of dollare. It also avoids conetruction of
regasification planta in the client countries, but does oblige them to take
a greater part in financing methods of land transportation. Negotiations
between Sonatrach and its European partn~rs could become heated, especially
since Holland aeems to have already arranged for construction of its own
regasificat:Lon plant.
Conditiona of the Chaice
Algerian exports of liquified natural gas to the United States as well as
to western Europe should increase by 1984 to 44 billion cubic meters per
year, taking into account only those firm contracts already signed by Sona-
trach and its customers and approved by the proper authorities in the
exporting and importing countries. Exports could reach nearly 60 billion ~
cubic mete~s by the middle of this decade, by taking into account nego-
tiated, but unsigned, contracts with other European countries, in case
_ the new prices for Algerian natural gas are considered profitable enough
fnr the construction of the costly facilities necessary for exporting the
additional quantity of gas.
Thus, the choice facing the~Algerian leaders in exploitation of the country's
energy resources during this decade, from the perspective of greater profit- -
ability of its resources while maintaining the country's accelerated ~ate -
of economic development, depends greatly upon the results of current nego- -
- tiations between Sonatrach and its American and European clients.
In one case, Algeria could arrive at some profitable prices for gas exports,
justifying costly investments in liquefaction facilities, which would then
permit an increase in natural gas prices which would compensate for a reduc-
tion in deliveries of crude oil, without affecting income in currency neces-
sa.ry for imports of equipment. In the other case, Algeria could be led to
slow uo its production of gas and to maintain petroleum exports at their
present l~vel, with domestic energy product needs being covered mainly by
_ a part of the gas production which would progressively repl~ce oil.
Belkacem Nabi Predicts Continued Oil Price Hikes for 1980
The movement to raise oil prices should continue in 1980 and place "the
~ price per barrel at a higher level of effective rate than the levels attained -
, during the 1970's," stated Belkacem Nabi, Algerian minister of energy and
petrochemical industries, in an interview published 3 March by the Algerian
monthly EL DJEICH (Army).
According to the minister, who considered "1979 to have been essentially a
year of compensation," stated that "this evolution should be made progres-
sively, in a concerted fashion, so as to permit all concerned to prapare
for a new situation where the price of energy is a significant element in
38 _
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economic policy." "It is necessary," he said, "to give the industrialized
- countriea time to absorb the increase in the oil bill and the OPEC countries
a chance to review their development plans with respect to the level of -
income and to define the means necessary for demonstrating their solidarity
with reapect to non-oil-producing developing countries."
Nabi ts of the opinion that "everyone ie concerned that the price of oil
- increases in real terma, if the world is to be spared the difficulties of
an energy supply crisis." He a:so confirmed Algeria's intention to reduce -
its oil production in the comir~g years, recalling the recent decision of the
FLN Central Committee.
Stressing that evolutiou in the price of oil would allow Algeria, while
- lowering production, to ffiaintain a high income from oil and gas to finance
its development, Nabi indicated that n2gotiations were continuin.g between
Sonatrach and its American and European clients, chiefly Gas de France, for
the upward revision of liquified natural gas price~ which, he stated, must -
be tied to the "ascending movement" of the price of oil.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
9171
CSO: 4400
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
THREAT TO FRANCE--"France w~ill pay dearly for its support of Morocco" in the
Saharan conflict, r~portedly threatened "Colonel Hoffman," one of the leaders
of the A1g~erian aecret services, son of a legionnaire and an Alger.ian woman.
_ ~'or the present, however, tw~ factora are appar~ntly holding back Algiers�
1) the fear, in the event of open conflict [witl: FranceJ, of the wholesale ~
~x~ulsion of Algerian emigres, "dangerous because of the labor union members";
an3 2) the risk of precipitating the overthrow of the M~roccan monarchy and
its reFlacem~nt by a hypernationalistic republic which would reelaim Tindouf
and the Oran area. [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7-13 Apr 80 p 10]
C50: 4400 .
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IRAN
BANI-SADR PONDER3 WAY OUT OF ECONOHIC RUIN
1911an IL I~ONDO in Itallaa 28 1Qar 80 pp 30,31
(Interview with Bani-Sadr by J.M. Cortea and A. Rafat]
[Text] "We are destroyed, economically. Juet give us time
- to rebuild." 3o saye the Pirat preaident of the
_ republic oi Persia. Can Italy iend a hand? May~
be, and yet...
As the firet preaident oP the Iranian Islsmic Rapublic ainoe February
, 1980, Abdolhaesan Beai-Sadr hae not tk,ua far had an eaey time of it.
- The hoetagea (arid he was opposed to that oaper) have yet to be freed -
_ from the Amarican embasay in Tepiran, daepite all the ePlorts of the
_ UN commiasion. Ae !or the legialative elections (the first round took
plsce oa 14 Harch, aad the eecond will be held on 3 April), the outaome
_ ia uncertain aad for the moment aeems to favor the Islamic hard-liners,
the inrces which Baai-3adr, though he regularly quotes the Koran, ie
in iact Pighting. Sven eo, Beai-3adr remaine the oae solid point oY
rePerence the Weet can count on in the stesmy ~relter of events in Iran.
- Furthermore, the preeident used to work as an economist (in Pari,s).
- Tiere are aome oP the things he had to say to IL DdONDO about the way he
aeee Pereia' s future.
Queation: Peapla o~ten talk of you ae an economist. What are the main
poiute in your plan for Iran's economic reconstruction?
Ane~rer: I predicted the crisis of the late regime 4 yeare bePore it came;
- to do that, I had conducted a broad analyais of the country's econo~y in
all its particulare. Aad it ie for this very reaeon thet I aai in a posi- -
tion today to propose an alternative, a plan for rebuilding Iran. It
ie, of courae, not a plan developed or approved by the entire body oY
_ people who contributed to overthroariag the tyrenny oP the ehah, but ra-
_ ther a plan of a~? or~, And yet, ainae there are no other plane, I muet -
add that thie plan oP mine ie, as o! now, the oaly alternetive. Iran
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today muat pick up an economy t?~at has been totally deatroyed and put it
- back together again. And this will call not only Por carePul, detailed
planning, but also for the total aommitment of the people. _
Quaetions You epeak oP a ruined economy. Yet Iran under the ahah wae
known as ~ tyranni'caI country, yea, but an induatrialized one... ~
~
Anawer: That wea the image the former monarch pro~ected o~ his regime,
and one which, in my view, bore not the alightest relation to ~reality.
If it i~a to move forward, Iran neede an independant economy. I think
it is neceseary to emphasize the point that by independence I do not
- mean autarchy, Whe~t I am talking about is etabilizing economic relations
with other countries an a domeatic foundation, one posessing a dynamics
of ita own. Once we have this, trade relationa with the rest of the world
_ will fall into place. In the future, oil will have its paxt to play in
this direction in the establishment of our basic economy. There you have
_ the main thruat of my views on Iranian economic reconstruction.
_ Let's look now at what the shah's economic policy was. Iie called it "pro-
tectioniet." And I must admit that indeed it wae that. But the intereste
proYiting by thst protection were foreig~n ones. Oil would leave Iran as -
- a bulk commodity, and be transformed into capital in Europe. Once that -
was done, a portion of that capital Would come back into the country in
the i'orm oY imports. This relation~hip between Iran and the West inarea-
aed buying pov?er, but ta the advantage of imports and at the price of
- a11 but complete deetruction of domeetic~indu$try.
Questions ~etting baak to your oMrn plan...
Answer: It ia hard to build an independent economy in view of the ~act
_ that the world economy ia based primaxily on trade. And the whole thing
becomes etill more problematical when the base of an econo~y is export of
one or more rew materials.
Bearing this dif~iculty in mind, one must firat of all create and build
_ up an economic "tradition." Our model is based on the principlee oP wor-
- ker management. We shall build up local production units, but those units
will operate as part of an overall plan elaborated by the government.
Polit~cal management of production vEill, according to the principles of
Islam, be the concern oP the labor force. Capital will handle economic
management.
Question: In other words, what you are proposi~g is aomething hal~pay
between aapitalism and socialiem. A third way, if you like. ~
- Anavrer: There is a classical definition that tells ue economias is the
organization of scarcity. 3ocialiem handles ~hat ecarcity one rvay, and
capitaliem artoth~r. The Koran, on the contrary, tells us that nature
- does not suffer from shortages. It is man rvho, Yor social reasons, is
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incapable of putting that wealth to good uae. And so, Yrom our point
of view9 the raieon d�etre oP an economy lies in avois~ing or even elimi-
nating theae men-made obstacles.
For the Ielamia eoonomy,-production muet not be ti~d to a peraentage of
proPit, but to the utility of the product itself. This ie p~eaieely why _
we are in favor of worker managemeat of production, Nhich r?ill not allow -
capital aad the market to impose their tvles. In our eoonomy, control
exeraised bv the maeeee ~+rill not ellow production of anything that ie not
needtul. to our eociety. Thia ie the on].y way t~a light communism.
Qn~stion: The porld, though, is divided into bloce aad spheres of influ-
- ence. How realiatic, then, do you th3nk your axgument is? -
Answer: ~y argument is not merely realistic: it is neceasary. Everybody
knowe that Iran is a strategic target for both the Americans and the So-
viete. Our oil and our geographical position make everybody envious.
There rvas a time when the United 3tai;as controlled the Iraniaa market and
economy, and it ia ready to do anything in order not to loee tha,t control.
The Rueaians, on the other hand, are trying to get their hands on it, no -
~ matter ~vhat t~e coat. And we, here in the middle, must be on our guard
and try not to fa11 into the trap oP either of them.
Our revolution has driven out the dominion of the White Houae. This does
not mean, however, that the Americana have accepted their defeat. The 30-
_ vieta9 in turn, are trying to fill the void left by the other euperpoper
_ with "eocial.iet aid." Ae an IraniAn proverb puta it, Ne ~ra betweon two -
Pirea, and we don't like burniag.
Queation: What will your nezt stepa be?
- Anawers An intensive campaign to get the maesea involved behind the motto:
"Use lese, produce more." That done, we ahall complete the reatructuring
oY the country~e entire economic apparatue. _
- Question: YYhat role will petrodollare play in your plaas?
Answer: more than 80 peraent will go to national reconetruction. A atar-
_ ring role r~ill go to agriculture. That is the aector that has been hard-
_ eat hit. One need only consider the Pact that not more than 15 years ago
we were more than self-aufficient, while today we have to import more than
, half our ~ood.
Queations There was a time when Irea was the paradise of westera capital
investors. Are you ~till interested in foreiga iaveetmente and technolo-
giea? ~
Answer: Yea. I believe collaboration between Iran and the induetrial
world would be very helpful, but only on an even ~ooting. We prePer to -
give priority to countries with greater independenae of the two supar-
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powers. We further prefer not to do business with the multinational cor- ~
porations. -
G~ueation: Doea Italy appear among these privileged countriea?
Ariewers Theore~ically, yee. Lately, though, the Italian government hae
shown several signs of eubordination to the Wllite Houee. For eaample, it
denied us some spere parte for our Italian-built helicopters, even though
they had long been paid for. It did thie as part of the boycott decreed -
by American Pr~eaident Jimmy Carter, and we do not like it at all. Atti - -
tudea of that kind could cause considerable daiu~ge in th~ Puture to eco-
nomic, political, and cultural relations between Iran and Italy.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1980
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LEBANON
DEATH OF PUBLISHER MAKES FUTURE OF MAGAZINE UNCERTAIN -
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Mar 80 pp 20-21
[Article: "AL-HAWADITH After al-Lawzi: A Tempting Sales Offer or a Change
in Political Course? He Is the Only One Who Would Have Dared To Write About
His Last Adventure"]
[Text] Perhaps the most exciting adventure of newspaperman Salim al-Lawzi
_ is the one from which he returned recently, incapable of writing about it.
His family, which has moved to IAndon, is faced with a difficult task that
may be summarized by a big question mark regarding the vacuum left by the -
- big newape,permar~. What will become of AL-HAWADITH after the death of its
chief?
The family of the late colleague Salim al-I,awzi could not stand stay~.ng in
Beirut. The atmosphere in the city became too oppressive for them after the
- tragedy. His third and his last wife, Umayyah al-Mar'ashli preferred to move
with his daughters to the British capital.
: Thus, the week of motirning wi11 be held in London. The family will then
devote itself to the burdens resulting from the ma~or vacuum left by the
deceased. Chief among those burdens are the affairs of his magazine, AL-
HAWADITH, in the areas of editorial [policy], ada~nistration, and finance,
and future political course.
With regard to family affairs, the prevailing conviction among the staff of -
the magazine and among the close friends of' the family is that al-Lawzi left
a will dealing with the distribution of his unknown fortune. Some people
. estimate al-Lawzi's fortune to be several million pounds sterling. This is
in addition to the value of the magazine if it is offered for sale or turned
into a ~oint stock company.
_ Friends think it likely that the family will sell the magazine so that it
may not have the same fate ~s that of the successful Lebanese ne~wspaper
AL-HAYAH followiilg the murder of its owner Kamil Marawah in 1.g65. He was
a capable newspaperman like al-?~awzi, but the newpspaper`s qualities declined
after his death, and then it died suddenly during the Lebanese War along with
its English-language sister, 2'I~ DAILY STAR.
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What may prompt al-La,wzi's family to sell the magazine is the fact that
the,y may receive a tempting offer. The fa.mily is also convinced that the
magazine will r~ot be able to preserve the ~ournalistic standards it main-
tained during the life of its chief, especially since a number of its best
_ Editors had left it recently.
The Polic,y of AL-HAWADITH After al.-Lawzi
,
The political course which AL-HAWADITH Magazine~~must adopt after the death
of its proprietor is a matter of considerable concern to his fatnily, which
has been advised by more than one Arab s~urce to refrain from the politics
pursued by its chief, especially in the last few years. A1-La,wzi's politics
had lnvolved him in disputes that were closer to being personal and tempera- -
mental struggles with more than one Arab regime. ~
- But turn~ng away from the political course pursued t~y A1-HAWADITH in the
seventies would require making changes in the editorial staff and doing -
~~r~thout those [staff reporters] who are inclined to oppose the nationa.list
Arab course and to support views of the /�Lebanese Front" and its close and
remote associates.
Our colleague al-Lawzi had returned to Beirut in ~955 after working success-
fully in the Egyptian press. He had come to Beirut to publish AI,-HAWADITH
Magazine which was then closer to being an artistic than a political journal. -
As the fortunes of the late President Ja,m,a,l 'Abd-al-Nasir rose, AL-HAWADITH
rallied around him. But collea.gue al-La.wzi left the Nasirist course after -
the defeat of June 1967. At the same time, he also gave up his agreement
wj.th the regime of the late Preaident ~lZ'ad Shihab. -
AL-fiAWADITH then found itself involved in successive conflicts with Arab
radical regimes that had come into existence late in the sixties. It also
found itself involved in a conflict with the Palestinian Resistance Nbvement.
When the Lebanese War broke out in 1975, AL-HAWADITH was described as being
conanitted to the course of the Lebanese Front. It was sometimes openly and _
, other times implicitly at odds with the opponents of the Front on both the
Lebanese and the Arab sc~nes.
~dhen the Lebanese FLront became involved in a dispute with the regime of
President Hafiz al-Asad in Syria, AL-HAWAI)ITH sided with the front. A1-Lawzi
wrote several commentaries and investigative articles against what he
described as the sectarian regime in Syria.
The position of the Lebanese magazine that emigrated to London grieved not
onl,y the Lebanese left and the Palestinian Resistance, but also Moslems in
general, since al-Lawzi was a Sunni Moslem from the city of Tripoli [which
is known for] its ancient Arab and Islamic traditions.
Feelings of bitterness against the magazine grew when the magazine went along
with President Sa,dat's initiative and its resultant Camp David Accords.
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Many observers attribute the campaigns launched by al-Lawzi against some
Arab regimes to his disposition and to the swift changes in h~s temperament.
- But he did not acknowledge this, and he insisted that his duty as a reporter -
required him to write about all forbidden or taboo subjects. Mere mention -
of these inevitably places a newspaperman on the "most wanted list'of several
_ regimes. These campaigns have been costly for al-Lawzi. His brother was
- murdered last year in Tripoli, and the officea of his magazine in Beirut were
de~troyed. Then he himseli" rece~ved a warning that he would be killed. His
visit to Lebanon for his mother's funeral was a ma,jor mistake that cost him
his life.
- A Horrifying End
Colleague al-Lawzi was kidnapped last February 24, and his body was found by
a shepherd on the rocks in the hilly section of 'Armun in South Beirut on the
4th-5th o.f March.
_ It was clear from observation and from the medical report that he had been -
sub~ected to severe torture during the 8 days he was alive and in the custody
_ of his kidnappers. There were bruises in various parts of his boc~y, and the
skin and flesh of his right hand, from the fingernails till the wrist had
been stripped off. The bone had been eaten away, an indication that his hand
had been im�nersed in a strong acid solution before he was fatally shot in Lhe
- head and the temple. The significance ef disfiguring his right hand was clear.
A1-Lawzi is 58 years old. He began his life as a self-made man. He achieved
success in broadcasting in the Near East Radio Station that was established
= by the British in Palestine. It was then moved to Cyprus for propa~anda
purposes for the allies during World War II.
_ Afterwards al-Lawzi went to Cairo, the capital of the press and the arts in
the forties. There he worked in several ma~or press organizations, and he
formed personal friendships with prominent figures in the press, in politics,
in the theater and in the motion picture [industry).
He returned in the mid-fifties to Beirut to take part in several press ven-
- tures. Then he settled down independently with his successf~il venture,
AL-HAWADITH.
In spite of his press preoccupations, colleague al-Lawzi lived the last 20
years of his life in comfort. He was married three times, and he had seven
daughters. He lost Yiis only son when he sought refuge in Damascus in the
late fifties to escape pursuit during the regime of former [Lebanese] Pres-
ident Sham'un.
Regardless of his political course, al-Iawzi is considered one of the most
successful newspapermen in the Arab world. He is knok�n for his tireless
activity and for always bein~ "on the go" in spite of his advancing age. His
colleagues who worked with him describe him as a dictator at work who believes
that he is always right. But all his co].leagues acknowledge that he is a -
skillful master of the indirect media.
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A1-Lawzi wrote 1,-wo novels and 43 short stories. He had hoped to become a
successflil novelist like Ihsan 'Abd-al-Quddus and Yusif al-Siba'i. But
political events in the Arab world soon occupied his attention and attracted
him. He wrote scores of successful press investigations, and he met hundreds
of senior Arab and foreign officials. But he was as dauntless in writing _
about sensitive political articles as in tackling artistic issues, disregard-
ing the fact that his words in the political arena had more far-reaching
repercussions than his artietic articles.
Perhaps the most exciting and the most u~ysterious of Salim al-I,awzi's adven-
tures was his most recent one. He is now incapable of writing about it to
his readers who will miss him very much.
COPYRIGHT: Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 1980
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- MOROCCO
WORRIED KING GETS U.S. ARMS, FRENCH SECURITY ADVICE
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb 80 p 16
[Article by Ali Gharbi: "Clouds Over The Palace"]
[Text] King Hassan II is pleased and worried. Pleased because the U.S. -
Congress has agreed to sell him 6 OV 10 aircraft, 20 F5E fighters and 24
combat helicopters equipped with antitank missiles. He is worried becauae
the Sacred Union and the social tranquility he had boasted of achieving have
been widely attacked by the movement of popular protest spreading in the
citiea and the countryside. The threata hovering over his throne--evoked
last year by a CIA report--are they perhape about to take specific form?
The question deserves to be raised, for what could be the reason behind the
"convereation" recently.held at Rabat between the king and three French
specialista: Robert Broussard, head of the antigang campaign, Raymond
Sassia, chief of the Security Service in the Ministry of the Interior, and
_ Captain Prouteau, chief of the Intervention Group of the National G~ndarmerie,
the same man who intervened at Mecca?
Clearly, there is on the agenda formation of "special antisubversive units"
with French advisers and cadres. This pro~ect under way is related to the
Gafsa affair, whose consequences show the role played by Giscard's power in
that part of the world. '~he royal authoritq, up to its neck in the war in
the Western Sahara, where Operation Badr has been beset by the same misfortunes
as its predecessor, Oper.ation Ohoud, finds itself compelled to tighten the
bonds o� dependence with France and the United States. All the more so
as it expects aggravation of the popular struggles and consequently is
preparing to step up measures of oppression, which have never slackened.
Since the escapes last October the political prisoners have had their condi-
tions worsen; several among them have been refused hospitalization. Arrests
and interrogations of students, trade union people and political militanta
are continuing. Among the latter are the president and four members of the
- iJNEM [Students' Union], officers of the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular
Forces), and one in particular, Ahmed ben Jelloun, brother of Omar ben
Jelloun, assassinated in 1975. A11. of them have been brutally interrogated
at police stations.
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But the real anxiety of the monarchist regime lies elsewhere. For some
weeks now, against a background of strikes with a political character conducted
by students demanding liberation of grisoners, the workers and peasants have
occupied center atage: the phosphate mine workers are r.ow starting their
third month of etrike, truck dricQrs and railway workers lay on frequent ~ob ~
actione; peasant farmer demonstrations are brutally dealt with by the auxi-
- liary forces, as was dor.e last 29 December at Beni Mellal (Tadlas region)
where two hundred peasants were arrested and taken to the military camp and
twenty-nine of them were tried and condemned to heavy penalties.
- This affair, which was recapitulated a month later at Azila in the ncrthern _
psrt of the country (where thirty peasants, ten of them women, were arrested)
was triggered by the monopolizing of collective pasture-grounds by a handiul
of big landowners who pasture some 10,000 animals there, guarded by auxi- -
liary forces. This is not the first time that grazing areas have been mono-
- polized by big landowners. One may recall the rural exoduses of 1959 (the
. Rif), in 1971 (in the Gharb), in 1977 (at Amizmiz), and in 1979 (at Temara).
This policy is the root of the impoverishment of the peasants, reduced to
swell the populations of the shantytowns, supplying the majority of the
emigrants, or hiring themselves out--at 6 dirham per day--as farm help.
HencQ the discontent.
It is in this context of profDUnd crisis that the royal authority seeks the
means of its survival: American weapons and French protectors.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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TUNISIA .
PROSPECTS REGARDING SUCCESSOR TO BOURGUIBA ANALYZED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 17 Mar 80 p 21
[Article by Adel Wahid: "Operation Recovery"]
.1 [Text] When he met for the second time within a month with Ahmed Mestiri,
leacler of the MDS (Movement of the Socialist Democrats), had Habib
Bourguiba decided th~s time--as he has done with a certain number of his
friends--to return his former minister of defense to the bosom of the
~ Destour movement and estrust a ministerial portfolio to him? The -
"suggestions" of the West~-n imperial powers would not be unrelated to
this change of tact by the Tunisian chief of state.
Ridiculed and humil�ated by Bourguiba during the first interview he had
with him in Nefta, a week after the armed popular revolt in Gafsa, the
- former mini~ter was again summoned to the palace in Carthage on 5 March
by the Tunisian chief of ~tate. On his departure he said he had dis-
cussed "indispensible and major changes to meet the aspirations of the -
people and to protect Tunisia from the perils threatening on all sides" -
with Bourguiba.
Edifying subjects for one preparing to accept governme~:tal responsi-
bilities. Mr Mestiri relaxes and joins in the chorus of those who con-
. tinue to blandish the "foreign threat," 3nd just at the time when the
French media, whir_h also saw in the Gafsa rebellion a"Lihyan coup," are
begin~ing to reconsider their position and to rncognize the Tunisiar~
nature of the matter, and the existence of a serious crisis within the ~
country.
The "Example" of Hassan II
The masks fall! Mr Mestiri, following Habib Boulares and oth~rs, is in
the process of returning t~ the fold. Their "journey in the desert" and
their presumed conversion to the opposition, it is true, never deceived
anyone. What �urpose would their joining the government serve if not to
guarantee a rE~gine shamed and discredited for good? The artificial -
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"national union" effected by Hassan II is in the process of realization
in Tunisia. "Those who want a national union government formed as soon
.1s possible take their inspiration from an example which f.asr_inates them: .
[h~t of M,orocco. The king, exploiting the Sahara aff.air, has won the =
support of the.left and even the extreme left. Similarly, the tense
situr~tion with Li~~ya.w{~uld serve to ,rally the main opponents around
~
_ President Bourguiba," wrote Paul-I~arie de La Go'rce in LE FiGARO (6 March
1980). ' . ,
, . , .
It is clear that the future change in the Tunisian political ehessboard
- is a direct result of the Cafsa rebellion. But the political withdrawal -
of Mr Nouira has considerable to do with it.
The physical condition of the Tunisian prime minister (69 years of age)
was not equal to the successive sh~cks suffered in the course of these -
recent months, to the point that thanks to the Libyan radio, Tunisians
were informed of Nouira's profitable transactions in Eu:ope and the
United States as well as certain deplorable aspects of his private life.
Rushed to the neurosurgical ward of a Paris hospital--where the
physicians on duty diagnosed hemiplegia resulting in paralysis of the
left part of his body--on the evening of 26 February, the designated ~
successor to Habib Bourguib~ convalesced slowly. His days may not be
numbered, but as a result of the consequences of this kirid of accident
in particular, it seems certain that Hedi Nouira will not be able to ~
- continue in his duties as prime minister, at least for a long period of
time. _
Taken by surprise by the illness of his heir apparent, the president entrusted
the responsibility for "coordinating government action" to his minister
of national education, Mr Mohamed Mzali. A native of the city of
Monastir, Like Bourguiba and Nouira, Mr Mzali is a faithful adduct of th e
Tunisian chief of state. However, he has adroitly avoided involving him- -
, self. in "the dirty business of the regime," which has won him a rather
favorable reputation with the population. His role will, however, -
involve implementing Bourguiba's directives to the letter. No more.
For apart from these adjustments dictated by circumstances, nothing in
_ Tunisia appears to have changed. On the other hand, since the "Mzali
solution" was only temporary, the race to become the successor of Hedi
Nouira has doubtless begun, while the appointment of Driss Guigua to head
- the Ministry of Interior for its part augers morP repression and violence.
_ A Petty Brainstorm
It is remembered in particular in Tunisia that the famous corps of
watchmen at the university was a petty brainstorm of this same Guigua,
y in the era when he was minister of national educar.ion between 1973 and -
1976, As to the return to favor of Tahar Belkhodja, former minister of
interior and the creator of th~ BOP (Public Order Brigades), the
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- pretorian guard of the regime, it is practically a fact. It is said
that he will replace Driss Guigua as the Tunisian ambassador to Bonn.
There is no shortage of pr.etenders to replace Hedi Nouira. But
BourKt~iba hns :~lways nurtured the hope of seeing his son succeed him one
d~~y. And this, ~~lthough the cerebral accident suffered by Habib Bourguiba
a Jr a few years ago, the consequences of wnich still plague him, upset the
dyn~stic projects of the father for a time. And it was in order to
obtain the ir~vestiture of foreign protectors that Bourguiba dispatched
his son to Paris, Washington and London, where he was welcomed by Giscard
d'Estaing, Carter and Margaret Thatcher, respectively. All of ttaem took
~ this opportunity to confirm their support of Bourguiba's regime, under-
: mined by popular challenge. And Carter even gave his agreement on the
delivery of heavy weapons to Tunisia. _
Heavily dependent on the Western imperialist powers, the Tunisian foreign
- office has not yet been able to digest the attitude of the Council of
= Ministers of the Arab League. An implicit rejection served as an -
- indirect illustration of the lack of any real basis for the Tunisian
- complaint based on allegations, of which the kindest thing one could say
is that they rely on no plausible proof of any Libyan interference in
the Gafsa rebellion.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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_ TUNISIA -
.
REASONS FOR NOUIRA VISIT TO PARIS DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Mar 80 pp 30-31. ,
~
[Arti.cle by Francoise Hubscher: "Nouira May Be Treated in~Tunfs~']
_ [Text] On Saturday, 1 March, the Ayahtollah Khomeyni was preparing to
leave the Mehdi Rezai Hospital in Teheran, where he had been taken five
weeks earlier followin~ a heart attack. That same day, the Yugoslav
- President Tito, for his part, continued to grow slowly weaker, despite -
the sophisticated tY~eatment at the Ljubljana Central Clinic. On ~
Saturday, 1 March again, a communique reported the satisfactory condition
of thr Tunisi~n prime minister, Hedi Nouira, who had been hospitalized
on Tuesday, 26 February, following a cerebral hemorrhage. "Since his
arrival, the alertness and the language of the patient have seemed
normal. His condition has steadily improved. His blood pressure has
stabilized, his temperature is normal, and he has begun to eat without
assistance." The communique was released by the neurosurgica,. department
of Prof Pertuiset in Paris. Doesn't Tunisia have, then, as Iran and
Yugoslavia do, a medical infrastructure equal to caring for the health
of a high political leader?
A Disputed M2dical Decision -
.
The individual mainly concerned, Hedi Nouira himself, was surprised:
"We are well equipped in Tunis and we have excellent physicians. Why
was I brought here?" (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1000). The reaction of a poli-
= tician? Without a doubt! But it was no different from that voiced by a
number of Tunisian doctors.
We are precisely at the same level as the Yugoslav physicians. But [hey ' -
have refused to surrender to the complex to which we still subscribe with
regard to the European, American and Soviet schools of inedicine, a
professor and doctor of inedicine says. Another adds: "It is intolerable
- that Tunisia should continue to offer the developed world an image which
_ is inconsistent with the reality. The transfer of Hedi Nouira to Paris
is humiliating."
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An assistant to Prof Abdelkrim Bettaieb, a renouned neurosurgeon, ex-
plains for his part: "Since 1973 Tunis has had a neurosurgical
_ university-hospital center endowed with marvelous equipment in which we
have invested much money. Our most recent acquisition, a scanner pro-
duced by Siemens, which cost us more than 350,000 dinars ($129 million
CFA francs), allows us to X-ray th~e brain to the tolerance of a millimeter
~nd p~inlessly, and in particular to locate cerebral accidents. This
~ apparntus is recognized by the profession as the best. The quality of
the ;.ictures is even better than those produced by the older scanner
available to Prof Peteuiset in Paris. In microneuurosurgery," this same �
physician continued, "we are also perfectly equiNped. The rather exten-
sive operatinp, areas are kept in remarkable aseptic conditions. And if
we still have problems in training and qualification, we are capable of
get[ing together an entirely adequate team with high quality specialists.
The transfer of Hedi Nouira to Paris does harm to our reputation and that
of our colleagues!" One could not be more categorical.
I[ was Prof Mongi Ben Hamida, summoned by the personal physician of the
prime minister, Dr Zouheir Kallal, who made the transfer decision with
~ the family and Mr Habib Bourguiba Jr present. Why? When questioned by -
~ JEUNE AFRIQUE, Prof Ben Hamida retorted: "Can't you delay your article -
for a week? Your question is indiscreet. Ask the family. I will not
answer you."
Patien[s Lack Confidence
It is not a question of challenging the moral and professional conscience
- of the physician who, faced with the enormous responsibility which falls
- [o him, has a natural inclination to refer it to the man who was his
"sponsor": Prof F'ertuiset. Nor is it a matter of the reaction of the
famii,y, concerned with saving the life of the dear one. But it does _
emphasize an att~ltude common to many Tunisians, and more particularly
- the more prosperous classes: they have little confidence in their
physicians.
y
However, Tunisia has since it gained independence made a considerable
effort in the health sector, placing it in a privileged situation in
relation to the rest of the African continent. There were 895 doctors
in 1913, half of them of foreign origin (about one per 5,900 inhabitants).
~y 1977 [here were 1,451, including 977 Tunisians, or one for every 4,067
inhabitants (France has an average of one physician for every 610
inhabitants). There are currently three faculties of inedicine, in Tunis, _
Sousse and Sfax, on a level comparablP to those in Western Europe. There ~
are 2,200 students being trained tnere, and as of 1981 Tunisia will have
2,500 practicing physicians (one for every 2,600 inhabitants) of whom
2,200 will be Tunisian. The fact remains that cadres and high officials
continue to go to France, Switzerland or the FRG for medical treatment, -
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like, it is true, President Bourguiba and his son, who nine years ago
_ occupied the very bed Hedi Nouira now has in the same Paris hospital
- section.
" "If the social ser.urity and welfare funds were to refuse to guarantee
coverage Eor patients transEerred abroad wi[hout good reason, nearly
500,000 dinars (275 million CFA francs) could be saved, providing
priority benefits to car~�ov~seula~ surgery, orthopedics and trauma-
tology," an official with the Minfs.try of Health estimates. "Since last
year, the Tawfik Clinic, which cost 7 million dinars (3.85 billion CFA
Erancs) has been in operation. It offers very comfortable facilities, `
= as well as ult:amodern equipment. A dozen accredited professors work
[here. But the rich clientele continues to go to France, and of the 116
beds, only a third are occupied!" ~
_ It is difficu~t to change habits. Particularly since the Tunisian
hospitals do not always enjoy a good reputation. Because the rural zones
still do not have an adequate medical infrastructure, the establishments
in the capital are overburdened. The care provided is rarely satis-
factory. Much equipment, and sometimes even medicines, are lacking.
- ''ithout a doubt too, the attitude of the medical body contributes to
:~trengthening the lack of confidence in it. What is particularly to be
regretted in the case of Hedi Nouira is that no medical committee com-
prising the specialists involved met, if only to examine the patient
before making the transfer decision.
This l.zck of teamwork, not to say rivalry, which is noticeable in
Tunis:an hospit~ls as well as institutes, also serve as hindrances to
research work And the proper organization of services, and thus affect
the quality of care provided.
' Here lies one of the real problems in the Tunisian medical sector, until _
such time as the new generations can break the feudal bonds forged prior
= to the winning of independence.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afriqu~ GRUPJIA 1980 .
5157
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TUNISIA
IMPROVED COVERAGE OF IMPORTS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 pp 559-60 =
[Te~ct] The latest statistics that have been established by the National _
Inaritute of Statistics show a clear recovery in Tunisia's external com-
mer.ce. In fact, the figures for the first 10 months of 1979 show progress
- iii both the ;~tal number of imp~rts and exports. -
= 1978 1979 change
Imports 719,894 932,227 +29.5
Exports 357,297 576,758 +61.4
Def icit 362, 597 3~5, 4ti9 - 2
Recovery rate 49.6 61.9 +24.8
Since exports have progressed at a rhythm clearly superior to that of the
- increase in imports, the chronic tendency towards a worsening of the com-
mercial exchange deficit seems to have stopped. The recovery rate went
from 49.6 percent to 61.9 percent.
Imports
Imports during the first 10 months of 1979 rose by 29.5 percent (212.3MD: -
NID = millions of dinars, 1 dinar = 10.2 FF) in relation to the same period _
during 1978, reaching a total of 932.2 million dinars. This increase
- affected all kinds of products with the exception of equipment, for which
imports decreased from 32.7 percent to 25.2 percent. This drop concerned
fork-lifts (-6.2MD), automobiles and apare parts (-15.31~ID), and material
for rail transport (-5.3t~) and naval navigation (-4.9?rID).
On the other hand, a slight increase was recorded in the purchase o� pumps ~
and compressors (+3MD), extraction and drilling machinery (+2.8I~ID), tele-
_ phone and telegraph equipment (+2.9NID) and optical and scientific apparatus -
- (+4.SI~ID). All other groups of products recorded an increase. Almost half
of this increase was in the energy group, for which the total amounte of
� purchases increased by 137.6 percent (+92.5IrID) between the two periods
compared.
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- The increase affected brute petrol oil (+37.ll~ID), kerosene oil (+20.8NID) -
and gas-oils (+27.2MD) above all. The increased import expenses for these -
producta comea more from the increase in price than from an increase in
quc~ntitiea purchased. This ie also the case for unrefined sulfur, for which
import expens,e~ totaled '13.2tID (+76.8 percent). -
,
--Other raw material and semi-refined produozs (29.7, percent)--Purchases -
of products from animal or vegetable sources changed lit'tle, totaling around
42tdD. In contrast, mineral products almost doubled their number of imports
. (9.9 - 17.9MD). Imports of other semi-finished products went from 155.1 to
- 2011~ID (+22.6 percent). The increase recorded in this area especially
y affected the purchases of products made of plastic materials, rubber, chemi- `
cal products, tubes, pipes and accessories. Following an increase in the
national production of cement, imports of this product dropped off a little
in tonnage and in value (12.2I~ID against 12.9 in 1978).
--Consumer goods (+22.6 percent)--Purchases of consumer goods made up 16.8
~ percent of Tunisia's total imports, a sum of 156.91rID. Protective measures
for Tunisian industry and the application of a special tax (March 1978) over
a large array of imported products have somewhat slowed the continual in-
crease recorded in this area.
--Food products (+36.2 percent)--Still under the effects of poor harvest
and the fluctuation of world rates, purchases of food products rose to
119.51~, an increase of 36.2 percent compared to the first 10 months of
1978. Cereal imports occupy first place, having increased by 23.5 percent.
Insufficient production necessitated buying 25Q,000 t of hard wheat,
_ 218,000 t of soft wheat and maslin, 69,000 t of barley and 125,000 t of
corn. -
Soya oil imports have quadrupled following a reduction in olive oil produc- _
tion and ~an improvement in the way the oil pours. Tunisia bought 20.2MD
worth of soya grain oil, i.e., 15.1NID more than during the first 10 months
of 1978. Purchases of a few other food products have decreased: coffee,
hard wheat and barley.
Exports
Initiated in 1918, the increase in exports continued during the first 10 _
months of 1979 when it reached 576.7NID, an increase of 219.5NID or 61.4
percent over their level during the first 10 months of 1978.
--Energy products (+103.2 percent)--Energy products accounted for almost
half of Tunisia's exports (48.5 percent). Practically all of these exports
are made up of brute petrol. Compared to the same period in 1978, energy
products have more than doubled, bringing in total receipts of 279.7I~ID and
thereby surpassing those from the tourist sector; at the ssme time, these
receipts amounted to 142I~ID more than was received during the first 10 months
_ of 1978. Exports of brute petrol oils reached 4,408,000 t, sold for a total _
of 262.6t9J. These quantities are doubled those of the previous year, and
those of kerosene more than tripled (69,000 t).
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--Other raw materia"ls and semi-finished products (+18.4 percent)--Raw
materials and products from vegetable or animal sources were not part of
the increase in Tunisia's exports. The level of sales fell 6.6 percent
and their part in the amount of total sales decreased from 7.6 to 4.4 per-
_ cent. The "other half products" registered a certain progress (+31.8 per-
' cent) thanks to the increase in receipts from the sale of phosphoric acid
(+6.41~) and from triple superphosphate (+6.2MD). Stabilization in the
price of theae products attributed to this progress.
--Finished products (+53 percent)--Finished conau~ner goods represent 20
_ percent of the total amount of exports. Lxports ot these items increased
by 57.4 percent, thanks to the accelerated sale of clothing (27.S1~ID), cotton
textiles (+3.81~) and hosiery (+4.4MD). As for equipment, which accounted
for 2 percent of the total number of exports, a slight progression was
registered in the area of electric machines and appliances (+3I~ID).
--Food products (+25.3 percent)--The scale of these items brought in 74.2I~ID,
which represents 12.8 percent of all sxports. An increase of 25.3 percent
was recorded thanks to the sale of 74,884 t of olive oil for 41.9NID (56.4
percent of all food exports). Other nroducts also increased their export
value (vegetables, almonds, shell-fish and molluscs, and dates). Sales of
wine, oranges and live plants were the only products to record and kind of
important decline.
Suppliers and clients ~
Geographically speaking, 80 percent of the comme?-cial transactions is with
_ European countries (461.4MD). 5econd behind Italy, France accounts for
one-fourth of all European trade. T.he imbalance with this country has
decreased somewhat, going from 187.9MD to 127.41~ in 1979. Exports to
France have more than doubled. As for transactions with Italy, they have
shown a net improvement in a 2.3NID surplus. In fact, only trade between
Italy, Greece and Romania has shown a surplus. Other important deficits
were with Spain (-361~ID), the Federal Republic of Germany (-28.3NID) and _
Austria (-25 . SI~ID) .
Trade with the African countries has continued to be in Tunisia's favor,
_ with Algerfa and Libya remaining her principal clients.
As for North America, the deficit has become even more pronounced, going
from 5.2MD (during the first 10 months of 1978) to 21.8MD. Imports from
Canada have been responsible for this imbalance (-1llrID), which has been
- samewhat counterbalanced by an American credit (5.3I~). As for Asia, the ~
deficit favors Saudi Arabia (-47.4I~ID) and Iraq (-18.SI~ID).
COFYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
9572
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TUNISIA
BRIEFS
ARM:~ CONTRACTS--Arms contracts amounting to a total of 3 billion francs are
reportediy being negotiated with, among others, Italy and France. Taking
into account the internal political situation on the eve of a number of
high-level political euccessions and the threat represented by Libya, the .
rieks of deatabilization in that part of the Maghreb are conaidered serious.
[Text] [Paria LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in Frenctt 7 Apr 80 p 3]
PETROLEUM PROSPECTING--At a cabinet meeting 27 March, Industry Minister
Amor Rourou diacuased proapecting for oil, noting that the numher of
boreholea would increase from 24 in 1979 to 36 in 1980; investment had "
increased from 20 millian dinars a year between 1969-1978 to 55 million
~ dinare in 1979 and would reach 71 million in 1980; and production had
risen from 600,000 tons in 1966 to 5.5 million tons in 19790 [Excerpts]
(Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 859j
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SELECTIVE LZST OF JPRS S~RIAL REPORTS
~ NEAR EAST AND AFRICA SERIAL REpORTS
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
SUB-SAHARAN AFRTCA REPORT
WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS
WORLU~IIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality
WORI,DWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
W()lt[.UWIDE REPORT: I~aw of the Sea
- WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
_ WOKLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development
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