JPRS ID: 9935 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040047-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9935 ~
25 August 1981
`West Euro e Re ort
p ~
CFOUO 41 /81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATi~N SERVICE
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, NOTE .
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JPRS L/9935
25 August 1981
_ WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 41/81)
CONTENTS
ENERGY ECONOMICS
TURKEY
No AgreemenC Reached With Iraa on Oil Supplies
tREUTER, 13 Aug 81) 1
ECONOMIC
ITALY
Reasons for Failure of Public Spending Reform
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 26 Jun 81) 2
POLITICAL ~
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
. European Pacifism Increasing; March on Paris, Not Moscow
(Branko Lazitch; L'EXPRESS, 21 Jul-6 Aug 81) 8
FRANCE
Communist Ministera: Duties Veraus PCF Principlea
(Michel Jacquea, et al.; L'~XPRESS, 10-16 Jul 81) 12
SPAIN
Poll on Background, Attitudea of PCE Membera Analyzed
(Jose Manuel Arija; CAMBIO 16, 27 Jul 81) 16
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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MILITARY
FRANCE
New Self-Aiming `AD 4A' Air-to-Air Missile Described
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 18 Jul 81) 23

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ENERGY ECONOMICS ~y
NO AGREII~NT REACHID WITH IRAQ OI3 OIL SUPPLIES
J::132108 London REUTER in English 2057 GM'T 13 Aug 81 ~
[Text] Anka,ra, 13 Aug (REUTER)--Turtceq and Iraq ended two days of talks t~day with-
out agreement on Ankara's requests for increased oil supplies and for higher fees
for the transit of Iraqi dil through Turkey, government sources said.
But they said the two sides agreed to a substantial increase in Turkey's exports
to Iraq in the talks between Turk-L~h Governmert leaders and an Iraqi delegation
led by ~irst Deputy Prime Minis~er Taha Yasin Rr~madan.
The sources said Iraq would supply Turkey with 8.5 million tons of oil next year,
the same as last qear and ~ust under half the coimtry's total needs. The sources
said yesterday that Turkey would ask for an increase.
T~irkey has also been pressing for an increase in the 38 cents per barrel fee paid
by Ba.ghdad for the transit of oil through the Iraqi pipeline from the Kirkuk oil-
fields to Turkeq's Mediterranean terminal at Yumurtalik.
The sources said the issue was discussed by Mr Ramadan and Turkish Prime Minister
Bulent Ulusu yesterday but no agreements were reached.
They said the two sides discussed a request from Turkey that the flow through the
_ pipeline be increased but no details of the discusaions were given.
The pipeline, which has become m~re important ta Iraq since ~ts war with Iran
closed its loadir..g terminals in the Gulf, is able to carry 35 million tons of oil
a year and is at present working at about 85 per cent capacity.
The sources said the two countries signed an agreement yesterday to develop 3ointly
Turkey's southeastern ports of Mersin and Iskenderun which have carried much of
Iraq's imports since the Gulf war began.
The~ said the two sides agreed that Turkey's exporte to Iraq would total about
400 million dollars this year compared ~th 50 million last year and that they ~
would grow further in 1982.
csa: 4600/124
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ECONOMIC ITALY
REASONS FOR FAILURE OF PUBLIC SPENDING REFORM
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 26 Jun 81 p 16
~Text~ Rome--This year for ~the first time, the teport to Parlia-
ment by the combined sections of the State Audit Court on the
general accounting rEturns of the state for �iscal yeas 1980 in-
cludes a set of "analytical consideratior~s," the purpose of which
is to explain the reasons for ttae failure of the public spending
- reform. We publish below the main peints of these "analytical
~ considerations."
The final balance sheet for fiscal year 1980 underscores the difficulties that
condition the management of public finances, tending to frustrate efforts to
attain the principal objective of the budget reform introduced by 1978 Law 468.
On the other hand, the need for a tight rein on the operative f~ctors in the
public sector is all the more irrenounceable in the current situation of the econ-
omy, characterized by an inflation rate that over the past 2 years has approached
~ 20 percent. .
Under the rationale ot the reform--making the state the sole publi.c body in
deficit--the funding needs o~ the entire public sector load the state budget with
incremental levels of spending, especially current spending, that piggyb~ck the
effects of the inflationary phenomenon. Fueled mainly by capital transfers, and
increasingly burdened--as will be see~n--by interest charges, current spending in
1980, in terms of appropriated funds, increased 37.8 percent (+32.2 percent in
1979). Thus, the process of decompartmentalizing spending,begun in 1979, when
the ratio between investments and current charges dropped from 27.4 percent to 20
percent owing to the decrease in the former, was consolid~ted; and in this con-
text, very little relevance can be attached to the signs of improvement indicated
by the 35.2--~ercent increase in capital account spending and the 46.1-percent ~
increase in net, unsegregated, newly formed surpluses.
The increased demands are borne out, in the assets portion of the balance, by the
unprecedented rise in ultimate revenues (+36.2 pe=aent)--which is even higher in
the tax subportion (+37.0 percent)--a riae that for the first time in many years
is greater, in relative terms than that of expenditures.
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This increase also appears to outweigh thz presumable effects of the fiscal drain
_ and upsets the tinal estimates, attesting their unstableness. In any case, it
diminishes the meaningfulness at the col.lection of public finance data on whioh
Parliament bases its spending decisions.
Whatever may be the future possibilities of eventually recovering evaded taxes,
the system at this point appeass to be reaching its point of maximum returns,
beyond which the only outlook for the control of public finances must be based on
containment of spending.
Basically, the situation described above is borne out by the cash flow figures.
- From these there emerges, moreover, a seemi.ng tendency (already taking shape with
more marked characteristics in 1979) toward circumstantial stemming of the outflow
through the slowiny down of disbursements from the earm~arked-funds account.
Especially symptomatic in this regard is the unusually slow rate of disbursements
from the allocated current accounts portion of the budget (74.3 percent) which is
decidedly lower than the ra.ther modest one of 1979 and which with respect to 1978
represents a drop of all of 11 percentage points. P~nd a direct consequence of
_ this is the impressive figure of newly �ormed surpluses under Title I(almost
26,000 billion), enough to oftset the speedup of outpayments from the outstanding
liabilities account.
The factor that chiefly characteriz~d 1979 management operations--namely, the
postponement of outpayments--therefore raised, in 1980, the rate of disbursement
of surpluses, but the effects of this speedup were amply reabsorbed by an eventual
~ s].owdown in disbursements from the appropriations account.
Residual Liabilities on the Rise
It is difficult to tell at this time whether this phenomenon is a circumstantial
one and will therefore exhaust its effects during 1981, or whether it is itself
the effect of a knowledgeaale maneuver actuated in the decisional area intended by
Law 468 to be reserved to Parliament. But in any case, a note of alarm was sound-
ed by the residual liabilities balance, which as a whole increased by 30.3 per-
cent (although the current liabilites~balance increased by 42.1 percent) and which
at the end of the fiscal year totaled 47,143 billion lire.
It is the picture that emerges froin these observations that must provide the basis
for evaluating the trend of unused funds in the appropriated funds account with
respect to 1979--as regards the growth rate--and also with respect to forecasts.
Bu~ this trend is in fact so linked to changes in fanal revenues and to the under-
estimation of these that it is not easy to draw from it conclusive indications
that effective anti-inflationary action was actually carried out in 1980.
The virtual stability of loan repayment expenditures--after last year's upsurge--
is reflected in an increase in the net balance to be financed, which in absolute
terms is not far different from the increase in resort to the market (from 32,265
billion to 49,178 billion in the first case; from 47,573 billion to 62,384 billion
in the second). In terms of percentage, the two balances increased by 39.5 per-
cent and 31.1 percent respectively over 1979 balances.
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The rise in net indebtedness, in absolute figures, was somewhat less (from 30,589
billion to 41,796 billion: 36 percent), after purging the expenditure figures to
~liminate financial operations, which incseased considerably over 1979. The net
unpaid (negative) balance in the current liabilities account rose at a slowes rate
in 1980 than in the two previous years (43 percent as compared with 73.4 percent
in 1979 and 121,9 percent in 1978), going from 18,007 to 25,759 billion.
In terms of cash flow as well, the general manaqement ieturn is dominated by the
level of increase in final revenues (+41.2 percent) and by the increase in oatpay-
ments (39.2 percent) which, from the standpoint of a comparison with 1979, in fact
, benefited from the hyped-up dynamic of disbursements in that year. Resort to the
funds market, in particular, increasec] by 36.1 percent (from 40,214 to 54,748 bil-
lion), with similar percentage inoreases for outstanding balances: 35.2 percent
for net indebtebtedness; 38.6 percent for net balance to be financed; and 42.9
percent for the current balance, which rose from 14,395 billion in 1979 to 20,577
billion in 1980.
The amounts of the above balances are--from the standpoint of the desired level of
coverage of cash requirements--substantially lower than forecast. But a much more
, meaningful variance between �orecast figures (even as regards appropriations) and
actual final figures is found under Title IV receipts, relative to the opening of
loan accounts, whose effective agreements and in-payments totaled a little over
13,000 billion.
The meagerness of these amounts as compared with thuse representing recourse to
the money market (the two figures coincide, as can be seen, in the initial fore-
cast.) is reflected in a characteristic feature of the 1980 return: The increase of
the financial deficit (or variatian), which in terms of appropriations is 49,378
million (+81.7 percent o~rer 1979) and which in terms of cash requirements (41,370
billion and +105 percenty quantifies the increasingly uncontrolled recourse to
treasury debt for "coverage" of the structural shortfall.
This figure, when considered against the total outpayments (142,924 billion),
expresses the level of budgetary dependency on the treasu~y (29 percent), which
inherently compromises the cash budget's ability to function as an effective
instrument of cash flow planning. Compared, on the other hanc~, with that of re-
course to the money market, it indicates that the ratio of cash flow requirements
covered by budgetary resources (medium- and long-term indebtedness) dropped from
40 percent in 1979 to 25 percent in 1980.
The so-called floating debt--particularly that consisting of treasury short-term
notes, total circulation of which reached nearly 74,000 billion lire at the
close of the fiscal year--thus now constitutes, in sub~tanceP by far the most used
form of real and true indebtedness. And the tendency of treasury resources them-
selves--imposed by market propensities--to further fluidify state indebtedness
increased, thanks to the competitiveness of the treasury notes, which tends to
constrain the placement of longer-term bonds (and even of certificates of deposit)
and is moreover beginning to make inroads on postal savings.
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This complEx phenomenology produces two direct effects on the national budget: On
the one hand, as has been said, the function of "covetage" now being per�ormed by
the floating debt requires that it be considered in the budget, i� the latter, as
a funding function, is not to be reduced to a mere formal compliance with the
provisions of 1978 Law 468; and on the other hand, the burden of interest charges,
which is being made heavier by interest on the treasury notes themselves, is hav-
ing an ever greater impact on the national current spending level.
The increase in curr~nt expenditures, as was pointed out in the beginning, was
mainly determined by the increase in current transfers (+44.1 percent over 1979
- a;id 55.3 percent in term~ of impact on Title I); but the impact of public tinan-
cing demands on the national budget involves also capital account transfers, which
rose 36.4 ~ercent to a total weight of 62.7 percent of investments.
The Transfer Dynamic
The substantial total of transfers re�lects, in large measute, the outflows from
the national budget to autonomous enterprises, social security agencies, regional
and local administrative bodies, and the other bodies of the broadened public
sector.
While the bringing together of all other deficits into the national budget by Law
468 has enhanced the tran~parency of information relating to them, it has not in
itself resolved the substantive problems. Absent in 1980 were decisions designed
to rebalance internally and tidy up institutionally the major compartments of the
public sector (social security, public health, regional and local finance, public
enterprises and credit facilities). Thus the increase in transfers under the
national budget was offset and at times rendered useless by the continued exis-
tence of endogenaus phenamena generative ot imbalances.
Regional finance was characterized by an expansion ot the demand on trans�er funds
from the national budget, deriving from the indexation (correlated to the course
of overali tax revenues) of the Investments Fund, which increased by 43.7 percent
in 1980; from expansion of the Public Health Fund, whose current expenditures
totaled 17,485 billion representing an increase of 47.3 percent over 1979; and from
the mechanisms that feed--and with predetermined sectoral allocations--the Fund
for Regional Developmental Plans.
This expansionary flow of revenues into the Regions does not meet with a capacity
for exper,.r]itures by thP Regions, above all, for investments. On the other hand,
the state's transfer disbursement process ia often characterized by complex
coordinative procedures between state and Region that combine to delay its actual
translation into payments. The result is a situation characterized by the simul-
taneous presence of large residuals of assets and growing residuals of liabili-
ties--factors that evidently, far from offsetting each other, attest to a dual
malfunction: in the administrative structure of the state and in that of the
Regions.
In the institutional configuration realized to date, there is an unsatisfied re-
quirement for effective coordination between national planning and that of the
Regions, with the instrumentalities already provided by the reform legislation
remaining largely unused.
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As regards local tinances, the system adopted for 1980, and suhstantially repeated
for 1981, oontinues ensuring increased current transfers by the state in line with
the inflation rate, while the role assigned to the Savings and Loan Fund offers
possibilities for expanding investment expenditures, which already evidenced a
particularly strong dynamic in 1980. Even in this sector, however, equilibrium is
entrusted to appropriations extended on a year-to-year basis, with no substantial
progress being made through Parliament by the structural provisions under discus-
sion in the Chambers with respect to the refarm of system of local bodies anc] to
a 3-year plan for rebalancing local finances.
Transfers, participations and grants to enterprises continue to be characterized '
by an upward trend. Capital account transfers to enterprises (effective commit-
ments totaled 2,723 billion) increased by 64 percent in 1980, and grants to public
enterprises (state participations and ENEL ~National Elec~ric Power Agency~) more
than doubled. These trends reflect a tendency--dif�icult to stem during periods
of crisis and of high inflation--to increase public financial support of the
enterprise system. But it is precisely awarenesa of the medium-to-long-term
characteristics of this tendency that makes strict monitoring of efficient use of
the resources allocated to the enterprise sector indispensable.
The need emerges as one of major importance, in the field of credit facilities
(toward which, for the most part, the resources intended for enterprises gravi-
- tate), to define a sharper line of demarcation between the responsibilities of the
administrative authorities empowered to disburse public moneys (Ministry of Treas-
ury, Ministry of Industry, and even the Fund for Southern Italy) and the functions
of the credit institutions; and of equal importance, in the field of public enter-
prises, is the need to reconcile overall planning of public enterprise sector
operations with entrepreneurial autonomy and operational and management economies.
Disorganization of Contracting
The system of rules and regulations governing contracting continues to be charac-
terized by an incoherent set ot norms at the legislative and regulatory levels,
that have piled up with time in a process of stratification lacking any unitary
rationale.
The result is a manner of proceeding that does not clearly identify a point of
- balance between the demands the government must satisfy as regards guarantees and
impartiality and those placed upon it as regatds efficient management of expendi-
tuzes, and that neglects to consider the contractual instrumentality in planning
the implementation of industrial policy and promotion of research.
The uncertainties of the r.egulatory ~ystem generate interpretative difficulties
on the part of the government and possible doubts as to the leqislative system
on which it is required to base any case in point. A1.1 of this contributes to
slowness o� administrative action and may generate a psychological climate of dis-
trust on the part of the private contractor, which in turn does not co:~tribute to
proper administration of the contract. The lawmaker has, in many inst~nces, shown
awareness of the danger of such slowness and has laid down norms substantially
designed to speed up procedures, but so laced with sectoral provisions and pro-
visions for specific programs that they have ended up accelerating the breakdown
of the system.
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Despite the large number of laws on the subject, the existing legislation does not
provide adequate regulation with respect to certain contractual typnlogies (for
example, as regards high-technology contracts) which are assuming substantial
relevance as a result of legal problems to which they give rise as well as ftttm
a �inancial standpoint.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
9399
CSO: 3104/320
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POLITICAL INTERNATIONI~L AFFAIRS
EUROPEAN PACIFISM INCREASING; MARCH ON PARIS, NOT MOSCOW
Paris L`EXPRESS in French 31 Jul - 6 Aug 8_l pp 46-48
_ [Article by Branko Lazitch: "Pandemic Pacifism"]
[Text] Ene~,ny within for Lenin, external ally for Brezhnev,
pacifism is gaining ground throughout Western Europe. Except
in Francea
"Down with NATO ~auclear plans!"; "No nuclear weapons in West Germany!" In the nain
street of Muens~er (FRG) pennants are streaming in the wind. It is 12 July, the 21st
_ year of the Pea.ce March for a Denuclearized Europe, organized by the Westem paci-
f ist ic movements. It left Copenhagen on 12 June, and will arrive in Paris on 6
August, aiter pa~~ing through the F~iG, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
That evening, in the course of a huge rally in MuenstQr`s town square, orators take
turns at the podium. Their favorite targets: the United States, NATO, Euromissiles.
The Soviet Union gets off pretty easy. Its willingness to negotiate is emphasize~i...
A specter haunts the countries of the Atlantic alliance, the specter of pacifism.
All of them have been touched by it in turn: Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, Bel-
gium, Portugal, and above all the Federal Republic of Germany. The lone exception:
France. "The French have four communist ministers in their governmenti. M~ost of
the other Atlantic allies have their pacif ists and neutralists in the opposition,
in the maj ority, even in the government. Not immediately~ but over the medium
term, we will be able to tell which of these effects wi11 turn our_ to be most
destructive for the cohesion of the West." These words were spoken by an advisor
to the Reagan Administration, at the conclusion of a brief trip to Europe. Every-
thing began on 12 December 1979 with NATO's twofold decision--which did not involve
France--to embark on nuclear rearmament and to negotiate with the USSR. With re-
spect to nuclear weapons, the implementation of the program was not to begin until
the fall of 1983, with the installation of Pershing-2 rockets and cruise missiles.
No date was fixed for negotiations with Moscow.
The Soviet reaction to this "nuclear escalation" was immediate. The USSR guarantees
its strategic suprema.cy with the installation of SS-20 missiles pointed at Europe.
It intends to safeguard that supremacy. It also gives out the orders fcr a massive
mobilization in the West against the Atlant;c alliance plans. A"peace nffensive"
is launched, an operation which the Soviets, the Western communist garties, and
satellite international organizations have lazown how to do for a very long time.
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In France, the PCF is in the vanguard of the anti-nuclear armament movement. On
20 December 1979 it organized ttie firet demonatration. As the anti-PS campaign
was then at its apogee, it became yet one more means of stigmatizing the "socialist
betrayal." Marchais was leading the procession, along with Fiterman and Aragon.
H~ did not hide his satisfaction when the crowd shouted: "Mitterrand, accomplice
to NATO!"
At the same tjme, other European cu.umunist parties tried to take action on behalf
of the struggle for peace. But an unexpected event destroyed the operation: on
27 December, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and ruined the credibility of the
"peace off ensive" in Europe.
However, relief was slowly on its way, with the addition of various leftist move-
ments: Christians, social-democrats, liberals, nuclear energy opponents, pacitists,
anti-militarists, and ecologists. Their common denominator: opposition to the in-
stallation of the Pershing-2's in Europe, support for bilateral Soviet-U.S. nego-
tiations on nuclear arms limitation. Soviet leaders immediately seized the ~m-
portance of this phenomenon: this pacifist movement was working "obj ectively" to
their advantage. It was a break in their favor. It served to reinforce an asymmetry
which was increasingly visible on both sides of Europe: in the East, military and
ideological rearmament and, i:z the West, moral and military disarmament. These
pacif ists-neutralists were not dismissing both the superpowers as non-suiting.
Reagan was the ideal scapegoat. Was it not he who refused to commit himself when
the Soviets repeated throughout the year that they wanted to negotiate?
Neutralist from the desire to detatch Europe from America and pacif ist in its op-
position to any nuclear arms and even to arms per se, the movement is paradoxically
more prosperous today where the communist party is weakest and social-democracy
strongest: Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, West Germany.
In Great Britain, the Labor Party declared itself in 1980 in favor of unilateral
nuclear disarmament. This position goes further than simple rejection of the
Pershing-2. It throws into question the very presence of the country in the Atlantic
alliance. As for negotiations with the USSR, Labor leader Michael Foot considers
them urgent, even without reference to the other issue, the installation of the
PEZ~shing-2's. In Norway, whe~e the socialists are in power--in a minority govern-
ment--and where legislative elections will be held on 4 September, the present govern-
ment team is trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. On the one hand,
it does not officially endorse the Soviet position on denuclearization of Northern
Europe, a region where in fact NATO has never deployed nuclear arms. On the other
hand, the Socialist Party has made denuclearization a part of its long-term program
for 1982-1985. And the vice president of the S~cialist Party, Forde, went to Mos-
cow in early June to discuss it.
In the Netherlands, since the legislative elections on 26 May, the pacifist parties
make up the majority in Parliament. According to a survey, 68 percent of the people
are against the stationing of nuclear arms on their territory. "Nothing but tulips,"
was the PRAVDA headline congratulating the country on its evolution into the van-
guard of pacif ism in the Atlantic alliance.
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But it is in Germany that the movement ie taking on the greatest proportions, both
in public at large and within the political parties. And first in line is the SPD,
- which has been in power for 12 years now. The pacif ist tradition goes back a long
way in that party, as does hostility to atomic weapons. The antinuclearists of
Coday love to recall the 1958 Bundestag debate and the words of the SPD's militgry
expert at the time: "The decision to equip both parts of our country with atomic
weapons will go down in history as a disaster equal to the vote to give Hitler full
powers in 1933." That deputy was Helmut Schmidt, who has been chancellor since
1974 and the principal defender of the installation of the Pershing-2's in Germany.
Today, the pacif ist and antinuclear tide is inundating all segments of the SPD.
First of all the youth, the famous Jusos, who have o�ten been at odds with the
leadership of the SPD: their 320,000 members at their congress in late June voted
unanimously against the installation of the Pershing and cruise missiles. According
to their president, Willi Piecyk, "it is now a question of developing a security
policy which will not be dictated by the strategic interests of the United States."
In several Laender, the SPD organizations have embarked on a similar course. Bade
Wurtemberg is calling for reconsideration of the twofold Atlantic alliance decision
of 1979 at the next SPD congress (spring 1982). The SPD congress of S4uthern Hesse,
by a clear majority of delegates, has proposed re-examining the 1979 decisions and
criticized Ronald Reagan for the absence of dialogue with the USSR.
The unionists, closely tied to the SPD, are marching in lock-step. Some, such as
Eugen Loderer, president of the federation of inetallurgists (2 million members),
are expressing reservations about the 1979 decision. Others openly signed a neu-
tralist and anti-American manifesto, the "Krefeld Appeal." Its promoters boast
of having already collected a million signatures, an impressive but probably ex-
aggerated f igure.
The youth syndicate, with 1,300,000 members the most powerful youth movement in
Germany, is calling for immediate negotiations to create a denuclearized zone in
Europe.
The two churches, Protestant and Catholic, are involved in the f ight. The 19th
congress of the Protestant church, held in Hamburg in June, turned into a forceful
expression of pacifist and neutralist sentiment. The presence of Chancellor Schmidt
at a controversial debate did not discourage his opponent;: "Your policy scares
me!" was the remark hurled at him by a 17-year-old high school student.
"A Position Immoral in the Extreme"
Msr Hans Otto Weber, the Protestant bishop of Hamburg, organized a monster demon-
stration which drew more than 100,000 participants on 20 June. With quotations from
the 34th Psalm, the Sermon on the Mount, and Bibl.e passages relating to peace, the
bishop provided the ~ustification for a movement which is much more political than
Christian. The Catholics? Last November, the German section of the organization
Pax Christi published a document titled "Disarmament and Security." In the opinion
of Bishop Georg Moser, the refusal of the European governments to openly discuss
security betrays "a position immoral in the extreme."
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The ecologists also subscribe to this pacifist activity. They have formed an
"ecology and peace coordination committee." The tendency even showed up in the
Liberal Party at its congress in May: out of 387 delegates, 103 voted against the
Atlanticist positions of the minister of foreign affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher.
This cleavage between pacif ists and Atlanticists is symbolized by the position of
the two principal leaders of the SPD. The pacifist is former chancellor Willy
Brandt; the Atlanticist is Helmut Schmidt. The f irst has long since been calling
for detente instead of nuclear rearmament. The second urges an effort on both
counts. Schmidt is better received in Washington than Moscow. For Brandt, it is
precisely the reverse. In a one-month period, the USSR ostentatiously illustrated
its critical attitude toward Schmidt_ and its preference for Brandt. The present
chancellor was accused by PRAVDA of aligning himself with the United States, an un-
precedented attack on a sitting SPD chancellor. By contrast, Brandt's arrival in
Moscow on 29 June was greeted with unprecedented ceremony.
With good reason. In fact, the Soviet leaders see in Brandt one of those rare
- European politicians capable of exerting a twofold influence: within the FRG, as
president of the SPD, and outside it as president of the Socialist International.
In his f irst role, Brandt can threaten Schmidt, and in the second he can slow down,
indeed perhaps block, implementation of the Brussels decisions.
- It is obviously impossible to lmow what conversation transpired in the Kremlin. But
one can measure the degree of Soviet satisfaction from certain outward signs. When
Brandt made his speech before the Kremlin leadership, PRAVDA published the entire
text. A year earlier, Schmidt's speech before the same areopagus had been censored.
~ The difference in treatment is easily explained. Schmidt had challenged Soviet
policy in Afghanistan and on nuclear matters: censored. Brandt did not risk that.
On 2 July, the day of his departure, Brezhnev accompanied Brandt to the airport,
which is not obligatory, even for hea.ds of state. During the ride out to the air-
port, he conf ided to him that the Politburo discussed his proposals for detente a..nd
peace. And, as if to show that he had only remained in Moscow to meet Brandt,
Brezhnev left for vacation the following day.
It is in the context of Soviet military superiority that the Western pacifists have
chosen to organize their march through Europe. It is true that they do not seem
tormented by that supremacy. Nor by another fact of capital importance: the Soviet
system leaves no room for pacif ism. It was Lenin himself who vetoed it: "We must
struggle against pacifism; it is a platform directed against our revolutionary
party." Brezhnev himself has just given the proof that this injunct ion remains in
effect. In con~unction with the Peace March from Copenhagen to Paris, four conserva-
tive Danish deputies had throught to send a modest "peace car" from the Danish
capital to Moscow. In all some 30 individuals who were supposed to arrive 9 August
at Red Square and unfurl a banner bearing a single word against nuclear arms in
both East and West: "Nyet!" the official Soviet response to this request was also
"nyet!" The bus trip to Red Square will not take place. But the march on Paris
continues. On the very first day Brezhnev sent the marchers a friendly message. He
was doing what Lenin counselled his foreign affairs minister, Tchitcherin, to do in
1922: make use of pacifism to contribute to the defeat of the enemy, the bourgeoisie.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
9516
CSO: 3100/888
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POLITICAI, FRANCE
COMMUNIST MINISTERS: DUTIES VERSUS PCF PRINCIPLES
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10-16 Jul 81 pp 50-51
[Article by Michel Jacques with Francoise Chirot and Francine Rivaud]
[Text] The four communist ministers of the second Mauroy government
are tnw discovering the realities of power. In opposition, their
party had ready-made solutions for every pro~lem. Today, in the
real word, they have to take the facts into account, and their
actions may end up contradicting positions of principle taken by
the PCF. These thoughts are suggested by an examination of the
issues with which the new ministers will have to deal.
Transport
Charles Fiterman, minister of state for transport, with a department which stands
fourth in terms of budgetary allocations with Fr 39 billion at its disposal, will
have no easy task. Like his predecessor, Joel Le Theule, he might well think before
long that he has been given "a miflistry that is impossible to govern. It~is diffi-
cult reconciling the conflict~.ng interests of various transport means, talking with
the unions, supervising big public enterprises (260,000 wage-earners at SNCF [French
National Railroads], 25,000 at Air France), while at the same time protecting the
interests of passengers. The first uproar: the increase in tariffs for public
transport, which the Socialists want to keep to a"modest level." Unlike other years,
the metro fare did not increase on 1 July this time. Who would pay the deficit (Fr
3.4 billion) if the increase were delayed until 1 January 1982? Can one ask the
industries, who are paying for 26 percent of RATP's [Independent Parisian Transport
System] operating expenses, for an extension at a time when many of them are them-
selves having problems? There is of course the state, which is already underwriting
70 percent of the deficit, and the general councils of the Ile-de-France, who previous-
ly have refused to pay, when they were predominantly communist. But is it fair for
the taxpayers to be subjected to still further strain so the users can continue to
pay only one-third the real cost of a ticket? He has also inherited a grim situation
with respect to the iailroads. SNCF has requested tariff hikes for rush-hour runs of
the high-speed Paris-Lyon train. The new minister is going to have to rPspond.
Awkward: can one take the risk of subsidies becoming the general rule, ~ahile the
user will have no other alternative to the high-speed train between Paris and Lyon?
Over the network as a whole, SNCF wanted a tariff hilte of 13.2 percent for 1981. The
Barre government gave it 7 percent in March, If Fiterman does not decide to increase
the rates, the state will have to pay Fr 870 million.
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Aviation, finally, will also require decisions. Is the government going to approve
Air France's request to buy Boeing 737's? Another sensitive issue: the Airbus A 320
with 15~ aeats. In this European project, the West Germans are hesitant and the
- British are only prepared to pay for their own share. Will France therefore under-
write a larger share of its cost?
Fiterman's only consolation: the 3ockworkers, the fisherman, and the sailors are no
longer his concern. They are now the province of his socialist colleague, Louis Le
Pensec, the minister of maritime affairs.
Civil Servtce
Anicet Le Pors, the communist minister in charge of the civil service and administra-
tive reform, is now France's largest employer. Sal~.ry levels, careers, and the work-
ing conditions of two million employees will ride on his decisions.
Raymond Barre provoked grumbling among the young ladies at the PTT [Posts, Telegraph
and Telecommunications], customs inspectors, and other administration employees by
treating them as "well-off." Will it be sufficient for the Left to summon them to
national solidarity and reestablish their duties to order to make them accept their
- present salaries, titles, and "privileges"?
This is the poisoned gift that has b een given to Anicet Le Pors. Among the various
thorny issues is that of salaries. After the 3.4 percent increase of 1 July, the
unions still have two demands. Tired of racing after inflation in the cost of living,
they are demanding a system that will anticipate inflation. For the lower pay grades,
- they are demanding a concrete revalorization policy. The ceiling for these remuner-
ations is generally 344 on the index, or Fr 4,694 per month, not to mention 'r?ousing
allowance.
These allowances, scales, indices, grades and premiums of all sorts make the wage
system of the civil service a chaotic mess. Negotiations should be started on the
revamping of that system, starting from the report produced by Claude Lasry, councillor
of state.
If this is actually carried out, will the public employees, that elite class of j~ob-
holders, agree to see their benefits eroded by unemployment deductions? Naturally,
the unions would agree, but only if everyone pays. "Like for the drought tax," one
unionist recalls.
Anicet Le Pors will also have to create the jobs that have been promised and get the
500,000 auxiliaries on the rolls. But his biggest challenge may well be to make the
administration less bureaucratic while increasing its size. "A labor wortt~y of
Penelope," predicted his predecessor, Catherine Lalumiere.
- Health
Jack Ralite, the coc~unist minister of health, should logically be expected to have
a policy diametrically opposed to that of Giscardian Jacques Barrot. In order to
' re-absorb the social security deficit, the latter made efforts to "control" illness-
related expenses. At once he became--in the eyes of Georges Marchais' party--the
symbol of "social reaction." But will his successor's actions be as different as
one might suppose from PCF slogans?
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The question is inevitable, for the financial equilibrium of the health-insurance
system remains fragile. Now that they are in the government, the communists know
that any la~ity regarding expenditures would lead to deficit, unless welfare assess-
ments were to be augmented.even further. And should they be tempted to forget, there
is someone there to remind them: Nicole Questiaux, the socialist minister of national
solidarity responsible for social security, who holds the purse strings.
Jack Ralite's first responsibility will be administration of the hospital sector,
which alone is responsible for more than half the outlays required by the health-
insurance system. Barrot was accused, in L'HUMANITE, of "breaking" the hospitals,
for having tried to put a lid on the mushrooming budgets, and for having decided to
eliminate beds. However, facing the facts, will the new minister unhestistingly
decide to reverse the course of things, at the risk of coming back to the same pro-
blems that confronted his predeceGSOr?
Another unknown: relations with the doctors. In order to reduce prescriptions, which
are one source of expenditures, Barrot had tried to curb the demographic explosion in
the medical corps (100,000 practitioners in 1980, 150,000 in 1985) by getting a law
passed which limited the number of inedical students. He had also concluded a new
protocol between Social Security and the doctors, which instituted a"second sector,"
in which patients received lesser reimbursement. Socialists and communis'ts are
opposed to those reforms. But as economies will certainly have to be made, medical
fees might have to be lowered. A test: the integrated health centers. This socialist
project disturbs liberal doctors. What position will Jack Ralite take on this point,
on which the party does not have a doctrinal position? Curiously, the communists
have always been less aggressive on the question of free medical care than have the
socialists.
They may, however, show a more hardline position on medications policy. There again,
Barrot had tr�ied to keep the lid on costs, but by means of flexible control which
allowed laboratories to continue to manage themselves. For the socialists and the
communists, this is the very activity of the pharmaceutical industry which needs to
be controlled: they are accused of carrying out a policy of super-profits by means
of a proliferation of patent medicines, many of which are doing "double duty."
. Remedies, therefore, could go all the way from strengthened price controls to a re-
fusal to reimburse for certain medications. In any case, the predicted nationaliza-
tion of the three big pharmaceutical groups should profoundly alter the situation in
this sector.
Vocational Training
Marcel Rigout, the minister of vocational training, will not be starting from scratch.
For about 10 years, France has been endowed with an impressive arsenal in this domain:
continuing education since 1970, job agreements which by various training formulas
aimed at the establishment of a bridge connecting youth and industry, and which were
replaced in 1980 by a"5-year employment plan." There were, however, serious gaps:
100,000 young people are still leaving school each year with no vocational training.
The Marchais program calls for a mxllion youths, within the next 2 years, to be given
training or real apprenticeship. The PCF is still asking for additional resources to
be given immedi.ately to technical education and the possibility for skilled workers
to qualify. This in turn requires more money and once again poses the crucial
question of financing.
~ 1L~
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This will predictably cause tensions with industry, if it is implemented, because
industry is already making a large financial contribution to training. Especially
since the unions, accusing certain employers of "diverting" vocational training
funds for their immediate advantage, are calling for joint production committees to
exercise the right to audit.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
9516
CSO: 3100/891
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POLITICAL SPAIN
POLL ON BACKGROUND, ATTITUDES OF PCE MEMBERS ANALYZED
Madrid CANIBIO 16 ir. Spanish 27 Jul 81 pp 22-25
[Article by Jose Manuel Arija]
[Text) The internal struggle between Euro-renovators and pro-Soviets, with
the Carrillo people in the middle wanting to embrace both groups, could affect
communist voters on the eve of their lOth Congress. PCE [Spanish Communist
Party] voters have an acceptable living standard, feel that a person can be a
good Catholic and a gaod Communist both, have ab~ndoned the idea of revolution
and are mostly skilled workers and white-collar employees.
Like their party, communist voters are caught between moderation and the old
inclinations. Older voters are the hardest-liners: they prefer friendship with
Russia and call themselves Communists. In contrast, almost one-fourth of voters
under age 50 feel more socialist than communist. This is a worrisome attitude
for the party with the general elections coming up, especially if we think about
what happened in the French voting.
All of these facts must be taken into account by the lOth PCE Congress, which "
is going to reelect Santiago Carrillo secretary general for the fifth time
this week. He is the country's only political leader who played a prominent
role in the Civil War and who has been at the head of a party for m~re than 20
years.
Along with Carrillo, two persons will become "dauphins" in their new posts as
deputy secretaries. The names that have been mentioned the most so far for the
posts are Nicolas Sartorius and Jaime Ballesteros. The former will guarantee
the CCOQ [Workers Commissions] that the party remains labor-oriented, and
the latter will strengthen the party machine. Older pro-Soviets, Carrillo
loyalists and the Eurocomnunist renovators will serve in the remaining leadership
organs.
The key struggle will be for the proportions that each of these factions is able
to secure.
At the Ninth Congress Santiago Carrillo relied on the cadres of CC00 at the
expense of those whom he called "the silver tongues." The silver tongues,
intellectuals and professionals, fled in droves from the party. The CC00
people will now bolster their positions. They are young leaders from the
interior, as opposed to the old politicians from the outside. But there can be
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no worker party without intellectuals to support it. If Carrillo turned to
Che labor movement at the previous congress, he will now have to avail himself
of the best trained Eurocommunistcadres thathe atill has left.
Carrillo's ability to make timely shifts and moves is beyond question, but
within the party he is criticized for his lack of strategy and his politics.
"The party is adrift," say the Euroco~nunists, who see their approach stymied
"by serious mistakes in running the party, by an alarming propensity for
ambiguity and reaction and by an enormous lack of sensitivity to important
aspects of the ideological and political struggle in Spain today." The mood
of this congress, the lOth for Spanish Comrtminists in 60 years, will be quite
different from the ninth.
In April 1978, the enthusiasm over a still recent legalization; the dominance
of the CC00 in the labor union sphere; the battalion of intellectuals, artists
and famous figures at its disposal; the hope that the 1979 ger.eral elections
would give the PCE a much higher percentage of the votes because fears at the
1977 voting, which Communist leadera felt justified the party's meager success,
had by then been overcome; the understanding with the UCD [Democratic Center
Union], and above all, the role in government that they thought was within reach...
These dreams dazzled the Ninth Congress, the first legal one since 1932.
The lOth Congress of the Communist Party will open its doors in a completely
different atmosphere. Almost all of the hopes on which the optimism of the
previous 1978 gathering was based have faded like a beautiful summer dream.
In just 3 years, the Communist union's policy is in disarray and it stands equal
to the Socialist union in votes; the intellectuals have fled in droves; the
- 1979 elections have confirmed a disappointing ceiling of 10 percent of the
voters; the honeymoon with the UCD shifted surprisingly from bed to divorce;
and, alas, the sought-after coalition government has been pitilessly cast into
the archives of history.
To top it all off, the newspaper MUNDO OHRERO, forgotten by its readers, has
also gone into the archives. Now the Communists are divided amid internal
crises, and even the unchallengeable Santiago Carrillo is being run down
left and right.
What has happened in the Communist Party?
Baffled, their longstanding leaders and members are~unable to explain. The older
militants who battled Franco are crushed by the treatment that implacable
reality has accorded them. They feel that they do not deserve it. They offer
confused explanations of "disillusionment," "fear" or "anticommunism," but all
indications are that their own mistakes are most to blame.
Ideologically, there have been chasm-like gaps between pro-Soviets and Euro-
communists; in terms of organization, there have been shortcomings in regional
administr.ation, as well as nationalist tensions; and politically, the party has
seen the failure of a program that th2 other parties did not accept and that some
of its members criticized. With regard to the loss of inembership, the excuse
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can be cited that the same thing has happened to other parties. The departure
of dozens of high-level cadres and prominent leaders has taken place only in
the PCE, however.
"There are disagreements and differences of opinion; that is obvious," concedes
Santiago Carrillo in his party's newspaper. The following is his suffinary of
the strife among the three factions (pro-Soviet, Euro-Carrillistas an~ Euro-
renovators) into which his organization is divided: "There are sectarian and
dogmatic positions; there is a Eurocommunist approach, and then I don't know
whether within or outside the Eurocor.ununist approach there is what wz call a
radical renovating approach."
The seriousness of the problem has convinced Carrillo that once the lOth Congress
is over, the PCE must "undertake an Operation Return, that is to say, building
the party from the bottom up." With this idea the Communist Party could begin
its own "democratic break," a break with the methods and practices of the
underground and wi.th the vices that it shouldered over these years and that
prevented it from assimilating the new situation and fully understanding its
constituency. '
With two million voters, the PCE is a large party, the third largeat in Spain,
as well as the third largest among Western European Communist parties, surpassed
only by Italy and France. Unlike Italy, however, it is not the dominant leftist
party, and compared to France, it is much weaker in rela tion to the Socialists.
With a membership tha*_ consists overwhelmingly of inen (89 percent), industrial
workers (61 percent) and older people (28 percent over age 50), the PCE is
having a most difficult time getting used to the idea that it is not the party of
the working class but rather a party of workers in a developed society in which
only one-fourth of wage earners work in industry.
If all too many of its members come from labor, the same concentration c~n be
seen in its constituency. Some 63 percent of cotmminist votes are cast in.
Catalonia, Andalusia and Madrid. What is more, one of three PCE votes is from
the metropolitan areds of Madrid and Barcelona.
"You can see the strength of the PCE," chant the Com~nunists. B~it not only does
its strength lie in just a few regions, but victory for the party hinges on two
metropolitan areas as well. This is the PCE's big weakness. This is why the
conflicts in the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of ~atalonia], the Catalan
Communists (who garnered 20 percent of the legislative votes and 31 percent of
the municipal votes in the cities ringing Barcelona), are of great significance
to Carrillo. If a split were to occur in Catalonia, it would destroy the
Co~nist team at the polls.
According to polls published in the Sociological Report of the FOESSA Foundation,
60 percent of the PCE's voters (working population) are manual laborers, 30
percent are white-collar workers and 4 nercent are officials. Some 92 percent
belong to the lower-middle and working class and 80 percent are not practicing
- Catholics, although only 9 percent consider themselves atheists.
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";~d~~`a~vi~iciA4 -
;..;.s:
c w DIPUTADO~i
47f
~ rA gp ~ 2Z3 POR�PROVINCI ~
OR ~y ~ '
TQ Z~ ~'S1 4'01 .
SO .
Z~u ~ ZR .
, SA 4'16 TE ;
~'04 AV 3'25 "1�+'~'..
781 `.'y �::f -
t,
, ~ti:
`~l. ,'.~~i2.
e
f.;
~ .
/ ej
~ ~
rn
r ~
~ ~rw . ;
, . :'s
~..i ?ya~
'.:S!~
M "~;tC~
~4'u ~'�`;.ij~'`::-
. + tir~' .
_ 6 % ''~k:ra*
~ ~ '~J~ .
~
540% ~f:r'.
CONCEJALES
ToUI todos municipios 3.731 15,5%) 10,16% :
Cspiteles de Provincia:. . . . 142 (10,1%) ~
ALCALDES
Todos municipios . . .~4~. . 238 (3,0%) ~
C6pitslesprovincias. . . . . 1 (1.9%)
Municiptos - 20.000 hab. . . 27 (13.4%) ~.1'
.
Key:
1. Deputies per province
3. Municipal strength of the PCE
' 3. Councilmen
Total ~in all municipalities
Province capitals
4. Mayors
All municipalities
Province capitals
Municipalities with 20,000 inhabitants
As far as their living standard is concerned, those who vote Communist have a
very acceptable level of conaumer durables ownership: refrigerators, television
sets, homes, cars, etc. According to the above report, the Catalan voters have
the highest living standard and are, in addition, more ideologically moderate
than the rest of the country's Communist supporters.
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It is odd and contradictory that in the area with the greatest pro-Soviet
influence among members of the Communist Party, its constituency is the most
- moderate. On a 1 to 10 scale, 17 percent of PSUC voters place themaelves on
the first two rungs of the left, compared to 43 percent among PCE voters
(excluding Catalonia).
The moderation of PSUC voters can also be seen in terms of preferred ideo-
logy. Some 75 percent of PCE voters outside Catalonia prefer communist ideology,
while 17 percent prefer socialist ideology. Astonishingly, 43 percent choose
communist ideology in Catalonia, and 39 percent socialist ideology.
In other words, if we go by these data, a pro-Soviet Catalan co~nunism like the
one that emerged from its last congress could be looking at empty ballot boxes
at the upcoming electoral contest. It goes without saying that some hard-line
facti~ns of the PSUC are dogmatically blind to this sociological reality.
It would not even be going too far to suggest that if the Catalans replaced
the "S" in their acronym PSUC with a"C" for "Communist, they would lose votes.
The FOESSA study conanents: "The PCE is clearly to the left of its Catalan branch
and is more homogeneous ideologically. Practically no Communist voter today
considers himself an ideological revolutionary, an approach he relegates to
the parties to the left of the PCE."
If we consider, on the one hand, the numerical importance of the PSUC and, on
the other, its pro-Soviet and anti-EurocoIIrtnunist zeal, it is no mystery that
the shrewd Carrillo has realized the danger that this poses to his party and has
gone all out to bring the Catalans back to the Eurocommunist fold. The next
general elections will tell whether he made his move in time or whether the
bywords "Soviet" and "Afghan" will frighten the voters.
The lOth Congress is going to gather together a PCE that has lost much of its
social impact and that is not too sure of its current identity, as it tries not
to become a second Socialist Party or the "left wing of the PSOE" [Spanish
Socialist Workers Party], as some of the intellectuals and professionals who
have left its ranks are saying.
In recent years, people correctly said, the Co~nists had much more social
and political influence than their votes provided them. Today, the opposite
is true, and the congress will unquestionably discuss how to reverse the nose-
dive in political influence by a party that for the first time in its history
is a sincere defender of the democratic system.
Age and Attitude as to Whether a Person Can Be Both a Good Catholic and a Good
Communist, Among PCE-PSUC Voters in 1979
PCE-PSUC Voters
under 29 30-49 50+
A Catholic can be a good Communist:
Yes 83 79 71
No 14 18 29
Don't know/no response 3 3
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Age and Religiosity of Thoae Who Voted for the PCE-PSUC in 1979
PCE-PSUC Votera
under 29 i 30 9 50+
Consider themselves:
Very good Catholics 3 2 3
Practicing 5 10 9
Not practicing too often 20 21 25
Nonpracticing 34 32 41
Indifferent 29 20 12
Atheists 8 12 9
Another religion
No comment 3 1
Occupation of PCE Voters (Working Population) at 1979 Legislative Elections
Occupation PCE-PSUC
Farm workers 10
Unskilled workers 18
Skilled workers 32
Low-level white-collar workers, clerka, foremen 15
Intermediate-level white-collar workers and technicians 15
Intermediate-level officials 2
High-level officials 2
Businessmen and executives 1
No information 3
Age and Ideology Anong PCE-PSUC Voters in 1979
under 29 30-49 50+
Ideology:
Revalutionary 4 3
Cotranuni s t 64 68 75
Socialist 23 22 16
Social Democratic 1 2
Christian Democratic 1 1
Other 2 4
None 4 3
Don't know/no comment 1 1 2
- Standard of Living of PCE-PSUC Votera in 1979
Potential Voters of
Own: PCE-PSUC PCE PSUC
Refrigerator 92 91 97
TV 89 90 86
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,
Bath or shower 87 85 95
Home 65 69 46
~dashing machine 63 62 68
Car 49 47 57
Camera 39 38 42
Record player 35 32 49
Tape recorder 30 31 24
~ Dishwasher 6 7 4
Age and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Those Who Voted for the PCE-PSUC in. 1979
under 29 30-49 50+
America 3 6 6
Russia 29 28 37
Both 38 48 36
Neither 17 7 9
No comment 12 11 12
Join Common Market 84 82 77
Should not join 10 7 16
Undecided, no comment 7 10 7
Join NATO 34 24 27
Should not join 51 54 42
Ambivalent 1 5 24
No comment 15 18 24
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8743
CSO: 3110/128
22
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MILITARY FRANCE
NEW SELF-AIMING ~AD 4A' AIR-~O-AIR MISSILE DESCRIBED
<
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Jul 81 p 59
[Article by Pierre Langereux]
[Text] At the Salon du Bourget, Electronique Marcel Dassault (E1~ID) introduced its
new "AD 4A" active electromagnetic homing head for new generation air-to-air
missiles designed to intercept high, low, or very-low altitude air targets. The
AD 4A makes it possible to aim the missile at its target in proportional navigation
during the last phases of firing, giving the weapons system greater flexibility and
the ability to simultaneously engage several targets with several missiles. This
solid-state transmitter homing head is characterized by miniaturized electronics
and very-high frequency circuits, and by digital data treatment.
A manufacturer of electramagnetic missile homing heads since 1958, E1rID has received
orders for over 4300 homing heads, of which over 3000 have already been delivered
for various missiles in service in 26 countries. Among the homing heads manufac-
tured by EIrID are the AD 37 for MATRA's and British Aerospace's Martel air-to-
sarface missile; the AD 26 for the MATRA 530 air-to-air missile; and the Super AD 26
' for the MATRA Super 530 air-to-air missile, as well as the ADAC homing heads in
production since 1972 for various versions of Aerospatiale's Exocet anti-naval
missiles (MM 38, AM 39, SM 39, MM 40). ErID has already delivered or received
= orders for nearly 2000 Exocet missiles intended for French and foreign navies.
ADAC is an active electromagnetic homing head equipping the various versions of the
= Exocet missile (sea-to-sea, air-to-surface, submarine-surface). ADAC provides the
missile's final homing guidance during flights at a few meters above the sea.
- During the first part of the flight, the missile's inertial devices assure
directional guidance before the homing head is set on course. During the last part
of the flight the homing head searches in distance and bearing to obtain locked-on
automatic pursuit of the target. It then pravides the information necessary for
the missile's proportional navigation until impact or until operation of the
proximity fuse, which is of a special type (integrated into the homing head), and
which controls the remote triggering of the firing of the military payload. Over
L30 firings were performed under operational conditions with a greater than 95 per-
cent gui.dance success rate.
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The Super AD26 is a semi-active electromagnetic homing head equipping the various
versions of the MATRA Super 530 air-to-air misGile. The Super AD26 directs the
missile to its target according to the ruies of proportional navigation. During
firing, the haming head formulates the orders necessary to the guidance of the
missile to the target. Anti-scramble systems make the homing head practically
- insensitive to scramblers existing now or in the foreseeable future. A successor
to the AD26 which equips the MATRA 530 missile, the Super AD26 is a new generation
of semi-active homing head offering excellent performances, particularly on the
antenna range and sco~:e, which makes it possible to improve firing possibilities
for all sectors and in rough terrain.
ENID has several versions of the Super AD26 (pulse and Doppler versions) for the
Super 530 missiles intended for the various weapons systems of the Mirage F1,
Mirage 2000 and so on.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
11,023
CSO: 3100/881 END
2L~
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