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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200'100032-3 ; . ~ ~F ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 I FOR OE FICIAL USE ONI.Y JPRS L/9201 . 21 July 1980 ' ; ; - ONest E u r~ e R e o rt ~ p . ; CFOUa 32/80) , t . ~ . ~ , , - �1 _ l I f$ FOREIGN BROADCAST lNFORMATION SERUICE FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 . NOTE - JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign ^ - newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] oY [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was - processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- _ ma.tion was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are _ enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- ' tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in th~ original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an _ item originate with the source. Times within items are as _ given by source. � The contents of this publicati.on in no way represent the poli- _ cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. ~ For ftirther information on report content call (703~ 351-7_811 or 351-?.501 ~Greece, C}~prus, Turkeyl. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE Oi~1LY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/92Q1 21 Jt~ly 1980 WEST EU RO PE REPO RT - (FOUO 32/80) CONTENTS ~ - _ THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE National Defense Commission's Bigeard Interviewed (Marcel Aigeard Intervie~a; PARIS MATCH, 13 Jun 80).. 1 : Firat Three Years of Military Programming Law Reviewed (Yvan Nnel; ARMEES D'AUJOURA'HUI, Jun 80) 3 COUNTRY SECTION - FRANCE More Efficient Use cf Defenae Resources Called For (Bertrand Lenicque; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jun 80) 8 - Military Service Reform Examined in Detail (Michel Labro, Yann de 1'Ecotais; L'EXPRESS, 7 Jun 80) 14 Mirage 2000: Two Years of Testing Summed Up (Jacquea Morisset; AIR ~ COSMOS, 29 Mar 80) 25 - _ Improved Operations, Financial Savings Deacribed (Bertrand de Lapresle; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jun 80) 31 ITALY - Financial Aspects of New Government-Labor TJnion Accord (IL SOLE - 24 ORE, 13 M~y 80) 36 Projected Increased Expe~:ditures, by Claudio Alo La Malfa Defenda Program Coata, Giorgio La Ma1fa Ir.terview a L I I I - WE - 15 0~'OLTO ) ~ ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOK Or'~ 1CiA;., USE UNLY - SPAIN Suarez~ Ability To Govern Questioned (Editorial, Juan-Tom~e de Salas; CAMBZO 16, 1~ riay so) 42 ~ Interior Minister Diac:xsaes Terrorism (Juan Joae Roson Perez Interview;CAMBIO 16,8 Ju.: 80) 44 - Workers Party Leader Glosses Over Extreme Left's Squabbles - (Joae Sanroma Aldea Interview; CAI~BIO ~6, 22 Jun 80) 52 � Briefs ETA Leader in Algeria 55 UCD Congreas 55 _ ~ ~ - b - ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FqR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSIdN'S BIGEARD INTERVIEWED � _ , Paris PARIS MATCH in French 13 Jun 80 p 81 [Interview with Marcel Bigeard of the National Defense Commission by Florence Portes] [Text] (Question] Should France be equipped with a neutron bomb? _ [Answer] The neutron bomb is an improved Pluton, a still more modern arm which does still more harm by deatroying people without destroying prop erty. As ours is a dissuasive policy--it is the end of the world or nothing--we should therefore do some research on the neutron bomb, for we canno~ lag behind the United States or the USSR. Gener~l de Gaulle, who was not one to lag behind, and who contrary to everyone else resolved to develop nuclear ~ _ power, would most certainly not be against it. [Question] On the strategic plane, what are the different points of view . among the four political units who are seated at the committee? [Answer] It is not my place to disclose these differences to you. At any rate, the Communists, Socialists, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the UDF [French Democratic Union] are all in agreement on strategic power. A few years ago, that was not so. Moreover, the entire committee is not ~ against a reasonable increase in the number of nuclear submarines. [Question] IIias France the means of pursuing its nuclear policy while at the ~ same time it is developing the neutron bomb? _ [Answer] Here w~ go back to the neutron bomb again. But we have not yet _ reached the stage of asking for research. I'll say once again: at this point, the Amerieans would like to have it--under certain cbnditions--and the Russians do not have it. And if neither one nor the other has it, perhaps there is no need to keep on trying to see which one can outdo the , - other, for at this stage of the game neither one is going to stop trying. Having made my point, I as calling for an increase in our budget which from ~ 3.76 percent of the PIB should go up very quickly to 4 percent and soon after to 4.5 percent. Now that the largest amount has been reached (22 0 billion fanded in 20 years), if we do our utmost, what can prevent us from . . having 8 to 10 nuclear submarines and a neutron bomb into the bargain? 1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 - [Question] Do you be].ieve that there is a risk of war? Some 72 percent of � the French people believe there is, according to the EXPRESS opinion poll. [Answer] That is why now is the time to increase the bsdget: the French people will understand this. Personaliy, I do not believe we are headed for the end of the world. As for war, we are already in one, an economic, demogtaphic war, which is why we need to maintain a standing army in o:der to be able to take a~tion as in Kolwezi, for example, But why would the P.ussians launch a nuclear attack on us? They have always said: we shall not engage in war with you with our t~.nks and our planes. We shall not engage in war until your countries are undermined from within. However, we must be ready for anything. France is separated from the Warsaw Pact countries only by Germany, a 200 kilometer strip, a half-day's run away. - .[Question] While in France, the Pope took up the cudgels against nuclear escalation. Yet, you practising Catholics, are all in favor o� the neutron bomb. [Answer] The best policy, of course, would be wo-rld disarmament. But we must consider what kind of world we are living in. France is not trying to pick a quarrel with anyone. We took action in Africa only at our friends` request, to keep the Russians out. But to enter into face to face conflict wit"t? the - Russians, that would be a very different sitLation. Confronted by a wolf- dog, a little pug that yelps "Stog" is very cute, but it gets him nowhere. - Yo~s would have to see how hard they exert themselves: 2 or 3 years of ~ military service, the Soviet sc~ldier vows to die for his country, and what discipline 4 million men under arms, 15 percent of the PNB [Gross National Product], 80 nuclear submarines, a 12-million kiloton power, a sophisticated airplane, the "Back-Fire," which the Americansdo not have...This is by no neans just to go strawberry picking with. Consequently, faced with a power - such as this, it is better to be on the defensive. y [Question] The RPR has just ~ropnsed a 4-month decrease in military service. Are you in favor of this? [Answer] I am against it. In my opi.nion, it should be 1 year or none at all. This is the way to develop patriotism, an ideal. Just when our armies 1 are reorganized and morale is good is not the time to go and reduce the ranks... [Questi~n] Is sending the privates to clean the beaches defending the country? [Answer] And the paratroopers? The 9th in Brittany? Our fighter pilots? What are you doing with them? There were only 3,000 conscripted men on the b~.aches. But as much as I am against soldiers being used as street sweepers, I believe that when there is a question of a national tragedy, it is only natural that the army be called in. COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse SA ~ 8870 CSO: 3100 2 r~R OFFICIAL ?JSE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE FIRST THREE YEARS OF M1"LITARY PROGRAMMING LAW REVIEWED _ Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 80 pp 56-57 [Article by Capt Yvan Noel--passages between slantlines originalZy p~sblished . in boldface] , [Text] "...A review of the first 3 years of the programming law makes it apparent that legislative goals were attained not only with respect to nuclear forces--improvement of which was a feature of the three preceding programming laws--but also with respect to the main armament programs, general and defense research, as well as the peace of activity of the forces and living conditions of military - - personnel."(1) , Law No 76-531 of 19 June 1976 covering approval of the military programming for the years 1977-1982, in its spec~al article, called for "Parliament to be delivered, before 31 October 1979, a report bringing up to date for the pPriod 1980-1982 the ob~ectives and their relation to military expen~i- tures and equipment for the armed forces." ~ - This report, covering the carrying-out of the law, was deli~~ered by the - go~vernment to zhe Assembly office at the beginning of September 1979 and was the object of a debate, but not a vote, during the last parliamentary session.(2) Midway through the period covered by the law, we can review the overall performance in the first 3 years; to do that, we must look at the main - ob~ectives set in the law in the following di.fferent fields: financial resources, activities, equipment programs, study and research.... It is also possible to assess the usefulness of the new programming method in force. ' One must first of all recall the main features of the 1977-1982 military programming law, and emphasiz~ its clear innovaticns with respect to previous programming laws. 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL`I IC covers /overa'.l programming,/ that is, it takes into account all the expenses of the forces, both operating expenses (Title III) and equipment outlays (Title V). Expressed in /parliamentary credits/--covering the totality of expenses-- it thus offers the armies a guarantee of resources by which they are assured a growth in purchasing power. It fixes /precise objectis/ to attain in the area of equipment; annexed to the law, a catalog recapitulates the delivery orders to be realized during the period covered by the law for the 39 main materiel programs of the 3 forces, while the priority given to the imp rovement of the nuclear forces and necessary efforts in study and research are underlined. ~ ~ The performance review of the first. 3 years of the law can be broken down into the following areas: /In the financial area/ first of all, overall resources devoted toPDescribed for the first 3 years w~ere higher by 3.943 million Fr. than those in the law (in total 204.558 million Fr.(3) compared to 200.615 million Fr.). These supplementary resources reflect, in part, the real change in economic parameters which existed ac the time the law was written. It must be noted, in looking over. these credits, tttat there has been a more rapid return than anticipated to a better bal ance between operating and capital e~^nditures, the Title I~I portion decreasing from 59 percent in 1977 to 56.8 percent in 1979, while that of Title V increased correspondingly fr~m 41 to 43.2 percent. � The appropriations in program authurizations were--in conformity with the law--annually adjusted to the resource packages expressed in parliamentary credits. They increased from 26.550 milZion Fr. in 1977 to 42.892 million Fr. in 1979, for an average growth rate of 27 percent. Priority for Achievement of the Primary Materiel Programs /In the area of equipment,/ the following observations can be made: --the priority given to /nuclear ~orces/ (Strategic Nuclear Forces/Tactical Nuclear Forces) has on the one hand allowed far completion of the research and production envisioned in the law, and on the other hand, for the carrying out of new decisions made since 1976: manufacture of additional M-20 missiles in order to supply four of the five SNLE~s (Missile Launching Nuclear Submarines) in service starting in 1980; ordering, in 1978, the sixth SNLE, "Inflexible," due to go into service in early 1985, armed with new M-4 missiles, extension to 1985 of the Mirage-4 of the strategic air forces... ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OF"r ICIAL USE ONL`I - The expenses for strategic dad tactical nuclear forces have stayed at about 33 percent of Title V credits; --Regarding/conventional materiel/, effort has been directed at the main programs figuring In the catalog annexed to the law; the latter have thus ~ . without exception been able to be accomplished under the conditions set by the legislature. The only delays, as a consequence of delays n~cessary for technical consi~erations, concern /for the land forces/ the 155 mm rapid-fire gun, and for the air force, the Mirage 2000. The new decisiona made since 1976 have been taken into account: they consist basically of: --/for the air force/, increasing the Transall fleet, in 1977, and acceleration of the program for anti-aircraft defense of vulnerable points, and especially of FAS (strategic air forces) bases. --/For the navy,/ the adoption in 1978 of a group of long-term objectives called "Navy 2000" as well as development of the new-generation naval _ patrol aircraft (A.N.G.). ~ Bur it must be ncted that the priority given to realization of the main materiel programs has had repercussions on the progress of operational environment programs--support, infrastructure, stocks--some of which have had to be stretched out. Progress in Various Areas /In the area of ac.tive duty strength,/ the law stressed that personnel in the forces had to be given suitable living arrangements and conditions, and that this responsibility had to be met no matter what. The agreed effort ~ on behalf of perscnnel enabled the carrying-out of the reforms promised by the new statutes put in place. The most significant measures concern the indexed ranking of officers and N.C.O.'s, imprcvement of career planning, creation of the rank of major, extension of enlistment bounty provisions to the legionnaires and female personnel, and the creation of inerit and [length of] service bonuses. /In the area of operational activity of the forces,/ the law set numerical ~bjectives to be met as soon as possible, in order to bring back up the level of activity, which was ~udged insufficient: 15 hours of f'light per month for each combat pilot, 100 days per year at sea for naval units, 100 days of training in camp, maneuvers or exercises outside garrison. The effort committed since 1977 has permitted the three forces to make significant progress toward reaching these goals. /In the field of operations,/ the ~ncreasing cost of salaries and fringe benefits (R.C.S.) as well as activity-related expenses, and the priority - given to weapons and materiel manufacture, have not allowed for freeing up for this sector all tY~e credits desires. 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL`I /In the area of study and research,/ the previousiy observed trend has been reversed, in conformity with the objectives of the law. In carrying out the decisions of the Council of Research and Defense Studies (C.R.E.D.) created in 1976 within the ministry, expenses devoted to research were increased quite significantly: in 3 years, credits for upstream development research alone grew by 60 percent. This sizeable effort, while assuring in the medium and long term the rea~ization of our future in materiel, also reflects the determination of the French armaments industry to provide high technology and competitiv~ness. _ Finally, the performance zeview on the military programming law would be incomplete without mention of the supplementary expenses born by the forces - because of ex~eptional circumstances. We are speaking of the interventions undertaken both within our borders, in the context of national solidarity ~ operations--the Polmar Plan (1978)--and on other continents for the benefit ' of states linked to France by international agreements, in Africa (Chad, Mauritania, Zaire) and iu the Middle East (Lebanon). According to the programr.ting law, the defense budget should reach 20 percent of the sta*_e's budget in 1982, this objective being defined by comparison to its 1976 structure. Now in 1977, then in 1978, exceptional increases hit public assistance e~enditures and modified the budgetary structu;e; the changes were accelerated in 1979 by the great increase in the public debt and in the state's intervention credits. The reference to the state budget having thus lost its practical significance, thP Go~~ernment ~ decided to link tne growth of military expenditures to a more permanent measure, namely the Gross Internal Product (mercantile), in order more - concretely to measure the gro~oth of the agreed financial effort for Defense. In this way Defense's share of the budget, as a portion of the Gross Internal Product (mercantile) grew from 3.41 percent in 197b on the eve of the law's coming into force, to 3.67 percent in 1979, this being an increase of 0.09 percznt per year on average. For the years 1980 to 1982, this share should - grow, as during the first 3 years, by 0.09 percent per year, to reach around 4 percent at the end of the period covered by the law. Because it gives, ever a period of 6 years, a picture of all the farces, the new programming method showed i.tself to be a valuable and efficient tool of analysis and decision-making for general staff, directorates, and services, and for facilitating parliamentary oversi~ht of execution. The military programming is developed each year through the internal work of the ministry, and in the context of a 6-year horizon; at that time, the authorities responsible for preparation and setting up of forces can devote their t~ought primarily to the medium term, watch over the cohercnce between the different programs in process of realization, measure the variance bet*~reen the objectives to be attained and th~ results obtained, and adapt their activity to this fact in a continuous manner. 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONL'I Though naturally improvement is always possible, the new programming method represents a tool well adapted for attaining the objectives of the _ law. FOOTNOTES 1. Report to Parliament on performance and results of Law No 76-531 of 19 _ June 1976 concerning approval of military prograumming fo r 1977-1982 (September 1979). 2. On 2 October in the National Assembly, on 8 November in the Senate. 3. Resources figuring in the catalog annexed to the law: /58,000 million Fr. in 1977, 66,460 million Fr. in 1978, 76,155 million fr. in 1979./ Initial budgets:/ 58,412.2 million Fr. in 1977, 67,654 millior Fr. in 1978, 77,110.8 million Fr. in 1979. --/Final budgets:/ 58,616 million Fr. in 1977, 68,282 million Fr. in 1978, ' 77,660 million Fr. in 1979 (estimate). (Captain Yvan Noel entered Naval College in 1951, has diplomas in submarine weaponry and advanced military studies, He has commanded the minesweep guardship "Paimpolaise," the fast escort shiY "Lorrain" and the squadron escort "D'Estrees." He is presently chief of the "Programming Studies" section of the "Plans/Programs/Budget" division of the general staff of the fo rces. COPYRIGHT: 1980--Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" 9516 CSO: 3100 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ CGUNTRY SECTION FRANCE MORE EFFICI~;NT USE OF DEFENSE RESOURCES CALLED FOR Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 80 pp 38-39 [Article by Bertrand Lenicque, commissioner in chief] [Text] Created in 1970, attached to the army general staff and located at the War College, the Center for Study of , Methods and Techniques of Action (CEM'TA) aims to help promote within the ministry of defense the attitudes, methods, and techniques of modern management. CEMTA each year organizes informative 1-week classes for general officers and month-long training classes for high-ranking officers, classes in which civilian personnel of equivalent rank also participate. It also lends its assistance to higher military education facilities in matters of training in econamics and management. The main objective of its activity is to help the senior staff of the armies to best use the resources of the Ministry of Defense to accomplish their , missions. To this end, it tries to mal:e modern management better known and _ understood, and to convince everyone that he can and should gut it into effect in his own field and at his own level in order to improve the efficiency of his own action. Myth and Reality in Management In France and above all in the public sector, including the armies, management is still a sort of myth for many. - It is often taken for a passing fashion spring from a primitive "Americo- - ~ mania," perhaps g~od for large capitalist enterprises avid for profit, but - certainly harmful or inapplicable to public services devoted to the general interest. It is also taken for a disorderly collection of vague methods or sophisticated techniques which delight esoteric specialists b~it which only serve to add further complications to the tasks of responsible officials and men of action. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 ? v~? va ~ i~~.a~u VJ~ Vl~u~ It is true that management is done a disservice by its more or less anglo-Saxon sound, which some pride themselves on their ability to pronounce correctly, - but the word actually does not conceal its Latin origin, and it is recognized by tFe Academie Francaise. It is also true that the esoteric language and perfectionistic comportment of some experts in moderr. techniques d~ not contribute to revealing the real essence of management and its real utility. It is true, finally, r.he msnagement often suffered from premature trans- positions from the United States to France and from the pritrate sector to the - public sector, without taking into account intelligently the human, social, _ and economic characteristics proper to each of these countries or sectors. But it would bF� a pity if the distortions of management poorly understood or poorly practiced should lead to a rejection of GTell-reguLated management the only ob ject and effect of which is to permit everyone to use more efficiently the human, financial, and material resources avaiZable within his rield of ac~ion. _ For *_ne real utility of management is precisely to improve the efficiency of organizations, in the public as in the private sector: this economic efficiency, through an optimal use of always limited resources; and their social efficiency, through a better satisfaction of the matarial and - intangible needs of their members and of the beneLiciaries of their activity. The uniqueness of the public services and the uniqueness of defense, in - comparison with private sector enterprises, are indisputable but should not - ba exaggerated. For the basic problems that lea.dership of any organization, public or private, poses, are identical: the desired efficiency can only be atta9_ned through good decisions, good choices, and by virtue of good execution and waste-free management. Now public and military uniqueness often serve as convenient alibis allowing modern management as a whole to be conc:emned and permitting total or partial rejection of its innovative attitude, its rational methods of thought and action, its modern techniques to aid er.lightened decision-making and efficient management _ Managemen.t and Defense The move to "rationalization of budgetary choices" (RCB) was officially _ begun in 1968 in the ministries in order to improve overall efficiency in iheir activities through Y�ecourse to an attitude, methods, and techniques uf modern rnanagement adapted to the public sector. The ministry of defense was one of the first to move in the directions opened up by KCA and the only one to use the approach of starting with missions and lorig and medium term objectives and then descending to daily and concrete activity in terms of financial and material resource management. - The ultimate goal of this approach ls to iml~rove the cost-benefit ratio of _ defense. The way of getting there is , ~n thz one hand, to deploy resources i~ an optimal way r_o the functions most conformable to the mi::sions, through 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY rational decision-making methods and mult~-year programming of activities. It consists, on the other hand, in using as efficientl;~ as possible the resources thus distributed, through modernization of management by the system of administrative budgets, total operating budgets, and program budgets. Thus the most efficient us~ of defense's financial and mat~rial reso urces is delineated and the resources are put in place. _ But much progress remains to be made. Inertia, reservations, and misunder- standings remain to be surmounted, for the decision-making tools remain all too often the province of experts in the central echelons, and de cision- makers at the less centralized levels rarely can, want, or know how to have recourse to them, The spirit and methods of multi-year programming still seem to remain too confined to the higher levels of the hierarchy. And modernization of management still appears to the eyes of most resource-users as a heavy and useless burden requiring an excess of work to no profi table end. ~ Moreover, a vast field remains to be exploited: that of good usage of manpower. For the methods and techniques of modern activity remain focussed on good use of financial or material resources, neglecting still the problem of the efficiency of human resources. It must not be forgotten that half the military budget is devoted to people, their remuneration, their training, and their maintenance. And one must not _ lose sight of the fact that if the overall efficiency of defense results from weapons systems and human systems, any increase in the efficien cy of weapons systems necessitates an increase in investmen*_ expenditure and in new operating expenses, ~!~ile a considerable increase in the efficiency of human systems can be obtained at no new cost by the revalorization of the ~ human potential already existing. Now concrete and participative processes of training and activity, p ro ceding from considerations of authority and the exercise of command, allow the mobilization of human energies toward a better accomplishment of the missions entrusted to the armies. The well understood and applied example of the "overall mission method" established since the end of 1976 in the schools and units of the ground army prove the point. An Increased Need for Efficiency The budgetary resources allotted to the Defense Ministry have increas e d = every year for the last several years. From 1975 to 1980 the military _ budget Rrew from 44 billion Fr to 88 billion Fr, and the programming law anticipates a growth in the share of the gross internal product to be devoted to defense. This increasing effort which France is making in the area of security should not blind defense personnel to the more and more critical situation in 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 which over the last few years the nation's finances find themselves. For ~ the slowdown of economic activity since 1974, the halving of the grc~wth rate (fro m~ or 6 percent to 2 or 3 percent) are bringing with them a stagnation with respect to state revenue, while the state's expenses continue to increase - steeply. The state's budget has thus been in increasing deficit since 1975. Such a situation imposes on all public servants and on all members of the _ defense ministry in particular--because of the vital mission they assume and because of the substantial size of the military budget--an increased need for efficiency in the use of financial, human, and material resources - that are available for their use. (Commissioner in chief Bertrand Lenicque served aboard several ships, and in ground units and services, in Indochina, Algeria, Dalcar, and in metropolitan France. He was assigned to the special staff of the pr~esident of the republic from 1964 to 1968. After having driected the Navy School of Administration~from 1973 to ~976, he became director of the Center for the Study of Methods and Techniques of Action in 1977. 1 TERRESTFiES 19.1% 1 _ 4 f0 11 A FORCES NUCLEAIFiES (re(? 2 - STR,4TEGIQUES iP FOR~ES ET A.N.T. AERIENNES 19.2976 12.3% 12 FORCES 73,496 ~ ~ � . 10 y w y ADMINISTRATION ~ 3 GENERALE 13 SOUTIENS q 3,696 o~s 26 6~ C FORCES 9 SOU~~P `5 ~ MAR~ITIMES 4 3W� O~y v+ ` ~t~~rc~' � - ~~~o~ 2 4 A - 0 y ~O ~~QyPa~� ,y~Q~ W v, GENDARMERIE 2 2 ~ G 8.296 VP p Q y ~ 1 S ~c W y 9 Presentation o ~n ~ W ; des credits - selon leur w~ M m destination ~ W o p de orces _ en 4 systernes f et S systemes ~ de sout7ens. 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 ~~c~R or~~Yr.rnT, �s~ ~H~,v - - KEY: 1. Land forces 19.1 percent 2. Air forces 12.3 percent ~ 3. Naval forces 11.9 percent 4. Constabulary 8.2 percent . 5. Overseas forces 2.7 percent 6. Research and testing 4.3 percent 7. Training organizations 8.5 percent 8. Personnel support 5.9 percent 9. Material support 4.3 percent 10. General administration 3.6 percent 11. Strategic nuclear forces and ANT [expansion u:known] 19.2 percent 12. Forces 73.4 percent 13. Support 26.6 percent 14. Traditional branches 15. Chart showing allocations according to destination among the 4 force systems snd 5 support systems. Le budgel de 1 Emplof REMUNERATIONS ET - 2 CHARGESSOCIALES 36.89~ - 3 DEPENSES ORDINAIRES q VIE COURANTE 12,696 . 5 - INFRAS7RUCT. 4,396 6 - DEPENSES EN CAPITqL 4596 ACTIVITE ET ~ STOCICS 7 FABRICATIONS OPERATIONNELS 18,896 14,596 - B � 9 ETUDES ET DE VE LOPPEMEhITS 1396 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL'I KEY: 1. Defense budget for 1980. Where the money goes. 2. Remuneration and fringe benefits 36.8 percent 3. Ordinary expenses 55.0 percent 4. Operating expenses 12.6 percent 5. Infrastructure 4.3 percent 6. Capital expenses GS percent 7. Manufactures 18.8 percent 8. Activities and operational stocks 14.5 percent 9. Research and developmQnt 13 percent COPYRIGHT: 1980--Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" ~ 9516 CSO: 3100 13 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION FR.AAICE - I"~l:I'ARY SERVICE REFORM EXANQNED IN DETAIL Paxis L'EXPRESS i.n French 7 Jun 80 pp 99-105 _ [Article by Michel La.bro~ ~aith opinion pall report by Yann de 1'Ecotais: "Should Military Service be Abolished?"] ~ [Text] "No problem. The little guys are ready to serve France." Named by the government in 1975 to end the unrest in the basracks, Gen Marcel Bigeard in his saxcastic way was optimistic about the morale of the troops after his visits to the mess ha,lls. - Some 5 yeaxs later, before this same Bigeard now chairmaxi of the na.tional defense commission~ Yves Lancien~ Ga.ullist supporter from 18 June 1940, former second lieutenant in Indochina~ said the oppasite: "The arn~y is � partially motivated, pastially trained and p~.rtially equipped for obscure missions." Lexicien proposed tha,t most draftees serve a short time, like the Swiss. - What would they do in the event of wax? They would protect the country from panic~ sabotage and enemy infiltration. Similiarly, motivated volunteers would be urged to serve in the manoeuvring.or forces. They would be ga,id for serving from 1 1~2 to 2 years and Hould receive benefits on leaving the army for return to civilian life. - Just 1 yeax before the presidential elections~ a short time before the h~r~,d of state will announce the new defense guidelines ~ the I~a,ncien report touches on a taboo sub~ect. Since the total mobilization decreed by the National Convention of 1792-1795 and the soldiers of year II, military service has been part of the common memory of the French. This reform proposal ma,y revive the old deba,te between the supporters of the draft and those of the volunteer army. It m~,y al~o deepen the divis3ons - within the ma,jority. On the draft as on the neutron bomb or nucleax arma.ments, the Gaullists take the opposite view to Giscardien military thinking and are closer to the socialists� ideas. D~caguignan, 10 September 197~. Here, in one of the most tra,nquil 14 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 re giments of the capital, the first bitter confrontation broke out. ~or over 1 hour~ 200 uniformed draftees maxched in tne streets. The same ~ thing ha.ppened severa.Z weeks later in Kaxlsruhe~ a garrison town for = F~ench forces in West Germany. Yes, friend private became a leftist. It was the shock of a repetition of the events o~ r[ay 1968. The com- plaints subsequ~ntly beca,me less political. The draftees demanded pay, leave, weekends with the conviction of oldtime trade unionists demanding - a 40 hour week. Demonstrations axe raxer toda,y. Does it mean that the draftees developed a taste for mili~asy life? The Cool Underbush Lt Col Jean Bescond is happy. This officer with a fighter's build is _ in chaxge of the commando training center of the 26th Infantry Regiment at the Pont-Saint-Vincent fort, about 10 kms f~om Nancy. The guns which in the past looked down on the Moselle Valley have been removed from the fortifications. The steep wa.lls~ the moat been made into an obstacle course. Everywhere, sweating draftees in combat uniform crawl from one to the other. It was very daxk in a naxrow underground corridor and taxgets lit up one after the other. The shots wAre on the ma.rk. The soldiers left, crawling underground. That night, the most formidable paxt of the apprenticeship began: a raid, 80 kms away, to be carried out in 2 nights. Si].ence: Tbe platoon moved in columns. It xas as if the darkness helped everyone to _ take it seriously. Despite the cool underbrush, people "were overcome with the heat." The next night, it rained. Their clothes were soaked~ the rangers were sinking into the slippery earth, they could no longer - feel their feet. They seemed to be walking in their sleep. However, no one complained..oalmost no one. "Here, at least the time goes quickly~ it is not like at the quarters:" grumbled one draftee. "llespite the - haxsh commando tra,ining, we few problems," stated the colonel. He ha,s an infallible method for determining the troops� morale--the number of consultations at the infirmaxy. There are rarely more than two a day per company, which is five or six times less than at the barracks. Boredom, the feeling of wasting time, combi.ned with inequality are the _ two ma.jor problems axising from conscription. The army has an answer ready for the first accusation. During the yeax of active duty, a draftee has an average of 100 days of training outside the garrison - (ma.noeuvres, one night camps or comma.ndo training centers.) There axe 55 days of training and 50 days of genera,l service work--the famous forced labor--or working in the fight against ac~s of God, oil spills, _ for example. The rema.inder is divided between classes--basic military training--and leave, weekends and holidays. "We would only need 6 months _ to Iearn what we are taught in 1 yeax," answered draftees. "Perhaps," admitted their o.f.ficers, "but if military service is shortened, young men would leave just at the moment they become opera,tional." It is 15 FOR OFFICIAT USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY understood.: we will never have anyone under our command ~o wage war, - we will train soldiers, not an arn~y. . It is 0600 hours at the RNII' [Gha,d Marching Regiment] at Montlhery in the Paxis area when the sergeant on cluty awakens the barracks roorns. Despite its name and its pa,st--its first patron was Fi;eld Maxsha,l - I~clerc--the RMI' is a mechanized infantry regiment like ma.ny others. It ~ has logistics problems--not enough showers a,nd meals which arrive cold - at ~he dir~ing~all, It has ~~uipment problems, like the ma,intenance of ANIX 13 troop transport vehicles, for example. It takes 10 hours to - change an engine, while the same ,job can be done on a modern AMX 10 in 2. The regiment will not be equipped for 4 years. It will not the new army rifle~ the Clairon, until 1981. The rate of introd.ucing new equipment in the army is slow~ much too slow. In 19'74, the Rl+'f~ had "its" incident: dra,ftees signed a petition sent to the minister. Since then~ nothing to xeport. "We are over the hump," admitted Ca,pt Claude Munk~ an officer who came u~ through the ra,nks. "Tt~e draftees axe available, but they are not patriotic. The country comes after their concerns.~~ On the edge of the ri.fle range, a sma,11 group is waiting dispiritedly to empty some sma,ll ma,chinegun cartridges into cardboaxd taxgets. A warlike nature has very little appeal for them, even if they are aware of deteriora,ting international relations. "We ha,ve lived without wax," said one of them, "so it is difficult to ima,gine a~ything else." Like his comrades, he is much more concerned by wha,t he has just learned: the company has duty Saturday and leaves have been canceled. A bitter blow. Leave rema,ins one of the primasy concerns, along with pay. Toda,y, it is 27~ francs a month. One young man saids "Yesterday evening, I went with a friend to Paris. We went to the movies, had a bite in a fast food place; it cost 110 fra,ncs. You see how much is left:" Severa,l of his comrades manages to be dischaxged during their "three days~" in other words, by failing the selection tests. He envies them. This is the second ma,jor problem of conscription: currently, one ~`rench- man out of four--the official fig~are--avoids the net. People in the barracks know this and it grates. The selection center at Rennes is the most modern of its ty~e with the entrance ha,ll decorated with green pla.nts~ fancy armcha,irs and a pleasant environment. It is the new-look reception. The first contact is designed to minimize the trauma, as much as possible. 'rle axe far from the review board of the past where the hairy privates maxched past a brusque medical o.fficer. Here, in 3 half-days~ medica.l examinations whether an individual is fit for duty. The psychiatrist has a difficult task. More than one self-styled mentally ill person, afflict~ed with problems of relating~ is, above all~ allergic to the uniform, In all, between 17 to 19 percent of the young men axe exempt for medical reasons. This percentage is lower than that of 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 neigh~ring countries, such as Wsst Ge:rmany (22 percent) or the N~ther- - lands (24 percent.) ~ Egalitarian Frenzy JF~ "We try to be as ega,litarian as possible," stated Gen Alban Baxthez, director of nationa.l service. The exemptions vary, however, according - to the principle of supply and demand. In the early 70's, there were more young men Qf draft age than the arn~y could incorporate. They raised the requirements by taking the bestf in other words~ medical - categories one to four. In 1973, those less well-qua.lified were once a.gain recruited, categnry five. In 1975, overcome by an egalitarian frenzy, category 6 were declared fit for duty. Tha.t did not work out because o.f the number of exemptions granted from guard duty, ~arches, even for shoes and helmets after induction. ~ Another source of inequality: some could pamper themselves with an easy tour of duty in the Cooperation Ministry, in technical a,ssistance or 3.n one of the innumerable staff jobs. It is more appealing to be a clerk~orderly at the F`rench Embassy in Ottawa than a G.I. in Mourmelon. ' Today, the reprieve denied, most draftees choose their date of induction. Ha,lf serve in thE region requested, even if the call often means a move to the east~ France's true drill-ground. It is more difficult t~ choose one's service. Out of 100 young men, 75 go into the army, 14 to the air force and 6 into the navy while the latter services are most requested. Although military service is boring for some, ineqalitarian for others, does military service at least constitute a vital component of our defense? We have come to the heart of the deba,te. One of its basic r.aisons d�etre was to supply reserves which the nation would need in the event of wax. "However~" said former Legionnaire Pierre Messner, "no - country, not even the richest~ can have on hand tanks, ships and planes which would go into action on D-day of the mobilization." The reservists could only be supplied with rifles andLniform~.... Gen Pierre Gallois, one ma.stermind of the French nuclear force, felt that, in any case, this immense outlay in men and equipment could no longer be jwstified. National independence is deterrence by nuclear force. There is no need for 500,000 men to explode the atom bomb and protect it from the enemy's grasp. No doubt~ one-fourth that number would be enough, he estima.ted. In this light, why not call on an army of techriicians? An army ready to serve with highly sophisticated weapons having a great destructive capacity? Volunteer arm,y? Draft axlr~y? The debate is not a new one. Adversasies 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and supporters clash on several points. First there is the cost. In , Segtember, Arthur Paecht, UDF [French Democratic Union] deputy from Va.r compared the ccst o~ an axrr~y of ~00,000 draftees and a professiona.l arr~y, whose forces would be either 350,000 or 480,000. According to the figures used~ the volunteer army would cost from 2.8 to 5.5 billion francs more a year for maintenance than the clra,.rt. The figures ~,lone, however, do not prcvide an answer. What kind of army, wha.t type of - duties are assigned must be decided. The supporters of the draft emphasize the need to make the country take _ pa.rt in its protection. "The ~ench must feel involved," said Gen Jean-Paul Etcheverry. "The entire population wins or loses the war, not just the soldiers." The objection is raised that specialists already handle most of the defense si.nce the ar~y has slightly more than $2 per- cent enlistees on active duty (including the ~endarmerie) as compaxed with 47 percent draftees. No Coup d' ~'tat with h'.issiles The deba.te also draws on history and political passions. According to some, the volunteer army might go beyond its role and intervene in the life of the nation. Is the volunteer arrr~y a.ri army of coup plotters? "The i:na,ge spreaci by the left is quite false~" admitted Socialist Charles Hernu. "In Chile, an axmy of dxaftees overthrew the government of Salvador Allende." In 'r~ance, there were also units of draftees among the rebellious regiments in 1962. "An ar~}r of specialists does not break up meetings or harangue crowds," said Genera.l Ga.llois. A coup d'etat is not carried out with atomic sub~marines and ba,llistic missiles. On the other hand~ a recent example favors the supporters of the draft-- the American example. Military service was abolished in the United States in 19?3 when the America.ns were withdrawing from Vietna,m. Since then, the armed forces ha,ve only taken voluriteers. They complain that they do not enough applicants and above all, about their low intellectual level. Many axe recruited from among and Hispanic- American minoritiea. ThFre i.s the danger of emp:~asizing the division bet~reen i~:~ army a.nd the nation. After the Kabui invasion, President Jimmy Carter announced hE; intended ta revive draft registration. In 'rlest Germany, Cha.ncellor Helmut Schmidt privately admitted tha.t he con- - sidered the revival of the draft as a test of America.n ability to stem the Soviet tide. The Iength and natuxe of military service depend primaxily on the choice - about defense policy. Volunteer army or drait army, should it be xell trained or not, how will these forces be u,sed? Officially, Fra,nce~s military policy is still General de Gaulle's: strictly national defense supported by nuclear deterrent. 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 In a major crisis, the government would use, as a last warning, small _ _ nucleax tactical weapons befcre unleasing laxge-scale nuclear force. ~'or 1~ years, conventional forces h~,ve thus been ~eglecte~. ~or rinancial reasons: one can not do everything at once. For strategic reasons, too: F`ra.n.ce for the first time in its history had the opportu- nity to be in second place. The doctrine has evolved. Political lead.ers, imply the military, will ~,void prema,ture u~se of even tactical nucleax weapons. This opens the way to a renewal of conventiona.l means. The ground forces--hundreds of thousands of inen--will be used to test the enerr~,y's resolve, before deciding to go any farther. Some twit about the need to commit so many men and means to this task when it is un- li~:ely that the adversary would limit himself to a.ggression by traditiona.l weapons alone. ~econd mod.ification in the the president of the republic - stated in 1976 that in ~ase of conflict "since there will be only one space~ there must 'be only one militaxy group." This concept was taken up~ then developed t7y the recent UDF pa,per on deA:ense. The French ax~}r must be planned~ equipped and organized �o do ba.ttle beside its European - allies, in front of its own lines. Socialists and communists see in this scenaxio a rejection of the strictly national concept of defense. The Gaullists do, too. They criticize it as weakening the credibility of deterrence. "F~rance can not do everything and ma.intain several armies at once," said RPR [Rally for ~epublic] member Michel Aurillac;. "The ground forces must provide a pause in the event of a.ggression and not fight on our allies' territory." "The definition of deterrence keeps us from having a ba.ttle strategy for the heart of Europe," advanced Socialist Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Gaullists and socialists logicalZy agree on the idea of militaxy service. A small number of divisions will be enough for the famous test of enemy intentions. To achie~re this goal, an ax?qy of volunteers with the most professional - equipment would be better no doubt. Most draftees could do regional _ service, desipzed above all to protect the people. "The draftees of - Le Puy-d.e-Dome would serve there," said Lancien, "and not in the ba,rracks. In wartime, they would defend their turf, their region." This is one _ theme of the debate which the National Defense Commission is working on. Signed: Chaxles de Gaulle In proposing 4 months on active duty, supplemented by reserve tours and a volunteer arrqy, Lancien thus eatisfied men like Pierre Messmer who ~ have never hidden their preference for an axmy oi prof.essionals. One ma.y critici~e La.ncien for trying to establish a volunteer army without ' saying so, or one may caxp about the regulaxity with which the F~ench-- - = who ase not the do their reserve duty. Some will also 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY criticizs hir~, like Jean-Marie Daillet for proposing a difficult costly reorganization of military structure in the context of i.nternational crisis and throwing tens of thousands of young men on the job masket. This ~'oot soldier of Gaullism does not mi.nimize the difficulties: "I ~ill ha,ve pa,rt o.f the arm,y aga,inst me," he said. "Its entire orga~nization, its commands axe ba,sed on maintaining active duty service. He a.dded, I will not be the first to clash with the milita...~y." On his desk, he has a sma.ll book with a red, white and blue cover. He quotes a sentence underlined in pencil: "The arn~y is by nature unwilling to change." The author was Charles de Gaulle. 'r~ench Opinion Poll and Commenta.ry Military serrice: a duty Is it the duty of young people to contribute to rrance�s defense by fulfilling their military service? Comnlete agreement 38 percent Partial agresment 2( Partial disagreement ly. Complete disagreement 21 - _ No opinion 1 ~~ihat tyne of service? 4~ich opinion do you agree with? We must ma.intain the current universal 25 percent military service We must retain universal military service ~5 in its essence but reform it Young people should the choice 20 between mi.litar~f and civilian service i~tilitary service should be abolished and only 17 a volunteer arrr~r retained The arrny in all its forms should be abolished 11 ~ No opinion 2 - Disputed effectiveness - In F`rance's military organization, obliga.tory mi.litary service is a factor which is Very effective 10 percent Somewha.t effective 36 Ra,ther i.nefiective z9 - 50 percent Not at all sffective No opinion 4 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 Duration of duty _ In your opinion, what would be the optimal tour of militaxy service? No service at all 16 percent - Less than 6 months 15 From 6 t o g months 12 F'rom 9 to 12 months " 3~ ~om 12 to 15 months 18 From~ 15 to 18 months 3 More than 18 months 2 No opinion 4 _ In your opinion~ should the a,~e for military service Depend on an individua.l's studies 77 percent Be the same for all, and the same a,ge 13 No opinion 10 Reform Among the possible reforms of military service, which one should have priority? (Percenta,ge cited first) - The possibility of obtaining additional 39 Percent vocational tra,ining during the tour of duty Increase in the monthly pay of the soldier 20 Limited period of military, then 14 resezve duty after returning to civilian life (15 days a year for 5 years, for example) Possibility of military service close to home 8 Greater freedom of expression in the ba.rracks 8 Reduced length of service 6 More exemptions and assistance for family and 3 profesaional reasons 2 No opinion Volunteer service or shortened period of service If you had the choice between the two following formulas, which would you choose Duty for 4 months with 2 reserve periods every 36 percent yeax for 5 years Volunteer service for 18 months with pa,y and 4.2 vaxious benefits *Question submitted only to young men of draft age, 12 percent of the sample 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY No opinion 22 percent ~'inancial Incentives Some propos~als call for the abolition of universal military service and the establishment of a volunteer arn~y. In this event, would you volunteer for 1$ months under the following conditions*~ Proposals Yes Ma.ybe Proba.bly Certainly No answer - not not Pa.y of 1, o00 6 il 12 68 3 francs a month (upkeep, - lodginU and food included) - '_'ay of 2, 000 9 1z 12 61 6 - francs a month (upkeep, lodging and food included) Pay of 3,000 17 17 l0 51 5 francs (upkeep, lodging~ food included) A bonus of 26 14 8 48 y. 30,00o francs at the beginning or end of service Conscientious ob,jectors In your opinion, should conscientious ob,jectors Do civilian service for the same amount of 51 percent time as military service - Do military service in non-comba.t units 20 Do civilian service for-a longer time ~0 than military service No answer (and refusal to contemplate 19 service for ob,jectors ) *Question submitted only to young men of draft age, 12 percent of the sample 22 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 4Jom~n Do you think that young women with no family responsibilities `~hould spend a year pex-f.orming civilian dutiea of a social ne.ture ? - rIo 68 percent Yes 26 No opinion 6 Should do military service in combat units? '~0 66 percent 1 ~S 29 No opinion s - Should do military service in non-comba.t units? _ Pfo 65 percent 'les 30 No opinion 5 This poll was taken between 5 and 16 May 1980~ with a representative sample of 1,200 members of the French population, ls years of age and older. A total of 70 percent of the French agree there should be military service. What kind of service should it be? Only half consider that it should be military and still another 25 percent believe it should be reformed. Another 20 percent of the population, on the other hand~ believe young people should have a choice between m~.litary and civilian service. These figures ~ taken from a Bernard Krief-"L'Express" poll are only superf'icial].y surprising. A~_though only one y'renchman in four ultimately ` - ravors traditional military service, this is because the country questions its usefulness at a time whon defense, in the general opinion~ is bas ically a nuclear problem ( See "L` Express" poll of 31 May 1980. ) Quite obviously, those 'between 35 and 44 years old favor the possibility of choice between civilian and military service or a reformed mi.litary ` service. Among those wer ~ we find the most supporters of the good old - service. ~ There is a conservativism based on social-professional categories-- . retirees and faxmers are the supporters ~F the status quo. - A total of 25 percent of the young people favor the pure and simple abolition of the army and an almost equal percentage favor a professional " army. ~ 23 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 f~Uk UF1~ i(:1.Af, USL ONI~Y _ In the le~'t, (Communist Party: 23 percent; Socialist Party: 21 percent; Ecolo~ists: 22 percent) most st~pporters of a professional asmy alone _ axe found. lJhat reform should be undertalcen? The poll ieolated the young men who in the .future must choose. Voluntary service for 18 months "with pa.y and various benefits" tempts 42 percent. This would be enough to form a sort of reserve if military service for most of the others were reduced according to the Swiss model, on the condition tha.t the financial arrangements were adequately remunerative. Even a of 3, 000 francs would only persuade one-third. COPYRIGHT : 1980, 5.A. Groupe Express 9~79 ` ~o: 3100 2!~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL�Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 CO~JNTRY SECTION FRANCE - MIRAGE 2000: TWO YEARS OF TESTING SUMrIED UP - Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Mar 80 pp 23, 25-27 - [Article by Jacques M~risset] [Text] The Mirage 2000 program was the subject last Tuesday at the Centre d'Essais en vol (Flight Test Center--~EV) at Bretigny during an overall presentation organized by the General Delegation for Armament (DGA) together with the air force and the main aircraft builders involved in the - program. This presentation took place shortly after the delivery to the CEV, for acceptance, of three prototypes of the latest creation of Avions Marcel Dassault. They have now completed 400 hours of flying time after 2 years of testing. Seldom can one observe such a large-scale presentation: Besides the three Mirage 2000 prototypes, which came in from Istres (they had arrived at - Bretigny 3 days earlier), this was in fact a demonstration of about 10 airplanes used by the CEV to perfect the weapons system, and of a test bench (researched and produced by Dar~sault) set up at Bretigny. Topging _ it all off was a~uch appreciated flight demonstration of the Mirage 2000-01. Explanations were provided by Engineer General Bousquet, technical director of Aeronautical Constructions (DTCA); chief engineer 1'amagnini, director . of the 2000 program at the STPA (Aeronautical Programs Technical Sei-v3.ce); Mr Benson, the leading engineer responsible for the weapons system at STPA; and Colonel Varin, CEV chief pilot, who expl:ained the means of testing and *he important CEV contribution to the 2000 program. Mr Hibon, director of International Operations of the DGA, and General Forget, assistant chief of planning at air force headquarters, were also present. The manufacturers: Dassault, SNECMA, Thompson-CSF, II~ID and MATRA were there also, but amazingly enough, they mdde no official presentations. However, the organization of this demonstration by the CEV and the SIRPA/DGA was remarkable. R Three Versions o.f the Mirage 2000 Considering the operational needs of several types of missions there are now, or more precisely, will be, several versions of the Mirage 2000. 25 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The present three prototypes, soon to be four, are actually the forerunners , of a family of planes whose main missions are: 1) the interception of aircraft flying at very high altitudes (25,000-30,000 meters, or 80,000 to 100,000 feet) and speeds (up to Mach 3) and planes flying at medium, low or very low altitudes. This miss~on will take on additional importance as a consequence of technical advances (which ha~Te resulted in the bes~ possibilities for penetration being at either very high or very low altitudes) and the appearance of bombers having an extended range of action at very low altitude; 2) air superiority (combat); 3) attacks on ground ; targets using various conventional weapons systems (guns, rockets and so on; and 4) attacks on ground targets using nuclear weapons, consisting of the future ASMF' (Air-to-Ground-Med3um-Range) missile. The response offered by the Mirage 2000 is based on the conviction that it is possible, starting from a basic airframe, to ad~pt the weapons system to these different missions. However, the first mission above is the most demanding (with respect to the airframe and engine) and the Mirage 2000, particularly its engine, has thus been made suitable for the high-altitude intercept mission. With respect to the airframe, let us remember that the �delta' configuration ' has been maintained because of its considerable advantages: low drag in supersonic flight; eas e of construction and capability of carrying more fuel. This same configuration does cause some equally well-known dis- advantages, such as the need for high takeoff snd approach speeds. This was overcome, however, by the electric controls and the maximum lift obtained by automatically-controlled leading edges combined with the flaps (elevons). The increased lift thus makes possible t~akeoff, approach and landing speeds that can be compared with those of conventional planes and heretofore obtainable with planes with no empennage but with delta wings. Likewise, the maneuverability was increase~ some 75 percent and the load factors 40 percent compared with the Mirage III. Still referring to the airframe, one notes the use of considerable quanti- ties of composite materials (carbon fibers and boron), especially in the rudder and elevons, resulting in a weight saving of some 20 percent for these components. Concerning the motor, the M53 of SNECMA is a modular twin flux motor with a single body the construction of which enables obtaining great thrust at high altitude, an indispensable condition in a true pursuit plane. The choice of a twin flux motor with a lean fuel mixture has enabled a consider- able attenuation of the consequences of this requirement on the rate of fuel consumption which is much lower than that in the ATAR. _ Three Systems Are Under Development As is known, the weapons system is completely number-coded and multiplexed. This has led to the replacement of numerous linkage cables by a single ~ 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 rux urrl~lew u~r. utvLx system (digibus) of data distribution. Three versions of the weapons system are under development: a system designed for intercepting aircraft flying at any altitude, perfected more specifically for detection of those that penetrate at low altitude, and including an impulse Doppler Radar (RDI); a multifunction system, for intercepting and attacking on the ground, with conventional arms, using a multi-function Doppler Radar (RDM); and a low altitude penetration system (linked to the use of the ASMP missile) and using a'ground-followir.g radar,' the furure Antilope 5. The Mirage 2000 versions for the first two systems are single-seaters, but a two-seat version, equipped with the same weapons system, is also being developed for training needs. In contrast, the 'low-altitude penetration version' will be a two-seater. Progress of the Program Resources drawn upon are considerable and their range would surprise the casual observer. The CEV is using 58 planes for various purposes in the Mirage 2000 program. About 10 of those selected as being the most repre- sentative were displayed at Bretigny. The list of major aircraft used to do the testing is impressive: a Mirage F1 and a Caravelle, five Mystere-20's, five Vautours, a Mirage IIIi two Mirage IV's and so on. As for the Mirage 2000 itself, three planes are continuing testing including: the Mirage 2000-01 (maiden flight: 10 March 1978); it had reached a total . of 125 hours flying time in 155 sorties by mid-March; the Mirage 2000-02 (maiden flight: 18 September 1978); it had a total of 180 hours flying time in 200 sorties by mid-March, and the Mirage 2000-03 (maiden flight: - 26 April 1979); it had a total of 75 hours of flying time in~68 sorties by mid-March. This is a total of 380 hours in 423 sorties. In 10 months (mid May 1979 to mid March 1980), these three planes made close to 250 sorties and flew about 215 hours. The CEV evaluation flights started ver;~ early on: from the 14th sortie of the Mirage 2000-01. Ey mid March, the CEV had already completed 66 evaluation flights and the air force 16. The acceptance flights of the current prototypes are progress~ing well: 28 have been made including 18 in 7 working days with the Mirage 2000-02 alone. ~ The flight characteristics are remarkable. The plane, with its electric flight controls is very maneuverable and affords precision flying, a decisive advantage for firing, in-flight refueling, approach and patrol ~ - flights. Flight capabilities examined can be summed up as follows: - -airspeed: 750 knots on the instruments and Mach 2.2; less than 100 knots for low airspeeds; up to 30� for large angles of attack; landing approach speeds: 140 lmots (260 km/hr); _ --altitude: 65,000 feet (about 20,000 meters); and --load factors: 8 G's. ?7 - FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY As a matter of fact, the final preparation of the airframe is now practically completed, hence the acceptance flights at the CEV, whose aim is official vericiation of flight performance and flight characteristics. Perfoztnances _ announced for the Mirage 2000 follows: ceiling of operation 20,000 meters; maxi.mum climbing speed 15,000 meters/minute or 250 meters/second; climbing time to 15,000 meters/Mach 2: 4 minutes; maximum speed in horizontal flight: Mach 2.3 + maximum sustained speed: Mach 2.2; landing approach speed: 260 km/hr; range of ac*.ion with auxiliary fuel tanks: over 1,800 km, all of which have been demonstrated in practice. The rather minor modifications made on the airframe (and first applied to the Mirage 2000-O1) were mainly aimed at reducing drag at high speeds. They had to do with: the air intakes: The boundary at layer diverters have been redesigned and the lower intake lips were made thinner (they were originally thicker to improve flow at large angles); the new design is the result of a compromise that is considered satisfactory; the vertical - stabilizer: Its sweep has been enlarged and its height diminished, re- - sulting in a design giving the Mirage 2000 a more typical Dassault look again; the original stabilizer had reall;~ been designed in view of the need to maintain the yaw behavior at very high fliglht~ angles: this made it possible to revert to a more classical design and thereby reduce drag in high supersonic flight; the rear section of the airfoil-fuselage attachment; the new fairing junction, being heavier, allows the inside elevon to move a couple of degrees frontir.g the vertical wall that forms the end of the fairing and thus avoid a discontinuity that could~ create a - disturbance in flow there. All these modifications were retained for the series. The Ol prototype incorporates all of them, prototype OZ has some of them and the 03 temporarily keeps the original geometric design. Prototype 04, which has had the series configuration from the outset, will fly at Istres at the beginning of May (see photograph of this plane in AIR & COSMOS No 799). The two-seater No 1 will fly at the end of September/beginning of October. Future Mirage 2000 P 1~ao additional prototpyes, to be prepared for the 'penetration' version, have now been announced and will fly in 1982. Their ground-following radar, the Antilope 5, is being developed by Electronique Marcel Dassault = and Thompson-CSF the former being the project foreman this time, as opposed to the solution adopted for the RDI. Development of this radar is being done with a Vautour (No 358) and two Mystere-20. However, the preparatory studies (blind instrument setting by radar cartography) calls on a Vautour No 355 equipped with an Antilope 1 radar and an inertia center. One can deduce from this that the setting of the inertia center will be done by a procecs comparable to the one developed for the U.S. cruise missiles (TERCOM system) whose principle is now known: reconnaissance of relief and comparison with a memory map. 28 FOR 4FFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 Finalization flights of the ASMP missile developed by Aerospatiale will be done, for their part, with the Mirage IIIE No 498 and a Mirage IV; the systems validation flights, of course, with a Mirage 2000. Deliveries This Mirage Z000 version will be delivered during the second half of 1986; deliveries of the first version (multipurpose RDM weapons system) to the air force,-however, will start in mid-1983 and those of the second version (intercept, RDI) in 1985. From these three versions, plus those that might be purchased later, the French air force will acquire about 400 Mirage 2000's with a production schedule of between two and four planes per month for its own needs, which implies deliveries spread out over at least 10 years, a period of time that will allow exports to develop normally and assure future customers of a solid technical and industrial base with required follow-up. The maiden flight of the Mirag~ 2000, first of its series, at the end of 1982 is in keeping with such a deli.very schedule. M 53: Towar3 the P2 Version Development of the M53 engine is now in a very advanced stage throughout the entire flight range. Two versions were authorized at the test bench (M53-2 and M53-5), specified performances have all been attained and the mechanical condition observed arter the tests was rated excellent. The prototype airplanes have started their tests with the M53-2 version of 8,500 kg of thrust with afterburner. They are flying now with engines - designated as M53-5. The latter will be incorporated into the f irst series of planes after receiving certain modifications perfected during the tests: adaptation of engine settings for high altitude and low speed and during fast power setting changes; structural reinforcement of the compressor, and so on. This M53-5 develops for an (equipped) weight of 1,420 kg a thrust for takeoff in dry air of 5,550 kg and a thrust of 9,000 kg using the after- burner. The dilution rate is 0.3 and the pressure ratio 9.2. Consumption levels arE 0.87 kg/kp/hr without afterburner and 2.05 with. An interesting feature of the M53-5 is in the thrust development as a function of altitude and speed. It in fact exceeds 11.7 tons at Mach 1.2 at sea level and 10 tons at Mach 2.2 at 36,000 feet. The M53-5 already allows better use - of the maneuverability characteristics of the Mirage 2000 and obviously improves its performance. However, the real Mirage 2000 engine, the one to be installed in series planes as of 1985, is the M53P-2. Its development started last year and it will generate a static thrust on the ground of 6,530 kg (+17 percent) 29 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY without afterburner and 9,700 kg (+8 percent) with. The substantial gain in performance is mainly obtained by progress achieved in materials and their behavior at high temperatures. Partial bench tests have started and are yielding good results (turbine). The first complete M53P-2 will be running on the bench next year. As of 1 March, the M53's had accumulated more than 11,000 hours in operation, including 1,450 in flight, on the Caravelle, the F1E and the Mirages 2000's. We shall come back to the finalizaticn of the Mirage 2000 weapons system, which is being pursued with the aid of various aircraft-bench tests of the CEV (see page 33). It should be noted, however, that the RDM radar, whose flight tests on the Vautour No 337 and the Mystere 20 No 131 are satisfactory, will soon be installed in the Mirage 2000-03. As for the RDI, it is f lying on the Mystere 20 No 79 as a definition prototype. 2000-O1 Flight Demonstration One might conclude with the demonstration flight of the Mirage 2000-01 conducted at mid--day on 25 March with Guy Mitaux-Maurouard the _ controls. In less than 6 min~ites despite a disturbingly low ceiling, the Dassault test pilot showed once more that the Mirage 2000 and its electric controls have truly created a new flying standard: a short takeoff followed by a turning climb and a series of maneuvers that spoke very well for how well the plane handles: rolls, turns at 8 G's, inverted flight and above all, the always spectacular fly-over at low speed (100 knots, 25� angle of attack) with the M53 at partial thrust, performed this time with an unbelievable and near immediate return to level flight that left the spectators flabbergasted. The hyperlift of the 2000 is indeed astounding. Only one plane in Europe leaves an even stronger impression of defying the laws of gravity and stress in flight. It is called the Mirage 4000.... COPYRIGHT: A.&C. Paris 1980 9609 CSO: 3100 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE . ~ IMPROVED OPERATIONS, FINANCIAL SAVINGS DESCRIBED - Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 80 pp 40-41 [Article by Lt Col Bertrand de Lapresle, ESM Saint-Cyr 1957-1959, Terre d'Afrique promotion is with the armored cavalry. Currently he serves in the management unit of the land forces headquarters, finance planning bureau: "The Ground Forces 'Enterprise [F~ccerpt] Today no one ignores the privileged role of the armed forces in the development of RCB* methods. In effect, the extensive discussions which developed in the country, specifically after the passing of the 1976 programming law, largely contributed to making public opinion - realize the thinking and estimation work d~ne within the defense estab- Lishment bath in terms of targets and the necessary means to reach them. However, th~ emphasis put on planning and programming should not make us forget that these instruments are valuable only if regularly readjusted ' on the basis of specific data on the factual changes in costs and physical achievements. Such is precisely the role of management which must not only insure that budget credits are used as "productively" as possible, but also contri- bute to implQment program decisions thanks to experience based on the - study of the annual physical and financial disparities compared with the targets. Search for "Economy" Through Better Loan Profitability The ground forces are among the biggest national enterprises both in - terms of personnel size and annual turnover. Yet, it would be both trite and essential to emphasize that the specific nature of this enter- prise lies in its role as a"producer of security" which is necessary to the life of the country at the cost cf levying from the national wealth the necessary financial means strictly defined by the political powers. * Rationalization of budgeting choices. 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 rok ohrcciA?, Utii: ONLY ` Therefore, the management would be considered optimal not to the extent to wh ich maximum "savings" would be achieved, but to which funds appro- priat ed for the ground forces would be used with the best possible produ ctivity for the development of its operational capacity which guara ntees this security. Therefore, any squeeze of general expenditures for the benefit of equip- ment, organization, or training of the forces in an "economy" similar to impro ving returns on means appropriated for the training of the units. In th is sense it would be easy to illustrate the permanent wish for "econ omy" which characterizes decisions implemented at all levels in the cours e of management operations in recent years. This desire shows, above all, in the extensive reorganization of the struc tures, already drawing to an end. It is based on principles exten- sively involving the "alleviation of general costs" with a view to impro vements in overall operational capacity within the stipulated ceilings. These are the purposes of the essential measures among which we co uld cite extending the quaternary structure to the corps in order to retai.n the same number of combat units despite the disbandment of a numbe r of regiments, the merger of the territorial with the operational comma nd, and the elimination of one level of command in order to reduce the number of staffs, the elaboration of guides thus enabling the ser- vices to expand extensively without raising costs, and the easiest and most effective mobilization of the reserve forces. Spec ificaily oriented toward the production of "security," the training and instruction of the units were also targets of redeployment, and the "econ omy" thus achieved was used to promote an increase in overall prof i tability, as follows: _ - Th e planning of fuel allocations, restructuring of exercise areas and the f ormulation of a plan for their use benefit the expansion of activi- ties aimed at acquiring the better mastery of the hardware; - Th e finance-based policy of developing both firing and driving simulators and audio-visual techniques makes possible the faster and less expensive acquisition of skills; - Finally, the quantitative growth itself is valorized through the quan- titat ive improvement resulting from renovated training methods. The strict reduction of current operational expenditures in the course of ma nual management operations is the expression of a deliberate policy of using all possible economy sources. However, no area is ignored ir~ the effort to reduce general coses: The infrastrt~cture, where a strict normalizing prevails both in terms of new construction and renovation, skillfully achieved through the use of substitutions or extensions of ~ ~2 FUR OFFICIr,L L'SE ONi,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FO[t 0~'rICIAL I~SE O~TL1' the life span of equipment, rationalization of logistic support circuits, etc. The activities undertaken in this respect, however, rapidly reach their limit and cannot be further developed without harming the opera- tional training whose indispensable environment they constitute. Modern Management Integrated Within the Overall Financial System of the Decision Making Process The substantial redeployment of ineans thus practiced over the past five years in order to obtain better possible returns on budget allocations, has been possible thanks only to modern management methods which allow the evaluation of the financial consequences of planned savings and of possible decisions. Such management is modern first of all because of its techniques. The automated data processing, indispensable in the management of either personnel or a variety of stocks, facilitates the use of accounting data in management. It allows the statistical use of records, and contributes to the simplification of administrative procedures. Furthermore, present- day methods used to optimize hardware design use modern procedures such as "value analysis," "the CCO method,"-~ multiple criterion analysis, etc. Furthermoxe, to modernize its management the land forces try to organize in accordance with the assignment related to the modernization and admin- - istration of the armed forces (MMAA) a coherent overall system whose data makes it possible to adapt practical experience to the stipulations - of the program and the budget through cost analysis and the study of noted disparities. Conceived in the sense of the participatory line by specific target, the purpose of the tools used within this system is to increase the opera- tional capacity of the formation through deconcentration reaching the implementation levels in order to promote the active participation of all the necessary means for the reaching of set targets.. In other words, _ on each occasion, it is a question of bringing as close as possible the area of decision making to that of action. Generalized in 1974, today the "operatianal budget" is implemented by over 500 centers of basic responsibility and, to the general satisfaction, fulfills its role as a tool for coordination and management. While pre- serving the financial freedom of heads of the center it allows the gain- ing of specific knowledge of costs not only by type of expenditure but _ also in terms of implementation or activities concretizing the attainment of objectives directly related to such programs. The advantages of the operational budget system focus current research on the increase in certain munition and clothing outlays. Furthermore, ' the "total operational budgets" of the schools and some departments of the armed forces are assessed and followed annually. * Design based on optimum cost. 33 FOR OFFICIt~L USE UPdLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The "management budgets" play a similar role for the services. Bringing closer the expenditures, broken down by budgetary item, to the funds - appropriated by the various services for the armed forces, they make it possible to determine the added value generated by each of the services and the complete cost of operating the formations. Logistics, engineers, and materiel formulate their annual anticipatory management budgets and, at the end of the year, draw up an account which, when compared with the initial forecasts, makes the control of management and the study of noted deviations possible. The management of the land forces, therefore, is firmly oriented today toward a system of contractual a11_ocations of finances, whose use is ~ controlled at meetings at which t}~e coordination between the results obtained at all levels and the stipulations of the action plan, hence- forth generalized, is examined. The time is past when financial affairs were the area of a few special- ists who were more accountants than managers. Henceforth, thanks to the development of a variety of techniques, some of which we mentioned, the command at all levels is assuming financial responsibility. The objec- tive study of resources helps to clarify, with a view to returns, the choice of individuals who are responsible along the entire hierarchical chain within the forces and the services. ~ The spreading of such modern management methods, actually, is attained even better since, in fact, it is merely a question of adapting to the current environment the traditional military concept of "economy of forces," utilizing as best as possible the "financial means" to serve the "mission." ~ Simulators _ Annual savings per simulator: - Driving the AMX 30 2.9 million francs - - Tank fire 2.0 million francs - Artillery fire 1.6 million francs Savings in munitions for 1981-1986 through the use of simulators 683 million francs Example of "General Cost Savings" Used to Improve Operational Fitness _ 1975 1979 Number of staffs 59 41 Number of corps 230 205 Number of combat units 740 730 31~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1975 1979 Number of days of activity 70 100 Of which, with materiel with limited potential 35 47 Rate of commar.d staffing 27.3% 28.5% Thousands of tons hauled by military truck 65 240 Inferred cost economy (currant financi3l means) 13 43 COPYRIGHT: 198o-Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" 5157 CSO: 3100 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = COUNTRY SECTION ITALY FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF NEW GOVERI~Il~fENT-LABOR UNIpN ACCORD Projected Increased Expenditures Milan IL SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 13 May 80 p 1 [Article by Claudio Alo: "The Cost of the Agreement"; additional material on the 10 May 80 accord between Che Second Cossiga Government and the United Federation CGIL-CISL-UIL labor unions, including textual references as well as reactions and commentary by the political left and by the - southern Italian areas may be found in JPRS 75970, West E~zrope Report No .1594 [Text] The agreement arrived at during the wee hours of Saturday between the government and the labor unions was received in a substantially favor- able manner by most commentators, This agreement as a matter of fact is being hailed positively for at least two reasons. The first one is of an objective character: there is no doubt that the labor union demands, along with the issue of public employment contracts and family allowances, were on a sound foundation and that their acceptance by the administration represents a further atep in the process of equitable redistribution of i`ncomes now in progress in Ita ly, The second positive element, which springs from last Saturday's agreement, is of a more strictly political character. The Second Cossiga government went into this meeting with the labor union organizations in a position of evident weakness. The restoration of good relations with the labor union organizations was thus able to represent a solid point in favor of the administration, perhaps the only one on which the administration was able to do anything on its own, and Francesco Cossiga did not w~ane to miss the bus, The operstion came off well and the execi~tive branch certainly came out Iesa shaky than when it went into this long and tiring meeting, From that angle, the agreement was positive although some by no means marginal questions remain yet to be raised. 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ The Second Cossiga government took over a month and a half ago, submitting a program based in practice on two fundamental elements: firmly sticking to the priority character of the fi ght against inflation and avoiding - - the mista kes which the new Minister of Budget La Malfa had several times ~ criticized the earlier admin~stration for: little rigor in holding down f the public deficit and weakness in dealing with labor union demands. Well, the impression is that, precisely on these poinCs, th e administration in several respect~ came into confli_ct with its own prior statements. Let us see why; : (1) The understanding concerning public employment and family allowances will, in 1981, according to initial computations, cost another S trillion. - This will further aggravate the public de~'icit or it will lead to a new wave of tax increases, in any case reducing the net amount available for in~estments . (2) A further deterioration in the public def.icit (which, without these new expenditures, would probably have been considerably below the 40- trillion figure for 1980) and the simultaneous increase in pay envelopes entails the risk of bringing about new tensions on the inflation front which, in 1980, according to an announcement by Ia Malfa himself, will hit 22 percent. (3) Another 5 trillion in current expenditures will certainly cause a deterioration in the structure of public spending, whPre expenditures for - investments will carry relatively less weight. (4) The agreement worked out Saturday has a single meaning at least for _ the moment since the Second Cossi~a government has not mana~~ed to get much more than a general inclination to hold hi~~ng proceduY�es coupled wic~1 unemployment benefits [integrative contract negotiationsJ down, This was so general that, a few hours after the agreement, the F YAT coordination procedure agreed on a bottom figure of 47,000 lire, in othe r words, higher than the one agreed upon a couple of weeks ago. Looking at the labor union commitment toward an increase in the productivity mf the economic system and toward holding down our growing labor costs, the administration had to be satisfied with an opening of credit. This is certainly important, as the budget minister maintained in the inter- view which we are publishing here, but there is nothing certain about it, ' We may hope that the turnabout in relations with the labor union, which Giorgio La Malfa talked about, will facilitate a rigorous economic policy, as required by the difficult period which awaits us; but the re is no doubt that many worrisome questions, arising from this substantially "political" 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY agreement, have not yet been answered in any way, And this is happening while the technical time frame for correcting the course of a year 1980 which promises growing infZation, trade deficits, and public deficit are getting shorter and shorter. - - La Ma1fa Defends Program Costs Milan IL SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 13 May 80 p 1 [Interview with Budget Minister Giorgio La Malfa by Claudio Alo"] [Text] Just 48 hours after the tiring negotiations leading to the agreement on public employment and on doubling the family allowances, Budget Minister Giorgio La Malfa is - etill convinced that there was a fundamental turnabout during the night between Friday and Saturday in relations ~ between the government and the labor union. For many hours he tried to move to the conference table the old economic rigor of the La Malfa clan, along with h~s concern over a period of time which looks as if it is going to be extremely difficult and he is firmly con- - vinced that the labor union deve loped a new awareness on economic policy problems. The economist who, until just a few months ago, talked the rigorous language of facts and figures and who now runs into a different policy, however does not conceal two main concerns: first of all, that the opening of credit, which the administration allowed for the labor union, would indeed have positive consequences and, next, that the awareness displayed by the labor union, during this meeting, wi11 be up to the extremely grave problems which the country is going to have to face, [Queation] Minisrer, your fellow government minister Pandolfi said that he ~ was satisfied with this agreemma~~6t~t tha t he is also worried. Are you more satisfied or more worried? - [AnswerJ I am substantially satisfied with the turnabout that emerged in relations between the administration and the labor union and I just want to wait and see where it takes us, As for any worries, I am neither more n;,r less worried than I was before the meeting and I am of course worried - about an extremely difficult economic situation which I described with maximum clarity for the labor una.on leaders; I am also worried about the background conditions of the Italian economy at the start of the eighties, That is what I am worried sbout. 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 I rUc~ urrt~lcu. u~L vivi.~ [Question] And you are not worried about an agreement which can be inter- preted as unil.ateral yiPlding by the administration, without getting any- thing in return? [Answer] I do not agree with your interpre~~~ion. There is a~ignificant novelty in the outcome of this meeting and it consists in the by no means minor fact that the administration and the labor union have signed a . common document in which they accentuate the problem of inflation and in which the administration has confirmed that it will not allow the government deficit to eaceed 40.5 trillion and thar it wil.l see to the financing of ~ any major spending either through tax provisions or by cutting other current spending. For me, Chis is certainly a turnabout. I do not know whether this turnabout will be followed by successive steps in the direction toward a rigorous economic policy, which is necessary, but what we achieved today is this: the labor union is very familiar with *_he administration's objec- tives regarding economic recovery but also iCs opening regarding collaboration toward a policy of reviving tFee pianning effort. [QuestionJ Minister La Malfa, the labor unionists are familiar with the - administration's objectivea but do they share the decisions that are necessary to attain those objectives? [Answer) Their signature under the joxnt document says that they do. And - they know that the situation is going to get worse and that we want to discuss rigorous measures in order to reduce inflation and restore the economy. The labor unions in su~ary agreed to a recovery policy instead of having it imposed by somebody else. [Question] And what if the labor union should be disappointed in regard to your expectations and your opening of credit? [Answer] There are direct instruments which the government has available, - such as credit policy and tax policy, ~ [Question] In summary, the well-kno~an "noose�" [Answer) Although I do not like that term, there would not appear to be any other. [Question] Miaister, how mucti did last Saturday's agreement cost the gov- ernment budget which is already so lopsided? - [AnswerJ The cost for family allowances will fluctuate between 600 and 800 billions for 1980. 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY I [QuestionJ And what about 1981? [Answer] For 1981, it will be around 2-2,2 trillion, aot counting public employment. But you have to keep in mind that a considerable portion of ` this higher cost is going to be financed autonomously by the increase in the salary amovnt, And you also have to keep in mind the commitment under- taken by the labor unions so Chat any further increases would be financed through forms of solidarity among the workers themselvea. - [Question) What about the agreement's cost for public employment? [Answer] That comes to about 2,3 trillion for 1980, [Question) Minister I,a Malfa, a few months ago you bitterly criticized the v First Cossiga government because it granted the quarterly setup for the emergency payments for goverrnient workers {state enterp rises?]~ without opening a discussion on the question of the sl3ding scale, Do you not think that the Second Cossiga government granted more while asking even less in return? [Answer] Absolutely not, And I will explain to 3~ou right away why. The First Cossiga government shifted the quarterly setup--a providion which extended the indexing mechanisms--to the deficit and outside an overall economic policy framework. Besides, this maneuver, like others, was justified by the need for providing support for the demand in view of a recession which has not yet arrived. Today, on the other hand, through this agreement, we are moving within a complex overall design and within the context of a policy essentially aimed at redistribution of funds, [QuestionJ But there remains the fact that the econ~mic burden of this agreement will make itself felt heavily in terms of the public deficit, the quality of spending, and, by the same token, on the very inflation which the administratd,un wants to fight. Do you not think so? [Answer] Apart from the fact that we have emphasized that the public deficit ~ will not increase the burden, there is another element that must be con- sidered, Family allowances carry greater weight in the South, Their increase, other things being equal, favors incomes in the South which are most heavily struck by inflation. Having made this point, there is no doubt now that we . are still stuck with all of the risks inherent in an extremely accentuated inflationary situation, A situation which absolutely requires that new atmosphere that was created through the agreement last Saturday, [Questionj Minister, do you not believe that the traditional La Malfian rigor is now clashing with political interests? ` . ~0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOIL OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] Absolutely not. Before the meeting, it appeared quite improbable to me that we would achieve a result such as the one we had. There was even reason to fear a quite different behavior on the part of the labor unions which howevAtc ga~e the impression that they are beginning to grasp the Country's economic problems in their seriousness and urgency. Whet I have to underscore is that we have not yet arrived at an understanding at ~11 costs. � 5058 CSO: 3104 F ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN SUAREZ' ABILITY TO GOVERN QUESTIONED Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 May 80 p 3 [Editorial by Juan-Tomas de Salas: "Sua-rez' 'Pime Has Passed (I)"] [Text] A political leader who served his country with distinction under certain given conditions has become a burden and a serious hindran.ce for the future, now that circumstances have radically changed. That is what has happened to President Suarez. After the latest government crisis, , there ie now way to hide the dismal ev~:dence even one more day. ~ After almost a year of paralysis and silence, with the nation infested with problems demanding decisive leadership, the pressure of events took its revenge and handed him three successive resounding defeats: the votes in Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country. And then his moment of ~ truth arrived. Either Suarez would radically change his policy and his government, or Suarez would sign his political death sentence rather quickly. After 3 weeks of anguished vacillation, the hermit of Moncloa finally managed to form a new government; so poor, so conditional, so whatever you want to call it, that it was almost like having the church bells toll the sad news that Adolofo Suarez already ceased to exist. It must be said this way: he can't function. Adolfo Suarez worked hard to win himself a noteworthy place in the modern history of Spain. He was the right man at the right time. No one could have dismantled Francoism from within better than he did, thus permitting the peaceful transition from one-man rule to the democratic system. Ad~lfo Suarez carried out his role in history with courage, skill, and even haste. No one can deny him credit for actions in the first 2 or 3 years of his great political adventure, and least of all this publication, which con- sistently supported him at that.time and even much later. For the last time, he did the ~ob. But the irony of history is that the qualities that were useful to Suarez in bringing down Francoism from within--skill,secrecy, a:~d astuteness, fundamentally--are not anywhere near enough to preside over a democratic - government. His deficiencies became increasingly obvious as the new regime was bring built up and strengthened. Suarez knew how to destroy, ~.2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 ~ but he did not have the least idea of how to build. ~~Ihat is worse, it is now clear that he never knew well what there was to build. From blunder to blunder, from clever move to cleverer agreement, the man was almost providential at a crucial phase was declining bit by bit. Silently, with a growing sense of harassment and persecution, Adolfo Suarez fell to his elephantine level of incompetence. What can we do about him? What now? The normal inclination of a sector of Spanish public opinion would be to lose hope, faced with this problem. He's the only one we have, help out, everyone into the bunker, long live the "caenas," and up with Numantia. But no, my friends, just the opposite. Soon we are going to prove in our own flesh one of the sublime virtues of democracy: here, no one is irreplaceable. Anyone who is not useful is removed, and someone else is put in. And, remember, there always is someone else. In the UCD [Democratic Center Union] itself there are leaders who are much better suited than Adolfo Suarez to the conditions in the country here and now. They are not well-known to many, but from now on they are going to be known, from now on the political discussions in the UCD should become public. Hidden debates should be banished forever from public life. Tt~e "off the record" chat in the hallways is already a thing of the past. Here, you must show your face. The nation wants to get to know its leaders and the solutions they propose. Anyone who is afraid--go back home. One fundamental thing must be kept in mirld: the relative majority of the country voted for the UCD and not for the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]. To betray this wish could have serious conse:~uences for the system. Suarez must be replaced, inexorably, but unhurriedly, from within the majority. Criticize Suarez--yes; dismiss Suarez--also maybe, yes; but merge with the PSOE--no. A Frenchman said, "Yes, but...", and now is president of the Republic. - (CA~MBI~0.16 editor's note: Independent friends who still believe in Suarez ask me: And if the president revives? Although in that case I would be the first to applaud, ~y lack of faith that the miracle will occur I will explain in coming editorials.) COPYRIGHT: 1979 INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A. 8131 CSO: 3110 - 43 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES TERRORISM Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 8 Jun 80 pp 51, 53, 55 - [Interview with Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson Perez by Jose Diaz Herrera; _ date and place not given] [Text] Juan Jose Roson Perez, aged 48, with a degree in political sciences, and a retired militarq inspector-commander, is the government's new "super hardliner" against ETA [Basque Fatherland.and Liberty GroupJ. Appointed minister of interior on 2 May, Roson.Perez was forced to withstand one oF the worst escalations of the Basque terrorists during the first days of his term in office: ETA assassinated eight persons in a week. The state security forces reacted and, 2 weeks later, 45 ETA members were captured by the police and sent to jail At the same time, on 21 May, the interior minister appeared in eongress and announced a 12-point plan against the ETA's terrorism. His plan may be summarized in a single phrase: "Against ETA, submachine guns." He ~poke with Jose Diaz Herrera, of EAMBIO 16, about the terrorism of the extremists of both the right and left. CAMBIO 16: As minister of interior, what is your main concern? Juan Jose Roson: The number one problem in the country is the tremendous defiance of ETA. There is not the slightest doubt that the restoration of a normal situstion in Spanish society entails the elimination of ETA. C 16: And you want to conquer ETA by force? - JJR: To me, the ETA problem is a problem involving a battle and effective- ness on the part of the police. But it is not an easy problem,to solve. There are political forces which are giving the terrorists a certain amount of protection. This is why I think that Parliamen*_.bears some responsibili- ties in this regard, something which I have requested in Congress. Those responsibilities include that of establishing and requiring democratic be- havior on the part of certain political groups giving protection to the terrorists. ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 16: You have resorted to Parliament in search o.E backing in the battle aga~nst ETA. If those measures should fail, would you request more severe measures for putting an end to ETA? ' JJR: I described to Parliament some guidelines for action. They are neces- sary guidelines for action to focus on the ETA phenomenon and to combat it. They may be insufficient and, if so, I would return to Parliament and ask - for further measures. It is Parliament which must authorize those measures. The battle against ETA is not a partial one, nor a battle of a government or a police force against a terrorist group. It is the battle of the democratic forces and those of the society to win ~ some fundamental rights against ETA, which denies them. C 16: There are some who claim that the terrorism might possibly be solved by a new amnesty, or by negotiating with ETA. JJR: I am drastically opposed to both methods, because they are counterpro- ductive; and I would refer you to history in this regard. The ETA's terms for negotiations are unacceptable. If the state agrees to those negotiations and the terms set forth in the KAS [Patriotic Socialist CoordinatianJ proposal, a state no longer exists. After that, we are all superfluous. Secondly, I think that there have been amnesties and possibilities of the elimination of the armed struggle. So long as ETA is killing, so long as it is cornering the society in:a campaign of physical and moral violence, so lor~g as it is intimidating all the citizens, no impunity can be asked for the terrorists. C 16: However, on a different occasion you were going to be chosen by the government to negotiate with ETA.... JJR: That is absolutely untrue, and you can deny it categorically. Let the former director of human rights of the Basque General Council's Interior Overseer, Jose Ramon Recalde, author of that "report" tell me on what date and in what place I was going to negotiate with ETA, and who told him so. Because no one every made such a proposal to me, and I would by no means have agree~ to it. I can also state that, insofar as I know, the government has never attempted to negotiate with ETA. On the contrary, the opposite has occurred: Sec- tors close to ETA have suggested to the government the need for negotiating with ETA, something which the head of the government has always refused. 45 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 16: Then do you maintain that the Basque problem cannot be resolv~~d with political measures? JJR: I did not say that. There are two problems in the Basque Country: the - Basque problem, which requires political handling, and the specific problem _ - of terrorism, which needs specifically police action. - When discussing the Basque problem, we must not forget that there is a group of Basque citizens giving the armed struggle owing to a lack of information, which prevents thera from observing the current poliCical situation and the fact that, under a system of autonomies, the Basque prob- lems can be resolved completely. Therefore, I am in favor of the political measures, and maintain that, in this respect, the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] government must be given definite support. C 16: What wi11 the entity called for in your 12-point p rogram to plan,coor- dinate and direct the anti-terrorist.battle consist of, and who wi11 head it? JJR: The battle against terrorism cannot be established as a battle in which the Gendarmery, the National Police and officials from the Superior Police Corps each act on their own. If we want to be successful there must ~e co- ordina tion on the highesr level of this ministry and among the groups engaged in concrete action. Therefore, it was necessary to create this entity for coordination and planning which will be headed directly by the interior mi- nis ter himself . C 16: That is all very nice, but while you were planning, ETA assassinated eight persons last week in its latest escalation of terrorism.... JJR: Because of the features of the terrorist battle, it is extremely diffi- cult to curb the escalations. This escalation, as I see it, occurred be- cause of an excessive number of coincidences when it was time for opposing sectors to request negotiations and amnesty. What ETA has done is make an escalation attempt to foster that campaign. But it has ended now. Since 15 May the police have had notewoi:thy success. ~ The material perpetrators of the assassinations have been arrested, as well as the members of the commando groups which participated in those acts. However, what we must do is not only be px'epared to react when ETA assassi- nates. The police must plan the battle against ETA with greater severity and greater contt_n~aity. C 16: And reach the "head," as M,anuel Fraga recommends. JJR: That would be good, but it is not so easy. It is a we11-known fact that the leadership ~f th~ rarrar~st battle in the Basque Country is not ` ~6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY situated in Spain. From that standpoint, there has been no great coopera- tion from countries which should rigntfully have aided the Spanish Govern- ment; because this is no longer a battle of a political nature, but rather a terrorist battle which, although it is concentrated in Spain at present, could become concentrated in that neighboring country later on. Secondly, for some time there has been insufficient information. We have started to obtain it during the past few days. We know the real structure of ETA, how it recruits peop~e and how and where the commandos.are trained. However, so long as the brains continue to move about freely outside of Spain, the battle will continue. When we succeed in depriving them of their - freedom, we shall have won the battle. C 16: Since it is now known what the ETA is, could you tell us what backing it has, and how it operates? JJR: :he Ministry of Interior has conaiderable information. It has suffi- _ cient names, information on the supporters and on the arms supplies. It knows what ETA is, and how it operates. But this is not the time to make ~ that information public. C 16: In your 12-point program, you mention the need for diplomatic action to create a European police and judicial jurisdiction. Could.a "Europolice" be the effective weapon against terrorism? . JJR: Thus far, the diplomatic action has brought few results. The European countries have thought for some time that the terrorist phenomenon requires a global, homogeneous treatment throughout all of Europe. It seems to have been proven that there is cooperation among Che terrorist groups. Hence, - the government must cooperate as well, so that the terrorists cannot take refuge in other countries, nor receive any type af technical assistance from any European country. C 16: Has it been proven that ETA is cooperating with all the European ter- rorist groups? JJR: It is obvious tl-iat there is a relationship among all the European ter- rorist organizations. The Ministry of Interior has a great deal of discon- nected information in this regard, which must be put in order, so that we can plan a forceful action in that area. . C 16: In France, for example, where are the ETA "brains" concealed? JJR: Not only in France, but in other countries. With France, we have the concrete problem that the southern part of its territory is the headquar- ters of ETA; but there are also connections with other countries, which are the ones that we are analyzing. ' 47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 16: Algeria, Libya, South Yemen...where is ETA being trained? _ JJR: I would say that there are more countries giving support to the ETA terrorists, even countries closer to ours physically and culturally. C 16: Is it Belgium where the ETA members purchase weapons through the traf- ficking networks? JJR: Cutting of the ETA's weapon supply routes is one of our main ob~ectives. But it must be realized that this will not be an easy job, because the arms market is highly complex. We have just received good news in this regard: The police have succeeded in breaking up a line of Y weapons, and we are engaged in that effort. C 16: But does ETA have m~ore backing now than it did previously? JJR: ETA has grown from the standpoint of backing from the population. In this regard, the features of the battle have changed somewhat. Now we must decide how to convince the civilian population that it does not make sense to give backing to groups of the type and with the methods of action of ETA. C 16: And how will you achieve that? JJR: The effort is a very complex one. We must convince the population that _ its most important aspirations can be fulfilled through peaceful coexistence, in the normal operation of the autonomies and the state. But this is not just my probiem; it is a problem for the entire state, and a problem involving the government of the state and the gove~nnaent of the Basque Country. It is a problem involving backing for the PNV government. C 16: In your 12-point program, you request the creation of parliamentary committees to investigate the connections between certain parties and the terrorist groups. Is there evidence that some parties are giving the ter- rorists protection? - JJr: The government has sufficient information to requ^_st parliamentary in- tervention in this regard, and in-depth intervention. There are parties of the "abertzale" [patriotic] left, the state extreme lef t and the extreme rigr.~ which are in this category. Understandably, out of respect for Par- li;iment, I musr. bring up the matter before the Spanish Cortes first. _ C 16: If it is pruven that there is collusion among members of legalized po- litical parties or those negotiating for amnesty and terrorists, what action ~~aill you take? JJR: The government's action will be very clearcut. In accordance with the Constitution and the Law on Political Association, the government will turn over to the public prosecutor's office all the dossiers that I am analyzing and preparing at present. !~8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 16: Come now, are you going to put the individuals who are connected with the terrorists in jail? JJR: The individuals who are connected with the terrorists will receive judi- cial treatment. And, insofar as there has been criminal conduct, the ~udges will have to act with the utmost severity. ~ C 16: What measures could the government adopt to protect.the Basque business- ~ owners who have been threatened with the "revolutionary tax"? JJR: By making a frank, calm proposal to the business owners, something that I am ready to do soon with their organizations, the government could offer - them protection of personal security. But, in addition, the government will pursue very harshly all the systems whereby the extortion is taking place; and, thirdly, we shall demand that - the neighboring countries not protect this type of extortion, which is a crime in all the European codes, and which appears to me to be a Mafia pro- cedure similar to that in Chicago during the 1930's. C 16: Will the police forces in the Basque Country be increased? JJR: No; what we shall do is make a better selection of the individuals in _ command in the Basque Country. The battle against ETA is a battle with its own peculiarities, and demands people who are very we11 prepared. And that is what we intend to do. Police with a higher degree of expertise will be countering ETA. C 16: Will those police forces have better facilities? _ JJR: There need be no doubt of that.. We shall not cnly create mixed anti- terrorist battle groups comprised of national police and gendarmery, but we shall also provide them with the best facilities. The countries in which the anti-terrorist battle has progressed are those in which the police have had facilities for the investigation, detection and location of the terrorists. Therefore, we must also have the best communica- tions systems, and the latest procedures for analyzing and observing.those _ movements, so as later to combat them, as well as the latest cantrcl sqstems which will be placed in service very.soon, after the installation work and the training of competent personnel. - C 16: Will the autonomous police forces be given the authority to battle against the terrorists? JJR: The terrorist situation can only be resolved by the state security forc- es. The autonomous police forces will also have to lend tl~eir assistance at _ times. But their basic mission will be to assume a different sort of func- tion which, in my opinion, is currently divertin~ national police forces - - from the anti-terrorist battle. 49 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 16: Will you take harsh action against the press in the matter of making a defense for the terrorism? JJR: I do not think that we can continue with a sitt~ation such as the pre- sent one. If we do not attack the defense of terrorism, we are not attack- ing one of the priority goals being sought by the terrorists: to place the civilian popula tion on their side, through their psychological.campaigns. C 16: Will not this matter of defense of the terrorism have repercussions on freedom of speech? JJR: Absolutely not. The fact is that freedom of speech is in the service of the community and of coexistence. Freedom of speech cannot be used to pro- vide moral protection for terrorist acts or to justify the~m. And, unfortu- nately, there is some evidence of this in the Spanish press. C 16: Are you referring to the Basque newspaper EGIN,.whiEh is claimed to _ be f inanced by ETA? JJR: I don't wish to refer to any of the media, but you have as much infor- mation as I do. C 16: What do you have to say on the subject of torture? JJR: Since that problem does not exist, if it did exist I would say that I would not allow torture on the part of the police. In any ?vent, there is a parliamentary committee to investigate that matter.; and I can state that the re is no real awareness that torture has ever existed. C 16: What will happen to the people who do not cooperate. with the police against the terroris ts? Is this a serious problem? , JJR: It is very serious. Because of failure to ~act, there have been instances of moral liability on the part of the civilian popul.ation recently. In fact, thEre was cooperation with ETA in the assassinations of the members of the gendarmery of Goinzue ta, who were murdered in that Navarre town on 16 May, owing to the apathy of individuals who knew that the attack was going to take place. Such crimes are penalized in the of any Western - country. C 16: Will you be as hard and unbending toward the right wing terrorists? JJR: To me, any kind of terrorism is serious, any kind of terrorism must be persecuted and checked, regardless of its type. The f~.ct is that, at the prNsent time, the most offensive terrorist group is ETA. But we cannot ignore the tendency toward violence among certain extreme right wing groups, ~ a tendency that must be curbed. 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - C 16: But do you think that the right wing terrorism is rather insignifi- cant because (in your opinion) it is not organized? ~ ?JR: I do not deny that the right wing terrorism may be organized, but it _ is my duty to speak quite clearly, and not with fals ehoods. At the present time, I have no evidence that the extreme right is supporting an organized terrorist organization. This does not mean that I preclude its existence, or that I would not ask the police to try to ascertain.whe ther such an orga- nization existed, whether it was na tional or whether it had internationai - ties . C 16: In the event that such an organization were to be discovered, a::d the New Force were heading it, as some parties in Parliament claim, would yo~ ~ request the outlawing of the New Force? - JJR: What must be done through the parliamentary groups and the Congress is finding out the real position of each party. And if there are any partiea, whether they be right or lef t wing, which are not engaged in absolutely clearcut political activity, repudiating violence and terrorism, they would automatically have to be turned over to the judicial branch, because they - would obviously not be abiding by the system whereby our Constitution is inspired . , C 16: Do you believe that the police act with the same stringency r_oward the ~ right wing terrorists as with the left wing terrori.sts? - JJR: The police are basically professional. But I shall change the question because it is passive. Would that we had the same success against the left wing terrorists as we are having with the right wing terrorists! C 16 : Nevertheless, on oecasion some collusion is detected between certain state security services and the extreme right wing groups.... JJR: All the cases wherein a connection has been proven between the police and the extreme right have been turned over to the common or special juris- - dictions. Moreover, there have been administrative actions which have been ; carried out in instances wherein such collusion occurred, and certain indi- ~ viduals were expelled from the police. C 16: Last week, DIARIO 16 pulilic~zed the investigations that certain police forces had made of democratic dep uties. Will you allow such activities? JJR: I am concerned that this cotitd have happened. Although the r~ports giv- - en to me do not coincide with the information from the newspaper, I have turned over the matter to the public prosecutor's office, and I have ordered the depar tment undersecretary to open an investigation. In any event, I shall take steps tu prevent such activities from taking place in the future. COPYRIGHT: 1979, INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A. 2909 CSO: 3110 ~ - 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ COUNTRY SECTION SPAI'_V WORKERS PARTY LEA.DER GLOSSES OVER EXTREME LEFT'S SQUABBLES - Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Jun 80 p 34 - [Interview with Jose Sanroma Aldea, member of the Central Committee of the Workers Party; date and place not given] [Text] On 1 July of last year, the Revolutionary Organization of Workers (ORT) and the Spanish Labor Party (PTE) combined thelr lives as Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. A new political graup came into existence in the left wing of ttie l~ft. At the time, it was rumored that the merger in the Labor Party (PTE) was more of a deal between leaderG than a spontaneous inclination among the nembers. ~aelve months later, the split is a fact viewed with bewilder- ment by both members and non-members, who have analyzed the situation as fur- ther evidence of the failure of the extraparliamentary left during this period of democratic consolidation. Jose Sanroma Aldea, a member of the Central Committee of the Workers Party (PT) and former secretary general of the ORT - (Comrade Intxausti when he was underground) spoke with this magazine. CAMBIO 16: The party is nothing but skin and bones. Jose Sanroma: N~~ at all. Contrary to what might be inferred from certain - reports, the defections have been minimal. Of the 90 members comprising the executive committee only 13 have become officially separated from the PT, and none of them are from the ORT. C 16: Not formally, but the truth is quite different. _ JS: Possibly, although it would have been democratic for them to submit to the conclusions of the special congress for clarification to be held from 24 - to 27 June; but never that drop-by-drop separation of the old members of the Spanish Labor Party. G 16: A congress which, to put it briefly, will be attended only by those of - your faction. _ JS: Well...although they have publicly promised to participate, I doubt the - attendance of the so-called radical line members. At the moment, they have - _ 52 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY not attended the National Congress of Andalucia, the first one of those sche- d uled for the nationalities or regions before the special one. It should also be pointed out that many non-radical former members of the Workers Party will not go either. C�16: That does not preclude the leaders of the dispute being ORT and PET. J S: The existence of the original parties has not been a deciding factor in the dispute. We are suffering from the development crisis that is being bo rne by all the revolutionary forces in Spain at present. I would go so - fa r as to call it the upheaval besetting the party system itself, This prompt- ed the need for a very intensive debate in the new party and, if it were not _ he ld in the depth required, the old mistakes of sectarianism which were eli- minated with the unification would be repeated. C 16: With this general breakdown in the so-called revolutionary left, what are your short-term predictions on its activity? JS: In our opinion, this phase will result in the advent of a plan for unifi- . cation of all the Marxist-Leninist forces. This operation would entail the creation of a new political party, ideological renewal and the reinterpreta- tion of the theoretical bases. C 16: You are inventing another radical movement like.the one sponsored b,j the "gang of four," your former colleagues Eladio Garcia Castro, Pina L~ ~ez, - Enrique Palazuelo and Heronimo Llorente. The difference is that they g~ b~- yond a party. JS: I may recall it, but that is all. We are convinced of the practical in- viability of the radical movement. There may be a glimmer of reality concern- ing its role, but we shall have to see how far it goes. ~ C 16: Isn't it possible that what is happening to many "revolutionaries" who are actually extraparliamentary is that they are dying for a seat and, when tYiey do not obtain everything they revert to quarreling? And the Workers Party obtained..some representatives in the municipal elections. JS: It is true that our separa~tion would not have been so easy.if we had a presence in Parliament, and that, at the present time, we lack su.fficient leverage to influence the society. Wherein lies the mistake? It is possible that we have not adjusted well to the change. Our problem, retained since Fr ancoist times, is that we have not subjected our theoretical bases to the ne cessary period o': readjustment based on the development that has taken place in the European societies. We had other priority concerns at the time which prevented us from discovering those issues. C 16: Is this your self-criticism? 53 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JS: It may be interpreted as such. And I might add that we have also erred in directing ourselves in an absorbing manner toward the inside of the party. It was a mistake to leave work, study and even personal life aside in order to concentrate all our efforts on concrete party activity. By not leading a life in society, we failed to relate to reality, to some extent. i~ow, we have nothing else to do other than what the population as a whole is doing. C 16: To be specific, what is the party's chosen political task at present? JS: To associate all the revolutionary and reformist forces and battle against anything emanating from the state which could damage the workers' interests; but without risky action which would offer an excuse for reaction. We are not better or worse on account of this. We want alternatives that will be _ part of a program that can be accomplished. C 16: Finally, don`t you think that the rapprochement between Peking and Car- rillo's PCE [Spanish Communist PartyJ is a slap at the PT, and at the ORT's pro-Chinese group in particular? JS: No one with a minimum amount of accuracy could accuse us of having under- _ taken ~ction on behalf of the Chinese people that was not considered from the standpoint of the interests of tfie struggle in Spain.. We never engage in imi- tation; and we differ with the Chinese leaders on key issues, such as NATO and ~ the Portuguese revolution. We are observing day by day that the relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Spanish Communist Party need not ' be exclusive. As a precedent in this regard there is the example of Romania, which has simultaneously been approaching the PCE and the former Workers Par- - ty. COPYR.IGHT: 1979, INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A. 2909 CSO: 3110 51~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104432-3 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ SPAIN - BRIEFS ETA LEADER IN ALGERIA--Miguel Angel Apalategui, alias Apala and one of the _ high ranking leaders of ETA-Military [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Groups], was seen in Algiers at the end of May [1980]. Nothing had been heard of Apala--one of the most mysterious figures in the Basque organization--since September 1977 when he was put on trial at Aix-en-Provence (France) and subsequently released. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Sp~~tish 22 June 80 p 5] UCD CONGRESS--The Democratic Center Union [UCD] will not hold its congress - during the planned dates. The congress, which was to be held in October, ~ will be postponed for several months. It is hoped that it will be held before Christmas 1980. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Jun 80 p 5] CSO: 3110 END 55 FOR OFFICIb;. L'SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100032-3