Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7.pdf9.41 MB
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI' JPRS L/9769 5 June 1981 - West Europe Report CFOUO 27/81) _ MITTERRAND'S FRAN-CE: PROPOSALS AND PROSPECTS FOR A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT F'gI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATIOlV SERVICE . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and - other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following tre last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the origir_al but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of tl:is publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWiNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMIPvATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE OYLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9769 5 June 1981 1* WEST EUROPE REPORT (FOUO 27/81) MITTERRANA'S FRANCE; PROPOSALS AND PROSPECTS FOR A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT CONTENTS . THEATER Fn RCES FTiAN CE Armaments, Alliances, Military, Foreign Intervention Policy (Various sources, various dates)............................... 1 Hernu Details Party Poiicies, by Pierre Daxcourt Mitterrazid Arms Policy Statements Mitterrand on Euromissile Deployment, by Alain Barrau ENE RGY E CON OMI CS FRAN CE Commentary on Socialist National Energy Plan Proposals (Frederique de Gcavelaine; L' UNITE, 23 Jan 81) 5 Commim ists Criticize Flaws in Socialist Energy Plan (Jacques Cramaix; REVOLTITION, 6-12 Feb 81) 10 Communis t Criticisms of Mitterrand's Energy Policy (Jean-Charles Dubart; REVOLU'?'ION, 17-23 Apr 81).............. 13 I - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO] FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL'Y E CONOMI C FRAN(E Mitterrand on Proposed Economic and Social Measures (Francois Mitterrand Interview; LIEXPRESS, 4-10 Apr 81)........ 15 Socialist Employment Policy Presented, Disputed (LE MONDE, 26 Feb, 7 Apr 81, LE NOUVEL EOONOMISTE, 20 Apr 81) .............o....................o.o................ 25 Unemployment Policy Mitterrand Discusses Situations, Plans, Francois Mitterrand Interview Contradictions in Policy, by Michel Durafour Socialist National3zation Strategies, Policies, Programs (I.E FIGARO, variotis dates, LE NOUVEL ECCN0MISTE, 6 Apr 81)..... 32 Nationalization of Industry, by Laurence Allard Nationalization of FYnancial Institutions, Editorial, by Georges Hervet Nationalization, Industrial Policy, Pierre Mauroy Interview Inherent Problems in Nationalization, by Antoine-Pierre Mariano Socioeconomic Consequences of Nationalization, by Michel Crozier Mitterrand Adviser on Changes in Fiscal Tax Policies (LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 30 Mar-5 Apr 81, LE FIGARO, 23 Apr 81) 44 Perspective From the Left Perspective From the Right Questians, Objections, Fallacies in Implementing Socialist P ro gram (Roger Prio ure t; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 9 Feb 81) . 49 Projected Costs of Implementing, Financing Socialist Program (34aurice Papon; LE FIGARO, 7, 30 Apr 81) 52 Budgetary Impact, Clost Breakdown - Projected Costs, Additional Considexations Projected Consequences of Implementing Socialist Progra.m (Anto4 ne-Pierre Mariano; LE FIGARO, 29 Apr 81) 57 = Pro jected Economic Growth Under Mitterrand's Presidency (LE POINT, 13 Apr 81) 59 - b - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY Comparison of Communist, Sociallst Economic Social Programs (Antoine-Pierre Mariano; LE FIGARO, 4 May 81)................ 62 POLITICAL FRANCE Mendes-France on Domestic, Foreign Policy (Pierre Mendes-France Interview; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 13-17 A pr 81) Consequences of Dissolving Nationa.l Assembly (Paul Granet; LE MOIQDE, 14 Apr 81) 74 Mitterrand on Constitution; Presidential, Ministerial Powers (VALEiJRS ACTUELLES, 9 Mar 81) 76 Constitutional Balance of E.`xecutive, Legislative Powers - � (Pierre Thibon; LE FIGARO, 26 Mar 81) 81 Viewpoints on Future PS-PC-RPR Government Coalitions (Various sources, various dates)............ 84 1 PS-PC-RPR Three-Way Coalition, by Gerard Grunberg - PS-RPR Disagreements, by Colette Ysmal Impossibility of PS-RPR Coalition, by Georges Sarre Hopes for PS-PCF-RPR Coalition PS-PC Problems, by Georges Mamy PCF Central Committee Resolution Supports Mitterrand (REVOLUTION, 1-7 May 81) 98 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Regis Debray on Mitterrand's i.atin American Policy (Regis Debray Interview; JORNAL DO BRASIL, 12 Apr 81)...... 100 EC, European Foreign Policy Objectives, Relations (Francois Mitterrand Interview; EL PAIS, 19 Apr 81)........ 104 Past Foreign Contacts as Portent of Future Policy - (Suzanne Labin; LE FIGARO, 22 Apr 81). 1 07 Past 'Mistakes' in Internationa.l Relations, Foreign Policy (Patrick Wajsman; LE FIGARO, 27 Mar 81 111 PCF: Contradictions in Socialist Foreign Policy Statement, Actions (Armand Cerkow, Davis Sephiha; REVOLUTION, 27 Mar 81....... 113 - c - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY MILITARY FP,ANCE Aerospace, Defense Industry Plans, Proposals (Francois Mitterrand Interview; AIR & COSMOS, 2 May 81..... 116 ~ GENERAL FRANCE Mitterrand on General Issues Facing Contemporary France (Francois Mitterrand Interview; PARIS MATCH, 3 Apr 81)..... 122 Selected Mitterrand Propositions Revealed, Analyzed - (LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, 9 May 81) 129 Mitterrand Answers Personal, The oretical, Political Questions (LE POYNT, 2-10 May 81 132 Mitterrand Outlines Governing Policy, Priorities (Jean Boissonnat; L'EXPANSION, 17-30 Apr 81) 143 - d - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 J _ FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY THEATER FORCES ARMAMENTS, ALLIANCES, MILITARY, FOREIGN INTERVENTION POLICY Hernu Details Party Policies Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Apr 81 p 4 [Article by Pierre Darcourt] PRANCE [TextJ Charles Hernu, deputy mayor of Villeurbanne, is the Socialist Party's (PS) defense representative. He is unquestionably that party's most senior and most qualified expert on defense matters. Hernu recently met in the National Assembly with reporters specializing in military affairs and briefed them on his party's program in clear and unequivocal terms. He began by reminding them that Francois Mitterrand supported modernization of a11 strategic deterrent forces. Yet "because of current technological conditions," he er.plained, "priority must be given to modernizing our strategic naval force. It is our view that two nuclear- powered missle launching submarines should be built and placed in service during the next presidentfal 7-year term." In reterring to the neutron bamb, Hernu said the PS was not opposed to the continuation of studies and tests. "Yet this essentially antitank weapon does worry us because it makes the idea of war `commonplace,' establishes thresholds of engagement, and can draw us into a'forward battle' in Europe." Francois Mitterrand contends, as indeed President Reagan has himself stated, that strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons constitute one homogeneous force whose employment is wholly subject to the decision of the chief of state, the sole offieial responsible for this terrible power of destruction that cannot be released "piecemeal" by subordinate military authorities. With reference to detente in Europe, Charles Hernu revealed that, in the event of a socialist victory, Francois Mitterrand could immediately make a certain number of proposals, the first of which wou:Ld b2 to ask the Soviets "to withdraw their mobile SS-20 surface-to-surface missi?.e as far back as the Urals." This would place France beyond their effective range wlaile at the same time delaying deployment of the American Pershing 2 mi$�.iles. It would also possibly permit redefining in Europe the 'zero point' of detente fnr open,ng new realistic and concrete negotiations." Independence, National Unity The socialist member of the National Assembly from Villeurbanne reaffirmed that France must "restore full independence and national unity to its defense." 1 FOR OFFICYAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 EOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Francois Mirterrand, and the PS along with him, will remain faithful to the Atlantic Alliance as long as there does not exist in Europe a real system of collective security. We shall refuse to allow the Atlantic Alliance to be an instrument of submission to American military strategy. We insist on preserving our complete independence in decision-making. On this particular point, Valery Giscard d'Estaing has placed himself on dangerously 'shaky ground'. He has-stopped referring to the `national sanctuary' and Iaid emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons, thereby indicating acceptance of the possible employment of our forces outside our borders. To my knowledge, the Elysee Palace issued no clarification after the recent statement made by General Rodgers, an American, who had asserted that in the event of war in Europe, the French would return to NATO's integrated military command and their troops would fight forward of their borders. In discussing the reduction of compulsory military service to 6 months as proposed in the "socialist plan," Charles Hernu said "the actual length of-the term of service appears to be of minor imgortance today. What does count is its content and effectiveness. If we should decide to -reduce the term of service, this change would have to be accomplished very gradually. Our acCion in this matter will bear on two points. First, on full application of Article 17 of the standing arders which is now being very poorly enforced. The participation of draftees in decision- making about their service must not be limited to discussions on operations of the service club or the organization of photographic clubs and leisure activities." Intervention Forces The second point has to do with the intervention forces. "These forces are necessary for fulfilling our commitments and our defense agreements with our African friends in particular. Only regular career personnel must be assigned to these forces. Sending draftees outside of inetropolitan France is out of the question." These forces must be equipped with a type of transport aircraft g3ving them the capability to - react rapidly and at a Iong-range. "Work is already underway on th.e second-generation - Transall transport." It may be completed in due time, but the requirement for a heavy and high-speed transport is imperative, whether it be < French or foreign aircraft. On the other hand, the personnel strength of ther- exou-ernal action - [rapid deployment] units must not be increased. Particular:, the Foreign Legion which has had no reason to increase its strength or maintai Rn overseas presence since decolonization, and which, above all, must no longer ~ ve a majority of foreigners in its ranks (currently 60 percent foreigners an' 40 ?ercent "Frenchmen"). Lastly, Charles Hernu firm].y stated that we must no longer v~ c ~n 10 ' r +r-~ ~ ' a.r: v co ~ 4 1J (1) 3,-+ -1 0 ~ u-~ o Rf 4-~ O cA .C Gl .f. cd �rl ~ C O J W �r~l TJ ld la U N C 0 Gl TJ Cl cb O i C IJ 44 rl O 41 F"+ U 4+ Ln N+ N - ro N> oo �14 m ~ . ..c ~n �n a +J a .c a . 3 N " vau~n y i a~,a ~+on~+s.0 a) +1v ~ H r~ t �~C ~uo+1 o N~ o 3'd V (d 'cy U.C �rl N �~1 n N G al �rl u a-1 cC r-I N+i 'C 'd :J rj) A 1.~ i-1 O tJ 44 ia N1-i R+ Ol l0 Ol 0 U f.. L: C1 ~~U -W Gl t!1 0 p O F' N i-+ N.C G cd 1.J C O~ r-f tJ 41 U! 'd R+ -rl ) 0 1r ctS N u1 T1 w �rl Ri U O cd Gl 10 V. ctl O N N 41 O ~:j A= i � J � ~ cd �ti dl O H 14 tA G ,J G�H 41 t~+ 00 U N H a o a) q 1O r. 41 3-i r-I U Gct ~ .a 11 Iv 0 41 � T r 4J a) tn N .a o - cy y, u) y(L) oo a p a) a) ~ G a a cn up D, p 3 w u 0 0 o w u 41 a� + g.u A o~+ 41 0 a) p+ 1.~ 41 -rl U1 f~' v c co U N 11 tq N 0 o a o p 1.~ 1�+ -r~i d cd r-i : N O �rl r �rl C 44 Eg P O >1 O C'+ rl .C'. co .ld O! Cd 0 00 O I- Gl w 4�1 Gl r-1 JJ 4 C+ tA O ~ :3 O U 6 w G N O a~ Gl '-i i-i C co N�H u q 0 4+ oo O c0 O 04 C% u 3 aJ o~--i 0 41 w v S-+ ~ a~ ' 0 o o .C Cl Gl H> ~ ui O>-. �H ~ y cd 1+ ~ a v a a~ v a~ 3 ~ b �H ~ b 3 ~H a cr a) a~ cd Go~ p~4 ~ ~Q,r-4aw ~~o bO.H .H o > w ~ ~g w p co ~oo0 x44 o .r.,.~~ ~ o o W ~ b o u v s~ bz G o Q, ~ . , a o u o o ~ a~ a C o c~ a ~ H au 4+ 4J oo c~ $4 o 1 b v a o > c~ .r  p i ,a a~ co o .r ; a .n o a~ ~.n v ~ 0 r-4 ~ �ri .-i o w a co o cd a~ .C 41 w o o ,H p o + v v o a > . l 44 r--l �rl w i 3~ ~r--j .a oo 4J w a ,J ao o H o 4J : a) q o 9 w a~ sc ,J a �,q o c n ~n (a G a~ cd cu x 4J a) > ~n o~+ a) 4+ 0 P ~ W cn A+ , u -H 41 rn eo = O N~ ~ 1 v a a) a cd p a O 0 1n ~ 41 �rl N a) 'b .c > o a.. cd Z +1 :3 4 �rl N U Cr .C ~ u1 O vo -rl o a) a) a) N.C C q a) r. .0 O�rl U1 N.p R! I- L. 10 O W~ C+ + J r l ~ C+ ' 10 i , 14 -I v Ul aI . f. . C l r-I O N ri U iJ ~1 c1 4J cd rl r-1 a1 N S-~ CO ~ 41 r-I U tA ~ 1.~ ~I C) r"4 Gl a td .G O Cr ~1 1j R) r C~ 0o g r C) ~ rl a1 ~I �r4 y ~1 . ~ 00 E � 1 o 0o co o U1 cd Np oo a c :j G~ � + x m 0 ~7 0 o p v v-H o oo 0 cd C cd 4 r4 q cn p o oo cd cd N co .c 4 .0 ~ N 3 0 v a a~ o 0 ` a 3 3 w a r r~ u N N+-J M �H rA B cn a+1 u ari) a 0 b u atn m41 _ m c 3 o m H rn W H p4 W ~ H 3 1-4 H W 00 IY.., C? U I O H � a - i o a) 4.+ o + a~ 00 ~ 1 ci a p Q) 44 p~o ~ 4J ~ 3+�J w v~i cd ~ rl co w t~ Ul 'b ~w�rl N y 4 44 ~"i N .0 O 'G �tJ 4J .C O rl t11 V-1 U 'b r-4 ~ ~ - 0 ' U4J rl R! 3-I ~ ~G fA fA 1.~ R1 O L+ O 41 oo .o � Ln C OD G ctl co o a m Q) u-, C �ri r-1 a~ a ~ o = 3 04 z 4 1 a) 44 � � ro 0 p a .o a w ~ a' o - ' ~ ~ ~ ' �r+ r--f v o ~ ~ on ~ o,J 0 r-4 X on (D .z q m o p Ln G o cn a) 0 �r4 m w I~+ r-1 0o N u cv H rl �,I 4j .C .2 tn ~+CO 3 N 03 Q) r-+ �r-i ro a~ 3 ao c~ 00 3�r+r v~ 4, .H 3 o v w o 0 (1) 4Ju p 10 o Cd 4-1 �r4 J l .C > 3 p H cd r-I 'r4 cd m~ - 4.j 4.) N = -W + H w 34 �r _ 0 Z u = .a ~ ~ a ' w u-, . 4-1 ~ ^ oo ,q o ~ m ~H -o ~ r-I ~ a) u (n :j G m .z 44 N0) O 4J O'-I �rl G Np UI rl '-I �rl 44 m 'U O p1 O 00 C+ N V1 0 %D r-1 -W 0 0 �ri c0 R) �r-I v' O w ~O cd R1 .C t1) cc N O! 'rl 3-i k7 � ?4 O.a cd bA G 0 W 4J~r1 1J :3 z N N co G N�n O tA r. Z o p O co Z a1 �rl Cd W N4 a)~ N � z ~ oo �r-i ~ a N.c". > a) �r+ o n -W +-1 0 3~s ~ +W C ctf o�r-I u w t O ' J G a! +-J w O 1-1 Rf ~ O O'J, b0 = �n .L' a1 C N - 0 7$ �rl �rl 4-4 1-J p Rf R 0.4 C 4 �rl W R) JJ .A �rl 1J S-+ N �rl r-i N � 1J 1J , tJ �rl y.! p 11 41 rl � bA N R', 1j �rl aJ 1j 1. Q) q(q 44 r-I 44 '-I �H 4-J cd co �r1 r-I ~ p G m r-i -H 8 a �rI �r4 D 0 c~ VI N lJ N�rl O O�e-I tA O tA tA �rl 00 N 44 U w p o cn G o 3 (d �H (1 3 0 0 o mr. q �ri a) a+J oz 0 a~ 0 a a x+J a) oa~ qs~u a~0 a u a x o o~+ a Cn � o a) ~ ~ p v 4-4 Z w a~ a Cm , a ~ ~ a a H b H m a~~ 3 a~ ~ 3�a v ro + o o - 64 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i ~ ~ ~ in ~ ~ ~ 0 1 w u�N v 0 4-+ 4+ y o�A m w a .a �r-4 up u q cr m m 4 p 3 N o v a o 0o cv " p N :j ~ u o � oo u a) r-i v D, - m 0 o w +1 -ri o �H o vz a) m o r-I u a) u a~ U I-I C v a+~ P N O+ o,~ cv ~ r-I cd pG w a I v ~d 1J 0) {a r-I p a cd 1.1 vi o 3 a f~ ~r" cd 4+ C~ cd .C c N CJ O q U O N rl 41 ~ -W � �rq R1 r~ G f3 G' U O aJ r-I 1J �rl U'd O GS 00 �rl a.J U1 �r! W tA .a r! -w �r4 �rl W �rl r-i td r-I 0 H CS Ol 0. .C 0 TJ p :j N p Z G) U W ~ 3 1 j 00 �ri G' l u p 0 O ~ U -ri tA O 1.~ ri ~ Ol G 0 ~ ~ ~ - O i~ . tA A ~ -r N G cd tA FH PQ I~ 1 1 I N ftl 1-1 41 w LL A 'C1 H �r-I .C q'C~ +1 G7 p ~ 'b ~0 0 1J Q~ 0 �I"4 b ~ r4 i i"I V~ {~1 ~I td ~ ~ 'P'~ W W 'H �H Q) W �1"i C1 0 C w 5 u al N cd Hr-1 �H u! C! U w c0 N -W U O d0 c7 O o0 r~ O N m G 0 4 A 4! 0 - TJ ~ 00 q ~Z t-I ~ ~ 4-i �rI Z u F.~ G v Rf 4-+ �rl u H .G 'U O�rl ~ O ~ r-1 O v1 'Cf 1-~ v1 "d H v q~f .C ~ o cd o p �p -ri cd u w v o0 o v a1 00 0 W 4-1 4-1 th a) a) m a 10 41 r-. b N�ri 'd p v 3 w u 44 v, q o a G i ~.n a) W -H ~ c14 o c 41 o .n 4+ .c v> a-+ ro o 4A :1 ~ o u cd o qr. a Ca r. q v m q 0 cn +1 a o w o�v a u o u as 0 w r-I o o u~ m vN .o ~-H ao ~�H oo.c Gct cn r. i a~ . r+u~ u o 1 q 0 0 ~ 0 0 x . cf ro 4 ~ oo v � 0 G o ~ q ~e a o ~ ~ o ~ 0 m a) C Q) 1 cu N -i cu N ~ 00 -I H m v b0 �H 3-H o U cO q o w H b~ � tA r-i �o ~ � l a) . 4- a) P 4-1 I.J o z N r N 0 0 .4 ~ c0 ~ � 0 CV ~ N U 0 � O F'1 - GY -W l~ .C N R1 D4 00 " O p O QI UI i-1 N Ol 3 W 0 d U iC OI ~E r r3 y 0 cd U . ^ p . 3 N a o v, � W p I U G �rj H co ~ r-- v c~ .C v 0 c cd m v ctl 0 N O~H 01 q G w r-I DC O N 0 H Z G% H e0 = H0 N 4H H GP w H4-1.,-l cu �ri p~ v r-I ^ a9 an z ~ _ N � oo s o u o = o u o = m � a w 4.+ ,-I o 4 ~ ~ 1v p r-i v o �r+ q �r+ ~ - a � q a) o o o .a a v o r .,1 a) W 4. -ri r-I W r-i �r~ v�rl cd �rl rl ~ N 44 (1~ (r' :3 Q N U 44 �rl N 11 C. M N R1 Cli Ro ctl r1 11 �g 1- cd p4 O O:1 O�rl cq O 0 41 tA O ' a) tA U 01 C1 ~ H 1 V r-1 10 >1'b r-1 H C+ G' '-I O~] O r-I O,a O ur-~ ~ �I"4 a) :J v 'rq 10 w a W r-i 0 bo .Z 4-1 aA aa v Ib ci " vr-i v (1) f-I Q) + a Q) � o 9 p ~v a a) r"'i 0 (D b (ni. r'i 0 OD 'C1 r-1 'J ~'e O S-I O O 01 H �tq 0o > �r'1 OA x y~ �e"1 F 60 "0 t-I 34 QI1 'b rl F1 cd a 0 4 ~p :3 s4 .z w u o 00 0 co a) �rq cd tv m r-4 o Cn r. � a ~ (d 0 �H w a~sacn p au ooa E-+ o ~~n~ m aa ~n +-3 a+~ a) U a~ 3 y a (t 3~ ~ z 0 H 74 ~ O N H . 6 O H H H -c~ z ~ ~ ~ w c o a~ a~ u ) r-~ o w v m u�H v o o i �rj v oo u p w a~ cd 41 m a~ 4.+ �rf 3 a.z o �r+ 0 c) $4 G -W o ~ cn 3 P. p o 4-1 w 4-1 -1 cc r-4 .-i r-i m 4-+ o �H � P b G 4--+ v v p �i-I R. L+ .a G �rl �rl ~rl R) C" U! R1 .f. 4.1 Q) -ri Ul O Li � a ~ 3 3 3 4 ' 'q ~ a ~ ~ ~ 4-1 ~ , i H u ~ , ~ c o G a~ o U N U1 Rf ~ tA >C ~ 'b O �ri 1.J 1j q-1 1-1 .O �rl 'a'+ 'd N a)�r-f 'U �rl fa >N x: N (t 'rf G"+ fA w r-I > (A 0 0 34 1a O) U 60 tA r-i QJ .-I P 4 4-J -ri 11 R1 f.' .L" Cd -ri 0 00 U r-1 :3 cd OD G; -ri ctl ct1 cb G 'Ly F+ 0 4-J SC U1 i-1 � �rl r-1 r-I b p R1 .a U q t0 -ri TI W cS1 1.~ 0 F+ -ri cU cq g G R! -ri cd 11 -ri O�rl U ^ Ul G PL U cd ~ Q) 4.1 ~ 1j 'L7 �n �rl U'3 TJ 'd .C -ri el .-i -ri r-I O D, U 0 a) � 41 U r-I U r-I N r-I U f-1 O - .Ll a-I C~ H C; G 0 w fA 0 4-+ :j ~ cb O O N O'C ~ 4J :j Ql w :3~d t0 LJ cd G U �rl F+ Q) r-I -O O p1 R GJ R1 O Gl .C W a a a a) m -ri b a~ q z v u>-. a) (1) M Cd r~ 4-J 3 ,n ~ :j.C :3 -ri a., N o 10 0 10 ma) ,z N cd m �H rn N CJ O 4-1 '0 44 cC u 4) cd U i-+ �rl 0 .f: " -W 0 u tl) rl N C .C a N a 4 a q Z X "o o 4.+ o cn ~v a) ~ ~c E-~ ~0 G �~-1 N--I cd H k�~1 cd U) N .C p C, �r-I r. " -ri 01) cd _ �r+ u r+ p = cd 4-1 4-1 u 44 o _ r+ on cd cd g a) 4+ r--i 0 ro 0 41 a) a 0 Cd a) ow r-A G P v oo cd v a) a C m o0 00 r-i 41 "1 ao ~ ~ � u~ o ~--i ~Z G ai cn o ~ u, �H ~ tn a cd Ln (n ~ ~ 10 (1) 9 ~ a) q co N O S~ cti 1~ � rl � M rl R1 0 cd N N ia M rl M �rl J-~ x F+ 11 cA "d .u r-1 a p rl � M r-I 1.1 LJ N cd W O O.C rn 5 f.' N N= 0 2 kg J-r r-{ O O cd O ia (A �rl U 4-1 O�rl - ',l -u :7 td w cd CG .C ~ Z W p Rf R1 R1 41 U Zi U �rl Z FTa 1J W 4W 4.�1 10 L+ 4 4-J'L7 O U�C v4 C', 'd td cd Gl Cl �rl q ro~ oo .j ~ v a) ~ s~ w a) a a) a) s .c a u 10 o a) o v~ 4 ~d +J o o cn b o ~ o cd o .u q a) 10 00 Sa DA Gl H 0 N �e-1 W'U �r-I 'd - rl O-rl O U ~rl 11 00 0 �rl Cd 1; N d A. A-rl � j cd '-I 1.J a) ' .C 0) tA :j 11 " 4J bA a ~ � lJ '-1 ~ � ~ 0 rn r-4 �H 0 ~ , ~o �H � a q q d cn cn a) ~ +J bo ca G o m 3 'd cn v r o = y�r+ q� d �r+ r. -ri 14 v +-J W u - o a0 o p ~ cn a) o o u a 0 u o a) o.a 0 4 �r+ �o cu Cd a) a) ai I. a) m v u a ~ r-+ b a ~ a b (2) a au ~ u o a~ ~ oo +1 a m o b u �d ~ G o~+ a) oco s~ q~n q -d r+ 0 1-~ N.C O ~ U~ Gl 3-+ U! f r' ~ A i R f GJ 3-r ~ . r.. ~1 1.~ O'~ Rf � H �ri O cd w.c ,J u Cd w (n a a~+ ra o r+ v A, t-+ -W a Cn u" u o _ > u 65 JMU (1'VTTnTAT TT[IT ^\TTIf APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  r- i . o 0 a ~ ~ u � ~ ~t ~ . L tA ~ U N co m U7 .C 1~1 4J .x W +1 O m U O Cl, tA O ~ H Rf 4..+ r4 O O c1I cC U ~ O cd a a ,J v -A 4., o ~ -1 $4 ~ a +J �H W a P 0 3 a ~ - a~ o = v b 4. $4 = o 0 1-+ o. . 00 ~n � Cls p a) -d aj co ~ (t 44 ~ o a~ . O U 41 ~ 00 M U ~ fA �rl r-4 4H .c cd d O o > G N OA cG N tU a " 3 ~ P. N .rj y cd A ~ ~ G = O W _ "0 N N ~ rn N v ~ .o v ~ - ~ ro 3 ~ _ ro i 4J v �ri o - a M U cd a) M pp O tn O U W O tn _ O u1 U 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL _ MENDES-FRANCE ON DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLTCY Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 13-17 Apr 81 pp 52-55 FRANCE [Interview with Pierre Mendes-France by Josette Alia: " What We Have To Do to Enable Francois Mitterrand to Win and to Open a New Era in France's History."] [Excerpts) Just one month prior to the fina 1 round of voting, the majority, unabZe to agree on the record of its tenure, can only come out with the old bogeyman: if the socialist candidate is elected, that would mean economic chaos. In an interview with Josette Alia, Mona Ozouf and Roger Priouret, Pierre Mendes- France explains why it is the left, on the contrary, which will _ be better equipped to restore the country's s ituation. But he also says under what; conditions that can be done. NO [LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUIt] : Let us now talk about economic problems. The socialist progran calls for the rapid adoption of social measures such as an increase in the SMIC [interoccupational minimum growth wage], family allowances, etc. Are you not afraid of their inflationary effect? After all, you have always been in favor of spacing such measures out in terms of time? ~ Pierre Mendes-France: Resignation and passivity--wha t some peogle call liberalism --are no longer acceptable. Suddenly, the administra.t ion has discovered unemploy- ~ ment. Did you know that, in the Common Market (and I am not including Ireland and Greece here), we are fifth in terms of unemployment rate among people of employ- able age, sixth in terms of unemployment among young p eople, and sixth in terms of unemployment among women? Is that acceptable? We must at last take action other than stopgap measures which only have an anesthe- ~ tizing effect and which cannot solve anything. We must have a will to builrl. A left-wing administration will have to undertake two series of ar_t;.ons from the very beginning. The first one, I dare say, is political: Rendering justice unto those who suffer most from the current situation, resp onding to needs, to legiti- - mate impatience after-.the very long period during which the right has been in power. It is quickly to take initial measures aimed at establishing a better social balance, to get everybodq to realize tha t we are entering a new chapter in our history. It is true that this policy entails risks. But speed does not rule out caution or the technical approach; the steps ta'.~~ ;aill have to b e properly organized, confined, 67. - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and fitted into a rigorous timetable so as not to lead to excesses which are not inevitable. At the same time--and this is the second aspect--it will be necessary to visualize a plan for the improvement of growth, a structural reorganization, as well as in- _ dustrial redeployment, in other words, we will have to start to build tor the future. In-depth reforms obviously will not bear �ruit instantaneously. A reorganization of our taxation system, for example, will not have immediate effects; that is just one more reason for launching this effort as quickly as possible. A left-wing ad- ministration will without delay have to prepare the indispensable revisions and reforms so that their effect may take hold as rapidly as possible. There will be a time of struggle, lasting several months, a year, perhaps more, as the case may be; this will be a difficult stage, a valley to be crossed. We must not fail to note that. Some people expect tensions if Francois Mitterrand is.elected. But our economy and ~ our community life have been frozen for a generation to the benefit of egotistical and conservative structures. Do you think that--regardless of tihe result on 10 May --we can indefinitely ignore the impatience of an entire people who wants more huma.nity and more-justice? With growing unemployment and with constantly rising prices, we must realize that 1981 and 1982 will be tense in any case. N0; During the first period, right after the presidential elections, there are two problems that will come up: the problem of money and the problem of foreign payments. Pierre Mendes-France: These two problems are tied together. For a certain time, one can accept the idea of a certain imbalance in payments. We can take a limited deficit, provided foreign loans are used to finance investments that wi11 save futuxe foreign-exchange expenditures rather than covering current consumption ex- genditures. N0: Especially since we do have "reserves." P ierre Mendes-France: I do not believe very much in those "reserves" which the administration is talking about because that is "floating" and very volatile money which has been flowing into France for a year or 2 years but which go out again even faster. On the other hand, 5-year or 10-year loans, such as we have already had them, can certainly be envisaged if they save foreign exchange later. It is likEwise possible to tighten the currently rather loose links in foreign exchange control without even amending the law. By taking certain precautionary steps, a left-wing administration will have to and will thus be able to respond to the first needs whose character of justice and humanity is indisputable and at the same time it will have to draft longer-range _ projects to be submitted to a renewed Assembly without delay. _ N0: But at that point the risk is politic3l. You said the other day that the policy of the current administration is bound to fail because it has no popular 68 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY support, no national confidence. After the recent statements by George Marchais, should we not fear a situation in which the government would have the communists and the right-wing against it? Pierre Mendes-France; In France we have for a long time been using the term "policy of conf idence" in referring to a policy that was designed to reassure the banks and business circles. That was the policy of Pinay or Poincare. Confidence is an en- tirely different thing for a left-wing administration: it means support which it must find, the hop e which it must arouse among the vast masses of tlie country so as to make sure that decisions will lead to successful action in the end. This mobilization, this popular faith can overcome resistance and overreaction. At the start of the P opular Front it was the support of the entire nation that permitted the Blum cabinet t o push through the reforms which the country had not forgotten. Right-wing opposit ion forces were unable to regroup until several months later. A new administration therefore must act very quickly and benefit from a climate of enthusiasm which p ermits the adoption of major measures and changes, even though the total effect may not be achieved right away. _ The action, the de termination, and the strong moves by the left, at last in power, cannot be equivocal or hesitant. They must be fast and they must be absolutely clear so as to dis arm any kind of distrust, impatience, or excesses. The announce- . ment of clear blueprints, proposed quickly to a new Assembly, will produce under- standin g, favorabl e attitudes, a desire to help, and at the same time it will paralyze the campaigns of demagogy, illusionist; . or d6�eatism. Public opinion will stand by and wait after an electicn such as the one in May to - see what the new administration will do. Can one rely on it? If we see that it provides a great opportunity, a real change, then the impact in public opinion will be immense and nobody will be able to resist it. N0: Is not what we call Mendesism precisely the capacity to modify the political facts of life? In 1954, Francois Mitterrar.d, talking about you, said that the politician who arouses dash and verve is the man who is also a catalyst, capable of attracting scat tered or floating elements to him. Is that still true? Pierre Mendes-France; This is always true when one adopts a political line of action whose corre ctness the country can feel. _ N0: In summary, you too beli-eve that, after the elections, there will be a"honey- - moon" during which the president will have a free hand. But it is this very lati- tude--combined the fact that the neoa legislative elections will suspend the operations of the Assembly--which sometimes worries the voters. Pierre Mendes-Fran ce: The new president can, himself, take certain steps but he cannot amend the law. He cannot, for example, carry out nationalization measures without parliament. Moreover, even regarding decisions that are within his purview, he can only spend money voted by parliament. I never heard Francois Mitterrand nor anybody else talk about measures that would go beyond the authority of the executive branch. The period prior to the parliamentary elections, announced by Francois Mitterrand, will not be a period that wlll just be a blank page: the 69 FOR OFFICIAL iJSE OIVLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFF(CIAL UrE ONLY a3ministration will continue to discharge its normal functions. But, without losing - time, it will then have to prepare the folloraup action, that is to say, the measures on which the Assembly will have to vote as soon as it has been reconvened. N0: You talked about bold projects. What are the first of these bold projects that are necessary? Pierre Mendes-France: There is one thing that has been much debated: the duration of the working day, the 35-hour work week. N0: The incumbent likewise seems to be in favor of the idea but that is only lip service and it is incomplete, at that, in his plan against unemployment. Pierre Mendes-France: I will come back to that. The thing that shocks me in Giscard's plan is not so much the details of the measures announced--those could be 3ebated--but rather the fact that all of this leads to nothing. He has scraped the bottom of the barrel, he has combined measures that have already been taken, - a little more for early retirees here and a little tap for the effort to return foreign workers there, etc. No innovations, no imagination. This is just a quickie _ touchup job but it is not a policy. We do not know where this will lead. Audacity today calls for much moie. France is going through a difficult time. Things are not going to be easy for several months in any case. There may perhaps even be cases of imprudence--perhaps inevitable?--and even risks. But we must know exactly where we are going, we must. explain the situation to the country, we must prepare the country and we must get ready to overcome difficulties. We know that, in the end, we are going to have the 35-hour work week; all of our actions must show that this is our determination. That does not mean that this is going to be proclaimed tomorrow in a theatrical fashion: - "No worker may work more than 35 hours"--which would not be any great help in this form. The essential thing is to act quickly but not blindly, abruptly, in an indis- criminate fashion. The essential thing is for everyone to determine what he wants to do, where he wants to go, where the political determination is. Does that mean that all of this must be imposedin an authoritatian and technocratic manner by a central, paper-mill bureaucracy? Certainly not. Decisions will have to be adapted to real-life situations, to specific needs, to the various job categories, perhaps in accordance with the various enterprises, because we must make sure to preserve their vitality and their operation; machines, equipment, and factories must work at maximum speed even while the workers in them work a little bit less. We thus need suitable and progressive solutions. Hence the need for direct debates in , which the social partners will have the floor and will seek better solutions, while - t he governmenr_ would intervene to help bring about or promote effective agreements sometimes through arbitration. _ , But the desired goal must remain clear and without doubt. Everyone must strongly _ feel that such a measure--which might appear too cautious or precautionary--is only a start toward the final objective. It is at this price that we will succeed and that we will progressively obtain time for leisure and cultural pursuits for the - workers. This will be a social gain, not a sharing of unemployment. 70 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Most importantly, in 1936, it was not one law or another, paid leave or the 40-hour work week but rather the profound psychological revolution, the feeling of libera- tion, of popular victory which counted; everybody realized that those who had always run things would not rule eternally; the people at last had a government in which it could believe. But, I emphasize, it is necessary to understand and to get every- body else to understand that, both regarding the working hours and nationalization-- the expected effect cannot materialize instantaneously and immediately. We cannot imagine that we are going to replace an enterprise which today is privately ou*ned with another one, a nationalized enterprise, a suddenly dynamic, bold, modernized, and export-oriented enterprise just overnight. That just is not so. The present nationalized enterprises, such as Renault, SNCF [French National Railroads], EDF [rrench Electric Power Company], etc., were successful oniy after a certain period of time. The same will be true tomorrow. 'Zndustrial recovery, success in leading economic areas, a free-enterprise economy, a real plan--that sort of thing cannot be improviAed in terms of time through a decree or a law. It takes fruitful efforts which must be inspired by popular faith - ~and the latter will sustain the adtninistration because it will be in the service of the country arad its future. That is the usefulness of a real plan. A gradual program, each of whose phases strengthens the chances of the next one. In the government, there has to be a de- termined and clear will as well as commitments with specific target dates on them. This also means that we cannot do everything at the same time; therefore, some de- sires will not be crowned by success until after the success of a more urgent, more necessary priority effort. T'he essential thing will be to advance stage by stage. Instead of trying everything all at once, instead of short-term improvisation, in- stead of the continuation of privileges, the country wants to know where it is sup- posed to be heading. We w311 have to make choices and we will have to have the courage to make choices. That is the only way we can mobilize the sound but often - wasted or misused forces. But then popular suppoLt will become a factor in producti- vity and efficiency. It is not true that private initiative can do everything better or faster or cheaper. I have just read a survey conducted by business and industry on energy savings. It is rather shocking. Most of the company managers interviewed did not respond or are not daing anything or they say that they are waiting for government decisions and that in any case they expect to get subsidies, tax benefits, etc. During that time, fortunately, the nationalized sector is beginning to do something. - In all fields, the equivocal liberalism of Messrs Giscard d'Estaing, Barre, and _ Monory or the provocatory liberalism oF Mrs Thatcher cannot solve the problems that - must be faced. It takes a del.iberate policy, chosen by the country, so that the - - country may accept the stages, the discipline, and the necessary time frame. The country will not agree to continue with the injustices, the privileges, the mess, . and the ill-gotten gains. . Some of the big business groupings are today content with waiting for the elections = before reducing their personnel force even more, dropping a little more ballast, re- , ducing their investment programs. We cannot allow that to happen. 71 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y But the current adminiatration is doing nothing along these lines. It did not even dare to defend the Eighth Plan (or what is supposed to take its place) in the As- sembly. N0: Let us get back to unemployment and the possible remedies. Francois Mitterrand talked about quickly hiring 210,000 civil servants or personnel for local communities; _ this measure has been criticized as being too "bureaucratic." Do you agree? - Pierre Mendes-France: The more our comiunity life is nationalized, the more people are we going to need to make it work. When they decided to establish the capital of the United States in Washington, in 1800, did yQU know how many civil servants they had there? Well, they had 120! Here is another example: I have just read a report from a teacher who proudly tells us of the opening, for the first time, of a school in a village in Loiret 100 years ago. He alone handled 70 pupils! Today, the norms have changed. - Everytime you extend social protection, public service, when you create schoolsa hospitals, libraries, you also increase the need for employees. This is a fact of life in a society that springs from progress. I am not saying that we must accept any number of employees, no matter where; there are certainly places where we can tighten up, places for revisions and priorities to be implemented here or there; but the increase in civil service perRonnel is inevitable in general terms and it is just plain demagogy to announce that one is go ing to make a massive reZuction in the nuuiber of civil service personnel from one day to the next. N0: Are there any possible bold steps in foreign policy? Pierre Mendes-France: In foreign policy, I have one big regret. After the war and since then, we should have concentrated on getting together with the underdeveloped countries, with the Third ldorld. They have been humiliated, injured, and exploited - during colonial times and they are still marked by the effects of that. At the same - time, they have tremendous problems and we should have helped them face those pro- blems. We should have been the true allies of the newly liberated nations. We could have achieved a historical turning point with them and that would have been a good thing for them and for us. Once we had achieved worldwide prosperity, we could have very easily done a useful job for the entire world by promoting changes that would benefit everybody--a general monetary reform, a reorganization of the basic raw material market, including petroleum, etc. But too often we preferred to defend the little egotistical interests. N0: Is it not too late now? Pierr.e Mendes-France: Today, this is much more difficult. Many Frenchmen and many Europeans above all are concerned with their own immediate interests, in the midst of this crisis, and Lhey do not always see what such a policy could be in line with our idr q.l and our real interest at the same time--and I do not hesitate to say so. Eviden,_~y, our financial resources and our moral authority are reduced today. The situation itself limits our possibilities. But what was true remains true. The North-South dialogue was an interesting idea; they offered us the Majestic Hotel, "they gave us petits-fours, fancy salons, we wern_ a fine thing for the hotel industry 72 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY but France did not make a singlE proposal during two years of negotiations, not a - single basic proposal! Anc; when we talked about allowing the poorest countries to postpone the repayment of their debts, we were still creditors, we were the last to agree to drop certain tough demands. The Americans, the Germans, and the British-- and I am certainly not talking about the Scandinavians--agreed to all that before us and forced our hand! - = NO: And what policy would be desirable in the Near East? Pierre Mendes-France: I am profoundly troubled by the tragedy ir: Lebanon. Moreover, the most widespread opinion in France, from Chirac to Marchais, is that Israel must - be safeguarded while the Palestinians, for their part, have the right to determine their own f ate, all the way up to and including independence. The only trouble is that our behavior was brutally provocatory toward Israel whereas we complacently sant ministers and the chief of state throughout the petroleum emirates. The in- - spection of the Israeli plain, from the military viewpoint, from the top of a for- tress near Golan, is not a way to promote appeasement and negotiation. There have b een too many gestures of th is kind. COPYRIGHT: 1981 ".le Nouvel Observateur" 5058 - CSO: 3100/731 - 73 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFACIAL USE ONLY POLTTTCAL CONSEQUENCES OF DTSSOLVING NATLONAL ASSEMBLY Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Apr 81 pp l, 2 FRANCE [Article by Paul Granet, a deputy from Aube and member of the UDF [French Democratic Union], and deputy presiaent of the New Social Contract: "The Risks of Dissolution"] [Text] The French electorat must sense the post-election ambiguities in Francois Mitterrand's strategy. Certainly, the terms currently being used such as "gamble," "leap into the unknown," and "uncontrolled process," are polemical. But it is still a fact that the statements of the socialist leader must be disquieting to citizens worried about the future of France. And it is a fac t that the risks being taken appear to be of critical importance not only to the majority, but also to the social democratic voters, who still hesitate between the enticing program of a Francois Mitterrand and the safety of Valery Giscard d'Estaing's planning. Thus, once the presiden.tial elections are over, Francois Mitterrand, if he is elected, will create a homogenously socialist cabinet and dissolve the national assembly. 0ne uiust oTSsex've f irot of all tha.t the cabinet in question, in the absence of _ any parliamentary ratification, given that the assembly will be dissolved, will Be unable to pass a single law. It will necessarily confine its governmental activity to the narrow framework of regul3tory authority. As the socialist party [P5'F] fias always denounced the existence of a regulatory domain, it is ha.rd fio i`.magine that it would use it extensively once in power. - As I would not do Francois Mitterrand the injustice of imagining that he might violate the constitution, I will conclude tha.t the government will do very little, refraining particularly from structural reforms, since that would require a law. Tn short, President Mitterrand's cabinet will implement the Budget passed in December 1980. The legislative elections will thus focus on intentions, not on decisions or actions. They will in fact delay any decision for a couple of months. It should next be noted that the new assembly would have to be elected under the existing electral law--ma.jority balloting on a district-by-district basis with a run-off--since the new goverrnnent will ha.-ve neither the time (if it wants to fiold the elections before sumer) nor the majority needed to modify it. Certainly, one might dream of changing the electoral law by referendum: but as this would take place in .Tune, the elections themselves would th:en be set back to September. Which would mean 6 months of paralysis, along with an increasingly aggressive communist party [PCF]. 74 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFCC[AL USE ONLY Finally, one must emphasize that all these viciss.itudes wi11 show a very clear acceleration of the trend in the French aystem of government of moving toward a presidentialisrn that Francois Mitterrand condemns, at least in tfieory. A president of the republic, dissolving the nationa.l assembly after consultation with a prime minister who will never be brought before it, and thus in the absence of any dialogue between the executive and legislative branches: this is the presidential system in its extreme form. It is the end of any tfieory of checks and balances between the branches. Of the 112 socialist group deputies elected in the country, only 20 would have been elected in 1978 i~rithout the coumiunist vote. The other 92 owe their election - to the PCF. Only three of the PSF federations (Ariege, Nievre, and Belfort - Territory) can claim to play a decisive role in their department withouC the PCF. ~ Thus, the legislative elections will unfold with a rope around its neck held and tightened by the PCF. Naturally, we will be told that PCF voters will not necessarily follow their party's instructions. This is true, but that reservation should be qualified in t-hree ways. In the first place, one must understand that if only half the PCF voters follow any eventual instruction from their party to abstain from the voting, 59 PSF incumbent deputies are already beaten. In the second place, it must be noted that teh PSF's problem, in this instance, would not only be to keep the seats it already ha.s but-in order to obtain a majority in the national assembly--to increase the number. Now the electing of new deputies is more risky than the re-election of incumbents: by the very de4inition it would mean wresting a seat fram another party. If one considers that the PCF has 20 percent of the electorate, the PSF would have to get over the 40 percent mark on its own power in order to Free itself of compromising _ partner. Lven in the event of a"groundswell," the chances of this are slim... rn the third place, it should not be forgotten that "character assassination" is _ much easier in the legislative elections where all manner of skullduggery is possible in the twilight of the 480 electoral districts, tha.n in the presidential elections where all the media are focusing on one na tiona.l race. This observa- tion remains valid, in case Francois bii_tterrand is defeated, for future legislative elections. I wish "fair winds" for socialists who are already - contemplating possible revenge in 1983. Tn truth, If I were a communist and I wanted to see my party's hold extended, - my strategy would be simple: I would facilitate the election of Francois - Mitterrand as president of the republic, then I would cause the PSF to lose the legislative elections. Tf Francois Mitterrand persists in his strategy--that of dissolving the national - assemblp without modifying the electoral law--it should be vigorously denounced. Tt is suicidal, it delivers the PSF into the hands of the PCF. Michel Crepeau calls on the socialist candidate first to modify the electoral law. Michel Rocard, if he had been nominated and E:lected, envisaged dissolving the assembly only in the event it would not pass his bi11s. But Francois Mitterrand prefers to flee in advance, without knowing in this gamble wha.t will become of his party, himself, or of France. This is ill-considered ac tion, in the first place. It is also a risk the French can avoi3 runxiing. - 9516 75 CSO: 3100/732 FOR OFFICIAL USE O1NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLFTIGAL MTTTIItRAPID ON COHSTITUTION; PRESIDENTIAL, MINISTERIAL POWERS Paxis VALEURS ACTUELLES in Frenclz 9 Mar 81 pp 26-27 [Dialogue with Debre, author of constitution] [Text] THe powers of the hea.d of state and those of the goveriuaent: Michel Debre and Francois Mitterrand the - same conceg t of the ins titutions . FRANCE A constitutional debate between Michel Debre aixl Francois Mitterrand. Tbe following document is an extract from the ~ exchange that occurred on the television magazine "Question of - Z`Sme� on Antenna 2 on 28 January 1978, 3 months before the ` legislative elections. Tfie principal author of the 1958 constitution and tiL,, head of the socialist party [PSF] ~ which did not vote for it ("I voted more against the context than against the text," he says) share a similar interpretation , of the institutions. This document, which was obligingly provided by the review POUVOIRS, sheds light on the campaign being carried out by the candidates and on their intentions, _ too. - [Question] Are presidents in the Fifth Republic rea.lly arbiters above the partisan strff e...or on the contrary are they political leaders? J Mr Debre: The three presidents have said tha.t they were arbiters, but that at the same time they were leaders. The idea seems to me to be compatible with - wTiat the presidential function should be. The president is in effect an arbiter in the sense tfiat, fiaving to lift himself up higfier than he was before, he is not partisan. But at the same time he muat continually, and certainly at important moments, take into account the f act that he is a keystone: which is as much to i say that he has obligations which are not precisely those of an arbiter. The obligations, in a word, of someone who must embody, at least during trying - circumstances, the decision of the country. - - [Question] Do you think this is how things work at present? ~ Mr Mitterrand: For the president of the republic to be a leader is, I am sure you wi11 admit, the bare minimum! _ 76 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFaCIAL USE ONLY Mr Debre: Tt Ls the most important thing of all! Mr Mitterrand: TP he were not, one would have to ask he is doing there at all... The president ot the republic, in the three embodiments we have known to date (General De Gaulle, Mr Pompidou, and Mr Giscard d'Estaing), though there were marcy diFferences between them in their conception of their -ale, always conducted themselve like captains of a team, rarely like fair arbiters between two camps. Tftis ts a poor r_onception of the president crf the republic's role. Where I agree with Micizel Debre is that the preside;it, when all is said and dune, is electeiL by the majority of Frenchmen and from tine to time has to speak in the name of France, particularly on the international scene. He m4Kes mistakes - sometimes; often I disagree with what he says! But obviously France must have a voice to speak for it in some circumst.3nces, and then the president's task as a leadex is to try to interpret the general will. [Question] Mr Mitterrand, in his speech at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs the president of the repuBlic said: "Z do not want to be a silent president..." Do you think it passible for a president to be silent? Mr Mitterrand: No. But I think that this aspect I described is a part of the instttu.*.ion. The aspect that pushes a president to be the head of a camp. - Mr Debre: The Third and Fourth Republics were weighed down by the fact--which resulted from institutions fashioned in the 19th century when problems were quite difPerent--that it 3id not have, when facing questions of an interna.tional cha.racter or the lEaders of the great countries, any heafl, leader, guide, or responsible official who had any legitimacy. Mr Mitterrand: TEie powers which presidents since 1958 secured for themselves have nade them into personalities who concentrate all power in themselves. Mr Debre: T exercised my functions as prime minister under conditions that I Believe to be tEiose of a parliamentary prime minister: Simultaneously I led the majoritp, met the opposition, organized the work of the legislature, and carried out some very important matters, in military, social, and economic affairs! TP1ere is no doubt that the president, who was General De Gaulle at the time, = wanted (where circumstances permitted) to more direct authority, and it has been found that the presidents of the republic (particularly the current one) . have the inclination to deal with matters directly, an inclination wfiich they _ can carry out because the parliaffientary majority sanctions it. But if that rnajority should change, or the president in office should entertain a differe.nt - idea oP fiis role, the constitution would still function just as well. Where we agree is that I am very much a supporter of the existence of a real govermnent, of a prime minister who is tryly the majority leader, the head of the executive branch, and at the same time the director of legislative work. _ Mr Mitterrand: TEie president of the republic and the national assembly may be of different and hostile political persuasions... 77 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFRCIAL USE ONLY ~ In 1978 situatlon, now, if I had been asked, Z would Iiave tried to govern an - eye to avoiding an additional major crisis for the country: in otIzer words, with the president wito was actually in office. Up to him, of course, Co meet fiis own responsiBilities and sfioar the same prudence. Tf that had been impossible, t8en the people would fiave resolved it. Tt's tfiat simple, Either by the election of a new presinent or by the electinn of a new parliament. 2`ir Debre: Tt would be impossible to come up with a better interpretation of the constitution than the one you just gave. [Question] In this context, what use is a prime minister? Mr Debre: During the 3 years and several months tha.t I was prime minister (as T waa just saying) parliament functioned as I wanted it to. Never has it passed so important bills, in the fields of agriculture, scientific research, - education, or regarding the defense package, or energy. - [Questian] And who was the initiator: you yourself, or the president of the republic? Mr Debre: T was the initiator. But, witIi respect to important problems in international relations, there was on the part of the president a new orientation, and in tfiis I was his prtncipal collaborator. But with respect to everything involved In the vast field of domestic work... the work of the legislature, the work oP the administration, the important economic and financial work, I was a leader Mrith a�ree hand. Mr Mitterrand: Certainly the very nature of the office of prime minister within the i.nstitutions should be seen in terms of Article 20 of the constitution which say+s that the decides and leads the conduct of the nation's al:fairs, but in fact the prime minister--and this is the case today--is nothing but the executive agent who carries out decisions made at the Elysee. The proof is that one of Mr Giscard d'Estaing's most frequent statements is "I conduct the affairs of France"... That's not right! It is not he who should conduct tfi.em... It is the prime minister! This means that the Fifth Republic is a fragile system... As long as the president has a secure majority everything goes well... But when there is a dissent from urithin the majority (that is the situation we are experiencing today), then the position of the president af the republic changes, if there is a goverrnnent that demands its rights, its constitutiona.l right, to decide and conduct the nation"s affairs. Even more so, you understand, if it were a question of an opposition parli.ament, _ since the president could not d-smiss the prime minister if he continued to enjoy the confidence of the assembly. Does that interpretation seem fair to you? Mr Debre: I am extremely categorical on this point. Every step toward presiden- tialism, in other words toward the involvement of the president in too many aPfairs, is a step in the wrong direction. Even in the special case of General 78 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = De Gaulle, T have always considered that our democracy, if it is to endure, = requires a prime minister and a goverrnnent. When the first president of the republic went to international meetings, I always asked to accompany him, and did so. Mr W.tterrand: That was not the case later on... So, there is a slide toward presidentia'ism. _ Mr Debre: Lt is a sporadic, circumstantial slide, and one which is not good for the functioning Qf our institutions. Nor for the president nor for the spstem. One loses ena"s authority sonewhat when one takes charge of everything. Secondly, the qua'-ity of the institutions will be put to the test when we come to a ttrne wfien the majority in the assembly is of a different persuasion than the ch-tef of state. When that happens, the presidentts powers will be curbed and those of the parliament increased. Tt could not be otherwise. But even _ when tfie majorities are the same, the prime minister must be the governor: of - the cabinet team and of the parliamentary ma,jority. [Question] Tn your opinion, who should head the executive branch? The president of tfie republic or the prime minister? Mr Debre: The president is the head of the executive branch, I may say in $ccordance with the constitutional provisions. The word "head" comes to have a varying significance in terms of jurisdiction and powers depending on the composition of the assembly, the circumstances, and, I would add, depending on the temperament of the president of tfie republic. In my opinion what must always be avoided (and what has not been avoided su�ficiently over the last 20 years) is effacing tiie government as a separate e ntity. And I will come back to a science f iction scenario: Francois Mitterrand as head of state. In such a case, I raould hope tha.t he would choose a prime minister who is not simply a mirror image, one who regards hjm witti appropriate deference, but who would te11 him, should the case arise: "Mr President, you are wrong." Mr Mitterrand: I would say the same thing. W Hat is certain is that the national assembly should not exercise the executive was the case under the Fourth Republic. Indeed, the executive powers should be shared. The president Pias some major executive fUnctions, and the head of government also. And 3.t seezns to me that the president is increasingly assuming powers that should Belong to Matignon... This is why I say tcday tinat Mr Giscard d'Estaing bears total responsibility, since he even goes so far as to determine the f ate of the Les Aalles gardens. Tfiat is a strikirig abuse, which shows the institutions' tendenc,7, or how should T say, temgtation to move toward monarchy. Mr Debre: You see that between my interpretation and Francois Mitterrand's there is not so much difference. Both of us understnad that ther are constitutional provisions (and there must be), but aside from that there is human nature. 79 FUR OFFICIAL ilSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY There is also circumstance. Ana, too, there is the mother of us all, the electorate in its entirety, and the changes it can impose. Mr Mitterrand: Frenchmen have never confined their hiatory to texts. And they have always believed they could do it. [PHOTO CAPTION p 271: M. Michel Debre: "I am strongly in favor of a prime minister who would really be the majority leader." Opposite page, M. Francois - Mitterrand: "It is not tlie president who should conduct France'l- affairs, it - is the prime min:fster." COPYRTGAT: 1981 "Valaurs Actuelles" 9516 CSO: 3100/732 80 FOR OFFICIAL t-SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE CONSTTTUTIONt1L BALANCE OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATI~_' POWERS _ Narts I,f. F'ICARO in French 26 Mar 81 pp 1, 7 [Article by Pierre Thibon: "The Tfao Readings of the Constitution"] ~ : : i 1 : 1 E i : 1 : E ~ ~ i ~ ~ A [Text] Lf he is elected president of the republic, Francois Mitterrand will dissolve the assenbly, and depending on the resuZts of the legislative elections that follow, he will either designate one or another prime mini5ter to head the government on the basis of the majority that the voting tallies produce. This relatively inactive role of the president in the definition and implementation of overall policy apparently breaks all previous constitutional practice under the Fif th Republic. Since 1962, particularly, when the ref erendum was fie1d to institute tfie electton of the head of state by universal suffrage, it is obvious that, in reality, the Elysee imposes its will on the prime minister i.t names and on the government as well. This trend toward presidentialization has even become stronger over the years: from tfie rather restricted "privileged domain" of General De Gaulle, we came little by little to the involvement of the president in almost every domain of governmenta]_ activity, whether in the form of "letters of instruction" from the h.ead oP sta te to the prime minis ter , or even by direc t con tac t be tween the f:lysee and cc particular ministry, the pr.ime minister therehy being, so to speak, "short-circuited." Uoes the interpretation constitute an abuse of the constitution, as members of tYe opposition maintain? In reality, the provisions in ques tion are poorly adapted to themutations through which the presidency has gone in the last 19 years from the time when he was chosen by a college of 80,000 leading citizens (muni.cipal councillors and delegates chosen by them), to the present when he is ;i personage invested with his authority by the entire country. While elected by those 80,000 some-odd notables, he was, in short, only a sort of senior senritor, and every deputy elected by direct universal suffrage by a number of vnters almost as large could have the feeling that his own legitimacy was at l.east equal, if not greate:~ than that enjoyed by the occupant of the Elysee. By the sraae token, the system remained essentially parliamentary, with allowances for the personal equation of General De Gaulle. liu [ tIe e Lec t Lon o f. thehend of 5 tate by universal suffrage over turned this~ bat,ince oF power: once elected by the whole of the cittzenry, while the deputies, ,is indivl.duals, are only elected from a small portion of the nation's territory, tho prer,LclenL can boast of a moral authority greater than that of the parliamen- tarllns. 81 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONY.Y ThJs is what fias happened. And the actual operation of the institutions has led to trasforming them into a presidential system (or even a super-presidential _ system, since tfie head of state has the right to dissolve the assembly, which is not the case in the traditional presidential system). Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions, aside from the articles-concerning election of the president by universal suffrage, fiave remained as they were in 1958. Naturally, they give the Elysee powers grea.ter than those that devolved in the Fourth Republic. But these powers are almost exclusively designed to be used under extraordinary conditions: Article 16, which, In case of a crisis that threatens the surviv:l of the nation and its institutions, gives the president the right to do prac:ically whatever he wants, and the righ.t to dissolve the assembly. In ordinary t:nes, by contrast, it is the gove-nment htat holds the reigns of power, and the head of state only has the role of an arbiter so as to assure "the "ordinary functioning of public authorities as well as the continuity of tfie state." The notion of arbitration is rather vague, and in any case does - not imply that the Elysee takes Matignon's place in conducting ordinary government activity: the arbiter does not replace the players on the field. Should one be tempted to conclude that this i.s an abuse of the constitution? Even if thispractice has been going on now for close to 20 years, there would be absolutely no doubt of it but for the fact that the definition of an abuse = rests fundamentally on the absence of consent. Now the people have given their sovereign consent--at least tacitly--to the extent that the various elected assemblie have by ma.jority rule acquiesced in the usage made of the constitutional language. This latter has thus been interpreted in a manner wA-tch, it could be maintained, does not betray the spirit of the institutions, even if it has not precisely conformed to the letter. - The Voters: The Supreme Judges What is certain, in any event--and it is af ter all the most important--is that no interpretatia whatsoever can prevail againsC the will of the general electorate. The present domination of the president of the republic over the government that is accountable to parliament could, in rea.lity, be very rapidly reduced to = nothing, whenever the majority of the assembly should really want to do so. It could for example resist the head of state's choice for prime minister by voting a motion of censure. Of course, the head of state has the privilege of exercising his right of dissolution, but he can only do it once a yea.r, and if the general electorte sends back the same ma.jority as obtained in the dissolved assembly, the president--thus disavowed--bould only either resign or yeild. Tn case of conflict between the president and the pr:Lme minister, the president, we will betold, could obstruct the system by refusing to sign the dec-rees made in the council of the ministers and by thus preventing the naming of prefects, generals, rectors, ambassadors, and a certain number of'other high off icials. Similarly, the administrators of public instituCions, public enterprises, and state companies (EDF-GDF [French Electric Company, French Gas Company], SNCF [French National Railroads], television networks, etc.) are chosen by decrees made in the council of ministers which require the signature of the head of s ta te. 82 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE OMY.Y - But these recent extensions result only from an organic statute and could be - easil.y e1Wrrated By a vote of parliament. Similarly, one can see that in a test of strengtFi between the president and the govertnnent (the latter by definition relying on tfie national assembly since, if this were not the case, the latter wouid fiave passed a vote of no confidence), the government has at its disposal taany more Rigfi cards tfiatn the occupant of the Elysee, and could impose its viev of things in tfie maj ority of cases. In parti.cular, it could keep the head o� state out of tfie preparation of the texts deliberated i-: the council of m4ta.tsters and, even where the Elysee ha,s a veto power, could get around that obstacle: in the most eatreme case, one could always for example pass a bill resnoving the larger part of the power vested in prefects or ambassadors and replace them with otfier higfi officials beartng other titles and which conse- quently- are not enumerated on the list of employees for whom the presidential sigriature is required. Ih the speech he made at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs: several months before the legis- lative eiections of 1978 Mr Giscard d'Estaing in fact emphasized that if what at that time was called the union of the left were to obtain the majority, there would be no constitutional way he could stop the i.mplementation of their program. Conversely, it is obvious a leftist president would not have the resources to impose his will on a rightist legislative chamber: this is in fact the reason why Mr Mitterrand intends, if he is elected, to proceed with the dissolution of the present assembly. But if,, hypothetically, the voters should oPt for a rightist majority in the Bourbon Palace after having voted a lef tist candidate into the Elysee, the problems would be the same. Said another way, the interpretation of the constitution which has up to now prevailed rests necessarily on harmony between the president and the prime minister, in other words on the parliamentary majority which supports that prime _ minister. In the absence of this majority one must return to an interpretation that is moie in conformity with the letter of the provisions and which gives the prime minister and the government accountable to parliament the lion's share of executive prerogatives in the administration of the country's affairs. So there - are, as Michel Debre has said, two possible "readings" of the constitution. Mr Mitterrand, for his part, has from the start upheld the "parliament-iry" rea.ding, and he confirmed the other day that he still adheres to it. One might in fact wonder whether in some way a kind of "settling" of presidential pre- eminence wi1 not be required, if only (aside from questions of political opportunzsm) becuase the election of the head of state by the whole elctorate has by now changed somewhat in nature. Wi thout their having realized it, those who drew up and voted for these provisions--which require that henceforth aspirants to the Elysee must gather 500 signa tures from elected officials in at least 30 departments--have resulted in making those 35,000 or 40,000 notables (parliamentarians, mayors, general and municipal councillors) the real masters of the game: henceforth the voters will be limited, in effect, to exercising a narrow choice among four, five, or six individuals who, in short, will have been preelected. So we come back, by a circuitous route, to a sytem for electing the president of the republic which comes close to that in force up to 1962 and which had the president chosen by 80,000 local elected off4cials. Regardless of the results of the voting in May, the less direct nature of the presidential election appears therefore likely to entail a correspondingly less direct manifestation of his authority. 9516 83 CSO: 3100/ 732 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R040440020008-7 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE VIEWPOINTS ON FUTURE PS-PC-RPR GOVERNMENT COALITIONS PS-PC-RPR Three=Way Coalition Paris FAIRE in French Feb 81 pp 46-47, 49-50 [Article by Gerard Grunberg: "The PCF, Debre, Chirac and Us"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] [Text] With the approach of the presidential elections, the subject of PS-RPR a [French Socialist Party-Rally for the Republic Party] convergence has aurfaced again. The continuing crisi3 of the union of the left and the growing crisis in the majority, statements of the RPR and also those of CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education] leaders have given some substance to Jean-Pierre Chevenement's old plan for a national PS-PCF-RPR compromise. For the moment, tactical asgects are of greater weight than strategy. The PCF [French Communist Party] denounces tae rapprochement it thinks it perceives between Gaullists and socialists. The RPR rejects beforehand any alliance with the PCF, and the PS swears its loyalty to the union of rhe left. The RPR electorate remains fundamentally hostile to communism, and the PCF's to Chirac. In short, if everyone ' tries, as is normal, to extend his electoral influence on the eve of elections then _ - the national compromise does not appear for the moment to be a credible alterna- tive to the confrontation between the right and the left which remains the funda- mental split in French political life. We would be mistaken, however, to dismiss the CERES plan lightly. Re-examined over the longer term it regains sufficient credibility to merit debate. Let us look at the communist viewpoint first. When Georges Sarre, in his article of 3 December in LE MONDE calls un the PCF "to recall those recent times when it was in search of national and popular alliances," and to revive "one of the con- stants of its history," he proclaims two truths and lays down a hypothesis. It is true that at the end of 1978 L'HUMANITE hailed the points of convergence between its own analyses of Europe and those of the RPR, expressing its satisfaction with Chirac's victory over his "Giscardian" adversaries in the Gaullist party, and called for the birth of a great national movement to counter "tht. decline of France." It is also true that from a certain poimt of view the PCF was more comfortable in _ great "antifascist" or "resistance" alliances of the kind in which it participated in 1936-1937 or in 1944-1946 than it is in head-on confrontation with the PS, - with which it has never participated alone as a partner in a government. 84 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - At bottom, CERES is beginning to realize that the common program version of the union of the left has long been dead, because the communists no longEr want any part of it (1). Thus a atrategic alternative to the union of the left is neecled, and the only one which both makes it possible to preserva the alliance with tl-ie PCF and rejects centrism is a national compromise "like in the resiatance," to use the worda of Georges Sarre. The unifying theme would be that of national indepen- dence in the f ace of American imperialism. This is behind J.-P. Chevenement's appeal to the Gaullists and in particular to Debre, who symbolizes the voluntarist Jacobinism of the right, which finds a pretty fair counterpart in CERES on the left. Chevenement considers it evident--"Press Club" on Europe 1 on 21 December-- "that a union of the left government could be expanded to include all those who, _ even though they once call.ed themselves rightists, nevertheless have a sense for the national interest, a sense of national independence, and who want profound change for France." Any strategic design needs historical legitimacy. The legitimizing factor at work here is a"return to the spirit, the alliances, and the programs of the national council of the resistance." One must show that a three-party government--Gaullism-communism-socialism--has its patents of nobility. At the same time there arises the question of identifying the nation's/excluded/ ~2~, what under various guises remains always the main enemy, exuding the poison of surrender: the third force, centrism, Giscardism... Liberties With History In the face of that continually regenerating hydra, the proud and patriotic French people must cultivate the spirit of the resistance, and, under the leadership of the Jacobins--whether they be communists, Gaullists, or socialists--get back on the honorable path... and the path of structural reform. Georges Sarre does not hesitate to take a few liberties with history to prove hts point. First of all, he makes a disingenuous mistake when he makes the CNR [National Council of the Resistance] the hjstoric expression of the three-party government on which his hopes rest today. At the time of the Liberation, CNR's president was none other than Georges Bidault, a confirmed Christian Democrat and one of the principal founders of rhe MRP [Popular Republican Movement] in 1945. That movement was going to become the third thief [sic] of a tripartism that did not incl.3e a Gaullist party for the simple reason that no such party existed until the creation of the RPF [Rally of the French People] in 1947. Jean Lecanuet later headed the MRP, which was the predecessor of the CDS [Social Democratic Center] of today. The CNR excluded no one but Petainists and collabora- tors in the Nazi occupation. Next, "The spirit of the CNR," if spirit there were, did not last long. Even before General De Gaulle's departure in January 1946, it w�s already moribund(3). Barely surviving that extraordinary period when the HitlPrian enemy was not yet beaten, when our institutions and our economy still needed to be rebuilt, the political alliance born of the resistance was to break up in 1946 and then in 1947 on the two fundamental questions any party must answer: what kind of internal political system, and what external alliances. When he accuses the third force of being alone responsible for that collapse, Georges Sarre omits mention of the fact that in late 1947 the growth of the Gaullist RPF and _ the PCF's agitation provoked this statement from Leon Blum to the national assembly: 85 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "The republic is in danger. On one side, international communism has openly de- clared war on French democracy; on the other side, a party has been estab].ished, the RPF, whose object is to dispossess the national sovereignty of its fundamental rights." It was no accident that De Gaulle was involved in the revival of colonial wars after liberation, and one sees today where the extreme centralization of powers - engendered by the new institutions he gave France in 1958-1962 has led us. But let us not, for all that, neglect the possible impact of the "myth" of the spirit of the resistance and the way in which it could serve tomorrow to disguise a plan - which seems to me to be diamet,:ically opposed to democratic and self-managing socialism. A Dangerous Analysis In effect, the deepening economic crisis, mounting unemployment, the apparent im- potence of traditional liberal nethods and the aggravation of international rival- ries could lend new credibility to the words af those who, in the name of national independence, preach protectionist nationalism as the solution in place of Giscardism, but more widely as an alternative for a social democratic Europe in search of its second wind. From this point of view, the CERES analysis is both mistaken and dangerous. Mistaken because it relies on the idea that Gaullism is the political expression of a national middle calss that is ready to fight against American imperialism. In short, it relies on a very questionable analysis of French so!;ial and political reality. First of all, this "national middle class" certainly seems difficult to identify in reality. Secondly, De Gaulle himself, perhaps despite his nersonal preferenr_es, ended up giving priority in the 1960'9--which are closer to us than the epoch of the resistance--to improving the competitiveness of our industrial structure rather than to national autonomy. As for Pompidou and Chirac, determined to play the world market game to the hilt, they, like VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing], subjected our economy to international competition. Today it is neither 1945 nor even 1969. One can be permitted to doubt that tomorrow the RPR can become the expression of a national capitalism. But, even granted that convergences with the RPR and batween the RPR and the PCF are possible in terms of some kind of state economic planning, do we want such state planning? Without elaborating here on.the risks and problema such a resolutely protectionist policy would have for our economy, we must underline the /"authoritar- ian"/ aspects that could accompany such a policy. Whether in terms of state cen- tralization, the repression of anti-authoritarian attitudes (which a growing share _ of the social groups that support us evince), or the abandonment of our proposal for self-management with respect to decision-making in industry. In reality, it is hard to im3gine Jacques Chirac or Michel Debre approving schemes--abortion on demand, power for the workers in industry, decentralization--which they have always fought. Will we give in on these basic parts of our program? In addition to these concessions which we would make to the right to obtain its support, any possible PS-PCF-RPR accord based on protectionist and centralized state planning would riin the risk of having an international dimension that could only be expressed by a certain complaisance with regard to the USSR. When Georges Sarre calls us to the resistance, he makes clear from the start he is not speaking of resistance to Soviet Russia by dismissing beforehand any "antjsoviet grouping." On the contrary, his resistance is totally directed again-~t "atlanticism" and "social democracy." 86 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY But are we not members of the Atlantic alliance? Do we not want to build Europe, and if so, will we be able to build it in opposition to European social democracy? We are back to the socialist outline put together by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, when France's security was link,ed with Moscow. One finds no mention of Polaiid in Georges Sarre's article. It is true that what is happening in Poland is somewhat -9 inconsistent with recent CERES analyses according to which the dissenters in the socialist countries are on the fringes of the worker scene. Benevolent Nationalism Certainly the RPR's current attitude toward the USSR seems more firm than that of VGE, whose pathetic expedition to Warsaw is still remembered. Certainly it is true that De Gaulle, even if he did use Franco-Soviet rapproahement to increase his freedom of maneuver within the Atlantic alliance, showed his true colors in the big crises (Cuba, Berlin). But all the same, Gaullism--we recall that Debre in 1968 described the Czechoslovakia affair as a passing episode--has from time to time evidenced a certain neutrality toward the USSR. Gaullists, socialists and communists could converge--on the basis of different lines of reasoning--toward _ a nationalism that would be rather benevolent toward the USSR. Are the majority of us in the PS in agreement with such a policy? Finally, the national compromise seems to me to present two dangers, each as serious as the other. It may be that this is a purely hypothetical plan that cannot result in any realistic alternative compatible with our views. This seems to me most probable. But such a plan, even if it is never rut into effect, has a serious drawback. It leads us to stay far away from any serious re-examination of our strategy, avoids the funda- mental debate with the PCF, and runs the risk of alienating whole sectors of our electorate. It contributes over time to the weakening of our party, by leading , those who believe in us to impasses, instead of causing us to reflect seriously on past failures and draw lessons for the future. On the other hand, it may be - that, with the further deepening of the political and/or economic crisis, this - plan is taken up again both by the PCF and a part of the RPR. Then the risks appear even greater. Doubtless there are ture Jacobins in CERES, in the RPR, and in the PCF. But is the democratic and open socialism that we want compatible with Jacobinism, whether Marxist or nonmarxist? This is a ques- tion that deserves to be widely debated. The answer that flows from such a debate may well 3etermine the course of history. Of our hiatory. FOOTNOTES 1. On thia point, read M. Simon's article in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISM of December 1980: "PCF Strategy and the Communist Candidacy." 2. See Alain Bergounioux and Bernard Manin: "L'Exclu de la Nation." LE DEBAT _ No 5, October 1980. 3. On this subjer_t see the excellent book by J.-P. Rioux: "The France of the Fourth Republic, Vol I, New History of Contemporary France." Le Seuil. Points. History. 1980. Reviewed in FAIRE No 62. 87 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PS-RPR Disagreements Paris FAIRE in French Feb 81 pp 60-62 [Article by Colette Ysmal: "PS-RPR: The Imposaible Agreement "--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] [Text] Any whimsical idea of working toward a convergence between the PS and the RPR presupposes the existence, on the part of both the organizations concerned and their active supporters, a certain degree of mutual acceptance, as well as a minimal level of agreement on basic policies. The least one can see is that RPR leaders hardly seem ready for such an adventure. Let us be blunt: for them, the PS is the enemy. Asked to indicate the cjegree of sympathy they feel for that party, 40 percent of the [RPR] delegates ~1~ gave it a"zero"--total antipathy--and 54 percent a mediocre rating (between 1 and 4). That is scarcely better than the PCF showing (Table 1); and if the PS wanted to get a little more "respect" it would be better advised to turn toward the UDF [French Democratic Union]! Should this be surprising? After all, this judgment - corroborates the incessant diatribes of the "Gaullist" movement against the social- . ist movement, which it accused, notably in "Proposals for France," (2) its the = 1978 campaign platform, of being a weak party destined to pave the way for communism (see separate box). - Beyond that, there is considerable political opposition. In f act, the RPR rejects all the values of the worker movement, rejects the essence of the socialist program, and positions itself clearly in the conservative camp. First evidence: the marked - antipathy shown by Chirac's militants for the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] labor organizations. These militants defend a class line and a preference for "sensible" labor organizations, indeed for openly paternalistic ones. Thus Workers Force [FO] an.d FNSEA [National - Federation of Unions of Farm Operators] are well regarded by 63 percent of the delegates, and even CFT-CSL [French Confederation of Labor-Confederation of Free Trade Unions] gets a 42 percent positive response! In this field, the RPR shaws itself more conservative and more antilabor than the UDF which is less delib- erately offended by CFDT, more reserved with respect to the FO and above all with ~ respect to the CFT (Table 1). Here again, the convergence is clear betw?en those attitudes and the texts denouncing "syndical power," which is what the PS would like to establish in industries for the sole benefit of "revo lutionary organizations." - (Sae separate box). Law and Order Talk This conservatism speaks the language of law and order, and of the tradition which the RPR is constantly invoking. One finds here a continual incantation for a "coming together" which would lead to the negation of all divisions. Not only does one not thin:z in terms of class conflicts--but even generational conflict, demands for regional and cultural identity, or circumstantial differences based -on sex are all unanimously judaed to be subsidiary expressions of special interests. 88 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY At the same time all political or "cultural" policies are stamped with the seal of defense of the established order. One notes, in fact, that only 49 percent of - the party militants are in favor of according /"women the right to decide about aboxtion for themselves"/ even though this is the law, and, in another area, 67 percentof them describe themselves as /"somewhat supportive of tradition from the religious point of view." /Similarly, 68 percent believe it would be proper to /"reduce public control over industries"/ (where is the language of so-called - _ planning, and where are the critiques of the laisser-faire liberal?) ; 7.5 percent - think we must /"increase defense outlays"/ and 72 percent maintain--the sweet revenge of Cartierism over Gaullism--that we must /"*ake our own needs more into account in the aid we provide to the Third World."/ In these matters, sometimes the RPR is perfectly aligned with the UDF, and some- times shows itself to be less "modernist" or less sensitive to the spirit of - the times (Tab le 2), unless one is in favor of a progressivism which results from nationalistic attitudes. What can be noted is the real sensitivity Qf the RPR cadres to anything that involves the integrity of the nation and its capacity to control "its own destiny." Thus, for example, many more of them than of their UDF counterparts are resolved to increase military appropriations, /"control the activity of the multinationals,"/ (65 percent are in complete agreemeilt, compared to 32 percent)...Above all, they are very opposed to building Europe: only 39 percent of them are in favor of accelerating /"the process of the integration of Europe"/ (90 percent in the UDF) and only 44 percent in November 1978 were in favor of the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage (95 percent in the UDFO). Having said all that, the questions remain. Is the PS ready, in the name of convergence, to embrace this nationalism which contravenes, in the view of many, - its policies? But there is an even more critical point. If it were to do this, and if, in order to attract the RPR or its electorate, a"socio-nationalistic" line were to prevail, how would the socialists handle their desire to transform society? How would they reconcile that desire with the obdurate defense of the status quo _ waged by Chirac's supporters? [Table 1 on following page] sy FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLEAUI 1 SYMPATHIE ACCORDEE A UX PARTIS ET ORGANISATIONS SYND ICALES (en 07o) RPR UDF RPR UDF Puti communiste Force ouvribro2 0 59 77 Q 3 2 1 AC 2.1 18 I id 35 27 S 4 I 5 25 IS 6A 10 3 - 61 10 34 45 ParU socialLste FNSEA 0 40 13 0 3 3 114 54 60 1 a 4 27 22 3 I Il 5 22 IS 64 10 2 9 64 10 41 41 CGT CFT-CSL 0 66 57 0 10 17 1&4 28 33 1 a 4 36 33 S 1 I 5 17 9 6A 10 1 I 6A10 25 IS CFDT 0 51 22 1 14 42 53 5 1 8 6A 10 2 7 3 ' Ce qui manque pour arriver au [otal 100 represente les � sans reponse ~ KEY: 1. Sympathy Felt Far Parties and Labor Organizations (Percent) 2. FO--Workers Force. 3. Figures do not add up to 100 percent because of "no opinion" responses. [Table 2 on following page] 90 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . TABLEAU 11 QUELQUES OPTIONS POLITIQUFS ET CULTURELLFS fer: %1 1 UberiE de i'avortement 2 RPR UDF Tout A fa)'t d'accord 3 29 29 D'accord4 20 19 ' Oppose 5 6 16 15 Tout A faic oppose 18 17 Du point de vue religieux 7 Plutdt favorable i la tradition 8 67 q, Plut3t favorable au changement 9 19 41 REduirc Ie contr8le public sur les eatreprises10 Tout A faic,d;accordll ' 1 ~ 29 ,33 D accord Oppose 13 39 26 Tout A fait oppose 14 12 5 10 4 Contrdler les muilineliuqalesl 5 Tout A fait accord 1 b 1$ ' 65 32 D accord Oppose 18 23 38 Tout A fait oppos619 1 1 10 4 Accroitrc les dfpensesmilitaires 20 Tout A faic d'accord ll 22 D' Zq 28 accord Oppose 23 51 24 Tout A faic oppose 24 7 1 19 11 AccflErer le prceessusI'jn t8gration europeenne 25 ' b Tout A fait d ~cord L 7 69 D'accord 2 OpposE 28 32 23 21 I Tout a fait opposc 29 21 - KEY : l. Various Political and Cultural Policies (Percent) 2. Freedom of Abortion 3. Completely in agreement 4. In agreement 5. Opposed 6. Completely opposed 7. Religious matters 8. Somewhat favorable to tradition 9. Somewhat favorable to change 10. Reduce public controls over industry 11. Completely in agreement 12. In agreement 13. Opposed 14. Completely opposed 15. Control the multinationals 16. Completely in agreement 17. In agreement 18. Opposed 19. Completely opposed 20. Increase military spending [Key continued on following page] 91 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 21. Completely in agreement 22. In agreement ~ 23. Opposed 24. CompletPly opposed 25. Accelerate the process of European integration 26. Completely in agreement 27. In agreement - 28. Opposed - 29. Completely opposed FOOTNOTES 1. The data utilized her e come from a survey made of delegates to the RPR's special congress held in Paris in 1978. This survey, carried out in France by Roland Cayrol and Colette Ysmal, is par.t of a research project on politi- cal elites in the nine countries of the EEC, the study being f inanced by the Volkswagen Foundation and the European Communities. - 2. Published by Stock. Impossibility of PS-RPR Coalition Paris L'UNITE in French 30 Jan 81 p 5 [Article by Georges Sarre, member of the PS executive committee: "Conquer and Succeed"] [Text] The very idea of a PS-RPR alliance provokes an immense outburst of laughter, but the question before us is one of pre- paring a new class front for tomorrow. Tempest in a teapot! The supposed "convergence" w3th the Gaullists is a flood of texts, speeches, and articles. The PCF, once again, is making unfounded accusations, and its secretary general - castigates the new gang of three. Even within the PS, there are comrades who deem it useful to add their voices to the incantations and ascribe to us the inten- tion of preparing some secret alliance with the RPR. Jean-Pierre Cot and Robert Chapuis i.n particular.thought it neGessary to ascribe _ such a plan to me, despite all evidence to the contrary (LE MONDE of 3 Januar.y 1981). Let us have rione with false accusations and look at the basic questions. The very idea of an alliance between the PS and the RPR is laughable in the Extreme. Can you for one second imagine socialist militants coexisting for long in the same meeting hall with the RPR people? Which RPR? That of Chfrac, Debre, or Chaban- Delmas? As for talk of a"cowmon program among the PCF, the PS, and the RPR," that truly belongs to the realm of comic strips. And it would be some fun in that respect to see Cot, Chapuis...and Rene Andrieu (who would have the advantage of experience) meeting for such an exercise. L'HUMANITE's editorial writer, perpetu- ally lying in wait for the elusive proof of veering to the right, is f inding a 92 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY new pretext for his completely spurioua diecourae which is totally without founda- tion. Speculation replaces the facta. None of all that is very aerious, and it is only the determination to diatort J people's thinking which leads our good authors to make wild conjectures. All the same, if one was determined to take their remarka aerioualy, one could ponder ~ the analysis Cot and Chapuis draw up, according to which "RPR and UDF deputies can be distinguished from each other, but they can also ,join handa to represent the right, just as PCF and PS deputies are distinguishable but also join hands to : represent the left." In vain one tries to be true to logic or Marxism, so quickly are basic principles forgotten. To reduce the workers movement in this way to an electoral "dance for two" similar to the RPR/UDF rivalry is certainly to evince a marvelous clarity of thought! Let us instead talk about the realities of France in 1981. Let us put aside one methodology. To assert that alliances must rest on a class basis, without pro- - ceeding to the concrete analysis of social classes in today's France is to be condemned to catechism, and to deprive the analysia of any'hold on reality. Now the decisive question is certainly the question of the birth of the claes front that will aggregate around the wage-earners in the social strata taat want to see the disappearance of the system. These partners are those whose aurvival as a class is threatened by the growth of an increasingly multinational and inte- grated capitaliam: the peasantry, artisans and small businessmen, the pre-capital- istic sectors doomed to pauperization and proletarianization. Gaullism served for decades as the ideological glue uniting these social strata to _ the blot~ of classes in power. This is so obvious no one tries to deny it. And the question for us is precisely to put together a recombination, a new crystalliza- - tion of elements existing today in order to forge a new class front tomorro�a. For the present it is a question of dissolving the ideological links to the bloc in power, and of aggregating the middle strata who are on the way to being proletar- ianized. One might obviously think the problem resolved. That is too easy. "The Gaullist votes have again found their respective homes," say Cot and Chapuis. Insofar as we are talking about the working class, this is largely true. But the question of the middle strata, whose attachment to the bloc in power is often based on ideology, ia stil] before us. Here again, it is too easy to resort to demagogic expedients to avoid this critical question. To assimilate the social strata that _ have been influenced by Gaullism, and the "great intellectuals" who emerged from the Resistance, to the RPR apparatus is a way of simply shuffling the cards. But, dear comrades, the sleight-of-hand is just too obvious! To transform the indispen- , sable thought on the broadening of the class front into a vaudeville "Fourth Republic" is a convenient diversion. It seems to me of more importance tc try to understand whether, given the exacerba- tion of the economic crisis--which signifies the euthanasia of France--, given the disaster and tragedies which unfailingly await us, the tendency of the middle strata under Gaullist influence to join up with the leftist block is going to in- crease. Indeed, I think that this phenomenon is inevitable, because of the acceler- ated rate of impoverishment of those classes, and becauae of the ideological schism which Giscardism has shown. 93 FOR OFF1CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY With that as a starting point, our role is then to transform that defensive move- ment, that movement of resistance to apathy and listl.essness, into a factor that will aid our victory. It is a question of promoting powerful ideas that will fa- cilitate the mobilization of our peopie and furcing the lock. Will we be able to get a grip on this phenomenon and give it the freedom it needs, or will we prac- tice "ostrich" politics in order to hide from other choices tomorrow? What political space is it possible to carve out? This is the problem of the - third family, and one which, in all truth, we have never up to now satisfactorily resolved. The radicals of the left constitute more of a regional reality than a representative current of thought at the national level. The organizational ties that were established with them led to an impasse, i.e. to the split with the MRG [Radical Movement of the Left]; the attempts conceived in 1977 to ally with opposition Gau].lists fared no better. Now this question needs to be resolved. In reality, the aim of the left in govern- ment is to really change things, to undertake profound structural reform. And this undertaking cannot be carried out against the opposition of 49 percent of the Frencn people. Our objective is not to cut France in half, but to bring our people together. Naturally, if one considers that a government of the left must confine itself to more socially oriented and more convivial management of society, then the problem does not arise. But a strategy of profound transformation of French society needs support or consent that must over time go increasingly beyond 50 percent. Remember the Chile of the Popular Unity; remember the Popular Front! Failure and defeat have in large part been the result of this problem. It may be time to think about this and to shake loose from the mellow complacency of well- meaning assumptions. There can be no question of doing less; rather we must obtain the means to hold to our line and our commitments. In short, we must neither betray the cause nor perish. Are not those who refuse to consider this urgent need betraping signs that would lead us to entertain serious doubts about their will to engage in a really audacious policy which attacks the very structures? So where do we expect to get support? What is proposed, and what is the deeper plan behind these false accu- sations? Putting forward Atlanticist or European themes, making ringing affirmations that we belong in the "camp of freedom and human rights" (since this is how the imper- ialist system is called currently!), all these themes tend to move us closer to centrism. And that is to opt for being swallowed up, and to close the door to any possibility of profound transformation of the country. We resolu::ely reject that path. We must get out of this impasse and formular.e proposals to anchor the socialist program in reality. It is desirable and possible to find people in the Gaullist camp who are disposed to join their efforts with those of the left as a whole to force the locks. On a certain number of big themes: independence to oe won, freedoms to expand, the return of the great instruments of production to the nation, democratic planning, the right to a job; the forces that could be brought together could extend beyond the ranks of the left and assure it not only victory, but also the possibility of enduring success. 9.4' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 - ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Hopes for PS-PCF-RPR Coalition Paris LE MONDE in French 3-4 May 81 p 5 [Article: "M Defferre Desires a PS-PCF-RPR Coalition Based on a Program"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] [Text] Mr Gaston Defferre, president of the socialist group in the national assem- bly, mayor of Marseille, was questioned on 30 April by Jou:nalists and listeners on Radio Monte-Carlo. During the conversation, he was asked to respond to the �ollowing queation, to which he then replied: /"Do you think that an accord is possible between the socialists, the communists, _ and the RPR? That was the case after the liberation with General de Gaulle; and if that coalition i5 possible that would then give the government that would be constituted--on the basis of the program that we would define together--a foun- dation, an attraction, which would I think be likely to inspire the confidence of - many Frenchmen. _ /"I would like to see a coalition on condition that a precise agreement be reached on the program that we ourselves define; in other words that first of all there would be major structural reforms, nationalizations; next, in social terms, an increase in the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage], the lowering of - retirement age, in short everything we propose. I am on the other hand completely against any coalition government without a precise program, becauae if that were to happen we would be where we have been for the last 7 years: impotent; and that would be intolerable, both for the country and for thoae who want to govern, in other words to take action."/ Mr Defferre said that he had never even spoken with Gaullists or communists about such a proposal, not even as a private individual, but it was rather /"Just an idea in my head..."/ That statement stirred up some feeling, for in the initial transcription diasemin- ated on the night of 30 April but amended the following day, the French Press Agency [AFP] had spoken of an /"RPR-PS coalition,"/ omitting the PCF. Mr Defferre published a correction to set forth the precise content of his statementa and - the management of AFP tendered its apologies for /"the groas error in transmission"/ which had distorted the mEaning of his remarks. - L`HUMANITE of 2 May Mr Rene Andrieu commented on the (unabridged) statements of Mr Defferre in these terms: /"Let us say right away that such a proposal is frivolous for a whole series of reasons any one of which would alone be sufficient. - /"Today, the RPR program is a rightist program distinguished particularly by the rejection of nationalizations and the granting of new subsidies to big business. /"Moreover, socialist leaders throughout the countr.y have been unsparing in their denuciation of such demagoguery. 95 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY /"Now by just what kind of dark electoral miracle would base lead be transformed instantly into pure gold? /"If we add to that what Mr Chirac himself had to say--that there could be no _ question of envisaging a rapprochement between the RPR and the socialiats so , long as the latter have not publicly repudiated any kind of accord with the PCF-- then we are obliged to observe that Gaston Defferre's scheme--as two other social- iat leaders noted in connection with a similar profession of faith--is perfectly/ utopian, confuaionist, dangerous, and unprincipled,/because/"you don't fight the devil by signing a pact with Mephistopheles." /"What might be called the moral significance of an alliance with the RPR could - lead only to a headlong plunge into the mire. The only solution in accordance with the interests of the workers is the establishment of a government that includes socialist and communist ministers responsible for implementing the new policy. /"Gaston Defferre's position is all the more disturbing because it goes along with convergent statements by other socialist leaders about the attitude of Francois Mitterrand if he should be eJ.ected. Everything leads us to believe that their - basic concern was to reassurt the right."/ PS-PC Problems Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9-15 Feb 81 p 30 [Article by Georges Mamy--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] [Text] Upon returning from the voyage he is getting ready to make to China, toward - the end of the month of February, Francois Mitterrand will go to Algeria, where he will be received by the leaders of the country. Tliat visit is of course a part of the program the socialist candidate has set up to inform himself more di- rectly on the great world problems. But it assumes a apecial significance since it is the first time that Mitterrand will be a guest in that young republic. Moreover, the PCF is going to see one of its favorite arguments unmasked. On 1 February, on "Press Club" on Europe 1, when Lionel Jospin alluded to the strange new treatment immigrants are receiving in communist municipalities, Rene Andrieu replied as usual by talking about the /"war carried out for 7 years against the Algerian people."/ The said people themselves appear more inclined than the PCF to turn the pages of history. _ In a more general way, moreover, the PCF is running into more and more difficulties in trying to coordinate its slogans and keep in control of its tactics, despite the aplomb with which it works at supporting contradictory ideas. One sees this clearly on the question of the possible presence of communist ministers in the government that could be established if Francois Mitterrand were elected president _ of the republic. What up until the beginning of the year was only a casually thrown-out stylistic flourish has become, since Georges Marchais's speech at Orleans at the end of January, a daily hammering: / For things to change, there must be communist ministers, and we are ready." /The socialists undoubtedly responded to that summation much earlier and much more clearly than the PCF would have liked. Much more candidly, too, than the right had hoped. 96 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - /'This demancl cor communiet miilisters, as the communists Yiave formulated it, is - �ur me incompatible with the policy currently being carrieci out by the leadership oi the PCF,"/ Jospin declared, thuij starting ofL his term as first secretary of the PS in 311 explosive manner. P.nd to demonstrate the /"illogic/ of the communist demand, Lionel Jospin recalled tnat ttie PCF calls for a/"union at the base"/ which its cells refuse to practice, tiiat it rejects any /"union at the summi~_"/ (would not a gavernmental alliance constitute in the most extreme form one of tliose "headquarLers agreements" wtiich it cienounces'?), and that it is constantly accusinr; the PS of /"veering to the right."/ /"It woulci be absolute?v ludicr.ous, given the current state of our own policy, to consider governing together,"/ he shot back at Rene Andrieu, whu during the course of the debate was to interrupt him _ - 37 times. There will therefore be no negotiations /"either before the first round, or after the first round, or on the eve of the second round."/ There will not even be any possibilities in the future--in other words at the time of the new legislative elections--if the PCF sticks with its current position on major ques- tions ]ike Poland, Afghanistan, the SS-20's, the Pershings (nuclear-tipped missiles, the first Russian, the other American, installed to he fired over Euro- pean territory) and on...immigration. The I'S did not find it hard to discover the "catch" or the trap in this question about communist ministers cahich was posed in order to embarrass its candidate - and arouse ter3r in a portion of its potential electorate. It was enough for its - leaders to recall the tone ueed by the same Ceorges Marchais in 1974 to deal with - the same subJect, when he had really wanted to reassure the vuters in order to help thc same Mitterrand to win. /"What we have in mind,"/ declared u humble and measured Marctiais on 15 March 1974, /"is a real but minority participation of the communtsts in a broad union whose goal is to commit the country to a patti - of social, democratic, and national renewal. This is the exact atid limited experi- ment we offer the French people...taking into account the realities of our country."/ '!'hat same day, he denied having demanded /"important"/ ministries, such as foreign affairs, interior, and defense. And he described the hypothetical government - team as a/"united, well-knit, effective team."/ Exemplary mo3esty, in order to avoid daunting anyone. Times have certainly changed; but not everyone has forgotten. CUYYRiGHT: 1981 "Le Nouve] Observateur" 9516 CSO: 3100/733 97 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION SUPPORTS PfLTTERRAND Paris REVOLUTION in French 1-7 May 81 p 6 [Decree of the PCF Central Committee, issued 28 Apr 811 FRANCE [Text] From the bottom of our hearts we thank the 4,450,000 voters who on 26 April cast their ballots for the communist candidate, Georges Marchais. They make up an important and lucid force for change and union. This will have to be reckoned with by everyone concerned in all present and future actions. - We thank,each and every ane of those who gave of their best to fight for the commun- ist candidate. We congratulate and thank with particular warmth the man who led this fight with courage, creative spirit, and combativity: our candidate himselfr Georges Marchais. With him, we have made a reality, under difficult conditions, of the political orientation of our 22nd and 23rd Congresses. The electoral setback of the PCF is explained first of all by the unique diffi- culties of this presidential election. Because of the way the election of the president of the republic by universal suf- frage has been designed by France's institutions, there is an inherent tendency from the very start to limit the voters to a choice between two candidates. Both general political conditions and the electoral mechanism lexd--in contempt of pluralism--to a polarization of the votes of the left around the wan who appears to them the only one in a position to defeat the candidate of the right. This phenomenon has been further enhanced by the critical situation of the urgent need to defeat Giscard d'Estaing. The convergence of other poZitical forces during the campaign further aggravatEd this problem. The refusal to debate the causes of the crisis, the conditions for full employment and the elimina.tion of injustices, France's international role; the wave of anticommuniam; the systematic silence of the news media on our proposals; concerted manipulations to reduce the choice to two candidates taking shots at each other: no effort has been apared, over the months, to put pressure on the voters. ~ This even went so far as that latest and treacherous maneuver that led men and wo- _ men--many tell us this--to vote in order to thwart the imaginary threat raised - by Jacques Chirac on the presence of the left in the second round. 98 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In October 1980, our party's natianal congresa clearly spelled out our objective in the conditions of this election: it was to give the forces of change the means to anaw their maximum strength, to be as secure ae poseible. Those who did thu right thing by voting for Georges Marchais underetood this well. We are going to continue the fight alongeide them, by relying on them. But, in the special circumstances of this election, some commnunist voters who ap- prove and support our policy thought it useful to vote for Francoia Mitterrand even on the first round. To all of those who left us in this way on the first round, we say with our hsoitual frankness: you did not fully appreciate the risks . entailed by having a PCF with insufficient influence. That is not going to help things. But, we are persuaded that you remain commun.'.st voters, and we call on you to take your place us, without delay, in the struggle for real change and union. We are counting on you, as you can count on us. For the moment, as Georges Marchais said on Antenna 2 on 23 March, we have decided to do whatever is necessary to defeat Giscard d'Estaing and his policy. There can be no question of us supporting him. And we do not want to abstain from vot- _ ing. So we call now to all those men and women who voted for Georges Marchais in the first round and say to them: you are hoping for a real change. You want to arm yourself in advance against disappointment. You know well that Francois Mitterrand remains vague about his objectives and the measures he will take to achieve them, that he refuses to havQ cummunist ministers, that he rejects any ne- , goti3tions between the two rounds. You do not want him to be able to govern with the right. We tell you again--and we say it to all other workers as well: in order to impose change, one must create the conditions by bringing together the great popular forces in the fight for our goals for transformation. It is above all in the strug- gles of the workers themselves that this unification will be realized and developed. It is true that the resrults of the first rouad do not give us all the strength that would be necessary to move toward change under the best conditions. But there are millions of you: we can, and we want, to get your support to move as quickly as possible, to beat Giscard d'Estaing and capitalist policy. With the objective of bringing about the best possible conditions for carrying out the struggles to satisfy the great demands, in order to obtain indispensable anti- capitalist and democratic reforms, in order to impose the establishment of a union of the left government in which communists wi11 take the place that is rightfully theirs, we call on you to vote for the socialist candidate, Francois Mitterrand, in the second round. We aek the party organizations to broadcast newa of this position widely. We ask - them to hold meetings in the departments and to call meetings in the cities and the suburbs, at and on the job, to acquaint the people with our analysis and our posi- tion on the second round, and to appeal for a strengthening of the party. 9516 - CSO: 3100/734 99 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL REGIS DEBRAY ON MITTERRAND'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 12 Apr 81 p 6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [Interview with former Latin American guerrilla and Mitterrand election team general staff inember Regis Debray, by Arlette Chabrol, in Paris; date not given] [Excerpts] A former Latin American guerrilla fighter, in the wake of Che Guevara, when he experienced the horror of the Bolivian prisons, and the author not only of many works on revolutionary theory, but also of seyeral novels and more "peaceful" �political essays, Regis Debray, 40 years of age, is currently one of the most important people on ths general staff of Franeois Mitterrand, the Socialist ' candidate for the presidency of the republic. Together with Jacques Attali, he works in the ing directly in the major decisions. He is a: who counseled the leading adversary�of Valery of "Revolution in the Revolution" and "Essays the Socialist Party. Just as during the 1974 capacity. candidate's private office, participat- Lso a member of the gr.oup of advisers Giscard d'Estaing. Yiowever, the author on Latin America" does not belong to campaign, Debray i.s there in a personal In his view (as will be observed in the interview), this presic?ential battle is in a way the last opportunity for French Socialism. But, Der-cay assured us, if his candidate wins, there will be many changes in France's T.,-tin American policy. Not only will it cease to follow the path of the United Stat;:., but it might even oppose the latter, for example in the case of El Salvador, or ti threats of blockading Cuba. Unlike many others, Regis Debr.ay, an intellectual engage-) i.. European democratic " activity, has not reneged on his former convictions; he - ;ill thinks that armed struggle is an acceptable solution in certain countries -herein dictatorship prevails. And he stresses that this type of revolution has never r.atded the Communist movement - in order to develop. He told us that rhe exporting cr: Cuban revolution is a myth without grounds, spread by the United States. [Question] Why did you accept that responsible po, on the general staff for Francois Mitterrand's campaign? [Answer] In the first place, for a personal �~:r~sc�,:~: friendly association with Mitterrand since 1973, since my return to Fxarnce. ~:jndly, because I made an 1ff FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL': APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . analysis which I can summarize in a simple fashion: It will be all or nothing for France. I shall explain what I mean. We are experiencing, if not the last oppor- tunity for the left, at least a crucial period in our country's history. _ The return of Giscard will mean an acceleration of the sociological, economic and - mental changes that will make the Socialist option something impossible, or else _ definitely Social Democratic; in other words, with integration into the capitalist system. At the moment, we are caught between the two: the PS [Socialist Party] cannot exactly be described as a Social Democratic Party of the British, Swedish or Gereian type, because the Marxist connotation remains. But, in particular, because the history of France is far more tragic than the history of the other countries; it is more Draconian and more demandirtg than in the countries wherein the labor movement never chose another.type of society. But, furthermore, Socia.l.ism is not our program, it has no way of being such. At the present time, it is merely a means of-making ttiis country, which is being stifled by the lack of an alternative, breathe. For the past 30 years, or..e French- man out of two has been excluded from conducting the affairs of France. This has rreated a state of pressure which at first prompted merely an attempt, and now the - establishment of order at home. Becauae the fact is that things are going very badly in trte economic and social areas. ~ [Question] Then do yeu expect the resurrection of the defunct Union of the Left? [Answer] It is inevitable, in time; but at present it is in its most threatening phase. Without looking back very far into the past, one could claim that the responsibility for the break lies largely with the Communist Party. I think that there is a general consensus on this point, even among many Communists. The _ Communist leaders carried out a policy of deliberate isolation, which created that desperate situation. But the Union will inevitably return, undoubtedly in a diffe- rent form than previously. But I do not think that a new common program, for example, will be possible. [Question] In the event of a Mitterrand victory, what will France's policy be with respect to Latin America? [Answer] What I can say is that France will no longer trail behind the United States. It will have a realistic, courageous position, giving its bupport to the national liberation movements in Latin America. It will maintain normal relations with the other countries, including those wherein the left is not in power. But unlike the case of Reagan, the human rights policy will be one of the deciding elements. For example, a Socialist government would obviously have an attitude toward Argentina, Chile and Uruguay quite different from its attitude toward such countries as Venezuela or Mexico. Mitterrand has a real interest in the Third World and Latin America in particular, dating back a dozen years. He established ties during many trips made to the conti- nent. In short, he has today a real sensitivity toward Latin American problems. [Question] And what will there be in connection with Cuba? 101 - ,.,.,.T-.TAT rTCF nNLy APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] There will unquestionably be good relations with Cuba, based on our respec- tive positior.s, cahich are different. In any event, reducing all the North-Soutti conflicts, that is, those of all the opposition or popular inaurrection movements of Latin America, to the Eaet-West syetem will not be accepted. There will, in Eact, be recognition of a specific dimenaion, and not a widespread Haig cr Reagan paranoia concerning the Third World as an area for penetration by the Soviet Union. In this respect also, the Swedish and Danish Socialists, and even the Germans, to some extent, are already aware that they cannot follow the ~unericans in that area. [Question] Do you think that, if Mitterrand is elected, a Socialist government might go so far as to break off diplomatic relations with certain countries in which human rights are disdained? [Answer] It is difficult to reply now. During 1974, in fact, we made the decision to break with Chile. It was obviously a symbolic measure. The question is to ascertain how one can be more useful. At the present time, insofar as I know, there is no plan to break with any country. But it is clear tnat there will be a - considerably f irmer diplomacy on the matter of human rights. And a relationship would be established between arms sales and democratic rights within the countries. In that area, there must be a consistent position on a world- wide scale. If we accept the division of the world into spheres of influence (Yalta agreements, division of the worlci into two parts), we must also remain impassive toward the possible Soviet intervention in Poland, or the present intervention in Afghanistan. That is approximately the current policy of the French Government, with a large amount of cynicism: allowing the Americans to do what they wish in their zone of hegemony, and allowing the Soviets to do the same in theirs. That brings Giscard d'Estaing twofold congratulations from Reagan and Brezhnev.. In this instancr., France has a low profile and does not bother either one. I think that a Socialist policy will be quite different; it will be considerably more bothersome to the two superpowers. It will be a policy of presence, and the affirmation af principles, accompanied by a concrete policy. [Question] In this case, what would the economic policy be? [Answer] It would change drastically. Inasmuch as the present government has based its policy on the economic interests of the multinationals, both foreign and French, it is obvious that Latin America does not offer any essential benefit, with the exception of Mexico, since it was learned that the latter has a large amount of oil. The other countries are considered to be of secondary rank, except for concluding contracts for weapons or as an export area. Our posi.tion would be completely differ- ent. Latin America would have a far more important role. [Question] What is your position regarding the danger of an economic blockade of Cuba which the United States has threatened? 102 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] A condemnation, without reservation, of the American attitude, which would consist of taking Cuba hostage for a face-to-face summit negotiation with the Soviet Union. This is impossible. In such an eventuality, our solidarity with Cuba would be reaffirmed. � [QuestionJ Socialism has been in a state of decline in Europe for some years. lIow do you analyze this phenomenon? [Answer] It is certainly an effect of the crisis. The end of the expansion phase caused the Keynesian modzl to experience difficulty supporting itself. The coffers cere empty; the nations could no longer redistribute funds. Then there was a resump- _ tion, with a kind of savage capitalism, of competition, of the struggle for life, of ferocieus productivity and of Draconian social policy. There was a fear reflex, for conserving assets. I think that the end of that phenomenon can now be observed. Note: Arlette Chabrol is ,70RNAL DO BRASIL's correspondent in Paris. 2909 CSO: 3101/84 w 103 T^T n7+L+T41TAT TrcF nNLy APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R040440020008-7 FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL EC, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, RELATIONS Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Apr 81 p 4 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [Interview with Francois Mitterrand by Feliciano Fidalgo, in Paris; date not given] [TextJ After 40 years of political life, Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist candidate for the presidency of the French Republic, is reacfiing the end of a"long march" that will end in the Elysee palace or in his definitive retirement, after the vote counting of 26 April and 10 May. On this decisive eve of his public activity, he _ made the following exclusive statements to EL PAIS. _ [Question] What do you consider to be the main significance of these elections, both - on the national and the international level? [Answer] The restoration of France's role, and the opportunity offered to a people beset by the crisis, the unemployment, the inequalities and the crushing of liber- ties. France must be awakened for a mutual plan, making our country an example based on the organization of its social relations; and this must begin by providing a response for the tnajor issues confronting our societies: the control of technolo- gies so that they may serve mankind; the battle against hunger and an behalf of the development of the Third World; and the achievement of an urban civilization and the development of communications among human beings. In short, the restoration to the men and women of our country of control over their lives and their right to respon- sibility regarding the concentration of economic and political power comprise the goal that I have set for myself. But, first of all, the battle against unemp'nyment and its tragic consequences. Thus, a moving France will be able to speak aloud and j ustly on the international scene, wherein the tensions are rising at the instigation of the superpowers, con- verting the Third World peoples into mere geostrategic pretexts and disdaining their liberties and their future. [Question] You continue to favor the Union of the Left, despite the repeated, savage attacks from the PCF [French Communist Party] against the Socialists and against you personally. As a result, do you think that the Communists will vote for you in the runoff? And, in the same connection, do you think that the *_ime has come in France to avert that kind of squaring of the circle whereby it is claimed that "nothing can be done with the Communists, nor without them either?" 104 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024408-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] The Communist voters comprise an appreciable portion of the French who have been suffering from the policy ot the right, the loss of Pmptoyr..ent, the reduction in purchasing power, and the sacrifices that are always asked oi the same people, the weakest and most dispossessed ones. Why do you think that these French people want the continuation of the same policy? To them also, 1 years of Giscard is g long time, and 14 would be too long. Insofar as the PCF leaders are concerned, it matters more to me to learn what they can do than what they might want. . 'The Socialist Ideas Have Progressed in France' ~ [Question] Why do you think that you will be elected president this time? [Answer] For a simple reason: How many people who voted for me in 1974 are interest- ed in voting for Giscard in 1981? And how many people, disappointed by him, are willing to off er him their conf idence again? riareover, I believe that the Socialist ideas have progressed in France, and that their infl.uence and their capacity to convince and to govern has increased. This counts as well. [Question] Let us suppose that Francois Mitterrand is elected: What would this mean, essentially, for Europe? [Answer] There are joint demands of the European labor movement, such as the reduc- - tion in the work period. Through this course of action, which everyone admits is the one that would help reduce unemployment, France would favor Europe's advancing in the direction of progress and social justice. Another example: the reform of the common agricultural policy, which I maintain lies in the possibility of benefiting the small and medium-sized farms rather than the large producers of expensive sur- pluses. The intensif ication of the regional policy and the attainment of a genuine _ industrial policy should also help to put Europe in the service of the Europeans, and not the opposite. - On another point, the European convention against terrorism is based on law rather than on the means of repression. In all these matters it is possible, and even essential, for Europe to progress if it wants to avoid being bogged down as a mere free exchange zone. - [Question] In present-day Europe, is it possible to achieve a more advanced policy, from the standpoint of justice and liberty, than that carried out by the Social Democratic countries? [Answer] In those countries, the notion of justice is based on the distribution of the benefits of grow-rh. And so long as the latter lasted, impressive re.sults were accrued. The crisis poses new problems which some Socialists, such as the Austrians, are controlling rather easily, but which others are not curbing so readily. In the view of the French Socialists, justice and quality must simultaneously relate to the distribution of - benefits, the reduction of inequalities and the increased responsibilities of the workers and citizens. This entails a distribution of power. 105 ��~tir/~T.1T .TOLI nrrr.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Question] How would you analyze Giscard the man, and his policy? ;Answer] His assessment is negative; his policy has created injustices and inequali- ties. France has declined. We might say that what he seems to prefer is power for the sake of power and its privileges, which are at times wrong. [Question] You often talk about Southern, or Mediterranean Europe. Into what would you convert that notion if you are elected? [Answer] There is a community of culture and tradition in Southern Europe. That ~ Europe is awaiting a common plan that will unite it around the Mediterranean with the peoples in North Africa who are seeking the path of autunomous development dissociated from the aegis of the big powers, in order to insure true peace. The aspiration of the peoples in the Northern and Southern Mediterranean areas to achieve new international economic relations and new models of development can and should find the builders that they lack today among the Socialists of Southern - Europe. - France-Spain: 'A Blend of Friendship and Resentment' [Question] Do you believe that your possible election would seriously change the spirit and the substance of the relations between-France and Spain, most especially with regard Y.o Spain's entry into the EEC? - [Answer] As is often the case between neighbors, there exists between the Spanish = and the French a blend of f riendship and resentments, which lends bur relations salt and pepper, strength and misunderstanding. Since we are close, sometimes we are too much so; and, therefore, there is no distinction between emotion and reason. Spain and France are two important and proud nations, and their independence must be upheld, both in the realm of their mutual relations and with respect to other countries. Hence the bonds of friendship which unite us, as our complementary features do, cannot allow either one to be unconcerned about the other. Spain's entry into the EEC, the source of many of the problems in.our present relations, must be dealt with clearly. Insofar as I am coneerned, in the political area the issue has been resolved, and only a setback in the difficult democrdtic process could bring it into question. But the economic problems to be surmounted still remain. And, on this topic, it must be said that, thus far, neither the Community nor Spain has clearly set forth the bases of negotiation and the goals that are being pursued in that negotiation. We French Socialists have cited three prior conditions: the agricultural, the industrial and the one related to regional policy. If it is desired that the entry of Spain (and of Portugal) serve Europe and the populations directly concerned, it is preferable to deal with the difficult issues directly, and not to evade them. [Question] How does the Spanish political situation strike you? [Answer] At a time when the Spanish people are undergoing a difficult phase in the battle for democracy, I want it to be known that, to us, that battle is indivisible in Europe. The Spanish people, united, have proven their adherence to democracy. The force of a people cannot be readily ignored by nostalgic troublemakers. 2909 CSO: 3110/111 106 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY V.T, , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFiC[AL USE ONLY POLI'TICAL PAST FORETGN COHTACTS AS PORTENT OF FUTURE POLICX Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Apr 81 p 2 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [Article by Suzanne Labin "Vhat Mitterrand is Aiding from You"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] jText] The leaders of the majority hit Mitterrand with arguments that are correct But wA:Lch axe conf ined to the domestic field, though that is of quite secondary _ inpoxtance at a time when western civilization is fighting for its existence; aad tRis implicitlp assumes that Mr Mitterrand, once elected, wi11 maintain a normal political system. idhereas in fact his victory would seriously jeopardize domestic tranquilitq and the whole structure of our society. To start with, it is rarely mentioned--though it should be hammered home day af ter day--that his real final goal is still collec tiviza tion and the state- planned economy. A formulation that remains inscribed as a fundamental objective in the by-laws of his party, which has not repudiated Marx. Now this formula has chalked up a record of resounding and ignominious defeat in every country without exception where it has been put into operation. Its economically pathological and politically stifling character shine forth most strikingly tfiese days in Poland: empty plates and full prisons, waste and tyranny, an iron curtain and a curtain of lies, censorship and long lines. The Rooster's Plumage To be forbidden to hold up to Mitterrand anything more serious than the poor record of liberal regimes in time of crisis is equivalent to being forbidden to mention burnings at the stake in discussing the Inquisition. And experience has shown how vain is Che illusion that collectivism can ever have a less repellent appearance. Now socialism has absolutely nothing else to offer, as the foundation for the millenium it ushers in, besides this very collectivism which Mitterrand we11 knows has become viscerally unpopular. This is why he tries with a thousand contortions to disguise it. By allowing him to stay inside the dead language of his posters, we help him to keep the people asleep. We help him too in another way, where it would be so easy to unmask him: the - f ield of /foreign policy./ In this field, Mitterrand shows his plumage proudly, I mean that he gives one to understand that he would oppose Soviet hegemonism more firmly than Giscard d'Estaing. This is a real deception, one = which h,e can only sustain by foaming with rage over the coup of Kabul. But on 107 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONi,Y hi.s part it was done purely for style, an indulgence of no cansequence, done sinply, to strirce Ais liCtle n,ote in the concert of universal indignation. In realitp, tFie record of the. positions he has taken-positions of consequence and commitment-witFi respect to the Kremlin's international adventures, leans heavily in their favor. Judge them for yourself! Mr Mitterrand fights against anything that would give *_he West the power to - match an over-armed USSR; the neutron bomb, Pershing miss9les to meet the SS-20's already deployed by the Soviets, naval protection for the Persian Gu.lf, and the growtfi of nuclear energy. Tn a remarkable article in FIGARO, Patrick Wajsman recalled that Francois Mitterrand has embraced and extolled Brezhnev, Castro, Qadh.dhafi, Neto, Kadar-- in short all these gulag-masters, emperors and satraps. He did everything possible to help the Sandinistas seize power in Nicaragua., which they turned into communist dictatorship. And he is at it again with E1 Salvador, where he is doing everything he can to facilitate the triumph of the notoriously communist guerrillas. He called it scandalous when Giscard d'Estaing saved Kolwezi from an invasion concocted in the Soviet colony of Angola, but did not utter a peep arhen Soviet-loving Libya invaded Chad. He flatters the POLISARIO invented by Boumediene and armed by Moscow. He calls himself a friend of Israel, but cooperates closely with the Socialist International which patronizes the PLO, which has sworn death to Israel and serves the Soviets as a relay station in the Middle East. Before entering the presidential lists, he went to have himself knighted by the most cruel of stalinist despots, North Korea's Kim 11 Sung. Everywhere the Kremlin advances its pawns, he overlooks their allegiance and paints them as champions of the people. Wherever strong resistance rises up against an assault of the Kremlin, he undermines it as "reactionary." The sole. target of his opporbrium is the same as that of the communists, which he and they call by the same name: "American imperialism." While with respect to the only imperialism that really does exist--Soviet imperialism--he employes a spectacular connivance and complancency. Concerning this it is most regrettable that the majority does not say a word, for by this fact the people end up seeing as a rampart against the Soviet menace the very man who is paving the way for the danger. A final point on which the leaders of the majority mince their words to the point of falsifying the image of their challenger: they speculate about the events following his possible election /as if he were going to observe all the rules of proper political conduct./ In particular, they lend credence to that rose- colored fairy-tale Mr Mitterrand is spreading about a/regular legislative election/ that he would call af ter his accession to the Elysee in order to decide whether to govern from the right or from the left. We forget that Mr Mitterrand would f irst of all be elected, then immediately watched over, controlled, and spurred on by a powerful communist party whose apparatus already has its tentacles on the sub-structure of our country, and has a thousand eyes pven w-ithin the bosom of the socialist party. 108 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY The situation will not be at all lik.e that of England, Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia, wRere social democrats were able to exercise power decently because their country was not deafened by the drums and whipped into a frenzy by the zealots of a formidable PCF. Tfte Frencfi situation will more closely resemble wTiat fiappened in Eastern Europe after the last war, when the state fell: into the _ Aands of socialists like Fierlinger and Ciriankiewics, to whom Mitterrand bears more resemblance than to Helmut Schmidt of Atlee. Fierlinger and Ciriankiewics were beseiged by a coffinunist legion that had sufficient resources to bend the half -consenting regime. Resources which, at the time and in those countries, _ were furnished above all by the Red Army and which, in the France of Mitterrand in June 1981, w-L11 be furnished by the big machinery of agitation, sabotage and control that the PCF has implanted in the subsoil of the nation. TAe Real Force of Intolerance We must hammer in this point, because the French people are living in a dream and do not think about it. In Eastern Europe, between 1945 and 1948, there were elections, but so triturated and constrained that they no longer meant anything. If Francois Mitterrand should be elected, we are running a serious risk that this precedent will be revived. The magnetion of success, dangerous enough in its own right, will be swollen in every way, and especially in disloyal ways. The left, which constitutes the real force of intolerance and hegemony in our time, /will bear down urith a heavy hand on the media,/ where it will unscrupu- lously marginalize the right--which, moreover, given its "worthlessness," will of course have no right to complain! Incessant and vociferous demonstrations will intimidate those who oppose the new regime, and will sabotage their meetings. Grievance committees wtll rise up at every streetcorner and on every imaginable subject to mislead or inhibit antimarxist factions. Strikes will swirl, sabotage will crackle in the air. Tn short, the lava from the totalitarian volcano Mr Mitterrand will have caused to erupt will engulf our plains with such impetuosity that there will be no chance to put a liberal majority together again. And who can believe that Mr Mitterrand will stop it? Is it conceivable that he is going to send out the bourgeois police against the ranks surging forward in the name of the "people's will"? The very will he will have enthroned and which he never ceases to praise? One often hears it said that electing Francois Mitterrand would be taking a leap into the unknown. fantastic nonsense! /Nothing is better known/ than precisely what would happen: a rapid slide by France toward the status of a people's democracy, economic ruin united with political subjection. But of course we could not imagine that such a scenario would be conceivable in - an established democracy like our own. /The abyss has always opened under the feefi of those who thought "it ::ould never heppen to them."/ As soon as they have - - a sufficiently strong local lever--bayonets or committees--and a Kerensky to pacify the government--the communists can take control in any country, however advanced it may be. Especially when the nearby Soviet presence has become very strong and very offensive. And when Mr is already acting like a potential i eginal comanissar. . 109 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 N'OR OFF'IC'IAL Utik: ONI.Y To sum up: k'rancoi,s Mitterrand is fevezi,shly working to conjuxe up as a backrlxop to his pos9ihle success /the rose-colored picture of an alternation/ [of power], while /tfie grim reality, of catastrophe/ is wfiat wi11 be established. And those wfio trPa t him as �Jus t ano tRer candida te" are ob j ec tively help ing to keep alive tFiis fata]. mirage. 9516 CSO: 3100/736 110 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFI('IAL USE ONLY POLITICAL PAST ' MISTAKES' IN INTERNATiONAL RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Mar 81 p 8 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [Article by Patrick Wajsman: "A Man of the Stage or a Man of State?"] [Excerpts] The socialist candidate is certainly the last one to be able to give lessons i.n international politics to his competitora. There is somewhat of a tendency to forget this these daps, when listening to Mitterrand discourse autfioritatively on the danger fianging over Europe from the SS-20's or the irreplacea6le virtues of t'he Atlantic alliance. Sut all the same, how can one �ail to realize that this lucidity is of quite recent date? How can one forget = ~ tfiat Francois Mitterrand over the last 10 years has committed more diplomatic mistakes tfian all the majority candidates put together?* How can one believe, finally, that a man who has been wrong as often as he on basic mattera would be transformed, as if by magic, into a responsible and coherent leader? Let us recall, it was only yesterdap... In November 1971, Mitterrand goes to Chile. Af ter several hours of talks with Salvador Allende, he delivers his professional opinion and proclaims peremptorily _ tfiat the Chilean government has succeeded in "overthrowing the economic structures while preserving individual liberty." Coming back to Paris, the socialist leader even goes so far as to assert that "the regime established in Chile comes as close as possible to being an example of what could be achieved in France." All who still have before their eyes the heart-rending image of those tearful peasants, dispossessed of their land by the MIR [Revolutionary Lef tist Movement] lef tists; all who recollect the interminable waiting lines before the bread-shops of Santiago, will appreciate...And above all let us not raise up the specter of Pinochet: he came later. In October 1974, Francois Mitterrand lands at Havana. Several days later, fascinated by the all-powerful god of that Eldorado, he conf ides publicly: "Fidel Castro is a modest man desirous of being understood, open, generous, in search of new ethos." Some evil minds will be astonished perhaps that such a great humanist as Francois Mitterrand failed then to give the least thought to the innumerable political prisoners held by the Lider Maximo. They would be doing him an injustice: in 1974, the Castro dictatorship had anly been in existence for 15 years, and the PSF's number one probably had not yet had the chance to learn about it... *On this problem (and on many others) we will refer to the excellent work by Branko Lazitch: "Permanent Defeat," Laffont, 1978. A key book. 111 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 H�oH OFNicInI, tJsH: oNQ.v Let uti continue our voyage. In April 1975, Mitterrand comes to the Kremlin at the head of a PSF delegation. 'Calks, toasts, congratulations: all very natural. Except, however, for tFie communique jointly signed by the CPSU at the end of the visit. This document, - in effect, discusses the "progress made by the USSR on the road to socialism, - in accordance with the plans and concepts of the CPSU," and enthusiastically - hails the "USSR's constructiJe contribution to the process of international detente." If, for good measure, one also recalls what Mitter.rand told RTL [Radio-Television Luxemborg] before flying off to Moscow--"Leonid Brezhnev`s contrihution to peace will appea.r immense in the eyes of history"--one will have a clear enough idea of the realism that subtends the global thinking of the - socialist candidate! But let us not be too demanding: in 1975, the Soviet dictatorship had only been in existence for some 60 years, and the PSF number _ one had probably not fiad time to learn about it... In May 1976, it is Hungary which Mitterrand honors with his presence, once again at the head of the PSF delegation. Here again, the communique published following the talks deserves a quick glance. Among other expressions of affection, the representatives of the PSF and the Hungarian PC mention therein their "joint action against the domination of capital," and celebrate their "similar - fight for democracy, national independence, and peace." Doubtless it is surprising to learn on this occasion that Francois Mitterrand's idea of democracy coincides on all points with those of Janos Kadar, who came to power 25 years - ago in the shadow of Red Army tanks. But what does it matter! The first - secretary of the PSF probably had not had time to inform himself... - Perhaps I will be told that the past is the past, and that sometimes one must be willing to turn the page. I am not so sure. Any public man is, whether he wants to or not, the living sum of his successive convictions. In any case, so long as he has not publicly recanted them. And I truly do not see why it should be Forbidden to ask Francois Mitterrand if he regrests the euphoric assessments he made in the past of Brezhnev, Allende, Castro, or Kadar. _ Having said that, the recent positions taken by the PSF candidate give us more of tlie same to applaud. One should consult, on this point, the "Socialist Project" _ which Mitterrand endorses. "American imperialism" and its allies are flogged f_rom top to bottom; Cuba is presented (page 358) as a model of "resistance to the economic colonization" of the United States; Marxist Nicaragua is lyrically described therein as a"liberated country." One even learns that "the foundations of France are more threatened by capitalism than by the USSR," and that Russian tanks should frighten us leas than the prospect of a"Santiago coup" (page 78). Lord! How can a man so prompt to denounce the "Warsaw wage" burden himself without a twitch with so many cunningly Soviet-loving slogans? The answer is quite simple: Mitterrand is probably not a dangerous revolutionary, but he is a marvelous "politician." An actor who believes that programs never imply commitment; that one promise can replace another; that one can simultaneously ' join hands with Chevenement and Mauroy, with Brezhnev and Reagan, with the hawks and the doves, with NATO supporters and fellow travelers, with the ecologists and the pollution merchants. In short, Mitterrand believes that to speak is enough to canvince, and mere dreams can lead to victory. But this is less certain. For ar_ actor--however clever he may be--does not become a statesman from one day to next. 112 9516 CSO: 3100/736 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL INTERNATIONAI.AFFAIRS PCF: CONTRADICTIONS IN SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT, ACTIONS Paris REVOLUTION in French 27 Mar 81 p 7 [Article by Armand Cerkow and David Sephiha "When Mitterrand Reaganizes, How to Forget the Remarks about the Cold War Which Francois Mitterrand Made on Antenna 2"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] [Text] It is almost a tradition: on the eve of every election, the PSF brings together in Paris dignitaries from its brother parties for a short ceremony for which it ensures the greatest possible publicity. The /"symposium"/ on culture* and the /"conference"/ on security and disarmament organized on 19 and 20 March do not, however, fall strictly into the routine. And nnt only by virtue of tfie prestigious list of personalities bedecking the grounds. Tt was a question, of course, as the socialist candidate himself sai,d, of showing /"that the socialists can win the solidarity of their comrades in Europe and beyond Europe,"% and of attesting thereby--as LE MONDE put it so hyperbolically--/"the credibility Mr Mitterrand enjoys abroad."/ All without the last bit of ineddling, obviously. But it would be quite wrong to see in this merely a banal prestige operation. Neither the themes nor the figureheads were in fact left to chance. On the one hand, men of culture are invited to discuss the /new international order,/ under the aegis of Leopold Sedar Senghor, who traded the presidency of Senegal for that of the new Socialist Interafrican. On the other hand, Europe's social den4ocratic leaders are to discourse on /detente/ with Willy Brandt, the former Wo-st German chancellor and acting president of the Socialist International, but pri'marily the symbol of /Ost-Politik,/ which won him a Nobel Prize. Thus surrounded, Francois Mitterrand finds himself suddenly a soldier of the /Third World/ and /pacifism,/ the disastrous record of the Common Market rendering - inauspicious his traditional image as a/pioneer of Europe./ The garb may be fairly worn out, but that does not alter his need to drape himself in it: the cold war remarks made by Francois Mitterrand in his 10Cards on the Table" broadcast of Monday 16 March offended hundreds of thousands of inen and women of the left...for whose votes he is panting. He has to win t:hem back, even while going fishing on the right. But coming only 3 days apart, is the contrast between the two vocabularies not perhaps too violent? - *See p. 44, the article by Joel Jouanneau. 113 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y Francois Mitterrand, a Third Worlder? If his speech invokes the aspirations of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for a new international. order, it is--like his fr.iend Willy Brandt, whose report on this subject defines that strategy--it is to better lead them down the primrose path, in order to save the old order. It was one year ago in Santo Domingo, in fact, as we recall, thnt he spilled the beans: it wa.s a question, he said, of. /"putting the brakea on the expansion of international communism."/ Such is the obsession that comes through as soon as one gets beyond great general and generous principles and down to concrete problems. _ Must we give examples? While at the Mutuality the PSF participates in "Six Hours For E1 Salvador," it supports the Brandt mediation, in which the U.S. sees /"a possibility of breaking down the unity of the opposition into reformist and - revolutionary elements."/* Wtaile COMBAT SOCIALISTE extols the Palestinian cause, the Palestinian daily AL CHAAB comments in these terms on the socialist candidate's trip to Israel and the positions he espoused before the Labor Congress in Jerusalem: /"It is astonishing that Mr Mitterrand passed in silence ~ over Palestinian rights...his statements are supportive of the Camp David accords, Israel's refusal to converse with the PLO, and the Jordanian "solutio.n" to the Palestinian problem."/ And if the PSF sends delegates to express its solidarity with the Saha.rans, it works no less closely with Leopold S. Senghor, whose country Is the principal African supporter of Hassan II's annexationism, and which considers POLISARIO /"a racist organization."/ Francois Mitterrand, a pacifist? Let us say it quite clearly: in "Cards on the Table" we saw the socialist candidate, but it sounded like Jacques Chirac imitating Marie-France Garaud: /"As for me, I did not wait 11 days to protest against the invasion of Afghanistan...As for me, it did not take me 17 days to nqtice tfiat there were American hDStages in Tran...Never has Giscard d'Estaing remarked tfiat we were at the mercy of these famous SS-20 rockets...As for me, T ari11 never go under the table,"/ etc. It is not a whimsical remark on the /"Warsaw wage"/ which is in question, but nothing less than the policy of France in the world. The fact that Giscard d'Estaing aligns Paris with Washington, that he condones the FRG's hegemony in Europe, that he, plays policeman in Africa: all this, it seems, is not enough toz, the socialist candidate. ! So we come full circle, as summarized in the statements appearing opposite: from the plea for a strengthening of the Atlantic alliance, to support for the implant- ation oP the Pershing and cruise missiles, from the condemnation of the trip to Warsaw to hostility on the Madrid Conference, Francois Mitterrand's drift has today led him to rival the rtght in Atlanticism. When we know that, under the Izeadline "Our New Best Friend," the WASHINGTON POST has just described France as /"America's most iinpoxtant ally against Soviet expansionism," while the NEW YORK TIMES uses the image /"cheek to cheek"/ to describe the proceedings of Paris and Wasfiington, and we wonder if Ronald Reagan himself will not soon appear too - soft for Francois Mitterrand. *This was disclosed by the Belgian daily LE SOIR on 8 March following the visit of Ronald Reagan's special envop, Mr FIalters, to Panama where he met with leadexs of the Socialist Tnternational. 114 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Peace in the world is too serious a subject to deal with in such a way. And peace is one of tfie things we are voting to protect on 26 April. _ PHOTO CAPTION "Francois Mitterrand discussed the military threat that grows stronger every day whicfi the Soviet Union holds over Western Europ e and especially the danger of the tactical 3S-20's... The French Socialist Party [PSF], he said, approves the building of Europe, calls for the strengthening of the defense potential in the - - ccuntries of Western Europe, and hopes tIiat the government of Ronald Reagan will establisfi relations as partners with the countries of Western Europe." (Communique from NEW CHTNA at tIze end of F. Mitterrand's trip to China 17 FeBruarp 1981). 9516 CSO: 3100/736 115 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MILITARY AEROSPACE, DEFENSE INDUSTRY PLANS, PROPOSALS Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 2 May 81 pp 9-13 FRANCE [Interview with Francois Mitterrand conducted in the period between the first bal- loting and the runoff election] [Excerpts] Because Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand pulYed ahead of the eight other candidates as a result of the f irst balloting in the presidential election, they are up before the voters for the second phase of the presidential campaign that will end on 10 May. ThP questions that we have asked the two candidates pertain to pro- blems general in scope shown by experience to be handled at the presidential level. The candidates have been kind enough'=to: hasten to answer the ques- tions of AIR ET COSMOS, for which we thank them very much. Our readers will find in the following pages our questions fol- lowed by the replies by Valery Giscard d'Estaing [not included] and Francois Mitterrand. Transportation [Questions] 1. In view of keen international competition, does or does it not seem advisable to you to proceed with a grouping of French regular international air transportation (Air France and UTA [Air Transport Union])? 2. In case of an Air France-UTA merger, what would be be position of Air Inter [Me- tropolitan Air Transport Company] and TAT [Transcontinental Air Transport]? 3. What policy do you advocate in the field of chartered air transportation? [Answers'j 1. The transportation sector is faced with some seriaus problems at pre- sent that must be tackled. Sixty-five percent of passenger air traffic leaving France is handled by foreign companies. Internationally, there is an attempt to deregulate tied to a competitive drive in the greatest liberal tradition whose brunt will be borne in the end by companies 116 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and users alike. Reorganization of the international structure of aiL transporta- tion should be supported by relyfng crrr Third World countries and companies and by promoting real cooperation between European compar.iea. � Likewise, nationally, it is advisable to start restructuring French air transpor- tation by adopting universal personnel guidelines and by improving public contr.ol of air transportatio n activity. The overall guidel:!nes of the plan on this subject will be determined in liaison with the representatives of every partner concerned: state, French airlines com- panies, companies or groups directly involved in air transportation. 3. I shall pay particular attention to promoting a charter activity aiming at meet- ing foreign competition and at fully democratizing air transportation. Industry Structures [Questions] 4. The airframe industry includes a large nationalized company (Aero- spatiale) and a large private company (Dassault-Breguet). Do you believe that it is advisable to nationalize Dassault-Breguet? In case Dassault-Breguet is nation- alized, should it be merged with Aerospatiale? 5. The space and missile industry includes a nationalized company (Aerospatiale) and a private group (MAT'RA [Aeronautical Equipment and Production]). Do you believe that riATRA should be nationalized? In case MATRA is nationalized, should it be merged with Aerospatiale? 6. Should the nationaliied engine builder SNECMA (National Corporation for Aircraft Engine Design and Construction] absorb TURBOMECA [expansion unknown; probably Turbo- engine Company]? 7. Are you in favor of grouping the equipment industry, or even of establishing a national equipment construction company? [Answers] 4. With regard to nationalizations, I have made a contract with the French people: about 10 industrial groups whose list is well known. - It is quite obvious that the Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aircraft Company appears on it, - because it has a monopoly of combat aircraft production in France. This company will retain its orientation and its specificity. There remains the matter of relations with the other large company, already publicly owned, SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Company]. I hope that the activities of these two companies will be Uetter coordinated in the sectors of research, of design and of production, so that the present dispersion will be eliminated. 5. All the above reasoning is applicable both to the space industry and to missiles ~ and, therefore, to the Armament/Space branch of the MATRA company. This nationalization will make it possible to form a public industrial group, better coordinated than at present and, consequently, more efficient and also more suitable for establishing international cooperative relations, especially European relations, well adapted to the characteristics of the various markets. 1~7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLw Atrframes [Questions] 8. Does not the Airbus -seri-es,: which made an international break- - = through with the A 300/310 models, seem to you too limited to ensure permanence of European industry as a builder of airlinere? What is your position with regard Co - the plan for a short- and medium-range 150-passenger aircraft (A 320)? _ 9. What is your stand on the launching of new regional transportation aircraft and on continuation of the effort in the field of business aircraft? 10. Does maintaining the position of French industry as a combat aircraft producer seem indispensable to you? - 11. What will your policy be with regard to exportation of aeronautical combat equipment? 12. Do you believe that it is. indispensab7.e to maintain a French light aircraft in- _ dustry? 13. If it is impossible to develop a new Franco-German antitank helicopter, should we start that kind of program on a purely national basis? _ [Answers] 8. You are right, the Airbus series is too limited to ensure permanence of European industry as a builder of airliners. In this connection, I call your at- tention to all the speeches made by Aur natianal delegate for Aeronautics and Space, = Alex Raymond, in the National Assembly. For 5 years now we have not ceased demand- ing the launching of a short- and medium-range aircraft with approximately 150 seats that had been announced by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in the 1975 Le Bourget Sa- lon, 6 years ago. How much lost time, but not for everybody, because the American _ competito r Boeing has been able to launch its 737-300 program. Industry on the other si3e of the Atlantic must not be lef t alone in this slot. My government will consider launching the A 320 program on a priority basis. 10. With regard to the praduction of combat equipment, I have said that France must have a nat ional defense industry, in order to ensure its defense independently. In particu lar, French aerospace industry, one of the world leaders, is one of the main factors in this policy. 11. Exportation of armament equipment must be governed by new criteria, conforming _ strictly with our foreign policy objectives, especially with regard to the Third World. We shall r efuse any delivery to racist or fascist governments. 13. You are well aware that the Franco-German armament programs are in process of reexamination at the request of the Germans. Therefore, the reality of the situation should be evaluated before deciding possibly on a national program. 118 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 fOR OFFiCIAI, USE ONLY Engines = - [Questions] 14. Sho uld the policy of developing the family of CFM 56 engines be contiriued? 15. Is it necessary to develop a new military engine to equip the generation of com- bat aircraft of the 1990's? 16. In your opinion, should the effort made by TURBOMECA to develop sophisticated technologies with a view to preparfng a new generation of gas turbines be main- tained? [Answers] 14. The policy of developing the CFM 56 family will be continued. Co- - ordination of the two development potentials--civilian aircraft and engines--is a requirement for the full development of the aeronautical industry. We shall see to it, however, that this cooperation on a civilian engine with the United States will no t hinder a European cooperation on military engines or on anoth- er series of civilian engines. 15. In the military field, France has always had engines for equipping its products. It is absolutely nec essary to adhere to this rule. Therefore, a military engine must be developed for equipping combat aircraft of the 1990's. But this engine must be developed in a European framework. = Defense [Questions] 17. Are you in favor of modernizing nuclear weapons? In what way? What launching pads? What launch vehicles? What nuclear warheads? 18. Do you believe it necessary to develop a multimission combat aircraft of the F-15 class? [Answers] 17. Franc e's defense must be ensured and autonomy of our decision must be guaranteed. In.this connection, the strategy of national nuclear deterrence is the only one that can be capable, at present, of warding off the dangers of conflict. Nevertheless, our conventional forces must not be neglected. But a defense, even based on improved equipment, is nothing, if it is not supported, _ first of all, by the determination of the entire nation. - I have pointed out on several occasions, and especially in my proposals, that moder- nization of our strategic and tactical forces should be pursued. In the present = state of technology, it should be carried out on a priority basis with regard to the ocean component. 18. One of the important matters that should be examined in the next few months per- tains to the necessary modernization of our Air Force, which has lagged behind con- siderably in recent years and some of whose components are going to reach obsolescence. 11.9 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Space [Questions] 19. Beyonu the programs designed around the Ariane launch vehicle, do you think that France ahould take the initiative in the achievement, by Europe, of an automated or manned system of space transportation? 20. What policy do you advocate for France in the field of ap p 1 i e d s a t e 11 i t e s? Should that kind of effort be developed competitively? [Answers] 19. First of all, Ariane should be a satellite launch vehicle that will - enab le us to ensure our independence for placing large a p p 1 i e d s a t e 11 i t e s i n o r- bit over a period of at least 15 years. That means that it is absolutely necessary to develop an "Ariane family" hy taking advantage of the.technologies acquired from the first models, including constantly better performing launch vehicles, well ad- ' justed to the dimensions and weight of satellites of the future that will make it possible to reduce appreciably the per kilogram price of the payload placed in orbit. But it is obvious that France must not stop there. It must rapidly acquire a cer- tain number of other technologies that it daes not yet have and that approach the space shuttle. In fact, by 1990-2000, new utilizations of space means will con- firm Cheir importance: manufacture of materials in weightlessness, biology, do- mestication of new energy sources, direct intervention on devices in orbit. Our - country should prepare for this without delay by initiating studies and experimen- tation on the following promising techniques: The automated tachnique, by which entirely automated space devices handled remotely - from the earth will perform a large group of missions relatively economically (ex- amp.lei autQmatefl statian:in permaneut orbit,..visited likewise automated modules bringing and taking away biology experiments or manufactured materials). The manned technique, with human presence, that the two large space powers have al- _ ready been preparing for a number of years now and that will certainly supplement the automated method. - Of course, the magnitude of projects like these leads very naturally to their accom- plishment in the European framework. It is up to France to design them and propose them, as a great common ambition, to its partners in Western Europe. French policy _ in these last few years, here as well as in other sectors, has sacrifice the long- - term outlook too much. A leading specialty like space can survive only if, 15 or 20 - years before the productions,/-utilizat3nn can bring about deep-seated modifications in /[words between / apparently mfsplaced] the~state makes a.serJ:0us,_ Gonsistent basic technological research effczrt:I- It it; indispensable for France and Europe to ac- quire the techniques on which their future depends and that pertain to rendezvous in orbit, reentry into the atmosphere, space robotics or space-borne power. 20. With regard to satellites, when all the major applications of satellites are reviewed(regardless of whether it is a question of telephone transmission, of telex or of data between computers, or else of reproduction of newspapers at a dis- tance, of direct television passing over political borders, of observation of the earth and of administration of earth resources) the future stakes for our country are obviously considerable. 120 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Our absence from these various sectors would lead us inevitably and rapidly to sub- _ ordirtation to those who are there or will be there and whose tolerated subcontractors we would Ue at best. Therefore, the decade of the 1980's must be for France the de- cade of operational utilization of systems that will have been produced, either en- tirely in our country, when the nation's interast so requires, or, more often, in cooperation with our European partners. These systems must meet the real needs of the national users. Their choice, espe- cially for those involved with information, defense or evolution of French society, will be made democratically, openly and no longer in the secrecy of ministerial of- fices and technostructures. Along with these programs of immediate utilization, the indispensable basic techni- cal research effort should be increased considerably. Preparation and development of the new technologies that will be needed for the satellites of the 1990-2000 ~ period, are being carried out now. The Germans and the Japanese are devoting defi- nitely more money to this than we. It is high time for France to react vigorously, if it does not want to be outdistanced in 15 or 20 years. Naturally, this direct effort by the state to ensure the long-term future must be accompanied by no less sizable an effort on the part of French industrial enter- prises, in order to be competitive; on the foreign markets. Exports should be de- veloped in this leadir.g technical field, in order to contribute to guaranteeing a favorable balance of our foreign trade, as well as our presence in a certain num- - ber of countries desiring to equip themselves with space facilities without having the capability of producing them. COPYRIGHT: A.&C. 1980 10,042 CSO: 3100/737 121 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GENERAL MITTERRAND ON GENERAL ISSUES FACING CONTEMPORARY FRANCE Paris PARIS MATCH in French 3Apr 81 pp 46-51 FRANCE [Interview with Francois Mitterrand by Michel Goaod, date and place not specified] [Excerpts] Francois Mitterrand begins this week the series of interviews PARIS MATCS is going to publish during the electoral campaign. With one month remaining before the first round, the statements of the socialist candidate take on special intereat. He bears out the style of his campaign: serenity, calm strength, criticism of the record of the last 7 years, freedom from the communists. He is confident. "The surveys have me running even with Giscard," he explains. "This is very good. This way we are on the same starting line." In actual fact, our new presidential poll confirma that the two candidates are running neck and neck. [Question] You seem very sure of yourself in this electoral campaign. On tele- vision the other aigbt you spoke of serenity. Your new poster describes your - "calm strength." In short, it is you who are looking like the office holder, the incumbent president. Haw does this come to pass? [Answer] I represent a great force in the country. This force has been con- stantly growing for 10 years. Now 7 years ago the incumbent president was a can- didate who was able to make promisea, create illusions. Today, he is a man who represents a record of failure. The French feel a need for profound change. Who, other than myself, can bring it to them? On 10 May, the choice will be simple. It is a fact that my position is moving up. [Queation] You have indicated your plans: once elected, to dissolve the national aesembly, elections, a government reflecting the new assembly. There remain, however, several hazy points, for example: what government will you put in place during this transition period? [Answer] I think that if the French change presidents, they will also want to change their governmental majority. That would be logical, in any case, aince that majority has consistently approved--despite its contentiousness--the legislative proposals put forward by the government, which itself emanated from the preaident of the republic. If, therefore, the policy of the president is repudiated, thoae who facilitated the execution of that policy should also be repudiated. As for the 122 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY possibility of a contradiction between the two policiea: that of the preeident and that of the parliament, this is the weak spot in our constitution, which does nat offer a very clear solution on this point. Doubtlese this problem will have to be faced sometime. One might as well face it squarely in 1981. [Question] You have thought about this? Do you have a solution? [Answer] If the aesembly were dissolved without a change of president, I assume it would be the government in place that would take charge during the transition per- iod. But next May, after my election, the political aituation will be profoundly modified right up to the moment that a new aesembly can begin lawmaking. So what we must have, during that interval, is a new government that will also be a transi- tion government. [Question] Is it your intention to indicate, after Che campaign, who will be the prime minister? [Answer] No one ever did this, except Gaston Defferre with Pierre Mendes-France - in 1969. But that never became a normal procedure. I offer myself, such as I am, in the name of the socialiets. The socialists with whom I work, and their abili- ties, are well known. I can count on them. As far the rest, the future will tell. [Question] With regard to the transition period, you have spoken of a sort of honey- moon that should facilitate the early days of the new president. I would be rather inclined to think that people are going to be, as the expreseion goes, lying in wait to attack you... [AnswerJ An election at this level causes a shock, creates a trend. Many French - are very civic-minded, and scarcely is the man they did not want elected, before they instinctively want to help and support him. My election will unleash many forces and give new drive to the very wave of support that made it possible. [Question] In political terms, perhaps, but what about in economic terme2 Do you not fear there will be some sort of immediate backlash that could lead to a deteri- oration? [Answer] It will be difficult to do worse than is being done right now! Giscard d'Estaing does not represent hope. After 19 qears of managing our economy he ia out of breattx and out of ideas...Everqone senses that we must try something else. The speculators will be against me. But the workers will be for me, and all those on every level who feel their responsibility and a love of their country. [Question] And what about an intentional or spontaneoua deterioration: flight of capital, collapse of the stock exchange... [Answer] I will take stock of the situation... [Question] Is that all you can tell us? [Answer] I never put myself in fictional political scenarios. 123 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Question] To govern is to look ahead... [Answer] That which must be already is. [Question] And what will you do in the face of pressure from organized labor? [Answer] Why do you want to make the arrival of a new president more catastrophic than the continuation of the old, even when no one expects anything of him any- more? Look at the final days of this presidencq: sad, pesaimistic, morose...I will be elected by the living forces of the country. They will help me. _ [Question] I did not use the word "catastrophic"... _ [Answer] No, but the whole thrust of your questions leads me to think that. In a very short time you have promised me both flight of capital aad labor agitation. ~ I repeat that, between a man new to the presidency, who could only be elected with the help nf a powerful popular movement--without which he would not be elected-- and a candidate at the end of his resources, I do not see why hope would not rest on the eide of the former. [Question] It does not seem to you that winning the confidence of the business leaders poses an insurmountable obstacle? [Answer] I aincerely hope not. I am not running after favora from a few business leaders who are identified with all the egoism big business has mobilized over the last 30 years, but great ma3ority of heade of enterpriaes will find in me someone who will try to get our economy out of the morass it is in today. They must simply underatand that this will never be to the detriment of the workers. Quite the op- posite. [Question] To my question on the new ma3ority in the national assembly, you imme- diately brought up the possibility of a majority that would not be in harmony... (Anawer] I fi*_iuly lualicve that the countrs w:.?.1 elect an assembly in harmcmy with my positiona. [Question] And if not? [Anewer] History will answer. I cannot write history in advance. We must have good judgment, wisdom, intuition. Politics is not a collection of pre-arranged returns. Nor is the government of a country. [Question] If I understood you correctly, you said the other night on "Cards on the Table" that you would not have any coaamunist ministers in your government. [Answer] I have put questions to the communist leaders; it is up to them to re- spond to them. - [Question] Do you predict the PCF position will change before 10 May? [Answer] For the moment, the issue is the election of the president of the republic. Will the leadership of the PCF opt for a president of the right and unemployment? No, I do not think so. 124 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY [Question) You clearly see that this is an important question, calling for a clear answer; all the same it is o� utmost importance to know if there will be five, six, or seven communista in your government. That doea not depend on a change of posi- tion by the PCF but on your own decieion as to what you are going to aek Frenchmen to vote for. . [Answer] I answered this question without the least ambiguity during my television braodcast of 16 March on Antenna 2. The future parliamentary majority will be the parties and groups o-f the assembly that create it. The government can only be composed of people who agree on the basics. Tlberefore the PCF leaderahip should - desist from its antisocialist campaign, desist from this ambiguous game it is play- ing with the right, desist from aligning itself, as it did on Afghaniatan, with a policy that cannot be the policy of France, in short: return to the union, both in form and in substance. Having said that, I have always hoped to reitegrate the milliona of communists into the national effort. I do not disavow this. I still want to see as many people as possible join hands to work for national re- - covery. [Question] Georges Marchais on Monday evening clearly showed his colors. If Francois Mitterrand will not take any communist ministers, he said, perhaps we will not vote for him, and if he is elected, demands in the factories--and even occupa- tion of factories will be in full swing. [Answer] And what will it be like with Giscard, then? I do not think that Georges Marcahis meant that the pCF would engage in protests if I were elected and abandon them if Giscard were elected! That would certainly be new evidence of a strange collusion which the workers would certainly take for what it was worth! What can - I say, we are rivals. Marchais is a candidate. I am too. This is only one epi- - sode among others before the first round. [Question] Georges Marchais is saying now that you are the candidate of the center left, that you are Edgar Faure. What do you say? - [Answer] That is a part of this electoral background music that one takes with a amile. It is not very serious. I have heard plenty of others! This one is just a little minuet muaicl [Question] He means by these remarks to show that you are the reformist candidate. [Answer] That is your conjecture. [Question] Does the label "reformist candidate" make you uncomfortable? [Answer] I have already had the occasion to say that the word "reformism" had connotations which in French politics were rather pejorative, for historical reasons on which it is pointless to dwell. But 1et us rid ourselves of verbal prestidigi- tation: yes, I certainly do hope to make reforms. [Question] If you had been in Giscard d'Estaing's place, would you have sent in French paratroopers to Kolwezi? [Anawer] From the moment it became a question of saving French lives, naturally. But I think that the French policy in Zaire created a situation which imperiled the French in Kolwezi. 125 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY [Queation] Ie there, then, nothing in Giscard's foreign policy which you find laud- able? [Answer] Some of his ideas on the Third World were good ones. He did not carry them through, but that ia not my fault. Yes, the North-South Conference was a good idea. The rapprochement with Weat Germany ie sound politica; it was not his idea, but he did well to follow it. On Europe, some desirable initiatives were taken, notably those that tended to make the council of ministers more responsible, more coherent. The problem with Giscard is that when he has good ideas he abandons them too soon. [Question] When you find his ideas good, why do you not say so? [Anawers] This might happen... [Question] Not in a very loud voice! [Answer] There are enough people to do it! ~ [Question] Do you not thinlc that ultimately the attitude of not saying anything in favor of good initiatives contributes to making the atmosphere of our democracy unbreathable? [Answer] If the government did not suffocate the life of the opposition in our democracy, one might see things a little differently. The party in power is a clan that practices the apoils system, it is intolerant, sectarian... [Question] Which makes any dialogue impossible. - [Answer] Unfortunately. Giscard has sometimes made useful suggestions regarding domestic policy. On the eve of his election in 1974, he wanted to see more under- - - standing and fair play for the opposition, and examined the possibilitq of a pro- portional law...None of all that has seen the light of dayl [Question] Efforte were made toward a detente. You went to the Elysee, you were given information... [Answer] Tao or three times in 7 years, and without any follow-up. [Question] You do not think it could go further than that? [Answer] I will reapect the people, the life of democracy. I will not consider that France belongs to me. I will free the xLidio-visual media from the political pressure that weighs on them, I wi11 try to let a little fresh air into a system - that needs to get uncramped. [Question] Will you propose some status for the oppoaition? [Answer] I have always been hostile to that notion because the status of the oppo- sition is defined by the laws, by customr by the institutions. A status for the opposition would be a little like apartheid, but I underetand what you mean. In reality, some kind of modus vivendi needs to be eatablished between the majority 126 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and the opposition in which each finds respect for his rights and his dignity. [Question] When people.say that your election would mean societal change, you seem irritated. [Anawer] No, not irritated...I said in a very calm way that I did not want to get mixed up in this kind of casuistry: societal change, societal change... If we nationalize Dassault, or more correctly bomber aviation, this will in effect be a societal change for Dasaault, for whom by the way I have only the best wishes. But _ for the rest of the French, there will only have been a change--for the better as. far as they are concerned--in a tiny little part of society... When my term is completed, hiatorians will judge my success in changing society where it needed to be changed. If I am accused--as the right has done--of wanting a collectivist society, I would observe that this has been said of every leftist for a century and a half now. It was said of Blum and Jaures. That is comforting! [Question] It was Gaston Defferre who said: "We will remain in a free society, in a market economy..." [Answer] In a society that will be more free than the one of today...since it will be freed of the hold of multinational capitalism and the policiea it inspires, such as those of Giscard d'Estaing. There is already a big public sector here. It was created in 1945 by General De Gaulle by a number of major nationalizations: gas, electricity, coal, banks, insurance, Renault, etc. The Popular Front had been content with arms and railroads. Our public sector is still less extensive than the one Italy owes to Christian Democracy, less extensive than Austria's under Social Democracy. I predict, if I obtain a parliamentary majority, the na- tionalization of ten or so industrial enterprises, which I have named, and which are monopolies or of monopolistic tendency in various sectors of our economy. All that in the context of democratic planning and greatly decentralized institu- tions. [Question] The French do not feel the urgency of nationalizing Dassault. [Answer] In whose name fortunes would be build on the order, manufacture, and sale of war planes? [Question] I mention Dassault, but the same applies to any of the other nine businesses. [Anawer] It is the state companies that today are bringing growth, that invest, that are in the vanguard of our exports. But I repeat here that we are not talk- ing about nationalizing 3ust anything. The list that I published has the status of a contract between the French people and myself. No more, no less. [Question] If perchance serious events occurred in Poland--and by that I really mean Soviet intervention--do you think that would be good or bad for you? [Answer] It is the conventional wisdom that it would be harmful to me. I am against any external interference in Poland, starting with Russia. To see Mr 127 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Brezhnev again in Warsaw, under those conditions, would be intolerable. I hope that Giscard d'Eataing would not use it as an occasion for returning there. But, in fact, so long as the Poliah Communist Party [POUP] ia prepared--even through ne- gotiations--to keep the eituation in hand, so long as it doee not suffer an inter- nal split, ae was the case with Czechoslovakia, Moecow will not intervene directly. 'Phat would after all be contrary to the lateat Chruet of Soviet diplomacy. _ COPYRIGHT: 1981 Cogedipresse S. A. - 9516 = CSO: 3100/738 128 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GENERAL SELECTED MITTERRAND PROPOSITIONS REVEALED, ANALYZED Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 9 May 81 pp 82-83 [Article: "Here Are the Propositions"] FRANCE [Text] Francois Mitterrand does not like the tube, and one understands why. Tele- vision is pitiless, transparent: through it, one has to say everything, openly, to " the 36 million demanding critics on the lookout for the errors, contradictions, omissions. Face to face with Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Francois Mitterrand knew well that he would be called on L-o explain a"hole" in his campaign: the almost to- tal absence of declarations about his program, the "Socialist Proposal" (summarized in "110 Propositions for France"). When he talks about his program, Francois Mit- . terrand prefers to do so behind closed doors, in the Medicis Hall of the Senate, _ during the weekend of 1 May, going on then to an economic "New Deal." If Francois Mitterrand keeps his proposal carefully concealed under his green loden coat, he has his reasons for doing so: th is text, which he recently described as a"grand design" for France, has been drawn u p by the leading lights of the CERES [Center for (Social- ist) Studies, Research, and Education], the Marxist wing of the PS [Socialist Party]. Whereas only 6 years ago, Mitterrand called the ideas of the CERES a"communist- leftist potpourri." Mitterrand also wants to hide his allies as he hides his pro- _ grams. In November 1980, in his book "Ici et Maintenant" [Here and Now], he wrote: "The decisions made in Paris by the leadership of the PCF usually correspond to the premises of a world strategy whose keynote is sounded by Moscow." But 2 months later, at his party's national convention, he stated: "Our intention is to associate the Communist Party in a pol icy aimed at transforming French society and opening the way to socialism." Taxation Proposition 34--"A tax on the big fortunes per a progressive scale will be insti- tuted. Inheritance taxes will be reformed so as to lighten the taxes on modest in- heritances (whether in the direct line or not) and tax big inheritances more heav- ily." But Francois Mitterrand is careful not to say what he means by "big inheritances." This fuzzy proposition opens up all possibilities, notably that of despoliation of _ heirs. J Administration Proposition 18--"One hundred fifty thousand jobs will be created in the public and social services...60,000 public-service positions will be made available to associa- tions and local collectivities." - 129 Al-VrrTeT. iTCR ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY When such a measure is advocated, Francois Mitterrand is not thinking about France but rather about the militants of his party: at the PS congress in Metz in April 1979, 83 percent of those in attendance were wage-earners, and 59 percent of them were in the public aector. The French do not want more civil servanta but rather "lese paper-puahing." Economy Proposition 21--"The public sector will be enlarged by the nationalization of the nine industrial groups specified in the common program and the Socialist program, of the steel industry, of armament and space activities financed by public funds. The nationalization of credit and insurance will be completed." The plan, authorYLarian planning, would become the regulator of the economy. But by suppressing the mechanisms of the market and free enterprise, authoritarian planning will cause the appearance of a black market, smuggling and therefore repression. Socialism denies the natural laws of economics and piits the producers and the con- sumers under an intolerable constraint. The Enterprises Proposition 22--"The trade union's capacity for taking action in the enterprises will be extended and strengthened: facilities for and protection of the elected del- egates, time set aside for information and collective express ion." 'Proposition 60--":The company committee will have adailable to it all necessary information on the company's progress. With regard to hiring, laying-off organization of work, training plan, new production technique s, it will be able to , exercise a veto, with recourse to a new labor jurisdiction." Proposition 74--"The young will be eligible..:from the age of 16 for occupational preferences." The PME [Small and Medium-Size Businesses), who are already the prisoners of state- controlled credit, authoritarian planning, will be placed under the tutelage of a strengthened trade-unionism, dominated by the powerful organization of the CGT [Gen- eral Confederation of Labor]. They will be able to survive only for an initial phase before they die, defeated by the multiplication of action in favor of trade- union demands. Agriculture Proposition 43--"The instrument of labor--the land--will be protected against specu- lation and overexploitation by the creation of cantonal land offices." In the long run, this idea inevitably results in the setting-up of large collective units and cooperatives on the model of the Soviet koZk!?ozes. Family "Children will have to be involved in real Iife far more than they are today, with concrete responsibilities and rights in the household" (p 306 of "The Socialist Proposal"). 130 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Francois Mitterrand is even planning for democratization and the development of homes to receive "young people in conflict with their families." This meane quite simply the destruction of the family unit: the child would be taken away from paren- - tal authority and initiated into "self-management democracy." Armed Forces Proposition 76--"Draftees into national service will have freedom of assembly and asaociation." In other words, young draftees of 18 or 20 will be able to dispute the necessity of a defense policy for France. How can one both pretend to want an effective defense policy and at the same time accept the idea of this policy's being disputed in the barracks? Everyday Life "A systematic effort will be undertaken to transform and activate the urban frame- work, to make it more community-oriented and improve collective housing" (p 177 of "The Socialist Proposal"). Actually, in the Socialist proposal, individual housing of the separated-unit type is disfavored, as is pointed out by Jacques Rougeot in his book "Socialisme a Re- sponsabilite Limitee" [Limited-Liability Socialism] (France-Empire). In effect, the Socialist proposal denounces individual housing as a"great consumer of space and en- ergy." Generally speak ing, as regards real estate, private interests will have to be subordinated to the collective interests: "the collective rights cf the, users will have to be strengthened," notably by means of "development of a trade-unionism of the framework of life" (p 275). For the Sccialists, taking the walls is not enough. It is also necessary to assail personal and individual property, since, ac- cording to their proposal, consumption.will be transformed by the "possibility of 4loint use of certain household equipment or certain leisure facili.ties" (p 177). 11267 CSO: 3100/739 131 Wnn n~'VrrTeT. TTSR ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R040440020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GENERAL MITTERRAND ANSWERS PERSONAL, THEORETICAL, POLITICAL QUESTIONS Paris LE POINT in French 2-10 May 81 pp 60-72 FRANCE _ [Article: "Exclusive--The Two Candidates Reply to LE POINT's 38 Original Questions"] [Excerpts] Here is a double interview-event. The editorial staff of LE POINT put to Valery Giscard d'Estaing and to Francois Mitter- rand exactly the same 38 questiofts previously unasked in this cam- paign. LE POINT gave each of them the same space for answering them (about 20 typewritten pages). They uaed this apace unequally. The questions, which LE POINT wanted to have an unaccustomed character, were designed to enable the candidates to express their personalities and their views in both a serious and an original way. They have done so. [Following are Mitterrand's replies. ] 1. What, in your opinion, qualifies you to be a better president than your opponent for the next 7 yeara? It is up to the French people to decide and evaluate whether the same men and the same methods would or would not lead the country to the same disappointments, the same errors, the same setbacks! The best president will be the one who knows how to put life back into the country. Now one cannot call for a national effort while re- jecting justice and equity. Energies cannot be mobilized without an ambitious and deliberate proposal. The perpetuation of serious inequalities and a day-to-day policy prevent all hope of rebirth. I would add that, aided by a team composed of the best experts, I have prepared the solutions of the future for each problem. The takeover team is ready: women and men of great talent will bring a new view of people and events. And this _ seems to me necessary for the governing of France. 2. Which are the qualities you have that make you more capable of overcoming poli- tical and intetnational crises? Let others praise themselves. Pleading for myself is not my strong point. Every- thing depends on mastery of se1f, speed of perception, readinesa for decision. There is also, of course, knowle3ge of history. Do I have these virtues? My life alone is a sufficient answer. 132 . . FUR 0V--CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFIC LAL USE ONLY 3. What historical precedents come to mind when you think about the difficulties _ that await you? Analogy is an artificial intellectual exercise. Each epoch presents iCa particular characteristica. Since you want an answer to this question, what precedent should I choose? Cle- menceau and de Gaulle in the war? Mendes-France and decolonization? Or Roosevelt facing the crisis of 1929? Two policies confronted one another: that of the outgo- - ing President Hoover, that of Roosevelt. Hoover was a specialisc, a great economist of hie time. He tried hard to herald "prosperity around the corner," but it did not come. None of his cechnocrat's methods was rooted in reality: neither the restric- tive organization of credit nor the restriction of consumption. Franklin Roosevelt, on the other hand, proposed to his country mainly an ideal, a faith, a will. And . hope returned. And America was put back on its feet. And the other nations fol- ' lowed. Here, it seems to me, today, is the historic role of France. To show to the French, first of all, and then to the other nations, the way of rebirth. Only a socialism of responsibility and freedom can get the world out of the crisis. 4. Who are the philosophers, the writers and the politicians who most inspire your - thought and your action? Here you are asking me for an inventory wh ich I often ask myself about. As my life goes on, I sometimes change my opinion. I would have to have a long stretch of se- = renity before me in order to answer you. The present moment hardly lends itself to this. 5. When you have political and economic decisions to make, do you ask, in addition *_o your official advisers and collaborators, the advice of privatz persons? Who? The insulated walls of ministerial offices make too many officials forget the deeper - life of their people. By temperament and by taste, I like to cover the country. By this I mean the voices of those who labor, those who build, those who hope. Their suggestions nourish my thinking and warm mq heart. I draw my most vital in- spiration from these often unexpected encounters with the women and men of my coun- try. When elected president of the republic, I will continue to live in synchrony and symbiosis with living France. Thus I will be better-prepared to resist the omnipotence of the technocrats. The solitude of power becom2s dangerous when power takes itself to be an interlocu- tor and closes itself in an echo chamber, where it no longer hears anything but the _ remarks of its partisans and its cour tesan s. As for private persons, independently of those few close ones whom I need not name, I do not make an important decision without taking a trip to my canton of Mont- sauche, in the Nievre, or to Chatesu-Chinon. What I hear and observe there is in- dispensable to me for undertanding the movements of the country`s opinion. My friends down there wi11 tell you that they see me arrive every week, full of ques- tions, queries. 133'. nnn n'WVTl~TAT TTCF nj1LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6. What is the total income that you declared for the year 1980? How does it break down? I declared in 1980: 163,000 francs in royalties as an author, 125,000 francs repre- senting my salary as a member of Parliament, and 72,000 francs in noncommercial in- come. I own no real estate and I do not collect any income from real property. = 7. Are you in favor of financial openness for politicians, on the basis of ensuring it by: --regular publication of the state of their fortunes? --its being monitored by an organism created for the purpose? Financial openness of politicians would contribute to the indiapensable moralization of public life. Do you know that under the Third Republic, even though it is so disparaged today, it was the custom for a politician, upon going into the govern- ment, to tranaform any portfolio of stocks he had into bonds? Indeed, how could it be tolerated if, for example, the eupreme authorities or their close associates could benQfit from speculation on the Stock Exchange when, by their information or their decisions, they can predict or influence its fluctuations? Too many officials at the present time intermingle their administrative life and their business life and confuse the public interest with their personal interests. The scandals that break out reveal the corruption of a system. Regular and controlled publication of the state of wealth of public persons seema to me to be a good measure. For those who hold executive power, the measure should be extended to their closest relatives. As muct as the legal rules, it is the public attitude that must be changed. It is - up to the leaders to set the example. It is the state's task to be at the service of not just a few privileged persons anymore, but of all the citizens. A different public ethic has to be established as quickly as poasible. 8. Is it inevitable, in your opinion,for a politician to speak some untruths during his career? If so, when has this happened to you? What did you feel about it? No one, whether in private life or in public life, can say he is beyond involuntary inaccuracy, or falsehood by omission. I try to be extremely cautious in checking my sources of information, but error can sometimes creep deeply into the heart of a reasoning process, to the point of vi*_iating it. But knowingly to state an untruth seems to me to be, as much as a fault, a stupid thing to do. 9. Do the French have reason to fear the future? All the candidates in this election, with the exception of the outgoing one, are in agreement on this point at least, that things are going poorly for France, and that without a different policy, it will go from bad to worse. But the virtue of demo- cracy is precisely that it gives the citizens the rights and the means to change di- rection. I have said, I have said and I will say again that the spiritual, technic- al and human resources of France are immense and that it makes no sense to doubt its capacity. 134. . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFTICIAL USE ONLY 10. Many young pe ople seem indifferent to the idea of having Valery Giscard d'Es- taing or Francois Mitterrand as president. If you had one of them in front of you, what would you say to him? First of all, I do not believe there ase so many as some like to say. A disinterest in politics on the part of young people scarcely appears from Che voting statistics. The fact remains t hat it ia a time of life when disenchantment is common. This has been true since Romanticism. To the young person you suggest I am talking to, I would simply say that it is dangere+is to leave the care of hia destiny to chance. At the end of the next 7-year period, your young person will be leas young. The broad outlines of his life will have been drawn. Simply within himself, how will he take the idea of not having made his choice? I would also say t o him that I understand his uncertainties. Society as it is bars the road of life t o you and steals your youth from you. But take heart. The future holds innumerable opportunities for building. - 11. Since the time you took up a political career, have you sometimes thought of changing professions? If yes, when, why, and what other profession? My trade was that of attorney and--when I felt like it--writer. Why would I change - today? Politics i s not a profession in the usual sense. It is a combat, it is an engagement with be ing. As circumstances would have it, it has taken over my life. How can one renounce it without renouncing one's convictions? 12. When was it th at you first envisioned becoming president o� the republic one day? _ The presidency of the republic is neither the beginning nor the end of everything. My ambition is to achieve victory for my ideas more than for myself. I simply have _ some coherence in ideas, my ideas are way and their path is ascendant. In _ 1965, I got 11 mil lion votes in my name in the second round; in 1974, 14 million. It is up to the French to decide about the next phase. Ideas ripen as do f ruits and people. One has to let time decide. No one goes over- night from the sow ing to the harvesting, and the scale of history is not that of newspapers. But after patient waiting comes the Spring. It is coming now, I think. 13. In your opin i on, does carrying out the duties of president of the republic require: ' --special knowledge? --a broad general culture? Is this a writing-assignment tooic for high-school students? The governing of peo- ple is not learned in the universities but in the school of life. This is not to say that the unive rsity is not a serious advantage! ~ 14. Should a pres ident propose a collectiue ideal to his fellow citizens? Yes. I believe th is deeply. One cannot get out of crisis by force of decrees or _ _ purely technical me asures. There is no change without taking a new breath. Excite- ment and enthusiasm--these are what is lacking today. How can worn-out officials, .135 ' k FoR (1FFT(:TAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY short on ideas, blase and resigned, wrench the country out of moroseness and lan- guor? How can our people be given new ardor and fervor, and therefore the will to do something and overcome the crisis, if there is not a reveranlof the value system and replacement of a policy centered on the profit of a small group by a policy basea on reapect for man? I say this often. The socialism of liberty is above everything else a cultural project: a choice of life or of aurvival, or rather a choice of civ- ilization. I propose to the French people that they be with me the inventors of a culture, of an art of living--in brief, of a French model of civilization. 15. In your opinion, are women capable of filling any political office, even that of president? If so, what names come to mind? Women have been answering this question themselves for a long time. At the top lev- els of the Socialist Party, women of great talent have made or are making a contri- bution of the highest quality to our work and cur action. I mention, in no partic- ular order, Marie-Therese Eyquem, Yvette Roudy, Edith Cresson, Veronique Neiertz, Marie-Jo Pontillon, Annette Chepy, Catherine Lalumiere, Nicole Questiaux, Anne Tre- gouet, Francoise Gaspard, Colette Audry, Christiane Mora, Irene Charamande, Dinah Caudron, and a great many others. Look also at the list of our European deputies: the highest percentage of women in Europe! It is doubtlessly necessary to go still farther. And my friends will strive to do so! A woman president or prime minister? Yes, obviously! Other countriea have opened the way: Israel with Golda Meir, India with Indira Gandhi. 16. Among the qualities attributed to you, which do you think represent the great- est misunderstariding? , Ambition. My ambition is to participate in the forward march of the people of my time and not to betray the hopes that I bear. This enables my opponents to repre- sent me as a Rastignac. These persons, when they say I am capable, imply that I am - too capable. My friends, though, know that this is not the case. Have I ever, in my political life, compromised on what is essential to me? I could more easily have made a career. I will never renounce the highest of my ambitions, which is unity of - spirit. 17. And as regards your defects? I have them, to be sure! I am reproached with being distant. It is not because of a likir.g for secrecy, but rattier the need for a certain reserve. I have difficulty in bending to the fashion of ::aying everything about one's private life, about one's family, one's children, one's friends. This explains to you why I reply briefly to _ this kind of question. - 18. How much sleep do you need per day? From 7 to 10 hours. I am getting less right now. - 19. Do you prefer to speak: - --before a crowd, an assembly, or a small audience? --on television, or on the radio? --alone, or in a debate? 136 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Either to a few friende or to a crowd. I am always improvising. Before a crowd, the exchange, the dialogue, take shape by themselves. I do not like those cold mon- sters, the television cameras,that do not smile at you, that do not respond, that say nothing to you. I do not like to speak to a machine. I like to speak to human be- ings. But I know my obligations and I have thought a lot about the way to be and do things on television. I hope I have made progress, during the present campaign, in my ap- proach to this practical matter. I still have to master the rather unreal mono- logues �that are imposed on the candidates, under ridiculous technical conditions. Radio, on the other hand, has not presented any problem to me. 20. To prescind from content, how is your political style distinguished from that of your opponent? There is quite a radical distinction, it seems to me. First of all, I do not place politics above everything. It does not have the creative value of art, it cannot pretend to anything more--though this is quite a bit--than to be the servant of sci- ence and the humble interpreter of society. I have already had occasion to write somewhere that I believe political action is subject to the necessity of not being cut off from knowledge of everyday life, of remaining close to what constitutes the warp and woof of people's lives. But at the same time, I strive to maintain a certain distance from events, the overview that is - needed in order to place them in their context and define their exact proportions. - This double view is not a matter of style but of conviction. - 21. What quality in your opponent do you have the highest regard for? A rare gift for exposition, and agility, speed of intelligence. 22. What do you think is his worst fault? That he appears to care so little about the fact that his words and his acts follow lines so perfectly parallel that they are destined to meet only in infinity. This distance between speech and deeds is, in the literal sense, astronomical. It often - gives me the impression that Giscard d'Estaing moves in a sleepwalker's universe. - - 23. Will you state your most regrettable blunder and that of your opponent during the last 7 years? Your questionnaire contains at least one blunder: this question. 24. On what occasion do you recall having lost your self-control? At the risk of appearing presumptuous, no recent recollection comes to mind. Even _ my fiercest adversaries do not take that tack when they want to criticize me. God knows that life has given me occasions to lose control of myself. The resistance, the war, and later, calumnies and insults have not been spared me. Whether it is a gift from heaven or conquest of oneself, self-control helps one to get through the most perilous storms. Does this mean that events never wound me? Let us say only that time has strengthened my defensea. 137 Fnp nFFTCiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 25. What has been your strongest emotion in political combat? When and how? I have never been without emotions. How is one to establish a hierarchy? Since you want an example, I would like to dig into the wartime period and quote something /from myself, which I hardly ever do. But I have to act fast! Here ie wh at I wrote in one of my books: "Through that tragic and eweet night of 25 Auguet 1944, when, with officials of the internal Resiatance, I weited at the Police Prefecture for the advance detachments of the Leclerc division, we were there, in small groups, await- ing the arrival of our victorious brothers. By the flowing Seine, the sky, as far as one could see to the west, resembled, with its golden stars on a field of blue, the cloak of Saint Louis, Midnight sounded. I wished there had been another symbol to add to the solemnity of the hour. It seemed to me t'hat the proeession of splen- dors,the procession of sorrows from the depths of our history, were finally going to meet and fuse in the unity of our people. There were no longer any humiliated French people, nor any glory to be gleaned at the expense of one's own brother. The dark grace of the heroic vigils penetrated the heart of Paris." Yes, 25 August 1944. 26. Do you think that your opponent could lose control of himself in the exercise of power? I reject trials by supposition. 27. When and on what occasion have you discovered signs of intolerance in yourself and in your opponent? _ When I was younger, I might have given in to the temptation of intolerance. May I invoke the impetuosity of that age to pardon myself for it? Certainly not. At any age, intolerance is to be banished, and if it were to be reborn, I would immediately try to quench it and contain it. Haven't I shown an example of this within the So- cialist Party itself? I have restored proportional voting in it. My party is the only truly democ ratic French party. It is the only party in which, with complete freedom and without fear cr constraint, everyone expresses his opinion, criticizes the leaders, proposes their replacement. Look at this presidential campaign. Every current was involved in it. All the colors of the socialist rainbow shone in unison with all their fires. Actions here say more than the finest words. Are they flattering to the outgoing candidate? I said it--that a pernicious screen separates words and reality. The words were sometimes noble: from "advanced liberalism" to "reasonable coexistence be- tween majority and opposition," one heard the most agreeable music playing. But alas, the deeda have not come. A calming of the waters? Who, if not the outgoing president, has agitated himself, appropriating the state as if it were his private property? Nothing has escaped his appetite for power: neither the media nor the press nor the administration nor the Parliament. Perhaps he has not encountered the trials that would have corrected this spoiled child's habit. Perhaps then he will find again the natural qualities that I am ready to acknowledge in him. 28. A politician is, in a way, cowardly when he declares he is personally against the death penalty but politically in favor of it. Please, then, answer yes or no to this question: are you for or against the death penalty, and if the lat- ter, will you take initiative to have it abolished? 138 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R040440020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY You are not wrong. How can one at the same time proclaim his profound aversion to the death penalty and prevent all debate in Parliament about its poss ible abolition? The conduct of the country's affairs requires courage and character. It is neces- sary to know sometimes how to hasten the evolution of attitudes. A c ountry is not governed at the pleasure of public-opinion polls. As I sai.d on television recently, I am opposed to the death penalty. It does not seem to me worthy of a civilized country. It conflicts with my conce p t of life. Moreover, it is ineffective: its abolition in all the countries of Eur ope has not brought an increase in criminality. Political prudence and ambiguotis responses do not seem appropriate to me in this matter. Obviously, I will not imp ose my convic- tion. It will be up to the representativea of the people or to the pe ople them- selves to debate and decide. 29. When a prisoner e; first feeling? In popular language, a sion has fallen out of very serious reply, it with the notion of the taking of hostages. 3capes from prison by means of a helicopter, wha t is your burglar used to be called a"second-storey man." The expres- use, it was premonitory. If I am accused of g iving a not will be agreed that the question is hardly more so. To go lesser evil, I would say that I prefer the hel icopter to the 30. Do you believe in human progress? How can one help but marvel at the movement of creation and invention? By means of the tool--the plow or the pick--man was able to extend his arm. Then the steam en- gine and the electric motor came to add to his atrength. Now today, computer tech- nology is assisting his intelligence and his memory. And with the tr aneistor and the microprocessor, the third industrial revolution is heralded. Is this fertile ground for new development for our country? It is c a lled, precise- ly, science, invention, creation. The message of socialism is first of all this: belief in the prodigious potentials of human intelligence. Thus we w ill give the leading role to those who clear the ground, to the enlighteners, the searchers and the discoverers. Human progress is not only progress in technologies and sciences. It is also the progress iri relations among people. This is the whole meaning of the coming elec- tions: will the time of contempt yield to the time of respect? Will France invent a new praject of civilization, or will it be content to live in the inte llectual orbit of the great powers? 31. What is the science whose development gives you most fear for th e future, and which one makes you most optimistic? At the head of the orientation document adopted by the last congress of the PS at Metz, I put under the title "Looking Ahead" a preamble devoted to science and tech- _ nology. It stated in particular: "Rejection of technical progress, f ear of the cre- ative act, are characteristics of lost societies. The danger for humanity is not _ that man invents, but that he does not master what he has created." No science dis- turbs me in itself. They all gladden me and give me confidence. Onl y the use made of them raises questions. I borrow Francois Jacob's image for my purpose: "One can 139 Vnp nFFTCTAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY use a knife to peel an apple or to plunge into a neighbor's ribs." There is only one solution: to govern the future and not to be its plaything. This is the entire difference between Giscard d'Estaing's laisser-faire regime and my proposal. Take the example of the revolution introduced by computer technology and genetics. Are they going to create a society of solitude, manipulation and dispossession? Or on the contrary, are they going to liberate labor, invent machines that care for us and teach us, save energy and increase the time we have for living and our joy in it? Remember the frightful social regression that resulted from England's mechani- zation in the 18th century: the labor of children attached to machines, women giving birth on the ground, the shortened lives of prematurely worn-out wor.kers. This is what I would like to avoid in the era of the third industrial revolution: that man should be transformed into a solitary robot, talking with the machine only. On the contrary, I would rather that the new technologies help him to find himself again and form a new and friendly dialogue with other men. It is also necessary for our country to keep control over its scientific research. Such cannot be the case when credits for research have been atagnating for 7 years. France must put itself in the lead: grey matter is its true resource. That is where our future lies: exploration of the still unsuspected deposits of our intelligence. 32. Are you happy? I relish life, therefore I relish happiness; all my friends know this--and espcially the kind of happiness that gives one the feeling of being in harmony with oneself. I am helped by a natural rejection of pessimism. I do not believe that happiness is only, as Jules Renard says, "the silence of misfortune." It is the state of a con- science at peace with people, with things. Can I, for all that, call myself happy? Was Montaigne correct to write that "men cannot call themselves happy until the last _ day of their life has passed"? 33. In your opinion, is the world heading toward war or peace in the long run? War exists today in a good many places in the world. The overarmament of the great powers is creating a growing danger of explosion. Finally, the inequalities between rich countries and poor countries are multiplying the risks; out in so serious a matter, it is not sufficient to have an opinion, one must put will to work. It is up to France and to the nations of Europe to avoid what is avoidable and to propose a profound rransformation of international relations. 34. Which slogan of your opponent horrifies you the most? = The only slogan of his that I have noted is: "France must have a President." On _ that point, I agree with him. 35. Which line of thinking of his troubles you the most? Does one call the ability to state an error, a false figure, with aplomb, a"line of reasoning"? I am always disconcerted when I hear my rival state predictions that are by nature chancy, without the least hesitation of eye or voice. Among a thou- sand examples, remember his proclamation of 8 July 1978: "France will come out of ~ the crisis at the end of the year." Or last week: "France has the leading computer 140 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - industry in Europe, whereas the leading European company is an English one, Sie- mens is ahead of us in electronic components, and CII-Honeywell-Bull is dominated technologically and financi^lly by its American partner Honeywell. In brief, as you see, what troubles me most about him is precisely his nonreasoning, or art of asser- tiOh. 36. Do you believe in the decline of Western Europe? No, Europe has the means for being the first continent to come out of the crisis. It has the intelligence, the natural resources, the vitality, the industry, the cul- ~ ture. But it lacks a sense of purpose, the will to take up the challenges, the use the means of science and economics in the service of a project for civilization. My ambition is to help give Europe a second wind and to propose some other mobiliz- ing missions for it: new joint research programs, new joint technological projects, preservation of our cultural patrimonies, control of our intellectual independence in the face of the appearance of new technologies, etc. It is up to Europe also to be in the vanguard of new relations with the Third World - and to carry still farther forward the noble and ambitious work auccessfully initi- ated by my friend Claude Cheysson, European commissioner in Brussels. 37. Is democracy a carryover from the past or an idea for the future? The present system is not unrelated to the Second Empire: the monopolizing of the state by one family, one clan, one caste; the policing of consciences and of hearts; _ centralization and bureaucratization. Reread Victor Hugo and his dazzling analyses of the regime of Napoleon the Small and of its social foundations: subordination of the immense mass of the sharecropping _ peasants, isolated from one another, the mere sum of identical units. Yes, democracy is an idea for the future. The time has come for the alternation in this lung of democracy. Can it be that the French, creators of the idea of Repub- lic, have let it fade? The state alone, all alone, decides on the life of our communities. 'Ihe prefect alone, all alone, governs the department. Men alone, all alone, too often choose for the women. The television directors all by themselves.... The same ones alone decide everything for everyone, and are often mistaken. My proposal is a different one. I trust life, I believe in the virtues of our shared intelligence, and at each stage of power I want the voice of each person to be heard, and his imaginative or critical contribution solicited. In brief, there is a democracy to be built: an open administration, free information subject to question, general experience of responsibilities, of the local collectiv- ities freely run at last. Where he lives and works, the citizen should be able to affect his destiny and bend the course of affairs. None of the liberalization proposals announced with lots of publicity has been real- ly implemented: neither the financing of the parties nor the establishment of pro- portional representation nor reform of Parliament nor decentralization.... So many commitments not kept make one lose forever the right to promise. 141 Fnu nFF7rTAT, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Along with 'rhLicydides and Monresquieu, I am not ignorant of the fact that every pow- er is Led to abuse its power. Thus I will propose, in the first weeks following my election, the passage of great laws of liberty rel.ating to radio and television, dE>- centralization, workers' rights, women's rights, etc. 38, no you believe that labor ennobles man or enslaves him? The very reality of labor is still too close today to its etymological sense: an in- strument of torture. For many women and men, labor means pain, suffering, humilia- tion. And yet who, in this period of unemployment, is not anxiaus about losing it? Labor is the only source of material survival for millions of people. Actually, the fight for an effective right to work and the fight for transformation of the condi- tions of work are one and the same fight. The crocodile tears of those who plead for a humanization of labor without ever doing any make me indignant. The disserta- tions for ladies of the world on the benefits of work are no longer tolerable in the mouths of those who deprive the workers of their prime dignity: serving the national community by the exercise of a production activity. Ennoblement or servitude? Would the choice be solely between aristocracy and slav- - ery? In truth, the function of labor lies elsewhere. Labor is indissolubly linked to the very genius of the human being. It is transformation of the world, recrea- tion of ideas, discovery of the mysteries of the universe, Labor is a natural act: the contribution of each person to the advance of mankind. As such, it could be a source of joy and plenitude. I will strive with all my strength to give labor again its original significance as an act of creation. 11267 CSO: 3100/740 142 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 r'uct ur'YicIA. USE UNLY GENEIZAL FRANCE MITTERRAND OUTLINES GOVERNING POL'ICY, PRIORITIES Paris L'EXPANSION in French 17-30 Apr 81 pp 5-7, 9 [Article by Jean Boissonnat: "'They Told Me... [Excerpt] Winning, OK. But governing? With whom? First of all, Francois Mitter- rand tioes not totally exclude the possibility of the PCF's taking a new tack when accounts are settled after the balloting. He reminds me about 1972. At the time of the referendum on Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, the Communists had come out against it; the Sociaiists abstained. The dispute was a wild one. That did not prevent Georges Marchais from phoning Francois Mitterrand a few days later tri propose that he sign a Common Program. With the Communists, anything is always possible. But in the last analysis, this is not the most probable thing, and Fran- cois Mitterrand does not give me the impression of being in a hurry to govern with them. Well, then, the same question again: with whom? Two hypotheses. Either the Socialists and their allies have a majority in the new Assembly, and the problem is solved; or else they do not have one, and it is necessary to risk a minority govern- ment based on a solid core of 200 deputies, making up the difference, depending on the vote involved, with support from the left or from the right. This does not seem to frighten this old fox of the Parliamentary chicken-yard. Supported by the insti- tutions of the Fifth Republic on the one hand and by popular enthusiasm on the other, Francois Mitterrand feels he is cut out to bridge the gap. He would not be displeased to show Giscard, who does not seem to have achieved this, that the same president can effectively govern with several majorities. Here he is in the Elysee, then, managing his Parliamentary credit in the best way possible. In order to do what? Francois Mitterrand is convinced that the first 18 months will be the most difficult. He admits to having been overly sanguine in proclaiming that he would not raise the pressure of taxation and social charges beyond the present 42 percent. At heart, he thinks that France could go up to 47 or 48 percent--that is, below the Scandinavian rates, which are over 50 percent-- but on condition, of course, of not doing anything whatsoever. But after Reagan's victory, relayed to France by Chirac's propaganda, it is not possible to go beyond that for the time being. It will therefore be necessary to spread certain social measures out over a period of time. It will be sufficient to explain about this. Likewise, if the situation makes it impossible to aim the repercussions of the raise in the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] (which could fall between 3,000 and 3,3000 francs per month, according to certain Socialist experts) at the wages hierarchy, it will be necessary to say so. Francois Mitterrand has confidence in the French: they will bear the truth if one takes the trouble to explain it to them. It seems to me that, in the cbntext of an entirely different view of matters, Ray- mond Barre thought likewise, without any apparent great success. 143 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY On the other hand, the Socialist candidate intends to go ahe ad rapidly on the 35- hour week. By means of adaptations on the part of branches of industry, he expects 900,000 jobs from�this,-a.hypothesis based on calculations more than on experience. Jacques Delors has convinced him, he says, that with an average growth rate of 3 percent per year, one can simultaneously reduce the work week without cutting buying power, give capital its share for financing investments, and bring about social _ transfera in favor of the most dieadvantaged. Isn't Francois Mitterrand afraid that he has not prepared public opinion for a dif- ficult period, giving the impression that one can diatribute money to everyone with- out taking any from anyone? He defends himself against this charge. He will make only a small number of commitments. Not everything will be possible all at once. Fie knows this. He will say it. But he points out to me that wage costs are higher in the FRG than in France; the employers have some margin (has he thought about the disparities in productivity?). As regards prices, reestablishment of controls does not seem at all indisp2nsable to him--though this does not conflict at all with his convictions--except in a few special areas. As regards relations beyond the nation's borders, use will be made, if necessary, of the safeguard clause provided for in the Common Market, but only for the most seriously threatened industries, such as textiles. Always optimistic, Francois Mitterrand does not believe that this would weaken France's authority in the Community bodies. As for nationalizations, only those th at will be necessary will be done. He will not tell me any more about this. His problem, as far as he is concerned, is the economy. Francois Mitterrand, though less optimistic than Valery Giscard d'Estaing as regards the international environment, is close to him in its conception of French diploma- cy. Both have learned from General de Gaulle the lesson that France can offer a certain neutralism as long as the Americans keep the Russians in check. 7his ;nan presents a curious mixture of tactical ability and strategic magnanimity. ,In the course of the conversation, he made frequent reference to morality and law. . His calculation is there to serve his conviction. When he runs up against practical matters, the word can overcome the obstacle. I went into the office of a socialist candidate; I left that of a republican poet. 11267 CSO: 3100 END 144 FOR l1FFTf'TAT, T1SR (1rt7,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020008-7