JPRS ID: 9395 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPflS L/9395
14 November 1980
West Euro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 46/80~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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_ JPRS L/9395
/ 14 November 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 46/80) -
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE
Briefs
Preelection Defense Request 1
SPAIN
Strategic Importance of C.ibraltar to I~ATQ 'Iberlant' Defenae
(Jorge Calvar Groas; DEFENSA, Aug-Sep 80) 2
Effect of NATO Admiasion on CSCE, U.S. Defense Relationship
~DEFENSA, Aug-Sep SO) 9
COUNTRY SECTION -
INTERNATIONAL Ab'FAIRS
Neo-N~zi Terrorist Groups Interact With Arab Counterparts
(Kathleen Evin; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 13-19 Oct 80) 12
New Book Tracea~International Arme Transfer Law
(Romain Yakemtchouk; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Sep 80) 15
FEDERA;~ ~EPUBLIC C~F GERMANY
Youth Surveyed on Political, Social Attitudes ~
(Karen Andreasen; STERN, 25 Sep 80) 17
FRANCE
PCF Changes Policy: Domination of Left Main Goal
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 20-26 Oct 80)..... 2:1
. PCF Maneuvers Cost PSF, PCF Seats in National Assembly
(Michel Chamard; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 6 Oct 80) 26
-a- [III-WE-150.FOU0]
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Defense Policy Update Reviewed in Extract
(DEFENSA, Aug-Sep 80) 29
J Draft 1981 Civil Aviation Budget Presented
(AIR & COSMOS, 27 Sep 80) 36
CNES 1981 Subaidy Increased Conaiderably
(AIR ~ COSMOS, 27 Sep 80) 39
UNITED KINGDOM
Admiral Finds Soviet Naval Strength Exaggerated
(David Watts; THE TIMES, 21 Oct 80) !~0
Financial Paper Reports on New Torpedo Test Vehicle
(David Fishlock; FINANCIAL TIMES, 6 Oct 80) 42
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THEATFA NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
BRIEFS
PREELECTION DEFENSE REQUEST--Valery Giscard d'Estaing has asked that the technical
drawinga of the mobile missile that is to replace the Mirage IV after 1992, and
the apecifications for the new strategic submarines, be pzesented to him in Jan-
uary [1981J. Planned for mid-November, the defense council meeting has been put
off [until January] so as to enable the new minister of defense, Joel Le Theule,
to familiariae himself with the files involved. The president wants a11 these
queations to be studied prior to the election. [Textj [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES
in French 27 Oct 80 p 25]
CSO: 3100
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES SPAIN
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF GIBRALTAR TO NATO 'IBERLANT' DEFENSE
Madrid DEFENSA in Spaniah Aug-Sep 80 pp 26-32
[Article ty Jorge Calvar Gross, lieutenant com~nander in the Spanish Navy]
[Text) Even though we realize that history ie aubjective, we must acknowledge
that the "maritime theater of the Strait of Gibraltar" has always been of
enormous atrategic interest. In England's longstanding battle againat the
Spanish Empire, its most important victories were not, as we might believe,
againat the "Great Arn~ada" of Philip II in the Engliah Channel, or at
Trafalgar againat Napoleon and hia subordinate ally Charlea IV, but rather the
conqueat of Jamaica, located at the very center of Spain's maritime trade in
the Caribbean, and the occupation of the Rock of Gibraltar. With these two
etrategically deciaive nointa of eupport in the hands of the adversary, the
Spanieh Erapire was headed for disaster.
The Roys~.l Navy's real domination of the world's seas could be esid to have
begun wit?~ the occupation of Gibraltar.
The Straii,:
The Iberian Peninsula is located at the juncture of two axes:
--A north-south axis that makes it either a natural bridge between Europe and
Africa or a physical barrier between the two continents, depending on Spain's
_ poature;
--An east-west axis that places it astride the unavoidable strait between the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
The two axes cross at the strait, whtch for this reason takea on an importance
perhapa unequaled by any other region in the world.
In ita east-weat projection, tr~e strait's importance stems from the fact that
a powerful nation could, from its banks, control ahipping. The ability to
do this would depend on the location.of its facilities, its weaponry and ita
inatruments of detection.
' A major percentage of the world's shipping (an average of 180 veasels a day,
equivalent to 2 million tons) pasaea thrc~ugh the strait, and 95 percent of this
ahipping is among Weatern bloc natione.
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The strait hae its own personaiity, importance and significancp. It.s strategic
importance makes Spar~ish naval action in it indisgeneable. The strait is a
paseage for the rest of the world; for,Spain it is a permanent fea*_ure. This
' meana that Spain must control it, though territorial poasession should 'oe the
aim, because this could make the country a firat-rate power, as history has
, confirmed.
Every naval operation requires a specific amount of maneuvering room, and since
the atrait covers a geogrpahically tiny area, ita theater must be viewed in a
larger dimenaion from a standpoint of etrategy and tactica: from the meridian
of San Vicente in the west to the meridian of Cape La Nao in the east. Perhapa
a better deRcription would be the zone insi.ie the lines joining Cape San
Vicente and Cape Cantin in the west and Cape La Nao and Cape Tenes in the east,
a etretch of some 500 miles.
Even tnough the great influence that the land has on the sea is indisputable
given the shape of this zone, strategy in the strait must be primarily naval,
- for th~:se two rea8ons:
--The main reason is that ita function is based on sea-borne trade; ~
i
--The second is that submarinea are the main threat to this trade, whether in ~
a time of criais or duxing a nuclear holocaust itself.
Gibra.ltar
Gibraltar is a pro~lem fraught with atrategic aignificance, to the extreme that
Coday ae yesterday, this is the main reason why it is still a colony, in apite
of the UN reaolutions and Spain's legitimate claim to it.
The Gibraltsr naval 'base, with ita arsenal, airport and centralized position
on the atrait, retains enough military importance in the theater in which it
ia neatled for Great Britain to refuae to let go of this bargaining chip in
the European power struggle.
Although The Rock, in England's handa, contributes to the aecurity of NATO's
southern flank, we must acknowledge that since it lacka apace and ita own
resources, it loaes much of ita value today as a means of controlling and
dominating Che strait against the main threat poaed by submarines.
Given the modern features of theae vesaels (there are more nuclear aubmarines
than conventional onee), monitoring their passage through the atrait requires
devices inatalled in deep water, which can be done only off the eastern and
weetern acceea coasts.
At present, modern nuclear submatines can pasa completely submerged through
the Strait of Gibraltar, thus diminishing the dangers stemming from adverse
countercurrents; inertial navigation precludes errors in this situatYOn.
Underway passage is still dangerous for conventional submarines becauae the
limited capacity of their batteriea impoeea serious restrictions if they are
~1 eubjected beforehand to heavy harasament.
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Spain doea not auffer from the aforementioned limitatione in the bid to make
the atrait imgenetrable, to keep Che threat stationary in a time of criais and
to nullify it later. The southern coast of the peninsula and the excellent
complement of Al.boran, Ceuta sn~i Melilla, bolstered by the outpoata of the
Balearic and Canary Islands, offer clear atrategic su�ficiency.
A Spanish Gibraltar would obviously boost Western defense capabilities, because
its degree of effectiveness could be complemented by placing other military
facilities and aubmarine detection systema, as branches of the base, all along
the northern coast of the strait.
The very structure of NATO, with the creation of "Iberlant," whose command and
general headquartera are in Liabon, is an acknowledgement that the atrategic
control of the Atlantic begins in the western Mediterranean and vice-versa.
The fact that NATO does not refer expresaly to Gibraltar as an alliance comcnand
base or assign control of the strait Co a specific naval authority, doea not
mean that it doea not attach the higheat importance to the strait and, of
course, to The Rock.
~ The raison d'etre of NATO as a collective aecurity organization countering a
~ common threat is the establishment of a solid defense network, in which Spain
theoretically has a place. The ideal development for the defense of Iberlant
would be to have bases in the Portugal-Spain-Morocco-Atlantic islands zone.
Strategically epeaking and in the theater that we are dealing with, defer~ae
means utilizing acceases to the atrait for one's own purpoaea and preventing
them from being uaed by the enemy in wartime. To this end, we must be in a
goaition to monitor the entire zone in the event of a crisie.
If Spain were to exercise actual control over the strait, and bearing in mind
that the scope of our territory would provide wider and better coverage than
from Gibraltar alone, which is in a choked off central poaition dominated by
ite location at Spain's periphery, why would NATO be interested in owning the
Gibraltar base under these conditiona? In any event, it would be interested
in having the cooperation of the country in a poaition to control the strait
or to take charge of it at a given moment.
Threat and Current Tenaions
In order to define a etrategy we must firat specify the threat, inasmuch as
no atrategy is posaible if there is no potential enemy. How could we justify
a defenaive strategy such as NATO's if we did not spell out against whom we
have to defend ourselves?
The Britiah geopolitical scientiaC MacKinder emphasized that the universal
threat would come from the land power that could cor.trol the Heartland (the
continent of Eurasia from Germany to central Siberia), because from there it
could endeavor to dominate the World Island (the continents of Eurasia and
Africa) and then go about conquering the rest of the world.
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The Soviet Union ia obviously strivin~ ta extend and conaoliddte ite influence
around the WorZd Island. Ite envel4ping movemente along all of the coaste of
- Africa and the gtowth of its nEVa'L miglit, with a presenc:e in all oceans and
seas and even in mariCime xones thst it had not previously frequsnted, represent
a potential threat and bespeak an expansioniat policy t~hat could give rise r.~
incidents and confrontationa in crisis siLua~ions.
Given the face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the
Medit~rranean, the problem of its ~ecurity seems not so much military as
politicalr although it is currently one of the world's tenae regions,
especially frc~m a military standpoint: Spain'e very security obliges it to
play an active role ir. thia ti~eater, a role in which it must neither avoid
riska nor fail Co make uae of advantages. We live in an age in whi~_h strict
independence ia practically nonexistent.. Nonalinement has no rea~ meaning,
and it nc?rmally camouflages de facto dependence. The atrategical problema
that Spain has to face revolve around irs geographical location on the
continent of Europe, be:suae Spain is part of Europe and the West.
The pres~ence of France, the covexage that the area of couunon Spain-U.S. i
intereat provides for the entire theater, and the fl.anking presence of Italy I
as a NATO member guarantee Spain relative secur.ity., even though institution-
aY1y speaking there is no unified politico-atrategic aystem, inasmuch as
France is not a full-fledged military participant in the Atlantic Alliance,
and Spain is not a member. The United States rounda out the imperfect arrange-
- ~nent by linking up the defensive syatems of Spain and NATO.
Aside from the repercussions that future alinement in bilateral pacts,
alliances or treatiea could bring, there are a nu~her of strategic reasons
why Spain will find it very difficult to remain outaide a confrontation of
intereste that in one way or another will affect ita security and aovereignty.
Spain's Invo3vem2nt
We must recognize that the Mediterranean is no longer the European "Mare
Nostrum," since oy their skillful strategy the Sovieta have been able to take
advantage of every opportunity to bring several southern Mediterranean coastal
nations into their sphere of influence.
It is hard to imagine today that certain north African countriea could serve
as a springboard for recovering Europe, as in the last world war. It seems
mor~ likely that many of these countriea, which still bear ill will againat
tt~eir former mother countriea, would like to see Europe aubjugated. An oil
embargo and granting the USSR the air. and naval bases that Europe has been
loaing along the southern Mediterranean coast could be atrong bargaining
chipa.
But we muat view thia basin, together with the Strait of Gibraltar theater,
in another dimeneion, from thp vxewpoint of a totally new crisis, the crisis
in northern Africa, which is basically characterized by competition between
Algeria and Morocco for supremacy in the zone. Spain is already involved in
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thie crisis, in the form of diplomatic efforta and because of Algeria's
encouragement of a separatiet movement on Spanish soil, the Canary Islands.
- The eituaCion in the Canariee Archipelago hae not escaped the aharp eye of
the Soviet Union, which is purauing ita objectives in the Sahara and would
_ no doubt be pleaeed if Spain left the Canaries Archipelago, so that it could
try to install a regime favorable to its intereata and thus eiiminate the
' bothereome geopolitical barrier that the islands pose for the Sahara.
! Spain is involved in the crisis, not so much as a pasaive party to the
tension between Algeria and Morocco but rath,er as a function of its own
territorial presence and interests in the area,. ate~ing from ita sovereignty
, over Ceuta, Melilla and the aeries of rocky hills in northern Morocco.
~ Purauing ita policy of an indirect approach, Soviet strategy aima at cloaing
I the ring around Furope by aurrounding the atrait on the eouthweat. In
j accordance with ite modus operandi, some time ago it sent ita vanguard, ita
' fiahing fieet, into the Saharan Bank, followed by ocean reaearch veasels.
Now that Spain has left the Sahara, the USSR seeme to be aupporting the
~ Polisario Front through Algeria, with an eye towards securing an independent
~ Sahara, which, given the ~cant resources and level of native population there,
i would transform this desert region into a atate at the mercy of its intereats.
~ Moecow's flirtings with and asaistance to Morocco in connection with the
i
~ outfitting of the porta of Nador and Alhucemas do not seem to have yielded it
i any appreciable advantagea.
j
The Stumbling Block of Gibraltar
~ There are often cracks in the Western bloc's defense against the S~viet
~ threat, due to the contradiction between the attempt to have military
; solidarity and Che permitted divergenciea in foreign policy prompted by
~ differing or opposing national interesta.
I
j One of the problems to he debated ia the future of the Rock of Gibraltar. It
j ia vital t~ NATO today to have the rock in atrong friendly handa to guarantee
its aecurity.
, The Britiah presence in Gibraltar obviously detracts from the importance of
' Spain's geostrategic locatior. as a military bargaining chip in the Atlantic
Alliance. By turning Gibraltar into a NATO base, Great Britain has bolstered
the alliance and gained preeminence in it, at the coat of Spaniah territory.
Furthermore, England will continue to have a presence in the Mediterranean
as iong as its flag atill flies over The Rock, which could be of importance
to NATO from a naval standpoint.
For all of these reasons we can assert that Gibraltar helps Britain to
enhance its might and to achieve ita political objectives.
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If Spain were to become a full-fledged member of the Atlantic Alliance, with
which it hae only indirect tiea through the Friendahip and Cooperation Treaty
- with the United States, thPre would be no reason at all to preeerve Gibraltar's .
colonial etatus.
The pasaage of time has bolstered Britain's conviction that Tite Rock is its
permanent property. Spair,'s course of action, based mainly on negotiation,
claiming ita rights and citing the clauses of the Treaty of Utrecht, has no
direct bearing on England's reason for keeping The Rock under its control:
to maintain its eupremacy in the strategic zone around the strait.
Since Spain is not a member of NATO, we cannot give aerious thought to a
Spaniah Gibraltar, with or without its own home rule, but with s naval base -
under British command in support of its naval policy and strategy and for
joint use by NATO.
Thus, Gibraltar, a longstanding stumbling block in relations between Spain
and B~itain, is also a factor in Spain's policy toward joining NATO. ,
I
One thing is clear: without a prior return of Gibraltar, Spain's membership in ~
NATO would be tantamount to participating in an alliance that retains part ~
of Spanish territory for itself, which would implicitly entail an acceptance
of this aituation. -
Final Coneiderations
I would streas the following points in this article:
Spain's Geoetrategy
The Spaniah peninsula forms a geographical barrier off ncrthwest Africa that
is enhanced by the Balea ric and Canaries archipelagos. Because of their
atrategic location off Morocco and the Sahara, the Canaries are more'than
juet a mere outpost.
The western Mediterranean repreaente a component or extension of tiie atrategic
Atlantic theater to Spain.
Spain's dominant position by the Strai,t of Gibraltar ia a tangible reality.
The raison d'etre of Spain's military and naval strategy is the presencz and
importance of the etrait.
Gibraltar
Diplomatic negotiations and even recourae to internat~onal courta have so far
not succeeded in establishing a common basis f~r dialog with England. As lang
ae Gibraltar hasthe full operational capability of exerciaing unlimited
control over the strait, it will retain sufficient strategic importance.
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In order to negotiate with the hope of poaitive results, Sppin must act in
the knowledge that Great Britain is unquestionably unwilling to renounce,
diminish or negotiate a~aay the influence that it exerta in an area of both
~ acknowledged world atrategic importance and of essential importance for ite
own national objectivea.
The key to Spain's participation in the Western bloc is to be found in the
interplay of politicostrategic approaches. In order to take the initiative
in international relations, atrategy muat be ~he cauae and policy the
conaequence. In order to parry a foreign initiative, strategy muat be
subordinated to politics. Spain must bolster the strait region militarily.
Thie will require a reordering of priorities in the defenae budget, but it
obviously satisfies a far-reaching need for Spain's sovereignty and the
integrity of its territory.
Only when Spain has sufficient naval power to replace Great Britain in the
atrait theater and only when the British presence in Gibraltar is no longer
regarded as indispensable, wxll we be able to give aerious thought to a policy
change on the part of the United States and the other members of NATO that
is favorable to, Spain, bec:ause as Professor Olesa from the Naval War Sct?ool
quite rightly says: "Location ia inert. It bacomes important only when it is
- utilized by man and furnished with appropriate materials. It makea no aense
to strengthen our control over the aea by taking possesaion of an unavoi3able
atrait if we lack the meana needed to assert our will in it."
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defenea, S.A., Madrid 1980
8743
CSO: 3110
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THEATER NUCLEAR F'ORCES SPAIN
~
EFFECT OF NATO ADMISSION ON CSCE, U.S. DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
Madrid DEFEN~A in Spanish Aug-Sep 1980 pp 90-92
[Text] Within the polemic discussion arising from the publication by DEFENSA of
its survey concerning whether Spain should enter NATO or not, high points in
whiCh were the statements by Defense Miniatar of Foreign Affairs Marcelino Ore~ a,
- the president of the Congress of neputies, Landelino Lavilla, and other leading
individuals, some of them foreigners, two articles published in the Madrid daily
EL PAIS by 4uthorized party members, one representing the government and the other ~
the main opposition party--Javier Ruperez and Enrique Mugica Herzog,
respectively--should be stressed. ~
, Javier Ruperez, ~aho is a DemocraCic Center Union (UCD) deputy for Cuenca and
UCD secretary for .foreign relations, wrote among other things:
"Between pure and simple falhcy and more or less ob~ ective conventional wisdom,
groups with a special interest or which are merely naive have tried to cloud the
calm needed for discussion with the black ink of simplistic charges.
"Setting the fallacy aside,the conventional wiedom says that Spain`s entry into
NATO would seriously alter the delicate balance we enjoy today. Let us not
deceive ourselves nor let ourselves be deceived: all the geographic territory
covered by Spanish sovereignty is accepted by a11 parties as a geographic area
defined as potentially friendly or possibly inimical, in a definition which in
cause and effect atill fails to take the full participation of the Spanish people
and their repreaentative organs into account,
"A dispassionate examination of the real andpsychological data which make up the
atatue quo today shows with blinding clarity that there would be no upset in the
balance if Spain decided to assume, as an active agent, the right of participation
which falla to it in a system of responsibilities in which we are serving today
as a mere passive ob~ect.
"For conventional wisdom also sees as axiomatic, and this is more serious, the
risk of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia in the event tha t Spain enters NATO. -
Iz is obvious that what happens in Xugoslavia, and I personally want and hope for
it to be nothing other than what is freely wanted and accepted by the Yugoslav
people themselves, will certainly occur without our decisions or our future being
able to affect it.
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"There ia no lack of thoae who assert a claim which threatens to become
conventional wisdom, to the effect that the European security and cooperation
conference scheduled ro be held in Madrid would be seriously compromiaed in its
development and its tesulta by a Spaniah decision to ~oin NATO. It would be well
to remember here that the text of the Final Heleinki Act itae lf recognizes 'the `
right Co participate or not in alliance treaties,' that in agreeing that Madrid -
would be tt~e eite of the conference, neither did the particip anta impoee nor of _
courae did the government accept any kind of conditions as to the goale sad pur-
poses of our foreign policy; that the success or failure of the conference can
never mean the succeas or failure of the host country, but rather of the 25
participating atatea; and finally, tt?at the events which migh t stand in the way
. of ths success of the conference occurred in dramatic fashion very far from our
. frontiere and in a way completely alien and radically opposed to our will, our
convictions, our interests, and the interests of the CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] itself.
"To claim that our defensive needs in cooperation with the West are sufficiently
covered by our bilateral relations with the United States meana forgetting in an
almoet reprehensible fashion all the ob~ections many of ufs have made against
some treaties which, invalidated by the times in which they were concluded,
require profound review within the context of equal rights and responaibilities
which has not existed aince 1953, and which would be difficult to achieve outside
the multilateral context which the Atlantic alliance offers."
At the opposite extreme, Enrique Mugica, political relations secretary of the
Spanieh Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), a PSOE deputy for Guipuzcoa and vice
president of the defense commission of the Congress of Deputies, said;
"In our opposition to NATO, we cannot be accused of unaccept able motivations.
Spain is not tied to any Third World movement, increasingly divided, since it is
a psrt of Western Europe by conviction and will, to an instit utional environment
whiGh has to be maintained, because only through it can liberty preside over the
unmictakable path of justice. ~y e~cterior aggression agains t this area would
come up against our oppoaition, because we defend oursE:lves in defending it. But
thie means above all preventing the conditions for possible aggression, which
involves suetaining the status quo which itself, within ita framework, does not
prevent the balance of forces from tipping one way at one moment and being re-
" eatablished the next, which would be problematical if a country such as ours, of
confirmed economic value and military potential, were to enter NATO. Imagine the
levels tenaion would reach! The Soviet response with a view to distorting the
direction of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era or any other, coxuiected with what is
happening in Africa and the Middle East, would pose an imminent threat to peace.
"But the statue quo would not be destroyed however if the treaty with the United
States were renegotiated on an equalitarian basis, if agreements and cooperation
were arranged with European countries, if an international ro le were undertaken -
with a free hand, all of this to the benefit of our interests and the atrengthen-
ing of our armed forces, which we want to be powerful in order to carry out their
constitutional duties, ready to defend the free institutions in which European
peoples recognize their identity, and ennobled so that on mis sions of peace, the
'Spanish flag--integrated in the United Nations--can guarantee security in any
" part of the world.
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"What is needed is sufficient imagination to plan for autonomy of decision in
defense, without detriment to Che necessary coordination.
"Does membership in NATO encourage entry into the EEC? One would have to ask
r
Portugal, which has belonged to the alliance since its founding, but which shares
the present dilemma with us.
"Are we assured recovery of Gibraltar? It would be illusory to ask the question of
the British, just as we are certain they would not contribute to the defense of
Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands either because they are outside their range
of interest. However, there is a question which should be of concern. Why is it
that a ma~ority of the officers in our armed forces were not in favor of the
alliance when polled by tlie periodical DEFENSA? And there is a certainty which
confirms our position: in the FGR, where communism has not succeeded in winning
even 1 percent of the votes, only 20 percent of those questioned in a survey made
by the Social Studies Institute of that nation's army expressed full confidence in
NATO.
"Should its fervent aupporters refler_t a bit further?"
_ EL PAIS itself, in an editorial in which it focused on the subject of whether or ~
not Spain should 3oin NATO within the framework of American-Spanish relations, ~
wrote a few days later:
"The prospects in our relations with the United States have not changed only
because of the advent of democracy in Spain, but becalise of the birth of this
'Euroneutralism' detected by Brzezinski, and to some extent materi.~lized in the
incipient and indicative Paris-Bonn axis. Just as the very concept of the Common
Market, the dream of a united Europe, is now in a phase of neceasary redefinition,
the concept of Atlantic loyalty, of the political and military solidarity of the
West contrived during th~ first co'ld war is now being reworked.
"Our govern~nent, moreover, although it has to draft a plan of national defense, in
which the weak points are the Canary Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar, the
Baleares Islands and Ceuta and Mililla. The renewal of the treaties of friendship
and cooperation with the United States cannot fail to take into account the
definite support of Hassan II by Washington and its abstention on the Gibraltar
question. Finally, a new plan for an understanding between the United States and
Spain cannot continue to be based on some reciprocal exchanges of military bases
and certain credit and surplus war materiel. The trade aspects, our chronic
trade deticit with the United States, the maintenance of our diplomatic inde-
pendence with the Latin American countries, the support they need in terms of
technology and research and even the functioning in Spain of the United States
secret .services, very active when it comes to revealing Soviet agents, real or
imagined, but nonexistent when it comes to the prevention and destruction of the
terrorism from which we suffer, must be taken into account."
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. Madrid 1980
5157
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
, 1-
~
IZEO-NAZI TERRORTST GROUPS INTERACT WITEI ARAB COUNTERPARTS
~ Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 13-19 Oct 80 p 50
[Article by Kathleen Evin: "The Cypriot Connection"]
(Text] Ties between French neo-nazis and Arab terrorist organizationa have existed
for a long time.
The entrance on the scene of a mysterious Cypriot motorcyclist [motarde] in the Rue
. Copernic affair seems to have been enough for certain persons, with obvious relief,
to separate the extreme right from possible responsibility for the act of violence,
as Cqprus is reputed to be the base of Arab terrorism against the West. That is
twt tel,l~.ng the whole story b}* a long shot. As a matter of fact, an advanced love
a$P$~ I~s eacisted Por a long time between a number of French groups of the extreme
xight and Arab terrorist organizations.
The summex o~ 1976: Lebanon, torn by a civil war which is as murderous as it is
incoherent, is agonizing. Among the dead and the combatants of the two sides
thexe ~xe a fe~r foreigners, mercenaries or ideologues who have come here to pursue,
_ by otFLer means and under other skies, a battle which they judge to be too stifled
in their own countries. ~n the ranks of Camille Chamoun's Christian militia there
is a handful of Frenchmen. They are all acquainted with one another: former
legionnaires cast off by the OAS jSecret Army Organization], young "hardliners"
f~om the Nationalist Revolutionary Groups (GNR) of Francois Duprat, who have come
here to put their theories to the test of fire, extremists of. the New Forces
Party (PFN) for wIzom the mere emotions of electoral "wall postering" were not
enough. M~ost of them, before rallying to Lebanon~ paesed through Cyprus, a
privileged place betwe~;n the East and West, which the secret services, arms
txaffickers and extremists o� all kinds have chosen to carry out their complementary
activities. In the following September, moreover, three men--who were less adroit
or more annoying than the others--were arrested in Cqprua for arms trafficking:
Yves Van Ghele and his two friends are members of the PFN. And Christian Bonnet
knowa very well that two members of the French police took advantage of their
vacations to put their ideas at the end of a rifle on the side of Beirut through
the same connection.
Within the PFN, which was established after the May 1974 presidential election by
old handa of New Order--thanks to the subsidies which they received entirely
officially for having "materially" assured the proper conduct of the Valery
Giscard d'Estaing campaign--all are :~o longer satisfied, in fact, with a"trend
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toward a middle class outlook" and with a"legalism" which are not even bringing
the expected political and electoral rewards. The most extreme, powerless
individuals do not wish to witness the rise of a lef t which is consolidating its
breakthrough during the elections. The~ found an ideologue in the person of
Francois Duprat, founder of the GNR who, particularly in "Review of the History
of Fasciam" calle for the implementation of a"strategy a la Chile," designed to
switch the country from the side of zhe "parties of order." Three ob~ectives ~~re
then offered: the esCablishing of a structure of "activists," the training of a
"combat group" and the setting up of a"war chest," all of which is in antici-
pation of the day in the near future when the "nationalists" will have to take
action.
For a "Strategy of Tension"
A program caxried out on the whole. From 1976 to 1978, the police experienced a
xecrudescence of activity within the extreme right: international contacts
increased, arms and explosives circulated and, above all, money collected. In
the principal foul crimes of that period (the kidnapping of Louis Hazan, the
Dassault-de Vatfiaire affair, the "break-in" at the Nice General Company...),
the extreme right was physically present. However, on every occasion the possible
palitical iznpl~.cations of these incidents reportedly were denied by the government.
I
j
The yeax~ 1978 marked a watershed in this atrategy: on 18 March, Francois Duprat
died in an explosion o� his boobytrapped autamobile. This was a job done by
professionals the perpetrators of which, for the friends of the victim and the
police alike, sFwuld rather be sought within th,e extreme right itself. Having
been made orphans, those of the GNR approached a small group established in 1966
which in the interim hac.fallen into a quasi comatose state, the Federation for
National and European Action (FANE), headed by Marc Fredriksen. It was Michel
Faci, wIw had been questioned by the police and arrested several times for theft,
caxrying and possessing w~apons, who brought the survivors of "Duprat's group" to
th.e FANE. As Fredriksen's right hand man, he has since been his principal driving
~ozce. In a report issued in July 1980, the RG jexpansion unknown] stated, "Since ~
that time (1978), whicii marks an important stage in its existence, the movement
was pazticularly active, both in our territory and abroad." Since then, the
police know that within the FANE activists are advocating movement to "direct
action." While waiting until the time is ripe, they "will content themselves"
~tith assaults and small acts of violence