JPRS ID: 9196 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100027-9
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

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H'ON O1~1~1('IA1, l~tiH: ON1.1'
JPRS L/9196
16 July 1980
- Latin Ar~erica Re ort
p
CFOUO 15/80)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NOTE
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JPRS L/9196
16 Ju1y 1980
LATIN AME~ICA REPORT
(FOUO 15/80~
- CON TENTS
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Columnist Contrasts, Compares Argentina, Brazil
(Estela Araujo; LA OPINION, 27, 28, 29 May 80) 1
Argentine Columniet Cites Brazil's Expansioni.st Tendency
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 18 May 80) 11 =
ARGENTINA
Three Mcnths of Political Dialog Show Consensus
(Eduardo J. Paredes; LA OPINION, 18 May 80) 16
COLOMBIA
Briefs
CP 13th Congress in November 21
COSTA RICA
Communist ~'arty Condemns U.S. Policies
~PRELA, 17 Jun 80) 22
CUBA
'GRANMA' Denounces Carter's Support for Constitutionality
(PRELA, 7 Jun 80) 23
EL SALVADOR
_ 'PRELA' Carries Chriatian Appeal to Latin America
~ (PRELA, 23 Jun 80) 24
- a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
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HAITI
Op~osition Discloses U.S.-Duvalier Agreement on Intervention
(PRELA, 9 Jun 80) 26 -
NICARAGUA
Comandante Dos Appeare on Direct Line Program
(PRELA, 13 Jun 80? 28
'PRELA' Carries Borge Interview for Venezuelan Paper
(PRELA, 10 Jun 80) 30
Minister Cardenal's Visit to USSR Concludes
(Leandro Pubillones; PRELA, 25 Jun 80) 32 _
Rancher Confessea Counterrevolutionary Ties
(Francisco Urizarr�i.; PRELA, 6 Jun 80) 34
PANAMA -
international Seminar Discusaes Media lnfluence, Family
(PRELA, 12 Jun 80) 36
-b-
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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
COLUIyIIVIST CONTRASTS, COMPARES ARGENTINA, BRAZIL
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 27, 28, 29 May 80
[Articles by Estela Araujo: "Argentina and Brazil, lfao Economic Dimensions,"
"A Trend in Foreign Policy" and "New Chess Game in the Plate Basin"] _
(27 May 80, p 8J
[Text] The rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, which materialized on
the presidenti~l level, was accompanied by a real confrontation.
That confrontation need not be negative, inasmuch as it may help both sides
attempt to make an improvement in the various aspects being questioned about
�the plan for economic complementation that is starting to be developed.
The comparison between Argentines and Brazilians always begins with the demo-
graphic area. The situation, in millions of inhabitants, has been progressing
as follows:
a. Erazil, with a population of 9:~.3 up until 1970, and an index of demograph- ~
ic gr~wth of 3.2, will reach 225 by the year 2000.
b. Argentina, which had 23.3 at the same date, with an index of 1.5, will
reach 35 million by the year 2000.
And the logical conclusion is that there will be six Brazilians for every
Argentine by the year 2000.
The next questions are: Will it be possible to be fed with the grain that
is produced? Will it be possible to be supplied with the oil that is avail-
able? Will it be possible to have education on all levels?
The Land
Argentina has an area of 2.8 million square kilometers, with an additional
0.97 million from the Antarctica sector and the southern islands. Without
- counting the latter, the population density is 8.5. Brazil covers an area
_ of 8.5 mill~on square kilometers, giving it a density of 11 inhabitants.
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Usable area in: Argentina Brazil
(millions of hectares)
1. Land with little cultivation 20 30
2. Pasturage 125 123
3. Suitable land in general 10 40
With these calculations as a basis, Argentina has a ratio. of 6 suitable hec-
tares for each inhabitant, and Brazil has a ratio of 2, considering that the
present population of both countries has a ratio of 1 to 4. If G~~ take into
account the figures for the year 2000, the gap increases. Without counting
technological advances, the figure for Argentina would be over 4 hectares,
and for Brazil less than l.
Brazil, which many consider to have an optimal geographical status, is locat- ~
ed in the tropical region, and is preeminent among the other tropical coun-
tries in the world for its degree of development.
Argentina, on the other hand, lies between the countries with a temperate
climate, and has the advantage of possessing tropical areas and cold regions.
The possibility of increasing its arable areas is due to the fact that all
it requires is more irrigation. The rainfall does not interfere with future
production in areas which are now marginal.
Irrigation, by means of the dams resulting from hydroelectric development,
could increase the arable land to a great extent.
~ The reservation area, Polimazonia, the so-called green desert, is th~ r.egion
in which progress could be made with planted land. For this purpose, the
jungle must be cut down. or burned. It is considered likely that the ecolo-
gical change that this would produce would entail major flooding, owing to
the reduction of natural defenses provided by the vegetation, circulating the
rain water more quickly.
Argentina, as a country with a temperate climate, has great opportunities
for expanding its grain growing area (wheat, corn), and also unused marsh-
land (Ibera), where rice and sorghum could be grown.
Energy
tt is thought that Brazil has a water-power potential of about 80,000 mega-
watts. The same sources attribute 30,000 MW to Argentina, which would in-
dicate a considerable advantage for the former.
Brazil's real advantage lies in the fact that, in 1970, it had 10,000 MW, as
compared with 600 MW for Argentina.
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The Plate country unq~~stionably began to use its rivers at a late date,
- because various plans did not attach to that area the importance that it
deserved. However, during the last decade, it began to acquire an awareness
of the energy problem, which led it to surpass Brazil, first in oil, wherein
it has achieved almost self-sufficiency (7 percent imports), while Brazil
had to import 80 percent; and second, in atomic energy, which has enabled
it to lead the Latin American countries with the Atucha. I nuclear powerplant,
and a plan for energy self-determination which is a matter of special pride
in the nuclear field. Water-power has represented a great step forward, r_he _
results of which will not be evident until the end of the century; but, with
Chocon-Cerros Colorados and Salto Grande, a new dimension has begun. Yacy-
. rets, Corpus and the Middle Parana, combined, represent approximately 13,000
MW, of which 10,000 MW are Argentine.
In the case of Itaipu, which is considered the undertaking of the century,
Brazil's share is 5,000 megawatts. This does not meati that one can overlook
the fact that, in the Upper Parana alone, Brazil has far exceeded that figure,
and that the Amazon region has an enormous potential which is still virgin.
Argen*_ina has one real advantage in energy, namely, the diversity of sources;
and one disadvantage: Its hydroelectric development began later, and will
be impossible to equalize in the long run.
Education
The statistics in the cultural area may be assessed from the circulation of
newspapers for every 1,000 inhabitants: 126 for Argentina, and 35 for Brazil.
The percentage of illiteracy is shown by the following figures: Argentina, _
9 percent; Brazil, 29 percent.
Elementary Education
Among the population between 5 and 13 years of age, the figures are 71 per-
cent for Argentina, and 40 percent for Brazil. For intermediate educ,.tion,
the figures are 27 and 14 percent, in the same order; and for higher ~duca-
tion, they are 7 and 2 percent. The analysis is too superficial for a po-
pulation which is growing more than twofold. Either the education budgets
must be doubled, or the gap will increase even more. If we consider the fact
that the expenditures on government-run public education amount to 3 percent
for Argentina and 2 percent for Brazil, we realize that the gap wi11 be dif-
ficult to close.
'I'his contrast occurs, of course, in the economic area, The 30 March issue
of LA OPINION, in an article entitled."Unequal Behavior of the Latin American
Economies," states:
"Brazil, with its large foreign debt of about $50 billion, is the one reflect-
ing the greatest economic problems in this part of the continent. Although
the total renegotiation of the debt has been rejected at the moment, there
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are quite a few international banking entities which are viewing with concerr.
not only the heavy schedule of commitments for the next few years, but also
the constant need for external financing required for the development of its
extensive growth program
"It is estimated that, in order to prevent the deterrence of its economic
model, Brazil would have to increase its level of indebtedness even more in
1980, to a figure which could range between $17.5 and $23 bl.llion, a sum
that would, moreover, include $9.5 billion for financial services and over
$7 billion for capital amortization. Thus, it would not be surprising if
the gravity of these figures, combined with the recent price hikes that have
occurred for oil on the international markets (from which Brazil iMports 80
percent), were to increase the deficit in its balance from $6 billion in 1978
to over $12 billion by 1980; a situation which would also make it impossible
to reduce the inflationary pressure on its economy beyond the 70 percent re-
gistered in 1979."
Brazil, a colossus which would appear to be tottering, has an acute growth
crisis. We must add to the foregoing figures the gross d~mestic product
per inhabitant:
1969 Brazil 480 Argentina 1,292
1972 Brazil 513 Argentina 1,366
1977 Brazil 1,390 Argentina 1,730
Argentina has unquestionably pursued an irregular growth process. At the
present time, after having experienced difficult bottlenecks, its economy
can be said to have good prospects, based upon an almost self-sufficiency in
oil, a search for new markets for its crops, a balanee of payments that will
exceed $1.5 billion by the end of the year and an inflation which has not
been curbed, but which is declining slightly. The major problems are the
policy to be carried out from now on in the industrial area, the maintenance
of the financial system and the achievement of the great national plans.
Brazil, for its part, is experiencing a wage of strikes and dissent, in its
search for democracy. President Joao Figueiredo.,, in describing the situa-
tion, said: "There are potholes in the road which will not interfere with the
process."
The arrival of the current president of the Federative Republic of Brazil
- in Buenos Aires on 14 May was a milestone in Argentine-Braailian relations,
a meeting point which cannot be ignored. In his welcoming speech, President
Jorge Rafael Videla said: "The opportunity has been afforded to initiate a
cycle of widespread agreement and a phase wherein the realistic acceptance
of the true limits of interdependence, objectively established, will replace
any other aspiration."
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President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figue~redo replied, with a brief but de-
finitive text, �rom which we quote one paragraph: "Heedful of the desire for
cooperation which inspires Argentines and Brazilians, and convinced of the
mutual benefits, our governmPnts must intensify the bilateral contracts.
Frank, uninterrupted anc~ cordial dialog, aimed at exploring new areas for
agreements, will bring particularly auspicious results."
As President Videla summarized, "The opportunity has been afforded to initi-
' ate a cycle of widespread agreement." ~hose who believe that it has been
started are confused.
- [ 28 riay 80, P 9 l
[Text] The relations between Argentina and Brazil cannot be dissociated from
the historical contexr of the two countries. They experienced the deepseated
discord of the 19th century when, as enemies (war with Brazil, 1825-28), or
as allies (war with Paraguay, 1865-70)., they upheld opposing views. The be-
ginning of the 20th century brought a new era of understanding, The so-called
First Republic, which emerged in 1889, began traversing a new path wherein
receptiveness to democratic ideals typified the affinity.
Thus, the presidential meetings began with Gen Julio Argentino Roca's visit
to the Brazilian capital in August 1899. He was received by President Manuel `
Ferraz de Campos Salles, who returned the visit in October of the next year.
On both occasions, che activities took place on a level of pomp and ceremony
germane to the "belle epoque." Both countries were starting to extricate .
themselves from institutional crises. Erazii had changed from a monarchy to
a republic; Argentina had withstood the serious financial crisis of 1890, and
the resignation of President Luis Saenz Pena in 1895, which brought Jose Eva-
_ risto Uriburu to the position of chief executive. The issue with Chile over
boundaries became~.increasingly difficult. When Roca came to power for the
second time, an era of prosperity began, which coincided with a rapprochement -
_ with Brazil fostered by the personal attitude of both presidents, .s democrat- ~
ic ideal and a need in the realm of foreign policy which was inten~:ified as
the disagreements with Chile occurred.
It took three decades for similar circumstances to take place. President
Agustin P. Justo began the first of three visits between the Argentine pi�esi-
dent and his Brazilian colleague, Getulio Vargas. In 1930, the reduction in
coffee prices created the conditions for the rise of a strong coalition op-
posed to the age-old preeminence of Sao Paulo in Braailian politics. Tlie
re~olution in that year supported by the politicians from Minas Gerais, Pa-
raiba and Rio Grande brought the "Gaucho" governor, Getulio Vargas, to power,
for an almost uninterrupted period of 24 years, ending tragically.
The Argentine Republic also had its revolution of 1930, wherein the radical
government of the illustrious president, Hipolito Yrigoyen, fe11. The mili-
tary coup of Jose Felix Uriburu was followed by pro-conservative administra-
tions beginning with Agustin P. Justo's in 1932.
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tt was in this context that the second rap prochement between the two coun-
tries occurred, after the wave of unemployment which accompanied, on a world-
wide scale, black Friday on the New Yor'< S tock Market and the period preced-
ing World War II.
In October 1933, Agustin P. Justo began the journey that was to take him to
Rio de Janeiro. At that time, when the wa r between Bolivia and Paraguay was
under way over the Chaco (1932-35), the "anti-war pact" was signed, to
which Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Paraguay also adhered. In this way, the
extent of the conflict was confined to its two opponents. In May 1935, the
Brazilian president traveled close to Buenos Aires, on that occasion going
as far as Tandil. The third meeting between the two presidents took place -
- in January 1938, the year in which Justo's term in office ended. -
The propitious occasion was the opening of the International Bridge at Uru-
guayana, the site of the official ceremony. The happy celebration was marred
by a subsequent incident, the tragPdy of Itacumbu, in which one of the air-
planes of the Argentine presidential party crashed in flames. The son of
the president, Eduardo Justc, was traveling in it.
World War II caused a natural dissociation. Brazil took part in the conflict,
and Argentina remained neutral almost until the end. For a long period of
time, there was a marking of time in presidential contacts, interrupted only
by Gen Pedro Eugenio Aramburu's intention of ineeting with President Juscelino
_ Kubitschek in 1956, an intention which, however, was not fulfilled. He only
' saw President Joao Goulart, who at that time was serving in the presidency.
, It took over two decad.es for the diaiog to be resumed. In 1961, in the bor-
der locality of Uruguayana, the two presidents met again. This time, it was
Dr Arturo Frondizi (1958-62) and Janio Da Silva Quadros. The agreement was
= signed on 22 April, and in August of the s ame year the Brazilian president,
who had not been in office for 7 months, resigned.
The strategy devised by President Frondizi, whereby Argentina would serve as
a mediator in the Cuban affair, was related to the spirit of the Alliance for
Progress and President Kennedy's view of South.America. Subsequent events,
- the fall of both Quadros and t~rondizi, bro ught about another period of si-
lence.
In March 1972, there was a fourth atten,pt at rapprochment, through Pr~sident
Agustin Lanusse's trip to Brasilia, Rio and Sao Paulo, during which he held
a dialog with his colleague, Emilio Garras tazu Medici, also a general.. In
1964, Brazilian President Joao Goulart was forced to leave the government;
whereupon, through consecutive elections in Congress, Garrastazu Medici was
appointed to the term from 1969 to 1974.
General Lanusse was the third president of the Armed Forces government, which
over�~hrew the constitiitional president, Ar turo Illia (1963-69). The openness
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toward the Andean Fact nations which was started by Lanusse did not coincide
with a rapprochement with Brazil, The visit only served to intervene in the
gap that existed between the two nations.
Hence, thus far in the c entury, this is the fifth attempt to improve the rela-
tions be~~ween the two countries, attempts which have all been separated by
decades: 1899-1900, 1933-35-38, 1961, 1972 and 1980; the only one taking place
during a shorter period (if we count President Lanu.sse's visit as rapproche-
_ ment ) being the fourth.
President Joao Baptista Figueiredo's arrival coincides with increasing demon-
strations in Brazil and receptiveness to political dialog in Argentina. Both
governments have a more or less military origin, and it is no coincidence that
both presidents are generals.
Joao Baptista Figueiredo has two conflicting connotations with respect to ~,r-
gentina: the first, tha t of belonging to the militar.~ group of Gen Golbery do ~
Cout-o e Silva, author of "The Geopolitics of Brazil," and of the theories
. that have continued up until now on Brazilian leadership in South America; -
and the second, of a,personal nature, his long period of residence in Buenos
Aires, which would appear to indicate an affectionate relationship with this
country.
If one attempts to question the two forces, it may be th~ught that one conveys
the essence and the othe r the form,
But one cannot make an alaysis on a merely personal or irrelevant level. It
is obvious that the status of Brazil has changed, with its new economic re-
quirements, something wh ich has prompted it to change its foreign policy,
[29 May 80, P $l
[Text] The 3-day visit paid by the president of Brazil, Joao Baptista Figuei-
redo, was regarded internationally as being of vital importance to ttiie new
rela~ions among the South American nations. As part of a series of ineetings
which both presidents have been hol.ding on a worldwide scale, its signifi-
cance cannot be disregarded.
General rigueiredo had held a conference with the president of Venezuela, a
nation to which he is linked by the Amazon Pact (.I979), and to which he
became closer, starting in January, through the Andean Pact.
The Peruvian president also visited Brasilia, and is expecting the arrival of
the head of state of the Federative Republic of Brazil thi.s year,
Chile is also expecti~ig the arrival of General Figueiredo.
Gen Jorge Rafael Videla received President Morales Bermudez of Peru; he met
on three occasions with Stroessner and President Aparicio Mendez of Uruguay.
On an international scale, he is about to start his second tour of the Orient.
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This characteristic of traveling presidents does not detract significance
from the meeting, because it is unquestionably the beginning of a change in
international policy for both countries, which will affect all the relations
in South America. The Argentina design ioith respect to Brazil needs a new
revampin~. It will also require a new overall view of all the countries
which Argentine-Brazilian relations used to consider in a static manner in
- calculating probabilities in the Southern Cone.
The new situation has been manifested by praise. The Chilean newspaper LI,
MERCURIO says: Brazil and Argentina are setting an example, by solving
problems related to many vital interests by peacefu]. means and with mutual
advantage." The government press organ is of the opinion that there should
not be blocs, but rather friendly nations. Perhaps it is assessing the im-
portance of Figueiredo's opinion on the issue of the B~agle Channel, or
Argentina's intransigent attitude toward the Brazilian proposition of in-
cluding Chile in the South Atlantic defense pact. This proposition is ex-
plained by Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, in an article published in EL ECONOMISTA
(16 May 80): "The organization of a defense treaty for the South Atlantic
is an id~a which is not included on our agenda."
The Uruguayan Government, which could be affected by the matter of the dams
on the Upper Uruguay, received advance information from San Martin Palace:
Through its ambassador to Buenos Aires, Luis de Posadas Montero, it express-
ed the certainty that those projects would be carried out in such a way that
they would not upset the waterways or the construction on the binational
Salto Grande dam.
The treaty on the Uruguay River establishes the legal and political frame- -
work that will govern the future development on.the lJruguay and Pepiri Guazu _
Rivers. The provisions which are called for, to~guarantee that there is no
damage downstream, and that shipping is not hurt, are obviously accomplish-
ments, since they represent the adoption of international legal systems re-
- garding the stated Brazilian position on "fa.its accomplis." The Argentine
position of considering the issue of the Upper Uruguay as a whole appears to
have won oveY the urgency over energy which wanted to start the Garabi dam
~ as soon as possible (see: "Garabi, an Economical Energy Solution?", LA
OPINION, 14 May 80).
The NEW YORK TIMES notes in two articles that the new Argentine-Brazilian r.e-
lations refute the theory of a nuclear race between ~he two countries, and .
remarks that, despite the problems with the United States over the issue of
human rights and the transfer of technology in the atomic f ield, no hostile
policies are being promoted against Washington. -
The nuclear topic, and the agreements that have been reached, which are po-
sitively the most important among the 15 documents that were signed, do not
have only one internal goal, progress toward self-sufficiency. Vice Adm
Carlos Castro Madero stated: "The Argentine nuclear plan is experiencing an
important period, wherein all the projects have been started without any
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obstacles, at least apparently; something whicti makes them quite favorable
- to the development of Argentine nuclear activity." And he also added: "The
si~ning of the agreements with Brazil is of great political importance, be-
cause they discredit the arguments that are being put forth abroad to pre-
vent technology from being supplied to both countries~ maintaining that the .
latter are engaged in a rivalry that is dangerous ta world peace."
In addition to the parties directly cuncerned, the atomic.issue has two ob-
vious destinations: the United Statesand Germany. .
Through KWU, the Federal Republic of Germany has arranged.with Argentina and ~
Brazil a supply of technology covering the Southern.Cone. If the accords -
allow for only a transitional phase, Argentina ~�*i11 have definitely achieved
its self-sufficiency. If it is caught, it will be part of a plan for a di-
vision of labor wherein one part will remain in Brazil, and another in Ar-
gentina, with the actual control in Germany,
The issue of gas is not dissociated from thP Plate Basin political chess game
ei ther .
"i'he PETROBRAS [Brazilian Petroleum Corporation] enterprise is due to conclude
the agreement on gas through the visit made by its president, Shigeaki Ueki,
to build a gas pipeline to the border at Rio Grande do Sul.
This decision affects the relations with Bolivia as a supplier to Brazil and
Argentina, which at f irst also seemed to be affec ted by agreements on iron
ore coming from Ur~cum. Uruguay also expects to be supplied with gas by Ar-
- gentina. The three components of Urupabol (Uruguay~ Paraguay and Bolivia)
are viewing with a wait-and-see attitude these new situations that are taking
place in the Plate Basin. Uruguay may even feel certain misgivings, owing
to the great friendship of its only two neighbors.
Paraguay has lost part of its negotiating power in the energy area, altho~igh
- it may have accrued very sizable benefits in the recent dealings with Argen-
tina.
Although Yacyreta represented Argentina's emergence from isolation,at a cost
higher than normal, this new appearance seems to have been unnecESSary. Cor-
pus will make it possible to view the real new positions of both countries.
Bolivia, staggering in it~ unique kind of democracy, may mistrust a strong
friendship that changes its role as a center for contacts. The Argentine-
Brazilian rapprochement will definitively restate ITrupabol from the time
that Argentina temporarily gives up its image as a defense attorney.
The importance of the agreements in the international realm is due to the
new moves of chessmen that they causeon the South American chessboard. Bra-
zil is replaced with ttie smiling image of Figueiredo ~;ho, nevertheless, in
his latest message delivered in Buenos Aires, did not fail to quote a com-
ment, apparently one of reconciliation, from the Baron of Rio Branco, who
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was so little liked by all the countries bordering Brazil. 'Ihe "patron of
Brazilian diplomacy," as the president called him, gained many square kilo-
meters of neighboring territory for his country in diplomatic contests.
[Jas it an allusion or a warning?
- COPYRIGHT: L~ Opinion, 1980
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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
ARGENTINE COLUMDTIST CITES BRAZIL'S EXPANSIONIST TENDENCY
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 18 May 80 p 10
[Article by Sergio Ceron: "T~ao Policies Toward the World and Latin America")
[Text] "We are, because of our situation, a Third World country, and from
this fact stem our individual positions in the international context, espe-
cially with regard to the matter of the transformation of the worldwide po-
litical and economic order." This was Joao Baptista de Figueiredo's response
to the Argentine agency TELAM, during the course of a recent interview.
Our country, on the other hand, even when underestimated and harassed by tl:e
United States and Europe, knows that it is irreversibly united with the West;
not only because of its national interests, but essentially because it shares
with the nations included in that controversial, contradictory and at~times
disconcerting West, a vision of the cosmos, a concept of the dignity of man
and ot the self-determination of peoples.
To be sure, we Argentines clearly understand that we must strive to have our
role as a nation in search of its historical fulfillment recognized. But,
at the same time, we realize that we are potentially a country that must be
taken into account from a strategic and economic standpoint when the ground- ~
rules of a new international order are being debated. Despite all the cur-
rent diff iculties, the future appears propitious for us. In a world beset
by the energy and food~crisis, we are about to become exporters of hydrocar-
bons and uranium, and we have sufficient capacity to multiply our food pro-
du~tion over the next two decades until it is tripled. Hence, we have ex-
cellent arguments for negotiating our inclusion in the present world and for
forcing the Western nations to give us a worthy place in the common family
existence. For this purpose, Argentina is also counting on moving in the
endeavor of constituting a geoeconomic and geopolitical area integrated into
the rest of Latin America. T`he basic goal of its foreign policy on the con-
tinental level is integration, because, in the 21st century, no nation in
our region will be able to confront the challenges of the times alI by it-
self. Some day, Latin America coill be a nation, and what exactly defines
the concept of a nation is the awareness of sharing a destiny.
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Brazil, on the other hand, has had its steps guided since the 1930's by a
political concept that has led it (a legitimate ambition to be sure) to be-
come converted into an emerging power and ta lead Latin America. Gen Gol-
bery do Couto e Silva, the intellectual inspirer of the Brazilian ruling
class and a constant presence behind the throne in all the governments that
have succeeded one another since 1964, developed the doctrine of his country's
"manifest destiny" which, in the final analysis, is nothing but the "aggiorna-
mento" (updating] of the goals assigned for Brazil's foreign policy by the
great foreign minister who indeiibly marked Itamaraty with his personal stamp:
the Baron of Rio Branco. At the turn of the century, the key points in his
strategy cited the need to choose the United States as a protective power,
to back Brazilian influence in South America, foster.pan-Americanism, win
the continental leadership and consolidate Brazilian prestige in the world.
Sor.?e of those steps were aehieved and are still in effect, others have become
_ obsol.ete; but the fact i5 that the guidelines of Brazilian national strategy
have remained constant. The present doctrine, that of "manifest destiny,"
is based on a nationalist, developmentalist and expansionist criterion, at
odds w~.th Latin American ifltegration.
Let us observe what Golbery do Couto e Silva says in.his book, "Geopolitical
Aspects of Brazil": "We too (like the United States) can invoke a manifest
destiny, and all the more so when it does not interfere with the interests
of our older brothers to the north in the Caribbean. The superiority in
Latin America is obvious. 2'here are only possible rivals: Argentina, Colom-
bia and Peru."
The policy of rapprochement with the United States reached its high point
during the government of Richard Nixon, when the latter, encouraged by Henry
Kissinger, announced the delegation of hegemonic powers for South America
in Brazil. But various events, including the intensification of an implicit
alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany to create a new political pole _
in the West (a "peak" episode, the signing of the agreement on nuclear co-
cperation against Washington's wishes) and Brazil's openness toward the Third
World and to~the oil-producing Arab nations subject to the Soviet Union's
influence (the contracts with Iraq) put an abrupt end to the idyll. The
"responsible pragmatism" of Itamaraty's policy indicated for Brazil other
courses of action to serve its national interests.
On 2 June 1977, the then undersecretary of state for Latin.American affairs,
Terence Todman, proclaimed in Caracas, a few hours before leaving for Bra-
silia, that James Carter's government was unwilling to accept the policy
of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, claiming that Brazil is.the leading coun-
~ try in Latin America."
Then there began a slow, arduous rapprochement between Washington and Buenos
Aires, often concealed by the harsh debates on the doctrine of human rights
and the controversies that were aroused regarding Argentine nuclear policy.
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It is likely that 1980 marks the certain start of a new phase in the bilater-
al relations, wherein utiderstanding will prevail over confrontation, and
wherein a realistic view of the world strategic chessboard will prompt the ~
North American leaders to give more consideration to their security require-
ments than to the doctrinaire speculations of their ideologues. Washington
must somehow fill the void left by the estrangement .from Brazil. Argentina
could play that role, provided the United States understands that its effi-
cacy is contingent on Buenos Aires' ability to fully implement its policy
of integration with the rest of Latin America. The strategic rear area of
the United States would be covered by an integrated, developed region, en-
dowed with political stability. It is here that the interests of the two
Americas become not only compatible, but also complementary.
A few years ago, I had the privilege of hearing in Buenos Aires, at a meet-
ing reserved for politicians and analysts, a speech by Aristides Calvani.
The former Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs., then chairman of the
related Senate committee, came to propose that Argentina head the integra-
tion process. For many reasons, the astute V~nezuelan statesman felt that
the responsibility for leading this historic endeavor should be assigned to
our country; because the first step to be taken was to integrate the Spanish-
speaking countries, in view of the fact that Brazil had a geopolitical con-
cept aimed at insuring its continental expansion and.its leadership in the
region. But, Calvani clearly explained, that could not be the final goal,
~ since neither Brazil nor the.rest of Latin.America apart from it would have
sufficient power to cou~teract the pressure from the centers of political
and economic power in the next century.
The proposal was to integrate Hispanic America, so as then to negotiate be-
tween one power and another, with a nation which, during the last decade,
had tripled its gross product, and which had a potential that was not match-
- ed by that of its neighbors, con~idered individually.
And it is here that we reach the explanation for why, although Joao Baptista
de Figueiredo claims that Latin American relations.must be inspired "by non-
intervention, peace and the search for harmony and equilibrium," he refuses
any commitment to employ a policy of continental integration. To Itamaraty,
integration means bilateral agreements with each one of the Hispanic American
countries. To Argentina, on the other hand, it impl.ies making the negotia-
tions universal, so as to form in Latin America a single, powerful, politic-
al and economic area', with a decisive influence on international relations;
an alliance of interests and cultures whei~in all are united in the service
of an endeavor, in "common and jointly involved endeavor," as the old writ-
ers of commercial treatises used to say when referring to the association
of individuals for reasons of profit. The difference being that, in addi-
tion to economic interests, a un=_`ed Latin America could strive on behalf
of its concept of life which, after all, is merely the result of its Greco-
Latin and Christian heritage. A necessary requisite for attaining that
goal is to thwart any attempt to destabilize the region. The advent of new
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- Marxist regimes, particularly in South A~merica, w~ould represent a destruction
at th~ roots of the attempt to achieve this historic enterprise. At this
point, we must understand the concern of the San Martin Palace over the fate
oE other nations on the continent; not, as Brazilian spokesmen have errone-
ously claimed, as an attempt to create subregional alliances and shared lead-
erships. At the beginning of the month, with correct geopolitical insight, _
Carlos Washington Pastor told the newspaper 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO that the
fall of Honduras and Guatemala (the presumable new targets of the extreme
left after Nicaragua and the possible collapse of E1 Salvador) would virtual-
ly cut the Central American continent in two; and, after such an event, it
would become a pole of ideological irradiation which would exert pressure on
Mexico to the north, and on the nations of the Andean Group to the south.
In the first contingency, the Marxist presence would reach the borders of
the United States; and, in the,second, the doors of Brazi],.
Pastor's probe met with a wall of resistance in Itamaraty, and so much so
that the Argentine Embassy in Brasilia hastened to explain that its govern-
ment was not sponsoring an ideological alliance, and that, on the contrary,
it upheld its traditional policy of "non-intervention."
The Argentine naivete (or diplomatic slip?) enabled the Brazilian foreign
minister, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, to take advantage of a dialog with news-
men and emphasize: "Neither Argentina nor Brazil has to form blocs. Mutual
integration and cooperation are more useful."
The Brazil of the "manifest destiny" had an opportunity to generate the image
of a country opposed to all types of pressure on its neighbors, while Argen-
tina had to bear the burden of attempting to create hegemonic blocs.
The underlying reality consists of the confrontation of two strategies: Ar-
gentina, aiming for continental integration within the context of what
Charles De Gaulle once described as the "Europe of native lands," that is,
an associations of equals, united to demand their right to live in dignity;
and Brazil, which has not changed its ambition to be a power that dictates
rules in which it considers its "sphere of influence."
The world situation requires a break in the doctrine of "manifest destiny'~;
~t does not expunge it. This is why Joao Baptista de Figueiredo, with the
, image of a cordial, open Brazilian leader (replacing the Germanic sternness
of Ernesto Geisel) is a lof ty emigsary of the policy of "bil~teral" rela-
tions: bilateral today with Argentina, a few months ago with Venezuela, a
few days before arriving in Buenos Aires, with Paraguay, and, in-the near
future, with Peru. Itamaraty is hastening to disarm the Caracas-Lima-
Buenos Aires geopolitical txiangl.e which was once cited as a bone of con-
tention for Golbery's expansion~sm. -
Brazil needs energy. Venezuela, Peru and Argentina can supply it (oil, gas,
hydroelectricity and uranium). It also sorely needs to win new markets, to
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make up for the decline created for its exports by the world recession. Its
economic model demands an aggressive policy of foreign sales and a search
for other markets for its products. Latin America (and Argantina in parti-
cular) meets some of its needs; the others can only be met by the socialist
and Third World countrie5. Therefore, Brazil has been virtually prohibited
f~om becoming enlisted in the West.
Such is the dilemma created by two national and two geopolitical strategies.
_ Each one upholds legitimate interests. In the case of Argentina, the situ-
ation requires clarity and firmness, in understanding the Brazilian circum-
stances, and in accepting everything that is mutually beneficial in a policy
of cooperation and friendship, while on the other hand rejecting what would
represent subordinating the nation's permanent interests to the explicable
_ and legitimate needs of our neighbor.
COPYRIGHT: La Opinion, 1980
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ARGENTINA
THREE MONTHS OF POLITICAL DIALOG SHOW CONSENSUS
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 18 May 80 p 11
[Article by Eduardo J. Paredes: "The First Results of the Dialog Show a
Coinciding Trend"j
[Text] Let us continue with the topic of the dialog, because there has been
a great deal of "off the record" reporting on the subject. The most recent
~ to exchange views with the minister of interior, Gen Albano Eduardo Harguin-
deguy, were five members of the board of the Junior Chamber, an entity which
became popular as a result of its annual contribution to the traditional
"10 outstanding young men," but which is also the author of a methodical
and little publicized work on behalf of the training and catapulting of
leaders. It seemed an exaggeration to many for the Junior Chamber to be
invited to the dialog, also because it is assumed that the young men whom
the entity is projecting toward decision-making are no longer so young (in-
dividuals between 35 and 45 years of age are usually selected) and belong
to a kind of elite group, not through their own fault, but through the fault
of those who propose them for this status wherein it is so difficult to ex-
cel. However, the sources who were questioned noted that the entity is suf-
ficiently representative to be regarded as one of the few organizations of
young people that do not reflect a particular political label, much less a
partisan cause.
The Ministry of Interior has been painstakingly following the partial evalu-
ation of the political dialog since its beginning, and could claim that, last
week, it made an overall assessment of its effects up until the twelfth meet-
ing, that is, the contact with Francisco :~lanrique. Important elemEnts in
that evaluation have been disclosed.
The Battle Against Subversion
The sources stressed that there was almost unanimity among those invited on
analyzing the subversive phenomenon that has occurred in the country, and
that, at the same time, they consider the action taken by the Armed Forces
in defending the national ir.tegrity attacked by the terr~rists to have been
- both effective and just. A large majority of participants agreed with the
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military theory that there should be no investigation of what has occurred;
although several (in what appeared to be more of a spirit of desire than of
knowing a means of achieving it) thought that the Armed Forces should bring
- the matter to a final end, a kind of "wax seal" that would shelve the issue,
but without leaving any do~tbts about the existence of a last word. There
were some who proposed the official publication of the list of missing per-
sons and, in this instance, the minister explained that such a list existed,
but that it related solely to the reports of missing persons made to his
ministry, which did not agree with others circulating among national and in-
- ternational entities concerned with the issue of human rights.
' Then there reportedly arose the question that produced the so-called "Bal-
bin theory," floating in the political atmosphere since the Radical leader
said in Spain that, in his opinion, those who were missing in Argentina were
dead. In the opinion of the observers, this, regardless of how hard it
mi.ght be for many, would enormously simplify both the drama produced by a
intrigue of that kind and the strange legal aspect caused after the definition
of a missing person was made to determine those cases. The.minister's posi-
tion in this regard is clearcut: He does not add nor subtract anything from
what has already been stated by the supreme leaders of the three branches of
the Armed Forces on the matter.
On the other hand, however, he cited a generalized idea which, rather than
resolving the issue in the past, seeks to put an end to the problem in the
future: the absolute and responsible control of the forces by the state.
Closed Book
There has also been unanimity to date among those. invited to the dialog on
approving all the concepts in the political bases o� the national reorgani-
zation process devised by the Armed Forces and submitted to the public, not
as an exclusive document, but precisely as the starting point for an in-
creased enhancement of that endeavor (and this phase of the dialog is es-
pecially useful for that purpose), in order to find a model of a country to
which the majority of Argentines aspire.
But the same coincidence existed in the detailed analysis of the bases, re-
garding an admitted flaw: the lack of emphasis on the federalist proposals
in the plan.
Presidentialism
The evaluation of the dialog indicates that the large majority of partici-
pants therein were inclined to retain the presidentialist system, consider-
ing i.t more closely allied to our history and to the political idiosyncra-
cies of Argentines. The opposing view was put forth by Prof Americao Ghiol-
di, the top-ranking leader of the Social Democratic Party, who advocated a
semi-presidential system, with the election of a president through a general
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agreement among parties, and the election of a prime minister belonging to
the ranks of the party with the most votes. Thus far, the latter has evoked
a certain amount of skepticism on the part of the military, but it should be
noted that (as the columnist and political analyst, Jose Claudio Escribano,
has already noted at a meeting with colleagues) Professor Ghioldi was ob-
viously not referring, with his proposal, to th~ progress of a stable poli-
tical system, but rather to the forced transitlon to it by a civilian-
military convergence that would make it possible to definitively establish
a democratic way of life. In other words, Ghioldj.'s proposal involves a
practical method for an electoral solution which, through an agreement among
parties, would allow for the election of a military president, a politician
prime minister and a congress representing the electoral tendency of the ci-
tizens.
With respect to this part of the future institutionalization, the sources
pointed out that there was a proposal emanating from the dialog that, when
the phase of electoral consultation occurred, only one third of the congress
would be elected, while the other two thirds would be provided for with
appointments, apparently by the military authorities. It would be ridicu-
lous to assume that the Armed Forees have already formed a homogeneous opin-
ion on that matter. The method, a way of curbing the possibility of a con-
gressional excess that would cause a conflict of authority, indicates that,
in the consecutive elections to renew congress, legislators should be elected
in thirds, until it was completely filled in three elections every 2 years.
It was in the aforementioned discussion among newsmen that Escribano's eru-
dition evoked a shared amount of admiration for his knowledge, and guffaws
over a strange ethnic association: It so happens that the method was used
in Thailand by the military when they began their institutionalist break-
through. It was columnist Jose Ignacio Lopez who finished off the irony by
talking about a"Thai model." The informants declined to identify exactly
who proposed that solution for the future means of restoring the legislative
branch, but common sense indicates that the notion is merely an isolated
remark, also aimed at making the transition from a state of exception to -
one of definitive normalization, and not at keeping it as a permane:~t method.
Municipalism
Another point stressed by the so urces was the unanimity that has existed tY:us
far on attaching special institutional importance to a strong system capable
of attaching special importance to municipalism, to be sure, witll very dif-
ferent viewpoints. While some of the participants in the dialog view the
municipal task as an administrative method of vital importance for raising
the living standard of the citizen with respect to the work that he is start-
ing in his own backyard, rather than looking at what is going on in the
governmen~ residence....others, however, view municipalism as the seed of
the citizen's participation in the political life of his country, far re-
moved from tihe merely statutory and efficiency-oriented positions relating
to the common task. This second position (backed for obvious reasons by the
representatives of political par ties) is one which observes in the develop-
ment of municipalism the best school for governors, with the theory (by
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no means preposterous) that those who become intendents or aldermen create
in the municipality a major school for sub sequent access to the provincial
or national legislatures, or to more impor tant echelons in the executive
- branch. It is a means of guaranteeing, in time and on the basis of tangible
facts, the famous suitability which everyone admires and proclaims, but which
cannot be achieved other than by a practical demonstration of the amount of
intelligence, integrity and executive skill that meritorious public office
reauires.
The rli litary Authority
- The issue of military participation in the future ins titutionalization of
the country, according to the statements made by our sources, appears to
have been better interpreted in the news media than among politicians, among
whom there have arisen expectations which are as irr itating as they are
dubious concerning the military's desire to participate in running public
administration.
The Armed Forces have actually never said that they wanted.to be converted
into an authority above the state authority, because that would result in
a political format that had nothing to do with the democracy that they sin-
cerely advocate. It is claimed that a military commander currently serving
in the government, upon analyzing the matter with his advisers, humorously
intx~oducedicheinerealitliwould beanothing butParcommongmilitary dictatorship
system, wh Y
with democratic trappings.
What the Armed Forces want, logically, is not to remain dissociated from the
high-level policy decision-making in the country, af ter having been respon-
sible (at a high cost of lives, sacrifices and the inevitable internal fric-
tion) for the total. assumption of political power i uttit bluntly,ltheydwant
to start t he nationa?. reor ganization process. To p
to prevent this from ending in a complete transfer of poLitical responsibi-
lity to the civilians, returning to the traditional fluctuations between
civilian and military governments. But the Armed Forces have in no way
established the form of that participation, much less hinted at a departure
� from the constitutiinedito suspendWthehforce~ofStheeConstitutionh~renounce
cause they felt ob g
Che spirit of the Consti.tution of 1853.
The politicians in particular are the ones who have unnecessarily suspected
- that this need that has been proposed to definitively establish the mili-
tary authorities' participation in the running of the government has anti-
constitutional connotations.
And, up until now, and quite effectively, the dialo g has servu~ist whoaspoke
way toward the forms of participation. It was apparently a 3
at length about the historical considera tions reflecting the issue. Until ,
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the institutidnalization of the Air Force, there were Ministries of War and
Navy. Later, the constitutional practice of calling for a law on ministries
which did not necessarily establish the eight portfolios separated the Arm-
ed Forces from the national cabinet. Most of the participants in the dia- "
log are inclined to return to the military ministr.ies, and even to a second
course of action, which was already ta.ken during the Radical government of
1963-66: the formation of a National Security Council, with obvious, ex-
tensive military participation.
- In this respect it should be pointed out that something is afoot in the mili-
tary ranks: what has not worked is the appointment of military ministers who
are not answerable for the leadership of the commanders-in-chief. To find
a really constructive formula, when the president forms his cabinet, he should
reach an agreement to have the military ministers be a real reflection of
= each branch in the executive branch, and not mere appointments which were of-
ten made but were seldom agreed to by the commanders and the high command.
_ It should be said that the issue is a priority one for achieving the pattern
for a realistic policy. But we must point out that, nowadays, the Armed _
Forces are hearing, through the dialog, ideas on the subject expressed by
the sectors that have been consulted. And there has been considerable pro-
gress in the idea of achieving a future military participation, which is,
moreover, institutionalized in all Western governments, within a political
system that is perfectly geared to the philosophy of our Constitution.
COPYRIGHT: La Opinion, 1980 -
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COSTA RICA
COMMUNIST PARTX CONDEI~IS U.S. POLICIES
PA171304 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0005 GMT 17 Jun 80
[Text] San Jose, 16 Jun (PL)--The participants at the 13th Congress of the -
Costa Rican Communist Party have condemned the aggressive policy of U.S.
imperialism against the countries of the socialist co~unity, the national
liberation movements and democracy. The congress of the Costa Rican Com-
munists scored the U.S. attitude in the Caribbean, Central America and
other regions of the world, an attitude aimed at undermining the detente
process.
During today's session, the delegates studied and approved the report pre-
sented by Manuel Mora Valverde, the p arty's secretary general. The report _
analyzes the national and international situation and some of the activities -
carried out by the party since the last congress. The participants agreed
that the country is going through a serious political, economic and soical
crisis, pointing out Costa Ri~a's dependency on the International Monetary
Fund and monopolies and noting the failure of the "development model" imposed
by the United States.
The Comnnunist Party imposed on itself the task of creating a broad d~mocra-
tic front that may unite all the patriotic and anti-imperialist forces in
the country to struggle for true national independence.
The congress also examined statute changes and elected a new Central Com-
mittee that has 35 members, 5 more than the preirious one. The congress
also elected 15 alternates. -
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CUBA
'GRANMA' DENOUNCE~ CARTER'S SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY
PA071445 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1330 GMT 7 Jun 80
[TextJ Havana, 7 Jun (PL)--The support of U.S.~President James Carter
for the Uruguayan Government's plan to obtain an alleged return to con-
stitutionality is denounced today by the newspaper GRANMA.
_ In an item in its international page, the Cuban paper co~enbs on the
statements by the U.S. President, on receiving former Uruguayan Presi-
dent Jorge Pachecho Areco as ambassador, according to which "He is
following with interest the process aimed at returning this Latin American
na tion to a constitutional governmPnt system."
Carter, the paper said, off ers his confidence to the deceitful plan which
the Uruguayan military has set in motion with the obvious purpose of
maintaining the reins of power under the guise of a return to constitu-
tionali~y. ~
GRANMA questions the success of a popular ref er~ndum in Uruguay where--
_ noting the prisons are f illed with political prisoners--there are many
persons missing and one of every five Uruguayans has decided to leave the
country in view of the existing political persecution and unemployment
p rob lem . ~
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HAITI
OPPOSITION DISCLOSES U.S.-DUVALIER AGREF~IENT ON INTERVENTION
PA091714 Havana PRELA in ;Spanish 0335 GMT 9 Jun 80 -
[Text] Mexico City, 9 Jun (PL)--Haitian President for Life Jean-Claude
Duvalier, in an act of treason, has signed agreements with the United States
authorizing intervention by foreign troops in Haiti in the case of internal
political conflicts, it has been charged here.
HAITI INFORMACION, the organ of the Haitian Democratic Committee, has published
an agreement signed by Duvalier after a visit to Haiti by U.S. Gen Robert
Schweitzer. The agreement authorizes intervention by Dominican troops in
Haiti. The agreement states:
"In view of the current difficulty the U.S. Armed Forces are having in in- -
tervening in Latin America, and particularly in Hait3., where an outbreak
of political and military tension can emerge at any moment; in view of the
great numerical, material, technical, tactical and morale weakness of the
Haitian Armed Forces, which do not have a navy, air force or artillery; and
in case a real guerrilla front emerges in Haiti, the Haitian and U.S. govern-
ments propose to the Dominican Government and armed forces that they directly
intervene in Haiti to become the main fighting force against the Hairian
guerrillas.
"Therefore, the U.S. Government firmly declares it is willing to help the
Dominican Governmen.t and forces in all fields (political, military and eco-
nomic) so they can fully carry out that possible role."
HAITI INFORMACION added that as a result of the Schweitzer-Duvalier agree-
ment, Lt Gen Mario Imbert McGregor, chief of the Dominician armed forces,
announced on 15 April the construction of 12 new military camps along the
border with Haiti.
The general also ordered the construction of a new milit-ary garrison, housing
and training areas for troops in Mecasi and the expansion of the Pedro
Santana and Elias Pina forts.
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According to the agreement and to talks subsequently held by Dominican Presi-
dent Guzman and Duvalier, the Dominican Army began "Operation Border Con-
f raternity . "
HAITI INFORMACION charged that this is an exercise for the mobilization of
an intervent ion force coordinated by the operating center of tt~e Dominican
armed forces and the national police.
HAITI INFORMACION concludes by issuing a call on behalf of the Haitian
immigrants and the Haitian Patriotic Nationalist Organization to all the -
continent's progressive forces to denounce Duvalier's treason, U.S. arro-
gance and the attempts to promote the Domi.nican Republic's intervention to
crush the Haitian democratic movement. ,
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NICARAGUA
COMANDANTE DOS APPEARS ON DIRECT LINE PROGRAM
PA132200 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2005 GMT 13 Jun 80
[Text] Managua, 13 Jun (PL)--The Sandinist Fron t includes Marxists and
Christians united under the symbol of Sandino. That is our militants' ide-
ology which, we believe, will help us in the advance of this revolution,
said Dora Maria Tellez.
Comandante Dos, well-known for her participation in the assault of the Na-
tional Palace on August 1978, appeared last nigh t in the Radio Sandino
"Direct Line" program to answer questions to the Nicaraguan people.
The vice president nf the State Council explained that those who are Sandi-
nists maintain flexibility and are receprive to and able to synthetize the
best of any theory and apply it creatively to conform to the needs of each
country.
She noted that the revolution is Sandinist because it responds to the legacy
of Sandino, because it considers the workers as the backbone of the pro-
cess and because it is anti-imperialist and rej ects any foreign interven-
tion which may try to exploit the country.
Dora Maria Tellez explained that the release of the members of the Workers
Front and the Central of Labor Action and Unity (CAUS), who had been ar-
rested for promoting antigovernment activities, was possible thanks to the
magnanimous nature of the revolution which believes in man's ability to cor-
rect past mistakes.
Notwithstanding, she warned, the people will be on the alert against those
who work against production, economic recovery and the revolution as a whole,
and added that the National Sandinist Liberation Front policy is not to
adopt harsh measures, but, due to its moral and political authority, to
offer those confused the opportunity to mend the ir ways.
Referring to the participation of the petty bourgeoisie in the revolution,
she said that many companeros of that sector are engaged in reconstruction
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NICARAGUA
MINISTER CARDENAL'S VISIT TO USSR CONCLUDES
PA261748 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1955 GMT 25 Jun 80
[Article by Leandro Pubillones]
[Text] Moscow, 25 J un (PL)--Nicaraguan Culture Minister Ernesto Cardenal
has said here that t he Nicaraguan peaple are the masters of their culture
as they are the mast ers of their means of production, the land and the mines
which were controlle d by the Somoza dictatorship.
Cardenal today ended an official visit to thQ Soviet Union. He headed a
delegation which included writer Lisandro Chavez Alfaro, chief of the National
Art Department, and Silvia Gutierrez.
Cardenal said that during the first year o� the Sandinist revolution there
has been a major cul tural rebirth in Nicaragua with the creation of culture
houses and folk, theater and music groups. -
He noted the high ar tistic level of current craftsmanship, primitivistic
painting and the new protest songs.
Sut the most imporCa nt thing of all is the people's access to culture,
Minister Cardenal summed up, because culture used to be accessible only to
the privileged.
In addition to meeti ng with Soviet Culture Minister Pietr Demichev, Cardenal
and his party spent almost 10 days touring historic and architectural monu-
ments, museums and a rt centers.
We visited heroic Le ningrad, birth of the socialist October Revolution,
this revolution whic h is a great source of inspiration to our people and
for which rnankind must be grateful, he added.
The Nicaraguan deleg ation and its Soviet counterpart drew up a work protocol
for Cultural Coopera tion 1980-1981 in line with the agreement signed here
in March by a deiega tion of the junta of the Government of National Recon-
struction which incl uded commanders of the revolution Humberto Ortega, Tomas
Borge and Henry Ruiz, and also Moises Hassan.
_ y.
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The protocol will permit theexchange of artistic groups and soloists, cultur-
al experts, exhibitions and representatives of the unions of composers,
writers, painters and others with the Sandinist Cultural Workers AssociaCion.
Our experts in the conservation of historic and architectural monuments and
our library scientists will come to the Soviet Union and we will receive
experts in these and other fields in Nicaragua, Cardenal noted.
Soviet-Nicaraguan cultural exchange will also cover the promotion of the
study of Russian in Nicaragua and the translation and publication of Soviet
literary works there, and the publication of books by Nicaraguan authors
in the Soviet Union.
They will also exchange radio and television programs, athletes' visits and
touris[s.
The poet and culture minister was very enthusiastic when he spoke about the
emergence of revolutionary literature in Nicaragua: "We have createdpoetry
workshops in factories, communities, m~litary units, study centers. We now
have L00 poets who have come out of the mass of the people as a result of
that work." _
Nicar.agua is composing realistic, vital, revolutionary poet ry, Cardenal ex-
plained, and when the literacy campaign is over several Ruben Darios will
surface in our country because we have always had a poetic tradition, he
stated.
Regarding repeated attacks on the Sandinist revolution in N icaragua, Cardenal
said that the reactionaries are trying to put obstacles along the way to
development by creating difficulties.
That is the normal way of the reactionaries, he said, but the enemies of
the Sandinist revolution have been defeated. He added that nothing will
prevent the accomplishment of the goals of the revolution f or which so many
martyrs gave their lives.
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NICARAGUA
RANCHER CONFESSES COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TIES
PA061525 Havana PRELA in English 1510 GMT 6 Jun 80
[A~ticle by Francisco Urizarri]
_ [Text] Managua, 6 Jun (pL)--Rancher Odel Incer Barquero, arrested three days
ago by state security, confessed his collaboration with counterrevolutionary
bands, announced Jaime Wheelock, commander of the revolution and farm develop-
menC minister.
Incer Barquero is deputy representative of the Nicaraguan Cattle Producers '
(UPANIC) in the Council of State and his arrest was given wide coverage in
the press media with links to private business.
In this regard, at a press conference Wheelock labelled "tendentious and
alarmist" reports in the daily LA PRENSA under the heading "Mass Arrests of
Ranchers in Boacoa." _
The irresponsible report, added the member of the national leadership of the
Sandinist front, is designed to suggest that the government is launching an
offensive against the producers when in fact those arrested are in that situa-
tion because of their counterrevolutionary activities.
- Incer signed a confession admitting he contributed 500 dollars for the coun-
terrevolutionary activities of the self styled "Democratic Armed Forces"
- (FAD) which was partially dismantled by the Sandinist security.
This cattleman, s aid Wheelock, was well aware that FAD was a pro-Somoza
organization led by such elements ~s former sports leader Carlos Garcia, whc?
was also a lieutenant in the Somoza security agency.
He added that the Incer Barquero brothers (both are under arrest) are also
linked to counterrevolutionary bands in the zone of Matigua, Boaco, Boaquito,
Chontales and other center-western cattle zones, as well as in this capital.
One of those bands killed a Sandinist policeman during an attack two weeks
ago on the San Jose de los Remates garrison 100 kilometers northeast of
Managua.
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Wheelock also spoke of the release under a pardon of five members of the
self styled "workers front" whom he described as elements whose ideological -
confusions and deviations turned them into obstacles for the revolutionary
process.
"We've spoken with each of them to work for their integration in the revolu-
tionary process," said Wheelock, who added that they will be able to continue
to defend their ideas and dissent, but not fall into illegality because that
means acting against the revolution.
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PANAMA
INTF.RNATIONAL SEMINAR DISCUSSES MEDIA INFLUENCE, FAMILY
PA120418 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0345 GMT 12 Jun 80
[Text] Panama City, 11 Jun (PL)--Several examples of manipulation of the
news by the international news agencies were given today during the second
~ session of the seminar on mass media influence.
The delegations from Chile, the Soviet Union and the International Organiza-
tion of Journalists (IOJ) presented their position papers to the delegates
from 41 nations who began to discuss them in four committees during the semi-
nar on the influence of the media on women, children and the family.
Hortensia Bussi, Allende's widow, discussed some examples of the international
press campaigns waged against the Popular Unity government, which was pre-
sided over by Salvador Allende, in or.der to destabilize it and lead it to the
military coup d'etat.
She cited the extensive coverage that the media, backed by capital, gave to
the maneuvers of the rightwing opposition to destabilize the popular govern-
ment while silencing its achievements.
She also noted the coverage that the media give to the alleged economic
accomplishments of the military junta led by Gen Augusto Pinochet, disregard-
ing the poverty, unemployment, lack of education and health of millions of
Chileans.
The participants in the seminar also heard a lecture by an old Soviet news-
woman, Valentina Vaniti, who denounced the constant campaign undertaken by
the international news agencies against the socialist countries and their
constant warmongering.
Efrain Ruiz Caro, IOJ representative in Latin America, presented a position
paper on media ownership. �
He explained the media are closely linked in Latin America and most belong
to family groups which defend interests alien to the people whom they claim
to serve.
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~ Ruiz Caro advocated the collective ownership of the press and briefly
referred to Peru's experience with this which, he said, has been interrup-
ted, but its basic guidelines should be studied and furthered.
The seminar which is being held at the conventions palace in Panama City
wi 11 end on 14 June.
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