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APPRdVE~ FdR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000300060002-0 . ~ ~ . . . . ~ ~ . LC ~ . i~ R~ i~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ 'i. i' i ~i Y ~ - . ~ ~ . . ~ ~~';i_ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFIC[t.L USE ONLY JPRS L/9421 ~ 1 December 1980 ~ _ st Eur~o e Re ort We p p (~OUO 50/80) - FBO~ FO~EIGN BROADCAST IN~ORMATION SERVIC~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 - NOTE JPRS publications cor~tain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also froR~ news agency transmissions and b:oadcasts. Materials from foreign-language - sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. - Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied b}~ JPRS. Processing i~dicators such as [Text) _ or ~Excerptj in the first line of each item, or following the - last line of a briet, indicate how the original information was proc~ssed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in Farentheses. Wor3s or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the ~ original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. = COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF ' MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION ~ OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE O~iLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - JPRS 7G/9421 1 December 1980 ~ WEST EUROPE REPORT _ - (FOUO 50/80) CONTENTS COUNTRY SECTION FINLAND Korhonen Discusses Country's Goals for Madrid GSCE Conference (Kei~o Korhonen; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 25 Oct 80) 1 FRANCE GERDSM Studies, Refines ASW Techniqu~es ~ (Jean Mitault; ARMEES D'AUJOURD`HITl, Sep 80) 9 ASW Rapid Detection, Countermeasure Methods Explained (Jerome Denavit; ARNiEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Sep 80) 13 New Aspects of Aerial Electronic Warfare (Jean-Ma.rie d,e Carpentier; ARMEES D'A.UJOURD'HUI, Sep 80) 24 ITALY ` , Forlani I7iscloses New Government's Economic Program (IL SOI,E-24 OAE, 23 Oct 80) 30 Text of Proposed Legislation for Aid to Chemica'1 Industry (IL SOLE-24 ORE, 22 Oct 80) 39 SPAIN Government, Politicsl Party Programs To Combat Unemployment (CANIDIO, 5 oct 80) 49 ~ - a - [ III - WE - 150 .FOUO] - r+~n ~r. ~rrt~-- � rOr nAt~ v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ COUNTRY SECTION FINLAND _ KORHONEN DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S GOALS FOR MADRID CSCE CONFERENCE Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 25 Oct 8Q pp 625-634 /Article by Dr Keijo Korhonen, undersecretary of state for political affairs at the Finnish Ministry of Foreign affairs, from September 1976 to May 1977 foreign minis- - ter in the government headed by P.rime Minister Martti Mietttuten:"The Madrid CSCE Con- ference as a Challenge ta Neutral Finland"I /Text/ The Madrid CSCE /Conference on Security and Cooperation in EuropE/ cannot be dealt with as an isolated event; we m~st consider it in its historic context. Ten years ago European modern political history passed through a significant period. In the ,years 1970-1973 the proceas of settling the heritage of World War II had some - noticeable results: Treaties were signed between Bonn and Moscow, Bonn and Warsaw; the Four-Power Agreement on Berlxn stabilized and clarified the status of the city, - ~nd the basic treaty was concluded by the two German states. At the same time it was agreed to begin arms limitation talks in Vienna. These general developments were coupled with the effort to organize a conference on - security and cooperation in Europe. This concept, initially markadly "Ea~tern," re- ceived definite impetus in spring 1969. At that time the Finnish Government defined its attitude to the pxoposal. Finnish opinion held that the concept of the confer- ence was to be backed with the proviso that it should be well prepared and all the governments involved attend. In May 1969 the Finnish Government proposed thst, *aith the consent of the governments involved, a preparatory meeting should take place in Helsinki. Following long drawn-oat and difficult talks the regresentatives of 35 governments met in November 1972 in DipoZi near Helsinki. '~his meeting in turn led to the first CSCE at foreign minister level in summer 1973. The next 2 years passed with negotiatiQ,ns in Geneva, and in late July/early August 1975 the conference of senior representatives of the countries responsible for Europe :net in Helsinki. - At the end the Helsinki final act was signed. The Helsinki Final Act From the Finnish Standpoint Considered after the event, the 1975 final act was a genuine achievement. Now that the general conditioa of international affairs with respect zo campror.:ise and media- tion has deteriorated, we would be well advisEd to recall that which was achieved S years ago, On the one hand the Helsinki final act settled the political legacy of World War II and thus served as a kind of substitute for the still outstanding peace treaty. On the other it became the basic document.of international behavior relating to Europe and, at the same time, provided a framework for the peaceful ~ 1 . ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 - cooperation of the European countries. In all postwar histoYy we cannot find a con;parable example of success by a11 the governments responsible fnr Europe for at a negotiated result which could justly claim the description peace po- licy. That which now appears to us logical and inevitable was actually the consequence of thorough and painstaking effort. The basic prerequisite for the realization of the final act was careful diplomatic preparation which--in the case of Geneva alone-- lasted for some 2 years. The work required a tremendous amount of patience, readi- ness to compromise and the wish to acknowledge facts as they are. Both sides had to be ready at all times to accept the premise that the real basis of negotiations was represented by the national interests of the countries involved. These, even by definition, compete with and differ from one another. In the cour~e of the = negotiations there was occasion to empnasize that the governments involved were mainly responsible for the talks and the result. Admittedly, all these efforts w~re backed at th e time by a favorable international atmosphere conducive to cooper- ation. " The Helsinki final act makes little sense unless we remember that it is a diplamatic document by the governments involved and, in essence, represents the sum of care- fully balanced results and compr.omises. A~ the natioaal :nterests of the various governments differed, tre advantage of one was often a concession by the other, and vice versa. It seems to me that tnis basic fact was insufficiently stressed in the discussion following, especially in recent years. Nevertheless,the outstanding fea- - turE~ of the Einal act is compromise, and that is the key for understanding its ap- plicability. A b alanced whole was created from the final act by difficult diplomat- ic labors lasting many years--and only thus could it be made viable. Evident advantages arose from the rea~ization of the final act for the national in- terPSt of Finlanu which is outside ~11 military alliances and pursues neutrality. From Finland's standpoint it was an advantage that a comprehensive acc~~rd had been realized, which included the mosc important principles affecting European security. It must be accounted an achievement that ali governments involved participated in t!'!is consensus, in other words a1.1 the countries which, compelled by the facts, are responsible for the security of Europe and the success of European cooperation. db- viously this does not concern only countries which are geographically European, it also affects the United States and Canada, though they' are located outside Europe. The Helsinki final act immensely strengthened yuropean political sta~ility and the status quo in Europe, and that t:aturally responds to Finnish interests. Moreover, all elemer.ts of cooperation which are progressive and also flexible must--from the Finnish standpoint- -be judged potentially beneficial. It has been characteristic of the policy of the Finnish Government that the develop- ment of. security and cooperation in Euror~e was considered a long-term process. From the Finnish aspect thi~ involves constant contacis, thP maintenance of constant ne~otiations and a constant dialog. This process has a broad topical as well us a lang temporal dimension in the form of consecutive events, meetings and special con- ferences. It is character istic for Finland's mF:ntal~ty to cons?der such affairs frum a long-term aspect. Finla.nd zs aware that the development of security in Europe and the advarce of European cooperatian are issues requiring a great deal of - time, a~~d it understands that they also call for much patience. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONi,Y ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The final act was never thought of as.cor:clusive. The assumption of constart fur.rh- er advances is linked to it both structurally ~r.d textually. The potential pursuit, appraisal and analysis of the overall development of events in Eurone is therefore an integral part of the procesa. Just as the Belgrade Conference of 3 years ago the - Madrid Conference ~s necessary to keep alive the dialog and the negotiations. The temporal dimension of the development of security and cooperation in Europe con- - fronts us with tl-.e quection whether it might not be possible more meaningfully to organize this process and better strt=cture it without adopting unnecessarily cumber- some institutional stel~s. It would be appropriate thuroughly to think out this is- sue at the Madrid Conference. It was an essential feature of the final act that, in a certain sense, it related to - - states, in other words that it was realized by the sovereign states of Europe rather � tiian by groups of states. This has sometimes been criticized as and ur.real- istic. Nevertheless it is entirely logical: It signifies recognition of the variety of peoples in Europe and the range of European cultural phenomena as the wealth of Europe. We are certainly not using an empty phrase by stressing that the 1975 Helsinki final act was an agreemznt among sovereign and indepenc.ent European coun- tries, not among power blocs or ~conomic associations. From the beginning some difficulties beset the Helsinki final act. The apparently - greatest wa~ that of arousing undue and even false expectations. If too much is ex- - pectPd of any event, howe~~er important, nonfulfillment is liable to produce irrita- tion, and this in turn weakens one of the crucial prerequisites for further progress� An affirmative atmosphere. A second weakness, more or less inherent in CSCE, is its international linkage. After all, the final act affects "ail gcvernments re.- sponsibla for the security of Europe." This scope inevitably links Et~ropean devel- opment with that of the international sup~rpowers. At times when relations between them ar~ tense and insecurity general this global linkage means that rhe entire Europeun process is wlnerable. Recent months have furnished many examples. It i~ another intrinsic weakness of the final act that a voluminous document, the result of well balanced compromises, offers tempting possibilities for us~ as a - pnlitical weapon for ephemeral purposes. Insr.ead of noting the preliminar~ defects in the implementation of the final act it would be more useful with resgect to the CSCE to ask what has so far been achieved, As in every political process achieve- ment is ttie onZy proper criterion by which to judbe the value of the CSCE. On ttie ottier hand the achievement can be appraised only against the background of t}~e starting point and by taking into account the time factor. Human rights ar2 an excellent example. The diplomats who had labored in Geneva for 2 years were well - aware that they were building a kind of verbal bridge. Everybody reaL zed that dif- ferences in interprPtation were inevitable. The causes are self-evident and relate to past history. Western cultural tradition interprets human rights mainly as the ~ liberation �rom something, the protection of the individual against the arbitrary power of society, explicitly the protecti~n of the individual against the state. - ~astern political culture in the modern socialist countries interprets human rights (on the basis of a strong historical heritage) as righ ts to something, such as the right to work, medical care and education; these are ultimately granted at the dis- cretion of the state. 1fi is dichotaray of interpretations is inescapable and profound; we cannot possibly escape it. 3 FOR OFFiCTAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 For politicaJ. practice it is after all decisive that the Helsinki final act is a document produced by 35 gove.~rnments and its application and intCrpretation therefore ~ ~ up to thuse gove:nments. The result of the Helsinki fin~l act and ir.deed the en- tire CSCE prucess is sometimes criticized in the West European discussion. It woi,ld be only appropri.ate to remember that each year and month of peace in Eur~pe is an achievement, and so is eacr dimension of increasing economic cooperation and mutual dependence--especially when it transcends the limits of the various so- cial systems--, moreover each expansion of human contacts and co:nmunications, each reunited family. What has taker. place in Europe is a positive development although, - c~f course, this is not due only to tt;e CSCE. Conversely, while it is not possible to identify the CSCE related development as such in isolation of other developments, _ w~ may well ask whetiier life in our part of the globe would not be far more peri- lous and difficult without the CSCE process. - Expectations Regarding Disarmamen.*. and Security 1'he considerations cited here largely determine the expectations harbored in Fir:- land with respect to Madrid. On the other hand we do not want to be either foolish- ly optimistic or unduly credulous regarding the future of our Continent. Finland is a northern country and champions the status quo in Europe. As far as we are concerned the process causing us the greatest anxiety at this time is the steadily increasing quantitative and qualitative xearmament in Europe. In particular the new technical dimensions of the arms race and the new and dil too noticeable qualitative standard arouse new and unprecedented misgivings. From the conceptual an~le alone this make.:, "crisis management" even more difficult and hazardous, because this part of the wor.ld is the most highly armed region on earth ancl will cuntinue to be so. Not to mention that, despite the ongoing European - _ disarmaMent and Arms control talks, no adequate ~:ounterpoiae to the rearmament trand is discernible. At the negatiations about the Helsinki final act a consensus was achieved on a, - brieF but significant appraisal of disarmdment relating to this part of the world. As this p~ssage ten:~s to be auoted far ~r,ore rarely than many other section~ of. tlie final act, it may be rewarding to cite it verbatim. In the first bas~:et (issues af security in Europe) of the final act the military measures to build confidence are followed b;r section II, "issues relating to disarmament." It reads as follows: "The participating countries acknowledge their common intFrPst in efforts to lessen the military confrontation and encourage disarmament, directed at complementing po- litical detente in Europe and strengthening its security. They are convinced ot the necessity to adopt effective measures in these fields, which--by their extent and nature--will represent steps for ultimately achieving general and cotaplete dis- - armament ;aith strict and effective international supervision, and which are to resulC in strengthening peace and security in the world ds a whole." - Subsequently section III, "general reflections," reiterates some principles which the participating countries promise to uphold when pu�rsuing tre stated goals. These include the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of securi.ty, respect for the security of all states participating in the CSCE, which represents = p~rt of kheir sovereign equality. It is also in the i~nterest of each country parti- cipatin,; in the CSCE by suitable means and at the appropriate level to obtain infor- mation about ongoing di~armament talks, and these countries tiave a right to expect _ their views to be taken into account. ' - 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064402-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY When the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Caoperation in Europe approved the ab~ve passage.of the final act, they accQpted a.specific role in view of t~:e disarmament and arms c~ntrol neRotiations touching upon Europe: A kind of follow-up activity. Ttie Finnish Government holds that it might be one of the tasks of the forthcomin~; Madrid Conference to continue the follow-up activities on this basis, in other words to pursuF the di:cussicn ~n the progress achieved in :he disarmament talks. This Finnish opinion was indicated (in connection with the disarmament talks) in the first committee of the U.N.General Assembly in autumn 1979 (A/C.1/34/PV.9). The Finnish Government assumed that multilateral and comprehensive taiks on disarm- , ament in Europe could take place in any chosen forum, but that the Madrid Congress would afford the best opportunity. After its latest contacts with the other govern- ments involved the Finnish Government has arrived at the conclusion that, for most people, the CSCE process would indee~ be the natural context of such follow-up activity. For that concept the Finnish Government is using the working term disarmament pro- ~ gram for Europe," but this term should not be ~~sed inflexibly. My government thinks it would simply be desirable and necessary to have a kind of clearing house talks o,i this topic and multilaterally as well as comprehensively deal with th.e present _ status of Curopean disarmament negotiations and arms control generally. To be aimed for in this case would be a consensus on tlie principles to be pursued, ~iie metliuds and approaches to bP used as well as the areAS to be considered in all onRo- _ ing nnd possibly future disarmament negotiations relating to Europe. Fvidently re- l~vant here are the quoted statements of the final act on the acquiaitiun of infor- mation and the consideration of the views of all countries involved in tlie Confer- ence on Security and Coopera~ion. Rearmament in Europe and European disarmament af- fect all CSCE countries, but niany of these are not involved in the disarmament r.e- gotiations, however much they may concern their own fate. Of course the CS~.;E talks should not prejudice the current disarmametit negotiations. Finland hopes for every possible success of all these negotiations, especially the SALT talks and the Vienna negotiations on arms limitation. A multilateral approach to the issues should encourage, not hinder settlement. Obviously mere demonstra- tions and declarations cannot advance the settleinent of such sensitive issues which directly touch upon the security of each country. The Finnish Government has pursued this realistic appr_oach whenever talks have been conducted about a European disarmament program. On the one hand France, backed by many West European couritries, on the other the socialist countries of Europe have lately submitted proposals for the convocation of a special European disarmament = conference. The Finnish Govei�nment welcomes tt?is idea as such and hopes that an ap- propriate agreement by the governments concerned will emerge as soon as possible. At the same time Finnish opinion holds that, in the present situation in particular, tl~e road to the convocation of a disarmament conference is agt to be long and stony. The Madrid CSCE negotiations should encourage this process. In the Finnish view - ti~e comprehensive clearing house talks about the general principles and guidelines of a European disarmament program (cited earlier) may represent a necessary--even indispensable--element of the process to implement the concept of a European disarm- ament conference. 5 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 The follow-up work ta be done at th~ 3isarmament negotiations in connection with . the United Nations--iierE I remind of the work in the Geneva ciisarmament committec~ - as well as and in particular the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly--, is considered by the vast majority of the world's population to be a legitimate and ir.- _ diapensable element of the global disarmament process, though it~ weaknesses are - - full well known. I~ is therefure ~uite logical that we need a paral.lel follow-up forum for Eur~pe, tile most heavily armed region of the world. The CSCE process is the most obvious. The Finn?.sh Government does not intend to forget one of the basic concepts of ttie - - Helsinki final act: lfiat there is a reciprocal balance between the various elen~ents and various baskets, and that the final act represents a~,?hole. It does not intend to propose that the disarmament talks should dominate the Madrid Conference. How- ever, such talks should have the status appropriate to them in the work of the con- ference, if for no ~ther reason than that, xn Finnish opinion, the problems rele- vant to Europe witli regard to the arms race have become really urgent in the past few years. - On the Procedure of the Madrid Confereace - As to the Madrid Conference in general, Finland consider~ it crucial to observe on the one hand the long-term aspects described by me at the beginning of this article as inherent in the process, and on the other the circumstance that the CSCE negotia- tiozis ::ire ~iot an isolated event but ar. integral part of the general international _ situ~tion. Jiist now when keeping free the channels of international communications ha~ become both harder and ;nor~ impcrtant, the CSCE may serve to keep contacts aiive. We are quitc justified in claiming that, regardless of the sexious differences between _ national interests, it is in the best interest of any CSCE country to be concerned aUout the continuing piirsuit of the CSCE proces~ and even in the most difficult pos- sible situation to see to it that this continuity is not lost. The "worst case ana- lysis" of eventualities in regard to the Madrid Conf~rence--interesting for purely theoretical reasons--would still mean that the Madrid Conference should at least be able to arrive at a decision about its own succession and thereby the continuation of the CSCE process. Tlie 1977-1978 CSCE Conference in BelQrade has been much cri.ticized, and not wirhauC justification. Still, the result was not so poor as assumed early on, under the - impression of inflated expectations. Nor should we forget that we may reap in Madrid reap the full benefit of the lessons learned in Belgrade. At least we know _ very well that the mistakes possibly made in Belgrade are not to be repeated in Madrid. ~n immense volume of new proposals (~nore than 100) was submitted in the course oi - the Belgrade Conference. Many involved important and significant ideas, But tile - sheer. weight of numbers in Bzlgrade was too great for tr~em to be dealt with in any meanins~Eul manner within the time available. Moreover it turned out to be a major obstacle that no cut-off date had been set for the submission of new proposals, ~o that some were tabled as late as the very end of the conference. 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is the view of the Finnish Government that this mistake should not be repeated. - In fact it is vi*_ally necessacy for the proposals to be submi~ted to be as concen- _ ~ trated and far reaching as possible. Also they ahould be actively backed by more _ - than one participating country at the time of submiasion. We should try severely to limit new proposals. It woulct be mast desirable for the major proposals to be submitted in the initial stage of the conference; if at all possible by a specific date. The Finnish Government, for its part, is prepared to adapt to this kind of ;~rocedure and plan its own pruposals accordingly. The discussion on imple~entation will be the one most sensitive in politicaL terms. It is evident that the spirit and tExt of che Relsinki final act and the entire nature of the CSCE process presumes an open and free discussion on the. succ~ss - - achieved by the respective governments in implementing the decisions of the final act. However, the sub;ect matter ar.d tena.rof the discussion must be kept at a - level of moderation and the facts appreciated. I do not believe that the national interest of a single CSCE country is served if the discussion is handled merely as a propaganda weapon, the use of which is dictated by the current international situ- ation. On the contrary, it is bound to be in the general interest that the discus- sion of the implementation of security and cooperation in Europe is carried on while bearing in mind both long-term benefits and common goals. At the same time I would like to stress that, in the opinion of the Finnish Govern-- _ ment, the critical discussion on the implementation of the final act should certain- ly not be restricted, let alone prevented, in Madrid. However, as we are dealing with a conference of 35 sovereign governments, we must appreciate that, from its own standpoint, each government is the only competent suthority to decide and accept responsibility for the implPmentation of the final act. It would therefore be de- - sirable for the discussion of the implementation to be mainly a kind of clarifica- tion af attitudes on the basis of independently initi.ated "challenges." It is con- ceivable that each government may preaent a written summary of the implementing pro- cess as carried eut in its country, and that this document serve as a starting point for the subsequent discussion, although it certainly should not limit it. On the Role of the Neutral and Nonaligned Countries Participating in the CSCE As early as the negotiations preceding the 1975 conference and, in particular, during the Geneva working session, it became customary for the neutral countries of - Europe in their bilateral consultations to discuss the issue of the organization and procedure of the conference and later--together with the nonal.igned countries--the question of the agenda also. Z'his cooperation between the nEUtral and nonaligned - countries has groFm into a vital and beneficial element of the CSCE process. The nonaligned countries (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Liechten- stein, San Marino, Cyprus and Malta) each pursue rather different defense policies and, given their political and geographical location, find tl:emselves in very dif- fer~2nt situations. Common to them is the fact that they are not part of any mili- - tary alliance and that, consonant with their interests, they endeavor to mediate and arbitrate any conflicts. The Finnish Government holds that cooperation between the neutral and nonaligned countries should benefit the totality of the Madrid Conference. Of course this is not mc~ant to imply the establishment of a new political bloc in Europe--such an ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 idea would be 2.bsurd because the differences between the.countries concerned are far - too great. It is our intention, however, that the respective countries should--inso- far ds the situation allows--jointly ~onsider how best t~ serve the conference in its search for a consensus. Obviously the neutral and nonaligned countries cannot ~ obligate themselves to achieving a joint neutral and nonaligned recommendation in every circumstance and on every topic. However, the steady maintenance of contacts between these countries hR~ already assumed the nature of a f irm trad ition. Fin- land will of course continu~ to be involved. It has also turned out to be useful that the four neutral European countries-- Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland--werE in touch with each oth er from time - to time concerning issues affecting the problems of security and cooperation in Europe, both in order to exchange information and comments. For Fin land this type _ of cooperation is as much a matter of caurse as the fact that the neu tral countries = of Europe do not a:pire to represerit a third European power concentration. At this point let us note that the Nordic countries within the CSCE are anoth er natural point of reference for us, which will be operative in Madrid also. Among the subatantive issues dealt with by the neutral and nonaligned countries those measures which promote confidence already loomed large in earlier CSCE phases. The total concept of ineasures for promoting confidence as known in connection with security and cooperation arose as a kind of byproduct of the disarmament talks during the CSCE preparatory stages; however, this infant conceived more or less accidentally has turned out to be rather lusty. Despite their relative modesty the results achieved by the final act with respect to measures to promote confidence are genuine. It is to be expected that the neutral and nonaligned c ountries wi.ll be specially interested in the further advance of the measures to promote confidence at the Madrid Conference alsc~. If at all possible they will submit joint and real- istic proposals on this topic, which might well be approved by the major military powers. It is too early yet to comment on the problem involved in Che textual and action-related relation of the measures i;o promote confidence within the CSCE pro- cess to those measures to promote confidence cited by FRance in particular in its - proposals on the convocation of a European disarmament conference. Th e measures suggested may in part be the same, some may be entirely differEnt. Differences may also emerge in the philosophy of the measures for promoting confidence. These are issues which, in the opinion of the Finnish Government, shou ld be dea lt with in a multilateral context and, above all, within the frameworic proposed by Finland for the concept of a European disarmament program_ - COPYRIGHT: 1980 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn 11698 - CSO: 3103 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFIC7AL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE ' _ GERDSM STUDIES, REFINES ASW TECHNIQUES Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 80 pp'48-49 ~Article by Naval Engineer Admiral Jean Mitault*~ - ~Text~ The special wanships used in ASW jantisubmarine warfare)~ must be ` armed with effective weapons systems capable particularly of detecting an enemy submarine, ~.o~~tifying it, determining its position and speed, _ displaying the elements needed for a cormnand decision, and in the last analysis carrying out the action of the final attack. - The ASW Group of the STCAN ~Technical Service for Naval Construction and Ordnance~, which comes under the DTCN CTechnical Directorate for Naval Construction~,is directly respor~sible for the conducting of stuclies, development and fabrication of ~1SW equipment. In this task it relies for , support on specialized stuc~y:organiaations set up within and outside the arsenals of: - --the GERDSM tUnderwater Detection Studies and Research Grou ~ of the Toulon DCAN ~Directorate for Naval Construction and Ordnance~, whose specialty is underwater detection; --the GESMA ~Atlantic Underwater Studies Group~ of the Brest DCADI, whose activities are devo ted entirely to mine warfare; *Having entered the Ecole Polytechnique in 1947 and graduated from the Ecole Nationale Superieure du Genie Maritime in 1953,~ Naval Engineer Ac7miral Jean Mitault has devotQd much of his career to weapons and weapons sys~ems. He has participated in numerous programs (Malafon, Masurca, Mer Mer 38, Crotale Naval) as engineer in charge of studies, plans or testing. For 7 years he headed the Atlantic Underwater Studies Group. 5ince 1976 he has headed the ASW Group of the Technical Service for Naval Constructien and Ordnance. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300064402-0 ~ ~ 1'Vl\ VL'lLI~lAL UJL' Vl\L1L - --the "studies" subdirectorate of the Saint-Tropez ECA1N ~expansion = unknown~, devoted to the full range of studies relating to torpedoes. - - We shall try te provide an idea of the activities of these organizations from the stanc7point of one of them: the GERnSM. _ An Entire Studies Organization Dedicated to Underwater Detection _ Created in 1946, the GERDSM is located a few kilometers east of Toulon. Its installations are situated just outside the little port of Brusc in a pine forest on the southern shore of the Sicie Peninsula. First of all it orients and conducts studies on sound propagation, on ocean noises and those produced by the ship itself, on signal Processing and on electroacoustical systems. When these studies, which are of an ongoing nature and seek to respond to long term general needs, have react,ed a sufficiently advanced stage, it becomes necessary sometimes, before dec;iding to pu!: out a new operational - equipment, to go through an intermediate stage called "exploratory devel- opment," which includes the design and testing of a maquett.e or ~f an experimental prototype ttiat is very close to being an operational madel to provide a maximum o: operational anc3 technical data and to better ~ssess the costs of future equipment. The GE~ASM has the entire respori- sibility for carrying out these projects to their full realization. One of the most spectacular of these is certainly "Carmorant," a deep-towed sonar project for surface ships. . After the Navy command has defined .a precise operational requirement, development begins on the needed equipment. Based on currently available knowledge and the results of its studies and of its long-term projects, _ the GERDSM draws up the technical specifications, selects s~ppliers, awards contracts, and monitors closely the design of the equipment, proto- types, production models and production. It then conducts the necessary technical testing and participates in their military evaluation together with the Navy's Applied Studies Commissions. The process that begins with researci~ studies and ends with the evaluation of a new system is an extremely long one: More than 25 years separates these two phases in the case of a major system. Artother characteristic of underwater detection is that it is totally specific to the Navy. The possible needs of other armed services or of the civilian sector are, for all practical purposes, nonexistent or too narrow to warrant the studies and applied research required to satisfy military needs. The GERDSM must therefore maintain and develog its knowledge of the sea environment, the structures of ships, and the entire 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY range of acoustic, signal processing and data processing techniques. Its field of activities is therefore vast and the GERDSM relies as much as possible on ex3sting specializaticn outside its own organization: within the DGA ~Genera]. Delegation for Weaponry~, ONERA ~National Office for Aerospace S:.udies and Research~, industry and universities. _ A Glimpse of Some af Its Specialized Technical Fields Transducers use the electroacoustical properties of crystals and ceramics ' that enable the conversion of underwater sound pressures into electrical currents and vice versa. Transducers may be said to be to sonar what antennas are to radar. In this field, the G~RDSM carries on research studies on transc7ucers, specifies the active piezoelectric materials that enter into their construction--currently, orders and tests transducers and their assemblies in antennas. The sea is an extremely ~apricious and complex environment, and a know- ledge of the propagation of souna in water is fundamental to defining and specifying long-range detection equipment. The GERDSM carries out ~inder- sea acoustics measurements expeditions and compares measured data with the calculations drawn from mathematical models. These models, thus refined, ar.e used to predict the range of detection equipment in service or under design, as well as to define the principal.characteris~ics of future equipment. Transmitters must, in very compact form, supply the enormous powers (many hundreds of kilowatts) needed by the transducers. The GERDSM has attained - a high deqree of expertise in the field of thyristor transmitters. Sonar must detect submerged objects and give their position, their speed if possible, and their identifying elements. The GERDSM conceives anii contracts for the production of receivers that must maximize the usability of the signals receiveci by the transducer, and of equipinent for displaying the required information in the form best suited ~to the needs of the operators and the staff. Noise constitutes a special sector of the GERDSM's activities, in wnich the GERDSM performs the functions of a measurements service for the naval architect, who conceives the ship, as well as those of a research organi- zation that, by~ expanding the knowledge of noises and of the phenomena - that produce them and contribute to their propagation, contributes to the - _ improvernent of the noise characteristics of warships and to the improve- ment of the pe~rformance of French detection equipment. The GERDSM has two acoustics testing sites--one at Brusc and the other opposite Cap Ferrat-- - that enable the taking of ineasurements on n~ises radiated under water, using hydrophones (transducers specially designed for recept�~on) moored at the bottom of the ocean: The ship being tested follows a marked-out 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064402-4 aV~~ Vl'i'1ViLLJ VN~J VL\La course, and a land station registers, analyzes and interprets the signals thus collected. The GERDSM also has equipment specially designed for noise measurements aboard ships, which, with the preceding measurements, enable the detection of acoustic abnormalities in ships and the orienta- - tion of noise reduction work. Staffing and Installations The GERDSM staff consists of 277 persons, 47 of whom are engineers, physici~ts, mathematicians, electronics specialists and mechanics special- ists. For underwater acoustic measurements, the GERDSM has a substantial infra- structure that is unique in France: --acoustic chambers, --laboratory lighters situated on the artificial lakes of Castillon and _ Chaudanne, --testing ships. It aiso has a calculating center designed to carry out scientific calcula- ti~ns and to rapid}.y analyze noise measurements, an~l a richly endowed documentation service containing some 15,000 works. COPYRIGHT: 1980 - Revue des forces armees francaises "armees d'e~ujour.d'hui" 9399 CSO: 3100 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUN'TRY SECTION FRANCE - ASW RAPID DETECTION, COUNTERMEASURE METHODS EXPLP.INED Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 80 pp 50-53 ' CArticle by Lt Comdr Jerome Denavit*~ ~ ~Text~ Detection equipment and weapons have been developed together since the advent of tY~e threat constituted by the submarine. With the ASDIC ~sonar~ of the last war there was the ASW ~antisubmarine warfare~ de th charge dropped from the stern of the frigate. Later, there came HF ~high- _ frequency~ sonar and the homing torpedo. The 1970's saw the V 23/V 43 combined and the arming of the heavy A5W units with the "Malafon" missile. Enhanced knowledge of ti~e.oceanic.environment together with tech~ological advances are leading to the attainment of the objective of the surface naval and air forces:�rapid detection and fast countermeasures.** _ Detection Equipment Sound remains and will for a long time to come the sole purveyor of _ underwater information capable of enabling acceptable performance. Detec- tion equipment is therefore a converter of sound energy into electrical energy and, and vice versa, and must be capable of: * Having entered the Naval Academy in 1964 and graduated from the ASW School in i972, Lt Comdr Jerome Denavit served as ASW officer notably on the destroyer "Vauquelin" and the corvette "Georges Leygues" and as instructor on the "Jeanne dlArc." After having commanded the oil tanker "Punaruu" in the Pacific, he now fulfills the functions of deputy chief of the Weapons Section of the Underwater Weapons Systems Bureau of the Admiralty. The problems related to detection anc] attack of a submarine by another submarine are not dealt with here. The submarine, however, thanks to its high-performance, quiet-operating equipment, can play an essential role in ASW and will take on even greater importance in this respect with future improvements in its means of cooperation with surface naval and air units. 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 ~ --receiving the noise radiated by an underwater source (passive system), ur of transmitting a wave at a given frequency and receiving the reflected wave from an object (active system); --processing the received signal to render it usable by an operator. The first underwater detection equipments,�developed beginning in 1918, - were essentially of the passive ty~e. But the noise emitted by an under- water source was very frequently masked by ambient noises. ~his, active systems were quickly preferred and presently equip the navies of the big - powers. The considerable advances realized over the past 10 years in the field - o� electronic signal processing (amplification, extraction, analysis) and in knowledge of the environment have brought about the realization of very-high-performance passive equipment, especially for reception at very low frequencies. The technical solutions--a summary glimpse of which is given in Table T-- must taka into account physical phenomena involved in underwater s~und propagation. Among those that most affect equipment performance, we must cite: --molecular agitation in water, requiring a lowering of operating frequen- - cy and hence an increase in size of the sonar; --reverberation owing to environmental heterogeneities, the effects of which are detrimental at higher transmitting powers; --inherent noise ~f the carrier vessel itself, which, at higher speeds, alters the performance of the sonar; --the slow speed of sound in water, which limits the rate of sonar infor- mation and hence imposes a highly computerized processing of the signal. _ Whatever its type, therefore, a sonar is necessarily a bes* compromise among parameters of range, power, cost, French industrialists and the STCAN ~Technical Service for Naval Construc- tion and Ordnance~ have attained a degree of exgQrtise in the field of on-board LF ~low-frequency~ sonar that no other ~ountry disputes. In particular, the combined DUBV 23-DUBV 43 has been a success that out- classes most foreign equipment. This combination is installed aboard the - "heavy" ASW ships: destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Over the medium term, the Navy could equip most of its combat ships with passive linear arrays, if current tests confirm expected performance, to complement their ey~ellent active equipment. 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ASW Weapons Increased ranges of detection on the one hand, and speed and maneuverabil- ity characteristics of modern submarines on the other, demand the use of long-range and accurate ASW weapons. The ideal ASW weapon should have the following essential characteristics: --a broad range of coverage and terminal homing, --high transit speed and a high degree of silence, --a powerful military impact. Table 2, analyzed from the viewpoint of these criteria, shows that the ideal weapon is difficult, i:~dPed impossible, to achieve. The best com- promise must be found among ~'.1 these parameters. The Navy has been equipped with short- and medium-range weapons. Depth charges: The ASW.depth charges with which sea patrol planes are eq~iipped are especially effective in shallow waters. Gunnery weapons: (Rocket launchers, mortars). These are short-range (3,000 meters) weapons, especially suited to shallow waters (where close- range detection is common) and characterized by great ease of utilization and low cost. The 375 ASW rocket launcher is standard equipment on all "d'Estienne d'Orves"-claes destroyers. ~'orpedoes: Heavy (L3 and L5) torpedoes are used by surface ships, light _ (L4, MK44, MK46) torpedoes by sea patrol planes, and Malafon missiles by sur f ace sh ips . It is to be noted that the speed of torpedoes (between 25 and 35 knots) is inadequate to attack high-performance submarines. This is why the Navy currently has under study a new light A6W torpedo (NTL 90) to be used by . planes and helicopters of the Naval Air Force. Eventually,-it is to be delivered by a missile that will enable surface ships to attack fast and at a distance. Study Commissions and Testing Ships Between the initial requirement-analysis phase and the final delivery of an equipment off the production line, an elapsed time of 10 years has been Iound necessary for laboratory studies~ technical tests, acceptances and operational evaluations. Certain developmental phases requirE the participation of the applied studies ~commissions , which come directly under the Admiralty, for which they act as technical and operational arms. ASW involves three commissions: 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 C~~- --the CEPOC ~Commission for Applied Oceanographic Studies~, which con- tributes to knowledge of the oceanic environment, participates in the _ compilation of the albums of sound fields published b~r the SHOM ~expansion unknown~ --the CEPASM ~Commission for Applied Studies on Underwater Weapons~ and the CEPSM CCommission for Applied Studies on Submarines~, responsible for oversight of weapons and underwater detection equipment in service aboard - surface ships and submarines, for oversight of studies and development of _ future equipment,... These commissions, made up of very few men, are indispensable cogwheels in the circulation of information between ships, the technical services - and the Admiralty. The finishing touch on weapons and underwater detection equipment, however, _ cannot conceivably be applied except under operating conditions in actual use of the equipment, installed aboard surface ships, submarines and aircraft. This is why all Navy units are, at the beginning of their active service, put through an operational evaluation by specialists under the aegis of these commissions. Additionally, ~wo ships are detached from ~ the destroyer squadron forces and devoted exclusively to ASW experimental activities: the "Aunis," a completely refitted cargo ship, which between 1972 and 1977 enabled the carrying out to its conclusion of the Cormoran project (feasibility study on a CAS ~reliable acoustic path~ sonar), and whicti is currently involved in the development of a new sonar prototype; - and the "Agenais," a fast destroyer on special detachment for the past year, aboard which initial tests are being conducted on a towed passive linear-array system. The hostile natural environment in which ASW equipment must operate exacts a heavy penalty in the search for high performance. The enhancement of _ detection ranges and improvemenL of the effectiveness of weapons require constant human effort and financial outlays to find the best compromise between the constraints imposed by installed equipment and technological - capabilities. . The results obtained in recent years in the field of ASW equipment cannot ~ other than encourage the continued pursuit of the efforts undertaken. Only thus can our Navy hold the posi~tion it>has attained in the oceanic game being played by the major powers. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 1- Underwater Detection Equipment = 1 gqW1p pE CQQIJE C}~6Yl~L D~ SIJR~+ACE tionu ~es limitE par la coadition~ du mil{su procha de la aurfaoe et ptr le bruit du porteur. - - DES ~MARNS ( 2) Ponh : S krrs (1 S bn chrnal dt ~wfact). ~ 4) Sonec tr~a 1' ' lee conditiow du miiteu SONAR REIIAORaUE CLASSaIJE proche de la eud'ece et par le bruit du porteur. On ~e~na ~ portk en iminer~eant plw pro- ,,.,;�r , r. ~ fondhneat la sonu. lii�,r=='~_ yy ~ � Ponh: 10 km. 7 SONAR A RffLEXION BIJR LE F011D Perenet d'aquiver la ioaes d'omtm du wnor de coqu0. mai~ ~u prix de puiaancas Enorcnee ,y i~. `~w,~ w pour cempenser la peroa duae i ta rcAmrion - ' 4: 1i;~~~ ~ ~ur te fond. Ce ayetbme implique une p~rfdte conn~ieiana dea fonde. Portet : ?3 lan SONAR A~011E DE OONVERGEIIICE ( 9) - Permet dee di.ta;tion~ 1~ ~r~ di~nnca ~ maie eat luQement tributairo de~ aoe au ' i ~ tmbiontes. Ponk : 30 km en MEd/tarcnnfe 60 krn tn Atlantique ~/T7/////// ~ La tran~aacteurs ablf[~fnmaree, l trb~ ara~?ae son~~~ . profoadeut (2 000 en Mbditerran6e, 4 000 en Sii~tii~:Ct.;~~~ :L"!~k' ~~�;';:s'~ ~ AtIi11t1Qt1C~dpAtDIEStE[ILIIDCCOYVORUiOtOWG ,'~.'.j(ti av:y-~~~ .�';~,,~.~L' .e:~1. itld~Efld61![0 dEb 61C88 t~lOCflllQllW. '~'vw '.r 't ~:3f~~ik~.. ~ ~'y%:~ti�' .t~._... ~G__4W +,._..s i;::.~~ Ce type d'Equipement at trbs eacombraat II a bt~ expbrimente conjointement par lea U.S.A. ~ et la Francx avec te projet . Corn?oran Portee : 20 d ~0 km. " (12) (13) FL~TE E~B.F (PASSIF) I.ea eatmnea x prlxentenc ~oua ta forme d'an ` cible immer~e de ~nnde lonQue~r d remorque tres loia du bitiment Ce type d'bquipameat esc I preaque compl~t effr~nchi de~ bruite rayonnee par le rert~orqueur. _ Porrie ucomptk : SO d!00 km. Tableau 1: bqnipecoeats de d~41on wuamaeim [Key next page] lt FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 vit�i.vicau aiva: Vl\LL Key to Table 1(preceding page): 1. Hull sonar with surface channel. 2. Maximum submarine submersion depth. 3. Sonar very limited by surface environmental conditions and by noise of its own ship. Range: 5 km (surface channel 15 k;n). 4. Conventional towed sonar. 5. Sonar very limited by environmental conditions close to surface and by noise of its own ship. A gain in range is achieved by deeper sub- mersion of sonar. Range: 10 km. 6, Seabed reflection sonar. 7. Enables avoidanc~ of hull sonar shad~w zones but at the expense of enormous amounts of power needed to make up losses owing to reflection from the seabed. This system requirES perfect knowledge of the seabed. Range: 25 km. 8. Convergence zone sonar. 9. Enables detection at great distances but is largely dependent upon environmental conditions. Range: 30 km in Mediterranean, 60 km in - 1ltlantic. 10. CAS ~reliable acoustic path~ sonar. - 11. The transducers are immersed at very great depths (2,000 meters in the _ Mediterranean, 4,000 meters in the Atlanticj and Qnable total coverage � independent of thermal contingencies. This type equipment is highly - cumbersome. It was tested jointly by the United States and France - under the Cormoran project. Range: 20 to 40 km. 12. Very-low-frequency passive linear array. _ 13. The antennas are assembled in the form of a very long submerged cable towed very remotely from the ship. This type equipment is almost - entirely immune to noises radiated by the towing ship. Anticipated ranqe: 50 to 100 km. U FOR OFFIGIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Sonars In Use By French Navy Ships Sonars Frequencies Principal Characteristica Frigates ~UBV 23 low Hull sonar in bulb - scanning Corvettes ASW squadron Variable-immersion towed sonar - destroyers DUBV 43 low scanning ~ Avisos A 69 DUBM 25 meaium Hull sonar in fixed dome _ Avisos DUBA 3 high Retractable hull sonar - direc- � tional - Destroyers SQS 17 me~ium Retractable hull sonar - scanning DUBA 1 high Hull sonar in fixec7 dome - direc- Tartar-class tional: � destroyers DUBV 24 l.ow Hu11 son~r in fixed dome - scan- ning Super-Frelon DUAV 3 medium Variable-immersion sonar - scan- ning WG 13 DUAV 4 high Variable-immersion sonar - direc- tional Z9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064402-4 ~ v~~ v~L r.V~~~~ V~/v V~~Y~ TABLE 2- Search for ldeal ASW We3pon - Weapon Characteristic Intended Pu~.~~+ose Problems Short minimum range Attack late-detected Low propulsive power � submarine - Long maximum range Attack submarine at High propulsive power, . _ outer detection limit hence wei~ght - Guidance necessary unless power- ful explosive charge High transit speed Rapid delivery of High propulsive power, weapon hence weight -:Radrated noise (torpedo) Homing Accuracy of final Noisy homing equipment - trajectory . Silent operation Surprise the submarine Inaccurate final trajec- - tory - Slow speed (tor- pedo) Powerful explosive Destroy submarine or High volume of charge charge put it out of action at expense of propulsion and electronics 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060002-0 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY - , ~ ~ , ~Y ~b ~Jl S i~l,j~' Y ~ z ' ` - r d ~ . . : ~ s , . i ~ , t s . ~ ' ~.'~c.. ~ . yJ 3 f Id _ ~~~'tr~'"~1 4 ~ ~.~;"r, .b, ,~y.i Q1 - Y" `+f'~~ cr~.; ' 4~`~~ '-~y {1 ~Li = ~ ~ F;~ ~ ~ 4r~ : ~ ~'~~Z # ~ w , . r �y ~ ti,~~w ~ '~F ~ , Y y csc , t ~ a i"a;~;r7~Y,~Y~,~t}~'~F~i~,~z{>~' ~a _f.. j c �r~. ,~.t,.. ro - r N ~ _ ~i,~,r~~,,,~i;~y i 'v < { ~ ~+t ~ ~ 2 i ~ ~ ~ ~ V ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~f ~ ~ ' 1 , * x ~ ~4?, ~ . a ~ v v a~,,~ t{ 3~ 4 ~ x'41 ~t ~ y+ tN r~"~ ' ' y ' ~ t~ h r ;~a -t ; ~ ~.i ~a. f t~CSs, .n ~~n \II Si~Y fi y. J.,. ' r .f u - ~,.~+.Fl~, x suti 74 _y�~y ~ ` +1 Q ~ t> ~ { *x ~ ~t ",t"~,~+~ y't~ ~ i ~ , ~C so { 1'~t . c k ~ t a' i+'. aV^ k 8 ~rt ,K^it ~~Y~ r~. , ; Q~ ~ ~~y~~~~y,1+'" ~~1 . i... w ,;rt~xa t~~. r. ~ _ Y�~ , ~ j 4 .f i YJ SC'f.' ~,~tF~'^41.-.t 4 ' ~ ! ~ 'ri Y rat f ^ ~t~ ^ _.isl~{ _ . ~"y ` . ; ~~f ~L ..T Y ~'�'~~~~a i' ~~.,.~Y ~ FY~ ~'~ies N MI x5w -y k.. y ~ r~ ~~T~ , ~ ~ ~ r~ . S _ ;,r~ 5 . ' fi~ . ~ ~ (U , r ~v. y.r e ~ ' / ~ ~ ~i L.1 { 7.: 'S .ly. ~'.Wr'u'r~~Y~ O U * r ~f ~y 1 t. jj O K ~ a , ~ y , ~ ' * " . G y . 3 ~ 0 7 O ~ 4 .G rt kS ~ a ~ ~ a n . t i."~ T., Y 1 J ~ . ~yu } o-7 i f �~F ~ .YT ~ e .Ci ~ ~ a t~ ~ ~ E�� ~ .yr~~ ~~tsN;'FZ~`3 ~`x f~ ~ W k `!?f ? ' ~ ~ t ~'t ' ~ ,~t}' ~ :a , Wtx ~ . n* y,~',~ ~~r?�'~~ fQ ~k~~iy