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JPRS L/9649
7 April 19~1
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1'ranslation
- WAR AND THE ARM'Y -
_ A Philosophicai and So~~iologiGal S~tudy
- Ed. b~
D.A. Volkogonov, A.S. Milovidov ar~d S.A. Tyushkevich
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JPRS L/9649
7 April 1981
_ WAR AND THE ARMY
A PHILOSOPHICA~ AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY
' Moscow VOYNA I ARMTYA--FILOSOFSKO-SOTSIOLOGICHESKIY OCHEFX in Russian
1977 (signed to press 17 Nov 77) pp 1-416
%
IText of the book edited by n.A. Volko~onov, A.S. Milovidov,
S.A. Tyushkevich, Voyenizdat, 1~0,000 coQies, 416 pages]
~ CONTENTS
I Annotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
� Part One
War as a Social Phenomenon
Chapter I. Arisal and Development of the Marxist-Leninist ~eaching
on War and the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter II. Origin and Social Essence of Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
:i
Chapter III. War and Other Forms of Armed Violence. 50
~ Chapter IV. Types and Social Nature of Modern Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Chapter V. The Nature and Basic Traits of Wars in I?efense of the
-'I
Socialist Fatherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Chapter VI. War and Revolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Chapter VII. War and Social Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
- Part Two
- The Material and Spiritual Factors of Modern War
= Chapter VIII. TH~ Laws Governing the Arisal, Course, and Ou*come of ?aars. 120
Chapter IX. A State's Military Power, Its Material and Spiritual Elements 138
- a - IIZ - uSSR - ~ouo]
- [TII - USSR - 4 FOUQ]
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Chapter X. The Material Factor and Its P.ole in War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Chapter XI. Modern Scientific-Technical Progress and Its Influence on
War and Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 i-
� Chapter XIi. Mil:Ltary Science as a Factor of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Chaptar XIII. The Spiritual Factor in War . . . . � e . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 _
Chapter XIV. The Role of Ideology in War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Chapter XV. 2'he Rc~le of the Popular Masses and ths Individual in War 231
Part Three
= Z'he Army and Its Social Functions
_ Chapter XVI. The Origin of the Army and Its Place in the Society's _
Political Organization. Types of rib3ern Armies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Cha~ter XVII. 7.'he Reactionary Essence of Imperialist Armies 258 -
Chapter XVIII. Armies of Liberated Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Chapter XI X. The Sociopolitical Nature and Purpose of Socialist A~-mies 289 ~
~ Chapter XX. Military Cooperatior~ Among Socialist Countries . . . . . . . . . 303
Chapter XXI. Z'he Methodological Function of the Marxist-Leninist Teaching
on War and the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 -
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
A 5hort Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
This Book Was Prepared by the ~'ollowing Auth~r Coilective:
Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Colonel V. M. Bondarenko (Chapter XI), Doctor of
Philosophical Sciences Major-Gene~al D. A. Bolkogonov (chapters II and XIII), Doctor _
of Philosophical Sciences Colonel (Reserve) Ya. S. Dzyuba (Chapter V), Doctor of
Philosophical Sciences Colonel A. P. Dmitriyev (Chapter XXZ), Doctor of Philosophical
Sciences Major General V. G. Kozlov (chapters I, XVI, and XVII), Candidate of Philo- -
sophical Sciences Coionel T. R. Kondratkov (Chapter IV), Doctor of Philosophical -
Sciences Colonel G. G. Dukava (Chapter X), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Major =
- General S. G. Lukonin (Chanter VII), Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Major General
A. S. Milovidov--Author Collective Chairman (chapters VI and XV), Candidate of
_ Philosophical Sciences Colonel (Reserve) V. I. Nbrozov (C`hapter XII), Doctor of
Philosophical Sciences Maj~r General V. F. Samoylenko (Chapter XX), Doctor of _
Philosophical Sciences Colonel (Reserve) I. A. Selezr.ev (Chapter ~IV), Candidate of _
- Philosophical Sciences Colonel K. V. Spirov (Ghapter XVIII), Doctor of Philosophical
Sciences Colonel N. D. Tabunov (Chapter IV), Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Colonel
A. A. 'Pimorin (Chapter XIX), Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Major General S. A.
Tyushkevich (chapters VIII and IX), Doctor o~ Philoso~hical Sciences Major General
M. I. Yasyukov (Chapter III) .
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_ ANNOTATION
~ This wark examines the pressing problems associated with the Marxist-Leninist teachinq _
on war and the army. Writing this book, the collective tried to make broad use of -
the rich theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marx_.sm-Leninism, and decisions
and documents of the CPSU and the entire'~r~orid communist movement; it tried to re- R
- flect our party's tremendous experience i.n leading miiitary develapment and armed
protectian of the socialist fatherland, ~nd to account for the advances of the
~ Marxist-Leni.nist teaching on war and the aL~my enjoyed in recent times. Antiscienti-
fic bourgeois conceptions and the �~iewpoints of rightist and "leftist" revisionists
' are exposed. -
- The book is intended for a broad ran ge of readers interested in the problems of the
Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. It is recommended as a handbook for
officer Marxist-Leninist training, and for cadets and students of military educa-
tional ir.stitutions.
- INTRODUCTION
iiistory ~.s irresistibly traveling the road of the world's revolutionary transforma- -
tion, initiated by Great October. The international positions of socialism are .
- growing stronger and expanding with every year. The successes of the national
liberation movement are increasing. Laborers are intensifying their class struggle
- against the yoke of the monopolies, and againc t the orders of exploitation. The
revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement is acquiring -.ncreasingly -
= greater scope. The ideas of Gre%tt Octaber are capturing the minds of millions upon
millions af new people on our planet. "Noevent in world history," said CPSU
_ Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidiui:~ of the USSR Supreme _
Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in hi s report to a joint ceremonial meeting of the
- CPSU Central Con�r?ittee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedi-
cated to the 60th anniversary of Great October, "has ever had deeper, farther- �
_ reaching consequences to mankind than the Great October Socialist Revolution. The -
flashes from the October thunderstorm lit the way to the future for peoples of many
- countries. History marched forward in giant strides."*
* PRAVDA, 3 November 1977.
.
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The most important prerequisite of mankind's progress is peace. Nations always
~ dreamed of a sound, just peace, a peace without social amd national oppression, but =
throughout the centuries and millenia one war after another broke out on earth--the
_ social forces opposing the aggressive policy of the classe~ of exploitation were _
- too weak and disorganized. In our times the peace movement has acquired a depend~ ,
- able support--the power, unity, and activity of world socialism, its growing union _
with all progressive and peace-loving forces.
Faith.ful to the principle of socialist internationalism, the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union is doing everything possible to provide the conditions for peaceful
- development in our country and in other countries of the socialist fratcernity, as -
well as for peace ar.d security of all nations. The main result of its foreign -
policy, noted the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th
- CPSU Congress, is that "The ~~'~arnational position of the Soviet Union is stronger
than ever before. This is ~che fourth decade we are living in peace. The positions
of soci.alism have grown stronger. Detente has become a dominant trend."* _
At the same time the congress emphasized the need for high alertness, and the im-
portance of energetic actions and unity of all forces of peace and good will. The
enemies of detente and disarmament have many resources at their disposal. Attempting _
to a~e.pt themselves to new international conditions, these reactionary forces are
displaying aggressiveness, they are experi.menting with various tactics, and they
are attacking the peace effort from different directians~ We cannot forget for
even a single day that although the possibilities for aggressive actions by imperi-
alism have now been significantly reduced, its nature has not changed. The issue of
war and peace remains the main issue of modern times. -
_ In this situation of conflict bet.ween opposing social systems, in the international
_ arena the solution to the problem of ~aar and peace is being sought in all spheres
_ of public life and activity--in economics, politics, ideology, and culture. Exper-
iencing shocks and failures in domestic and foreign policy, and bridled by the
powerful revolutionary forces of modern times, imperialism now rests special hope
on ideological sabotage, and it is mobilizing more and more sources and resou.rces
for ideolog~.cal disorientation of the masses.
= The sole correct solution to the problem of war and peace is provided by Marxism-
_ Leninism. Deeply rPvealing the laws governing societ~'s development and exposing
_ the reactionary sccial essence and scientific groundlessness of various sorts of -
bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints on war and peace, it is a dependable founda-
tion for developing the correct strategy and tactics of the struggle for peace, -
prevention of war, and international security. -
_ Marxism-Leninisn: also provides the sole correct solution to problems of wa.r and -
the army inseparably associated with a more-general issue--the issue of war and
peace. The system of viewpoints on these problems mal:es up the Marxist-Leninist
teaching on war and the army, the oremises of which are supported by the fundamental
conclusions of dialectical and historical materialism, political economics, and
- scientific co:tmlunism.
*"Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976,
p 34. _
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_ The teaching on war and the army is an organic part of the Marxist-Leninist teaching
on society. Utilizing the categories and concepts of dialectical and historical `
materialism, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army analyzes the most
general, fundamental problems of the essence of war as a social phenomenon, the -
o~igin and class nature of war and the army, the relationship between war and
politics, the mutual ties existing between economic, scientific, sociopolitical,
and moral-political factors in war, the social nature and types of wars, the role ~
of the popular masses and ihe individual in war, the role of ideology in war, and
others. Being the most general and profound, the premises of historical material-
~ ism perform an integrating function within the entire structure of sociapolitical
_ knowledge on war and the army, permitting us to interpret it in a dialectical
_ mutual relationship with different elements of this structure's foundatioi~ and
superstructure.
In addition the teaching on war arid the army utilizes the categories and concepts
of political economics, scientific comnunism, and other sciences. Witn their
assistance, we analyze the economic raots of war and the army, the role of the
economic factor in war, the relationship between war and the society's economic
_ life, and the economic foundations of a state's military power. In addition the
teaching on war and the ar,ny examines, from a sociopolitical aspect, the relation-
ship between war and revolution, armed defense of the socialist fatherland, the
essence and laws of development of the army, the particular features of scientific
control in military affairs, and so on. Naturally these problems are not indepen-
dent of one another. In their sum total and in their dialectical mutual relation-
ship, they represent a single, integral Marzcist-Leninist teaching on war and the .
- army. -
- The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army bears a creative nature. It
~ is constantly developing, and being filled with new content. Basing themselves
on the ideological-theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the Communist
_ Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal communist and workers parties are
consistently and persistently enriching this teaching with new premises and conclu-
sions, in accordance with changes in the conditions and balance of forces in -
different stages of human society's development, and in accordance with the ob-
_ jective trends of history.
- One of the most important prerequisites for scientific leadership of the troops ~
and for improvement of the sty le of work of our military personnel is deep mastery
of the entire sum of knowledge contained in the Marxist-Leninist Leaching on war
and the army, and development of the ability to competently use this knowledge in
- practice. This task has acquired special urgency in the present stage of develop-
ment of the Soviet Armed Forces, swift development of military science, deepening
differentiation, and concurrent integration of military knowledge. -
_ Preparing this book, the author collective tried to make the broadest possible use
of the rich ideological-theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and the de-
cisions and documents of the CPSU and the entire world communist movement, to re-
flect more fully our party`s tremendous experience in leading Soviet military
development and armed protection of the socialist fatherland, and to account for
the advances the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has enjoyed in recent
times.
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Fc~u or~�tc~ni, t~sE oNt~v
The structure of the work reflects th~ Marxist-Leninist approach to integrated
analysis of the problem~ o= wa.r and the army.
_ The book cox~tains three parts.
The first analyzes the fundamental issues in the teaching on war, and it explains
thp Marxist-Leninist interpretation of war, and its xoots, essence, and place in
~ history.
The second part of the book reveals the mutual ties and interactions of material ~
and spiritual forces in war, and describes the military power of the state, the
tundamental laws cletermining the course and outcome of a war, and the mechanism of
their action and utilization by social forces. ,
The third part of the book examines the origin, essence, and laws of development of
- the army, its place anc~ role in ~ocial life and in the fate of war and peace, and -
the nature of modern armies and military alliar~ces. The concluding chapter illumi-
nates the methodological functions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and
the army.
A significant purt of the book is devoted to a criticism of antiscientific bourgeois
and revisionist viewpoints on the causes, nature, and social consequences of war,
and on the social nature and purpose of the army.
The author collective expresses the hope that this work, which has the purpose of
" systematizing the basic provisions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the
army, will provide assistance to our military personnel in their effort to raise
the level of their theoretical training and in their practical activities aimed at
constantly reinforcing combat readiness, as required of the Soviet Armed Forces by
- the 25th CPSU Congress, and expressed by the new USSR C~nstitution.
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_ I
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PART ONE
WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENONIENON -
~
I
~I CHAP7'ER I
I ARI5AL Ai~D '~EVELOPILP?'?' 0~' ^'HE MARXIST-LEIdIP]ISi TEACHING ON 'vJAR AIQD THE ARMY
The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the result of many centuries of
the 3evelopment of society's thinking, and it is its greatest achievement in the -
investigation of military phenomena. Having made a real Yevolution in the view-
- points on society, Marxism was the first doctrine to encourage scientific study of
war and the army, from the positions of the proletariat.
Citing the history of philosophy~and social science, V. I. Lenin noted that Marxism
arose not as an offshoot of the trunk of world civilization's development, but as
- a direct continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy,
political economics, and socialism.l Naturally, Lenin's conclusiori also extends to
formation of the Marxist teaching on war ~-?d the army. This teaching did not
arise in a vacuum; it was the continuation and a further, qualitatively higher
development of the achie~ements of pre-Marxist military-theoretical thought, criti-
cally reexamined from the standpoint of working class interests.
1. The Problems of War and the Army in Pre-Marxist Philosophy and Sociology
The birth of viewpoints on war and the army is associated with formation and develop~
ment of a class-based slave-owning society, and its ideology. Being one of the as-
pects of ideology, from the moment of its arisal military-theoretical thought began
- expressing the viewpoints of the dominant class on war and the army, and the function-
al nature of a class society. Slave-owning society, which was typified by the
~ cruelest sort of exploitation and by numerous wars, also generated certain id~as
about war and its instruments.
One of the first attempts at a theoretical generalizati~n of the issues of war was
the "Manu-smrti" (an ancient tndian collection of laws reflecting Brahman dogma and -
~ ideology; 6th century B.C.). Later such attempts were undertaken in the 5th century
, B.C. in Ancient Greece and Ancient China. The attention of the ~khinkers was attrac-
ted mainly by the roots of wars, by their origin. Representing the class interests ~
~ of the slave-owners, for whom war was a means for reinforcing their dominance, they
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= explained war as supposedly a natural phenomenon. The ancient Greek philosopher-
idealist Plato (427-347 B.C.) asserted that wars are a natural and permanent state -
of mankind, since they provide slaves, without which society could not exist.
5haring this viewpoi~lt, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) viewed the art of warfare as the `
art 'of acquiring slaves. _
Ideologists representing the progressive faction of the ruling class--slave-owning _
democratic materialists such as Democritus (460-370 B.C.), Epicurus (341-270 B.C.),
and Titus Lucretius Carus (99-55 B.C.)--felt that wars came into being with forma-
_ tion of society. As long as people remained wild,Titus Lucretius Carus wrote as an
- example, there had been no wars, and thousands of people were not called to arms.
Because the dor~inant form of ideology in the era of feudalism was religion, war was
interpreted from the standpoint of religious philosophy. One of the "Fathers of
the Church", A. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), represented the life of society in the
form of a struggle between two opposing kingdoms--"profane" and "divine", and he
: structured his conception of war accordingly. He recognized war to be a riecessary
- evil, without which the "blessings of the Christian world and justice" could not
exist. In the same period, however, the ideas that the causes of war are not in
Heaven but on Earth, that they lie in the mercenary goals of feudal lords and
princes of the Church, were also stated as a protest against feudal wars, and in
~ opposition to state doctrine protecting the interests of the feudal lords. Thus
in his book "Defender of the Peace", the Italian philosopher Marsilius of. Padua
(1280-1343) named the exorbitant claims of the Roman bishops as one of the main causes -
breaking the peace and generating war.
2'he ideas and problems suggested in Antiquity enjoyed further development and sub- .
stantiation in recent history. In the period of early bourgeois society, the
interpretation of war as an Earthly social phenomenon enjoyed much greater accept-
_ ance than under feudalism. The English materialist philosopher Thomas Hobbes
(1588-1679), as an example, found man's nature to contain "the three h~asic causes
of war: first, rivalry; second, mistrust; third, passion for glory.i2 "The first
cause," wrote Hobbes, "compels people to attack one another for the purposes of
personal gain, the second for the purposes of personal security, and the third
out of conside~ations of honor. People motivated by the first cause use force to
make themselves the masters of other people, their wives, children, and chattels;
people motivated by the second cause use force for the purposes of self-defense; the _
third category o� people resorts to force in response to trifles such as a wrong
word or a smile, and in response to disagreements of opinion and other manifestations
of disrespect...."3 Hobbes suggested that wars ~were also associated with a lack of _
room on earth due to the growing numbers of people. As we can see, given the limita-
� tions of the naturalistic approach, in opposition to religious dogma Hob~es reduced
the origin of wars to earthly causes.
The German idealistic philosopher G. Leibniz (1646-1716) felt war to be inevitable.
In his words the roots of war lie in the insurmauntable hostility of people; monarchs
toy with the fate ef peace as if they were playing cards; to them, peace treaties were
nothing more than temporary truces, .and perpetual peace was possible anly in ~the
, grave. _
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Fou o~F~c~AL us~: or;:.~~ -
The ideologists of the French bourgeois re~:,Iution made a noticeable contribution
to our understanding of the causes of wars. Am~r.; cn. most important causes ot war,
J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778) indicated the inequality of property in ,society, man's
yearhing for private ownership.`' But he believed the l~tter to be clerived from "the
riature of man", and therefore he was unable to reveal tht~ material sources of war. -
Nor were the French materialists of the 18th century able to see the true causes of
wars, inasmuch as they remained idealists in their interpretation of social life. ~
In their conceptions, wars were associated with various ideological, mental, and
other factors. Thus P. H. Holbach (1723-1789) wrote that an excess of sarcasm in -
t the bile of a fanatic, blood running hot in the heart of a conquoror, =ndigestion
in a monarch, and the capriciousness of a woman are sufficient causes of F~ar.5
The theoretical act ivities of utopian socialists and Russian revolutionary democrats -
' occupy a special pl ace in formation of our viewpoints on war and its roots. Ex-
pressing predomin antly the interests of the oppressed masses, these intellectuals
managed to arrive at deeper conjectiires on the origin and essence of war. Long
before Rousseau, T. Campanella (I568-1639) suggested that private otanership elicits
wars. G. Winstanley (1609-1652), the leader of the English Diggers, discussed the -
_ causes of war lying in private ownership.6 The French utopian J. Melier (1664-1729) .
attempted to s;~bstantiate the thesis that distribution of wealth based on private =
_ ownership engenders feelinga of hatred and envy among people, who in turn cause
mutinies and wars. All of these ideas were develo~ed by Saint-Simon (1760-1825),
_ R. Owen (1771-1858), and C. Fourier (1772-1837). ~ey argued that private ownership
is a constant cause of wars, Zeading to rivalry not only among people but also among
states and alliance s of countries, and drawing them into wars. -
Expressing the inte rests of the peasant masses, Russian revolutionary democrats
_ arrived at a scient ific intergretation of wars and their sourres. N. G. Chernyshev- -
skiy (1828-1889) vi_ewed war as a social phenomenon inherent to particular historical
- conditions, to a particular civil structure of society.~ War, he wrote, is generated
by a society in which oppressors dominate and the common people are enslaved, and as
long as such a soci ety exists, its develapment would proceed through conflict, through -
wars.
- Democratic sociopol itical.thought also attempted to explain another important pro-
blem--the relationship between war and politics. This problem was stated ~n primitive
form as long ago as in the"Manu-smrti". Canakya, a prominent progressive intellec=
tual of Ancient India, suggested in his work "Arthasastra" (4th century B.C.) that -
war is not an end in itself, that it serves politics.8 Aristotle felt war to be a
part of the art of politics.
Z'his prablem was de veloped iri recent history by the works of the prominent German
- philosopher G. Hege 1(1770-1831). He approached war as an implement of politics.
"Troops were used," Hegel wrote "to achieve the special objectives of politics...."9
Hegel's dialectics tzad an influence on the military-theoretical viewpoints of
_ K. Clausewitz (1780-1831) one of the prominent military ideologists of the bourgeoisie.
He was able to sense the mutual relationship existing between war and policy.
Clausewitz noted that war cannot be understood apart from politics., since war is
a part of a whole, and that whole is policy. He wrote: "War is...a continuation
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of state policy by other means.... War is not only a political act but also a real -
instrument of policy, a continuation of political relations, their exercise by
other means. That within it which remains unique has to do only with the uniqueness
of its means. " 10
- However, Clausewitz was unable to reveal the deep objective mutual relationship
existing between war and policy, since in view of his idealism and class limitations
he could not undPrstand the essence and nature of policy. He based himself on the =
- idea that policy, being the "wisdom of the state embodied,"11 represents the
interests of society as a whole12--that is he felt policy to be above the classes.
War, according to Clausewitz is a continuation only of foreign policy, which in _
his interpretation is essentially subjective. Clausewitz could not see the
material, economic foundatians of state policy.
Democratic intellectuals also tried to explain the nature of wars in accordance ~
with their understanding of the origins of wars and their relationship to policy.
Plato, the ideologist of the slave-owners, attempte-3 to justify the legality of
_ wars which pursued the goals of enslaving other peoples ("barbarians") and suppressing ~
slave uprisings. In the well-ordered state he describes, honors are paid to those
who distinguish themselves in "the greatest form of war"--foreign war.13 Aristotle
- forwarded the concept of a just war. But his, and Plato's, was not yet a moral
- assessment, be ing only a legal one, inasmuch as the criterion of justice used by
Aristotle was the interests of the slave-owning state, as reflected in its laws.
Augustine attempted to provide relig.ious grounds for his moral assessment of war.
~ SincE war is the product of divine predeternu.nation, he asserted, then the justice
of a war waged in the riame of faith, in the nar:~e of Christianity, emanates from
God. This conception was dPVeloped by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). He felt that a _
war would be just if it is engendered by "legal causes" sanctioned by the Church,
if it is waged by a"legal power", and if it pursues "legal goals". In the condi-
tions of f.eudai separatism, where might made right" and where every feudal lord
engaged in warfare, the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, a proponent of centralized
state rule, satisfied the interests of absolutism (secular and clerical) in
preservation of peace within the country, which was constantly being broken by the -
feudal lords. However, this teaching justifies predatory wars and crusades ini-
tiated at the will of monarchs and the Church. _
_ Bourgeois ideologists had their own interpretation of the nature of wars. They
declared feudal wars ar~d armed uprisings of oppressed masses to be illegal,
_ recognizing only bourgeois wars to be legal. This was the position taken, in
particular, by Hegel, who justified the reactionary de:nands of the German bourgeoisie
for Germany to conquer and enslave other countr~es, defended its predatory wars, _
and rejected wars of liberation by the popular masses. Hegel's reactionary ideas
were precisely the ones used subsequently by the Nazis in their ideoiogical
"substantiation" of their piratic policy.
Concurrently, certain pre-Marxist philosophers and sociologists suggested more-
rational ideas. Thus the French materialist Holbach justif~ed war only in one
- case: if it were waged for defensive purposes. "War," he wr.ote,"is just and un-
avoidable only in the event that it is waged in order to repe114n attack by an un- _
just predator, to restrain the violence of a rabid nation.... 'Phe German =
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' philosopher I. Kant (1724-1804) felt that it was natural for an alliance of states
to b~ created to repel another state forwarding unjustifiable claims.l5
The most progressive ideas to explain the nature of wars were suggested by utopian
socialists. Saint-Simon hypot}iesized that it would be possible for a defensive war
- to transform into a~redator;� war under the influence of certain factors. G. Babeuf -
(1760-1797) presumed that the goals of a war make it legal or i.llegal; war pursued
for niercenary goals was illegal.
~ N. G. Chernyshevskiy made a significant step forward in resolving tY?e issue as to
the nature of wars. The prominznt Russian revolutionary democrat noted that wars -
_ are not unic~ue. In this connection he criticized the passivists, who condemned all ~
wars. Chernyshevskiy supported force directed against evil. He distinguished
ruinous, harmful; devas~ating wars from useful, beneficial wars; useful wars were -
_ only those which were waged to repel an enemy, "to defend or r.ecapture national
independence," while harmful wars were ones fought in the interest of the exploiters.
Chernyshevskiy appea3.ed for a struggle against harmful wars and support for useful ,
ones.
The social consequences of wars were also examined by pre-Marxist philosophy and -
sociology. The class goals of the exploiters affectsd the interpretation as a
_ rule. Expressing the viewpoints of the slave -owning aristocracy of Ancient Greece, -
Plato and Heraclitus the Ephesian (circa 544-ci'rca 483 B,C.), for example, saw wars -
to have only positive consequences for the state. Heraclitus promoted war as some-
thing good because, he wrote., the stronger and braver survive in war. "War," read
the writinys of Heraclitus, "is the father of all, and the ruler of all; it made
- some gods, and others men; it made some slaves, and others free."16 The ideologists _
of slave-owning democracy--Democritus and others--pointed out the ne gative results -
_ of wars. Canakya said that war is accompanied by a loss of wealth an d the fall of -
morality. -
Many ir.tellectuals of recent history tried to represent the wars of the bourgeoisie ~
as something necessary and beneficial to the country. The English materialistic
philosopher F. Bacon (1561-1526) condemned feudal wars but tried to j ustify Great
Britain's colonial expansion. He was one of ~he first ideological defenders of
the colonial wars of the bourgeoisie. A nation, Bacon declared, cannot develop
- its wealth in any way other than at the expense of another nation.
In order to justify wars and their consequences, Hegel suggested the thesi.s tPsat
war is a moral necessity. "...the qreat significance of war," he wrote, ":.s that
- owing to it...the moral health of the people is preserved... In the same way that
the stirring of winds keeps a lake from decaying, which would be the unavoidable
_ consequence of a prolonged still, so it is that warlceeps nations from decaying,
- which would be the unavoidable consequence of a lengthy and, all tne more so, a ~
permanent peace."17 Nations emerge from ~:~r spiritually strengthene d,. Hegel con-
cluded, achieving internal peace.
In addition some bourgeois intellectuals defended the notion that wars and their -
consequences were ruinous to the state and its subjects. Thus Hobbes condemned ~
wars as bearing misfortune and disaster for people, since in a state of war there
is no place for labor, agriculture, crafts, or sea trade, there being only perpetual
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_ fear and the constant danger of violent death.18 But if war happens, "every indi-
- vidual is obligated in view of the law of nature to pr~tect, by protecti.ng with all
of his strength, that power which affords him protection in peac~time."~`~ r~ll~wi~~~~ -
Hc~bbes, Leibniz noted that war devastate; a country, inasmuch as it is diFfic:ulL _
- to preserve that which is won through war, and even a dictorious war does tremen-~
dous harm to the trsde of the victors.
_
= Devsloping these premises, French materialists called wars the vestiges of the -
~ "barbarian era". They sharply condei~uied conquest and violence, they defended the
principle of the equality of nations, and they opposed feudal wars, believing them _
to be disastrous to the people. War, wrote D. Diderot (1713-1784), supprssses the -
voice of nature, justice, and humanitarianism, it generates pi.racy and crime, and
it distorts the morality of entire nations. -
Russian revolutionary democrats reve~led the negative consequences of wars. War,
felt A. I. Gertsen (1812-1570) "is a misfortune, an evil necessity."20 N..G.
Chernyshevskiy argued that the results of wars waged by the exploiters are negative
ir. all respects. The preparations themselves for war enrich the propertied classes
and devastate the country. War disturbs finances ar~d all administration, placing a
heavy burden upon the common people. The deprivations of the people grow to enormous
proportions during wars. War annihilates masses of people, and it tears them away
from peaceful labor even more. The moral consequences of such wars are especially
- dangerous to society. 'I'hese wars kill the people's love for labor, and produce
tyrants and predators. -
Condemning wars and their consequences, almost all pre-Marxist intellectuals tried
to indicate the road to peace. Representatives of utopian socialism, for example, -
believed that wars could be avoided if people would live a communal life, and if -
all of their property were to become common tu all. Then, noted Campanella, there
would be no wars, and people would beat their sabers into plowshares. Winstanley _
concluded that peace would set in and wars would disappear with elimina.tion of pri- _
vate ownership. T. More (1438-1535) wrote that in a society in which private owner-
- ship does not exist, wars would not exist either; in such a society, in order not
' Lo reveal an inability to make war to foreign eiiemies, the citizens must constantly
exercise themselves in the military sciences.
Utopian socialists tied ~eace in with the activities of an enlightened ruler who
might eliminate private ownership and thus insure the unity and equali~y of nations.
Though in naive form, we can discern here the idea of doing away with wars by making
a transition to a different kind of society, to socialism. This made the utopians
- different from those who felt it p~ssible to put an end to wars in bourgeois society.
Bourgeois theorists took a different approach to the problems of peace. As an `
exampl,e Hobbes believed the roots of peace to lie in the people's f~ar of war,
of the disastrous consequences it bears. The ideologists of imperialism now make
- rather broad use of this Hobbesian thesis to justify the arms race, as if i~t is `
necessary to create "a balance of terror"as the foundation of peace. Condemning ~ -
wars in general, Hobbes also condemned civil wars, associating thPm with the fall
of a state. He believed that opposition between secular and clerical power to be
the cause of these wars.21
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Believing the causes of wars to lie in chance phenomena, the French materialists
were unable to understand the ways to peace, and they placed their hopes on achieving
it through "the wise administration of an enlightened ruler." _
� The German philospher Kant surmised the existence of an objective law leading to
affirmation of Nerman~nt peace, one of the inevitability of creating, on a founda- _
tion of peace, a union of nations serving peace. To Kant, however, peace was
only a moral ideal, and not a practical objective.
The Russian revolutionary democrats came right to the threshold of a scientific -
conception of the ~aays of achieving peace. In order to do away with war, N. G. -
. Chernyshevslciy believed, we must do away with the social structure generating wars;
wars would disappear only when the common people assume power. In his opinion there
, is only one means for elirninating wars: the overthrow of a reactionary regime, a
popular rPvolution.
~ Pre-Marxist intellectuals also posed the problem of the army. Viewing it in their
majority from the standpoint of the ruling classes, they were nevertheless able
_ to cor.tectly discern certain aspects of the army of the exploiters as an instru-
ment for reinforcing their supremacy. It was stated as long ago as in the "Manu-smrti" -
- thai: the army controls subjects, that it suppresses uprisings by lower castes.
Aristot~e pointed out that a state cannot exist without troops. _
_ Bourgeoi~ theorists criticized the feudal army and tried to substantiate the idea of
a national army, one supposedly called upon to stand guard over the interests of all _
society, in contrast to the purpose of the feudal army. Givinq substance to this
pren~i.se, Hegel wrote that the army, being an instrument of policy in the hands of
the state, protects national interests.
_ An attempt to portray the army as being a national force, one independent of classes,
- was typical of all philosophers and sociologists expressing the goals of the classes
o� exploitation. The ideologists of the oppressed masses, meanwhile--the utopian
socialists and the revolutionary democrats--arrived at the threshold of clarifying _
the class nature of armies. Utopians correctly caught the essence of the armies of
exploitation, labeling them social parasites, and noted that this minority of armed
slaves was intended to restrain the majority of unarmed slaves.
Rejeating the false assertions of bourgeois theorists ~that the army of exploitation
was supposedly national in nature, N. G. Chernyshevskiy demonstrated that it served
_ the interests of the exploiters and their governm~nt as a means for suppressing the _
. commen people in their state and in other countries, and as a means of warfare with
the goal of enslaving and plundering neighboring nations. In this case he sharply
condemned the use.of armies against nations, and he used the term vileness when de-
scribing the desire of the ruling classes to keep other nations dependent for their
= mercenary interests.22 Exposing the true nature of the reactionary theories on the
perpetuity of armies, N. G. Chernyshevskiy wrote that armies came into being and
underwent development under certain social conditions, ones in which the dominance
of exploiters was established. When common people come into power in most countries,
- the need for a permanent army would wither away.
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_ The intellectuals of the pre-Marxist period tried to resolve the question as ta the
- conditians of victory in war, and as to the sources of an army's strength. The
- "Manu-smrti", the writings of Sun-tzu, and other theorists of Antiquity offered
suggestions concerning the significance of moral forces in war, which they defined'`
as a unification of a ruler and his people, concerning the influence of the geo-
graphic environment, and concerning the role of troop training and supply. However,
the military leader, who was said to hold the fate of war in his hands, was given
- the main role. These problems enjoyed further development in bourgeois milit~ry
and philosophical conceptions. New questions of other kinds were posed as well.
As an example Bacon suggested an interesting idea about the relationship between
military affairs and science. 'rIe wrote that the printing press, gunpowder, and the
compass altered the countenance ar~d state of the entire world, first in the art of
writing,"second in the art of war, and third in the art of navigation."23 Hegel
suggested ideas about the role of the moral spirit of the people and the army, and
the military leader and common soldier in war, and about the dependence of the ~
military organization on the internal structure of the state.
Russian revolutionary dem~crats hold views on the sources of a state's military
power that are very interesting. Analyzing the histnry of wars and contemporary
military affairs, Chernyshevskiy concluded that for war to be successful, there ,
must be developed industry and transportation, and this would be impossible without ~
- eliminating serfdom. Chernyshevskiy attached important significance to the morale
- of the troops in war. He criticized foreign and Russian theorists who examiiied the
morale of the troops apart from the nature of war and the goals of the dueling
sides.
Chernyshevskiy noted two conditions for moral supremacy over the enemy: 1) recogni-
_ tion, by the people and the army, of war goals useful to the people; 2) the confi-
dence of the people and the army in their strength and in victory over the enemy.
These conditions arise only in the event that the war is in fact waged in the
- interests of the people. 2'he miraculous energy of Garibaldi's volunteers,
Chernyshevskiy wrote, was an expression of the popular forces of Italy.24 He
demonstrated with many facts that the strength of an army lies, in the end, in its
ties with the people, in the people's support of the army. This strengthens the
morale of the army. The morale of the troops is the main prerequisite of their
strength.25 Arms, training level, and discipline are important to an army's strength.
- Discipline is the foundation of all in a good army. Without it, the ~rmy is a mob,
unsuited for war. Chernyshevskiy opposed the discipline of the rod, and mechanical
drill. An army trained in this fashion "would always fall to an enemy whose soldiers
~are not. dead machines but live beings."26 Chernyshevskiy attached great significance
- to nurturing patriotism, love for the fatherland and the people, awareness of
civic duty, and a sense of personal worth in soldiers of the army of a democratic
- state. .
,
As we can see, justification of wars as a means of social development was typical
of most pre-Marxist intellectuals expressing the interests of the ruling classes.
They suggested a number of ideas which sometimes correctly captured the essence of
certain aspects of war and the army. However, these ideas were nothing more than
conjectures that were not supported by detailed scientific evidence. War and the
army were made dependent on the will of a great personality as a rule, and they
- were felt to be permanent attributes o.'c society, It is in this that the class
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limitations of the authors of these ideas ~nd their idealistic and metaphysical
understanding of social phenomena manifested themselves. At the same time the
materialists, especially those who defended the interests of the oppressed classes, -
viewed war and the army not as perpetual phenomena but rather ones associated with
arisal of an unjust society. They condemned the wars of the exploiters. But these
- were only isolated theses which did not enjoy scientific substantiation. In view
of their theoretical and methodoloa,ical weakness, as well as their social limita-
tions, pre-Marxist materialists could not create a cor~sistent teaching on war and
the army. This task was completed by the founders of Marxism.
2. Ttie Revolution Made by Marx and Engels in Viewpoints on War and the Army
In new historic conditions, when the proletariat entered the arena of tYie class
struggle, Marx and Engels developed a social teaching for this most-progressive
class. Extending materialism into the realm of social phenomena, they caused a
rev~lution in views on society. In V. I. Lenin's words, by doing so they indicated
"the path toward scientific study of history as the sole nat~:Yal path, in all of
its tremendous di�~ersity and contradiction."27 Marx and Engels surmounted the _
- limitat~~ns and other shortcomings of previous sociology, and together with this,
the existing interpretations of war and the army. They also caused a revolution -
in this sphere of human cognition. Critically reexamininy the military-theoretical
legacy of the past, Marx and Engels generalized the tremendous amount of military
- historical material from the standpoint o.f the working class, and they created a
teaching on war and the army based on proletarian philosophy. All of this pre~
determined the start of a qualitatively new, higher stage in the development of'
the teaching on war and the army. Problems posed by former intellectuals were
deeply developed at a truly scientific level, and new important problems associated
with war and the army were posed and solved.
The founders of Marxism deserve great credit for the fact that they were the first
ira~history to sciei~tifically explain the origin and sources of war. Marx and
Engels thoroughly substantiated the dependence of wars on social and hi.storical
_ factors, and they demonstrated the causes of their arisal, which came into being
with the appearance of private ownership, with division of society into antagonistic
classes, and with formation of the state. War arises as a natural phenomenon of a
society of exploitation. It becomes an inseparable property of social relations
based on a system of social and national oppression. The role of war in the functions
of exploiting states grows as their sociopolitical organization b~~omes more complex, _
as antagonistic contradictions grow more acute, and as the results of material pro-
duction are used more and more extensively in the interests or militance. -
Exposing the idealistic "theory of violence", according to which social inequality
is elicited "simply" by violence imposed by some people upon others, Engels demon-
- strated that inequality and classes were not brought: into being by wars, ~hat on the
contrary it was class inquality that caused the arisal of war as a social phenomenon.
The founders of Marxism criticized various antiscienti~ic theories explaining the
origin of wars on the basis of biological, psychological, geographic, and other -
factors of similar nature. They revealed their scientific groundlessness and their
. social purpose--that of covering over the true causes of wars, which were contained
within the very nature of antagonistic society.
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After answeri~g the question as to the causes of wars, Marx and ~ngels were able
- to provide a scientific explanation of the relationship between war and statE
policy: being a product of class-antagonistic society, wars arise and proceed in
belialf of the poiitical interests of ~ertain classes. In war, one of the extreme
forms of violence--armed violence--is used for poli2gcal purposes. "...an act of
_ vio]_ence Engels stressed, "is a political act. "
The leaders of the international proletariat did not restrict themselves to re-
vealing the ties between war and policy. They revealed the root~ of war palicy in
- the economy of the society of exploitation, and they demonstrated that no matter
~ what the motives of war, its roots lie in economics. "...violence is only a27eans,"
wrote Engels, "and the end is something al~ogether different--economic gain.
Marx and Engels also deeply and thoroughly analyzed the nature of wars contemporary
- to them, and they laid the basis for a concretely historical interpretation of wars.
- They closely tied their dialectical-materialistic analysis of wars in with the
general objective of the liberation movement of oppressed masses, and mainly with
the struggle of the working class, and they determined, from the standpoint of its
interests, their relationship to concrete wars of their era. Their works drew the
- distinct outlines of the teaching on different forms and types of wars, and laid
the foundation of a scientific classification of wars.
Marx and Engels divided wars into defensive and offensive depending on their socio-
political content. Defensive wars, they saia, were ones fought by nations and
states with the goal of protecting themselves against foreign invaders, and revolu-
~ tionary wars fought by oppressed classes rising against social oppression. Marx
and Engels categorized aggressive, predatory, and reactianary wars fought by ex-
ploiter classes and states as offensive wars. In this case Marx cautioned that
_ it was wrong to confuse defensive wars with defensive military operations.30
"Defensive war. he said, "by no means excludes offensive operations dicatated .
'by the course of military events'."31 Marxist classiaists felt defensive wars
fought by oppressed classes against the oppressors, and popular wars of national
J liberation, to be legal and historically justified. Cc~ncurrently they sharply con-
- demned, as illegal and unjust, the predatory and dynastic wars of the exploiters.
- Basing themselves on an ana].ysis of the sociopolitical nature of wars, Marx ar~d
Engels examined the role and place of armed violence in historical progress from
a concrete historical aspect. They made a tremendous step forn~ard in the study of
this problem, raising its development to a qualitatively new level.
The issue as to the conditions for excluding wars from the life of mankind and con-
solidatinq peace enjoyed development and ~full scientific substantiation in the works
of Marx and Engels. Regarding war to be an invariable satellite of a society of
exploitation, the proletarian intellectual genuises proved that only the victory
of the most progressive structure--the communist order--would put an end to class
antagonisms and insure the triumph of peace. Thus they dealt an annihilatory
blow against antiscientific bourgeois theories whi~h, justifying the aygres:;ive,
predatory wars of the exploiters, declared them to he a permanent phenomenon, and
asserted that they were supposedly inherent to the nature of human society and that
they were the principal motive force of its development. The founders of Marxism
were the first to scientifically determine the historical bounds of the existence
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of wars. The union of the workers of all countries, wrote Marx, will, in thc erld,
eradicate all wars and lead to peace among nations, since in opposition to the old
society,.the new society will have peace as .its international principle, and each
_ ndtion will have one and the same master--~~:bor.32
_ Mar~; and Engels were the first to pos2 anc: solve the problem as to the relationship
- between war and revolution, demonstrating that this relationship is complex and
contradictory, and that revolution does not necessarily occur through war. They
~ also outlin~d another aspect of this highly impor~~nt nroblem, tyir..g in the possi-~
- bility for cor~solidating peace with revolution. The leaders of the world prole-
tariat believed socialist revolution to be a means for avoiding war. Z~ius, noting
- the growth of miliL-ance in the late 19th century, Engels wrote that hatd a revolution
occurred in Russia at that time, it would have saved Europe from the c;alamity of
- universal war, and laid the basis for a world social revolution.
History also credits Marx and Engels with scientific development of the question
- as to the origin, class essence, and funetions of the army as an armed organization
of the state intended for warfare. They deeply analyzed the antipopular, reactionary
nature of the armies of exploitation, which serve as an instrument of suppression
- of the oppressed classes of their states, and enslavement of the peoples of other
countries, they substantiated the idea that the bourgeois state machine, and the
- bourgeois army, would disintegrate in the course of a socialist revolution, and
_ they demonstrated the need for replacing the old, disintegrated army by a new
- armed organization capable of protecting the revolutionary achievements of the
laborers. The founders of Marxisin defined the nature, the most important principles,
and a number of the significant traits of the proletarian army.
b9arx and Engels made a significant contribution to analysis of war and the army
_ with their work on the prerequisites of victory in war and on the sources of an
army's strength. Basing himself on a materialistic conception of history, Marx
concluded that "the fate of war...rests upon material factors.i33 After this,
Engels revealed the 3ependence of armed violence on material resources. 1ie empha-
sized that "the victory of violence is founded upon weapons production, and in turn,
weapons production is founded upon production in general, and consequently...on the
material resources at the disposal of violence.i34 Without these resources,
violence would generally "cease to be a force."
The Marxist classicists were the first to scientifically resolve ~he issue as to
the role of the popular masses and military leaders in war. They noted that the
success of combat is directly dependent on the morale of the army and people, since
"battles will be won by people, and not by muskets...."35 In the course of war, the
- moral element txansforms into a material force. An army fighting for just goals ~
_ is characterized by higher ideals, resolve, and unity. Defending the true father-
land, a citizen of communist society would fight with inspiration, with fortitude,
with courage.36 In addition to this, Marx and Engels turned their attention to
the fact that the material and spiritual forces of an .~rmy create only the possi-
bility of victory. Its transformation into reality would depend on both the
- conscious activity of the masses and the ability of the organizers and leaders to
_ correctly understand the course of events in war, and direct the actions of the
` masses accordingly.
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~ Marx and Engels made an important contribution to the theory of war and the
- army by revealing the laws governing development of military affairs. They sub-
- stantiated the dependence of the methods and forms of warfare on the level of
development of productive forces and on the nature of production relations. Engels
emphasized that "new productive forces would be the prerequisite of each new im-
provement in the system of wagiiig war."37 He pointed out that fundamental changes
occur in military affairs as a result of social revolution. New social relations
- generate a new system of waging war.
The founders of Marxism demonstrated the revolutionizing influence major technical
- discoveries and inventions have on military affairs. As productive forces develop,
military technology and weapons improve constantly, at an ever-inereasing rdte and
scale. Appearance of new weapons leads to fundamental changes in the strategy of
warfare and the organization of the troops. "With invention of a new instrument
of war...," Marx wrote, "the entire internal organization of the army inevitably
changed, the relationship on the basis of which individuals form an army and are
able to operate as an army transformed, and the relationship of different armies
- to one another also changed."38 Engels noted that "technological advances, as soon
_ as they became ap~licable and did in fact find application in military affairs,
elicited changes and even revolutions in the means of warfare--almost violently,
often even in opposition to the will of the military command...."39 This depen-
dence stems from the fact that improvements in arms have their own source of
development--internal contradictions. The most important of them is competition
between offensive and defensive weapons--the saber and the shield, the lance and
the suit of armor, the artillery projectile and armor plating. Such competition ~
promotes invention of increasingly more effective offensive weapons, in response to
which more-dependable means of protection are created. Engels saw in this competi-
tion a manifestation of the intrinsic law of dialectical motion.
The appearance of a new weapon creates the technical possibility for a turn in
military affairs. After the availability of a new weapon in the troops reaches
- a certain point, fundamental changes also occur in the very foundation of military
affairs. Only the mass use of new, improved weapons, and mass qualitative changes
in the personnel, can lead to a revolution in the means of warfare, to a revo~ution
in military affairs. Discussing such transformations in the second half of the
- 19th century, Enqels wrote that "conscription of all persons fit for military
service into the army, which was now millions of soldiers strong, and use of fire
weapons, artillery projectiles, and explosives of unprecedented power created a
complete revolution in all military affairs, immediately putting an...end to the
geriod of.Napoleanic warfare...."40 When military.affairs assume a new qualitative
state, they acquire a new quantitative character. This law reveals itself as a
constant increase in ~he quantity of army personnel and arms, an increase in the
proportion of equipment in the troops, and growth in the scope of engagements and
wars in general.
The revolutionary intellectual genuises were the first to cor~clude that new social
relations create not only a new system of warfare but also a new military ~cience.
- "...the military science created by the revolution and Napolean," Engels emphasized,
"was the inevitable result of the new relations generated by the revolution.'~41
He suggested the idea that liberat~^r of the proletariat would also express itself
in a special way in military affairs, leading to creation of a unique, new mi.litary
method.
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Marx and Engels also deser;ve tre:aendous credit for developing a number of fundamental
- provisions of the strateg~~ and tactics of the working class in an armed uprising,
wh.ich they validly interpi-eted as an art. In his article "Revolution and Counter-
revolution in Germany" Engels pointed out that an uprising is an art, in precisely
the same way as is war. It follows certain rules, neglect of which harbors fatal
~ conseql~ences .
'Thus, interpreting social de;;elopments from the staadpoint of dialectical material-
: ism, Marx and Engels rritically a~~imilated, qualitati.vely reworked, and developed
_ the achievPments of prior philosoph.ical, politiGal, and ecenomic tho~aght, including
- investigations of war and armies. Surmounting the limitations of the lati:er, they
- revealed the deep economic roots and the class-political n�ture of war and armies,
- demonstrating their historica]_ bounds. Thus they caused a revolution in the
-'I teaching on war and the army, and they created the foundation for the military
program and the military science of the proletariat.
I
3. The Leninist Stage in Development of the Teaching on War and the Army
V. I. Lenin was the brilliant successor of the affairs aiid teachings of Marx and
Engels. "An entire revolutionary era in the life of mankind is associated with
the name and activities of Lenin. Lenin gave answers to the most pressing ques-
_ tions posed by the course of hi~torical development, he comprehensively develaped
the theory of socialist revolution and development of communist society, he armed
the Russian and the whole international revolutionary movement with scientifically
grounded strategy and tactics, and he led the struggle of the w,~rking class for ~
implementation of the ideals of socialism."42 ~
Lenin's activities associated with developing the teaching on war and the army
were also multifaceted and exceptionally productive. He laid the basis for a new,
Leninist stage in improvement of this system of knowledge, one which was the
immediate continuation and a further development of the viewpoints of Marx and
Enqels on the issues of war and the army in new historical cond�itions: in an era
of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, in an era of mankind's transition from
capitalism to socialism, of co].~nialism's fall and the victory of national libera-
tion movements. IInder these conditions, there arose an objective need for scienti-
fically analyzing development of class and national collisions, antagonisms, and -
conflicts in order to permit a correct understanding of the essence of all of the
basic types of wars, and determination of the relationship of thP proletariat to
- them. 2"he new factors affecting the social and military-technical nature of war
- had to be interpreted from Marx:st positions, the working class had to be given -
the theoretical weapons it needed in its struggle against imperialist, predatory -
wars, and the way to pull down the military organization of imperialism in the
course of socialist revolution and to organize armed defense of socialism had to
be shown. This task of historic proportions was completed by V. I. Lenin. He
defended and developed the Marxist teaching on war and the army, and he exposed
its falsifications by opportunists.
The important contributions Lenin and his associates made to the Marxist teaching
on war and the army consisted of their analysis of the essence of war and its
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class nature. :'celying on the premises of Marx and Engels and generalizing the
historical ex~erience of ~aars in the new conditions, Lenin explained the essence
and class nature of war from the standpoint of dialECtical materialism.
Lenin did a tremendous service by enriching the Marxist classification of wars
- with his hypotheses on th~ types of wars typical of the imperialist era. Con- -
- siderinq tne trends of economic,.political, and scientific-technical development,
Lenin pointed out the most important features of modern wars. This permitted _
him to deepen, and maY.e more concrete, the premises of the founders of Marxism -
_ on the role of the popular masses in war, and to demonstrate the possibility the _
laborers had for preventing imperialist wars and the reality of transforming an _
imperialist wa, int~ a civil war. In this way, Lenin also made a significant
contribution to analysis of the relationship between war and revolution.
- Lenin's thorough study of sociopolitical development of capitalist countries in
the imperialist era and his generalization of the revolutionary experience of the ~
working class in the new historical conditions permitted him to enrich Marxist
= ideas on the role of armed violence in the class struggle of the proletariat.
Even before the revolution Ler~in clearly defir.ed the fundamental principles of
development of the working class's military organization. Lenin's analysis of
problems in military theory armed the proletariat with a military program in the
- time of its preparation for and performance of the socialist revolution. Lenin's
work on these issues significantly supplemented and deepened the Marxist teaching
on war and the army.
- The Great October Socialist Revolution was a turning point of world history. It
initiated the era of universal revolutionary renewal of the world, the era of
transition of capitalism to socialism. Socialist transformations in our country ~
laid the basis for revolutionary change of the entire p~anet's social countenance.
_ With the victory of Great October, Lenin and the Communist Party found themselves
facing, ror the first time, the full measure ~f the responsibility for generalizing
- the world-historic experience of the socialist revolution, including the military
experience of the proletariat within it, and of revealing the laws and motive -
_ forces governing development of socialist society and the military organization
of the working class, and its utilization in the defense of the achievements of
socialism. Marxists interpreted the problems of military theory from the aspect
of the most typical traits of the new historical era.
Socialist society came into being in a country encircled by a hostile capitalist
world. Lenin warned that this encirclement, by exerting military, political, -
economic, and ideological pressure, was not about to halt its attempts at re-
storing capitalism or at least re~arding the growth of our social economy, forma-
tion of a new way of life, and development of socialist consciousness.
During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, military problems
acquired vital significance to the state of socialism. "In our times...," Lenin
said in October 1918, "the issue of war, of strengthening the army has priority."43
The ma.in efforts of the military theoretical activities of the Marxists were
directed at resolving this issue. During this period the Nlarxist teaching on war
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and the army served as the immediate sciqntific foundation for formation of Soviet
military doctrine; it provided eff~ctive assistance in organization of an army of
a new type.
V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party decisively fought against bourgeois and oppoY-
tunisi: distortions of the problems of war. There was great significance in the
fact that V. I. Lenin and the party armed our military personnel w~th the prin~i- -
ples of scientific criti~is~ of militant ideology, with an irreconcilable and
' uncompromising resolve to fight for preservation of the purity of the Marxist
- teaching on war and the army, and with the understanding that ideological defeat- -
of the enemy is just as important as his military annihilati~n. �
~
' Posing and resolving the isst-es of war and the army in the new historicai situa-
~ tion, Lenin suggested and substantiatzd the idea of peaceful coexistence among
~ states with different social structures. His great contribution to Marxism wa~
creation of an integral teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland. Lenin
enriched the teaching on war and the army with an analysis of the essence and
( 1Zws of the armed defense of socialism. He clearly demonstrated that protection
oi: the socialist fatherland is one of the most important laws of development a.nd
c~~nsolidation of the new society, and an international responsibility of inter- _
n~tional proletariat,
Lenin was the founder of Soviet military science. Owing to Lenin and his asso-
ciates, the military science of the working class developed from its first days
on the sound theoretical and methodological foundation of Marxism. Relying upon
the premises of Marx and Engels, Lenin exerted the full power inherent to him to -
place a scientific foundation beneath the question as to the mutual relationship
existing between Marxist philosophy and military science. His premise that without
dialectical materialism as a method of scientific cognition, scientists would be
hopeless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations4; has great methodo-
logical significance to military science as well. Lenin was a master of dialecti-
cal analysis of the problems of war, armies, and military affairs. He served as
- an example of aoplication of dialectical materialism to the problems of military
theory, and of practical achievement of a union between Marxist philosophy and _
militazy science.
Decisions of the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of bolsheviks~] Congress
- had special significance to assertion of Lenin's principles for creating the
army of the socialist state. The party program adopted by the ~.~ngress defined
~ the road of socialism's development and cletermined military policy. The congress
j based its resolution on the military issue on the main principle of our army's
development and activities--the Communist Party's leadership of all of the
state's armed forces. The congress pointed out the need for strictly complying
: with the class principle in the army's development, for intensifying formation of
the officer corps out of the proletariat and semiproletariat, for elevating the
role of'commissars and the entire party-political machinery, for improving politi-
cal work in the troops, and for implementing other important measures aimed at
strengtheninq the Rsd Army's battleworthiness. The tremendous significance of
clear centralized control and high military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces
= was emphasized.
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After the foreign interventionists were expelled and the civil war came to an end,
Lenin and the Communist Party raised development of the Marxist teaching on war
and the army to an even higher level. All possibilities were employed in order
to broadly develop military-theoretical research based on the military experience
of the revolutionary masses. Marxists concentrated significant efforts on concep~ ~
- tualizing the experience of World War I and the Civil War, and they determined the
course of development of the Soviet Armed Forces with a consideration for this
experience. Such was the w~ll of the times. "We have seen the end of one stage
of war," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "and we must prepare ourselves for the second;
- but we do not know when it will come, and we mu45 do what needs to bz done so that -
when it does come, we could stay on top of it.
The acquired experiena~ was to go a long way in yuiding the party in its subsequent
work. At the same time Lenin's ideas on military issues had to be generalized, _
and used as a sound theoretical and methodological foundation for development of
the socialist state's military science and formation of Soviet military doctrine
_ fully satisfying internal and extern a'1 conditions.
In the 1920's-1930's the Communist Party posed and promptly solved the problem
of the union between Marxism and military science. It actively fought against
anti-Marxist conceptions in military theory and against the mistaken and hostile _
- viewpoints of "leftist" communists and Trotskyites on the issues of military con-
struction under socialism. The party did a great service by thoroughly analyzing
the tasks arisiny in the course of improvement of military affairs, deeply
analyzing the nature of wars, and revealing the fundamental laws qoverning develop-
ment of the country's military power, with a consideration for new elements
appearing within it and for the features of a future war.
The question as to the unique features of a possible war occupied a cpnLral place
in analysis of the problems of war. It had great theoretical and practical _
significance because the success of strengthening the state's defenses and
gaining a clear understanding of the nature and objectives of military development
dependedi.n many ways on achieving correct, scientific viewpoints on future warfare.
A large group of outstanding military leaders and theorists of the Lenin school
- participated actively and productively in this highly important research--
M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, K. Ye. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov,
I. S. Unshlikht, Ya. M. Zhigur, A. K. Toporkov, S. M. Belitskiy, and others.
They thoroughly analyzed changes in warfare elicited by its sociopolitical nature,
growth in army strength, and the increase in the equipment available tocalmofs.
It was concluded that engagements of unprecedented scale would be typ
possible war. Hundreds of millions of persons would be drawn into the savage ,
struggle---on land, at sea, and in the air, over tremendous territory. In such a
war, the sharp boundary between the fr~nt and the rear would disappear. 7.'he ou'c-
come of the war would be defined not only by decisive victories at the front but
- also by the productive power, organization, and steadfastness of the rear.
It was in this connection that the relationships between war and armed conflict
were illuminated. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. V. Golubev, K. I. Bocharov, and others _
wrote that war is not limited to just military operations alone, that it is also
waged in the economic, diplomatic, and ideological spheres. New forms of conflict
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in the future war were examined: mass attacks ry aviation, airborne assaults in the
deep rear, actions by the submarine fleet, economic blockade, agitation and propa-
, ganda among enemy troops and population, and so on.
The problems of the army enjoyed further development, especially the social~st army.
They were illuminated in documents of the Comintern, in decisions of our party, and
. in the works of B. K. Blyukher, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuybyshev, _
- I. V. Stalin, M, V. Frunze, and oth~rs. The basic trends of militr.r~~ development
- were thoroughly studied. ~
Realizing the decisive significance of man in war and the ~wiftness with wnich _
science and technology were progressing, M. V. Frunze, V. K. Blyuklier, and others
raised the issue of increasing the role of science in the army's consolidation, in
_ personnel traininy, and rnainly in the training of command personnel. Daily atten-
tion was devoted to the task of troop political indoctrination. S. M. iCirov,
M. V. Frunze, A. S. Bubnov, S. I. Gusev, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and others developed
Lenin's piemise that the Red Army was strong due to its political awareness, and
because each of our soldiers knew who an d what he was serving. The power of the Re d
- Army rested upon the selfless devotion of the personnel to tr~e Soviet motherland
and the CommunistParty, on the inviolable princinle of proletarian internationalism,
and on a burning hatred of the enemies of socialism.
Careful analysis of the pressing problems of the Marx~st-Leninist teaching on war
and the army in the period between the wars went a lo'Zg way to promote creation of -
- t~e military-theoretical prerequisites of the Soviet;'~rmed Forces' victory over the
fascist aggressors in the Great Patri~~tic War. -
In the harsh years of war, owing to the theoretical and organizational activity of .
the Communist Party our commanders, all armed forces personnel, and all Soviet
people were armed with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army as a daily
guide in their struggle against fascism. In turn, the practical efforts of Soviet
troop commanders, the combat experience of the army and navy, and tYie heroic labor
of workers in the rear nurtured the party's theoretical activities, and enriched
them.
_ In those hard times the party systematically generalized the experience of the war
and helped military personnel assimilate it in the intereGts of developing military
science and organizing the swiftest possible defeat of the aggressor. The situa-
tion demanded that we concentrate our attention on analyzing the social'essenc~'and
unique features of the war, on publ icizing Marxist-Leninist ideas concerning pro-
tection of the.socialist fatherlan d, on mobilizing all of the strength of the peonle
- to repel the enemy, and on unmaskin g the piratic nature of fascist actions in the
war. The party did everything to insure that the Soviet people would clearly under-
stand ttie goals of the struggle, that they would maintain an unshakeable faith in =
their strength and in their victory, and that they would selflessly fight at the
front and work in the rear.
The just, progressive goals of libe ration and the popular nature of the war fought
- by the Soviet Union were deeply revealed. Analysis of the sources of victory and
the foundations of the state's military power assumed a prominent place, as did
examination of the economic, moral-political, and especially the military factors
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of the victory. Much attention was turned in the study of the army to the mission ~
of liberation of our armed forces.
Following the world-historic victory of the Soviet people and other freedom-loving _
peoples over fascism in World War II, Marxist-Leninist thought found itself faced
by the tasks of critically studying and assimilating the experience of the past war,
and theoretically generalizing all of the innovations that had arisen during it.
This task was completed with a consider_ation for the achievements in economics,
science, and technology, the constant changes occurring in the balance of economic,
political, and military forces of the two social systems in the world arena, arid -
- improvements in troop armament and organization. . -
The conclusions and premises forwarded by Communist Party congresses on the problems `
of.war and peace, military development, protection of the achievements of socialism,
and clevelopment of communism were a tremendous contribution to development of the
- Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. The congress documents examined -
- the unique features of the country's milit~ry power at the present stage, and they '
� substantiated the importance of considering the combined military power of systems
of states--coalitions. The documents placed special emphasis on the growing role
of science and technology in the state's military power and in the fighting power of _
the armed forces. The successes of socialist production and of Soviet science and
technology, noted the 22d CPSU Congress, permitted us to enact a true revolution in
military affairs.
~ ' i
- Problems associated with the army, its functions, and the laws ot its development, _
and the tasks of the party associated with affording leadership to all Soviet
military development occupied an important place in the proceedings of the CPSU
congresses. The CPSU Program adopted by the 22d CPSU Congress stated: "The CPSU
views defense of the socialist fatherland and reinforcement of the USSR's defenses
and the power of the Soviet Armed Forces as the sacred duty of the party and all
Soviet people, as the most important function of the socialist state. The Soviet
Union feels it to be its international responsibility to insure, together with other
- socialist countries, dependable protection and security for the entire socialist
camp . 4 6
The conclusions of the 25th CPSU Congress were a new and significant landmark in
development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Defining the
- y new, grand prospects of peaceful construction, the congress based itself on Lenin's _
premise that development of communism and the country's security were inseparable.
It pointed out the constantly increasir.q significance of scientific research on
the fundamental problems of the clash of forces in war and peace, and it devoted
a great ueal of attention to this problem's examination. The congress described ~ -
the forces blocking the path of the policy of war and insuring peace on earth.
- Countries of the socialist fraternity make up the foundation of these forces. ~
The 25th CPSU Congress determined the specific causes of military danger in the
present era, causes contained within the imperialist camp, and it revealed the
most important manifestations of the aggressiveness of reactionary forces. Forces
of this sort in the USA and~other imperialist states had no wish ~o halt the arms
race, divarce themselves from cold war psychology, or successively implement a
policy of mutually advantageous cooperation and noninterference in the internal _
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affairs of other countrics. Military actions against nations fighting for their -
liberty and independence continued. -
The Soviet Union, the congress emphasized, will conduct its foreign policy, one -
enjoying the respect and support of the multimillion popular masses in all the _
= world, with doubled energy. It will neutr.alize the forces of war and aggression,
promote consolidation of universal peace, and insure the rights of nations to liberty,
- independence, and social progress.
Basing itself on an analysis of the aliqnment of the forces of peace and war, t}ie -
congress pointed out that as long as a danger of war exists, and as long as mili.-
" tant circles pursue the arms race and the NATO bloc continues to function, the need
for str~:ngthening the country's defense capabilities, improving the armE~d forces,
- and strengthening the military-political alliance of the members of tr.e Warsaw Pact
would persist. Our country has supported and will continue to support nations
fighting for their liberty.
- The proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress revealed the fundamental contradiction -
_ existing be.tween bourgeois and socialist armies, they demonstrated the p.rogressive
nature and purpose of the army of the socialist state, and they theoretically sub-
stantiated its historic mission in foreign policy and its role in the internal life
of the countries of socialism.
'The congress deeply analyzed the relationship between detente and the class struggle.
Detente has to do with international relations. It means that disputes and con-
flicts between countries mtist not be resolved by war, by the application of force
or the threat of force. Detente does not supplant, and it does not change the laws
of the class struggle. No one can hope that in the conditions of detente, commu- -
nists would mak~ peace with capitalist exploitation, or that monopolists would
, come over to the revolution.
The fundamental principles of party and state policy in the area of the socialist
fatherland's defense enjoyed legal documentation in the new USSR Constitution. It
emphasizes that defense of the socialist fatherland is one oi the most important
functions of the state, and that it is a matter of all the people. The duty of the
armed forces to the people is clearly spelled out: dependably defend the socialist
fatherland, and maintain constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate re-
pulse to any aggressor. Consequently the responsibility for maintaining constani:
. combat readiness of the troops and naval forces is now a constitut~onal provision. -
Z'he analysis of the most imQortant problems of modern in;:ernational life, made in
the documents of the postwar international conferences of representatives of
communist and workers parties, has great significance to further development of
_ the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. These documents describe the
alir,nment of political forces in the world arena, and they formulate the tasks in -
- the struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism, and against the aggressive actions
of imperialism.
The decisions and documents of the CPSU, of the communist parties of other socialist -
countries, and of the international conferences of representatives of cor.imunist and
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workers parties feed new ideas and premises into the Marxist-Leninist teaching on _
war and the army, and quide and accelerate its development. The quality and
- quantity of works on philosophical, sociological, sociopolitical, and economic
problems of war and armies are growing. They are typified by a wide grasp of
the important problems, and by effective analysis of the a.rising questions.
- New integrated studies based on the systems analysis approach became a significant
feature in the postwar development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the
army. They analyzed the .problems of war and the army on the basis of a unified
philosophical and sociopolitical approach. This approach reveals itself, for ~
example, in the collective works "Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii" [Marxism- _
- Leninism on War and the Army] (published in five editions), "Metodologicheskiye
problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki" [The Methodological Problems of Military -
- Theory and Practice] (two editions), and others. -
Another important feature is the significant expansion of the subject matter dealt
with, the addition of new problems of war and the army, elicited by profound changes -
~ in the sociopolitical and military-technical areas. Priority attention is devoted
to the study of the revolution in military affairs: its causes, essence, unique
features, and.sociopolitical consequences. _
Publication of a number of works on the history of the past war has great signifi-
cance to development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. This is -
especially true of the continuing publication of the t~,~relve-volume "Istoriya vtoroy -
- mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. It provides
a thorough scientific analysis of the events of the prewar and war years.
- In the period under examination a new feature took shape in the development of
_ the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army--analysis of the teaching's -
history itself. This was promoted in many ways by publication of a number of party
documents, as well as books devoted to the 150th anniversaries of the birthdays af -
Marx and Enqels, and the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. 2'his research direc-
- tion is typified not only by profound generalization and multifaceted analysis of
the military-theo"retical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism, but also
by utilization of this rich material to solve the problems of modern military _
development. Mention should be made of collective works such as "Filosofskoye
~ naslediye V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny" [The PhilosopY~ical Legacy of _
V. I. Lenin and the Problems of Modern War], "Karl Marks i voyennaya istoriya"
[Karl Marx and Military History], "Fridrikh Engel's i voyennaya istoriya"
[Friedrich Engels and Military History], "V. 2. Lenin i voyennaya istoriya"
[V. I. Lenin and riilitary History], "Problemy voyny i mira" [Problems of War and
Peace], and others. _
Marxist-Leninist military-theoretical thought also concentrates on development of -
the methodological foundations and,problems of military science under socialism.
Study of the processes and phenomena of presently developing military affairs and
- the phenomena of war occupies an important place in this regard. This is primarily
an analysis of modern warfare in all of its complexity and contradictions from the
standpoint of dialectical materialism. Problems associated with the essence, nature,
_ and types of wars in the modern era, the consequences and h.istorical role of wars,
the relationship between war and state policy in the nuclear age, the relationship -
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between war and revolution, the mutual ties existing between military science and
military doctrine, the essence of scientific control of troop ac~ivities, and
~ other methodological problems of military theory and practice enjoyed especially
deep illumination in recent years. ~5cientific criticism of bourgeois conceptions
of war and armies has become broader. Further development of the Marxist-Lenihis~
teaching on war and the army in the postwar era served as a highly important pre-
requisite for development of the fundamental premises of Soviet military science.
Questions concerning the forms and methods of military activities and the relation-
ship among different resources of armed conflict were answered on the basis of an
analysis of the unique features of modern wars and the fundamental changes occurring
in military affairs. The dominant significance of nuclear missiles was pointed out,
' and at the same time the necessity for correctly accounting for the role of conven-
tional weapons, for avoiding the extremes when assessing both new and existi.ng forms
of armament, and for being ready to perform missions with both conventional and
nuclear resources was stated. These conclusions promoted successful solution of
other complex probletna of military science, which aros~ in connection with the
- revolution in military affairs.
Thus the Leninist stage in the development of the teaching on war and the army is
typified by further development of the entire complex of its problems, and enrich-
; ment of this teaching with new premises and conclusions, as stated in the works
of V. I. Lanin, his associates and scientists, in the documents of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties, and in the works of Marxist-
; Leninist scholars.
The Leninist stage in development of the teaching on war and the army embraces the -
' same historical period that Leninism as a whole does. And this is natural. Develop- -
ment of Marxism is a single process of theoretical reflectian of economic, political,
and scientific life in close interaction with the requirements of the class struggle -
~ of the proletariat against imperialism. Therefore the issues of war and the army
and of protecting the socialist fatherland undergo development within the framework
of the same revolutionary teaching as well.
~
Development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is distinguished _
! by a creative, international nature, by a broad research front, and by an uncompro-
. mising struqgle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology. It is proceeding in -
organic interaction with the practice of socialist military development and armed
defense of the revolutionary achievements of the laborers against imperialist
. aggression. An inseparable tie between the Marxist-Leninist tea..hing on war and ;
the army and practice has great significance to constant growth in its effective-
ness. The following premise stated by the 25th CPSU Congress pertains equally to
it and to all other social sciences: "The tasks facing our social science could
- be completed only on the condition of its most intimate association with life.
_ Scholastic theorizing can only hinder our movement foYward. Only an association
with practice can raise the effectiveness of science, and toda.y this is one of the
central problems."47 It is in daily reliance upon practice, in an inseparable
association with it that we can find a guarantee for constant growth of the effec- ~
tiveness of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and of its influence
upon reinforcement of the defense capabilities of the Soviet state and the entire -
fraternity of socialist countries. _
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- FOOTNOTES
- 1. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 23, p 40.
2. Gobbs, Tomas, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh" [Selected Works in _
~ao Volumes], Vol 2, Nbscow, 1964, p 151. -
3. Ibid., p 152.
A
4. See "Antologiya mirovo~ filosofii v chetyrekh tomakh" [Anthology of World
Philosophy in Four Volumes], Vo1 2, Nbscow, 1970, pp 565-567.
5. See Gol'bakh, Pol' Anri, "Izbraniiyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh" [Selected -
Works in Ztvo Volumes], Vol 1, Nbscow, 1963, p 260.
~ 6. See Uinstenli, Dzherard, "Izbrannyye pamflety" [Selected Pamphlets], Nbscow-
- Leningrad, 195~, p 203.
7. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch." [C.omplete Collected Works],
Vol 4, Moscow, 1948, p 489.
8. See Neru, Dzhavakharlal, "Otkrytiye Indii" [The Discovery of India], Mpscow,
1955, p 126.
_ 9. Gegel', G., "Soch." [Works], Vol 8; Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, p 291.
10. Klauzevits, "O Voyne" [On War], Vol 1, Mc~scow, 1941, p 43.
11. Ibid., p 45. . _
12. See Ibid., Vol 2, p 336.
- 13. See "Tvoreniya Platona" [The Works of Plato], Vol 13, "Laws", Petrograd,
- 1923, pp 23-24.
14. Gol'bakh, Pol' Anri, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh," Vol 2, p 459.
15. See "Tr~ktaty o vechnom mire" [Treatises on Permanent Peace], Moscow, 1963,
p 189. _
16. "Materialisty Drevney Gretsii" [The P~laterialist of Ancient Greece]', Moscow,
1955, p 46.
17. Gegel', G., "Soch.," Vol 7, Nbscow-Leningrad, 1934, p 344~. -
~ 18. See Gobbs, Tomas, "Izbrannyye proizveaeniya v dvukh tomakh," Vol 2, pp 152-153.
19. Ibid., p 668.
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20. "'Kolokol'. Gazeta A. I. Gertsena i N. P. Ogareva. Vypusk 9. 1866-1867" _
- ["KOLOKOL". A Newspaper Published by A. I. Gertsen and N. P. Ogarev. No. 9,
1866-1867], Moscow, 1964, p 1742.
21. See Gobbs, Tomas, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dwkh tomakh," Vol 2, pp 341~342.
~ r
22. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, Moscow, 1949, p 105.
- 23. Bekon, F., "Novyy Organon" [Novum Organum], Moscow, 1938, p 10~.
24. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, p 326.
25. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, p 494.
; 26. Ibid. , p 316.
I 27. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 58. _
i
~ 28. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 20, p 162.
29. Ibid. , p 164.
30. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 33, pp 36-37.
31. Marks, K. and Engel's, F.,"Soch.," Vol 17, p 275.
~ 32. Marks, K. , and Engel' s, F. ,"Soch. Vol 17, p 5. _
i
1 33. Marks, K., and Engel's,F., "Soch.," Vol 13, p 287.
_i 34. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 170. _
35. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 15, p 225.
; 36. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 2, p 539.
~ 37. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 7, p 510. -
38. Marks, K. , and Engel' s., F. ,"Soch. Vol 6, pp 441-4~2.
39. Marks, K., arid Engel's,F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 176. _
40. Marks, K., and Engel's,F., "Soch.," Vol 22, p 537.
41. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "So;.h.," Vol 7, p 510.
42. "K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy Tsentral'r~ogo _
Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo 5oyuza" [The 100th Anniversary of
~he Birth of Vladimir tl'ich Lenin. Abstracts of Reports of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1970, p 3.
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43. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 125.
44. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 45, p 31.
45. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol ~2, pp 143-144.
r,
46. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1976, pp 110-111. _
47. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 73. -
. `
; ~
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. CHAPTER II
ORIGIN AND SOCIAL ESSENCE OF WARS -
= Climbing the endless ladder of social progress, mankind has dragged behind it a
lengthy train of wars and conflicts over the millenia. The insatiable Grim Reaper
of war gathered an abundant harvest for many centuries. The principal instrument
of international disputes and of national and ra.cial discord was the force of arms.
_ Scholars believe that in the last five and a half thousand years there had been
more than 14,000 wars on earth, which took the lives of more than 4 billion persons--
as many as there are now in the present population of the planet. The 20th century
was not an exception in this reqard. Zt~uo world wars unleashed by imperialism in _
just its first half took more than 50 million human lives and annihilated colossal
quantities of material and cultural valuables. After 1945, new wars and military
conflicts arose more than 100 times in the world.
Nor has the danger that imperialism might unleash new wars, including a world war,
disappeared today. Therefore Marxist-Leninist analysis of war and of its origin
and essence has extremely important significance.
~ 1. Origin of Wars and the Causes of Their Arisal
Wars, teaches Marxism-Leninism, are a historical phenomenon. Throughout the
lengthy existence of primitive society, people did not know wars as a sociopolitical
phenomenon. Contrary to this, however, bourgeois sociologists and historians assert
that war has existed since the dawn of man, that it is a permanent phenomenon. As
we can see, that there are two fundamentally contradictory viewpo__its on the origin
of wars is obvious. This can be explained by the fact that the approach taken by
different researchers to the study of war depends entirely upon their class-based
attitude--their philosophy and the methods they use. Only a materialistic inter-
pretation of history faithfully reveals the genesis and social essence of all social
phenomena associated with war. Marxism-Leninism has demonstrated that the history
- of human society is a socially dependent process depending to a significant extent
on the levcl and nature of development of the society's material foundation--its
means of production. It is namely upon the means of production that the relations ~
among people, the social ties, and the contradictions and conflicts arising in
society depend.
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Primitive society, which existed for hundreds of thousands of years, was the very
first stage of social progress. It was distinguished by an extremely low level of
productive forces, and an exceptional dependence of man upon nature. But social _
relations which separated man from the natural environment forever evolved at this
~irst stage of history. This was not a society of domination by some and subo~dina-
tion by others; primitive collectivism and equality were the society's dominant ~
- features. The tribal structure, in which the relations of primitive society attained
their greatest maturity, promoted maximum unification of the efforts of all members
of the tribe in their struggle agains t natural elements, and for survival and
existence.
Consequentl.y the main source of the primitive social structure's progress was a
struggle between natural and sociohis toric factors, man's strugqle with surrounding
nature. The contradictions and conflicts arising between tribes were secondary,
they were not paramount. The primitive means of production was based on common needs
and interests. The social organization of this classless society, which was typi-
fied by a low level of economic development, required close unity and cooperation
within the tribe and family. 2'he natural environment--the cradle and source of the
people's existence--was to them a hostile demoniacal force which could be fought
only if the people were closely unified. Without such unity, people simply could
not have survived.
Armed conflicts between tribes did not have a social nature; they were only -
skirmishes fought in an effort to acquire the best hunting grounds, pastures, and
shelters. They were also fought as vendettas. The founders of Marxism sometimes -
referred to such armed collisions as "ancient wars".1 The element of armed
violence--a permanent attribute of all wars--was present in such tribal battles,
but the only goal pursued by this violence was immediate satisfaction of the
economic needs of primitive people. Therefore Marx felt that "ancient wars" were _
one of the forms of primitive labor. Armed conflicts in pre-class society remotely
recalled wars as we define them today only in form, inasmuch as the sociopolitical
sources of their arisal and conduct did not exist at that time, and there were no
special implements of war. Absence of classes and private ownership in primitive
society deprived "ancient wars" of their main stimulus--they were not fought in -
- order to enslave and exploit the conquered. This was economically unsuitable owing
to the extremely low level of development of productive forces. Captured members
of other tribes were eaten, and sometimes they were killed or accepted into the .
winning tribe.
Consequently the armed collisions of primitive peoples were a continuation and a
part of their common struggle to create the conditions permitting their existence.
Immediate economic necessity was at their basis. Except for blood feuds, they were
to a significant extent chance encounters, and they were not unavoidable. Al1 of
this confirms that war had not been with us forever, and that mankind went through
a very long period of history without the sociopolitical phenomenon of war.
Investigatinq the origin of wars, it is important to understand the conditions of
their arisal and existence; in the modern era, it is also important to understand
= how to prevent and exclude them from the life of society.
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Tne conditions of arisa~ of war are also the prerequisites of the actual birth,
manifestation, and realization of social conflict. They are the prologue of war. ~
We know that at a certain stage of history, the possibility i'or accumulating
surplus production arose as a result of a certain amount of growth in labor
productivity. It becarne the economic source of social violence and inequality. ~
Private ownership, classes, and states arose. Exploiters could no longer survive
without wars as a means for enslaving other peoples and rei.nforcing their domina-
tion within their own country. This historic period of transition caught primitive
society in the stage of its disintegration and at the time of arisal of the slave-
owning socioeconomic formation. Armed aggression, which, as Engels noted, existed
previously "only as a means of revenge against aggression or as a means for ex-
panding territory when it was no longer large enough, was now resorted to only -
for the sake of plunder, becoming a permanent craft."2
After ant~gonistic classes formed, the class struggle became the source of society's
progress, though the initial contradiction (between the social organism and the -
natural environment) can never be fully erased. Striving to acquire boundless
_ wealth, thc classes of exploitation "legalized" the "craft" of war as one of the
means for achieving this goal. Organized armed violence became a permanent element
' of their policy.' ' _
Thus with the appearance of antagonistic class society, its permanent satellite--
wars--naturally arose. All wars without exception were the result of the action of
_ profound socioeconomic processes within this society. In other words the source
of wars and their genesis are embodied within the structure of exploitation itself,
being based on private ownership of the means of production, and on oppression of -
the laborers. But the economic goals of the classes of exploitation are reached -
through the i.mplementation of a certain state policy. In this sense policy is a
"generalization" of economics. "Politics," wrote Lenin, "is a concentra.ted ex-
pression of economics...."3 Lenin's statement is the key to analyzing and under- ~
standing wars as a sociopolitical phenomenon brought into being by the very nature
of a society of exploitation. His premise permits us to understand the initial--
economic--foundation of war, which can be differentiated in terms of concrete causes -
of each war viewed individually. _
� We can distinguish several levels of historical causality of wars.4 First there is
the level of root causes. The overall, root cause of every war reflects the inner-
most production relations of a society of exploitation, and the sociopolitical
phenomena these relations generate, taking the form of armed vio'ence of some
classes (states) against others. War is an expression of ultimate aggravation of
- political conflicts, and it is simultaneously a specific means of their manifesta-
tion and resolution.5
_ In other words the contradictions of antagonistic society create~the permanent
~ base of various sociopolitical conflicts (including those taking the form of
war) between classes and states. _
The next level of causality consists of specific, special causes. They express
the dialectical relationship between the given antagonistic means of production
and the concrete historical conditions, and the social situation under which a
certain form of social antagonism arises and develops. The sociohistoric situation _
in which the general cause of war manifests itself may retard or accelerate its
action.
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The general, root cause of wars is ever-present today, inasmuch as it still persists
within the capitalist structure; however, wars are not fatalistically unavoidable.
It is only when the cause leads to a certain crisis situation that it serves as a
trigger, irreversibly igniting the flame of war. But when the action of concrete
factors that keep the cause of war from manifesting itself is intensified (whpri the ~
balance of forces shifts away from the potential imperialist aggressor, when the _
social movement to prevent war grows, when antimilitant movements become unified, ~
and so on), the possibility for preventing war grows. ~
Within the bounds of historical necessity, as defined by the root causes, events
are unrepeatal~le and unique in their manifestations. A concrete situation ex-
pressing a particular acuity arid maturity of the root causes of war can lead directly
to war, or it may provide a possibility for avoiding war. This depends on the
nature and orientation of the efforts of the masses, classes, and parties, through
the activities of which social necessity is realized. It may even be said that
the specific, special causes of war are a unique manifestation of the root cause
within a particular social situation, in particular historic conditions.
And, finally, we can distinguish another level of causality of wars reflecting
_ unique, particular causes. These are associated with individual factors beYiind
manifestation of the root cause of war in a particular historic situation. A unique,
- particular cause is not the dominant cause of war, but in each case it imparts a .
~ special hue to this process, in a sense supplementing it, giving the root cause
concrete f.orm. 'lhe actions of personalities, social groups, special circumstances, -
and random factors can retard or hasten, and weaken or intensify the influence of
the general, root cause. The general cause manifests itself precisely through a
set of social acts, through the social wilJ, of individuals possessing different
political qualities. A unique, particu~ar cause mainly reveals the dialectics of
necessity and chance in cause-and-eff~ct relationships, and it serves as the means -
by which the general and special causes of war become more concrete. �
Both the general, root c.auses and the specific and particular causes of wars
operate not on their own, not in isolation, but together, in their unity. 2'heir
relationship and their mai>:ifestation in each separate war are unrepeatable and
unique. But uniqueness d~es not preclude the fact that no matter what the circum-
- stances, the root causes, the basic causes always remain the decisive, dominant
causes. The conditions and causes eliciting a social crisis taking the Form of a
war do not disappear completely; instead, they appear to undergo modification,
and they become included within the process of war, representing important elements
of its content.
And so, wars arise owing to the action of cause-and-effect relationships existing
as a complEx structure, owing to the dialectics between the general, special, and
unique causes, with the general, root causes playing the main role. In th~is.case
causality expresses itself differently in different concrete historic conditions.
The chain of phenomena leading to war may not only follow a stable t'rend; they
_ may also deviate from it (we may witness acceleration or deceleration of the .
process of a war's arisal, or even its prevention), depending on the concrete
situations and the concrete actions of personalities and social groups. To put it _
~ another way, the general cause realizes itself in different ways while preserving
its main, fundamental orientation.
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Examination and consideration of the different levels of causality permits us to
gain a deeper understanding of the concrete causes of wars in the present era,
and the ways and means of blocking their znanifestations; it also permits us �o _
~ persuasively reveal the true face of fatalistic and subjectivistic viewpoints on
war.
The events of our days confirm with new force the validity of Marxist-Leninist
analysis o'.~;both the causes of wars and the means of their prevention. In the `
_ face;~f the).'constantly growing power of world socialism and the tremendous inter- -
national ~uthority of the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and other states -
of the socialist fr~ternity, the ruling circles of a number of capitalist countries
have been forced to take certain steps in the direction of realism, toward recog-
nizing the immutable fact that the sole sensible alternative to a war of deva~ta-
tion is peaceful coexistence of states having different socioeconomic structures.
In essence the favorable shifts presently occurring in international relations
reflect a factor of paramount significance: chanqe in the balance of world forc~~.s
in favor of socialism. the bankruptcy of the im~erialist "position of strength"
policy, and the groundlessness of bourgeois doctrines of dicLatorship, pressure,
and threat against states of the socialist fraternity.
Now that the balance of forces has changed in favor of socialism, imperialism's
possibilities for using war as political means for attaining its reactionary goals
has decreased. Under these conditions, peaceful coexistence--the foundation of
~ peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism, a specific form of the
class struggle between them--is at the same time one of the means for restricting
and blocking the general, root cause of wars, a cause built into the structure of -
exploitation.
While the general positions of imperialism have weakened, this does not mean that
its aggressiveness has decreased. Evidence of this can be found in imperialisn's
aggression against Vietnam and the Arab countries, the invasion of Guinea and
Angola by neocolonists, the subversive activities against progressive regimes in
- Latin America, and numerous other facts. As a socioeconomic structure, imperialism
continues to be the general, root cause of all wars of the modern era. The ten- -
~ dency toward iaternational detente has not changed and could not change the internal
social structure of modern bourgeois society or the reactionary essence of the
imperialist state, together with the greed, aggressiveness, and antihumanitarianism
inherent to it.
The aggressiveness of imperialism persists owing to the action of a group o~
factors.
~
First, the end result of the historic duel between the two socioeconomic systems
is becoming ever-clearer. The complete triumph of socialism in the whole world is
inevitable. However, attempting to postpone its fate in the arena of history, -
imperialism continues to place its hopes on military violence. Given the present,
= level of development of weapons and military equipment, the special danger this
course has to peace and the security of nations is clear.
Second, the general crisis of capitalism, which continues to deepen, is revealing
irresolvable internal conflicts in the capitalist system. New centers and
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junctions of imperialist rivalry are forming. Growth in unemployment, financial
and monetary upheavals, stiffening of market competition among imperialist .preda-
tors, stagnation and decline of industrial production, and many other manifestations
of the general crisis of capitaZism clearly demonstrate the scandalous contradiction
with the entire course of social progress into which the capitalist system has
placed itself.
Attempting to find a solution to its critical situation, imperialism is placing
great hopes on intensifying the society's militancy, and on pursuing the arms
race. Just in 1975 alone the total military expenditures of the NATO countries
increased by 10 percent over the previous year's level, exceeding $149 billion.
The military budget of the USA has attained especially large proportions. In the
1977 fiscal year it was $113 billion, increasing by more than $39 billion in just
2 years. The USA's decision in 1977 to initiate production of cruise missiles and
allocate assets for a r.eutron bomb marked the beginning of a new spiral in the arms
race. The allocations were a record for peacetime military expenditures. Growth
_ in militarism increases the potential threat of a;nilitary explosion and creates
crisis situations in international relations. However, the following paradox is
_ becoming more and more evident: The military potentials of the aggressive im-
perialist blocs are growing, but their ability to impose their will upon other
states is relentlessly decreasing. This situation is the consequence of objective -
changes in the balance of forces in the favor of socialism.
Third, imperialism has not been able to accept the fact that its colonial system
crashed in the postwar era. Attempting to retain its influence in vast areas
economically and strategically important to it, and trying to strangle the growing _
national liberation movement, it is resorting to the methods of neocolonialism,
it is evoking armed conflicts in the Third World, and it is supporting the forces
of extreme zeaction.
Imperialism is adapting extremely aggressively to the new situation in the world.
In military terms this means that imperialism is finding it increasingly more
difficult to lay all of its immediate hopes only on a world nuclear war against _
the socialist fraternity. It is becoming more and more obvious that this would
mean the liquidation of the entire capitalist system as well. Therefore, while
not abandoning preparations for a world nuclear missile war, imperialism is placing
special hopes on unleashing local wars, thus attempting to retard the world revolu-
tionary process, and achieve its predatory goals in parts.
- Thus imperialism bears the burden of numerous social ills, including the const~nt
threat of war. And while it has no grounds for counting on victory in war, it is
capable of beginning it. This obliges us to strengthen the defense capabilities
of the Soviet state, and the combat readiness of the army and navy in every
possible way.
2. Z'he Social ~ssence of Wars.
- Having arisen as a social phenomenon, war has attracted the attention of intellec-
t~~als and military leaders as an extremely complex object of cognition since
ancient times. But it was only the classicists of Marxism-Leninism who were abl.e
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- to provide, on the basis of a materialistic understanding of history, a truly
scientific explanation of the essence of wars. V. I. Lenin made an especially
great contribution to solving this problem. In a number of his works, mainly the _
article "The Fa11 of the Second International" (1915) and his lecture "War and
� Revolution" (1917) , V. I. Lenin worked out the methodology of analyzing the social
essence of war. Lenin's fundamental methodological requirement to understanding
- war can be stated as the need for maintaining a consistent class-political approach
to it as a concrete historic phenomenon. "How do we arrive at the 'true essence' of
war, how do we determine it?" Lenin asked, and he replied: "War is the continuation
of state pnlicy. We must study state policy as it existed before war, the policy
which led to and he ralded war.i6
The essence of war cannot be determined apart from an analysis of the entire set -
of socioeconomic and political relations within a state or system of states leading
to war. Describing the essence of World War I, Lenin said: "...we must inspect
the entirP policy of the whole system of European states, in their economic and
p~litical mutual .relationship, if we are to understand the way this system led
directly and unavo idably to this war."~ Criticizing the leaders of the Second
- International for substituting dialectics by sophistry in their explanation of the
essence of war, V. I. Lenin wrote that war is a continuation of state policy by
other, violent means. He emphasized in this case that "this was precisely the
_ point of view held by Marx and Engels, who interpreted every war as a continuation _
of the policy of certain interested powers--and of different classes within them--
at the given time.
This extremely profound thought expresses the most important thing in the Marxist
definition of the essence of war. It differs fundamentally from the interpreta-
tion given to this issue by bourgeois theorists, Clausewitz in particular.
V. I. Lenin referred to Clausewitz many times, praising him as a military philoso- -
pher of his era. But this does not at all mean that Lenin's and Clausewitz'
viewpoints on war are identical, as bourgeois ideologists assert. Quite the con-~
trary. While Clausewitz explained state policy idealistically as some sort of -
abstract phenomenon independent of classes, and believed that war is a continuation
of foreign policy alone, V. I. Lenin approached state policy from class positions.
He viewed foreiyn and domesti~ policy in their aialectical unity, placing priority
- ~n domestic policy, since it exNresses the f undamental interests of classes che
most fully and deeply, and since it is responsible for many processes occurring
in society. This is precisely why, ?,~anin conrluded, "t~:at war is a reflection of -
the internal policy iollowed by the given country prior to a war."9
Domestic policy directly represents and defends the fundamental economic and social
interests of the dominant classes, and therefore it has a tremendous influence on
the nature and content of foreign policy, though in a number of cases ;for example
at the eve or or in the course of a war) foreign policy may play the dominant role
in relation to domestic policy. In this case both domestic and foreign policy,
according to Lenin, are not simply an expression of the interests of the dominant
classes and governme nts, but they also express the "relationship betwee n classes....~~10
And so the assertions of bourgeois theorists that Lenin and ;.lausewitz adhere to the
same viewpoint on the essence of war are entirely groundless, being nothing more than
bare ideological speculation.
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It follows from Lenin's methodological premises that the structure of the essence of
war consists of two main elements: 1) a particular policy and 2) its continuation
in specific form--in the form of armed violence.
War is a political phenomenon, and therefore it possesses all of the functional ,
characteristics of state policy. In this sense, as V. I. Lenin said, "war is policy
- throughout, a continuation of the pursuit, by these classes, of the same goals by
other means."11 In essence this statement contains the fundamental methodological
principle of analysis of war: assessment of all phenomena associated with prepara-
tion for war, and the process itself and consequences of war, through the political _
prism of class interests. Were we to neglect the requirements of this principle,
- all discussions of war would be nothing more than an idle philological exchange.i12 _
Basing ourselves on this, we can deduce a number of mutual deoendencies in the rsla-
tionship between war and policy. Let us note first of all that policy determines -
the orientation and nature of preparations made by a class, a state, or a coalition
for a c~ncrete war. It also defines the criteria of preparedness for war, designates
the goais, and controls the initiation and, to a certain extent, the course of a war. -
While the policy of socialist states, which defends the fundamental interests of the
laboring masses in the struggle against the aggressor, is based on the principles of _
_ social justice, international assistance to class bro thers, and faithfulness to i
treaty obligations, the policy of imperialist states pursuing reactionary goals
rests on demagoguery and treachery. Memory of the fruitless e~iorts of American re- -
actionary circles to break the will for victory of the Vietnamese people is still I
fresh in all; the inhumane adventures of imperialism in Algeria, Korea, the Congo, ~
the Dominican Republic, Angola, and other countries have not been forgotten. And
in each of these and in a multiplicity of other militant actions, imperialism has
hypocritically declared a"struggle for freedom", "fulfillment of obligations", and
so on.
Politics influences the course of war by setting and elaborating on strategic goals. ~
- Through strategy, it influences the concrete forms and methods of armed conflict,
subordinating them to an overall military-political plan. It is only through
political means that the action of all factors deciding the course and outcome of
a war can be coordinated. The close unity existing between political and military
activity in a war also expresses itself in the fact that the foreign political
leadership of a country during a war usually defines supreme military leadership
as well.
State policy also capitalizes upon the results of pas t wars, promoting new goals -
and tasks for the class and society on the basis of the real social consequences of
war.
We naturally need to see the reverse relationship as well: the dependence of state
- policy on war, especially if military activities proceed contrary to the plan. In
this case state policy must be restructured, the goals must be changed, and new
tasks must be posed. Thus when it unleashed World War II, fascist Germany in~ended -
to conquer first Europe and then the whole world. However, after a number of major -
= defeats on the Soviet-German front, the Nazi lPadersh ip was forcen ~o consider some-
thing entirely different--the rescue of the Nazi regime, and so it attempted to make
a separate peace with the Western powers for this purpose. In the end, the
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inconsistency between the posed goals and the availability af the means of their
achievement, and inconsistency resulting from the adventurism of fascist policy,
led to fascism's total downfall.
The reverse influence of war on state policy makes itself known through different -
- channels, but tt;e main one is represented by the results of combat activities, by -
- the victories or defe~ats of troops on the battlefields. In this case the particular
- influence war has on policy stems from de~p-lying factors: the viability of the
concrete social structure, the soci.al relations existing in the country, and the
_ political content of the given war.
Military successes on the fronts of armed conflict may reinforce the political -
slogans, appeals, and political programs of the ruling classes in the minds of
the people. In regard to capitalist states, however, even military successes are
- unable to completely camouflage the harmfulness and the reactionary goals of their
= wars, which are fought for the purposes of invasion, plunder, and suppression of
revolutionary masses. -
War has an especially direct influence upon the policy of classes and states
_ suffering military failures. Many centuries of history have demonstrated that
when exploiting states a.re defeated, all of their internal weaknesses and failures
~ are revealed. The military failures of capitalist countries are promoted by the _
awakening of significant strata of the population from a ohauvinistic trance into -
- which they might have fallen as a result of inilitant propaganda. Class antagonisms
become more obvious, and the laborers begin to realize :nore clearly that it is the
policy of the monopolistic bourgeoisie that is leading the country to disaster,
deva~tation, and deprivations. Defeats at the front also elicit further aggr~vation
of national and racial contradictions in the antagonistic society.
In wars imposed upon socialism by imperialism, on its road to victory the socialist
- state encountered many difficulties of military and economic nature. But in the
end it aia surmount them. We can cite, for example, the experience of the Soviet
- people's Great Patriotic War against fascist invaders. In an improbably complex
situation our society maximally mobilized its material and spiritual possibilities
and turned the course of the struggle in its favor. The tremendous advantages of -
socialism over capitalism, which were realized owing to the colossal organizational
activity and ideological indoctrination by the Communist Party and the heroic efforts
of all Soviet people, welded together into a monolith by a unity of viewpoints,
will, and actions, played a decisive role in this.
~
Consequently politics is the principal component of the structure of the essence
of war viewed as a sociohistoric phenomenon. At the same time w~.r is not simply
or solely politics. An.other component of war is armed violence. War is the continu- ~
ati.on of state policy by a special means inherent to it alone--armed violence, which
is the main resource and the specific characteristic of war.
- The fact that armed violence is dominant in war does not by any means signif}~ that
= war can be reduced to just military actinns alone--battles, encounters, and engage- .
ments. Even in the very heat of military actions, state policy promotes attainment
of the posed goals not only with the help of armed violence but also other means:
conduct of an economic struggle, activation of diplomatic activities, and
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intensification of ideological and psychological influence upon the enemy. State -
' policy is precisely what determines the nature of all measures having military
signiiicance. Only it is in a position to organize and direct the struggle against
the enemy, utilizing all of its forms in the interests of achieving victory in war.
It would be correct to say that armed conflict is the main form of struggle in war.
Without it, war would not be war. Thus certain expressions we hear today--economic,
ideological, psychological, and commercial war--are rather arbitrary, and should not =
be taken literally; they emphasize, first of all, the resources of compulsion~and -
influence used in the duel--economic, ideological, psychological, and so on. But -
these resources can also be used without war.
Any war is always an armed social conflict. But not every armed conflict can be
called a war. Here again the problem lies with more than just the scale of the
- military duel. War possesses a number of characteristics which are not always
~ inherent to armed conflicts.
~ First~ war leads to a qualitative change in the state of the society. This trans-
formation occurs mainly within all of the elements of the superstructure, wirhin the -
political organization of the society. Many state institutions begin to perform
_ new specific functions. The role of the political and legal superstructure grows ,
even more. The ideological resources of the state are channeled almost entire].y
' into supporting the political goals of the war; the entire spiritual atmosphere of.
~ the society changes rapidly, and the population's way of life acquires unique traits.
The economy is placed on a war footing. Centralization of state power is increased,
and all maLerial and spiritual resources of the society are concentrated on supporting
- the war. In an armed conflict, on the other hand, the political goals are more-
limited than in a war, and they do not require fundamental alteration of the entire _
state mechanism, and the society as a whole need not shi.ft into the special state
elicited by war.l'~ -
Second, while every war is generated mainly by the general, root causes stemming
from the economic structure of a society of exploitation--this is even true today,
= special and particular causes expressing unique features in the interaction of a
concrete historic situation and the existing means of production may assume priority
in an armed conflict. And inasmuch as special and particular causes are organically
associated with the general, root causes, armed conflicts may be precursors of a
- war--not only local but also world war. We know of cases in the past where im~-
perialist circles have organized armed coiiflicts many times so as to create an
excu~e for. war.
As we can see, armed conflict does not possess all of the characteristics that make
war a special stat~ of society. However, by its ~ocial essence it is also a conse-
quence of a certain state policy; it is the latter's expression by violent means
- in a concrete area, and it pursues concret~ ~olitical goals, though more iimited .
in scope than those of war.
~ It should be noted that the problem of armed conflicts is now becoming an object
of persistent study by bourgeois theorists. Attempts are also beinq made to create _
some sort of "special science" of conflicts which, in the opinion of Western ideolo- -
gists, should have the purpose of studying the "technique" of conflict, the _
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"mechanism" of its manifestation and resolution. Indicative in this respect is the
collection "Control and Resolution of Conflicts" published in Stuttgart. The authors
of this collect~on examine military conflicts apart from a particular sociopolitical
cOntext, reducing their examination to the development of various logical specula-
tive schemes that stray quite far away from the essence of the problem. Their
attempt to build ab5tract models of conflicts based on game theory, apart from real
- analysis of sociopolitical situations, essentially does nothing more than lead them
away from a real resolution of the issue.
Thus the social essence of war is expressed in the classical L,eninist premise that
war is a continuation of state policy by different, violent means. This premise
is implied by the materialistic, class interpretation of state policy and armed
violence in their dialectical mutual relationship and mutual dependence. It teaches
us to see, in the essence of ~var, not simply the "sum" of state policy and armed
violence, but the deep dialectical unity of these elements in the process of reali-
zation of certain class interests.
The definition of the social essence of war given in the Marxist-Leninist teaching ~
on war and the army is general in nature; it applies to all types of wars. As far
- as the essence of ea~~h war taken separately is concerned, it naturally manifests
itself uniquely each time, in accordance with the nature of the politics, the means
, of armed violence, and the historical conditions. This essence assumes concrete -
form in application to each type and form of war, and each individual war. This
- concrete nature manifests itself in the political content of the war. By reviewing
the political content of a war, we are able to see its role in social development
and give it a general saciopolitical description. This political content differs
- in different historical eras. Thus in the 19th century many wars had a national ~
bourgeois liberation movement as their content. With the end of the 19th century,
= wars began to arise between capitalist states with the goal of reapportioning colonies,
of reapportionin g the world. Wars having defense of socialism as tY;eir political
content arose for the first time in the 20th century. It follows from this that _
analysis of the essence of a concrete war presupposes clarification mainly of it~
political content--its goals, its nature, the social forces involved, and so on.
The Marxist-Leninist definition of the esser.ce of war is also fully applicable to
a world nuclear missile war, which imperialist reaction has still not discounted
as a possibility in its plans. In recent years some bourgeois authors have stated
the opinion several times that were a global military collision involving nuclear
missiles to occur between the two systems, this war would be devoid of any sort of
political essence. The arguments they suggest in favor of this premise are as
follows: No political goals can be achieved through nuclear war, since all it can
do is annihilate civilization; such a war would be not a continuation of state
policy but "a continuation of insanity". "It is impossible in modern times to -
realize political solutions by nuclear means," declared, for example, the French
general A. Beaufr~.i~+ _
- What can we say in th~,s regard?
The authors of the statements cited above confuse two factors: the unsuitability
~ of using nuclear weapons to achieve political goals, and the real essence of a -
nuclear missile war. _
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The fact that some authors have been led to believe that a nuclear missile war
_ could have no political essence can be explained to a significant extent by the
new properties of such a war, generated by human imagination. Were we to look at
the causes, nature, scope, and consequences of war as a whole from the standpoint
of basic methodological premises, we cannot but see that state policy is responsible
for the most significant traits of a world nuclear missile caar as well, deeply in-
fluencing both the probability of its arisal and its prevention. The aggressive
_ policy of militant forces can lead to a nuclear missile war; the peace-loving
policy of socialist countries as well as actions by all other forces fighting
- for peace are capable of preventing this war. In the case of its arisal, a nuclear
missile war would be the mos~t "political" of all wars known to history. This con-
clusion is based on Lenin's thought expressed in his remarks on the book "On War"
by Clausewitz: "The more political it is, the more 'warlike' war begins to seem...,~~15
Were a nuclear missile war to occur, it wauld preserve within its origins the general
= social essence of war: continuation of state policy by other, violent means, con-
tinuation of a policy of aggression by imperialism on one hand, and continuation of
a policy of defense by socialism on the other hand.
_ All policy of the socialist state is aimed at eliminating war trom the life of
society. On the very second day after the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin's
famous Peace Decree was adopted, dec].aring to ail mankind that from that day forward
this country was to be one of the laborers, one which would do everything to affirm
peace on earth, and which would promote in every way the fall of the imperialist
war machine. V. I. Lenin described the October Revolution itself as "the first
- victory in the effort to annihilate wars....i16 Socialism is pursuing this great
- effort with faith and justice. The world policy of the Soviet state and other
countries of the socialist fraternity is based not on competing ideas and tactical
considerations, as is often declared by bourgeois ideologists, but rather on the
limitless possibilities of socialism, certain of the final triumph of its ideals
- even without the need for resc~rting to war, in the conditions of peaceful competi-
~ tion between the two systems. And if in opposition to the will of the peoples the
z fire of a world nuclear missile war does flare up, its root cause would be the
capitalist system, imperialist policy.
It is ~ntirely obvious ttlat it is extremely difficult today for imperialism to
- continue its policy by the "nuclear" avenue, since imperialism's socioeconomic base
and its ~~ossibilities are growing constantly smaller while the forces of socialism,
which re~ect war as a means of resolving international disputes, are swiftly in-
creasir.g. ri'he fact that a nuclear missile war has not started on our planet is
mainly owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and the community of socialist .
states--a powerful force capa.ble of restraining the ac~gressor.
While the general social essence of war would remain the same, some new factors
may arise in a possible nuclear missile war. Z'hey would express themselves in the
- nature of continuation of policy by violent means: first, in having a tremendous
influence upon the future of not only individual countries and coalitions, but all
mankind as well; second, in broad reflection, in the essence of the war, of the
~ greatest technological achievements of recent decades in military affairs and in
exercise of armed violence by fundamentally new technical resources. These resources
would add many new things to the content of the ~rmed conflict itsElf, and they would
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have an influence on all factors defining the course and outcome of the war, but
_ at the same time they would not change its general social essence as a continuation
of poli,y by violent means.
Consequently throughout its existence, war has always been, is, and will be a con-
- tinuation of policy by violent means. The genetic stability of the essence of war
lies in the invariably dominant role of policy in relation to armed violence.
Marxist-Leninist analysis of the origin, causes, and essence ~f wars is not only
one of the most important methodological principles of investigation of the nature
; of past and present wars and arm~d conflicts, but it is also an effective means of
fighting against bourgeois and opportunist falsifiers of these issues.
3. A Criticism of Bourgeois and Opportunist Conceptions of the Origin, Causes,
, and Essence of Wars '
i
i Examining the origin, causes, and essence of wars above, we saw that in the area of
military theory, as well as in other spheres of ideology, a savage, irreconcilable
~ struggle is going on. This problem is the battlefield of two viewpoints, opposite
in their class content, on the causes and essence of wars: on one hand the Marxist-
- Leninist viewpoint, and on the other hand the bourgeois viewpoint, with which various
opportunist points of view align themselves to one extent or another. The met:~odo-
logical and philosophical premises on the essence of modern w,~rs and on the causes
of their arisal, presented in concentrated form in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on
war and the army, are the object of special attacks by Western ideologists and
their opportunist allies. The capitalist countries publish large numbers of articles
and books and conduct numerous studies, conferences, and symposiums with this purpose.
(
- What are the roots of such high attention of bourgeois ideology to the Marxist-
Leninist teaching on war and the army? They can be described as follows.
i
~ We know that the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate
_i philosophical and methodological foundation of Soviet military theory and practice.
~ Guiding military development, the Communist Party bases itself on the conclusions
~ of Marxism-Leninism on the essence, causes, nature, and 'consequences of modern wars.
~ Bourgeois ideologists would wish to distort these fundamental conclusions of Marxism-
I Leninism, and to cast a shadow upon the concrete content of the CPSU's military
~ policy, upon the orientation of Soviet military development, and upon its philoso-
phical and methodological. foundation.
- The growing aggressiveness of the ideological attacks by our class enemies upon the
Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is also a product of their attempts
to theoretically "justify" the militant, aggressive course of monopolistic reaction.
_ Bourgeois conceptions of war, which falsify the true causes of modern wars, ancl
which justify militai�ization of imperialist states, play the role of a unic~ue sorr
_ of theoretical "lightning rod", having the purpose of directing social awareness
onto to a false path. This is why Lenin's words are so important today: "We must
explain to the people the real situation, the great secrecy surrounding the birth
" of war.... It may be that the sophisms in which the bourgeois press engages may
in fact be the main resource for drawing the masses into war..."17
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Within the variegated mosaic of viewpoints of modern bourgeois ideo'logists on the
origin and causes of wars, we can distinguish three main groups. -
The first group consists of conceptions having to do with the sociopolitical
c~eterminism of wars. They essentially explain the origin a,nd causes of war by
differences in the sociopolitical doctrines operating in society. The articles
and books of theorists adhering to this group contain many discussions of the role ,
of politics, ideology, and social institutions in the arisal of crises leading to
war. The reading of such publications by a person unexperienced in the nuances
of bourgeois political demagoguery may create the impression that these the~ries
- are scientifically based. But deeper familiarization with them makes it clear that
there is only an appearance of a scientific approach to this extremely important
problem. ~
= Not one work by bourgeois authors on the causes of wars recognizes the dominant
objective premise�i:hat the socioeconomic structure of the society of exploitation
is the deepest, general, and most permanent cause of all wars and conflicts, both _
in the past and today.
The rather influential sociological school of "political realism" existing in the
USA (H. Morgenthau, A. Schlesinger, W. Whitworth) spreads the assertion that the
struggle for power, for hegemony by all available means is supposedly the basis of
social development--both in the framework of individual states and on an international -
scale. And, using the terms of the proponents of this school, inasmuch as "the _
- communist hegemony is absolutely unacceptable", then a military duel between the
two systems supposedly becomes an unavoidable reality.18 Even peaceful coexistence
is viewed by them as a means of military conflict. Thus the authors of the
collection "Arms and Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age", published in the USA,
feel that "peaceful coexistence is.nothing more than another conception of the -
struggle for domination and supremacy in the world.i19
- Our viewpoints on peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures
are fundamentally opposite to these reactionary views. "Peaceful coexistence,"
reads the CPSU Program, "presupposes: rejection of war as a means for resolving
disputes between states, and insistence upon the resolution by negotiation; equal
rights, nutual understanding, and trust between states, and consideration of each
other's interests; noninterference in internal affairs, and recognition of each
nation's right to independently resolve all of the country's owr: issues; strict
respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; development
of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual
- benefit.i20 Such relations between socialist and capitalist sta~tes are an objective
prerequisite of human society's development. The policy of peaceful coexistence
is opposed by reactionary imperialist circles, which are incredibly persisting with -
military adventures and with the arms race, and which have pursued, and still try
to pursue, a foreign policy "from a position of strength".
Having tremendous experience in social demagoguery and utilizing an entire system
of ideological myths and propaganda slogans, Western theorists are trying to inject, _
into the consciousness of the bourgeois masses, the false tenet that the main cause _
of wars in the modern era is the "Soviet threat", the existence of socialism, cf its
supposed policy "~f achieving domination over the world."
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Manipulating certain passages and premises taken out of context from the works of
the classicists of Marxism-Leninism, bourgEOis ideologists are attempting to trans-
form the very fact of our scientifically justified, optimistic certainty in the
final triumph of the ideals of socialism and communism throughout the entire planet -
in~o an expression "of the expansionistic orientation of world communism". By
_ juggling anticommunist arguments, for example, the American sociologist W. Whitworth
hopes to lead the reader to the hypocritical conclusion that "the USA has been
forced to create a military machine, armed forces, and foreign bases, and pursue
a'policy of deterrence' and engage in military activities only in order to contain
the expansionism of world communism."21
All military-theoretical conceptions of modern militarism are based on this false
premise. The myth of a"Soviet threat", of the "threat of communism" fabricated
in the West serves as a screen covering the aggressive actions of imperialism.
It is being used actively by the enemies of international detente. _
We cannot but see that in a number of cases such tactics could produce temporary
ideological results advantageous to imperialism, and inject false ideas into the
minds of some strata of bourgeois society, deformed by Western propaganda. As the
French sociologist C. Moisy writes in the book "America Under Arms", "the Pentagon
has been able to draw the United States into military conflicts in the past; and in
the present (be it the war in Korea or Indochina) owing to the fact that the average
- American still believes the USA's mission of protecting all Western democracy agains~
world communism."22
Reality itself refutes this myth. The Soviet Union and other countries of the -
socialist fraternity are directing their efforts not at "expansion", as the enemies
of socialism falsely assert, but at the "peace offensive", at deepening detente,
at further improvement of the living conditions of different nations. This humani-
tarian course was clearly re-embodied in decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and in
documents of the fraternal parties of other socialist states. Unmasking the designs -
of our enemies, whose main motive is to spread the assertion of the so-called
"military threat", Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress: "In fact, -
of course, there is no Soviet threat in either the West or the East. All of this
is a monstrous lie--from the beginning to the end. The Soviet Union has no inten-
, tion of attacking anyone. The Soviet Union doe~~ not need war. The Soviet Union -
is not enlarging its military budget, and it is not reducin~ but steadfastly in-
creasing its allocations to raise the welfare of the people. Our country is con-
~ sistently and unwaveringly struggling for peace, and it is const~ntly suggesting
concrete proposals aimed at arms reduction and at disarmament."23.
- Expressing the class interests of the bourgeoisie, the representatives of the
conceptions of sociopolitical determinism of wars declare in their theoretical
- developments that the source of war can also be found in the struggle of the
working class of capitalist states for their social liberation, and in activation -
of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of colonial and dependent
countries.
The scientific groundlessness and social reactionism of such assertions cannot be
doubted. The op~ressed classes and peoples have the historic right to fight -
against their exploiters. 2'hey select the forms of this struggle depending on
the historic conditions--both peaceful and nonpeaceful forms. Thus Marxists are
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not against any and all wars in general, they are only against unjust, predatory, -
imperialist wars. Peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures
does not mean "prohibition" of revolutionary and civil wars fought by laborers for
their social liberation, or national liberation wars fought by people against -
imperialist oppressors. What brings misfartune to people is not these just socio+
political acts, but the policy of imperialism, aimed at strangling the just desires
for liberty and forcing the masses to take up arms.
- 'I'he conceptions of sociopolitical determinism tie the causes of war in with only -
the phenomena of the superstructure, completely ignoring their fundamental econornic
- grounds. And if such fundamental grounds are ever brought up, this is only done
with the purpose of portraying war and the arms race as one of the means for "curing"
the bourgeois economy of its numerous shocks. In reality, however, the arms race
leads not to economic fluorishing but rather to a constantly deepening crisis in _
social relations, and meaningless waste of more and more material resources.
V. I. Lenin aptly referred to the "scientific" arguments of bourgeois theorists
trying to justify these outlays as the vulgar nonsense of a militant.Z4
The second group of bourgeois theories on the origin and causes of wars includes
the conceptions of natural determinism. This group contains the viewpoints of a
neo-Freudian, psychological interpretation, biological conceptions (social Darwinism, ~
racism, neo-Malthuseanism), and so on. i
The proponents of the theory of psychological causality of wars view the mind I
' not as a continuous process of reflection of the objective world but rather as
_ something primordial, unchanging, self-contained, and permanent. The English _
- bourgeois sociologist G. Blainey asserts that the principal mechanism that supposed- _
ly determines whether we are in a state of war or peace is the so-called "primordial
psychological cycle of the world, following which, any society would sooner or later
acquire the propensity to go to war."25 Usually the proponents of this theory place
dominance on subconscious, irrational factors, pathological drives,and "permanent
- instincts". In their opinion, presence of "primordial aggressive drives" within -
man's spiritual structure creates a permanent foundation for his warlike nature,
for his propensity for violence. As an example the American sociologist (A. Meyerlo)
- writes in the book "That Difficult Peace" that "in each of us there dwells a pri-
meval instinct of aggressivei~ess, and man's desire for devastation, for war, and
for conflicts is ingrained in his mind...."2Ei -
Such viewpoints a.re based on the neo-Freudian suggestion that collisions between -
people are supposedly unavoidable and permanent, something stemming from their _
- "inborn aggressiveness". This subconscious drive, neo-Freudians say, is what
elicits social crises in society, and the fall of ideals, hopes, and prospects.
As a result we see amplification of the traits of egoism, individualism, and _
aggressiveness--that is, all that prods people to violence, including armed
violence; leaders in executive positions and possessing such traits determine
whether or not there will be war.27 The psychological basis of military conflicts,
the adherents of this conception believe , is ineradicable.
Different modifications of social Darwinism~ racism, and neo-Malthuseanism ex-
plain the causes of war as the incompatibility of races, as overpopulation of =
~ certain~regions of the world, and as the "demographic explosion". This is yet
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another expression of the deep crisis of bourgeois r~iilitary theoretical thought,
of its powerless social reactionism, of a philosop!iical and methodological inability
to provide a scientific idea of the real social processes and the roots of war.
I n essence the proponents of explaining wars by natural causes mechanically
apply the laws of development of the animal world to human society,'they ignore the
class and socioeconomic causes of wars, and thus they attempt to whitewash the
_ monopolistic bourgeoisie, the principal perpetrator of modern wars.
The representatives of biosocial conceptions of war have become noticeably more
- active in recent years, speculating on some facts concerning overpopulation of -
_ certain regions of the planet and on high population growth,in developing countries.
Z`hey attempt to persuade public opinion that these phenomena are supposedly aggra-- _
vating the struggle for existence, making war a blessing,a means for achieving the
- needed decrease in population. The causes of conflicts and wars, consequently,
- are moved from the social sphere to the realm of natural conditions. ~
Z'he third group of viewpoints on the origin and causes of wars include the concep-
_ tions of bourgeois military sociology centering on so-called technical determinism.
Their essence lies in the assertion that the danger of wars in the modern era stems
_ not from the capitalist means of production and not from the social failures of
bourgeois society, but from the depths of scientific-technical progress. These -
ideas are not new. The roots of such viewpoints extend back to the middle of the
last century, when they were expressed in concentrated form by the bourgeois
economist and sociologist T. Veblen. According to him, science and technology '
- fully predetermine all processes of social life, they serve as the cause of growth
in production, culture, and the needs of people, and they are the source of all ~
_ social antagonisms. According to an updated version of these viewpoints, in the
interaction of two factors--cultural and material--the latter supposedly is far
ahead of the culture factor in its development, and it is gradually acquiring its
owr. independent logic of development, one that is out of the control of man's poweY~
and his political institutions.28
The authors of the book "Breakthrough to Peace", published in the USA, go even -
further. They say that "the scientific-technical determinant of life is gradually
making the latest weapons more and more automated, and thus they are going farther
and farther out of our control. It could be said that arms will become higher
beings, that they will be typified by ultimate manifestations of decisiveness and -
courage; we will tend to trust them more than ourselves."29 The bearers of such
views state that nuclear weapons and automated armament systems, which are supposed'ly
irreversibly slipping away from human control, are transforming irito a"demoniacal
force" and becoming an independent monstrous factor that objectively threatens the
future of mankind. -
Divorcing the achievements of science and technology from concr.ete policy, or -
- identifying social progress with scientific-technical progress, bourgeois ideolo- _
gists usually reach anticommunist conclusions i.n their reasoning. The most
reactionary followers advise no restraint in the choice of the resources for
fighting against revolutionary forces. Thus the notorious American atomic scientist
E. Teller prophesies: "Use of any weapon, of any resources in the struggle against
_ world communism is justified by the very essence of our technological age.~~30
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As with other antiscientific viewpoints on the sources of wars, technical determin-
ism has deep social and gnoseological roots in bourgeois society itself. We know
that transformation of the products of labor into commodities and their alienation
from the producers under capitalism leads to the erroneous idea that things con-
~rol society. Being itself a commodity, technology acquires certain mystical _
traits in the awareness of some people, and assumes the characteristics of a
. fetish. Here lie the grounds for the gnoseological possibility for Western soci-
oloqy to shift, from imperialism to scientific-technical progress, the blame for
many antagonistic phenomena and social diseases inherent to bourgeois society.
Z'he following are typical of all such conceptions that provide a distorted ex-
planation of the origin and causes of wars: in social respects--distinctly pro- , _
nounced anticommunism, and in the theoretical aspect--idealism and metaphysics,
which are hidden in fashionable pseudoscientific clothi.ng.
Basing itself on the interests of the ruling classes of capitalist society,
bourgeois military sociology also prejudiciously explains the essence of war.
While recognizing the relationship existing between war and state policy in their
majority, as a rule Western theorists interpret the essence of a concrete policy
(both bourgeois and socialist) with a bias, in a way advantageous to themselves,
divorcing it from its economic basis and treating domestic and foreign policy as I_
_ oppasite entities. I-
Other viewpoints on the essence of modern war are also widespread in bourgeois
military sociological literature. Some Western authors, as was noted earlier,
feel that the essence of a possible nuclear world war.is devoid of political
content, inasmuch as such a war would lead to universal disasteri the senselessness
of such a war is said to be proof of this in itself. It would not be difficult to
deduce from such conclusions, in particular, extinction of the hope, harbored by
certain aggressive circles of imperialism, of achieving their global political
goals by force of arms. 'I'his trend could have arisen only in an atmosphere of
continuing reinforcement of the positions of socialism, and the influence of its
broad "peace offensive", which has the purpose of affirming more and more strongly,
in international relations, the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with
opposing socioeconomic systems.
Some bc~urgeois ideologists who preach the notion of renouncing war stand on the
_ positions of passivism, and directly or indirectly they condemn the actions of
militant circles making preparations for a new war. 'I'his is a manifestation of
the positive element of passivist conceptions. -
~ Attacking the Marxist theoretical definition of the essence of war as a continua-
tion of policy by violent means, bourgeois theorists are trying to carry this
problem to another plane--the plane of a nuclear missile war's suitability or
unsuitability, asserting in this case that Marxist-Leninist theory supposedly
treats such war as inevitable. This is a gross falsification. Marxism-Leninism
has never thought of war as a means for resolving international disputes, and
it never will. 'I'his premise is written into the CPSU Program.31 It also clearly
states our attitude toward world thermonuclear war: "The efforts of the people
must be concentrated on promptly neutralizing the imperialists, and depriving them
~f their possibility for placing their death-dealing weapons into motion. The
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most important thing is ta prevent thermonuclear war, to keep it from starting."32
The CPSU Program, the USSR Constitution, party congress decisions, and o ther party
documents clearly express the humanitarian principles of Soviet peace-loving foreign
policy.
Analyzing the essence of local wars, modern bourgeois ideologists try to diminish
the role of armed violence in them. Western literature usually defines local
wars basically as ones involving small areas and being characterized by "limited"
use of inen and equipment, "political limitation" of violence, and so on. As an
example in his book "Limited War" R. Osgood asserts that violence is an insignifi-
cant element of local war, that everything supposedly depends on policy alone.
_ Definitions of the essence of local wars place their emphasis on the need for a
' "pacific~tion policy", for fulfillment of "accepted political obligation s" to
other countries, achievement of a"political resolution", and so ~n. Falsely
representing imperialist policy as having a peaceful orientation, bourgeois ideolo-
gists try to reduce the essence of imperialist local wars mainly to political actions, -
to political support ~f what are said to be forced military measures, and so on.
However, as with attempts at removing the entire political foundation from war,
these attempts at reducing war down to policy predominantly (after first distorting
its content) are unable to conceal the aggressive essence of imperialism generating
war, including local wars, which may become the detonator of world war under certain
conditions. And Lenin's assessment of the "minor" wars of the imperialis ts as a
_ continuation of their policy of seizure and slaughter of entire nationalities, and
of unprecedented atrocities fully retains its significance today. Mankind is aware
of numerous facts and documents that have shed light on the true political goals
of imperialism in the wars of recent decades--in Korea, Alge ria, Vi.etnam, the Near
East, and other regions of the planet. _
Various opportunist conceptions also express viewpoints obje ctively in common with
bourgeois theories. When defining the causes and essence of modern wars, oppor-
tunists on the right typically understate the military dange r of imperialism and
overstate the possibilities of moral resources for restraining the threat of a new
world war. Opportunists or ideologists on the right usually see the source of
modern wars mainly in the contradictions of the era--in tlie contradirtions between
socialism and imperialism. 'I'his is fundamentally incorrect. Wars are elicited
- not by the contradiction itself between two opposing socioeconomic systems--wars
had been fought even prior to this, when this contradiction was still nonexistent.
Wars are generated, as was demonstrated above, by one of the two ~ides between which -
this contradiction exists--the imperialist side.
Modern "leftist" opportunism, especially Maoism, cloaks itself with revolutionary -
phrases, and in the area of military theory it specializes in distortion of the
causes, essence, and role of wars in the life of society, declar~ng them to be
inevitable.
Opportunism in theory and political attitude inevitably leads to opportunism in _
practice, to betrayal of the fundamental interests of the laborers. This i~
why the task of unmasking both the bourgeois theories of war and the opportunist
interpretations of this phenomenon is especially important today. What is importanz
= in the struggle against our ideological enemies is not just defending but also de-
veloping the premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.
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- Grounded criticism of bourgeois and opportunist viewpoints permits us to reinforce,
- in the consciousness of the people, scientific, class-based ideas on the causes,
essence, nature, and consequences of modern wars. Assimilation of Marxist-Leninis`c
premises and concl usions on the essence and causes of wars plays a tremendous philo-
sophical and methodological role, since it provides a possibility for each person
to clearly determine his true class position in assessing concrete wars and his _
own practical relationship to them.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 21, p 108.
2. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 21, p 164.
- 3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.� [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 278. -
- 4. Various aspec ts of the origin and essence of wars were studied in the works
of a number of Soviet authors: T. R. Kondratkov, S. I. Krupnov, V. I. Morozov,
Ye. I. Rybkin, G. A. Fedorov, and others.
5. Naturally, not every war resolves existing contradictions to the end. Reso- _
- lution of some conflicts often leads to aggravation or arisal of others.
Only just wars create a possibility for effectively resolving contradictions -
by eliminating class oppression, nationa?_ enslavement, the consequences of ;
- aggression, and so on. ~
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 82. ~
7. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 80.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 224.
9. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 319.
- 10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 43, p 72� `
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 281.
12. Ibid., p 82-
13. For greater detail on qualitative changes in the state of society during a
war, see pp 59-64 of tnis book.
14. Beaufre, A., "Strategie pour demain.," Paris, 1974, p 19. -
15. "Leninskiy sbornik XII" [Lenin Anthology XII], p 397.
16. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 149. -
_ 17. Lenin, V. I., "Poln, sobr. soch.," Vol 45, pp 318, 319. ~
4 8
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18. Whitworth, W., "Naive Question About War and Peace," New York, 1972, pp 77-78,
19. "Arms and Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age," New York, 1975, p 237.
20. "Pr.ogramma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet UnionJ, p 59.
21. Whitworth, W., "Naive Question About War and Peace," p 41.
22. Moisy, C., "L'Amerique sous les Armes," Paris, 1973, p 185.
_ 23. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 22.
24. See "Lenin Anthology XXVII," p 17. ,
25. Blainey, G., "The Causes of War," London, 1973, p 87.
26. "That Difficult Peace," New York, 1970, p 180.
27. Etrioni, A., "The Hard Way to the Peace. N. Strategy," New York, 1970, pp 77-79.
_ ' 28. Dessauer, "Streit um die Technik," Frankfurt am Main, 1970, p 16.
29. "Breakthrough to ~eace," New York, 1969, p 167. ,
~ 30. Teller, E., "Alternatives for Security," New York, 1968, p 61.
31. See "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 59. ,
32 . Ibid. , p 57.
33. See Ler~in, V. I., "Poln, sobr. soch.," Vo~ 32, p 86.
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(~iP,PTER III
WAR AI3D OTfiERS FOgIriS OF ARMED VIOLENCE -
All war is a continuation of state policy by the resources of armed violence.
These resources are used to achieve certain goals of classes and states. But far ~
from all armed violence can be defined as war--it may also be employed onsin~sides. -
lateral basis, while war presupposes mutual use of armed violence by oppo g
Armed violence, being the most acute forra of social violence, is generat~d by
social antagonisms existiny in structures of exgloitation, and it is one of their
- attri.butes. Only the emergence of socialism in the worl3 arena and continual
growth in its political and economic power m~de it possible, for the first time _
in history, to realisti~a~ly consider the notion of ~xciuding tlte use of violence, _
including armed violenc;e, in relations between states.
At the same time the world still contains influential imperilacetresourcesh~f are
doing everything they can.to spoil the process of detente, p
armed violence of ever-greater destructive power into motion, employ atomic and .
~ other military blackmail and, finally, ~.mder certain conditions initiate a new
world war in order to fuxther their criminal designs. Careful analysis of the
histo~ical forms of armed violence can help to reveal the true nature of the plans
of aggressive imperialist circles, and to mobilize'tne popular masses in the
struggle for a sec~re peace and:the secuxity of nations.
1. The Role and Place of Armed Violence in Social Violence
T.he classicists of Marxism-I,sninism fully substantiated ~he origin, essence, and
role of social violence in history. Social vi~lence arose in thE heart of a
socie~y based on privatp ownership, on man's exploitation by man. It is a system -
of economic, political (including military), and ideolagical measures of compulsion
- imposed by some classes and states in relation to others. Armed violence is a
manifestatian of social violence in which armed~resources play the main role in
- the effort to reach par~ticular goals. -
= After its arisal, the exploiting minority found a need for using force to keep
- the exploited masses subservient, and to multiply its wealth ancl privileges -
through seizure of new territories and enslavement of other nations. In response
to the violence of the exploiters, the oppressed.classes rose u~ in arms for their F
- liberation, and they opposed the enemy with the~resou�rces of revolutionary violence. :
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� Since power depends on economic and other social factors, violence is subservient
to these factors~ serving the economic and political interests of classes and
states. "...violence..." wrote Engels in his criticism of (Dyuring):f.or making the
role of violence in history absolute, "is predicated upon economics, which provides
~Che resources for creating and preserving the.instruments of violence."1
_ Viol~nce is organically not inherent to socialism, since socialist society is
based on public ownership, which exclude exploitation and suppression of one
individual by another. Within a socialist state, relationships of friendship and
mutual assistance dominate between people, while foreign policy is aimed at con-
solidating peace, friendship, and cooperation with otner nationG.. But inasmuch as
all of the existence of exploiting states is inseparably associated with their use
_ of violence, Marxists cannot renounce the use of violent means by the laboring
masses as a retaliatory, forced measure in the struggle against the exploiters
- and their system of oppression and violence. V. I. Lenin taught that "Without
revolutionary violence aimed at the immediate enemies of the workers and peasants,
we cannot break the resistance of these exploiters."2 .
Consequently vio~ence has played either a reactionary role in history if its purpose
was to defend outdated social orders, or a progressive role, if it served as an
instrument used,.by progressive forces in the struggle against these orders.
ZUday there are two types cf social violence that are diametrically opposed in
' terms of their class content, social orientation, and role in history: 1) the
reactionary violence of exploiter classes and states, used to preserve and con-
solidate a system of exploitation of one individual by anather, to multiply one's
~ wealth and privileges, and to combat the forces of democracy and socialism, and
2) the revolutionary violence of progressive classes and states, which serves as
- a r,;eans for restraining violent ~:xploiters, and as an instrument with which to over--
throw exploiting classes, defend the achievements of socialism, and eliminate the -
colonial yoke.
V. I. Lenin wrote: "...socialism generally opposes violence against people. How-
_ ever, with the exception of Christian anarchists and the followers of Tolstoy, -
no one has ever concluded from this that socialism is against revolutionary violence. _
- Consequently referring to "violence" in general, without analyzing the conditions -
making reactionary violence different from revolutionary violence, means siding
with the petty bourgeoisie who have renounced revolution, o~ it means simply de-
ceiving oneself and others by sophistry. i3
It is precisely the class content of revolutionary, progressive violence, viewed -
- in inseparable unity with its social orientation and historical role, that i.mparts
to it a retaliatory, forced form of opposition again:t the violent attempts of -
. reactionary classes to perpetuate the system of exploitation and retard the ob-
jective, progressive course of history. _
_ Thus the main criteria used to determine the form of social violence, ir.cluding
armed violence are: the class content of social violence, the historical dependence ~
, and orientation of its action, and the way the resources of social violence are
used.
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As we can see from the above, social violence is a broader cancept than armed -
violence. Social violence manifests itself in different forms--economic, political,
legal, and ~ilitary. In a certain sense it is only to reactionary violer..ce that
we can apply the concept of ideological violence, in which the mass media ideo- ~
logically brainwash the broad masses in the interests of the classes of exploita-
tion.
_ Consequently violence cannot be interpreted simplistically; it cannot be reduced =
to armed violence, to physical action. Such a simplified view is typical of some
- petty bourgeois ideologists and "leftist" revisionists siding with them on this
issue, mainly the Maoists, who are attempting to picture the revolutionary struggle
of the laborers only as a series of armed uprisings, and ~~.:o refer to armed seizure
- of power as the highest form of the class struggle. -
In opposition to these assertions, Marxism-Leninism views not war but the political
struggle, of which war is a possible.DUt not a mandatory component, as the highest
- form of ~..he class struggle. The concept "highest form of the class struggle" can _
be applied to a socialist revolution, which may be brought about by both Peaceful
. and nonpeaceful resources. Z'he classicists of Marxism-Leninism said many times -
that the working class and the laborers would prefer to come to power by the peace- I
~ ful means--that is, by ~he least painful route. However, trying to retard the
, revolutionary process, tne classes of exploitation as a rule place weapons in
motion, and thus they force the oppressed to resort to military resources of con-
flict. ' ~
_ Hence we can see that armed violence is not the highest form of the class struggle, 'I
but the most decisive form of social violence. 'I'he type of social violence to ~
which armed violence is related has a dominant influence on the nature and methods ;
of armed violence. ;
The armed violence of revolutionary classes, and progressive violence in general, I
is typified not only by progressive goals but also by the maximally humanitarian ,
nature of the resources by which these goals are achieved. When revolutionary
classes fight a war that may be referred to as a reaction, they relate humanely ,
to the peaceful population, to the defeated enemy, and to prisoners and casualties. ,
Here lies one of the important sources of the power of revolutionary, progressive i
armies. 'I'he progressive goals of war, when viewed in unity with the humanitarian
methods of the conduct of war, promote development of high moral-political and
combat qualities in soldiers. -
And ori the other hand,� the reactionary goals of unjust wars fought by classes of _
e~ploitation make extremely cruel methods of armed violence necessary. We are
, well aware of the mass slaughter of Communards in France in 1871, the merciless
terror of the external and internal enemies of Soviet power in the period of
- foreign m~.litary intervention and civil war in Russia, the "scorched earth" policy
followed by the Nazis in World War II, and the outrages of the American aggressors
in Vietnam. According to official Pentagon figures, in 1966-1972 American avia-
tion dropped more than 7 million tons of bombs on the countries of Indochina--
~ 3.5 ~imes more than was dropped by it on the fronts of World War II.4 As of the
- ~eginning of 1971 almost 1.5 million Vietnamese had been poisoned, and many died =
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a~ a result of the use of chemical weapons by American interventionists. A tre-
mendous number of atrocities were coimni.tted by other imperialist armies. PunitivE
operations, the slaughter of peaceful residents, destruction of crops, forests,
ancl so on--all of these methods of armed violence, ones which are angrily condemned
by progressive civilization, have become a permanent fixture of the arser.al of
i imperialism. Unjust wars, and barbarian methods used in them, h~ve a disintegrating `
action upon the personality and transform the imperialist army into a band of
murderers, marauders, and rapists.
2. The Forms of Reactionary Armed Violence
Armed violence by reactionar.y classes possesses traits brought about by the place
of these classes in history and by the concrete forms and technical resources of
= violence.
- The historical trend in the evolution of capitalist society has been such that
as it turned from its ascending to its descending line of develoPment, as the
_ prerequisites for arisal of the new society matured ar.d manifested themselves,
~and especially as the general crisis of capitalism began, bourgeo.is society became
- increasingly more militant, and the bourgeoisie resorted with increasing frequency
to armed violence in the name of preserving and consolidating its domination. This
= trend achieved its apogee under imperialism. Imperialism elevated armed violence -
_ to the rank of its highest policy, making it the main resource of systematic alter-
ation of the world, and of the struggle against socialism and the international _
workers and national liberation movements. "...politically," Lenin wrote, "imz~eri-
_ alism is in general a tendency toward violence and toward reaction."5
Imperialism's reactionary nature and its tendency to resort to violence constantly
- manifest themselves today. Utilizing al~. resources, including armed violence,
slander, befuddlement of the public, economic blockade, organization of starva- -
tion and devastation, bri~ery, and so on, imperialism is trying to halt the ob-
jective process of the world revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, _
_ which makes up the principal content of the modern era.
The armed violence of imperialism, which permeates all of its domestic and foreign
- policy, should be defined as the us~, by monopolist bourgeoisie, of its military -
- organization with the purpose of achieving reactionary economic and political goals, ~
both in war and apart from it. 2'he monop~list bourgeoisie mainta~.is large armies,
police, a political apparatus, intelligence organs, and special armed detachments '
for this purpose.
As an example according to data of the London Institute of Strategic Research,
- as of 1977 the U.S. Armed Forces had a strength of 2.1 million men. In all, 5
- million persons were employed by various militarized organizations of the USA.6 -
Despite the fact that a significant amount of time had already passed since the _
- end of the wai in Vie~nam, the numbers of American troops abroad was 500,000 men _
in this same period. Z'he American armed forces have 340 major bases and over -
~ 2,000 other military facilities at their disposal in 30 states.~ 'I'he United
_ States has military treaties and agreements with 40 countries, and it provides
military aid to 50 s~ates.8
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_ As of the beginning of 1977 the combined armed forces of NATO contained about 70 -
- divisions, 10,000 medium and heavy tanks, 3,000 warplanes, and more than 7,000 units
~ of nuclear ammunition. Z'he t~tal strength of the armed forces of all NATO countries
was about 5 million men.9 -
' All of these resources of imperialist armed violence are not only a potential threat
to peace., They are systematically used in the interests of major capital.
One of the typical ~orms of armed violence resorted to by monopolist bourgeoisie
- within its own country is the performance of police functions (dispersal of demon-
strations, laborer.meetings, and so on) by police formations, by troops, and es-
pecially by units specially trained for this purpose. In periods when the revolu-
tionary uprisings of the.people acquire special danger to the power of capital,
imperialists quickly increase their use of armed violence against the laborers, _
_ not hesitating to use even the cruelest measures.
Counterrevolutionary u~:risings and military coups are a widespread form of armed -
violence by reactionary classes. As a result, governments following a democratic
course are overthrown and reactionary governments come into power. Indicative in
- this aspect are the coups in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973). Espionage and sub-
versive activities by major imperialist powers play a great role in the implementa-
tian of reactionary conspi~acies.. As an example the Central Intelligence Agency
(CrA) of the USA partici~ated in the overthrow of the governments of Nbsaddeq in
Iran (1953), Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), and so on. Just in the last 10 or so years
reactionary military coups were conducted with the participation of the CIA in Ghana ~
(1966), Mali (1968), and Chile. -
' The forms of imperialism's armed violence in the international arena have become
more diverse and monstr~us. The first half of the 20th century was marked by two -
~ world wars, started by the leading imperialist powers with the hope of satisfying
their aggressive appetites. The armed violence of imperialism in these wars, es-
pecially in World War II, acquired an all-encompassing nature, drawing hundreds of -
millions of people into its reach. It attained its highest point when in 1941 _
fascism unleashed a war historically unprecedented in terms of its cruelty and
scale against the world's first socialist state. The Soviet Union suffered the
main blow of the most reactionary forces of imperialism. Owing mainly to the -
heroic struggle of our people, inankind.was rescued from the threat of fascist en-
slavement. -
- World wars are a product of imperialism. The resources of armed violence are uti-
- lized in them to their fullest degree. Monopolist reaction used the most destruc-
tive weapons in these wars. While war gases were placed into common usage in
World War I, "mushroom" clouds raised by the explosions of atom bombs dropped by -
American aviation on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki served as the
- finale to World War II.
Imperialism's nreparation for a new world war against the countries of the socialist -
fraternity directly and indirectly express the tendency for manifestation of the
- reactionary class essence of armed violence by monopolist bourgeoisie in its most _
inhumane forms. However, now that the balance of social forces in the international
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- arena has tilted in favor of socialism, it i~ becoming increasingly more risky and
dangerous for imperialism to unleash a world war. Z'herefore militants are devoting
increasingly greater attention to other foxms of armed violence which they believe
to be more flexible and less dang~+.rous to imperialism's existence: local wars,
demonstrations of power, and military blackmail. Thus, as is obvious~y implied by
figures published by the nrookings Institution, since 1945 the USA resorted to the
_ use of armed forces to support its foreign policy actions in 215 cases.l~ Armed
violence was used against peoples rising for their liberation by the armies of
- England, France, and other imperialist states in the last few decades.
Armed violence, which has penetrated deeply into the day-to-day policy of imperial- ~
_ ism, is a means of both direct aggression and political and psychological pressure
in international affairs. Imperialist states undertake special actions having the
purpose of exerting political and psychological pressure on the policies of certain
countries and on the class forces within them. Such actions include military
maneuvers, transfers of ground troops, fleets, and aviation to the borders of the
_ state selected as an object of terror, placement of troops located at bases near
the given country in combat readiness, flights to its borders by warplanes, and so on.
~ Thus the U.S. Navy participated many times in demonstrations of power along the
coast of Southeast Asia and Africa, and in the Mediterranean Sea. In October 1962
, the government of the United States placed its armed forces, to include the 6th and
_ 7th fleets and several thousand warplanes, on combat alert, and concentrated about
250,000 enlisted men and officers and over 200 ships for an attack on Cuba. A
naval blockade of Cuba was organized. The republic was threatened openly by in-
vasion. "...we made plans for 2,000 sorties," wrote R. Kennedy, "and the landing
of marine infantry and paratrooper assault parties; several carriers, two heavy
_ cruisers, 25 destroyers, ana a significant number of auxiliary ships were aoncen-
trated in the vicinity of Cuba.... The American Armed Forces were brought to full
combat readiness throughout the world."il The world was placed at the brink of
war, and it was only the decisive and, at th~e same time, flexible foreign policy
of the Soviet Union in Cuba that permitted the Cuban people to defend their revolu-
tionary achievements, and maintain the peace.
In December 1971, when the Indo-Pakistani conflict beg~:i, the U,S. government sent
a naval squadron to tne shores of the Indian peninsula in order to exert pressure ~
= upon progressive circles in India and Bangladesh which had demonstrated their oppo-
sition against military violence by the reactionary circles of Pakistan in power
- at that time. However, the firm position of the Soviet Union ana other socialist
states, which supported the just struggle of the peoples of India and Bangladesh,
_ avertea armed intervention by imperialism in the Indo-Pakistani conflict.
Major imperialist states are resorting more and more frequently to another form
of armed violence--use of inercenaries and of the armies of their "junior partners"
to fight against developing countries assumi.ng a progressive path. Typical in
- this regard were actions by bands of inercenaries hired by Western monopolies in
the Congo and other African countries during the time of achievement of their
national independence, partici~ation of units and subunits of the armed forces of
Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand in the dirty war in Indochina,
. participation of troops of the South African Republic in the intervention against
- Angola, and Israeli aggtession against Arab peoples.
.
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International imperialism not only inspired Israeli invaders and supplied their
military macnine with weapons and modern combat equipment, but also supported them
in critical moments by concentrating their troops near the Arab states. It is
known that at the time of a new outbreak of Israel's war against the A.rab peoplea
in October 1y73, the USA immediateLy provided broad military assistance to Israel,
placed its troops in combat readiness, and sent its fleet into the area of the
Near East conflict. ~
And so, imperialism has been using armed violence in the modern era mainly to
fight against socialism and the international workers and national liberation
movements, to preserve obsolete social orders, and to retard�the pace of social
progress. It has also been used several times in internal skirmishes of the -
- reactionary forces themselves, but it has mainly been directed against the principal _
- re volutionary forces of modern times. The logic of historical develoFment demands
that the violence of the reactionaries be opposed by the power of socialism, the
international working class, and all other progressive forces having the objective -
- right and responsibility to employ all forms and methods of the struggle in behalf
of the defense of social progress, and that particulas forms and methods be compe-
tently utilized in accordance with the concrete situation.
3. The Forms of Revolutionary Arrned Violence Used by Laborers
Various military organizations of the progressive classes and states serve as the
instruments of revolutionary armed violence. Each social organization arises and .
functions in a concrete situation. It may include an entire army, a workers -
militia, partisan formations, or an armed nation. ~
Armed violence of the proletariat came into being and underwent development in
- the course of its resistance to the regular troops of the reartionary classes.
S uch was ttae case, for example, in the days of the Paris Gommune, when reactions
of the armed public against the regular army pZayed a tremendous role. "Had the
Paris Commune not relied upon the authority of the armed people against the bour-
geoisie," Engels emphasized, "it could hardly have held on for more than a day."12 _
The armed uprising was historically the first form of armed violence by laborers.
The classicists of Marxism-Leninism viewed it as one of the possible forms of -
revolutionary transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of
the groletariat. Marx and Engels taught that we should view the uprising as an art,
~ that we should master its laws, and that we should act sensibly, boldly, and de- _
cisively. "...the armed uprising," wrote Lenin, "is a special form of political
struggle following special laws...,~~13
The party of the Bolsheviks made broad use of the experience of the Paris Commune
and the December (1905) armed uprising.in Moscow in its preparation for the armed _
overthrow of the Provisionary Government in October 1917. This path was the sole
possible one in the situation that had evolved.
After February 1917 the Communist Party maintained a course of peaceful develop- ~
- ment of the revolution. However, it was forced to call the proletari.at out for an
armed uprising in the face of the unceasing attempts of the counterrevolution to
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destroy the revolutionary organization s of the laborers, peasants, and soldiers,
- and to crush the struggle of the laborers.by armed resources.. Under these concrete
- situations the armed uprising of the proletariat in Russia in October 1917 became -
- an objective necessity. By implementing this uprising, the Communist Party insured
a swift and least painful transfer of power into the hands of the working class,
and decisive defeat of the counterrevolution. Detachments'of the Red Guard--the
prototype of the future Red Army, an army of a fundamentally new type--made up the
. main fighting force of the uprising.
The revolutionary movement of the 20th century reveals to us that the armed up-
rising remains an important resource of conflict within the arsenal of the revolu-
tion, one used in a particular situation precluding the possibilitx of peaceful
development of the revolution. It is capable of achieving decisive goals.
As an example the armed uprising of the Vietnamese people against the Japanese
invaders in 1945, which occurred under the influence of the Soviet Armed Forces'
= li.beration mission in the.Far East, initiated their 30-years' heroic struggle for
the liberty of their motherland against Japanese, French, and Amet~ican invaders.
This struggle culminated with the total victory of the Vietnamese people. The
armed uprising of Cuban revolutionaries headed by Comrade Fidel Castro marked the
beginning of c~vil war in Cuba, which ended with the persuasive victory of pro-
, gressive forces.
Deznonstrations by revolutionarily predisposed units and subunits of the PortugesP -
- army, supported by the masses, led to the overthrow of the fascist regime in
- Portugal (1974). .
The experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the subsequent
struggle against interventionists and White Guards demonstrated that the Red Guard
- detachments were not enough to oppose the hordes of the international and internal
counterrevolution. Creation of the regular Red Army became a new stage in organi-
zation of revolutionary armed ~violence, satisfying the tasks of protecting the
_ revolutionary achievements of laborers against imperialist aggression. This was
an objective necessity following from the laws of social development and the uniquE
features of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism.
The combat actions of the army of a new type are the most decisive form of revolu-
tionary armed violence. The Soviet state used this army in response to imperialist -
aggression. Defending the highest ideals and the most progressive social structure,
the Soviet Armed Forces displayed exceptional decisiveness, and the yearning and
ability to achieve total victory in all of its struggle against the aggressors.
.'The following facts support this more than persuasively. Our army annihilated the
overwhelming majority of the Axis forces on the Soviet-C~rman front--607 enemy
divisions. For comparison we can note that Anglo-American troops in West Europe,
North Africa, and Italy destroyed only 176 enemy divisions. The German losses on
the Soviet-German front were 10 million killed, wounded, and captured--more than
_ 70 percent of fascist Germany's total manpower losses in World War II. The fascist
_ invaders lost three-fourths of their aviation, the bulk of their tanks and artillery,
and more than 1,600 warships and transport vessels on the Soviet-German front. In _
. the Far East, the Soviet Armed Forces destroyed the Kwantung Army, a Japanese troop
grouping of impressive strength.
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Another form of the just arn,ed struggle of the popular masses which had arisen in -
the distant past is broadly employed in the deEense of socialism as a supplement :
. to the combat activities of a regular army--the partisan movement. The methods of
the partisan stxuggle a~e Extremely diverse: raids, ambushes, diversionary move-
ments, joint combat activities together with regular army units, and defense of _
liberated regions.
Hundreds of thousands of Soviet partisans and underground fighters operated in
the enemy rear during the Great Patriotic War. Z'hey provided active assist.ance to
the Red Army. The whole people's support made the partisan movement very powerful.
The population of areas temporarily occupied by the Germans replenished the
partisan detachments and supplied_food and clothing to them. By their decisive
= actions the partisans contained a significant quantity of enemy troops on the Soviet-
_ German front, doing tangible harm to them.
The partisan movement also developed succes~fully during V~orld War II.in Yugoslavia,
Poland, France, Greece, Italy, IndocMir~a, China, Burma, and other countries. _
Following World War II the partisan methods of the struggle for the motherland's
liberty were employed by patriots of Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, Campuchia, Angola, Guinea,
_ Mozambique, an3 other countries. ~
~ Reactionary classes cannot.but see the fighting effectiveness of partisan methods, ~
- and they are trying to incorporate them into their own fighting forces. At the
end of World War II the Germans are known to have attenpted to create peoples'
militia detachments, which adolescents, men exempt from the army due to age or
illness, and women were forcibly compel~led to join. However, because of the swift
~ victo.rious advance of the Red Army.,.breakdown of the fascist Reich, and absence of -
_ serious support from the German population, these detachments did not have any sort
- of significant influence on tlle course of combat activities at the front. -
2'he Pentagon devotes significant attention to preparing diversionary detachments -
that could utilize, at the needed moment, the methods of the partisan struggle
in the rear of regular enemy troops. But even these efforts could not produce the -
desired results. By its class na~ture and possibilities the partisan movement is
fundamentally different fxom various bandit and diversionary groups created by
reactionary circles. Partisans fighting for progressive ideals rely on the whole
people's assistance. The bandit and diversionary groups of the reactionary classes
operate as an antipopuYar force, and they do not enjoy the support of the laboring _
masses.
~ Imperialism is constantly trying to conduct its policy "from a position of strength".
- It creates centers of military danger, and it concentrates its shock military
_ groupings in the most diverse regions of the globe. Under these conditions the _
Soviet Armed Forces are called upon.to display high alertness, and to dependably
protect the peace and security of.nations. 7.'he Strategic Missile Forces and the
- National Air Defense Forces are serving comnat duty, ready to make an immediate
retaliatory strike against an aggressor. In the period when imperialism sharply =
aggravated the international situation and raised tension to the extreme limits
in the Caribbean in 1962, the Soviet government took additional steps to raise the
combat readiness of the armed forces.
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Thus concern for maintaining high combat readiness of the socialist army is sub-
- ordinated to the goals and tasks of.~the peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist
state, and it reflects the objective necessity for protecting it against the
intrigues of the imperialist aggressors.
4. Society in a State of War
- With the beginning of a war, armed.con~lict becomes the principal means of achieving
_ political goals, and a factor causing changes in the social life in the interests -
of achieving a military victory over the enemy. Wars from different periods of
history can serve as an example.
'I`he main goal of the wars of slave-owning states was the capture of slaves. Only
their regular replenishment could support the functions of the slave-owning struc-
ture. Wars influenced the state of society, and the position of different social -
strata. They devastated the..plebians, tearing them away from their prodtictive -
, labor, but they enr~ched the patricians. During wars, the population was reduced,
entire cities perished, and vast regions were devastated. Thus Carthage was
wiped from the face of the earth. Z'he Tatar and Mongol invaders ravaged signi~i-
cant areas of Ancient Russ. Through wars, conquerors often made profound changes
, in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical life of other countries. It was in this
" way that feudalism of more-finished.form than that seen, for example, in France,
where_it evolved naturally, was introduced into England.l4
The relationship between.military activities and the economic, political, and
ideological changes occurring in warring states grew stronger in the feudal era.
In some countries wars accelerated transformation of free peasants into serfs.
"Under Karl the Great," wrote Marks, "French peasants were also devastated by
war, such that t~ey had nothing left to do but transform from debtors into serfs.~~15
A significant part of the wealth of warring states was often annihilated on the
battlefields arld excluded from economic turnover. Significant transformations
occurred in society and in the structure of industrial production. As an example
during the crusades the. Italian cities of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa essentially
became the "commissaries" of the warring armies.
But not all wars fought in the feudal era caused great transformations in social
life. They were often limited to just troop activities alone. Such wars did not
lead directly to abrupt turns in the economic, political, and idE~logical spheres
of society. As a resu,lt the illusion of ..full consistency, of the identity of
the concepts of war and armed struggle sometimes ca+~ne into being; this illusion
was also promoted by the fact that each time, war begins only with the initiation
of combat activities, with the beqinning of an armed struggle. -
~
_ However, as social life and its economic and social organization grew more complex
and as the scale of wars broadened, the warring countries underwent increasingly ~
deeper reorganization into a war economy. The wars of the imperialist period
demonstrated that most of them were associated with tremendaus stress upon a].1
of the material and spiritual strengths of the people, and with significant changes
in all social life of the dueling states.
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~ 'I'his revealed itself especially clearly in the two world wars of the 20th century, _
in a series of civil wars (in Russia, .Spain, and China), and in a number of othe.r
military collisi~ns. All other forms of activity engaged in by social forces
were subordinated to the armed struggle. War ma~ie a u.nique impression on the ,
entire life of nations. Discussing the experience of Soviet military development
during the years of foreign intervention and civil war., Lenin.emphasized that this _
experience cannot be interpreted as an i.solated experience. War includes within
- itself all forms, all areas of deve2.opment."16 _
M. N. Tukhachevskiy deeply studied the influence of war on the life of society
on the basis of Lenin's ideas. He wrote: "While feudal wars and all subsequent -
wars prior to the great French Revolution had the outwar3 appearance of being
separate from the life of the entire countrX, with further development of capitaZism,
war and social_.life intertwined more and more closely. While the tactics of a =
theater of war involved the maneuvering of manpower on the fronts of a war, the
- conduct of war by industrial countries taday entaxls the maneuvering of the country's
manpawer and economic resources.i17
_ Tukhachevskiy nfl~ed the great practical harm cauyed by defining war narrowly as
only the actions of arn~ed forces. In his opinion the general staffs of all warring
- imperialist po~vers prior to 1914 did not think'deeply enough about preparing not
only the armies but also their entire states, especially their economies, for a
protraated and burdensome war. As a consequence significant difficulties arose
at the beginnir~g of World War.I in switching the economy to a war footir,g, this i
process requiring a long period of time.l8 ,
~
~ The experience of history teaches us that when we reduce the concept of war to the i
- armed struggle of troops, we understate the decisive role played by the popular ~
masses, diminish the significance of political leadership in war, and prevent a
correct understanding.of the role of the unity of the front and rear. Such mis- ~
takes would be especially dangerous in a.modern war, which would have a universal ~
nature and impose extremely high requirements on development of the military.
Uependable support of the-motherland'.s armed protection presupposes complete and ~
all-out use of the country's econom~c, political, scientific, moral, and specifi- ~
� cally military potentials. _
- Of course, the degree to which a country's social life changes in different wars
is far from the same. When a large state fights a war against a small one, the
socioeconomic lives of the two undergo different degrees of alteration. Neverthe-
less, in any case war is a qualitatively new state of the society in comparison
with peacetime. With the k~eginning of a war, one type of relations maintained
within the limits of the rules of peacetime law are substituted by another type,
in which the economic, po Iitical, and ideological forms of struggle are inseparably
associated with the armed struggle, and support it. Classes waging the war try
to subordinate the entire life.,of the country and all functions of the state to
the objective of defeating the enemy through the resources of armed violence. Th.ese
trends mar.;'s:fest themselves in every state, but the possibilities and laws of their
manifestation and of a country's transformation into a single mi.litary camp differ
in relation to capitalist and socialist states.
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In a case where imperialist agg:ession is imposed on a socialist state, owing to
- the latter's socioeconomic nature and the moral-politi~al unity of the society,
the socialist state is capable of mobilizing all of its resources for the struggle
against the enemy in a srort time. 'I'hese advantages.were d.emonstrated fully during
the Great Patriotic War. The Leninis.t Communist Party--the leading and guiding
_ force of Soviet society--was the inspiration and the organizer of the selfless =
struggle of all the people of our great socialist motherlard against the fascist
aggressors. In response to its call, all Soviet people rose to the defense of
the fatherland as one man. Devoting all one's powers to the cause of victory be-
came the inviolable law of the life of each Soviet patriot. -
Organizing the repulsian of fascist Germany's treacherous attack, the party energet- -
ically initia~ed the state's economic alteration. The country's military economy
grew and developed quicicly. While in 1940 only 15 percent of the national income _
was being spent on defense needs, in 1942 these outlays grew to 55 percent. The _
bulk of industrial production--68 percent--was carra.ed out in support of the front.~9
= The war also demanded serious changes in the state's domestic political life, which -
had to subordinated to the objective of the enemy's military defeat. The new condi-
tions unavoidably elicited extraordinary forms of party leadership of the country's
entire life. By decision of the party's Central Committe? Politburo, the State
Defense Committee (GKO) was formed, and all of the power of the country was concen-
trated in its hands. Local extraordinary organs--city defense committees--were
created at cities on the fron.t. The institution of party organizers of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks) was expanded at the most
important enterprises, as was the inst.itution of sector secretaries in local party
organs. Political sections were formed at motor-tractor stations and sovkhozes.
- "Implementation of extraordinary forms of party leadership of the nationa'1 economy _
= permitted the party to switch it to a war footing in a short time."20
~ With the beginning of the war, rigid centralization was established in the work of
state and social organizations, elections to the soviets of labor deputies were
temporarily postponed, martial law was instituted in a number of oblasts, and some
other measures were implemented.
The party's entire ideological activity was subordinated to the goal of victory.
, Political ideals, legal rules, morale, literature, and art ~vere all aimed at
mobilizing the popular masses for the defeat of the fascist invaders. Simultaneously _
with traditional methods, speci�ic methods were also employed in the ideological
struggle aqainst the aggressor, especially on territory temporarily occupied by
the enemy as well as among the'troops and population of the enemy.
Z'he activities of the party and state in the economic and ideological spheres -
t:ere intimately intertwined with the struggle on the diplomatic front, which also
experienced profound changes in its content and methods. The diplomatic efforts -
of the Soviet Union were channeled into creating and strengthening the anti-Nazi ~
alliance, at apening up a second front as quickly as possible, and at achieving
international isolation of Nazi Germany.
Under the guidance of the Communist Party our country won a victory of worldwide
historic proportions. The Soviet people were the chief creator of this victory. -
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Unified about the Co~nunist Paxty, they committed an act of heroism having no equals
in history.
I* stands to reason that bourgeois society, the entire life of which is permeated
by the uncompromising class struggle, doe~ not have such possibilities for be~
coming a unified, monolithic force. This is why imperialist ruling circles
- preparing for and con3ucting a war make broad use of ineasures to brainwash their
armies and the public, and why they deprive laborers of their elementary rights.
All changes inevitably occurrinq in bourgeois society during such a period bear .
the impression of a structure of exploitation, and they have an antipopular orienta-
- tion. We know.for example that during World War II a system of forced labor, com-
parable only with a similar system of slave-owning times and pernGi.tting monopolies
_ to enrich themselves to an unprecedented degree, was created in fascist Germany to
support the standing army. The num~ber of foreign citizens forcibly conveyed into
Germany to work at its.enterprises exceeded 7 million persons in 1944. The social
system of the Western states in the anti-Nazi alliance also made it possible to
shift the entire burden of the war ont~ the shoulders of the laborers and insure
high profits for the monopolies. =
Summarizing the above, we can isolate the following most typical traits of modern
war as a special state of society, and demonstrate its differences from a state
of peace. -
_ First, military resources acquire.the main role in implementation.of state policy,
which has an effect on all social relations within a country and on its mutual
relations with other states. 2'he society's economic, political, diplomatic, and
ideological activities are subordinated to the interests of the armed struggle.
Modern world war necessarily presupposes maximum exertion of all of the powers of
the state, and a stubborn armed st~uggle by the army and other combat formations _
gaining their direct support from the country's economic, diplomatic, and ideologi- _
cal efforts.
The ratio of different forms of struggle and their influence upon the course and
- outcome of a war have a complex dialectical nature. Wars of different types and
- scales can have different~effects upon a given form of struggle, which as a supple-�
ment to combat activities of the troops can acquire special significance in the `
attainment of victory. Demanding a concrete historical analysis of every situa-
- tion that evolves, V. I. Lenin wrote that "different forms of struggle assume
priority, becoming the main forms of struggle depending on variations in the
political, national cultural, personal, and other conditions, and in turn, the
secondary, incidental forms of struggle undergo modification in this connection."21
_ The course and results of armed struggle and of the actions of troops, while re-
maining constantly dependent on economics, diplomacy, and ideology, are them- -
selves capable of influencing the potentials and prospects of these other forms.
Let us look at the facts. 7.'he victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great _
Patriotic War, which immeasurably raised the authority of the U5SR, prc~moted achieve-
ment of our foreign policy's important goals. Thus the victory of the Soviet troops
. at Moscow had a decisive influence, unifying the forces of the antifascist alliance.
It had a sobering action upon the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey which, after
the beginning of fascist Germany's agqression, were simply waiting for an appropriate -
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= moment to attack the USSR. As a result of the defeat of fascist troops at Stalin-
grad, disorder in the ranks of the fascist bloc grew intense. As in 1941, the -
ruling circles of Japan and Turkey were forc~d to restrain themselves from
entering the war against the Soviet Union. The defeat of the Germans at Kur5k -
and other victories enjoyed by the Soviet trocps iii 1943 initiated the disinteg~a-
, tion of the fascist bloc. Germany's isolation in the international arena deepened. _
It was claar to the entire world that the USSR was capable of defeating Nazi Germany -
and its satellites and liberating Europe.on its own. In this situation tie govern-
ments of England and the USA could no longer drag their heels in opening a second
front in Europe. In June 1944 Anylo-American troops landed in France. But even
a.fter this, the Soviet-German front continued t~ be fihe decisive one. In response
to the annihilatory blows of the Soviet Ar~med Forces in the concluding period of -
the war, the fascist bloc fell apart forever. The victory of the Soviet people in- -
spired the peoples of *nany countries to fight actively agai.nst the invaders. In
the course of the war against a common enemy the Soviet Union acquired new allies.
International relations of a new, socialist type began to evolve with a large _
number of them. The circle of countries with which the USSR established diplo- -
~ matic relations widened, their r_umber increasing .f.rom 25 at the eve of the war to
49 at its end. ~
No matter what achievements there might be in the economic, diplomatic, and ideo-
~ logical areas, they cannot decide the fate of a war on their own. Their role is
necessarily mediated by the armed struggle of regular troops, national resistance,
'and partisan detachments. In the end, the advantages achieved in economics, science,
diplomacy, and ideology manifest themselves in the course of armed struggle through
the quality and quantity of the troops and the artfulness of their actions. ~
, It is entirely obvious that the enemy's military resistance is broken mainly
through military resources. Inasmuch as military violence is the principal re- -
source of war, the next world war, were imperialism able to unleash it, would
first of all be typified by a decisive armed collision of unprecedented cruelty
between opposing class forces--socialism and capitalism. The outcome of the war
will be deterinined primarily on the battlefields, by people having perfect mastery
over modern combat equipment and possessing a high moral spirit.
Second, war as a special c';ate of society presupposes shifting the economy to a =
war footing. The importance of war industry increases. Structural changes occur
in the se~tors of the natioiial economy, resulting in their prepo�3erate production
of war products. The nonproductive outlays of material resources and their irre-.
versible loss rise dramatically. While during World War I material valuables worth
$338 billion were annihilated, in World War II these losses increased by alm~st
' 12 times to exceed $4 trillion.22
The standard of living of the laboring masses declines significantly in war. ~
As a rule, food and industrial goods are rationed. 2'he birth rate drops, and
migration of the pcpulation increases.
Third, war elicits profound changes in the political superstructure. The role
of the army among all of the instruments of pclicy g~ows sharply. The country
assumes a wartime position partially or completely. In the interests of the war,
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structural transiormations are made in state organs and state power is centralized _
further. New goals are set for the resources of ideological iniluence. .
~.'here is great methodological signifis:ance to defining war as a special stata -
of society, since this pennits us to scientifically study the basic ways to con- -
tinually reinforce the defense capabilities of the Soviet state and all countries ,
of the socialist fraternity. When we :iefine war in this way, the conclusion we
necessarily reach is that we must thoroughly pre~are socialist society to repel
possible aggression by imperialism. Such preparation presupposes, in addition to
- increasing the combat readiness of the armed fo~ces, constant cor.cern for economic,
moral-political, ideological, and diplomatic support to the defense capabilities
r
of the socialist fatherland.
FOOTNOTES
- 1. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." iwvrks], Vol 20, p 171.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [C~~mplete Collected WorksJ, Vol 40, p 117.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 296.
4. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, IQo 3, 1973, p 3. .
5. LPnin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 27, p 388. _
~
6. "The Military Balance ?~76/77," AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, December 1976, p 45.
- 7. AIR FORCE TIP~S, 3 3anuary 1977.
- 8. See "SShA: vneshnepoliticheskiy mekhanizm'. Organizatsiya, funktsii, _
upravleniye" [The USA: Its Foreign Policy Mechanism. Organization, Functions, _
Control], Moscow, 1972, p 134.
5�. "The Military Balance 1976/1977," AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, December 1976, p 55. -
~ 10. PRAVDA, 13 February 1977. ~
11. Cited in the book: "Armii stran NATO" [Z'he Armies of the NATO Countries], _
Moscow 1974, p 34.
12. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 18, p 305.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," V~l 34, p 382. _
14. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., �'Soch.," Vol 46, Part I, p 479.
15. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soc.h., Vol 25, Part II, p 148.
- 16. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 76. _
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~
17. Tukhachevskiy, M. N., "The Issue of Mpdern Strategy," in "Voyna i voyennoye ~
_ iskusstvo v svete istoricheskogo materializma" [War and tlie Art of War in
Light o~ Historical Materialismj, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p 115,
18. See Ibid., p 115-116.
19. See "Sovetskaya ekonomika v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg."
[The Soviet Econo~y in tlie Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Moscow, 1970,,p 32.
_ 20. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo SoyLZa" [History of the Commu-
nist Part of the Soviet Union), Vol 5, Book 1, Ma~;;,cow, 1970, p 167.
21. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 14, p 2.
_ 22. See PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSI7~LIZMA, No 7, 1969, p 30. E
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i
I-
I
i
CHAPTER IV
TYPES AND SOCIAL NATURE OF MODERN WARS .
Wars in~luence all sphex~es of soc~~l life and affect the fundamental interests of
all classes and social groups, and therefore they evoke a certain attitude toward
themselves in these classes and groups. Z'he popular masses may supporr a certain
war, and thus promote its victorious conclusion, or they may remain passive to its
- goals, and even actively oppose it. This is precisely why social assessment of
wars and the orientation of the popular masses relative to the nature of wars
have always been in the center ~f attention of political and military leaders and
ideologists of the most different persuasions.
~I'his problem is acquiring even greai:::_r acuity today in connection with the fact
that the world's largest armies are now supplied with nuclear missiles. Decisively
unmasking the attempt to falsify ~he nature of wars by militant ideologists,
Marxists-Leninists counter their attempts by th~~ir own conclusions based on a
scientific classification of wars. A scientific~. de~inition of wars permits the
Marxist-Leninist paxties to develop a proper strategy and tactics for resolving the
main issue of modern times--the problem of war and peace.
1. The Methodology of Classifying Wars
A scientific methodology for classifying wars was fully developed by the classicists
of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin made an especially great contribution to this problem.
- Ii. enjoyed further development in the program. documents of the CPSU and the entire
international communist movement. Questions pertaining to scientific classification
of wars have been deeply illuminated in the theoretical works of the contemporary
= Marxist scholars.
War is a multifaceted phenomenon having certain traits and characteristics. Among
- them there are significant and insignificant ones, and principal and secondary ones.
- The more thoroughly a war is an alyzed and the more fundamentally its significant
facets are revealed, the fuller would be the assessment of a war. The scientific
classification of wars is structured precisely on the basis of a determination of
t~e most important aspects of war.
l '1'he most significant criteria used in.classifying wais can be combined into three
groups: 1) sociohistoric, 2) quantitative, and 3) military-technical. The first
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_ group of criteria affords a possibility for assessing wars as sociopolitical phenom-
ena, for revealing their place within the framework of the historical era and their -
influence on social progress. The second group of criteria permits us to determine
the scale of a concrete war in time and in space, and to establish the number and
groupings of its participants. Using the third group of criteria we can reveal -
the nat wre of the armed struggle and the technical resources employed in it. This _
= is especially important today, when revolutionary changes in the equipment of many ~
armies are occurring under the influence of scientific-technical progress.
All of these groups of criteria are closely interrelated, The technical resources
_ of conflict, for example, depend on the extent to which the state's econoit~y is -
developed, on its economic structure, while the latter, as we know, is the founda-
_ tion of the political organization and its goals.
The classicists of Marxism-Leninism used all three groups of classification criteria -
- in their assessment of concrete wars, but they placed priority on the sociohistori-
cal criteria, since only they pro~ide a possibility for clarifying why a given war
, is waged, and the policy of which class it is a continuation.
One of the most important sociohistoric criteria for classifying wars is the re-
- ~lationship of a war to the era. "We cannot understand a given war," V, I. Lenin
taught, "without understanding the era."1 This criterion derives from the methodo-
logical principle of examining all social phenomena on a concrete historic basis.
"The war musk be placed within that historic situation in which it proceeds, and
_ only then can we determine our rel~.tionship to it."2 We can use this criterion to
scientifically establish the periods of history into which wars fall--wars of the -
slave-owning era, of feudalism, of capitalism, and wars of the modern era. .
_ Inasmuch as each historic era undergoes certain stages in its development, the most
diverse types of wars can be found within the limits of a single era. "An era is
called an era," wrote Lenin, "because it encompasses the sum total of diverse
phenomena and wars, both typical and aty~ical, both large and small, and typical r
_ of both advanced and lagging countries." Thus subdivision of wars into different _
types, which permits us to view a war as a single two-sided process, is a concrete
- expression of the first classification criterion. -
Lenin attached great signi~icance to classiPying wars in relation to types. In
- August 1915 he wrote the following to A. M. Kollontay: "I believe it theoretically
_ wrong and practically harmful not to distinguish between types of wars."4 Many of
I,enin's works contain statements having methodological significance to understanding
this category. The premises he formulated in his letter to I. F. Armand on 19
January 1917 and in his lecture "War and Revolution" (May 1917) play an especially
important role. In his works, Lenin uses the system of economic and political ~
relations between states and classes involved in a given war as the basis for sub- -
dividing wars into different types.5
~
The category "type of war" combines a certain group of wars having similar character-
istics that are the product of unique features of a concrete historic system of
economic and political relations bEtween states and classes and the contradictions
� between them they generate, as well as of the w~.ys and means used to resolve these
contradictions.
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Inasmuch as the word "war" in the concept "type of war" presupposes an integrated,
two-sided process, the name of the type of war indicates both warring sides asso-
ciated by a concrete system of econo:~nic and political mutual relations (for example
a war between imperialist states).
However the goals of the two opposing sides may differ.significantly from one
another depending on which class or state the war is being fought for. Therefore
it becomes necessary to define the class and political orientation of the war
_ fought by each of the warring sides.
a Marxists distinguish another classification criterion based on the class and
po~irical orientation of wars--the social nature of the war. This criterion dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of wars: just on one side and unjust on the other,
or unjust on both sides. The concept "kind of war"combines just or unjust wars
differing in terms of their concrete political content. In this connection the
kinds of wars are subdivided into forms of wars, which imply concrete just or unjust
wars of a certain historic era. We will see this more graphically somewhat later,
in our examination of the structural nature of wars of the modern era.6
The brilliant leaders of the proletariat also use quantitative criteria to classify
wars. Thus they distinguish between local and world wars with a consideration for
the range of the goals and the nuznber of participants of a war, and the space over
which military activities were carried on.~ This subdivision has great theoretical
and practical significance. The consequences of a war and its influence upon the
state of mankind depend significantly on how local or global it becomes. Under
modern conditions, due to closer mutua.l relationships between states, even local
- wars affec~ the interests of nations on all continents, and harbor the possibility '
_ of mushrooming into world wars.
In terms of the number of participants in a war �nd the groupings they assume,
we subdivide wars into those fought by two states and by several states, and
coalition wars. A tendency toward waging coalition wars can be observed in the
modern era. Of course these coalitions may not always be obvious, but for practi-
cal purposes a duel between even individual countries may be "supported" by co-
alitions of countries behind them. Z'his can be explained by the ever-increasing
polarization of forces in the international arena.
Also included among the quantitative criteria is the duration of wars. In this
aspect we distinguish between swift and protracted wars. Many wars of the modern
era lasted for many years, even though their initiators counted on achieving their
designs in short time, As an example the hope of the Nazi clique to win the war
with the USSR with lightning speed was foiled by the Soviet people. The war dragged
on for almost 4 years, and ended with the total defeat of the fascist aggressors.
The attempt of American imperialism to conduct a new variant of the blitzkrieg in
Vietnam also f~iled. The heroic Vietnamese people selflessly fought for their
~ liberty for many years witk~ the support of peoples of the socialist countries, and
they won their struggle against the giant of the capitalist world and its Saigon
puppets .
_ The military-technical criteria for classifying wars are placed in an independent
group. The most important among them is the nature of the military equipment and
weapons employed.
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Inasmuch as the arisal of new types of weapons causes fundamenta.~_ changes in the
methods of military activities, when we describe a war it is very important to con-
- sider the achievements of military-technical progress. It should be kept in mind
in this case, however, that a new weapon does not displace former resources of armed
- conflict immediately and completely. This can be explained by the fact that, firSt,
neither warring side wants to risk immediate rejection of tested weapon models,
and second, new weapons are never available in sufficient quantity to instantaneously
- occupy a monopolistic position in the arsenal of technical combat resources. More-
_ over it takes a significant amount of time to master a new weapon.
The military-technical criteria for classifying wars (or, more precisely, their
individual stages) also include the means of combat activities. In different
stages, the same war may be dynamic and fluid, or it may be distinguished by a
certain degree of stasis. The categories "mobile warfare" and "static warfare"
are broadly employed in the history and theory of the art of war.
All of the classification criteria namec~ above are essentially objective, reflecting
- certain facets of war. Were we to fail to consider any one of these facets, our
assessment of a war would be incomplete. Modern bourgeois politicians and military
officials, meanwhile, make ready use of the quantitative and military-technical
criteria while attempting to ignore the sociohistoric criteria of their classifi-
cation. As an example according to the classification presently used in the USA,~
there are four variants of modern wars: strategic nuclear war (implying a war
_ between coalitions of imperialist and socialist states); nuclear war in a theater
of war (one in which tactical nuclear weapons are employed) leading to limited goals;
conventional war in a theater of war (using only conventional weapons); conventional
war in a theater of military activities or in a limited region of a theater of war.
As we can see, this classification is based mainly on the quantitative and military-
technical characteristics of wars. When forced to comment on such a classification,
bourgeois officials do everything they can to distort such issues as the essence
of the war, its social nature, and the political contradictions being resolved by
resources of armed violence. And this is no accident. Objective analysis of these
problems would inevitably lead to the conclusion that imperialism is a constant
source of military danger to all mankind.
Problems associated with defining the types and social nature of modern wars have
acquired the greatest acuity in the ideological struggle centered on military
issues in the international arena. Z'his can be explained by the fact that the
= contradictions between scientific, Ma~ist-Leninist analysis of wars and the anti-
scientific conceptions expressing the viewpoints of bourgeois ideologists and
rightist and "leftist" revisionists reveals itself most obviou~ly in the funda-
mentally different relationship maintained toward the different types and socio-
- political nature of wars.
2. Types of Modern Wars
A scientific approach to defining the types of wars presupposes examination of
the basic types of antagonistic economic and pelitical relations of the era, and
the contradictions inherent to them.
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- The modern era is typified by the following basic types af antagonistic economic
and political relations: 1) between socialist and capitalist sociopolitical
systems (states); 2) between the working class and all laborers of antagonistic
states on one hand, and the dominant classes, mainly the monopolistic bourgeoieie,
- and the forces of extreme reaction of these 5tate5 on the other; 3) between nations
fighting for their national li.beration or assuming a path of sovereign development,
and imperialist states pursuing a colonial or neocolonial policy; 4) between
capitalist states.
Antagonistic economic and political relations of the modern era contain within
themselves the possibility of war, but it should be considered in this case that
- on their own, ~hey do not transform a possibility of war into a reality. Such
_ transformation occurs owing to the aggressive course of imperialism and the
actions of those reactionary forces which see military violence as the best means
for resolving existing contradictions. As far as socialist countries as well as
other revolutionary forces of modern times ar~ concerned, they pursue a course
aimed not at starting but, on the contrary, at preventing war. To them, resorting
- to military means is a forced, retaliatory measure in opposition to the violence of
- reactionary states and classes.
As history attests, the type of war fought be tween states (coalitions) representing
opposing social systems--capitalist and socialist--is associated with the first
type of economic and political relations and with the social contradictior~ of the
modern era stemming from them. Wars of this type included the war between the
- capitalist interventionists and tne Soviet Union (1918-1920), the war between
fascist Germany and its allies on one hand and the USSR on the other (1941-1945),
and the war between the American aggressors and the Vietnamese people.
Relations between the working class of a given state and all laborers of antagonistic
states on one hand and the dominant classes, mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie
and the forces of extreme reaction, on the other occupy a special place in the
system of economic and political relations of the modern era. Civil war corresponds
to these relations. The warring sides may be represented by the following depending
_ on the maturity of the society's social structure: in capitalist states--the working
class and its allies on one pole and the bourgeoisie, mainly the monopolistic
bourgeoisie, on the other; in developing countries--a bloc of progressive forces
~ against the society's reactionary forces. Despite certain differences in these
wars (in the social composition of the warring sides, their goals, and so on), they
make up one type of wars--civil wars, resulting fram social antagonisms within the
~ society of exploitation. Examples of civil wars fought in the modern era include
the civil war in Russia (1918-1920), the civil war in Greece (1946-1949), and
civil wars in a number of other countries.
The type of war fought between nations striving for national liberation or
assuming a path of sovereign development on one hand and imperialist states pur-
suing a colonial or neocolonial policy on the other is associated with the next
type of economic and political relations of the modern era.
Antagonistic contradictions existing between peoples striving for their indepen-
dence on one hand and their imperialist oppressors on the other are resolved today
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- in two ways: Either the imperialists are forced to "voluntarily" leave their
colonies and resort to veiled means of exploiting these countries in view of the
hopelessn~ess of presently employed methods of ~olonial oppression, or'they attempt
to openlli hinder historic development, going as far as military violence, in which
- case the peoples of dependent countries are left with no other choice than to fight
for their independence with arms, in just the 1960's-1970's the peoples of more
than 30 countries of. Asia and Africa were forced to take up arms to achieve or
defend national independence. ~
- Another type of war possible in the modern era is war between capitalist states.
_ For example despite the attempts by anti-Soviet forces to immediately direct
- the aggression of fascism toward the USSR, World War TI had its beginning inside
the capitalist camp. The.military conflict between the capitalist states lasted
for 6 years with varying degrees of intensity. In this case after Nazi Germany
attacked the USSR, a certain group of capitalist countries--the USA, England, and
- others--was compelled to establish an alliance with the socialist country in order
to win its war against the second grouping of capitalist states opposing it. -
- We cannot exclude the possibility of wars between capitalist states in the future,
though obviously because of the deepening general crisis of capitalism, for the
_ sake of its class interests the mc,nopolistic bourgeoisie is striving to somehow -
dull the sharpness of the contradictions existing within the capitalist system.
Its policy in the world arena is being defined to an ever-greater degree by the
- class goals of the common s~ruggle mainly against the socialist fraternity.
Certain armed collisi~ns occur between developing states, but obviously they cannot
be treated as an independert type of war. The fact is that some of these countries
maintain a socialist orientation while others follow a capitalist path. Therefore
' the relations between these groups of states reflect the typical antagonistic re-
lations of the era already discussed above. Countries with a socialist orientation .
- try to resolve their disputes by peaceful means. Falling under the increasing in-
- fluence of the imperialist powers, states following the capita].ist path lay their
hopes on force in a number of cases.
- Armed collisions between developing countries are not in keeping with the interests
- of their peoples, hindering the growth of their economies and their national
consolidation. Such states face a multiplicity of domestic problems, success.ful
solution of which cannot be promoted in any way by war. Armed collisions between
_ them are a manifestation of the pernicious influence of the legacy of imperialism
and the acute economic, political, religious, ethnic, and other problems left to
- the young countries, they are the consequence of the criminal policy of imperialist
reaction attempting to capitalize upon these conflicts for its own mercenary
interests, and they are the result of the short-sighted actions of some political
leaders of the developing states. -
Such are the types of wars in the modern era. It should be kept in min~ that
~he type of concrete war does not always manifest itself in pure form. 5ome
_ wars are an alloy of different types. Let us look at World War II as an example. -
- It possessed both the characteristics of a war between two groupings of imperialist
countries, and those of a coalition war fought between imperialist states headed
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by Nazi Germany on one hand and a socialist country--the USSR--on the other. It -
is entirely ~bvious that a eompiex phenomenon such as World War II cannot be
interpreted within the limits of a single type of war, since this would be a
simplification of the problem. -
_ The social interests of the bourgeoisie encouraged its the~rists to create their
own classification af wax�s, one that is far from scientific and far from objective
in relation to both modern and past eras.
Highly indicative in this regard is the two-volt~ae work by the American socioloqist
and lawyer Q. Wright "A Study of War", which was republished several times. 2'he
author ~bases himse lf on an abstract metaphysical definition of the essence of war,
identifying it with any conflict occurring not only in human society but also in
_ the animal world. Wright's approach to war is typically nonhistoric, biological,
and psychological. It is on this antiscientific basis that he structures his -
classification, dist;i~zguishing four types of past and modern wars. The first type,
the American theoris'~t declar~s, includes "wars between animals". These are "wars"
based on the use of violence by one species of animals against another or against
members of the same group. 5tudy of "war" between animals, in Wright's words,
."contributes much to our understanding of wars between people." The second type
- includes "wars between primitive peoples." They were supposedly "the most im-
portant factor of cultural development," they cultivated courage and obedience, -
and strong qroups that were able to occupy significant territory were created
with their assistance. 'I`he third type consists of "historic wars" of the past
between civilized peoples having a written language. Wright believes the causes
of these wars to be a custom of crueity and aggressiveness, a warlike morality,
and political despotism. Finally, thP fourth type includes wars fought by highly
developed nations using ~:~dern equipment and weapons.8 .
Such a classificat ion of wars rests on a false interpretation of the socio-
historic process, including that of war. The author glosses over the qualitative
difference between conflicts in the animal world and in human society, between
classless and clas s societies, and between armed collisions of primitive society ~
and the wars of c lass-antagonist formations. He does this in order to perpetuate
war, to expand the historic bounds of its existence indefinitely, and to represent _
it as an ineradicable, fatalistic phenomenon. Z'he class purpose of this apologetic
classification of wars cannot evoke any doubt.
_ An arbitrary approach to classification of wars is also typical of other bourgeois -
sociologists and military officials. They distinguish "religious", "national",
- "philosophical", and other wars as special types. As an example the West German
A general W. Baudissin, who had occupied important posts in NATO, defines the
following types of war: religious wars of the 16th.century; "abstract" wars of
- the 17th and 18th centuries; national wars of the.l9th century; "philosophical" _
wars of the 20th century (following the Great October Socialist Revolution). This
classification is also groundless, laeking objectivity, inasmuch as it is created
without a conside ration for the fundamental socioeconomic and class-political
chaYacteristics of wars. It has no scientific value, and its purpose is to deceive ~
- the gopular masse s. ~
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The attention of bourgeois ideologists to classifying so-called "minor" wars
increased noticeably in recent decad~s. A confirmation of this can be found in
a book written by the West German philosopher and historian W. Hahlweg, "Typology
_ of Nbdern Minor Wars". It presents two types of such wars, the main ones in the ~
author's opinion: "Eastern" and "Western". "Politics dominates in the Eastetri
_ type of mino*- wars," writes Hahlweg, k~hile on the contrary "military strategic
interests are paramount" in "Western wars".9 As we can see, Hahlweg divorces
military strategy from politics, placing one in opposition to the other, which
is clear].y contradictory to a scientific approach to the analysis of wars.
'Thus the classification of wars publicized in modern Western literature is anti-
scientific. Its principal fault, a product mainly of the class interests of the
bourgeoisie, is distortion of the essence of the modern era, and failure to
analyze the structure of economic and political relations and the ensuing contra-
dictions between classes, states, and sociopolitical systems. Attempting to con-
ceal the fact that imperialism is the source of modern wars, bourgeois authors
- refrain from objective analysis of the sociopolitical content of wars, and in -
their classifications of wars they place priority on biological, religious, and
national, as well as quantitative and military-technical criteria.
3. The Social Nature of Modern Wars
In order to deeply understand the social nature of modern wars, we need to once
again turn to some general methodological premises briefly discussed above in our
examination of the sociohistoric criteria of a scientific classification of wars.
_ The category "type of war", w~zich defines war as a struggle between two hostile
- sides observed in their unity, reveals the nature of the antagonistic contradictions
existing between the sides, ones elicited by economic: and political relations. -
~ However, this category does not reflect, with maximum clarity, exactly which of
the dueling sides represents sociai progress, or the political goals each of the -
sides pursues. It is not enough to assert the existence of a contradiction. We
must, Marx thought, clarify "which specific position each of ...the two elements
occupy within the contradiction."10 This goal is served by the concept "social
nature of war". "Revealing the nature of a war," said Lenin, "is a necessary pre-
requisite to the Marxist seeking to define his relationship to it.~~ll
What does Marxism-Leninism define as the social nature of a war"
The category "social nature of a war" is kindred to the concept "social content
of a war". Explaining the social content of World War I, V. I. Lenin wrote:
"Capture of land and enslavement of foreign nations, devastation of tne competing
nation, the plunder of its riches, distraction of the attention of the laboring
masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, England, and other
countries, isolation and nationalistic stupefaction of the laborers, and eradica-
- tion of their advance guard for the purposes of weakening the revolutionary move-
ment of the proletariat--such is the sole true content, significance, and meaning ~
of modern war."12
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The politic~l content of war includes within itself both relatively stable and
_ dynamically varying ~omponents. The social-class orientation of a war, which is
labeled the social nature of a war, is a relatively stable element. Concrete
political goals of military aetions occurring at strategic and tactical scale
are a more-dynamic element of the political content of war. Lenin cautioned
against confusing the social nature of a war with its strategic and tactical
content. He taught that when we define the social nature of a war, its true
significance must be sought no t in the position occupied by the enemy's troops,
but rather in the nature of the policy of which ~he given war is a continuation. -
Z`his premise does not mean that Lenin contrasts the elements of the same political _
_ content against one another; he is simply stating that they must not be identified _
with each other. The category "social nature of a war" expresses the social-class
orientation of the war--that is, the consistency or inconsistency, with social
- progress, of the main political goals (and their,realization) of each of the -
warring sides, and an assessment of the war as being just or unjust.
Considering that the relationship of the popular masses to the objective content
of the social nature of a war expresses itself mainly in the assessment of this
war as a just or unjust one, reactionary state officials intending to unleash a
knowingly unjust war resort to cynical deceit of the laborers. In his time, the
Prussian King ~'riedrich II uttered a phrase which has become notariously famous.
"If a foreign province is to your liking and your power is great enough," he _
= declared, "seize it immediately. As soon as you do so, you'll al~~aays find a
sufficient number of lawyers who will prove that you did have evexy right to the =
occupied territory....i14 Even the Nazi clique, with its openly inhumane plans `
for conquering the entire world and enslaving some and physically liquidating
other peoples, tried to impart a"just" appearance to its vandalism. It attempted
to "justify" the aggressive ac tions of German imperialism by a supposed shortage -
of "living space" for the "Arian race", its"superiority" over other "~3eficient" -
peoples, and other delirious assertions.
An evaluation of the objective content of the social nature of the war--�be it
just or unjust--contains within itself the following facets: political, legal,
moral, esthetic and, in relation to nations consisting mostly of believers,
religious. Such an evaluation is made, first of all, by the dominant clas::,
which utilizes powerful mass media to support it. But secondly, the popular
masses themselves also make their own assessment of the war.
The political evaluation of the social nature of a war is the dominant one. 'I7ie
- reason for this lies in the fact that war is permeated throughout by poli~tics,
that the political content of a war is its principal content in general, and that
political evaluations reflect the fundamental interests of entire classes ar.d ttle _
millions of common people. _
Closely associated to a political evaluation of the social nature of a war is a
legal evaluation based on the rules of international law. Principles condemning
_ the methods of armed aggression were documented in international law prior to the
- start of World War II. Z'hese principles were devEloped after World War I2. Thus
the sentence handed down by the International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg
- trials to the principal German military eriminals (1946) emphasized quite cate-
gorically: "...initiation of an aggressive war is not simply an international
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cri.me--it is the gravest.international crime differing from other military crimes
only in that it contains within itself, in concen~rated form, the evil which is con- _
tained in all other crimes.~~15
A resolution of the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly (1974) containing a
- definition of aggression was a major achievement of peace-loving forces. This docu- -
ment states: "Aggression is the use of armed forces by a state against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state, or in
some other fashion incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, as set forth
' in this definition.i16 This definition provides the legal basis for evaluating
aggressive wars as unjust.
Documents such as the treaty between the USSR and the USA to prevent nuclear war
(August 1973) and the agreement adopted in August 1975 by the Conference for
Security and Cooperation in Europe also have important significance. The partici-
pants of this conference pledged to refrain from using force or the threat of force
in their mutual relations. All of this creates the international legal grounds for
condemning aggressive war and for preventing it. _
Evaluation of a war as just or unjust also has a moral aspect, represented by th~
condeznnation or approval of the war by the people and by the pubtic opinion of the
- countries. A moral evaluation of the social nature of the war is extremely effective.
"A conviction in the justic of a war, recognition of the necessity for sacrificing
_ one's life for the good of one's brothers," Lenin pointed out, "uplifts the spirit -
of the soldiers and compels them to endure unprecedented hardships."17
Some facets of the social nature of a just war--its goals as well as the bravery
- and heroism displayed on the battlefield--are given an esthetic evaluation with
terms such as noble, beautiful, and so on.
Thus an evaluation of the social nature of a war as just or unjust is a generalizing
evaluation, one which synthesizes the political, legal, moral, and esthetic evalua-
tions into a single unit. The most important evaluation to be given is the polit~_cal
one.
- An evaluation of 'the social nature of a war can be true, mistaken, or false. A true
evaluation of the social nature of a war is possible only from the positions of pro- -
gressive classes. Such classes are represented today Mainly by the working class-- -
the most consistent revolutionary class, arme3 with a trul.y scientific theory of -
social development.
Such are the general methodological premises at the basis of a scientific classifi-
cation of wars in relation to their social nature. Z}hey permit the conclusion that
within the framework of the types of modern wars examined above, the following basic
forms of just wars exist: 1) wars in defense of the socialist fatherland and
- countries of the socialist fraternity; 2) wars of the oppressed classes and of all
progressive forces against the classes of exploitation; 3) wars of national libera-
� tion. In accordance with this, the basic forms of unjust wars are: 1) wars fought
by imperialist states against socialist countries; 2) wars fought by exploiting � _
_ classes against exploited classes within the framework of a civil war; 3) colonial -
or neocolonial wars.
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TYie social nature of a concrete war, as well.as its essance, does not always remain ~
- constant. The nature of a war may undergo transformy~tion in connection with possible
changes, in the course of a war, in the political goals and ratio of forces of the
warring sides, and development of new resources and means of the struggle. Z`hia can :
- be distinctly seen from the example of World War II. It began between two groupirlgs
of imperialist states as a mutually unjust war, though from the very beginning i~
did exhibit certain popular, national-liberation tendencies. Thus the Polish people, -
who became the sacrifice to fascist aqgression, fought a just struggle of national -
li.beration against the German oppressors fxom the very first days of the war; moreover
they fought it in contradiction to the state policy of the reactionary Polish govern- _
- ment that was in power a,t that time and which fled the country in cowardice. How-
- ever, the heroic struggle of the Polish people could not make fundamental changes
in the general direction of the struggle between the imperialist groupings, or
tr ansform its principal trend.
Be ing a~ first unjust in relation to both imperialist groupings, later the Second -
World War gradually began to transform into a just war of liberation on the part of
forces fighting against the fascist bloc, mainly under the influence of the growing -
struggle of liberation waged by people in states occupied by the Germans.
Entry of the Soviet Union into World War II, which was evoked by Nazi Germany's
attack on it, was the principal factor of this progressive process. Its entry into
tYie war was the last step in formation of the social nature of World War II, trans-
forming it from a mutually unjust, predatory war into a just, antifascist war of
1 iberation fought by all forces opposing fascism. Z`he Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet people was the keystone of World War II. It decided not only the fate of
- the world's first socialist state but also the future of all world civilization,
_ progress, and democracy. ~
_ As far as the bloc of fascist states headed by Germany and Japan is concerned,
the war on its part remained unjust and predatory from beginning to end.
Consequently the social nature of a war is a complex, changing phenomenon, the con- �
te nt of which cannot be reduced~to just a political or a moral evaluation. It is
an integrated class-political and moral-legal evaluation, one which broadens the
1 imits of the definitioz~ of a war's essence and the forms of its manifestation.
It reflects real processes occurring in a war, and its sociopolitical orientation.
An examination of the social nature of a war would be incomplete, were we not to
touch upon its relationship to the resources used in the armed struqgle.
Guiding itself by humanitarian ideals, the Soviet state consistently opposes the
- use of resources causing mass annihilation of people, including nuclear weapons,
which in view of their poor selectivity are capable of doing colossal harm not only
to the warring armies but also to the peaceful population. But inasmuch as the
threat of nuclear war still exists, and inasmuch as the world still contains
aggressive forces hoping to achieve their reactionary goals with the help of
nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and its armed forces are left with no choice
other than to remain in constant readiness to decisively repel an aggressor with
a 11 forms of modern weapons available.to it, including nuclear. When viewed in
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this way, such use of nuclear weapons is legal. Use of a nuclear weapon as re-
taliation to its use by an aggressor does not can~e~ o~t the just nature of the war
fought by the state opposing the aggressor.
In this connection we cannot agree wi~h the position taken by some foreign theorists
- who c~iew a war in which nuclear weapons are used as unjust on both sides. This
assertion reflects confusion of two different, though mutually related prcblems,
namely: the tremendous destructive consequen~es of nuclear war, and the social -
nature of a nuclear war. As far as the first problem is concerned, Marxists-Leninists
have only one response: Nuclear war would be ruinous to many peoples and states, _
- and therefore everything must be done to prevent it. But it is one thing not to
want nuclear war, and something else to act if such a war comes into being. There-
fore we should emphasize once again that were the aggressors to impose nuclear war _
- upon the socialist countries, the peoples and armies of states in the socialist '
fraternity will do everything to defeat the invaders and forever eradicate the source
of military danger. A war fought in defense of socialism~will have a just nature, _
and for the people of the socialist countries this evaluatic~n will be a powerful -
supplementary weapon. -
Marxists-Leninists also decisively oppose relativistic interpretations of the concept
of just wars by bourgeois ideologists. The essence of such conceptions is that an
evaluation of a war as a just one supposedly does not contain an elEment of truth, _
since both warring sides try to represent any war they are waging as just. The -
- question as to which war is just, declared the American military writer S. Possony,
is resolved in the end "by the tribunal of arms".18 According to the logic of this
militant, military force is what dominates in society, and r~ot justice. Another
American theorist, P. Ramsey, emphasizes the relativism of a moral-legal evaluation
of a war in precisely the same way in his book "The Just War". In his words the _
- concepts "justice", "good", and "benefactor" are extremely relative when applied
to a weapon system and to warfare.19 _
In fact, however, as was demonstrated above, the social nature of a war may be
determined with scientific precision. For this purpose we need to establish the
true political goals pursued in the war by each of the dueling sides.
Marxists-Leninists also fight uncompromisingly against obvious falsifications made -
- in relation to just wars, especially revolutionary wars. A book by the American -
theorist J. Collins, "Grand Strategy", as an example, contains the slanderous -
assertion that "a revolutionary war is inherently amoral.... 'I'he end justifies
all mear.s in the co~~rse of such a war. "20 At the same time the works of such
"theorists" falsely claim that any war waged by the USA and other NATO states is
a just war. Such declarations cannot be viewed as anything other than cbvious
- deceptiori of the masses--a tactic that has become an inseparable attribute of the
state policy of monopolistic capital.
' Only Marxism-Leninism can insure a correct, scientific interpretation of the types
and social nature of wars. The Marxist-Leninist classif.ication of wars, which
persuasively refutes the antiscientifi~, bourgeois-idaalistic classification of wars, _
serves the purpose af indoctrinating Soviet soldiers, improving their knowledge of
military theory, raising their conviction and revolutionary alertness, and insuring
continuous reinforcement of the combat readiness of our armed forces.
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= FOOTNOTES
- 1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Coll~cted Works.], Vol 49, p 287_
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. ~soch.," Vol 26, p 27.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, pp 86-87.
- 4. Lenin, V. I,., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 49, p 118.
5. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 80; Vol 49, pp 369-370.
- 6. See pp 73-~~ of this publication. -
7. See Marks, K., and F:ngel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 36, p 531.
8. Wright, Q., "Die Geschichte des Krieqes," in "A'riedensforschung," IGoln-Berlin,
- 1970, pp 29, 43. `
9. Hahlweg, W., "Typologie des modernen Kleinkrieges," Wiesbaden, 1967, pp 52-53.
10. Marks, K., and Engel's, F.~ "SoCh.~" VO1 2~ p 38. "
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 27.
= 12. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 15.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 262. ~
- 14. Cited in Osipov, K., "Suvorov" [Suvorov], Moscaw, 1941, p 25.
15. "Nvurnbergskiy protsess" CThe Nuremberg Trials], Vol 7, Moscow, 1961, p 327.
16. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 3, 1975, p 154.
17. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, p 121.
18. Possony, S., "Zur Bewaltigung der Kriegsschuldfrage," K~oln and O~laden, `
- 1968, pp 38, 45.
19. Ramsey, P., "The Just War," New York, 1968, pp 5, 55.
20. Collins, J. M., "Grand Strategy," Annapolis, 1973, p 310. -
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CHAPTER V
- 3'HE NATURE AND BASIC TRAITS OF WARS IN DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND
Wars fought in defense of the socialist fatherland make up a special form of wars
of the modern era. They differ significantly froin other forms of wars in terms of
their goalsand nature, the methods of their conduc~:, the relationship of the popular -
masses to them, and historic significance~ Our understanding of ti~e nature and -
- unique features of this form of wars is ~ased on Marxist-Leninist ideas concerninq
_ defense of the achievements of the socialist revolution. It also stems from the
experience of wurs the s~~cialist states have had to fight against imperialist
aggrsss:~rs.
~ 1. `P'r~e Nature of Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherlar.d
- The,social nature of wars fought in defense of the socialist fatherland is defined
- by the la.ws of the class struggle. These wars represent a retaliatory measure by _
socialisi..'states, undertaken to repel imperialist aggressozs. They are a continuation
- of the politics of revolution, the politics of defending the achievements of
' socialism against transgressions by imperialism. Attempts by international im-
perialist reaction and, in a particular stage of socialist soci~ty's development,
by internal counterrevolution to liquidate the achievements of the socialist revolu-
= tion by all resources available at their disposal on one hand, and protection of
these achievements by the victorious proletariat and its allies on the other hand
- is an expression of an acute class struggle.
= L�~~prived of p~wer and its economic and social privileges by the v:~ctory of the
- socialist revolution, a country's bourgeoisie viol~ntly tries to recapture its
' ''paradise lost" and restore capitalist orders. It employs conspiracies and sabotage
againstthe working and peasant state, it speculates on its difficulties, it engages
- in false counterrevolutionary propagand~ with the goal of deceiving the masses,
and ii: re~orts to civil war with the support and direct participation of world -
imperialisL reaction. Imperialist states do not limit themselves to financial, _
�1 material-tecrnical, political, and ideological support to counterrevolution; they
also organize diiect militaryattacks upon a country that had undergone a socialist
- revolution. -
In accordance with his new the~ry on socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin concluded
that socialism could be victorious initially in a single country taken alone, or iri =
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~
several countries, pointing out that this victory should evoke "not only friction _
but also a direct desire of the bou~geoisie of other countries to defeat the
- victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In these cases the war would be
legal and just on our side. This would be a war for socialism, for liberation of
other nations from the bourgeoisie.i1
Imperialist reaction undertakes aggressian again~t workers and peasant states not
only scon after a socialist revolution, but also later, after socialism is firmly
consolidated. ~
_ Developing a new society under the constant threat of imperialist aggression, the
- working class and its Communist Party are compelled to concern themselves daily
- with the state's defense capabilities. Protection of revolutionary achievements
from the aggressive transgressions of ir~perialist reaction is one of the main laws
- inherent to all countries assuming the path of socialism.
The main goal sought by imperialism when it unleashes war against socialist states
~s the overthrow of the new so~ial structure and restoration of the power of -
capitalists and landowners. Coizcurrently it tries to deprive the people of
_ socialist countries of their national and state independence, plunder their national
wealth, subdivide their territory, transform a significant part of the latter into
_ ::olonial possessions or the "spheres af influence" of imperialist states, make the
_ population of sociali.st countries its slaves, and exterminate the disob?dient ones.
_ Imperialist aggressors also tie their designs for destroying or at least weakening
socialist states in witl-i their reactionary goal in relation ta the laborers of their
own country~ as well as in relation to nations that had liberated themselves from
the colonial yoke of imperialism, or ones still wearing it. Writing its aggressive
plans against the advance guard of the revolutionary forces of modern times--the
- fraternity of socialist states, imperialist reaction hopes to make its main thrust
against the entire world revolutionary movement.
The threat of imperialism's aggressiveness to all mankind and the interest of all -
laborers in preserving the peace and the achievements of socialism are a sound
- objective foundation fr~r unifying all anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces _
with the goal of fighting imperialist agg�ression.
The social nature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland is directly -
determined by their fully just and noble goals, ones which are in keeping with the
~ nature of socialism and which follow from the peace-luving policy of the socialist ' -
state, a policy of defending the achievements of socialism. -
The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity utilize all peaceful
_ ways and means of defending socialism--a peace-J.oving foreign policy, and development
of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural ties with nonsocialist states. They
_ constantly display peaceful initiative and submit constructive proposals aimed at
- consolidating peace among z~ations and at preventing world war and the local wars of ~
- imperialism. _
- All of this proves over and over again that the causes of wars between socialist -
and imperialist countries lie not within the socialist system but rather in the
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aggressive essence of imperialism, and that socialist states are forced to wage a
patriotic war to repel military attacks by imperialism and by other reactionary
forces. Thes e are the roots nf the fully just and noble goals pursued by laborers
in g war in defense of the socialist fatherland~. These goals are as follows: �irst, .
- defending history's most progre5si~=e and just social structure--socialism, and its
= great achievements in the coizntry, and providing all possible assistance to other
_ states of the socialist fraternity in their struggle against aggressors; second, .
defending the liberty and independence of socialist nations, their territory, their
culture, and existence itself; third, helpi;zg our allies--the working class, the
laboring masses of the capitalist states, the colonial peoples and dependent
countries, and young national states--in thei.r struggle of liberation against the
imperialist yoke and foreign enslavement.
These just goals correspond to the objective laws of historic development. They are
- not only dianetrically opposed to the reactionary and predatory goals of the counter-
revolutionary wars of imperialist states against socialist countries, and the goals
of all predatory wars fcfught by exploiters, but they also differ significantly frofi
the goals of other just wars of the past and present.
They differ mainly in the fact that socialist states defend a progressive, just
_ structure that reflects the fundamental interests of not only all members of
socialist soc iety and all of its classes and social groups, but also of all pro-
gressive mankind, since the socialist fatherland is a dependable bulwark of the
international working class and all laborers, as well as oppressed peoples in their
_ revolutionary struggle of li.beration against imperialism and for national indepen-
_ dence, peace, democracy, and socialism. 2'he just wars of nonsocialist states also -
pursue progre ssive and sometimes even revolutionary goals (this can be seen in the
wars of national.li.beration fought by countries oppressed by imperialism), but in
these wars the interests of all society agree only temporarily, and to just a
relative exte nt. Laborers fight to cast off the foreign yoke and achieve real
liberty for their motherland. Propertied classes rising against the dominance of
foreign monopolies try to capitalize on the struggle of the masses with the purposes
of establishing anc? consolidating their own domination�within the country.
Wars in�defen se of the socialist fatherland also 'iffer from other just wars in -
that socia.lis t states defend the liberty and independence of socialist nations,
unified by common social, moral, and political values. On the other hand capitalist
states (or developing countries in which the bourgeoisie is in power) fighting just
wars defend the liberty of the evolved bourgeois nation, or they fight for condi-
tions permitting consolidation of separated elements of the population into a single
nation. There is not and cannot be class unity in a bourgeois nation. "Landowners
and hired workers making up a negligible number of wealthy individuals, and tens
of millions of poor people and laborers--these .are truly two nations' ...."2 wrote
V. I. Lenin on bourgeois society. Occupying a pc.~sition of dominance in a capitalist
state, the bourgeoisie tries to subordinate the ir,terests of the nation to its own _
egoistic clas s goals, and when the laboring masses prohibit this by their class
revolutionary struggle, it renounces the national interests and makes deals with
exploiters in other states, sometimes with yesterday's oppressors. Betrayal of
national interests by the classes of exploitati~n is one of the indications of their
antipopular social essence. Lenin believed this to be a law of the class interests
and class policy of tY?e bourgeoisie.
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Thus wars in defense of the socialist fatherland are the most legal, fully just, _
and progressive w~rs. Such were, for example, the war fought by the young Soviet -
republic against foreign interventionists and internal'. counterrevolution, and the
- Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the fascist invaders. The war of
the Vietnamese people against American agqressors also had a legal, just, and pro- _
gressive nature.
The social nature and essence of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland reveal
themselves most graphically in the basi c traits of such wars.
2. The Basic Traits of Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland
One of the basic traits of wars in defense of t.he soci alist fatherland is their _
consistently revolutionary nature. I} manifests itself in the class content, the -
basic political goals and military obj e ctives, the strategy of the struggle, the
historic results, and the consequences of these wars.
By tY:eir class content, wars in defense of socialist states against imperialist
aggressors are a continuation, in the international arena, of the class struggle
of the proletariat and its allies, in new conditions and forms, against the world r
imperialist bourgeoisie and all reactionary forces of the old society. This premise
is in fully carrespondence with Lenin`s conclusion that the war of the Soviet state
against foreign interventionists bore the nature of an international civil war.3
It is also in keeping with the assessme nt made by a combined plenum of the party
Central Committee and Centr3l Control Cottrmittee in 1927 of the nature of the new
, war for which imperialism was preparing itself: "...the preparations being made
for war against the USSR a~e nothing more than a duplication, on a broader basis,
of the class struggle between the imperialist bourqeoisie and the victorious pro-
letariat. This is precisely how the cl ass essence of this war will be defineci.i4
Consequently wars between socialist and imperialist states, which express the goals
and interests of opposing classes, combine within themselves the traits of both
international and civil wars. They are typified by an uncompromising struggle,
inasmuch as they resolve the fate of a particular sociopolitical structure. This
, is how wars of this type differ from wars between exploiting states of the same
- kinds, which do not lead to the annihi 1 ation of the so ciopolitical structure
existing in one of the warring countries (coalitior.s) .
The Great Patriotic War of tl~~e Soviet Union is an example of a supreme revolutionary _
element i.n a war fought in defense of the socialistfatherland, in a situation where
the exploiters in a country are eliminated as a class and where the people ri~e as
= a single monolithic force. By its so ci al content, it was a decisive revolutionary
struggle of all of our people, faithful to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, against
the most reactionary forces of world imperialism, and it uriited within itself the
traits of international civil war in de fense of the achievements of socialism, and
a war of national liberation in defense of the liberty and independence of socialist
nations. It decided the fate of the Soviet socialist state, and the future of
world civilization, progress, and democracy. Our victory, emphasizes the CPSU Central _
Committee decree "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in -
the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", "persuasively demonstrated the viability and
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invinci.bility of the world's first socialist state. It was a triumph of the new
social and state structure born of October, of a socialist economy, of the ideology -
of Marxism-Leninism, of the mc~ral-political unity of Soviet society, and of the
inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR."5
The revolutionary nature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland also
expresses itself in the fact that their victorious outcome weakens the positions
of international imperialism, and under certa~in conditions victory can cause the
downfall of reactionary regimes in the aggressive states, promote the victory of
democratic and socialist forces in these states, encourage new countries to leave
_ the w~rld capitalist system, and provide tremendous assistance to the struggle of
national liberation of peoples oppressed by imperi.alism.
In the hard times of foreign intervention and civil war, V. I. Lenin said: "Today,
fighting for the socialist structure in Russia, we are fighting for socialism in ~
- all the world."6 Dealing annihilatory blows on troops of the interventionists and
on the White Guard counterrevolution, the workers and peasants of the young Soviet
state had a revolutionizing influence upon the laborers of capitalist countries and
colonial peop les, they weakened the war machine of the imperialists, and thus they
- helped the laborers of the world in their struggle against the oppressors.
The USSR honorably fulfilled its mission of liberation in World War II. Its victory
of world hisf:oric proportions over the fascisi: invaders had the most profound in-
fluence upon the entire course of world development. The peoples of a number of
European and Asian countries to whom the Soviet Union had provided decisive
assistance were now able to build a new, socialist life. Favora.ble conditions -
were created for further development of the workers movement in capitalist states,
and for growth and consolidation of communist and workers parties, which are the
most active warriors of the proletariat and all laborers. The prerequisites of -
- even broader development of the struggle by colonial and depender,t peoples against -
imperialist oppressors and for the liberation of their countries from the foreign
yoke arose.
In the final stage of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years the Soviet
_ Union was able to avert armed intervention by imperialists in a large number of
countries, and to prevent export of counterrevolution to them.
The revolutionary natuxe of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland also ~
manifests itself in the revolutionary method of their conduct. '~:ie essence of
this method is as follows :
Communist Par ty leadership over everything having to do with armed defense of the
- socialist fatherland, and unification of the efforts of all people and of all
s~ate and soc ial organizations for the struggle against the enemy; reliance o.f the _
Communist Party and the government of the socialist state upon the high political
- awareness and patriotic inspiration of the laborers, and upon their revolutionary
and military creativity;
definition and attainment of decisive political and military goals in the war, a
firm and unshakeable line of total defeat of the enemy, and the consequent highly
aggressive, offensive nature of combat activities of th.e socialist army, and _
, ~
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selflessness and mass heroism of its soldiers; organization of a multifaceted
sta-uggle, including an armed, whole peop 1 es struggle, on territory temporarily
occupied by enemy troops, and coordination of the actions of troop formations on
the front and partisan formations in the en~my rear;~
�
close military cooperationwand mutual ass istance among socialist states, and combat -
cooperation among their armies, relying upon all-out economic and political cooper-
ation among socialist countries; -
fraternal assistance to other nations ris inq in a just struggle against foreign
invaders;
creation and broad utilization of the latest resources and met}~ods of military
activities, and attentive study and creative utilization of T:;orld military ex-
perience, to include the achievements af the enemy in military affairs;
� a humanitarian attitude toward prisoners of war and the population of countries
' prodded into a criminal war against soci alist states by their rulers, and help
to all progressive forces in these countries in their struggle against reactionary
militant cliques, -
One of the most important traits of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland
- is that they are truly popular from the very beginning of the existence of the -
socialist state, and aftex elimination of the classes of exp~oitation from the _
country, they become whole peoples wars. Owing to the fully just goals and objec-
tives of these wars, ones which are fully in keeping with the interests of the -
laborers, the masses consciously participate in them, and actively support and
implement the policy of the Communist Party and government, aimed at decisive
defeat of the enemy.
Thus the first participants of the war against interventionists and 4~hite Guards ~
in Russia were laborers and the most con scious impoverished peasants. Z'hen, as the
masses began to realize the just, progre ssive nature of the war being fought by
the Soviet republic and the unjust, reac tionary war of its enemies, increasingly
broader segments of the lower and middle class rose in the defense of the young
socialist state. "...we have created a conscious attitude toward the war and toward
active assistance to it in an unprecedented mass of people," said Lenin. "For liter- -
ally all to be sympathetic with the war, for all party and nonparty iaborers and -
nonparty peasants (the bulk of the peasants are not party members) to understand
the war, is something inherent only to Soviet rule, being a goal not even one-tenth
reachable in any other political regime. This is basically why we were able to =
- beat the strong enemy in the end."~
The Soviet people displayed unprecedented aggressiveness in the Great Patriotic
War. From the very first day of the war our people rose as one man to defeat the _
fascist aggressors. Their conscious and active participation in defense of the
Soviet motherland expressed itself in the unexcelled heroism of the Soviet so:Ldiers
on the front, in the selfless labor of 1 aborers, kolkhoz farmers, and the intelli-
gentsia in the rear, in the brave struggle of Soviet people on territory temporarily
occupied by fascist aggressors, and in o ther forms.
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_ A significant trait of wars fought in the defense of the socialist fatherland -
is their deeply international nature. In `hese wars, national and international
goals and objectives of the struggle of liberation of the working.class and all -
~ laborers of our planet merge into one. Socialist states defending their revolu-
tionary achievements consequent~ly defend the achievements of the international
- proletariat, and they are a dependable support and inspiring example to the
working class of all other countri~s in its struggle for d~mocracy and socialism,
while for peoples oppressed by imperialism they are an example to be followed in
their struggle of national liberation. Socialist states also provide direct aid
to peoples enslaved by foreign invaders. This aid is sincere, comprehensive, and
_ disinterested. It does not pursue any goals other than liberating oppressed
- people and providing them the possibility to decide their own fate. In turn, the
" laborers of capitalist, dependent, and recently liberated countries provide support
to the peoples of socialist states in the struggle against the aggressors.
In a certain situation capitalist states may also pursue just goals in a war
against other capitalist countries; for example they may defend their national
~ independence. Under pressure from the laborers, and sometimes in order to earn
some political clout, these states sometimes provide aid to other peoples in their _
struqgle against foreign oppressors, though only to an extent reflecting the
interests of the dominant class of such states. In addition to just, openly de-
clared goals, bourgeoisie leading a just war fought by a capitalist state also
- pursues covert predatory goals in relation to other peaples. Thus during World
War II the USA, England, and other Western countries in the antifascist coalition
fought together with the Soviet Union for just goals of liberation. But at the -
same time the reactionary forces of these countries also had secret predatory
plans, including anti-Soviet plans, which had a significant influence on the way
they satisfied their obligations as allies to the Soviet Union and nations enslaved
by the fascist aggressors. This is expressed, for example, in the delay of a -
- second front in Europe by certain circles of the USA and England. Our Western
allies participating in the war against Japanese aggressors in Asia secretly sup-
ported reactionary pro-imperialist forces in Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, and other -
countries. After introducing their troops into these countries to liberate them
- from the Japanese invaders, the imperialist states unleashed colonial wars against
- the people.
The international nature of armed defense of the socialist fatherland enjoyed
further deepening in connection with formation and consolidation of the fraternity
of socialist countries. Owing to the continual growth of the ec.~nomic and defensive
power of the USSR and other socialist states, and of their influence upon world
social development, the possibilities for jointly defending the socialist countries
against the military threat of imperialism increased considerably, and the inter-
national positions of socialism became even stronger.
This noble goal is being effectively promoted by full cooperation among socialist `
- states, to include military-political cooperation, which has the purpose of
defending the revolutionar~- achievements of peoples in the fraternal countries.
"Together with the f~uorishing of each socialist nation and reinforcement of the
sovereignty of the socialist states," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Account-
ability Report of the CPSU Central Committe~ to the 25th CPSU Congress, "their
~ ~
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mutual ties are becoming ever stronger, more and more common elements are arising
in their politics, economies, and so cial life', and their levels of development
are gradually becoming equal. This process of gradual.convergence of socialist
countries is manifesting itself quite definitely today as a law."8 This law also
- manifests itself clearly in the soci alist states' joint defense of their revolu-
- tionary achievements.
The international tasks of states in the socialist fraternity are constantly ex-
panding in connection with fonnation of many new independent national states,
to which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are providing diverse, -
constantly increasing aid in their struggle against imperialism and for preserva- _
tion and reinforcement of national independence and social progress. The role and
responsinility of socialist states for preser~ration and consolidation of peace -
throughout the whole world are rising continuously. `
Z'he perfoxmance of the international mission of insuring the security of all
- peoples and consolidating universal peace by the Sovie~ Union, other countries
- of the socialist fraternity, and the ir armed forces is promoting further growth
in sympathy throughout the world, and it is eliciting support for their peace-
loving policy by all progressive man]tind, which is helping to continually con- -
solidate the international position of states in the socialist fraternity. Ex-
pansion of the diverse aid rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist
~ countries to their allies in the struggle against imperialist reaction and aggres-
sion on one hand and the growth in the activity of the broad popular masses through-
out the world in the struggle for peace and in support of the socialist states on
the other is a law of defense of the socialist fatherland.
Comprehensive cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance among countries of the -
- socialist fraternity in their development of socialism and communism, to include -
military-political cooperation with the purposes of jointly defending the achieve-
ments of socialism and peace throughout the world, the friendship among the peoples,
and the unity of comnunist and workers parties based on Marxism-Leninism and the
principles of socialist internationalism are all a guarantee of continual reinforce-
ment of the economic and defensive power of the fraternity of socialist states.
3. The Communist Party--the Organizer and Leader of the Defense of the
Socialist Fatherland
_ One of the most important laws of the defense of the sociali~t fatherland is that ~
the Communist Par~y is the organizer and leader ot all efforts to consolidate
the defense capabilities of the soc ialist cauntries, and to insure its security, _
armed repulsion of imperialist aggressors, and decisive defeat of the enemy.
In distinction from the class-antagonistic society, socialist society comes into _
being and develops not spontaneously but in accordance with a c~lan, consciously, -
on the basis of the successive application of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.
It is created by the broad popular masses, the activity of which grows constantly.
"Socialism," emphasizes the CPSU Program, "is the living creativity of the labor-
ing masses. Growth of the activity of the popular iuasses in construction of a
new life is a law of the socialist era."9 Development of socialism and communism
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_ proceeds in a situation of an acute class struggle in the international arena (and
within the country during the transitory period from capitalism to socialism). All
of this makes it necessary for the Communist Party to provide daily leadership to all
areas of the life and activities of socialist.society, to include the defense of its
revolutionary achievements. Armed wi.th this Ma~xist-Leninist doctrine and a knoWledge -
of social development and the ways of society's revolutionary transformation, and ~
- possessing tremendous practical experience in implementing scientific theory, the
Communist Party is the foremost, most conscious, most organized, and most seasoned
detachment of the working class and all laborers. It is precisely owing to this that
it is capable of organizing and heading the grandiose effort to develop socialism
and communism, and of directing the energy of millions of laborers toward creation
of new forms of social life and toward defense of socialism's achievements. _
"Socialist revolution,� L~nin said, "brings out collective organizational talent,
without which the multi.million army of the proletariat could not achieve victory.'~10
- The Communist Party is such a collective organizer. It concentrates its main efforts
on the general prospects of the society's development, on maintaining a correct
political line, and on organizing the laborers t~ implement *..his line. In the srea -
of the socialist fatherland's defense, the party's activity mainly involves developing
a scientifically grounded military policy, and organizing the masses for its imple-
mentation.
'I.'he military policy of the Communist Party has a scientific nature because it is ~
based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which reveals the la~ws of social development,
the laws of the class struggle, and the laws of development of socialism and communism.
Lenin's teaching on def~nse of the socialist fatherland is the immediate methodologi-
cal and theoretical foundation of the Communist Party's military policy, which is
organically associated with all of its domestic policy--economic, social, national,
technical, personnel, and cultural--and with foreign policy. This tie expresses
r
itself in the basic directions assumed by the party's leadership of the entire
effort of defending the socialist fatherland.
Z'he most impor~ant direction in the Communist Party's activity in defense of the
socialist fatherland is creation of regular armed forces of a new type, and constant _
- concern for reinforcing their battleworthiness and combat readiness.
- The USSR Armed Forces were created under the leadership of the CPSU and V. I. Lenin,
and later on, in all stages of the Soviet state's development, the party maintained
direct control over Soviet military development; it maintains such control today as
~ well. The Communist Party's leadership of the armed forces, and growth in the role
_ and influence of party organizations in the army and navy make up the,most important
foundation of Soviet military development. The party bases its effort on the idea
that continual reinforcement of the country's defense capabilities and improvement
of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces were and continue to be an objec- -
tive necessity, one of the decisive prerequisites for development of socialism and
communisn,. This necessity is predetermined by the constant danger of military
attack by imperialism, a danger brought on by its aggressive nature and state
policy.
The CPSU's lea.dership of 5oviet mili~ary development expresses itself in different
- forms. ~'Y,e party has developed scientific principles for Soviet military development,
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_ and it guides the activities of military and other state organs as well as those
of public organizations implementing these principles. The military doctrine of the
socialist state, which fully considErs the political and military situation in the
- wosld, is developed under the lEadership of the Communist Party. The CPSU guides _
all activities in the state aimed at traininq and placi ng regular officers, and it _
manages the ideological indoctrination of army and navy personnel. It leads the
activities of public organizations (the Komsomol, DOSAAF, and others) and of educa- -
tional institutions (grade schools, production-technical schools, tekhnikums, _
institutions of higher education) aimed at training preconscript youth.
One of the most important directions in the Communist Party's organization of the _
socialist fatherland's defense is management of the activitie s of state, business,
and public organizations and of all Iaborers aimed at creating and strenqthening =
the economic, material, and technical foundations of the country's defense capa-
~ bilities and the fighting power of its armed forces. Placing priority in its economic ~
policy on constant improvement of the people's welfare, the party also foresees
measures for reinforcing the state's defense capabilities and supporting the armed
forces with materiel and equipment.
Thus following the civil war the party, basing itself on Lenin's conclusion that the -
Red Army must be strengthened in every possible way, planned a gigantic program to ~
surmount the technical and economic backwardness of the country; formation of the
economic foundation of the Soviet state's defensive power was an organic part of
this program. Z'he policy of socialist industrialization of the country and
c ollectivization of agriculture, and successful fulfillment of the prewar five-year
plansinsured creation of a powerful economic base for the state's defense capability.
- The most important directions of the party's activities in defense of the socialist
fatherland include constant concern for strengthening the sociopolitical prerequi- _
sites of the country's defense capabilities on the basis of a correct social and
national policy, development of socialist democracy, and consolidation of the socio-
political unity of socialist society, and of friendsh ip among different peoples.
The CPSU is engag~~d in purposeful ideological work, nurturing the Soviet people in ~
the spirit of selfless devotion to communism, in the spirit of socialist patriotism
and internationalism, and in the spirit of a readiness to selflessly defend the
achievements of socialism.
The foreign policy of the Communist Party plays a tremendous ro~e in defense of the
socialist fatherland; it is oriented at promoting favorable international conditions
for development of socialism and communism, at strengthening the socialist frater-
- nity, at unifying all ant`_.-~Mperialist forces, at exposing the aggressive plans of
imperialism, and at repellin~ its aggressive desires. -
In wartime, the party mobilizes all forces and resources of the state for defeat
of the enemy, transforming the countiy into a single military camp. It insures the
- unity of political and military leadership, provides leadersh ip to the army and
_ na~ty and to their military actions, and implements the strategic plans it develops.
Analyzing the causes of the young Soviet republic's victory over foreign interven-
tionists and White Guards, Lenin found the Communist Party's leadership of the entire
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struggle against the numerous enemies to be one of the decisive sources of this
_ victory. H~ said: "And it was only owing to the fact that the party was on guard,
that the party was supremely aiscipl.ined, because the author.ity of the party united
all departments and institutions, because dozens, hundreds, thousands, and, in the
end, millions marched as one man in response to the words of the Central Committee,
and only because unprecedented sacrifices were made, ~~as the miracle that occurred
made possible. It was only because of this, despite a second, third, and fourth ~
campaign by imperialists of the Entente and imperialists of the whole world, that
we found ourselves in a position to win.~~ll
War poses new, extremely complex tasks in all areas of the life of socialist society.
Possibilities for victory over an imperialist aggressor, created in years of peace,
cannot transform on their own, automatically, into reality. In order that these
possibilities could be capitalized on fully, and in order that the enemy could be de-
_ feated, a colossal amount of organizational work is required.
Thus following the treacherous attack of fascist Germany upon the Soviet Union, our -
par.ty developed a truly scientific, concrete program for defending the Soviet mother-
land on the basis of its creative application of Lenin's teaching on defense of the
socialist fatherland: its deep analysis of the ba~,ance between the forces of progress
and the forces of reaction in the international arena, and its thorough accounting of
material and spiritual resources--both ours and the enemy's. Consistent im~lemen-
_ tation of this program led the Soviet state to its world-historic victory in the _
Great Patriotic War.
During the war years the Conununist Party began by reorganizing, for war, its own
internal life and activities aimed at leading the society, and it directed the
efforts of the state, social, and economic organs and organizations toward the same -
sort of alteration.
- All fundamental issues assoc iated with leading the country and managing the war
= were examined and resolved by the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the
- party Central Committee. De cisions of the party Central Committee were then imple- '
mented through the efforts of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Council
cf Peoples Commissars, the S tate Defense Committee, and the Headquarters of the -
. Supreme Command. Military issues requiring swift resolution were discussed at
general meetings of the Central Committee Politburo and the GKO [State Defense
Committee], and the Central. Committee Politburo and the HeadquartPrs, while the
most important issues were examined jointly by the Central Committee Politburo, the
GKO, and the Headquarters.
The strictest possible centralization of leadership of intraparty life, combinea
~ with the use of forms of int raparty democracy suited to a war situation, competent
application of leadership methods consistent with the concrete conditions of
difcerent periods of the war, effective leadership of state organs, especially the
central organs of the military department, and effective leadership of social
organizations all permitted the Communist i~arty to honorably perform its role as -
the leading, mobilizing, and guiding force of Soviet sociPty. The flexibiZity o~:
the party's organizational s tructure and of the party effort as a whole clearly
- manifested itself in the party's high effi~iency and purposefulness, its strictest
_ discipl.-ine, and its ability to quickly find the most effective ways to complete
- diverse tasks. ~ ~
_ ~
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One of the most important means the Communist Party had for exercising its leader-
ship role in the armed defense of tMe sociali~t fatherland was concentration of
its forces in the decisive areas of the struggle. During the Gre at Patriotic War
- more than 1.64 million communists, including tens of thousands of party, state,
- trade union, and Komsomol executives, w~~e sent to the front by territorial paYty
organizations. Comanunists marched in the advance guard of the whole people's -
struggle against the sworn enemies of the Soviet motherland, servi.ng as an example
of heruism and self-sacrifice. During the war about 2 million co~nunists--more than
half of the party's membership as of summer 1941--gave their live s in behalf of the -
liberty and independence of the socialist fatherland. Party members and candidates _
made up almost three-fourths of that glorious detachment of the mo therland's
defenders who earned the lofty Hero of the Soviet Union title.
The heroi.; activities of uommunists on the front and in the rear raised the in- -
fluence and authority of the party among the broad lak~oring masse s and strengthened
the unity of the party and people. 2'he ever-rising influx of new forces into the -
party ranks was one of the clear expressions of this. Moreover the largest influx
into t'tie party occurred in the party organizations of the operating army on the
front, where each day one had to come ~ace to face with mortal danger. In all
during the Great Patriotic War, the army's and navy's party organ izations accepted -
about 4 million persons into their ranks. Hundreds of thousands of privates, seamen, _
sergeants, petty officers, ~n@ officers, having submitted their application to the _
VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] prior to battl e, died the death -
of the brave and were never officially initiated into the party, their faithfulness
to which they demonstrated by self-sacrifice. Despite the large losses of communists
on the front, party membership in the armed forces did not drop; on the contrary it
- grew: While in 1941 there were 1.3 million communists in the army and navy, by the
end of the war there were 3 million.12 Growth in party membership.during the war
also occurred due to acceptance of the best representatives of the laborers,
kolkhoz farmers, and the intelligentsia, heroically laboring in the rear.
As always, the Komsomol was a faithful assistant of the Corcm?unist Party. Prior to
- the Great Patriotic War there were 1.71 million Komsomol members in the army and -
navy. About another 2 million Koms~mol members were called up in to the armed
forces during general mobilization at the beginning of the war. Over 700,000
Komsomol members were mobilized by special decrees of the Komsomo 1 Central Co~nittee
- and assigned to paratrooger units, shock ski battalions, Guaxds rocket units, and
the navy. More than 300,000 Komsomol girls fought fearlessly at the front. During
the war more than 5 million soldiers joined the Komsomol. Despi te large losses _
- on the battlefield and departure of inembers due to age, there were about 2.5 million
Komsomol members in the armed forces by the end of the war.13 Komsomol members
- proved themselves to be a dependable support to commanders, poli tical organs, and
- party organizations, and they faught in the front ranks of the soldiers as well.
_ Among Heroes of the Soviet Union, 11 percent were Komsomol members. The Komsomol
_ was awarded the Order of Lenin for its outstanding service to the motherlan~i in the
war years. Comanunists and Komsomol members made up almost half of all recipients i
of orders and medals during the war.
The Main Political Directoi�ate of the Soviet Army and Navy, military councils, and
- the political organs and party organizations of the troops and fleets played a great -
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~ role in supporting the CPSU's militazy policy ar~d.its leadershi~ of the armed
forces. Together with ccmmanders, they promoted,fulfillment of the Communist Party's
- decisions in the army and navy, they�supported personnel training, and they help ed the
_ command organize all of the combat activities of troops and naval forces in support
of their missions.
Redistributing its e;:ecutives, during the Great Patriotic War the party sent many
members of the VKP(b) Central Committee and secretaries of union republic Communist
Party central committees, and of kray, oblast, and rayon party committees, to re-
sponsible posts in the Main Political Directorate~in other political organs of the
army and navy, and the military councils. This promoted a further rise in the
_ authority and influence of the military councils, political organs, and party
organizations of the arme d forces.
All activities af the military councils and political organs were reorganized in
= accordance with the war conditions. The party broadenecl the functions of the
_ political organs. While prior to the war they were only organs of political propa-
ganda, now they were given the mission of promoting daily and comprehensive party
- influence upon the life and combat activities of the troops and carrying on agita-
tion and propaganda work in conjunction with their organization activities aimed
_ at strengthening the fighting power of the army and navy, improving discipline and
the political-moral state of the personnel, and achieving closer unity of the
personnel about the Communist Party and its Central Committee. The forms and
methods employed by military councils in their leadership of combat operations,
the training and indoctrination of the personnel, and material-technical support
and supply of units, ships, and formations imp.roved constantly. The military coun-
cils were given functions they did notlaave in peacetime: consolidating the
immPdiate rear of the country in the name of the Co~aununist Party and the Soviet
state, and perfornung the functions of organs of government authority in areas
declared to be under martial law. They maintained close ties with party formations
on territories~temporarily occupied by the enemy, they provided arms, combat equip-
ment, and other resources to them, and they coordinated their efforts with the
actions of the troops.
The Communist Party did a great deal of organizational work in mobilizing all of
the society's resources to supply weapons, combat equipment, food, clothing, and
the resources of agitation and mass cultural work to the front. The party re-
organized the country's economy and the activities of state and social organiza-
tions, scientific institutions, and schools for war under the motto "Everything for
the front, everything for victory!".
One of the decisive conditions of our vict~ry over the enemy in the Great Patriotic
War was the social policy of the Communist Party, directed at constantly strength-
enin~ the union of the working class and peasantry, the sociopolitical and ideo-
; logical unity of Soviet scaciety, and the friendship among peoples of the USSR.
The party developed, in all laborers and all of the country's peogles, a deep
- sense of devotion and faithfulness to the single Soviet motherland--the Union of
Saviet Socialist Republics, it illuminated this feeling with the bright light of the
ideals of communism, and it armed the Soviet people with a scientific understandi;:g
of their patriotic and international duty. Soviet patriotism, which organically
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included friendship among peoples and socialist internationalism in its content,
manifested itself as a great active force, inspiring the popular masses to acts
ef heroism in behalf of the socialist fatherland.
An important area of the party's leadership~of the Soviet people's strtxggle a.gainst _
fascist aggressors during the Great Patriotic War was its foreign policy. Owing
- to scientific, Marxist-Leninist analysis of the relationship between different _
social forces in the world arena, the par~y was able to plan a correct foreign
- policy course intended to unify the efforts of all countries threatened by fascist
Germany, to win over previously neutral or even hostile bourgeois states, and
to break up the fascist bloc. Cansistently following this course, the Soviet Union _
managed to create an anti-Nazi coalition, and it promptly unmasked and paralyzed ~
the actions of reactionary circles in the USA, Great Britain, and other states--
our Western allies at.that time, and fascist diplomacy intended to weaken and
break apart the anti-Nazi coalition. At 'the same time the Communist Yarty, the
Soviet government, and our diplomatic organs, gaining their support from the
_ victories of the Soviet Army and Navy, applied tremendous pressure to shake the
fascist bloc apart.
Our party broadened, and strengthened its international ties with the Communist
Parties of other countries, with the international working class, and with peoples
oppressed by imperialism who rose in the struggle against the fascist invaders.
A broadly organized resistance movement in the occupied countries played an im-
portant role in this struggle. Communist and workers parties marched in the advance
guard of the struggle against this most dangerous enemy. Communists proved them-
selves to be true patriots and internationalists, consistently fighting for the
liberty and independencp of peoples. -
The intenseforeign policy activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet g~yern-
ment effectively promoted victory over the fascist states and creation of a post- -
war world which would satisfy the interests of the Soviet Union and all peoples
fighting for peace and progress. These activities pr~rnoted tuzprecedented growth
of the Soviet Union's authority and its influence on''international problems in the
~ pos twar conditions.
Thus Communist Party leadership of a war in defensei~of the socialist fatherland
is a principal source of victory. This objective law revealed itself to its
full extent in the Great Patriotic War, which was�one of the hardest trials ever
experienced by our motherland. "The Leninist Co*.;~inunist Party--the le?ding and .
guiding force of our society," notes the CPSU Central Comin~.ttee decree "On the
30 th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of
1941-1945", "was the inspiration and organizer of the struggle of the 5oviet people
against f~scist Germany. In exceptionally difficult conditions it was able to
mobilize the Soviet people for a crusade against the fascist invaders, and despite
temporary setbacks in the initial period of military actions, it managed to achieve
a fundamental turning point in the course of the war and insure its victorious
conclusion. The party did a truly titanic amount of work to reorganize the national
economy for war. By their personal example, heroism, and bravery, communists
raised the fighting spirit of the masses, led them on 'to acts of heroism, and in-
_ spired a firm confidence in total victory ovez the enemy. During the war the
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~ party's authority grew immeasuxak~ly, its ranks closed tagether even more tightly,
and the unity of the party and people becau~e stronger.�14
_ The experience of the CPSU in leading the defense of the socialist fatherland in
- peace and war has international significance. It is being studied and ut~lized
- by .fraternal communist and workers parties of countries in the socialist fraternity
working to insure the peace and security of nations and dependable protection of
_ socialist achievements. It is also being studied and utilized by communists and
revolutionary democratic parties in developing and coloni.~l countries leading the
strug~le of the popular masses against imperialism and its armed violence, and
for national independence and sovereignty, for progressive development of their
states.
_ This experience enjoyed further creative development during the postwar era in the
theoretical and practical activities of the CPSU and fraternal parties in the
' socialist countries. Creati~ely applyinq and developing Lenin's teaching on deferise
of the socialist fatherland, and enriching the accumulated experience, they are
thoroughly analyzing and accounting for the new conditions and trends of world
_ social development, and the changes occurring in the b~.lance of s~cial forces in
the internata.onal arena: the continual growth of the forces of socialism, which
- are defining the basic directi.on of modern world development, the tremendous
- growth of the revolutionary strugg]e of liberation of the working class ancl all
laborers, deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system, disintegra-
tion of the colonial system of imperialism, and the movement of the proponents of
peace against rear_tionary wa=s and military conflicts initiated and prepared for
by the imperialists.
The C:PSU and the fraternal communist parties account for the persisting danger of
_ military attacks by imperialism upon socialist countries, its aqgressive neocolonial
_ policy aimed agair~st the developing countries, and the desire of the imperialist
and pro-imperialist bourgeoisie of a number of capitalist and developing states to
- transcend to overt military terrorist dictatorship, to a f.ascist regime within their
own countries. Of. important significance is the fact that the duel between the
two opposing social systems--socialist and capitalist--the struggle of the forces
= of progress, peace, and socialism against the reactionary forces cf imperialism
and aggression is proceeding in an atmosphere of scientific-technical revolution,
in a time when imperialist states are t~ying to use the tremendous achievements of
science and psychology mainly to support the arms race and to crea+:e and accumulate
- weapons and combat equipment having enormous destructive force. Under these condi-
- tions the leadersh~p role of the comnunist parties of the socialist countries in
' develo,pment of socialism and communism and in defense of the revolutionary achieve-
ments of the peoples has grown even more.
Following Lenin's commandment of implementing thz largest possible quantity of
J decisions and measures "which would lead to peace, if not total elimination of the
dangers of war",15 the CPSU is consis4ently following Lenin's foreign policy course.
It is persistently implementing a principled fa~^eign policy aimed at neutralizing
the forces of aggression and war, consolidating universal peace, and insuring the
- security of the socialist states and the right of peoples for liberty, independence,
_ and social progress.
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The CPSU devotes unweakening attention to developing the economic and material-
technical foundations of the country's defense capabilities, and to strengthening
- the social, political, and ideological prerequisites of the sacialist fatherland's
relial~le protection.
The sphere of economics and material production has been and continues to be a
principal target of all of the party's activities. The economic strategy of ~he
CPSU f~r the lOth Five-Year Plan ~nd the long-range future has the goal of con-
tinually increasing the standard of living of the people on the basis of dynamic
= and proportionate development of social production, improvement of its effectiveness,
acceleration of scientific-technical.progress, growth in labor productivity, and
all-out impro~~ement of work quality in all segments of the national economy and in
all spheres of social life. The central link of the Comanunist Party's economic
policy is further growth of the country's economic potential in clcse association
- with gr~wth in scientific-technical potential. 7.'his is in keeping with the main
~ objective of the lOth Five-Year Plan and the long-range program, aimed at raising
ttie material and cultural level of the people, at the same time it is promoting
consolidation of the social prerequisites and the economic and material-technical
base of the cr~untry's defensive power. As before, the tasks of strengtheninq the
- state's defense capabilities are carefully accounted for by the Communist Party in
its development and implementation of economic, social, and personnel policy, and
_ Yn other aspects of its activity.
- The Communist Party devotes unweakening attention to constant growth of the combat
readiness of the armed forces. The troops and naval forces are being outfitted with
modern weapons and military equipment, their organizational structure is being im-
proved, and the level of combat and operational training and of the ideologicaY maturity
. of the personnel is constantly rising. "Soviet soldiers," writes CPSU Central
Committee Politburo member USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the 5oviet Uion
D. F. Ustinov, "have a daily awareness of the wise leadership and guiding role of
the CPSU in the armed forces, they treasure its attention and concern, and they
respond to this with whole-hearted devotion to the party and people and with
selfless military labor. We are..extremely lucky that the armed forces are being .
, led by such a tested strategist, organizer, and indoctrinator, as is the glorious
Communist Party and its Leninist Central Consnittee.~~16
The most important direction in the activity of the Communist Party aimed at organ-
- izing and leading the socialist fatherland's defense is its ideological ~~ork, whicn
- is directed at nurturing all of the people, and especially the growing generations,
in the spirit of devotion to communism and love for ~ne's socialist motherland and
for other countries of the socialist fraternity, in the spirit of socia?ist patrio-
tism and internationalism. In this indoctrination effort, the CPSU attaches great
significance to publicity on the her~ic traditions of the Soviet people. The in-
violable ideoloqical and moral-political unity of Soviet society is the result of
the Communist Party's tremendous ideological activity, of its organizational efforts
- to unite Soviet people of different nations and nationalities in the struggle to
build socialism and communism and to defend the socialist fatherland.
~ The Soviet Armed Forces are honorably fulfilling their patriotic and international
duty in a fraternal uni~n with the armies of other socialist states.
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. "Nor shet:l3 anyone doubt," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress,
"that our party will do everything to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the
Soviet Union will continue to possess all they need to perform their responsible
Mission--standing guard over the peaceful 1�bor of *..he Soviet people and serving
as tne bulwark of universal peace.i1~
Thus growth in the Communist Party's role in streng~thening the country's defense
c~pabilities and in leading the whole effort of the socialist fatherland's defense
is one of the mc~st important laws of development of socialist society. ~
FOOTROTES
1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln, sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, p 133.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln, sobr. soch.," Vol 11, p 282.
3. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sob r. soch.," Vol 38, pp 113-114.
4. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK"
[The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Central
Committee Plenums], 8th Edition, Vol 3, Moscow, 1970, p 465.
5. "Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne.
Dokumenty i materialy" (The 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet
~ People in the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1975, p 4.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr, soch.," Vol 37, p 68.
7. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 42, p 140.
- 8. "Katerialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 6.
9. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist
Party of the 5oviet ifiion], p 15.
10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 79.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Polr,. sobr, soch.," Vol 40, p 240.
12. See "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 19=~1-1945, Kratkaya
- istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short
History], Nbscow, 1970, p 604.
_ 13. Sae "Velikaya Oteche:>tvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya
istoriya," p 605.
_ 14. "Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne.
Dokumenty materialy," p 4-5.
~ 15. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vo1 45, p 241.
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16. KONII~IUNIST, No 3, 1977, p 22,
- 17. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS,�.p 83.
i
~
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. CHP.PTER VI
WAR AND R:;VOLUTION
- Z'he modern era of transition from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale
_ has placed mankind face to face with a dramatic break from the old foundations of
social life, and with great revolutionary development. In a time of swift develop-
- ment of the world revolutionary process, when socialism has firmly entrenched itsel�
in tne world and has become a powerful international force, in a situation of con-
s~ant aggressiveness of i.-nperialism and the greater, possibilities for using the
achievements of scientific-technical progress in war, the guestion as to the
_ relationship between war and revolution has acquired special importance.
Marxism-Lenirlism provided a clear scientific definition of war and revolution as
~ different social phenomena, and it revealed their dialectical mutual relationship.
.
1. War and Revolution as Social Phenomena of Different Nature
~ The ideologists of imperialism try to i~e,.tify the concepts of war and revolution
with each other. 'This is contrary to the facts of history and the conclusions of
scientific theory. Marxism-Leninism persuarively substantiated the fact that al-
though they are:not isolated from one another~ war and revolution are nc~ cnly not
identical in:content, but they also do not exist in a unique, consta:lt, and manda-
tory relatiQnship between each other~
69ar and revoluti~n have a common socioeconomi.c source. They are assoc~ated by their
origin with private ownership, with relationships of domination e~:d subaervience, and
with social antagonisms. Elicited by the conditions of a society of exploitation,
war and revolution are the resources of a political struggle, a continuation of
the policy of certain classes. Achievement of the goals of war and revolution
presupposes the use of violence, though in different forms and to different degrees.
Hoth war and social revolution are historically transitory phenomena of social life,
inherent to a class-antagonrstic society. At the same time, while they do bear some
similarities as social phenomena, they are typified by a profound qualitative differ-
- ence.
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Diffex�2nces in the Causes of War and Revolution
_ A conflict between new productive forces and obsolete production relations that
have become a hindrance to the former's developnlent is tY~ie gene.ral economic basis
of revolution. Under capitalism, ti~is conflict ex~resses itself as sharp aggrava-
tion of the antagonistic c4ntradiction between labor and capital. The entire cour:ae
of this structure's economic development leads to the fall of capitalist domination.
"Had it not been eroded and undernuned by history," said Lenin, "no other force
would have destroyed capitalism."1
Socialist revolution is the result of both objective and subjective preconditions
in a given country: material, de~ending on the maturity of capitalism; socio-
political, defined by Lenin as a revolutionary situation; presence of a political
_ revolutionary army--class forces quantitatively, organi~ationally, politically,
and ideologically prepared for a successful assault on the foundations of capitalism.
Of course all collisions of history~ Marx and Engels taught, are rooted in the con-
tradiction between productive forces and in the form of communication2--that is,
production relations. But war, which is contained within the very nature of a
society of exploitation, is not necessarily always directly associated with a con-
flict between productive forces and production relations. Aggressive imperialist
wars are the result of the action of the law of nonuniform economic and political
dev~lopment of capitalist countries, domination by monopolies, and the desire of
i.mperialists to acquire maximum profit by any means. Revolution, meanwhile, is
- always directly associated with the action of the law of co~respondence of produc~
tion relations to the nature and level of development of productive forces.
- The Specific Nature of the Opposing Forces in War and Revolution
- In cori~rast to the situation with wars, which, with the exception of civil. wars,
represent a duel between states or coalitions of countries (not necessarily ones
with different ,sociopolitical st~uctures), revolution is a~txuggle between antago-
nistic classes within a state. Hence follows the special attention devoted to the
inner source of revolution, to analyzing the preconditions existing within the
given country, though of course war is a3so inseparably associated with the internal
policies of the classes (states), and revolution is not isolated from the influence
of external conditicns.
In their time, Marx and Engels offered crushing criticism of Blancists and anarchists
- who asserted than an organized group of conspirators is supposedly enough to incite
a revolution at any given time. Marxists-Leniniets are opponents of the "export of
revolution". Revolutions are not made by orders or conspiracies, nor can they be ~
averted by th~m. At the time of the signing of the Brest peace, Lenin harshly
labe~led "left�wing communists" as adventurists and false revolutionaries, who en-
couraged "inciting" socialist revolution in West Europe, even at the price of the
death of Soviet rule in Russia. War was to be the means by which such revolution
was to be "incited". The conception of "revolutionary war" fought for the purposes
of "inciting" a revolutionary process, declared by the Trotskyites, was referred
to by Lenin as "a disease of revoluLionary rhetoric."3 The conception of "inciting"
revolution by arms is preached today by the ideologists of Maoism.
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When we analyze the social orientation of opposing forces in war and revolution,
we should keep in mind that wars are fought by both reactionary and progressive
forces. Revolutions are made only by progressive forces. Some just wars, primarily
wars in defense of._the socialist fatherland, are revolutionary in nature, inasmuch
as they are aimed against reactionary forces of the old society and require the
axmy and people to display high awarenessr decisiv~ness of action, selflessness,
ancl :nass heroism.
The prafound diff.erences especially stand out when we com,pare revolution and an
unjust international war.
Although they are waged by popular forces, unjust wars are prepared for in deep
secrecy from the people, they begin and proceed under false slogans, anc~ they pursue
the mercenary goals of the classes of exploitation, goals k~ostile to the laborers.
In a revolution, progressive forces capable of handing down a death sentence to the
obsolete structure rise. This manifests itself especially clearly in a socialist
rev~olution, which expresses the interests of the people and gains its support from
the politi.cal activity of the broad masses, mainly the working class, led by a
Marxist-Leninist party.
The experience of the socialist rev~olution in Russia has u.~fading significance.
Lenin had this to say a.bout it: "We were a minority party in Russia, but most of
the whole country's soviets of workers and peasants deputies were with us....
Almost half of. the army, which contained at least 10 mi,llion men at that time, was
with us."4 The bolsheviks united the entire revolutionary advance guard anc~ the
overwhelming majoi~ity of the country's laborers,and they led them to victory over
_ Czarism and capit