JPRS ID: 9288 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000300030008-7

~ ~ F ~ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFIC'IA1. Uti~: ON1.1'
JPRS L/9288
5 September 1980
Near Eas / '
t North Afr~ca Re ort
p
~
CFOUO 33/80)
FBIS FOREIGN BROA~CAST INFORMATION SERVICE
~
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
- transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
- other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
- mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
_ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
- The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2833 (Near East); 351-2501
(Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North
Africa).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI.A.TIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATiON BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y.
J
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9288
5 September 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 33/80)
CONTENTS
IN7ER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Arab Nationalism Said N~t To Be Anti-Islam
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jua-4 Jul 80) 1
]iRAN
Tehran Labyrinth Explored for Coup Possibilities
(Jean Cau; PARIS MATCH, 1 Aug 80) 12
UK Journalist Urges West To Heed Iranian Exile Groups
(Simon Henderson; FINANCIAL TIMES, 8 Aug 80)........... 19
LEBANON
Future Course of Struggle in South Explored
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 30 May-6 Jun 80) 22
Leftist, Palestinian Leaders Condemn Settlement
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 3G May-6 Jun 80) 28 =
Most Arab States Contribute to National Reconstruction
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 7-13 Jun 80) 34
PEOPL~'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YF~NiEN ~
Opposition Leaders Interviewed About Opposition Movement
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, various datF_s) 36 `
Opposition Formulates National Charter ~
_ Subordination to Soviets Rejected, 'Abd~al-Qawi Makkawi
Interview
Persecutions in Exile Deplored, Muhammad 'Ali Haytham
Interview
Change of Regime Analyzed, 'Abc!-a~.-Rahman Mahyub Interview
- a- ( I I I- NE & A- 121. FOUO ]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
1~vt? vri'tl~itlL UJL' V1VL1 -
UTIITED ARAB EMIRATES '
Economic Progress Marked by Formation of Central Bank
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABl, 23-29 May 80) 54
WESTERN SAHARA
- OAU Summit Considered 'Decisive Advance' in Saharan Cause
~(Fode Ama.dou; C~'RIQUE-ASIE, 21 Jul-3 Aug 80)........... 60
-b-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARAB NATIONALISM SAID NOT TO BE ANTI-ISLAM
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun - 4 Jul 80 pp 36-39
[Article: "Arabism, Islam and Racism"]
[TextJ "You are the best nation that has been brought forth." 3o the
holy Koran addressed the Arab nation when it gave them the mission to
spread Islam throughour the earth.
~
So that the Arabs would have no arrogance, pride or boastfulness about ~
their race, the holy Arab prophEt told them, "The Arab can excel over
the non-Arab only be beizg more devout."
However, Islam, which emerged among the Arab tribes and brought them out
- of their ignorance, grew and was in fact strengthed by the Arabs' faith
that they were one nation. This belief unconsciously spread widely,
although it was greatly intermixed with religion, since Islam and Arabism
cannot be separated.
The Arab connection revealed ifiself in literature and poetry, as well as
_ in government. The Uimnayyad state was strictly Arab, in heart and soul,
' � and in form and substance. When the helm of the 'Abbasid state was
taken over by non-Arabs, ~he state fragmented and collapsed and the
brillance of Arab c~vilization withered with its gradnal decline. Islam
was frozen into a mold.
The AraL~s experienced successive centuri~s of decay under thA shadow of
those ~;no assumed power. The Ottoman Caliphate, which ruled for 5
centuries in the name of religion, was the blackest period of decadence,
and, perhaps, was historically responsible for the backwardness which
befel them. In the meantime, Europe passed them, using what it inherited
from the Arabs as a foundation for its modern civilization and brilliant
science. When things tur~ed toward getting the Arabs and rhe other
peoples of the Ottoman Empire moving again, the Arab nation awoke from
its stupor, stirred up by Arab nationalism and itsemotional appeal to its
intellectual elite and officers.
.
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
The Arabs were not diverted from their determination to get rid of the
Ottoman hell by Jamal Pasha's hanging of the vanguard of this elite and
the cream of its youth on gallows in Beirut and Damascus in 1915 and 1916.
The nationalist struggle was crowned with success when the Ottoman Empire
collapsed in 1918. The Arabs' pullout from the Empire was suff~.cient to
eliminate its Islamic character. Thus, Mustafa Kamal, the builder of modern
Turkey, was forced to bring down the religious caliphate once and for all.
Under the banner of pure Arabism, the Arab East, including Lebanon, Iraq,
Syria and Palestine, fought against recalcitrant forms of colonialism--
French, British and Zionist.
As the 30's ended, Arab nationalism began to shed its emotional garb in
order to base its appeal on scientific and humanitarian foundations.
First there was the Ba'th movement and then Nasirism, both accompanied
by dozens of different by-product factions.
_ However, from the very start, the scientific nationalist appeal was aware
- of the role of religion, and gave it a secure place in its ideology. It
was recognized, and firmly believed, that the heavenly messages which
descended on Arab land were an essential part of the spirit, mentality
and her~tage this na~ion, and consequently, were an inseparable part
of its preser~t and its future and of its nationalist pride and faith.
It is jelf-evident that the Arab appeal is directed toward a high and
noble go~.l, the achievement of Arab unity. It is also self -evident that
all hostile forces, whether local, regional or interaational, are directed
at defeating this effort by striking at the nationalist forces. First,
the union between Egypt and Syria was aborted. Then, the plan for a
tri-partite union among Egypt, Syria and Iraq was frustrated. This was
followed by the decisive blow dealt to the nationalist forces through
the June [1967] defeat.
- This, however, does not absolve the nationalist forces of their responsi-
bility for shortcomings, atrophy and retrogression suffered by the nation-
alist movement. The internecine fighting and competition of these forces,
their avoidance of a democratic approach at times, and the infiltraCion of
paralysis and denominational, tribal and opportunistic factions into their
ranks, has all led to the forma.tion of a negative aspect of the nationalist
movement. The impact of this has brought trouble, confusion and disappoint-
ment into the daily life of the Arab masses.
Attacks are made on Arabism by leftists cloaked in slogans by "pro~res-
_ sivism" and "internationalism," using the argument that Ar ab nationa'lism
has turned into a reactionary or cl~auvinist appeal. This left wing feigns
to overlook the fact that scientific socialism cannat come into existence
within partial or fragmented entities that have not yet achieved their
national unity. This left wing keeps in mind that is is not in the inrerest
of "internationalism," as it advances to encircle the warm Arab waters in
the Mediterranean and the Gulf, that the Arab region should have a single
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
nation with a single political entity and a single decision-making process.
- Such a single nation would quickly take its place among nations as a great
unity, profoundly proud of its particular character, its independence and
its regional international and humanitarian role.
Arabism today is also attacked by rightists on the grounds that Arab
nationalism has turned its back upon Islam, and that talk about the unity
of the Arab homeland is in conflict with talk about the "international
character" of Islam.
_ Worse still, those who were first .*.o undermine the Islamic edifice of the
_ Arabs [the Persians] are today accusing Arabism of "heresy" and shedding
the blood of its advocates. They are now "exporting" Islam to the Arab
world under various and contradictory leadership elements which have been
able to shake off the heavy burden of the Shah from their shoulders, but
which have been unable to shake off the sores of rigidity, ethnic separatism
and hidden hatred of everything Arab.
It is also unfortunate that the Arabs these days are producing individuals
who deny the purity of origin of their nation and its right to be a nation.
They disparage its past and its great n:en. However, there is some conso-
= lation in the fact that these voices emerge in dissonant tones from the
rabble, and express little calm, logical scientific thinking.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI does not figure that its role lies in reaffirming the
Arabism and unity of the Arabs, something wilich is self-evident. We are
not trying to be involved in trivial, rabble-rousing dialogues as are
displayed on the pages of some newspapers and magazines. Rather, we are
today addressing ourselves to Arab public opinion with two questions:
Is Arab nationalism anti-Islamic?
Is Arab nationalism a racist appeal?
AL-WATAN A~-'ARABI has chosen to have these questions answered scientif-
ically and objectively by three well-known thinkers in the Arab East. This
does not imply that its pages are not open to any thinker, writer, poli-
tici~?or intellectual, wherever they may be on the political map, to have
his say scientifically and objectively, whether positive or negative, about
what is the best these days for the Arabs and Islam.
This newspaper finally puts to the Arab conscience a question that may
need no answer. It is, "Is it not strange that Western secularism, the
Zi~nist ~pueal and Persian ethnic separatism should coincide in denying
that the Arabs are wortny of being one nation?"
3
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
I
1. Is Arab nationalism anti-Islamic?
~ a. Manah al-Sulh is a political thinker, well known as an Arab nationa?tst.
He is descended fron~ an old Lebanese family known for political work and -
its Arab orientation. His thoughts and writings are very influential among
the younger generations in the Arab world. Al-Sulh's answer to this question -
is as follows:
When 'Abd-al-Nasir emerged as a representative of the liberal Arab nation-
alist outreach, individuals in Iran, Turkey and the Arab world itself arose
to open tedious and hostile political fronts against him in the name of
Islam.
The fact is that it was they who created the fairy tale that there is a
contradiction between Arah nationalism and Islam. Who can believe that
~he Turkish regime that inher~ted power from Mustafa Kamal and inherited
his secular teachings is closer to Zslam than 'Abd-al-Nasir?
From the first day he attained power, 'Abd-al-Nasir defined that what was
important for Islam was important for him, and that the Islamic framework
came immediately after the Arab framework, as far as his activity was
concerned.
~ In fact, who can believe that the Shah, the advocat~e of Aryarism and the
views of the Sassanids, was more genuinely Islamic than 'Abd-al-Nasir? _
However, 'Adnan Menderes, the 5hah of Iran and so~e Ar~b rulers took on
the guise of teachers of Islam for one thing only, to strike a blow at
the Arab liberation movement. In reality, this movement was the corner-
stone of the renaissance of the Arabs and of thF Islamic and eastern _
countries in general. In fact, not one Arab school of thought held a
view toward Islam similar to that authorized by Mustafa Kamal in Turkey -
and the Shah in Iran.
The conservative school which governs most af the Arab countries talks of -
Islam as the foundation for governing.
The Ba'thist school of thought also talks of Islam, and refuses to adopt
the Western view which espouses a complete separation of religion from the
state and sanctions secularism as the foundation for governing.
So there is nothing in the Arab schools of thought about government, whether
old or new schools, which has any negative aspect in its view of the re-
lationship between Arabism and Islam. What then is the source of this _
accusation against the Arabs who have a deep relationship, as a people,
with Islam?
The charge of damaging Islam must first and last be made against anyone who
~ refrains from pursuing the Arab and liberatior.ist renaissance. This �
lagging back, wherever it occurs, is a sign that a deep desire for Islam is -
4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
rc~it urr rc; ~,~t, usr; c~Nr.~r
lacking. In the countries where there is progress, liberation, a pan-Arab _
creed, and a reQsrd far Islam as the spirit of Arab civilization, Islam is
very healthy indeed. ~
.
b. Muta' Safadi is a political thinker of Syrian origin. He belonged to
the Ba'th Party in his early youth, fought in its ranks and was one of its
prominent advocates among students and young people. He converted to
Nasirism in the 60's. His works and books on Arab nationalist thinking are
quite worthwhile. Safa~li's answer to this question is as follows:
No one can bre2?.c up the historic and continued intermeshing between the Arabs
and Islam. How could the idea of Arab nationalism be opposed to or conflict
with the Islamic doctrine, when aff iliation with a nation has never been a
barrier to affiliation with a religion? -
~ This applies to all contemporary nations which have not been prevented from
_ having their own religions by the fac~ that they were French or German or
Indian or even Soviet. This applies to the Arabs and Islam in particular.
Because the Arab nation was the home of the Islamic message and has
preached it and has fought to spread and develop it, it has retained this
- distinguished status which has, in fact, been a bridge between its periods
of underdevf,lopment.
There is a succession of examples from history to prove that whenever the
Arabs lay down their missior~, Islam as well loses its cultural vitality and '
its independence is lost or subdued by the big political powers in the
various Islamic countris.
Conversely, all the political victories achie~ ed by the Arabs in their `
fight for the independence of their countries and for the rights of `
colonialized and oppressed peoples, have had a major effect in reviving
modern Islam. The battles of Arab nationalism fox more than a quarter of
a century cannot be isolated from the revolution now invading the neighbor-
iag Islamic countries, revealing nationalist 3wakening under the guise of -
diverse religious ideologies.
The fact is that the rupture between nationalist affiliation and religious
_ affiliation arises only when religion is transformed 'nto ideologies.
These result in a series of sectarian and doctrinal schisms which conflict
with the thrust of the awakening which seeks effective unification of the -
energies of society and its various segments in the uattle for total
liberation from cultural backwardness and politicaY aitd economic sub~ugation.
We ought not to be surprised to see today that the appeals to religious
ideologies are accompanied by sectarian, racial and regional winds blowing `
from the Mediterranean coast to ~ur Asian heartland in the east an3 to the
Kabylie mountains in Algeria to the west.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
The ini~ial experiences of Arab nationalism have proven that it is an appeal
for liberation and unification in the real world. We should not forget that
along with this appeal, national iadependence has been achieved for more
than 20 countries, and that, under the slogans of this appeal, Muslim and
Christian Arabs of every denomination have fought as have the Arabs, Berbers
and Kurds.
The progress of national independence has been obstructed by a number of
political regimes and prevented from developing into total pan-Arab indepen- -
dence, because a new and previously unexperienced split has crept into the
fabric of the nation. Some time will have to pass before a new vital
struggle capable of overcoming this situation will develop.
Restraining Arab nationa'.~m a~ this level of national independence and -
freezing it on the geo-politicatl-economic man, by a number of regimes and
international influences lurking behind them, is a symptom of a major threat
facing both the Arabs and Islam. Maintaining this status quo is only a -
short breathing spell after which hostile forces will launch a chain of
events completely counter to the previous wave of liberation and unification.
It will be a series of domestic fragmentation stimulated separately in each
country through its own type of inherited Plements of discord. Today, we
face internal fragmentation and collapse on every level, making a reality
- of the slogan of the Zionization of Arab society and its conversion into
_ minority societies, all at each other's throats. What is happening today
under the umbrella of the Iranian "Islamic" revolution is an advance sample
of simultaneous racial, denominational and regional polarizations.
Many voices of international public opinion nominate our Arab an.d Islamic
area for a new epoch of denominational wars similar to Europe's Hundred
Year War during the Middle Ages, but this will not happen, unless we
ourselves place ideologies, sectarian differences above the fateful drive
to promote and develop unification.
If the sectarian termite can eat into the fabric of society of a small
country, think how effective it can be when its artificial forces are _
released against whole ethnic groups. When that happens, we will be facing
not just sectarian wars; rather, ethnic segaratist wars will arise with
them. The strategy of Kissinger, Brzezinski and Hertzel will have `
triumphed.
c. Shaykh 'Abdullah al-'Alayli is a well-versed religious teacher, immersed
in linguistics and familiar with various cultural currents. He is descended _
from a well-known Lebanese family. A1-Alayli'sanswer to this question is
as follows:
Islam, as an international appeal, is not in itself a substitute for
nationalisms; rather, its adherents are expected to stave off the injustices
- 6 '
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
I~OR O1~FICIAL USE OM.Y
of aggressors and invaders. When nationalism is defense against injustices,
it is an in~eparable part of religion.
2. Is Arab nationalism a racist appeal?
a. Manah al-Sulh: The left and the righ*_ come together in accusing the
idea of modern Arab nationalism of racism. The nationalists have fought
a bitter struggle in ideas and in actions to forge the Arab nationalist
course in the face of various skeptics. The Arab nationalist idea has
continued to impose its accepted fac*_s and premises and its avant-garde
horizons on all ideological currents in the Arab homeland, whether leftwing
or conservative.
There is not one adhering to the ideological currents in the Arab countries
bold enough at present to slap nationalism as an idea; in fact, everyone
races to take a firm stance of faith toward it and to adopt it as a basis
for thought and action.
However, there is still a gulf between practice and application. There is
more devotion in words than in action. There are man~? factions in the Arab
homeland which do not espouse the nationalist idea although they are no so
~ bold as to openly profess their rejection of this idea. Some Islamists in
politics are still trying to put Islam in the place of Arab nationalism and
some regional lef tists are trying to attribute racism to the Arab -
nationalist idea.
However, nowhere in the Arab homeland rave things gone so far as to charge
- Arab nationalism with being synonymous with Zionism, as was the case with
- some Iranian leaders. These made statements to some Lebanese reporter.s
equating Arab nationalism with Zionism, a sort of one-upmanship which does
not indicate true or enthusiastic hostility to Israel.
If it is conceivable to charge any nationalist idea in the world with
racism, the idea of Arab nationalism is the last that could be accused
of r~~cism. Arab nationalism, with its cultural and humanitarian roots
and its historic values embodies one of the most complete forms of
_ social, political and cultrual unification the world has ever known.
Everyone who has lived on Arab land,; in fact, everyone who has lived in
Asia and Africa close to the Arabs, feels that Arab nationalism represents
him to a large extent and that he is not a stranger to the concerns,
aspirations and radiance of Arab nationalism. Anyone exposed to the East
or to Islam will of necessity have a love for Arabism and tne Arabs. If
any person from the East or any Muslim does not feel this love, it means
that he is lacking in Islam and in character. Any true belief in Arabism
is accompanied by a love for Islam and an openness toward the East; any
shortcoming in the latter means a shortcoming in the former. !
7
FOR OFFICIAL JSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
The finest example of the degree of love of Islam and the East in the heart -
of any Arab nationalist was that address given by the martyr, 'Abd-al-Ghani
al-'Arisi (a Lebanese who was executed by the Ottoman murderer,�Jamal Pasha),
at the first Arab conference in Paris in 1913. He opened the address with
a brilliant exposition of the essence of Arab nationalism and then moved on
to a discussion of the relationship of the Arab~ and the Turks under the
shadow of the OLtoman state. He said:
"The Arabs and Turks together founded this Ottoman state on the premise of
partnership in the holy war against the Crusader invaders. We, the Arabs,
gave the Caliphate to the Turks because of this holy partnership in war
and in defense of the East and Islam. We did not feel that the Turks were
conquerors and that we were countries conquered at the point of a Turkish
sword. We were, therefore, satisfied to establish this relationship. When _
we felt that some Turks wanted to deal with us as a victar who had taken
our land at swordpoint, we had no choice but to stand up against them,
whatever the price."
'Abd-al-Ghani al-'Arisi and his brothers rose against Turkish rule, and
_ tried to liquidate the Ottoman state. However, their Arab nationalist
thinking was so accepting of the East and of Islam that it went so far as
to be content with a status of equal partnership wi.thin the Ottoman state.
How can modern Arab nationalism--this product of the womb of the Ottoman
state--be accused of racism?
Certainly, Arab nat~onalism did not come into e~istence originally to solve
the problem of the minorities in the Arab East, but the enthusiasm of the
minorities for it was, at the ~ime, something very natural. It was the
- nature of Arab nationalism to constitute a vehicle [for the improvem~nt of]
their circumstances.
It is, however, unfortunate that some of these minorities did not retain
their old enthusiasm for the idea of Arab nationalism. That has hurt the -
Arab nation as well as them. The refusal of some minorities to adhere
to Arab nationalism and to carry its torch was a factor which reinforced
in others the propensity toward sectarianism. This happened in Lebanon,
for example, when some Maroni;.es turned their backs on the Arab natianalist
principle. Thus, they created a sectarian propensity which insisted on
following the logic of numbers and statistics in acquiring shares of the
land. In other words, these insisted on treating the Maronites as a
denomination, just as any denomination, to be given a share according to
its numbers.
Had it not been for the Maronite renunciation of the Arab nationalist line,
which had been followed by persons such as al-Rihani, Jibran Khalil Jibran,
- Najib al-`Azuri and Bishara al-Khuri, we would not have seen other sects .
proceed to look at the issues from a narrow denominational point of view.
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
' Arabism involves a great lov2 uf Islam. Anyone whose Arabism does not give
him this Iove lacks a fundamental element of his ability to give himself to
his homeland.
Enough said about the minorities within the Arab homeland. As for the
Muslims outside the Arab countries, it c;an also be said that Islam has a
- great deal of love for Arabism. Anyone whose Islam has not given him love
~or the Arab s lacks ability to give himself to his own homeland.
+ b. Muta' Safadi: If we aspire to scientific precision in def ining concepts,
we must first ask what is meant by the concept of racism. This ters has
been bandied about to describe a type of concept and practice, par t icularly
among some European peopZes, to be more precise, some political regimes
and their associat ed positions in international relations.
So, where does Arab nationalism .stand with regard to these racial theories
which have always accompanied the evolution of Western civilization and
which can be regarded as its distinguishing feature in various per iods of
history?
During its modern revival, Arab nationalism acquired its intellectual and -
practical values from the struggle for survival which the various regions
of the Arab nation waged, particularly during the period of Western
colonialism, from the stage of direct occupation up to the stage of con-
temporary imperial ism. It was a struggle which was directed toward
liberating the Arab homeland from the foreign aggressor and from the
domination of it exploitative and per_verted cultural systems. This
combative nationalism did not give rise to any principles of discrimination,
except on the basis of who sided with imperialism and who fell vic�-im of
imperialist oppression. -
- Accordingly, Arab nationalism was described as having a humanitarian out-
look, because. in its struggle and its progress, it served only the cause
of the liberation of all oppressed peoples. Any fairminded historian will
acknowledge that the struggle of Arab nationalism since the middle of this -
century has, to a great extent, helped to reaff irm the liberation of -
dozens of peoples and nations. It also helped to establish the so-c~lled
third world and it s just issues.
= There is nothing in the concept or practices of Arab nationalism which can
in any way imply any connection with practicing or teaching racism. Just
the reverse is tru e, since the struggle of nationalities characteri zed the
struggle of the peoples of the third world and gave them the quality of
popular nationalism.
_ On the other hand, the racism of the modern industrial societies is no
longer content with the well known concepts of race, religion or cu 1 ture.
It is today a racism of technological superiority running the gamut from
the machinery of war to consumer appliances and automated systems of
analysis, thinking and information.
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
Also, the experience of contemporary history show that certain peoples and
denominations have changed from being oppressed to practicing persecution
- when given the chance to do so, thereby becoming racist.
There is no better example of this than Zionism which reversed the suffering
- of the Jews under Nazis~r~ to persecution of the Arabs of Palestine. Zionism
claims a right to a homeland it doesn't own, from the Euphrates to the Nile. _
Finally, I fear what we all fear, that some factions of the Iranian revo-
lution will again pick up the slogans of the Shah which made themselves
a model of imperial racism. They would look for some religious ~ustifications _
to export Islam, f~r example, to the very nation and homeland which witnessed
. the birth of Islam and carried its message to the whole world.
The popular nationalisms which have led the struggle of the third world since
World War II, and which were pioneered by the experiment of Arab nationalism,
accomplished effective responses to various forms of old racism. These
include European colonialism as well as the new economic imperialism or
ideological imperialism, both of which are going through a period of eclipse
- and retreat today.
The only thing left is for the disease of racism to be caught by new nation-
alisms emerging from the depths of the third world and claiming for themselves
artificial fa~tors of superi~rity. Their histcry should induce them to co-
operate and integrate with predecessor popular revolutions, be they Western
or adjacent movements.
c. 'Abdullah al-'Alayayli: It is absolutely ridiculous to say that nation-
alism is stained by racism. We are not referring only to Arab nationalism;
no nationalism carries the stain of racism. Although nationalism is linked
with a nation or people, the intent is not "race."
Nationalism, in fact, can be ca'~ed a phqsical, moral and economic compound.
_ Nationalism involves a physical element--land and beings, and a moral
element, that is, a heritage and the enjoyment of specific religious,
literary and cultural characteristics.
Arab nationalism is totally removed from the idea of race. Science a long
time ago invalidated the idea of race; both anthropology (the science of
man) and ethnology (the science of types of peoples) have totally invalid-
ated the claim that there is an absolutely pure race as follows: Every
nation or group on historical record has become a blend. In other words,
their blood has been mingled with various bloods. Science has condemned
racism, and it is completely ridiculous to talk about the idea or race.
How could racism have been made an integral part of natiunalism?
Even were we to suppose that there exists a pure being, we would not find
- him, even among the Eskimo tribes or among the aborigines.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
I~OR UFFICIAL USF. ONLY
To refute racism, science has made this sweeping statement: Every group
that has appeared in history has been a compound. Thus, the hypothesis of
race now has no connection in any shape or form with nationalism.
Nationalis~ can, in fact, be defined in two words which must be easily and
gently superimposed: nationalism and patriotism. In superimposing them,
we find them completely compatible. In doing so, we define thz nationalist
concept, which has been advocated by tihe Arabs and others. In other words,
rather than speak of social nationalism, we should speak of patriotic
nationalism. So there is no basis for race or blood; rather, there are
human beings on earth with their own special qualities.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8389
CSO: 4802
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY
~
IRAN
TEHItAN LABYRiNTIi EXPLORED FOR COUP POSSIBILITIES
Paris FARIS MATCH in French 1 Aug 80 pp 34-35
[Article by Jean Cau: "Tehran, Beirut, Paris: Bloody Channel"] _
[Text] In Iran, who arms the killer sent abroad? Who wanted to assassi-
nate Mr Bahktiar, and to whom would the crime profit? To ask these
questions is like trying to disentan;le a huge ball of woolen skein -
turning up there, in Iran, and a bit of thread--a bloody thread--appear- ~
ing in France last week. In fact, it is certain that when a state is
shaken by frictions and is ruled only by jolts of violence, the men in
the saddle are apprehensive about losing the reins of power fall back -
on the olden recipe: terror. At home, they terrorize and execute;
abroad, they assassinate.
= At home, for 2 months, the Iranian revolution has become u~ore radical,
swinging into the worst: a religious fundamentalism more and more blindly -
prone to excesses. Who rules? No one. But, since it is precisely -
- there where the Iranian form of government lies, who then terrorizes?
The fundamentalistic mullahs, whose leader is Ayatollah Beheshti, a
terrible melange of black-frocked Robespierre and bearded Savonarole.
However, following the elections which were tampered with, the funda- -
mentalist party now holds the ~ajority of seats in Parliament. Through
the hostages it can call its own "plays," against a President Bani-Sadr
who is more and more a puppct chief of government. 'i'hanks to the mullahs
the party enjoys a propaganda network (agitprop) in the country, and -
plenty of money coming from mosque funds. It also makes the most of
information gathered by SAVAMA, the pol~tical police which has replaced
the shah's SAVAK, whose numerous agents have resumed work by simply _
"turning their coats." Finally, not only does it tolerate but it also
subsidizes the Hezbollahi (party of God!) in which a few idealists are
submerged by a swarm of former marginal elements, and recently released _
common law prisoners and criminals. Real terror, these Hezbollahi!
They kill, hit, nurture violent demonstrations and flog for the least
thing. (They may be compared with the militia in 1944, in which very
hnnest boys were mixed ;~ith unscrupulous scoundrels and foul Gestapo-
like agents. And in Teh;an it is God who has to shoulder all the
blame, just as did the struggle against Bolshevism in 1944 in Paris.)
12
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
The Pazdarans (Pasdarans) (guardians of the revolution), a mass movement
composed mostly of illiterate youths, are equally violent; nevertheless,
they take orders from Ayatollah Khomeyni, or rather make use of his name. _
Islamic "students" also had their hour of glory when they seized the
hostages, now they live, so to speak, on that capital. It is considera-
ble. Consequently, when that jumble pours into the streets how can one
know who exactly conf iscates properties? Who, arm in hand, breaks into �
apartments to loot? Who deals in precious objects, Korans, manuscripts
and stolen jewels? Is it in the name of Islam or by unrestrained liking
for pillage that precious stones and diamonds inlaid in the Great Mogol's
famous throne were pried loose from their fittings with blade tips? _
Is it in the name of Islam that a veritable cyclone pulls down historical
. monuments in Kerman City, liming frescoes everywhere and trampling
miniatures under foot? Before Mao, nothing, said the Red Guards. ~
Before the Prophet, nothing, say Islamic fanatics in whose footsteps
rascals follow, picking up boo~ies and establishing a reign of boundless
, corruption.
Th~y Execute, Control and Muzzle
Such is the internal situation in Iran, being aggravated further by
troubles or revolts in the provinces. This caused the religious party
to flee forward, thinking that by terror it is possible for them to
fight on all fronts. They execute "coup plotting" brass hat~ by firing
squads, hold Bani-Sadr by the nose and muzzle allies of yesterday such
as the mudjahidin (combatants of the people), a movement composed of
"progressist" religious and intellectuals listed now, as under the shah,
' as "Islamic Marxists," or the fedaye'en (Marxist-Leninist leftwingers)
250 of whom are in pri.son and the rest in semi-clandestinity, although
these 2 movements have not publicly opposed the mullahs, and have pre-
tended only to a critical attitude. They relegate Admiral Madani,
prestigious military leader, to the sidelines. At the same time, they
- do not forget to sing the praises of Islamic purity, to brandish inter-
dicts and to encourage more and more denunciations. They flog people
for a cigarette, or for a glass of alcohol; they impose the chador on
women and prohibit tiheir driving a car. Spying thrives on at all levels.
_ As for him, Ayatollah Khalkhali has recently switched to hunting dope
traffickers. Crafty, that Khalkhali! He knows that dope in Iran is
at, appalling scourge; but while the ayatollah does not clobber hundreds
of thousands of consumers he hangs traffic!cers by the neck until dead.
- This ferocious rigor is not, to be true, without earning him a kind of
redoubtable popularity, thanks to which the implacable justice meted
out by him to generals, sent in droves before firing squads, to civilians
convicted for close or loose colJ.aboration with the former regime, and
to real or imaginary p~otters, aF~eared to be served by nothing but
revolutionary virtue.
In brief, such is Iran, a hodge podge in which everything is moving:
politico-religious intolerance, gangsterism with alibis, and terroristic
= 13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
- puritanism. Khomeyni remains the key. His death would entail chaos and
civil war. The Muslim patriarch does not rule but continues to reign.
tie is nothing politica].ly, but is all-powerful through symbolic radiance.
We, Westerners, must understand the strength of Iranian religious feeling.
It pervades, horizontally, al.l strata of society. General or paysan,
subtle intellectual or consummate illiterate, bourgeois or. oil worker,
all of them share a same current of faith--which was synonym of deliver-
ance when it toppled the shah--and Khomeyni is the incarnation and symbol
_ of that faith. "He has no power, according to Western standards," an ~
Iranian who arrived last week from Tehran told me, "but he is the only
- man capable of throwing 5 million of persons into the streets." "Still
today?" "Always today! He is the imam. He is untcuchab].e. I under- _
stand that you do not understand that paradox of a Khomeyni who is all-
powerful but does not rule. Seen from Paris, New York or London, this
is an imperceptible effect...but that is the way it is."
Only the Army Can Put an End to Dictatorship
Now, another topic: exterior opposition.
Three heads: General Oveissi, not long ago nicknamed "the butcher of
Tehran," because he had rigorously repressed the riots preceding the down-
_ fall of the shah, who still has real prestige within the army. Dis-
missing the popular uprising theory, he thinks that only the army can
put an end to the mullah dictatorship. He lives in Paris but "travels
a l.ot" (United States, Iraq, etc.). Second head, Nazih, former oil
_ chief. Nationalist. Third head, finally, Shahpur Bakhtiar, very close �
t~ Nazih, resolute opponenr of the imperial dictatorsiiip even though he
~ had accepted, in order to save Iran from chaos and prevent the religious
from conquering power, to be the last prime minister of. a shah at bay. ~
. With his f irmness, lucidity, courage and political consistency, Bakhtiar ~
has up to now been the veritable "pivot" to this day of the opposition
in exile. In Iran, over the past few months Y:is star has singularly
risen among the ~ntire enlightened section of the population. With the
common peopl.e, r.his is another question; but, given the mullah's reliance
on the primary L-aaaticism of the illiterates, it suffices to liquidate
that fanaticism at the top to see that only the enlightened section of
_ the population is capable of putting Iran back on the right track. Th~
mullahs know that. Nor do they ignore that Bakhtiar's popularity has
considerably increased since the former prime minister began his daily
talks on Radio-Baghdad, and that his voice has crossed borders. Radio
talks.and transistors were the supreme weapons which De Gaulle knew how ~
to use. Bakhtiar recalled that lesson a few weeks ago, so it is possible
that the decision to assassinate him has been taken to prevent him from ~
reaping the benefits of that compaign. Decision taken by whom? It is _
hard to answer, since all enemies of the anti-mullah opposition have
interest in liqu~dating Bakhtiar. Including--and this is not without
complicatin~ things--those who, albeit not being dependable allies of the
religious party in power, would be displeased with its eventual replacement
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
by a firm democracy but showing Western coloration. For instance, the
Tudeh communist party, a Soviet surrogate weaving its plots in the back-
ground. Evidently, this is only an example. There are many who do not
want the mullahs, but who want Bakhtiar even ~ess, whose accession to
power would be regarded with favor in the West. Consequently, from the
iChomeyni extreme to the other extreme, the Tudeh, encompassing mullahs,
" guardians of the revolution, and thugs of the present regime, all the
shades in the spectrum had a common No 1 enemy: Shahpur Bak'~tiar.
Who has attempted to kill him (and has missed him at the cost of two
innocent deaths)? The police have detained five killers. Certainties:
they arrived aboard different flights. The commando chief, Amiz Nacczsh
(Amis Naccache), checked in at the Grand Hotel near the Opera, the others
~ at the hotel Gerson, on Sorbonne street, and at an apartment rented,
by pure coincidence, on Toullier street (100 m from the hotel Gerson)
reknowned for the massacre of policemen in which the very famous Carlos
took part. Naccash has admitted to working for the Palestinian al-Fatah
since a decade.
Two Enormous Grains of Salt in Cogwheel
The expedition germinated in the brains of the terrible Ayatollah
- Khalkhali, who has charged Amal Organization, a leftwing Lebanese move-
ment composed of pro-PLO Shi'ites, with carrying it to completion. That
movement has called on a specialized service--Aman 17--which, within A1
Fatah, performs that kind of "coups." The chief of Aman 17, Abu Hassan
Salameh, was killed in Beirut by th2 Israelis a few months ago, and was
replaced forthwith by two new "bosses": Ayil Hamid and Colonel Abu
Musa. It should be added that all Palestinian special services work in
' close collaboration with their Syri3n counterparts led by Col Ali Doba,
who supplies them with passports and weapons tranquilly dispatched through
diplomatic pouch, or via Marseilles. Training takes place in a military
camp south of Bei~ut. It is in that camp th~.t the Paris-bound commando
underwent training and set details for the first part of the terroristic
operation. Naccash, who speaks French very well, would pass off for a
journalist. Three terrorists would enter the building, gun down Bakhtiar,
then leave the building, to be covered by two cronies who would neutralize
the policemen guarding the entrance. Two enormous grains of sand had
slipped into the machine: Bakhtiar has not been killed; the two accom-
plices slated for the cover job fled, so that thei-r three colleagues
were ler"t petrified in the face of a young probationary policeman, who
held them at a ssfe distance permitting the police to nab them gently.
This unnreparation for the "coup" is not the least of the surprises of
French policemen. An explanation: the five men have confused Paris with
Beirut where they are like fish in water; away from home they were very
improperly prepared for the new "environment," and thus were as flabber-
gasted as a band of thugs accustomed to attacking a rural credit union in
- France now switching to a New York bank. Only two, for instance, Naccash
and Falaheddin E1 Kara, speak French. The other three, not a word!
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
Another astonishment: the five men, now behind bars, have come clean -
and told ttie whole story without any difficulty at all.
_ Impr~~ssion of police: they are religious fanatics ("Our cause is sacred"
."We are ready to sacrifice ourselves in the name of Allah," etc.), r
but their other structures are equal to a goose egg. At the limi.t, they
are more ixiclined to die than to kill, to be martyrs rather than soldiers.
Religious passion devours them, and now, arrested, they proclaim it with-
out realizing that they have "broken down."
Thus, it is in that Palestinian stew and on religiously motivated
terrorists that the Iranians, through Ayatollah IChalkhali (who, occa-
sionally, sends dope peddlers to hang) have called. Basides, the
Iranians are not short of arguments with which to talk PLO leaders
_ into underwriting the operation.
PLO Leaders, These Very Dear "Brethren"
In fact, Khomeyni's Iran welcomes PLO members as very dear "brethren,"
has not hesitated to offer them the premises of the former Israeli
embassy, willingly supplies PLO tropps with weapons (and, according to
Israeli special services, would have recently put at their disposal
U.S.-made Red Eye missiles capable of shooting down civilian planes),
- and kicks back to the PLO $1 to $2 per barrel of oil sold to the West.
In any case, the operation consritutes a harsh blow for 'Arafat, so
much anxious during the past few months to cultivate his credibility
with the West. E~ther he is forced to admit that he does not have his
troops in hand, and that the Palestinian resistance is only a puzzle
in which a piece may go mad; or--but this is what he wi11 recognize
still less--he was aware that a cammando was going to assassinate
Bakhtiar, and that he had approved of the operation. Its failure is
grave in all respects. On the plane of "pr~stige," because the opera-
tion--let's say it again--was conducted in an extraordinarily clumsy
way. Thus, for instance, Bakhtiar used to take a daily walk, lasting at
least an hour, in the Boulogne wood. Evi.dently, he was tailed by
- guardian angels, but it would have been easy to kill him with a telescope-
equipped rifle, to jump into a car and to disappear in the traffic flow
toward the Etoile. Instead, the murders grope for the "right" door,
miss it, kill a lady and a policeman, finally riddle the right door with
bullets before scrambling do~:~nstairs only to be collared by the young
probationary policeman. This is a stupid job. AggravaLed by two
- crimes. On the political p~ane, this is an enormous bloomer. In fact,
P'r.ance is one of the least stingy countries when it comes to granting ~
asylum, and certainly it is not Ayatollah Khomeyni who could attest to
the contrary. Proteczed by the shield on which the words "right of
sanctuary" were engravPd, terrorists and agitators from all places and -
from all colors abound in our country where they are welcomed without
excessive worries, apparently in the name of our "traditions." (In
short, France would be the tdetherlands of the 17th Century, except that
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
Descartes while enjoying our neighbors' hospitality, did not handle
plastic bombs and Kalachnikov submachine guns...). German terrorists,
Italian Red Brigades, ETA Basque l:illers, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian,
Palestinian agents and others, all that world living on our soii plots
and agitates, hatches schemes and organizes--and kills if the occasion
presents itself--in relative tranquillity. While criminality is one of
our major problems, considerablE police forces are deflected away frcm
the fight against ii: Lo hunt down terrorists or to protec~ their eventual
victims. So, for instance, the anti-crime squad has arrested since this
past January, 50 terrorists of all nationalities (considerable balance-
sheet, but leading to the thought that for 50 men arrested there are
certainly hundreds still at large...), and our inspectors are wondering
whether ttiey are there to repress gangsterism or to dam up excesses of
the blind tolerances of our first-rate "right of sanctuary," in the name
of- which we have released Abu Daou, organizer of the Munich killing,
extradited the murderers at the Iraqi embassy, let Carlos slip away,
and set free (according to Israeli reports) Ibrahim Elbaz, redoubtable
terrorist apprehended in May 1979 in Roissy with a suitcase full of
terrifying toys, etc. Finally, that is the way it is. Nevertheless, the
Bakhtiar affair lays bare the risks of the "right of sanctuary." There
are flaws.
Moreover, recent declarations of our government and of its president of
the republic have, nevertheless, expressed some understanding about the
Palestinian i:ause, thus irritating the Israelis. Finally, our ties
with Tehran were far from being broken up.
We Demand of You a Small Service
Well, at one blow thunder fell on that edifice, threatening to under-
mine it. Must one think then that the Bakhtiar danger is so great that -
the Iranians were compelled to har~hly ask the Palestinians to carry out,
in specialists, which they are reputed to be, an attempt upon the life of
the former prime minister? A give-and-take bargaining session would have
taken place. "If you still want tr~ enjoy our protection and our support9
- if you want to draw on our finances, we demand of you a small servicery" '
"Which one?" "Help us to get rid of Bakhtiar!" Perhaps the Palestinians
scratched their heads a little, ~hen with the kn~fe of blackmail on the
throat, they accepted, thinking with much frivolity that the gods would
be their accomplices, and that the French police would be inferior to
anything. Things did not happen as expected. 5camped Qperation, scamped
slaughter, and perhaps scamped arrest (because without the sang froid of
the young policeman the chaps would have disappeared); but, at all events,
enormous flop on the finishing line. Bakhtiar is more alive than ever,
and now in the eyes of his partisans he has become a half-martyr; the
Palestinians, even if 'Arafat makes himself hoarse with bawling that he
has nothing to do with the affair, are compromised and, dropping their
masks, they show once again the repulsive face of terrorism; the French
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
government is ill at ease seeing its pro-Palestinian policy stained with
~ blood; Tehran vociferates against France. Much ruin for a vain result.
A second thing is certain: purges, shootings, hangings, appeals to
murder and to denunciations prove that the Tehran power is seriously
tottering since it endlessly continues to rule by the gallows or firing
squads, and seeks survival and salvation in terror. Another thing ie
n o less certain: Bakhtiar symbolized an insupportable recourse and
an unbearable danger and must be liquidated. Failure. Bakhtiar, missed
by the killers, is from now on a still greater danger and a stronger
recourGe.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipress S.A.
9213
CSO: 4900
~
~
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
r
IRAN
UK JOURNALIST URGES WEST TO HEED IRANIAN EXILE GROUPS
LD081315 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 8 Aug 80 p 2
[Article by Simon Henderson: "Why the West Must Take Iran Exile Groups
More Seriously"] -
[Text] We will use terror, we will use assassination and we will use
bombings"--the words were spoken last weekend by an Iranian emigre in
Paris as he discussed future tactics against Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime
in Iran.
Six months ago such words would have been greeted with derision. Iranian
exiles were seen as being the new white Russians, endlessly talking about
the good old days or what might have happened if Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, the
interim prime minister who asked the shah to leave the country, had been
more successful.
But there are now good reasons why the exiles, disunited as they are,
should be taken more seriously. ~ao uf the leaders, Dr Bakhtiar and
General Gholam Ali Oveysi, have the nuclei of private armies based in
Iraq where the regime of Saddam Husayn regards the Ayatollah Khomeyni as
a danger to the stability of th e region and a threa.t to Iraqi influence.
Also the Iranian royal family, despite the death of the shah, is still
acting as a focus of both money and political clout among the estimated
1 million exiles scattered through Europe and the United States. -
The situation presents a dilemma for the nations of the West who play
host to the exiles but who also need to safeguard their subjects and
remair~ir.~ rommercial interests in Iran itself. _
But, perhaps more important, is the choice they face in deciding how far
they should go in supporting the Iranian exiles against the religious re-
gime in Tehran whose policies have proved so inimical to the interests of
the West.
However much Washington, London and Paris may wish to be rid of the trou-
blesome priest in Iran, they may regard a prolonged period of instability
in the gulf as the greater of two evils.
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The dangers of disrupting world oi]. supplies and encouraging further
Soviet expansionism in the event of c-ivil strife in Iran must remain an _
important consideration.
Even so, it is clear that, even with the hostages still in the hands of
the Islamic militants, Washington is already involved.
Reports from Iran play down the exiles' significance. The royal family
_ is still generally despised. General Oveysi is still remembered as the
"butcher of Tehran" for the way he handled anti-Shah demonstrations; and
Dr Bakhtiar is considered one of the world's biggest losers with nothing
to show on his record except fence-sitting or failure.
But they still worry the revolutionary authorities. This week, President
Bani-sadr accuszd France of allowing Iranians to be trained in sabotage -
in the country. A coup attempt was made last month--for which SO sol-
diers have so far been shot--in the name of Dr Bakhtiar. Relations between
Tehran and Baghdad are very tense with frequent reports of cross-border
shooting.
Part of the revolutionary regime has already started fighting back.
Dr Bakhtiar narrowly escaped assassination in Paris last month and one
of his leading supporters in Washington was killed four days later.
~ Although Dr Bakhtiar receives most of the publicity he is probably not
the force that Tehran has most to reckon with. In an ircterview in his
bullet-scarred Paris apartment last weekend he appeared absurdly prin-
cipled for a politician. "Success or failure is not important," he sald.
"It is more important for me to be in conformity with m}� conscience."
~ Rather more credible, and certainly more sinister, is Gen Oveysi's organ-
isation. Unlike Dr Bakhtiar, he does not give interviews and his aides,
while friendly and obv3.ously bright, are tight lipped when it comes to
talking about tactics.
There are indications of the size of the backing he is receiving, and it
is substantial. Like Dr BakhCiar, he has a radio station in Iraq, where
his military wing is probably very much bigger than the former prime
minister's. It numbers more than 1,000 well-trained former officers and
NCO's from the shah's army, and insiders say it is likely to grow to more
than 20,000. Given the large number of desertions in the Iranian Armed
Forces at the time of the revolution 18 months ago, this could easily be
true.
With the death of the shah, 20-year-old Crown Prince Reza is pretender to -
the peacock throne. Last week, the Empress Farah published what she
claimed was the shah's last will and testaiaent.
It was a tape recording in her voice rather than hxs but called on the
people to obey the crown prince. .
- 20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
_ p~1~~ Vt�i� ~~.teW u~u VI~LI
Despite the disunity, it is not hard to imagine circumstances by which
the emigres might work more together. Dr Bakhtiar says that, if re-
turned to power, he would work from the 1906 Constitution, which
accepts the monarchy. General Oveysi was a loyal soldier to the shah,
although his aides say he is now a republican. Mona?-chists in London
still regard it as possible to work with him.
So far, it is only Iraq which is providing open support to the emigres.
Egypt is probably giving more than hospita lity. Of the Western nations,
only the U.S. is known to be keeping lines open to both Dr Bakhtiar and
General Oveysi, but it is a lso running an anti-Khomeyni clandestine radio
out of Cairo and admitted to a force of Iranian "friendlies" at the time
of the abortive hostage rescue mission.
Of the European countries, Britain appears to be keeping well clear of
political contact with the exiles. However, the conspiratorial Iranian
~ revolutionary mind probably would not accept this, remembering British
~ assistance to the U.S. in 1953 at the time of the overthrow of Dr Mosaddeq,
the nationalist prime minister,and the return of the shah to his throne.
France, it seems, is trying to repeat the diplomatic success it achieved
for a short while when Ayato llah Khomeyni himself was in exile outside
Paris. Although France perhaps is not offering direct support, it is easy
to know what precisely is going on wi.th Dr Bakhtiar and General Oveysi
living in Paris .
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times, Ltd, 1980
CSO: 4920 _
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
FUTURE COURSE OF STRUGGLE IN SOUTI: EXPLORED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 20, 21
_ /Article: "Lebanon before the Unknown"/
/Text/ Has the deterioration of the political, military and security sit-
uation opened Lebanon up to grave possibilities once again? Has the danger
stage reached its full extent? What will follow? An Israeli invasion and
occupation? International trusteeship? A Palestinian Lebaneae clash?
Settlement or partition?
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's bureau sends this report on the situation and antici-
pated probabilities, relying on information available to it from official
Lebanese and Palestinian sources and sources in the Maronite "Lebanese
Front."
The Israeli operations in the military context, regardless of what they
, led to along the Lebanese coast and in the Palestinian population centers,
stirred up basic questions for which the leaders of the resistance could `
not formulate clear answera, which has caused them to open to all p ossi-
bilities without exception.
These questions are:
Since Israel began its military operations with an official declaration
that it was determined to continue them, is what has occurred the maximum
it is aiming for?
If what it is doing is only diversion or attrition operation, what is the
ultimate goal? Where will the main Israeli blow be--in the south or in
Beirut?
_ What character will this strike assume--a lightning operation or an occu-
pation operation, as happened in spring 1978 when Israel entered the eouth
up to the al-Litani? ;
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
r~ox oFr�iccA~ usL UNLY
The leaders of the Palestinian resistance in Beirut are acting as if the
possibilities contained in the questions are real. In their behavior, they
give the impression that they are not just calculating probable military
operations but are also calculating the repercuasione and effects they
could have on the resistance in its Lebanese environment and in the context
of its Arab and international activity.
In the meetings the Palestinian resistance held this week, the cotmnand
studied the various military reports and information drawn from all Arab
and international sources and found that the likelihood that Israel would -
carry out a broad military operation in Lebanon had recently became strong-
er, especially after the failure which afflicted the Egyptian-Israeli peace
- talks on west bank sutonomy, the great uprising in the west bank itself,
and the disappearancP of imminent solutions.
The Palestinians Anticipate an Attack
Palestinian sources state that Abu Iyad's reference to probable Israeli
military operations against resistance commanders in Beirut is not the on- -
ly likelihoud the Palestinian leaders have d ealt with. The most conspicu-
ous thing they have dealt with is the war of attrition Israel started
against the Palestiniana in Lebanon and various areas, without exception,
and the probability that this attrition will escalate to the level of a
continuous daily war or a war of occupation in the area where the P$lestin-
ians exist, in the al-Zahrani region.
Palestinian sources believe that the Israeli military "diversion" of
Palestinian forces along the Lebanese coast is a practical attempt to
sense out the best areas for mounting an arm~red brigade invasion along
the Lebanese coast and that an invasion of this sort will not be aimed at
carrying out lightning military operations against the Palestinian resist-
ance but at remaining in these areas, which lie outside the international
emergency forces' zone of operations, under the guiae of putting a limit
to "constant Palestinian terrorist operations," as Menachem Begin and Ezer
weizmann described trem in their latest statements.
The climate the resiseance commanders fear is what the Lebanese government _
is making calculations f or, and whose results and consequences it is anxi-
ous over, not just on the military level on Lebanese soil.but also as re-
gards the new political factors which these kinds of grave possibilities
could produce.
This situation was laid on the table for discussion at the meetings which
the president and the premier held and which were tended by the minister
of foreign affairs tow2rd the end. Likewise, this situation was the f ocus
of discussion between Premier al-Huss and Abu al-Wali.d and Abu Jihad of
the resistance's military command.
- 23 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
F~~z c~r r rc rn~, us~, ON1.Y
Government sources state that the military leaders of the resistance do
_ not share some Palestinian leaders' fear that Israeli operations will be
of this magnitude, because that could lead to extreme los..;:s for the
Israeli invaders and because the international climate is not favorable
~ for this kind of operation in the current circumstance.
However, the resistance's military commanders have not ruled out the fact
that Israeli operations could assume a large magnitude in the coming per-
iod, in order to create a state of internal disruption in Lebanon and
create pretexts for a clash between Lebanese and Palestinians.
These people consider that the resistance's military requirements may
cause its presence in some areas to make Lebanese citizens feel pressure,
aud that because of the extensive area of Israeli operations its broad
military deployment could lead to further pressure on Lebanese citizens.
What Does the Government Want from the Palestinians?
These Palestinian fears have prompted the Lebanese government to state
. that the resistance leaders must take initiatives to remedy such possibil-
ities before [hey get out of hand, especially since the fact that Israel
is maintaining the power to stir up such problems will cause any attempts
in other contexts to be fruitless.
Although Premier Salim al-Huss di3 not mention to the resistance rommand-
ers what he meant by Palestinian initiatives on the practical level,what
he meant was that the resistance should acquire an understanding of the
dangers Looming over it and of attem~ts to fabricate a clash between it
and its Lebanese environment.
al-Huss considers that there are measures which the resistance could have
taken previously to set Lebanese citizens at ease in the south which were
not taken. They still could be taken, if the resistance actually wanted
to frustrate those perpetrating the clashes and dissension.
Premier al-Huss' sources point out that Lebanese political bodies have
been carrying out a mobilization operation for some time to create the
climate for a clash with the resistance and that the talk which has been -
raised recently on settlement and resettlement is aimed at alleviating
the severity of the tension and creating justifications for such a clash.
al-Huss' sources point to the attacks the "Lebanese Front" has started
in this regard; these have been transformed into the demand for "a change -
in the Palestinian revolution," as the Phalange Party recently said.
These sources say that this kind of tendency reflects a serious new devel-
opment in the delicate ciresmstances through which the Middle East crisis
is passing.
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
. . ,
Escalation of the "Lebanese Front" Attack
- The fact is that the Phalange Party expects that its attack on the Palestin-
ian reaistance will assume new dimensions after the meeting the Political
Committee of the Lebanese Front will hold on 28 May to study a report on
"settlement" and ways of confronting it in Lebanon.
. Phalange circles consider that the "Lebanese Front's" conception of the
Palestinian problem resemblea Syria's and that Syr.ia has stated that it
does not have any ready-made solutions for such an issue. It has also
atressed that this issue must be remedied carefully through the resistance
so that the situation will not b~ow up in a way which cannot be contained ~
in the future.
Phalange circles consider that the Syrians have joined with them in stat-
ing that a Palestinian state on the west bank is not possible because of
Israeli intransigence, hhat the Palestinians are staying in Lebanon until
circumstances change, and that they, that is, the circumstances, do not
seem likely to change in the foreseeable future. ~
_ Pert~aps this is what has caused the Phalange to assume escalation of the
military confrontation with the Palestinians, and perhaps this is what
caused a Phalange military source to say "A broad Israeli operation against _
the Palestinians could be the entree for a Lebanese-Palestinian confronta-
tion in the future."
In its campaign, the "Lebanese Front" talks about the need "to have the
Palestinian resistance respond to the security requirements of the Leban-
ese nation." In this campaign, it goes beyond the measures and procedures
which would achieve coordination to ward the danger away from Lebanon, its
villages and its citizens, which the Lebanese government had previously
discussed with the resistance leaders,and propounds "the need for the
Palestinian revolution to change so that it will not exert conercion
against a nation which has no alternative for itself or for others when
it could exercise coercion against a revolution which has more than one
alternative."
This statement opened a big wound in the Palestinian side. One leader of
the Palestinian resistance even said "This kind of talk faces us with the
_ option of throwing down arms and stopping the struggle against Israel or ~
clashing with the Lebanese Front, and we have no option here except to -
continue the struggle."
Palestinian sources believe that the Maronite "Lebanese Front" is playing -
a dangerous game and is responding positively to Israeli tactics. To talk
about "compelling the Palestfnian resistance to draw back from its histor-
ic error and other errors," as was stated in the Phalange Party report, is
- 25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
not to attempt to ward off the dangers of aettlement but to move toward
sanctifying settlement of the P alestinians in L~banon.
Disarmament Means Settlement
These sources say that ending the Palestinian struggle will mean once
again turnin~ the Palestinians into tent dwellers who are not capable of
changing their status and consequently changing the intention of Israel
and the United States of America to keep them where they are. This is
settlement.
Apart from the potential political effects of any broad Israeli aggression
against Lebanon, and its relations with the Palestinian resistance, such
aggressions on the ground could assume a military character which would
make it necessary to act to bring about an Israeli withdrawal rapidly
through the United Nations forces which could arrive in othar areas north
of the al-Litani River if the international Security Council found that
that was the only solution for Israel3 withdrawal from any new areas it
might occupy.
Western diplomatic sources camment on the likelihood that Israel will
carry out an occupation invasion operation by saying that this kind of op-
eration would result in the emplacement of Palestinian tents in Sur for
the first time under the protecti.on of international forces if these
forces were assigned to operate north of the al-Litani, and that that could �
lead to a sort of international trusteeship over the Palestinians in this
area.
These Western diplomatic sources consider that Israel might exploit the
United States' preoccupation with the presidential elections to launch a
strike which could help Begin consolidate his chances of acquiring new
popular support.
In the midst of these circumstances of utmost complexity, Israel and its
allies on the border strip are continuing military operations against the
heavily populated southern towns and the Lebanese coast from Sur to Beirut.
All the detachments of the resistance have~been placed in a state of maxi- _
mum alert, and all detachments of the National Movement have been alerted
to provide support against the Israeli operations. It has reached the
point where a foreign correspondent has described the state as "one of
actual war." ~
Will what is going on be the prelude to a great explosion or will the ex-
plosion be a war not between Israel and the resistance but between the
Palestinian resistance and the forces which make up its natural environ-
ment in Lebanon?
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
Premier al-tiuss says that the resistance must understand the conditions of
Lebanon because, like a fish, it can live only in its environment and must ~
keep this environment from turning into a climate mobilized againat it.
President Ilyas Sarkis described what has been going on as the most seri- ~
ous thing Lebanon has witnessed since 1975. The main problem is that it
is not known whether this trend is toward a solution or toward the end of
a dead end, and it is not known whether or not the solution will be at
Lebanon's expense. The main problem is that Lebanon is not taking serious
action to ascertain thaC.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
11887
CSO: 4802
~
27
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
LEBANON
LEFTIST, PALESTINIAN LEADERS COI~IDENII~] SETTLEMENT ~
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 22, 23
/Article: "Settlement--Once Agsin"/
/Text/ Why is the ballad of the Palestinians' settlement being repeated?
Three senior officials in the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestin-
. ian resistance express their view on the boisterous media campaign whic:h
the "Lebanese Front" is Iaunching over the settlement issue.
Ttte subject of settlement has once again assumed the central place in of-
ficial and popular Lebanese concerns, to the point where some parties, -
through their atatements and media, have started acting as if settlement
was a fait accompli.
The Palestinian resistance and the National Movement, the two main parties
concerned with this issue on the Lebanese stage, assert "Settlement is an
old American-Zionist plot" wh3ch could be realized, if the Camp David line
triumphs, although those who are afraid of settlement now are the ones who
support Camp David.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI brought three questions on this issue to three leaders
a~ the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance, In'am Ra'd, vice
president of the Political Council of the National Movement, the lawyer
'Isam Nu'man, member of the Executive Co~nittee of the Nati~nal Movement,
and Majid Abu Sharar, secretary of the Revolutionary Council of the FATH ,
movement.
The questions are:
1. Why have some parties resumed raising the issue of settling the
Palestinians in Lebanon? Are there indications and justifications to call
for this fear?
2. Do you believe that it is possible to realize the settlement ptan in
southern Lebanon?
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
!
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
Fox or~r~lcl~ U5~ UNLY
3. What are possible means for confronting and thwarting this scheme?
In'am Ra'd: Those Who Are Betting on Camp David Are Betting on Settlement.
I would like to restrict the answer to a startling Eact, which is that our
brothers al-Qawasimah and Milhim, the mayore of Hebron and Halhul, and the
imam of Hebron, banished by order of the occupation authorities, have set
out from Beirut to the bridge dividing the occupied territories from Jordan
_ in an attempt to return after spending a few days in exile, thus uniting
the will of the occupation.
Fears of settlement arise among those who are betting that Camp David will
be consu~nated in the context of an Israeli-American peace and that its
foremost result will be the settlement of the Palestinians outside
~ Palestine, who will therefore be outside Lebanon also. The slogan of set-
tlement has been and is being raised by the people who are betting on Camp
David--both those who are proceeding in its cavalcade and those who despair
of any alternate approach.
In either case these people talk of settlement as if it were a Palestinian
or Arab plot, and not what it is, an Israeli-American plot. Resistance to
and perseverance before Camp David is the only way to eliminate the settle.-
ment plan, which is the other face of Carnp David.
r^abricating the settlement issue by some agencies of the authorities to
justify the army's entry into specific areas, as if deploying it would re-
sult in preventing this process, is an exaggeration which goes beyond the
facts. The issue of deployment of the army has been subjected to a domest-
ic Lebanese struggle over the Army Organization Law which has no relation
to the Palestinian resistance. It is an issue on which the viewpoint of
the Lebanese prime minister coincides with that of the majority of the
Lebanese, foremost among them the Lebanes~ Naticnal Movement.
In another area, the arnry was deployed in some areas of the seceosionist
ghetto but still was x~ot able to prevent armed dominance by secessionist
militia, their d~ominance over the installations and harbors of the state,
including the port of Beirut, or their tribal wars.
Moreover the Palestinian resistance, in areas where it is present, is not
a settlement authority but a revolutionary authority directed toward
Palestine; relations be~ween the Lebanese National Movement and the
Palestinian resiatance are established on this national basis.
'Isam Nu'man: They Are Trying To Glorify the Occupation
1. The hidden objectives in raising the issue of settlement are clear:
To cover up the fact of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and
the continued exacerbated aggression against the Lebanese and Palestinian
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY �
people by raising the controversy over the settlement issue, which is ex-
tremel;~ sensitive to the people of the south, among whom and next to whom
Palesti.nians live.
Ignoring rhe perpetrator aa far as the party really responsible for settle-
ment goes, because the "Camp David" agreements have assured that the
Palestinians who are not residents of the bank or Gaza will be prevented
from returning t~ the autonomous statelet once it is established. This
means that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians will be compelled to stay
where they are now, that is, in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan atul other Arab
countries.
Therefore, the function of those raising the settlement issue--some of them,
at least--.is to glorify the simple fact that Israel expelled the Palestin-
ians from their homes in 1948 and 1967, that the parties to Camp David
_ have sanctified keeping them where they are by leading public opinion to
believe that settlQment is occurring perforce because there is no solution
to the Palestinian cause at the present time, and that the Palestinians
are compelled to stay where they are and perhaps fortify themselves in
their positions to repel the almost daily Zionist aggressions.
The "Lebanese Front" is trying to allude to the danger of settlement in
order to put pressure on the central authorities (President Sarkis) and
- defraud Lebanese national forces in order to retain the privileges and in-
- terests which the present format of the Lebanese regime guarantees them, _
including tha composition of the army, in any anticipat~d settlement.
2. The settlement plan can be realized in southern Lebanon and also in
all adjacent .~rab countries. The matter depends on the Arabs' ability to
repel Israel and thwart its plans. However, if the Arabs are unsuccessful
in the fifth confrontation with Israel, the enemy will be able not just to
carry out the settlement plan but will also actually proceed to cut rela-
tions with the surrounding Arab countries in order to establish worthless
little statelets in which political boundaries will coincide with religi-
~ ous boundaries.
3. The means of confrontation in the Lebanese context may be summarized
as follows:
Resisting the Israeli occupation and settlement plans by sugporting the
Palestinian revolution .simed at the total liberation of Palestinian soil
and psssing through the tentative solution of establishing an independent
state which is not mortgaged to the Zionist imperialist enemy.
Dealing with transgressions caused by some Palestinian resistance organi-
zations with decisiveness and determination in the context of the united
Lebanese-Palestinian struggle against the enemy and the agreements in
force, with the intention of attaining the highest degree of effectiveness
in confronting the enemy.
30 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
rvc~ vrri~iru. u.,L Vl\LL
Translating the principles of national reconciliation contained in Presi-
dent Sarkis' message into an action plan aimed at cornpleting the construc-
tion of the Lebanese army on a basis of national balance and confrontation
with the Zionist enemy, and establishing the legitimate authority of the
state over al~ Lebanese territory by eliminating factional statelets and
pockets of inercenaries and smugglers.
Majid Abu Sharar: The Conspiracy is Zionist-American
1. Settling Palestinians outside their country is to be cor.sidered one of
~ the objectives which America is trying and has tried to achieve for many
long years. The first time America set out the settlement issue was in
1954 when it proposed settling the Palestinians outside their country--at
that time specifying the Sinai area for set:ling refugees from the Gaza
Strip. This led ro a popular uprising against settlement in the Gaza Strip
which went on 4 days. At~~that time the demonstrators raised a slogan which
I still remember, which is "No settlement or housing, AmPrican agents:"
This is the Palestinian position. At the time the Palestinians paid the
price of seven martyrs and dozens of wounded people who fell during the up-
rising for it. It still is the current Palestinian position and will al-
says remain so. If the Palestinians want to settle down wh~re they live--
in other words, if the Palestinians choose the settlement road instead of
the road of revolution and the gun--they will be met with acceptance and
- welcome from many Arab regimes, including the regime in Lebanon, and they
will not be exposed to the slaughter and tragedies they were exposed to
after choosing the road of revolution. Therefore I say that the people
who are afraid of the issue of settline the Palestinians in Lebanon now
are in fact among the most intensely enthusiastic about settl~~:g the
Palestinians.
But what Palestinians do they want? They want the Palestinians working in
- factories, workshops and feudal manors at the cheapest prices and wages.
They want the Palestinians who have been stripped of their identity and
will.
- Therefore I ask those who are afraid of zhe settlement of Palestinians
about the tens of thousands of Palestinians to whom they gave Lebanese
citiz~nship when their interests coincided with those of these Palestinians. _
Even those Palestinians who at that time faced two choices--the ehoice be-
tween continuing a life at the mercy of the agenc~es of the authorities _
_ and Lebanese citiz~nship--chose citizenship. When we presented them with
the correct choice, which was that of revolution, we found that most of
them enlisted in the activities and ranks of the revolution. This shows
that the Palestinians are the main real opponents of the settlement of -
Palestinians outside their own country.
Tn another area, all those who slavishly rush after a solution to the
Palestinian issue come up against the continuing problem of Palestinian
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and other Arab countries. When
these people feel that they are incapable of creating conditions which can
enable the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland because of the
blatant failure to realize that the party which possesses the solution--I
mean America--has always been the most persistent enemy of the return of
the Palestinians to their homeland, you find them resorting to the solution
which in their opinion is the easiest, that is, to settle the Yalestinians
in the Arab countries in order to realize two goals at the same time--first
to consecrate Israel's survival as a base protecting American imperialist
interests in the region and second the assimilation and elimination of the
Palestinian national personality, the uplifter and mover of the Arab strug-
gle for the liberation and unification of the Arab nation for dozens of
years, that is, substituting combative people with deep bonds to their ter-
ritory, their Arabhood and their national causes for Jews coming from all
corners of the world to protect American interests and consequently to pro~
tect the survival of America's agents in the form of the Arab reactionaries
who tyrannize their people and pave the way in full for the plunder of t.he
nation's resources and its continued bondage in the chains of backwardness
and impotence.
2. As for the issue of settlement in southern Lebanon, that is relevant, -
but, if the enemies of the Palestinian people can snatch the rifle frvm
the hands of the revolution and defuse it and sanctify the Camp David agree-
ments, then the solution wi1L be to settle the Palestinians in southern
Lebanon through planning and with encouragement from those now afraid of
settlement, such as the Lebanese Front and the Americans, and the reaction-
aries behind them. This means a solution at the expense of the Paleatinian
people and their cause and at the expense of the people of the Lebanese
south who have been oppressed and neglected by the Lebanese authorities
throughout the life of the Lebanese nation. For the Lebanese Front and its
aides to cry over the south is a fraud which will not dec~ive the simplest
- persevering citizen of the south.
In any event, while people are scheming to settle us in southern Lebanon,
we ~re scheming to make southern Lebanon the gateway to the nation and the -
- liberation of the Arab nation from those who enslave it and plunder its
resources.
3. The basic means for thwarting tha settlement conspiracy is further ad-
herence to the revolution and its fighting gun, because the gateway to
settlement lies in stripping the revolutionary Palestinian of his rifle--
and woe to him who believes that that is possible. Our people have borne
arms and will cast them down only after the liberation of their homeland,
at which time southern Lebanon will be the neighbor of northern Palestine,
' among the most beloved pieces of Arab territory to every Palestinian who
has known how the southerners suffered from oppression, humiliation, and -
neglect before the Palestinian revolution, how they are suffering now from
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL US~; UNLY
Zionist-secessionist aggressions against their towns, villages and fields,
and how high tbe price is which they are paying to preserve their national
identity and continue persevering in the trench of the revolution.
COPYRIG?~T: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
11887
CSO: 4802
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
MOST ARAB STATES CONTRIBUTE TO NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 P 49
/Article: "Bei~-ut: Except for Liby$ ~d Algeria, the Arabs Are Paying
Their Sharea of the Program To Rebuild Lebanon"/
/Text/ Iraq was the first to carry out its Tunis sunm?it comnitment to aid
Lebanon. Recently it paid the second instalment of its share of the first
year's assessment, which totals $4~p ~llion out of a total of $2 billion. '
The premier, Dr Salim al-Huss, told ~,_y~pT~ ~~BI that his government
received a money order for $20 million, the second instalment of Iraq's -
share. Thus it has received from the Iraqi government a tozal of less than
$40 million out of $58. 64 million, ~raq~ share for the f irst year of the
aid program.
The third instalment, totalling about $19 million, is expected to be paid
a~ a Zater time this year. ~
It is worth pointing out that the proportion of Iraq's share to the total
Arab aid the Tunis summit had approy~ fox Lebanon is 14.66 percent, equal
to $293.2 million, distributed over S years, at the rate of $58.64 million
per year.
After the annual budget of Saudi Arabia was put into effect last month,
Lebanon waited for the bureaucratic procedures to be completed for imple-
mentation of the instructiona of Prince Fahd, the crown prince and deputy
prme minister, on payment of Saudi Arabia's share for the f irst year,
which totals more Chan $114 million.
The Saudi share is the greatest Arab share, as its proporti on comes to
23.58 percent of the total aid of $2 billion and equals $57 1.6 million.
After that comes Kuwait, with 15.71 percent, equal to $314.2 million or
$62.84 million per year. The Lebane$e government has been informed that
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
r'Ux urrt~ttw u5~ ~ivLx
it intends to transfer $25 million during the first year, with the proviso
that it will pay the rest soon.
The emirates' share comes to 11.63 percent, or the equivalent of $232.6 ~
million, broken down over 5 years at a rate of $46.52 million per year.
The Lebanese government has received notification that the value of the
first instalment will be handed over in fult. -
According to information at the disposal of the Lebanese government, Qatar
will soon pay its share for the first year, which totals $26.38 million,
as its share is 6.57 percent, equal to $131.4 million. `
There remain two countries which seem unprepared to pay; these are Algeria,
whose share tatals 7.14 percent or $142.8 milAion, to be paid at a rate of
$23.56 per year (it declined to pay because oi- the financial straits it is
suffering from), and Libya, whose share totals 15.71 percent, the equiva-
lent of $314.2 million, broken down over S yeHrs at a rate of $62.84 mil-
lion per year.
- From this it may be deduced that Lebanon may not obtain the entire first
year's assessment of Arab aid which the Tunis su~anit approved, which is
$400 million out of a total of $2 billion. The total contribution by
countries giving their agreement totals about $309, leaving $91 million,
the shares of Libya and Algeria.
Here it is worth wondering: if this is the total of the Arab aid, what
will the volume of expenditures for rebuilding Lebanon be for the first
year? -
The fact is that the Lebanese government is hesitant about the Arab aid
figure. The Development and Reconstruction Council, chaired by Dr Muharmnad
'Atallah, has set forth a 12-month redevelopment plan which includes the
implementation of projects which cost 2,961,000,000 pounds or more than
$800 million. This means that the government will finance half the expen-
ditures for these projects with domestic and foreign loans, including the
$150-million loan the Development and ReconstrucCion Council obtained fram
the group of foreign banks in 1978, of which it has not yet spent one
piaster.
- The state's entry into the financing process is tantamount to an official
confirmation of the Lebanese people's desire to rebuild their country,
even in the light of unstable security conditions, without relying on Arab
aid funds alone to do so.
This step is to be considered a factor in encouraging the Arab countries
to provide what they committed themselves to at the Tunis suumit.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
11887 35 -
CSO: 4802
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
OPPOSITION LEADERS INTERVIEWED ABOUT OPPOSITION Mn~MENT
Opposition Formulates National Charter
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May- 6 Jun 80 p 32
[Text] 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the new Yemeni president has recently spoken
more than once to explain the objectives and the reasons for the new change
in South Yemen. The most important feature of this change was the ouster
of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il from the presidency of the state and from the
party's general secretariat. But what does the opposition think of these -
changes and of the Marxist regime as a whole? This is the question that
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has been trying to answer through the interviews it
conducted with the leaders of the broad coalition which included almost all
the political organizations and movements in the country. AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI will review and present the most important items of the draft
National Charter which has been attained recently during the meetings of
opposition leaders.
The first coalition of forces opposed to the ruling Marxist regime in South
Yemen was formed last April in Baghdad.
The National Coalition of Patriotic Forces in South Yemen included the
following organizations:
- * The United National Front, chaired by Mr 'Abd-al-Qawi. Makkawi who was
chosen secretary general for the coalition.
* The National Unity Front, chaired by Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham who was
chosen to be deputy secretary general for the coalition.
* The Liberation Front and the Arab South League Party, chaired by Mr
Muhammad 'Ali al-Jafari who died suddenly while he was in Baghdad. This
organization is currently chaired by Mr Shaykhan al-Habashi.
* The 26 June Organization--this is the organization of the late Salim
Rabi' 'Ali.
* The Popular Organization, chaired by Mr 'Ali ibn Hadi.
The coalition also included a number of independent civilian and military
figures that is no*_ ~r;considerable.
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
L'VL\ VL'1'1V1~1L U~1L ~/~1LL
Principles of the Charter
The coalition was able to attain a draft national action charter which it
regarded as a comprehensive theoretical guide for national action. The
coalition defined its programs with the following objectives: -
1. Establishing a united, progressive, democratic, national government.
2. Eliminating fanaticism, sectaria~iism and partisanship which constitute
an obstacle to the cultv.rally pure and sound unity, development and prog-
ress of Yemen.
3. Eliminating the atheistic movement and preserving our spiritual and
cultural heritage.
4. Pursuing a national economic policy that has national prospects and
dimensions for the purpose of building a free national economy that is
based on the principles of modern knowledge as well as thos~ of scienti.fic
planning which has been thought over and programmed. _
5. Encouraging national capital withing the limits of the public interest.
6. Organizing the economic sectors accord~ng to a specific time plan.
7. Establishing a public sector in addition to the private sector and
drawing up a purposeful economic policy that would acr~ieve balance between ~
the public and the private sectors; this balance is to be consistent with
the public interest of all citizens.
8. Ensuring the freedom of opinion and of faith for all the people; en-
suring the freedom of all branches of political and cultural action; and
ensuring the freedom to establish professional organizations and coopera-
tive, cultural and charitable societies.
9. Building and developing the national army on modern principles.
10. Making diligent efforts to achieve the unity of Yemeni soil and working
for the establishment of the real unity of the people on the basis of
sound democratic, popular principles after a popular referendum is held
under a neutral and a joint Yemeni government to provide a free, democratic
climate in both parts of Yemen.
The National Action Charter determined the principles of the domestic policy
by endorsing justice and equality among citizens; by eliminating privileges,
discrimination, oppression and arbitrariness; by affirming the principle
of a democratic government and the principle of democracy for everyone; and -
by encouraging the establishment of popular organizations and professional,
farmers' and women's unions.
37 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
I~OK OI~FICIAL USE nNLY
The charter also affirmPd the importance of guaranteeing individual and
public liberties, including the right to publish newspapers and magazines,
and of setting democratic freedoms loose in the broadest sense.
On the economic scene the coalition committed itself to supporting public
order; limiting ownership in basic industries and in the vital facilities
of those industries; encouraging the private sector to participate in
� development projects; remedying the dangers of migration and unemploytnent;
- offering guarantees to Arab capitalists; and issuing a law to regulate
agricultural ownership.
- On the national and international scene the coalition committed itself to
affirming the notion of pan-Arab unity, fighting separatist and anti-Arab
tendencies; resnecting all the Arab regi~as that did not renounce basic
- Arab principles and questions; and pursuing a non-alignment policy.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met and talked with a number of coalition leaders.
Today, it relates the opinion of Mr 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi, the secretary
general of the coalition, and of Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, the deputy
secretary general. In the next issue we will publish the opinion of Mr
'Abd-al-Rahman Mahyub, member of the command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th
Party in Yenen.
Subordination to Soviets Rejected
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARA.BI in Arabic 30 May- 6 Jun 80 pp 33 -34
[TextJ 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkaw~. was accused of being a reactionary and an
- agent for colonialism. People forgot that he had resigned as prime min-
_ ister of the Federation of South Arabia to join the national rank. They =
also forgat that he has paid a high price for that. Agents cf colonialism ~
killed his sister and three af his sons in one day. Just as Makkawi led
the struggle of his people one day against British colonialism, he is
saying today that he is determin.ad to lead the struggle of this nation
against the Marxist regime in South Yemen und against the subordination of -
this regime to the Soviet Union.
The name of'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi is not strange to Arab politics. He is
a well-known leader from South Yemen. He surprised the British when he
submitted his resignation as prime minister of the Federation of South -
Arabia in 1965 to join the national rank that was struggling for indepen-
dence. He became the leader of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen. This front included broad national movements and led the
struggle against colonialism.
'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi paid a high price for his struggle. The agents of
colonialism blew up his house in Aden on 27 February in 1967. Three of
his sons were killed: Jalal (23 years old); 'Adil (20 years); and Samir
(9 years). His sister was also killed. When all of Aden came out for
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
rux urr 1t;lEU, ua~: UNLY
the funeral of Makkawi's sons, the British fired [their] guns at the
mourners, but the people insisted on sharing their leader's loss despite
the gunfire of colonialism.
To spite the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasi.r whose forces were still in
North Yemen at the time, the British Labor government placed the National
Front, whish was then led by Mr Qahtan al-S~ia'bi, in charge of South Yemen. -
The National Front was the principal front opposing the Front for the
Liberation of Occupied South Yemen which was supported and subsidized by -
President `Abd-al-Nasir.
Makkawi left the homeland, moving about in the Arab world and practicing
his opposition to the current regime in his country as a member of the
United National Front. This front has been expanded recently at the -
Baghdad Conference which included various opposition movements.
'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi has a dignified appearance and a strong stature; he is
well-educated, well informed and quick-witted. Here he is talking to the
correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Baghdad.
[Question] What do you think about the recent change in the top positions
of government in Anen?
- [Answer] I think these changes were chan.ges in people only and were not
changes in the state`s policy, especially since Nasir Muhammad did declare
after assuming power recently that his affiliation with the Soviets would
not be shaken and that he would continue this policy of Soviet dependency.
- But what concerns us above all else is getting rid of this foreign influ- _
ence which is threatening our independence as A~abs, as progressive people
and as nationalists.
Therefore, if 'Ali Nasir wants to come back to the Arab fold, he has to rid
himself first of the foreign interventions and the foreign influence in
his country.
This is a fundamental condition required by all the forces of the Yemeni
opposition whose groups are working in the National Coalition of National-
ist Forc~s.
The second thing that we want is to put democracy in action and to achieve
national unity. When, for example, Sultan Ahmad 'Umar, the chairman of
what is ca11Pd the National Front, and his group insist on putting democracy
in action in North Yemen and on having all the popular forces take part in
_ a national government there, it would stand to reason also that those
communists who are controlling the lives of our people in South Yemen apply
[that principle] too before the unity of Yemani soil can be completed.
Let me say again an2 emphasize that what happened in Aden was a play in
which a few faces who were not in =avor were rejected and other faces who
39
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
were more flexible returned to the stage. 'Ali Nasir Munammad is the
Soviets' man, and so is 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il. The only difference be-
tween them is that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is more flexible than 'Abd-al-Fattah
- Isma'il, and his flexibility may be a factor that will help in obtaining
some financial aid for the purpose of overcoming the economic crisis that
_ is choking them off now.
- This is naturally a Soviet tactic. Instead of "wasting" 'Abd-al-Fattah,
the Soviets brought a more flexible person in to overcome this crisis.
After this crisis is overcome, 'Abd-al-I'attah will return to take over the
following stage. The Soviets know that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is more accep-
table to the people of South Yemen than 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.
'Ali Nasir Muhammad Will Be Destroyed
[Question] Do you think that the new president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad will
succeed in shouldering the responsiblity of [this] stage?
[Answer] 'Ali Nasir is now shouldering a major responsibility in the state
and in the party. I fear that he may be destroyed if he cannot overcome
~ the ~3estructive economic crisis or if he cannot perform his roie well in
; the Soviet drama.
[Question] Can what happened in Afghanistan be repeated in South Yemen
with regard to armed intervention and with regard to replacing Zayd with
'Amr [i.e., one man with another)?
[Answer] What I am afraid of and what I did not want to declare is that
the Afgha~istan experience may be repeated in Aden. This is because this -
has always been the Soviets' custom.
I am absolutely certain that, when they dispensed with 'Abd-al-Fattah -
Isma'il in this manner, they would not at all hesitate to dispense with
'Ali Nasir Muhammad in another short period of time. They would replace
_ him with a person who would be more acceptable to the people, who would do
better service and be more loyal to the Soviets--one who would be more
- s~;ccessful in carrying out the duties of [this] stage.
This does not mean that 'Ali Nasir is less loyal to the Soviets than
'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, but it does mean that he is the man of the hour.
'Abd-al-Fattah alienated many Arab countries that have an unadulterated,
pan-Arab and nationalist outlook. He became more of a Soviet than the
Soviets themselves. But 'Ali Nasir, as I said is more flexible than
'Abd-al-Fattah is in dealing with the Arab countries.
I also do not find it unlikely that 'Abd-al-Fattah's role in this drama
will come at the end of the performance, after 'A1i Nasir fails [in his
mission], having been fettered with all these enormous responsibilities.
40
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
r�ux ur�r~lciai. USE UNLY
The Soviets are concerned above all else with their own interests. If
their in~erests are not served through 'Abd-al-Fattah, 'Ali Nasir or
'Ali 'Antar, they can easily appoint any replacement who will be more -
~ailling to carry out their demands and serve their interests.
[Question] Does what happened in Aden mean that the military faction has
won a victory over the party faction?
[AnswerJ The army is loyal to 'Ali Nasir and to 'Ali 'Antar. 'Abd-al-Fattah
has lost the army and the militia, especially after the militia was incor-
porated in the regular army. -
[Question] It is being said that Mr al-Qamati and four of his strong aides
have been physically liquidated. It is well known that he was a militia
leader and the right hand man of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.
[Answer] I believe that the army now is in the hands of 'Ali Nasir and
'Ali 'Antar and their group. Even the party ~s now in their hands, now
that 'Abd-al-Fattah is out of the picture. Many of 'Abd-al-Fattah's aides
and supporters have been removed from all importar.t positions. It is for
this reason that the change came about quietly and without visible battles
as was the case in the battle with Sa].im Rabi' 'Ali.
No Unity with a Marxist Re~ime
[Question] Can unity be achieved between the two [sections of] Yemen after
the change that took place in Aden?
[Answer] I do not believe that these steps have any serious implications.
There can be no unity between a Marxist regime and a canservative regime.
I believe there is Yemeni unity now be~ause the two peoples are united,
but Yemeni unity cannot come about unless a patriotic national regime is
established in South Yemen. Unity under the present regime will be frail
and wou~d soon collapse.
[Question] What about the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Aden?
1I
(Answer] Saudi Arabia has been working for the supreme pan-Arab interests;
it has always extended a helping hand to Yemen. If there should be a
rapprochement between it and the regime in Aden, Saudi Arabia would con-
sider the people before the regime. I do not believe that the atheistic,
communist regime of Aden can agree with a regime which holds our most
sacred Islamic reJics.
But we must first be certain of the good intentions of the Aden regime and
of its sincere inclination in favor of Arabs. When it rids itself of
foreign subordination, it can then return to the Arab fold.
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIEiL USE ONLY
[QuestionJ How can a sound, hAalthy relationship be established between
Yemen and the Soviet Unioni
[Answer] We are not in any case opposed to cordial, normal relations
with the Soviets. What we do oppose is that this superpower gain absolute
coc~trol over our country. The relationship today between Aden and Moscow
is one of subordination. There is not an ounce of independence in this
_ relationship, and this is what we oppose.
_ Hence we do not believe that the Aden regime is serious at all in estab-
lishing good relations with Saudi Arabia. It is rather an cpportunist
relationship from which the Aden regime is seeking a solution to its
economic crises.
So far 'Ali Nasir has not shown any sincere inclination [towards the Arabs]
to make us believe that he has returned to the Arab fold. We believe that
he will not be able now to declare any sincere inclinations towards the
Arab nation.
We Will Take Serioua Action
[Question] What are the goals of the National Coalition of Patriotic
Forces in Yemen which was recently established in Baghdad? How much in-
fluence does it have on the domestic Yemeni scene, and how much influence
does it have abroad on the two Yemens?
. [Answer] We thank God that we were able to bring together in one melting
pot all the forces that oppose the Shu`ubi [anti-Arab dominance] regime in
Aden, which is hostile to our nation. All the organizat~ons inside and
outside the Yemeni scene met in Baghdad to confront the common enemy in
their country as a single force.
We thank God that we agreed on everything. We agreed on a national action
program; on the broad lines of a general policy; and on serious, fruitful
actian inside the area. We are still at the beginning of the course. I
am confident that the beginning bodes well [for usJ because we have placed
ourselves on the ca~rect course.
The purpose of the coalition then is, first, to bL~ng about the downfall of
the regime in South Yemen because it iG an unnatural regime that does not
serve the interests of our people; and second, t~ establish a nationalist
democratic, patriotic government of unity in South Yemen.
The action that we will take is political, media-oriented, organizational
and military. When we say military action, we mean guerilla and organized
military action. We will have a fruitful and a sericus beginning that will
surprise many people.
- The coalition includes all the national parties, chief among which are the
Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, the Yemeni Unity Front, the United National
42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
~
FoK or'rICIAL USE UNLY
Front, the 26 June Front and the Popular Resistance. I am very ogtimistic,
more than any time in the past, t~hat suc~ess will be our ally because we
w:ill undertake actions that are very effective in the near future.
[Question] How do you view relations between the coalition and the Arab
countries neighboring South Yemen?
[Answer] They are very good relations, supporting our positions with North
Yemen, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries. They are all with us body and
soul because we are a nationalist, patriotic group working to expel the
foreign influence that is threatening our nation and because, as I said,
we belong to our Arab nation before belonging to any other agency.
[Question] But is this coalition a periodic one or is it a long-term
coalition?
[Answer] Our alliance is a long-term strategic alliance. It is not just
a t~mporary alliance to overthrow the regime. Our alliance seeks libera-
- tion and the establishment of a socialist Arab coalition because we believe
that the regime in Aden is colonialist. We came out from under British
colonialism and entered into Soviet colonialism.
Persecutions in Exile Deplored
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 34-35
[Text] Muhammad `Ali Haytham is one of the leaders of South Yemen living
in exile who is probably the most knowledgeable person about the person-
alities and the trends of the ruling regime in South Yemen. He is also
the one who is most st~.bject to persecution and harassment by the regime.
Today, Haytham is the deputy secretary general of the opposition coalition
which has recently been formed. Her~ he registers his observations and
his impressions of his experience with the regime of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il
and his hopes for the future.
Muhammad 'Ali Haytham is one of the founders of the National Front ~n Aden.
When the faction of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was overthrown in 1969 by
President Qahtan al-Sha'bi and his command of the front, Muhammad 'Ali
Haytham was selected to be one of a five-man team that constituted the
presidential council. He was then charged with forming a government, but
he was relieved of his position in 1972, and Isma'il banished him to the
Soviet Union. However, he escaped to Cairo where he formed an opposition
organization called the National Unity Front.
'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was aware of the danger Muhammad 'Ali Haytham posed
to his regime. He therefare pursued him relentlessly. There wzre three
attempts to assassinate him in exile. He was seriously hurt all three
times: in his face, in his neck and in his chest, but he survived
miraculously.
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
1~0}t UH'FICIAI. USE ONLY
Muhairunad 'Ali Haytham is described as having inclinations towards Arab
unity. He is characterized by his political moderation and his flexibility.
It is being said that he is popular in Yemen.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARr~BI had this interview with Muha~nad 'Ali Haytham in which
he talked about his experience and his suffering and about the future of
the current regime in South Yemen.
~ [Question] You know the makeup of the current regime in Aden better than
anyone else. How do you interpret what happened, and who are the new
officials?
- [Answer] I would like to emphasize on the basis of my knowledge of the
ruling group that 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was forced to resign and that he
did not resign voluntarily because he has been the primary figure in the
regime since the changes that took place on 20 June 1969.
I do not ihink that 'Abd-al-Fattah gave himself up that easily. He has
always aspired to the role of the hero, and numerous circumstances had
been prepared for him [to play that role].
Because we know many of the brothers,who joined the current setup of the
- regime, we know that their inclinations were nationalistic. But with the
change that occurred in the ideology of the regime and of the party, and
as a Marxist-Leninist course was adopted, those inclinations vanished.
' We hope they will disavow their new persuasions, their mistakes and their
oppressive and terrorist practices against the helpless citizen of Yemen.
We hope they will not introduce our people into the struggle of the i:~ter-
- national game against the interests of the Arab nation.
At this present stage we may not hope for much from them, but we ~re hoping
for another and a more far-reaching change in the future.
Half of Our People Are Homeless
[Question] Do you believe that unity is possible between the two parts of
Yemen under present circumstances?
[Answer] When Aden became independent, we were hoping that an additional
flag would not be flown [in the capital]. We were rather hoping that
San'a' would seize us and unite both parts of Yemen; we were hoping that
unity would be [established] under one flag. But this unfortun~tely did
not happen.
The present call for unity between the two regimes is based on the fact
that the Aden regime, with its Narxist-Leninist ideology, would take over
the other part of Yemen and impose its ideol.ogical control throughout the
territory of Yemen.
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
~
I~U!' 'r l~ LC 1 AL UtiJ; nNLY
We consider the regime of Aden to be an implanted regime because it did not
come (to power] through the will of the people, nor does it realize the
ambitions of the Arab citizen. We are part of a large nation, and this
nation has major interests. The Arab nation must fight for its national,
its humanitarian and its democratic unity, and it must fight for a just
social system.
The population of South Yemen when [it gained] independence was 1.5 million.
'Today, the population in South Yemen is much less than a million because
hundreds of thousands of citizens have been made homeless. They live in
tin huts in the desert of al-Itub' al-Khali and in Sha'ab in North Yemen.
They wander in the streets and alleys of the cities of North Yemen, the
Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Gulf, of Egypt, Sudan and Iraq.
This is the biggest indication that it is an implanted regime which prac-
tices terrorist oppression against the masses who do not believe in what
the regime believes.
[Question] What is your evaluation of the situation in Aden? Who won and
who lost there:
[Answer] The fact is that the makeup of the socialist party now, and ever
since the National Front was changed and turned into a party, i~ an exten-
sion of the organization of the National Front with all its evils, its
negative factors and its contradictions, whether they be tribal, sectarian
fanaticism or a separatist spirit.
The present Yemeni Socialist Party represents the same former makeup, and
the struggle that can be found now is not the struggle of ideological
movements, but it is rather the tribal mentality that is in control.
It is evident from the new makeup of the Aden regime that military men
played a major role in that change, and they settled the situation to their
advantage. We are encouraged by this because the military men have begun
to take action.
[QuestionJ What then in your opinion is the future of the regime?
[Answer] No regime can be overthrown quickly. Today, we are resisting
a regime that senses a major point of weakness: that it is an implanted
regime.
This feeling is growing within the regime, and in spite of its terrorist
practices, we can say that any serious opposition and resistance can
achieve major results.
We are in the process of achieving this now that the Yemeni opposition has
consolidated itself. We will take effective opposition action, and we have
~ the enormous manpower that can achieve the most difficult of mi~sions.
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The question of ease or difficulty goes back to our ability to take action.
I believe we are capable of taking major action and of ridding the Arab
nation from this cancer which has been implanted in it.
Aden Is a Soviet Colony
[Question] What interest do the Soviets have in supporting a regime that
is as isolated from the people as you describe?
[Answer] As a superpower the Soviet Union strives to have stable interests.
It is not interested in who achieves these goals for it. What is important
to the Soviet Union is that these goals are achieved by any person.
During the war of liberation against British colonialism the Soviet Union
used to refuse to give us any aid. It would not even give us any weapons.
But after independence the frenzy began, and the Soviet Union began to
mobilize people and to strive to achieve its interests. It was gradually
able to implant this regime in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.
Ever since the early seventies the Soviet Union has obtained terms that
it would never have dreamed of at all.
The airports at Aden are always open for Soviet flights. Suffice it [to
know] that last year the Soviet Union trained a division in its entirety
with full military equipment to conduct rapid transport [operations] from
the Soviet Union to Aden and vice versa so as to test its capability for
rapid transport.
If the Soviet Union were to pay billions of dollars, it would not be able
to obtain such facilities free of charge.
All the ports of South Yemen are also open to the Soviet navy. Soviet
ships and submarines that malfunction at sea had to be returned to Lenin-
grad for maintenance, but now all maintenance is carried ou~ in the ports
of Aden, and this saves millions of dollars and large quantities of fuel.
Fishing vessels, which are espionage vessels, and all commercial and
militaxy ships sail into Aden without contacting authorities in Aden.
Al1 the crews of military and commercial ships in Aden have also been
given facilities for storing all kinds of weapons to suppress all libera-
tion movements in the Horn of Africa and in the Arab homeland.
Aden has become a Soviet colony or a new Soviet repiblic to be added to
the Soviet republics.
[Question] Do you believe that the political future of 'Abd-al-Fattah
Isma'il has come to an end?
46 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
r~x ~ t~ cc; i nt, iJSF. ~Ki,Y
_ [Answer] The recent changes in Yemen have become clear because the people
who are in power have a bloodthirsty nature.
~ They know the danger 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il poses to r.hem if he remains
a.live, and fearing a repeat of the Afghanistan experience, they will not
allow 'Abd-al-Fattah to live.
If their assassination squad is traveling in foreign countries looking for
opposition members, is it reasonable [to expect them] to leave 'Abd-al-Fattah
alive so hp would return [to power] and liquidate them?
~ [Question] What about the rapprochement between the regime of South Yemen
and Saudi Arabia? What do you think about it?
[AnswerJ Aden's leanings towards Saudi Arabia are taking place with in- .
structions from the Soviet Union, in v:Lew of the fact that the Aden regime
is an implanted regime which receives directions from whoever implanted it.
[Question] You are now an active member in organizing the opposition and
in organizing the National Coalition of Yemeni Patriofiic Forces. What
are your hopes and your expectations?
[Answer] The coalition is a positive step taken on the correct road of
confronting the client regime in Aden. Al1 the groups of the Yemeni oppo-
sition have been aspiring to form such a coalition. We are hoping that
this coalition would have been established a long time before this so it
would have been more effective. We would have at least taken some strides
on the arduous journey of a 1,000 miles.
The National Coalition is introducing a new method; this is a practical
method to bring the client regime of Aden to its knees.
Our objectives are clear: to establish in our country a nationalist regime,
whose thoughts are of unity--a regime that is humanitarian in its practices
and strong in its aspirations.
We hope to establish a regime that would raise the standard [of living]
of the Yemeni people and achieve the unity of Yemen. This will only come _
about by overthrowing this regime and destroying all its political, con-
stitutional and other institutions. I can say that the coalition can
achieve that.
[QuestionJ Do you believe that the coalition is a front with an interim,
tactical objective, or do you believe that it has objectives that go
beyond those of changing the regime?
[Answer] The alliance of these opposition parties in the coalition is a
long-term strategic alliance and not a temporary tactical alliance that
will come to an end when the objective of the stage is realized, and
- that is the overthrow of the regime in Aden. -
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The regime in Aden has already begun to fear the newly created coalition. _
It is trying to encircle it be making offers for talks, but we are reject-
ing [such talksJ, and we wi-1 only be satisf ied with the overthrow of the
regime.
Change of Regime Analyzed
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 pp 32-33
[Text] In the previous issue of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi
~ and Muhammad 'Ali Haytham spoke about the view which the opposition in
South Yemen has of the events and developments that have happened and are
happening there. The two men stated their opinion of the policy and the
directions which the ruling Marxist party in Aden was taking.
Today, AL-WATAN A:.-'ARABI continues its review of the positions of the
' opposition groups. It is publishing an interview with 'Abd-al-Rahman
Mahyub, member of the command of the Ba'th Party in Yemen. Mr Mahyub
expresses his opinion about the situation in South Yemen and the change
which culminated with President 'Abd-al-Fatt~h Isma'il abandoning his post
in the party and in the government. President 'Ali Nasir replaced him.
Mahyub also states his opinion of the estab lishment of a coalition f.or the
opposition and the drawing up of a charter for it.
The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Xemen played a prominent role in the
national struggle movement against British colonialism in South Xemen an d
against the regime of the Imam in North Yemen.
_ After independence the party found itself with other national groups in
the position of opposing the policy of the National Front and then that
of the ruling socialist party. It was this policy that involved this dear
part of the Arab homeland in internatiQnal struggles and tied it to the
wheel of a specific international camp as well ~s to a lack of earnestness ,
in achieving Yemeni unity.
Mr `Abd-al-Rahman Mahyub member of the command of the Ba'th party in Yemen
spoke to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI about the opinion and the direc:tions the party
was taking vis-a-vis the recent events in South Yemen and in the aftermath
of th~ formation of the National Coalition of Patriotic Forces there. Ex-
cerpts from the interview that tcok place between him and our correspondent
in Baghdad follow:
[Question] Can the change that occurred recently in Aden be considered
something advantageous to Arab independence from international camps?
[Anser] The events that culminated in Aden with the removal of
'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il were the result of cumulative events and struggles -
inside the ruling socialist party. They go back to July 1978 when the
various parties cooperated to overthrow Salim Rabi' 'Ali and to kill him.
48
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOK FFICIAL USE ONLY
The struggles continued to take various forms afterwards. These struggles
were manifested by st~akeups within the leadership and the staff oi the
socialist party. The situation was the same internally where r_onditions
were deteriorating daily and the repressive notion as a method of dealing
with various national opinions and trends in South Yemen was prevaiting.
On the Arab scene these struggles were manifested by the Aden-Soviet treaty
which established South Yemen as a base for foreign forces; and they were
also manifested in the agreement that Aden had with Mengistu, Ethiopia's
strong man. According to this agreement A.den was turned into a manpower
center for shoring up the Ethiopian regime against the aspirations and the
will of our Arab people in Eritrea.
Everything that has occurred and everything that materialized was a fore-
gone conclusion and was to be expected. These events were postponed 2
months since the situation was sopposed to have exploded last February.
The simplest indication of this vicious repressive campaign against the
fighters of the Soci~list Arab Ba`th Party, whose numbers in the prisons
~ of Aden ha~~e reached 400 prisoners, is the fact that 18 of them were to be
tried in secret trials that began early in January 1980.
- All this was a clear indication that the parties to the government had
reached a dead end. Consequently, one party had to settle the situation
against the other party.
Awaiting the Cour~e of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad
[Question] What are your expectations of the new political leadership
there under the leadership of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad?
[AnswerJ 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il immersed himselt in hard-line positions
and in the practice of terrorism. At the same time we find that 'Ali
Nasir Muhammad has given himself a distinctive style that became known for
~.ts moderation on the domestic scene and on the Arab scene.
If 'Abd-al-Fattah I~ma'il represents the hard-line stage on all levels, we
are await~ng what the course of 'Ali Nasir_ Muhammad will produce.
We think that matters are not to be judged by intentions, but rather by
practical concrete positions. There are several questions in front of
'Ali Nasir Muhammad today: there is the question of democracy; the question -
of the detained Ba'th party members; there is the questiori of thousands of _
prisoners; of deteriorating conditions; the question of Yemeni unity; and -
[the question of] freedom to travel and to assemble.
Our evaluation of the new conditions is based on settling these questions
so that the method of treatment may become a practica3. test of the new
policy of Aden. _
49 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On the Arab scene, bringing Yemen out of a cycle of haphazard conduct, and
hard-line and overbearing positions in many instances--such a~ making
relations between Aden and Baghdad more critical--does in ou~ opinion
constitute an actual test of the new trends.
On the international scene we are awaiting [a shift in] direction towards
the independence and sovereignty of South Yemen and towards the removal
of foreign bases and the preservation of Yemeni dignity.
We are naturally against international imperialism, and chiefly that of
the United States of America. But this does not at all mean falling into
the snares and the plans of other forces regardless of their identity. _
Inasmuch as the head of the current regime adopts a democratic, Arab and
independent course, such a course will be met by understanding from th=
other parties and a realization of the true intentions, the moderation and
the openness of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.
Will a New Karmal Appear? "
[Question] These are your hopes as a patriotic Arab for South Yemen and
for the political leader.ship there. But do you believe that the Soviet
Union can easily give up its position of influence there?
- [Answer] The distingui.shed location of South Yemen constitutes a basic
link in Soviet strategy in the Arab region, and especially in the area
adjacent to the oil wells and to the approaches to the Red Sea and to
East Africa.
Therefore, regardless of the changes that are made in people and in tools,
after having shaped this area into a military and a manpower center, the -
Soviet Union cannot, practically speaking, but hold on tight to this area
and strengthen its presence in it because it constitutes the spearhead in
its policies and in its strategies. Hence, it would not be unlikely for ~
the Soviet Union to bring a new Karmal to Aden.
[Question] A new Karmal just like what'happened in Afghanistan. But do
you believe that former President 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il gave up easily and
that he will not return again?
[Answer] It is not possible for 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il to give up power
as long as there is a breath of lif e in his body. As a result, using the
- logic of the repeated physical liquidations that we have experienced, he
may try to return through the physical liquidation of his opponents. It
is inevitable that he will kill or be killed.
[Question] Do you think that the regime in South Yemen is serious about _
achieving unity between the two sections of Yemen?
50
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR JFFICIAL U5E ONLY
[AnswerJ Yemeni unity is a deep-seated faith in the heart of every Yemeni.
The history of the Arab people in Yemen has always teen tied to a struggle
for unity.
Rut when colonialism was thrown out of Aden in 1967, the National Front,
which came to power at the time, strengtliened the partition and established
a state instead of fusing the two parts of Yemen into a single Yemeni state.
The same course was followed by the Socialist Party which is now in power.
The slogans that it is proclaiming now are no more than hot air for politi- -
cal consumption only.
They d~ not want unity un"less it is under the leadership of the socialist
party. This was affirmed by their resolutions and by their secret con- -
f erences. That is, they are working for the overthrow of the San'a' regime
- by implanting their agents there. Thus, the leadership of 'Abd-al-Fattah
Isma'il was not serious ab out achieving unity.
Today, if the regime in Aden were to abandon the irresponsible programs of
'Abcl-al-Fattah and his gangs in North Yemen; and i~ it were to make a dili-
gent and a sincere effort for the establishment of unity, it would thus be
offering preliminary indications that it was serious about achieving unity.
We' 11 have to wai t and see !
And here I want to affirm that unity can only be established on the shoul-
- ders of genuine advocates of unity and through the free exercise of the
popular will, without maneuvers, political extortion and toying with the -
emotions of the public.
[Question] What is your view as a Ba'th Party leader of the opposition
front that has recently been formed under the name the National Coalition
- of Patriotic Forces in Sou th Yemen?
[Answer] I want to explain first that the national opposition to the
separatist regime in Aden consists basically of those forces that were
engaged in a political and a military struggle against British colonial- -
ism. This opposition with its various political aff iliations has expressed
its rejection of the Aden regime in various positions and methods. How-
ever, the predominant characteristic of this opposition is its diversity
and its fragmentation.
Recently we have sensed that there was a serious inclination in the forces -
of this opposition to unify its ranks and its word and to amass its capa- `
bilities so it can move from the stage of waiting to that of confronting
the separatist regime in Aden, adopting thereby all the forms and methods
of struggle.
In the context of this ~inclination, the various groups of the opposition
invited each other and met in Baghdad. These groups are: the United
National Front, chaired by Mr 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi; the Yemeni Unity Front,
51
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
:
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
rok orrlcrni. us~: orr~Y
c~aired by Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham; the Liberation Front; the League
Party, chaired by the late Muhammad 'Ali al-Jafari and Shaykhan al-Habashi;
the 26 July Organization, the forces of the late Salim Rabi' 'Ali che
Popular Organization, chaired by 'Ali ibn Hadi; and a number iudepender.t
national political personalities and various military trenc~s.
This meeting is considered an i~portant step on the course of the national
struggle in South Yemen. It was the first time for the national forces to
meet to confrent the communist regime in Aden. The results that have been _
achieved bode well and indicate that there is a possibility that matters _
may assume a bettershape and that greater action [may be taken].
The fact that various parties were able to unify themselves, after forget-
ting their differences and the negative occurrences of the past, in a
f ramewark that regulates their actions, whicn are represented in establish- _
ing the national coalition and its national charter, will :iave major effects
when this is translated into practical terms.
We bless this step that has been taken by parties to ~he national opposi-
tion, and we affirm our interest in achieving positive results that would
enable them to rectify conditions and establish truth.
~ We hope that the national conference that is to be held soon in Bagh3ad
will place these forces on the correct course. We are looki.ng forward to a
democratic national regime that will provide all liberties, end the un-
_ usual situations and achieve for the people their sovereignty, their
independence and their. national unity.
Let me affirm again that the position of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party on
the National Coalition of the Opposition and its new directions comes in ~
the context of its clear and firm position on the prevailing conditions
in Aden. Therefore, it looks with considerable satisfaction upon what the
national opposition has been able to achieve to unify its ranks.
Having looked into the N3tional Charter that was issued by the coalition
and having sensed the earnestness and the interest of the variQUS parties
to continue the struggle tY~e Ba'th party blesses, supports and strengthens
all these steps.
We are with them with our hearts and with all the power we have. Today,
they represent an imporant vanguard in the Yemeni national struggle. We
hope that their actions will be crowned with success so that Aden will be
Arab again.
(Question] The Ba'th Party is an effective force c~n the Yemeni scene. Can
you give us a general picture about its political activities there?
- [Answer] Ever since its early beginnings, tre Socialist Arab Ba"th Party
in Yemen has played an important role in establishing labor unions and
52
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR _FFICIAL USE ONLY
hence, the leadership of the labor conference, which bore a large burden
in the struggle against British colonialism.
The infrastructures of the party joined the combat groups, and chief among
rhem were the vanguards of the Popular Liberation War. The party made _
tremendous and large sacrifices, and its choice leaders, staff inembers and
Eighters died fighting for the principles and for achieving the objectives
of the party and of the revolution.
After independence the members of the Ba'th Party continued their struggle
to lay the foundations of democracy, to a~hieve Yemeni unity and to improve
living conditions. They paid much for that. But they were not scared by
acts of repression and terror, and they were not dissuaded by harassment '
and physical liquidations. They remained loyal to their principles and to
the will of the people. They made tremendous sacrifices. The destiny of
scores of them is still unknown. Not a day goes by when the prison cells
of Aden are not opened to receive many of them.
Last June more than 400 members of the Ba'th party were arrested and st;b-
jected to various kinds of torture. Then they were put on trial. Unfair
sentences were issued against a number of them, but 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il
did not enjoy his oppression. He fell [from power] 2 weeks after those
sentences were issued.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
~
8592
CSO: 4802
53
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
~
FOK UFFIC [AL USL: ONL~'
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ECONOMIC PROGRESS MARKED BY FORMATION OF CENTRAL BANK
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 May 80 pp 48-49
[Article: "Central Bank Will Help the UAE Avert Economic and Banking
Upsets"]
[Text) The UAE is moving toward regulating and controlling its banking
activity through the establishment of a central bank to take on the job of
steering the UAE's finaiicial policy. This wi11 prevent the kind of banking
and economic upsets that have occurred in the past few years due to the
lack of so important a financial institution.
The UAE has recently entered a process of placing money, investment and
banking policy under the direct supervision of a central bank. The basic
articles and functions of this bank have been established on the basis of
the experiences of the developed states in this field of activity with the
- aim of profiting completely from the errors and mistakes made in the past.
The UAE banking sector consists of 54 banks with a total of 420 branches.
The goal ~f placing these institutions under the control of the central bank
is to steer them toward participation in development projects. Another goal
is to regulate and develop banking activity and place it on established
principles which will protect it from any upsets.
The new banking measures including the following:
Issuing new paper and metal currenciPS to replace the currency now in
circulation beginning in 1981.
--Regulation of the positions of the banks so that the commercial banks will
have a minimum of 20 million dirhams in completely paid-up capital.
--A requirement that all licensed banks wi].l be listed on registers main-
tained by the central bank, which will establish the conditions and measures
required for listing on these registers. -
--No commercial bank will be permitred to open a new branch, change the
location of a branch, or cYose a b.unch without obtaining prior approval
from the b~ard of directors of the central bank.
--A commercial bank can be deleted from the register and required to cease
its activities under the following conditions: if the bank itself requests
54
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY
that this action be taken; if the bank fails to begin its operations within
a period exceeding 1 year; if the bank declares bankruptcy or merges with
another bank; if the solvency of the bank is threatened; or if the bank
commits a serious infraction of the laws, regulations, rules, decisions
and directives which govern its activity in accordance with the organiza-
tional provisions of the central bank. In addition, commercial banks are
prohibited from conducting nonbanking activities.
This fundamental step in the banking sector possesses great importance in
the UAE because it is the outcome of studies which covered a long period
of time and dealt with the appropriate methods and means to put the country
on the road to investment and sound economic development dnd eliminate the
mysterious jumps which propel the country into inflation.
Importance of the Central Bank's Activity
The establishment of the central bank in the UAE was accompanied by a series
of financial legisla~ion approved by the Supreme State Council and the
National Assembly as a part of the general budget plan approved last April.
Intensive deliberations have recently been held among senior officials for
the purpose of selecting the members of the bank's board of directors.
These members have been chosen from among experts who have proven their
qualifications in the planning and development field, so that the board
will be able to put the bank law into effect. This law actually consists =
of three parts: the law establishing the central bank, the law defining
the central banking system, and the law governing banking functions. All
of these are contained in 130 integrated articles which provide the bank
with powers that will bring about complete coordination in monetary and
financial policies. {
The plan drawn up for the central bank provides for the establishment of
the largest possible reserve of foreign currency. This will be accomplished
by transferring the state's foreign currency revenues to the central bank
to ensure the continued adequacy of the legal currency backing to meet tlie
country's foreign currency requirements necessary for importation and ex-
portation and to balance the country's international payments [accounts]
wi.th other states.
In addition, the bank will be assured of a large degree of monetary liquid-
ity since UAE President Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan and his vice president
have decided that Abu Dhabi and Dubai will contribute half their oil rev-
enues, or approximately 30 billion dirhams, to the federal budget, and
these funds will be placed on deposit in the central cank as the state
banking institution.
Thus, the recommendations passed by the Federal National Assembly along
with the general budget at the beginning of last month are viewed as the
final link in a series of ineasures which are being prepared and implemented
in order to rectify and regulate the financial situation.
55
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FUR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
''"servations of the National Assembly
Af.ter comprehensive discussions of the budget, the Federal National Council
adopted seven reconunendations pertaining to regulation of the financial
situation.
_ Some of these recommendations expressed the National Assembly's great
appreciation for the patriotic step undertaken by Abu Dhabi and Dubai in
which they agree~ to allocate half of their. oil revenues to cover general
budgetary exper.ditures. In view of this step, *_he assembly felt that the
channeling of the emirates' revenues into the state treasury will help
support the UAE at?d strengthen its progress toward growth and advancement.
The recommendations also state the following: "The assembly has observed
that the budget has not been drawn up on the basis of a comprehensive plan
for economic and social development. Therefore, it recommends that both
short-range and long-range comprehensive development plans be drawn up
along with an annual program for tt~e implementation of each plan. The
- assembly further recommends that indu~try form the basic element for the
creation of a strong economic base. Thus, the assembly hopes to see the
' formulation of a plan to open the way to industrialization in cooperation
with the other Gulf states on the basis of integration rather than com-
petition."
The Federal National Assembly expressed its view that raising the standard
of living of limited-income persons should not be accomplished by pro-
viding aid and charity. It stated that the honorable solution to this
problem lies in the creation of suitable job opportunities for these citi-
zens. Therefore, the assembly recommended that a plan bE drawn up to
ensure that new work opportunities are opened for national labor and that
these workers are trained to perform appropriate jobs.
During the comprehensive debate which took place, UAE finance and industry
- minister Hamdan ibn Rashid acknowledged the difficulties arising from in-
flation. He said: "The UAE is a state which is completely dependent on
importacion, and the existing indu~trial sector is inadequate. The govern-
ment is working to remedy these deficiencies, increase social assistance,
and support the prices of all foodstuffs and daily necessitias based on a
study which is currently under discussion. Another study has been conducted
which establishes the percentage of new positions, stipulates a 50 percent
_ increase in the budget of the armed forces and security forces, and calls
- for improvement of conditions in the cities and assistance for the munici-
palities."
_ With regard to Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's agreement to contribute 50 percent
of their oil revenues to the general budget, the minister said: "The total
amount has varied between 28 and 30 billion dirhams, which represents the
actual federal revenues. However, these figures are just estimates of the
income that is expected to come in."
- 56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOF JFFICIAL US~. ONLY
Picture of the New Financial Situation
llr 'Abd-al-Malik al-Hamar, general director of the UAE Currency Fund, gave
AL-WATAPI AL-`ARABI a comprehensive picture of t;~e state's new financial
situation.
He said that the board of directors of the state's central bank will draw
up all the details of the financial policy and supervise its application
based on its delegated powers. The general director added: "The fact is
that sincE~ mid-1977, we haye suspended the licensing procedures for estab-
lishing new banks in the state. The currency board has announced on more
' than one occasion that all new license applications must wait for the
formulation of the new policy currently entrusted to the central bank.
Even though some exceptic;ns have been made, these have not included foreign
banks, but have been limited to national banks. Of course, this includes
both banks and branches."
The general directol of tt~e currency board also said: "The number of
branches of foreign baraks in the UAE will be reconsidered and only national
or Gulf banks will be permitted to establish new branches. These banks
must be built around specialization in banking activities which serve and
advance all fields of developmer..t and construction. Examples of such banks
include the real estate bank and the ind~istrial bank, the latter of which
will be allowed to be established in order to organize aizd develop indus-
tries, because for the coming decade the conntry needs an industrial
institution concerned with the developme.nt, improvement and organization
~ of industry. This is perhaps what is suggested by greater attention to
the encouragement of industry in the interior."
The general director added: "~very central bank law stipulates that clear
and detailed principles be drawn up for the monetary policy. Naturally,
these involve so:nP measures which require a sufficient amount of time.
However, there are several measures in the text of the law which together
constitute monetary policy. These can include, among other things, gui3e-
lines for developmental policy. All these matters are decided by the
bank's board of directors, as I said previously."
He also talked about the problem of economic stagnation. He said: "The
problem of relative stagnation, or what some experts call financial and
monetary coiifusion, have been a basic problem damestically. As is general-
ly known, this problem developed from the failure of the previous currency
board to adhere to the provisions and laws and to federal law no 2 of 1973. :
Every central monetary institution has a law, and the law establishzs the
framework in which action must be taken.
"The mistake which was made was that the currency board participated in
commercial activities outside the scope of its authority, and this leu to
confusion. It also got involved in some unsecured fflreign obligations and
~ expansion of activities, and this led to the complications which confronted
the country.
57
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"What the present adminis~.ration of the currency fund has done is to work
toward reapplying the exact provi~ions concerning its operation and powers
as laid down in the aforementioned federal law. This law includes many
~ sound guidelines which, had they been correctly applied from the beginning,
would have prevented us from getting into the circumstances we got into.
"Of course, we cannot forget the foreign developments and influences in
the economic and financial sphere which intensified the difficulties which
persisted until 1977. At that time, the state hired a number of experts
and implemented some basic financial measures which forced the banks to set
aside a large financial reserve as local currency deposits and to regulate
investment and interest rates, along with other measures and controls.
These actions created a basic starting point and a financial system which
restore3 the banks to a proper state of organization.
"From that time, the situation began to improve based on the policy which _
was put into effect under the supervision of the currency fund. The im-
provement was reinforced by the fact that the state took advantage of the
world recession. It heeded the importance of reg~"_ation and concentration
and maintained moderation in its spending. This led to a relative reduc-
tion of public spending and caused state spending to be confined to essential
requirements without any waste. This in turn checked the difficulties.
"This combined with control over the activities and investments of the banks
by the monetary board helped limit the scale of the recession. Thus, the
inflation rste dropped fron~i 35 percent to between 15 and 20 percent, noting -
tha~ the natural rate of growth and spending usually varies between 7 and
8 percent. The rate of spending in some states does not exceed 2 percent."
, Dr 'Abdallah al-Hamar continued: "It has been agreed that the oil revenues
which are to be deposited in the cPntral bank by Abu Dhabi and Dubai will
be spent first and foremost on the federal budget of the state as approved
by the Federal Natiunal Assembly, which amounts to approximately 16 billion
dirhams. Part of the revenues over and above this amount for the current
year, for instance, will be allocated to back the currency, and an addition-
al amount will be allocated for foreign investments. However, after all
possible attention and concentration are directed toward encouraging in-
vestments inside the country, we have federal projects who expenses are
covered out of government funds and these have first priority of implemen-
tation."
Reviewing the problem of steering Arab investments, Dr al-Hamar said: "We
hope that additional investment in the various fields will be channeled
into the Gulf and Arab states, because domestic investment provides a
guaranteed future return which is much more significant than that of in-
vestment made abroad. The many crises, including Lhe political and monetary
cris~s, have taught us lessons which we hope will benefit us in the phases
of coordination wY~ich must be developed among us in all fields. We do
not forget the factor of security and stability which provides a complete
58
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR JFFl(:IAL U~L UNLY
~ safeguard for the development plan. For no matter how big the financial
- return from a project may be, the failure to provide security decreases -
its importance and lessens its benefits.
In this connection, he emphasized the importance of coord~?.nation: "This
makes it clear that the establishment of effective coordination among the
Gulf states is very important. We hope that there will be greater divers-
ificat~on zn the area of foreign investment, and that this investment will
be channeled toward the developing areas in the world. There are areas in
various parts ot the world which are abundantly open to such economic activ-
ities. Coordination now exists among the monetary authorities in the Gulf
area through meetings in which Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi
Arabia and Om3n all take part. The purpose of these meetings is to study
monetary policies snd their impact on investment projects in the Gulf.
These meetings have continued since the beginning of 1978. A certain
amount of agreement has taken shape through a statistical publication which
is distributed and through continuous consultations."
Dr al-Hamar qualified this by saying: "However, we must formulate an in-
tegrated plan for the future so that this cooperation can take on a
fundamental and fruitful character. For without the formulation of an
economic plan *_ranslated into a monetary and financial plan, it will be =
impossible to achieve our aspirations in this area.
"The financial and economic regulation movement appears to be strong, since ~
the laws which have been passed are being applied and proposals for new
and integrative legislation are being put forward. Examples of such legis-
lation include a bill concerning the movement of capital, an investments
bill, a bill pertaining to the prosecution of individuals who write checks _
without sufficient funds, an amendment to the law governing foreign agencies,
and other bills which will help achieve integration in a~ound economic
structure fc,r the state."
The workshop of regulat~on and development is still just beginning its
' work and momentum, and it is at the start of its commitment to achieve
the requirements of a strongly established economic structure. ~
- COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8591
CSO: 4802
59
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WEST~t?N SAHARA
,
OAU SUN~'IIT CONSIDERED 'DECISIVE ADVANCE' IN SAHARAN CAtJSE
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 21 Jul - 3 Aug 80 p 54, 55
_ jrticle by Fode Amadou: "A Success for Saharans"
~Excerp~ Despite all M~neuvers, the '17th Summit Confirmed the Grow-
=.ng Isolation of Morocco
Meeting in Free}.auai, capital of Sierra Leone, from 'I to 5 July, the 17th
OAU summit was dominated, as were preceding ones, by the western Sahara
~ question. And it marked a decisive advance for the cause of the Saharan
- people. In fact it was during this summit that Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe,
Mali and Chad made public their decision to recognize trLe Saharan Demo-
cratic Arab Republic (SDAR). Consequently, OAU Secretary General Edem
Kodjo was led to point out in plenary session that 26 of the organization's
50 member states--that is,~the majority--have recognized the SDAR. Under
the OA1J charter the SDAR should thus by right become the 51st OAU member.
This was to be emphasized, following the summit, by Mohamed Abdelaziz,
president of the SDAR Cornmand Council and secretary general of PoI,ISARIO.
However, with the support of a number of so-called "moderate" states--but
whose "moderation" is a one-way street- Moroccan premier Maati Bouabid did
his utmne~~to hide that fundamental result in a maze of procedural maneu-
vers, while once again brandishing the threat of his withdrawal and of the
OAU's breakup. Such blackmail, though B~xticularly sensitive in its effect
- on an organization concerned above all with preserving its still fragile
_ unity, did not this time yield the results awaited. Tndeed, the summit re-
fused to decide the prior issue raised by the Moroccan delegation, and
which, under the pretext of denying to the SDAR the character of a sover-
eign and independent state, in fact tended to replace a simple majority--
sufficient for the admission of a new state--by a two-thirds majority, as
required for fundamental political questions.
True, admission of the SDAR as the 51st member state was not solemnly pro- -
claimed. But juridically, as soon as a state has given notice of candidacy
and the latter has received the assent of the ma.jority (or 26) of the mem-
bers, membership follows automatically after a simple administrative proce-
60
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034408-7
FOR ^FFICIAL USE ONLY
cedure. ~i'he fact that this interpretation is opposed b~r Morocco and a few
of its supporters, who act as if nothing had happened at Freetown, cannot
for lon~ decei~ve.
What Yias emerged with evident clearness is the ever growing isolation of
_ the Moroccan kingdom, and the ever broader and clearer condemnation of an
expansionist policy which tramples underfoot the inalienable right of a
people to its existence, sovereignty, and independence, while at the same
time constituting a challenge to Africa, whose leaders have ceaselessly
recommended a peaceable solution of the Saharan conflict. In this regard,
the speeches by Presidents Samora Machel and Didier Ratsirika, Premier
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe--whose appearance at the rostrum was one of th~
high points of this summit--and Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahiu,
were particularly firm and convincing.
- Pressure was so strong that, after President Senghor's motion to convene an
extraordinary summit was submerged by indifference, the Moroccan delegation
had to make a show of endorsing the recommendations of the ad hoc committee,
which were solemnly confirmed by the summit. That committee, whose mar.date
was renewed.for 3 months, and which will henceforth meet under the chair-
manship of President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, not only "earnestly re-
~ quested of Morocco the immediate withdrawal of a11 its troops and officials
from the region of the western Sahara evacuated b;~ M~.uritania," but insist-
ed on the need for a general cease-fire to permit the Saharan people freely
to determine its own future. By discreetly taking note of "Morocco's de-
termination to enter into discussions with all interested parties arid par-
ticipate fully in the work of the ad hoc committee�'--which Rabat has up
till now boycotted--the summit has backed Hassan II to the wall.
'I'he future will soon tell whether Morocco will finally abandon its vain
dreams of hegemony, and truly wishes to attain a just and lasting peace, or
if on the contrary its retreat is but purely tactical.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
6~~+5
cso : 4400
END
61
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030008-7