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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010007-8 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY JPRS L/1Q209 23 December 1981 West Euro e Re ort p p CFOUO 6~6/81) FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE H'OR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504010047-8 NOTE - JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from Englisti-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and - other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the firs~ line of each item, or following the Iast line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are - enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the - original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other ~nattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. - COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF *~fATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 ~ JPRS I,/1OZ09 23 December 1981 _ '~EST EUROPE REPORT (FOItO 66/B1) - C0~lTENTS ~HEATER RCES I~'RANCE Briefs _ More Accurate '.~Iiss.ile 1 UNIT~I'~ KINGDOM P'ormer Defense Chief Carver on Nuclear Deterrence (Eie1d Ma.rshal Lord Carver; THE GUARDSA,T~I, 14 Dec 81) ? a ENERGY E~ONOMICS ITALY Delays in CoMpletion of I~ydroelectric Plant e.t Porto Tolle (Marco Moussanet; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 20 Nov 81) 7 ECONONIIC TEUEf~L REPUI~LIC OF GF,RMANY - 3riefs _ Food ~xports 1;o USSR 10 F'RANCF Bx�iefs Changes Concerning Nationalizations il - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL FEDERAT, ~REPUF3LIC OF GERMANY Allensbach Polls Show Popularity of Parties, Poli~icians (ALLENSBACHER BERIQiTE, 1981; DIE WELT, 6 Nov 81) 12 SPD Popularity Declines Genscher D4ost Populax Leader FRANCE Rocard Reviews Plans for Nationalized, Private Sectora (Mir_hel Rocard Interview; FTNANCTAL TIMES, k Dec 8].) ............t 14 - ITALY Labor Union Bureaucracy Analyzed (L,orenzo Scheggi; IL MONDO 13 Nov 81) 17 _ SPAIN Columnist Analyzes Causes of Disaxrey in UCD (Jose OLieto; CANIDIO 16, 9 Nov 81) ....o 31 SWEDEN Sociologist Korpi Interviewed o~ SPD, Le,bor (Wa.lter Korpi Interview; MONDOPERAIO, Nov 81) 36 GENERAL ITALY CNR's Development Plans for the Antaxetic (Gianni Migliorino; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 10 Oct 81) 42 - b - ' FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504010047-8 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THEATER FORCES FRANCE BRIEP'S MORE ACCURATE MISSILE--The new M4 multiple-hPad miesilea that are to equip France's " strategic submarines after July 1985 will be of remarkabl~ accuracy; they will h~ve a CEP of 200 meters after traveling 4,000 k3lometera. Of 5 test '~irings carried out at the protoiype missile test center at Landes, 4 were complete successes. The [President's office at the] Elysee expressed i~s satisfaction with these results. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 Dec 81 p 18] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"] CSO: 3100/168 - 1 FOR OFFiC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504010007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THEATER FORCES UNITED KINGDOM FORI~IER DEFEN5E CHIEF CARVER ON NUGLEAR DETERRENCE - PM141329 London THE GUARDIAN in English 14 Dec 81 p 7 [Article by Field Mazshal Lord Carver, former UK chief of defense staff: "In a Conventional War, Nuclear Weapons Must Never Be Used To Stave Off Defeat in Eu,r~pe"] ~ [Text] After thE> recent antinuclear demonstrat3ons, there can be little doul~t in anyone's mind that the public attitude to defence in this country, and in European NATO nations--most signi�icantly in Germany--is overahadowed by the - nuclear issue. Some might say distorted, but, if we rely on the fear of nuclear war to deter war--as we have done for a long time- we muat be prepared to admit it, and must take into account the effect of that fear on our own people. It is remarkable that, for about 20 years at lt~aet, NATO governments have got away with hiding the issue under tYce carpet of an almost incompYehensible and certainly illogical concept, ealled flexible response:: The illogicality - of that concept has recently been starkly r~vea~ed by Presinent Reagan, who clearly also found it hard to understand. If, instead of ir~~plying that the u~e of tactical or theatre nucl~ar weapons would nat automatically and inevitably escalate to a str~tegic intercontinental exchange--which is the - essence of the fle:cible response concepS:--he had said that it would, he would have been in equal, if not greaCer trauhle, certainly with the American publ.ic. Not long after that Casper Weinberger, in his long interview with Michael Charlton on BBC Radio stated categorically that th~e USA would - never engage in a f irst strike,~, a blow to NATO's nuclear strategy, which depends on the threat of a first strike to deter conventional aggressidn. When President Kennedy made the same atatement in the early etages of hia administration, the cries of outra~e from his NATO allies forced him to modify it by stating th~?t, although the USA would never execute a first strike on the territory of the 5oviet Union, it might do so against its forces involved in aggression outside it, Kissinger's remarks in Sruesels a few yeara ago caused si_milar excitement, and President Reaggn's second statement could be interpreted - as folluwing in Kennedy's second footstep. At the heart of the problem ts the dilemma that, if you u.*ish to ~.ieter war by the fear that nuclear weapans will be used, you have to appear to be prepared _ to ~~se them in certain circumstances. But if you do so, and the enemy answer 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY back--as he has the capability to do and has clearly said he would--you are very much worse orf than if you had no*_ done so, if indeed yau can be said to be there at all.. To pose an unacceptable iis!: to the enemy automatically poses the same risk, or perhaps an even greater one, to yourself; but to attempt _ to reduce the risk, in order to make the threat of use more credible, by some form of limiting nuclear war--territorially or by types of targets or means of delivery--begins to make the risk more acceptable and therefore less of a deterrent. The ~iore acceptable nuclear war may appear to be to the governments and military men of the nuclear powers, the more likely it ia that it wi11 actually come about, and, even if it is limited in some way, the effects on tr~ose who live in the countries in or over which the nuclear weapons of both sides are expluded will be catastrophic. To call the results defence or security makes a mocicery of the terms. What is happening in the public attitude to this issue is that a numbEr of very intelligent people, principally university professors, but supported by many others, notably in the teaching professions have detected the weaknes~es in - deterrent philosopny and have followed the line of argument I have ~ust - described. They tend to differ about what should be done about it and almost all tend to exaggerate the danger of mutual deterrence failing to prevent war _ between the USA and the USSR, as Mountbatten did in his much quoted speech in Strasbourg in May 1979, when he described us ae being on the brink of the final abyss. These professors, many of whom have become much more expert in the ' subject than most sailors, soldiers or airmen, have exploited the emot3on that can easily be aruused in their students, in the young generally, among the old ~ and in the churcties . Tileir opportunity was created by a concentrat3on of circumstances. Events in Iran and Afghanistan made it look as if an armed clash between the t1SA and tr.e Soviet Union was a real possibiJ.ity. The Republican administration, headed by Reagan (who had made extremely hawkish sta+tements in the presidentia]. campaign) , came to power wit~ a clear intention of ac~ing tough with the Russians, promoting - a rearmamecit programme, in the nuclea.r as well as the conventional field, and no apparent interest in reviving SALT talks or in arms control generally; the American demand to station cruise missiles and Perahing IIs in Europe as a response to the Russian S5-20s; the neutron bomb; and the British decision to welcome cruise missiles and to replace Polaris with Trident, with apparently no deep consideration of the pros and cons of either. Finally the puritannical, _ radical, middle-class urge to have some cause to protest about was rather short of themes. Only South Africa and some remote and unpopular issues in Central and South America were available, once the Rhodesian aettlement had been acP~ieved. The anxieties, which this combination of reason and emotion have raised, have _ spread beyond the circles of the type of people who participated in the recent marches and wear lapel buttons supporting CND, END or other anti-war groups. Ma.ny _ parents, grandparents and children, even some aervice officers, exprese their - concern. They are genuinely worried and perplexed; and it is not surprising that they are, when they hear the atatements made by some members of the governmen~ on the issue. G3hether they have been def.ending the Trident decision, the cruise missile, the neutron bomb or their rival defence policy, they havc~ often given the impression that we have to be prepared to accept nuclear attack on this country, as if it were something not all that different in scale from the b1.it2 of the second world war. - 3 _ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFF[ClAL USE ONLY That is the view of one extreme. They paint a picture of Russia as bent on world conqiiest, constan.tly piling up arms, nuclear and conventional, on land, at sea and in the air, so that she can either overwhelm the quest by military action or by nuclear blackmail. The latter is based on a superiority in ~ nuclear weapons, either wi~hin Europe, or strategically by the ability so to cripple America's strategic nuclear capabil3ty by a first strike that the ].atter's only retaliatory threat would be to Russia's cities, which would _ provoke a Russian second strike against American cities. Rather than make that threat, the Americans woul~i have to give way to Russia's demands, whatever they were. Not only must the U5A prevent this situation arising, by having a force which is invulnerable to a Russian first strike and which threatens Russian strike forces as well as her cities, but there mu�t be a balance of nuclear forces within Europe at every level. The critics of that attitude see it, with some justification as they look at what has :~appened since 194:~, as leading to a never-eriding nuclear arms race, in ~ahich the numbers of - warheads on both sides will escalate to even more grr~tesque figures than the 50,000 or so which exist today, as well as to proliferatiott among other countries. The other extreme maintain that it is the nuclear arms race itself wnich is the - principal potential cause of war. If it were eliminated, and the US~1 and the , USSR separated fro~r direct con*act, especially in Europe, there would be no casus belli. We would all live together in amity, solving our differences by negotiations. Nuclear weapons should be abolisi;ed altogether; but, as a first step, they should be removed from Europe, as should all the forces ~f both the USA and the USSR--Euro~e for the latter being deemed to start at its western front3ers. ~ Tho,e who are not pacifists or total disarmers go on to propose that the arrned forces of the countries of Europe should consist of partisan or homeguard forces, which, thev assume, would have no offensive capability, not therefore provoking their neighbours, but which they happily suppose will have considerable defensive and d eterrent capability--a view of very doubtful validity. They contend that Europe would be more secure at less expense, both in terms of money and of the need to have standing forces (based either on conscript or volunt~ry services) than it is at present with forces and equipment that place a heavy burder? on countries' 2conomies, forcing NATO nations, because tihey are not prepared to carry the burden that balancing Russian conventional forces would involve, to fall back on a nuclear deterrent strategy, with all the consequences they believe it to involve. They have no faith in progress being achieved by negotiations between the two power blocs, and 3nsist that the only way to get results is for tl~e peoples of Europe to insist that nuclear weapons are removed from tlieir countries, and thej.r defence burdens reduced. This may or may not force the Russians and An~ericans to reduce and eventually abolish their - respective nuclear arsenals, but at least it wil.l ensure that they do not use ~urope as the battlefield on which to fight out their differences. The dialogue between those two extreme v3ews is a dialogue of the deaf. Fortunately there is a wide spectrum of intermediate opinion, held by many sensible people; but they have diff iculty 3n making their voice heard, and, - w'hen tt~ey do, getting their position understood. Moving across the spectrum from l~ft to right, one finds those who would like to aboliQh nuclear weapons � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ _ _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ altogether--and believe that a unilateral renuneiation by this country would hel.p to get the process going--through those who believe in multilateral neg~tiations to achieve the same aim, to those who do not wish to see them abolished altogether, believing that they do deter the great powers from fighting each other, but wish to see the numbers greatl.y reduced and the nuclear threshold raised. 5ome of those who hold these views accept the logic that it sould mean that NATO should put a greater eff~rt into con~rentional forces, although many of - them hope that this can be done without increasing the real burden of finance and manpower--alternative strategies is the in-word for this. Further to the right are those who see no need for any fundamental chgnge in 1~AT0's strategy, apart from the recognition that one cannot actually fight a nuclear war; and there are those who believe wholly in NATO's current concepts, but thi.nk that there is no need for us to have an independent strategic nuclear force; and further to the right again those who think we eHould, but believe - we could do it in a cheaper way than with Triderit. None of these attitudes between the extremes of the spectrum ran escape the fundamental dilemma to which I drew attention at the start. T11ey are vulnerable to r_he criticism that, if you wish your nuclear weapons to detex warsr you have to appear to be prepared to usa them. Once you try to define the circumstances under which y~u would do so, you get into thQ tangle which President Reagan and his defence secretary have found themselves. But to fall back on the argumert of uncertainty lands }ou in equal trouble. It is little wonder that the public find it difficult to make up their minds on the issue, and find it easier tn drift to one extreme or the other. In spire of recent developmenta, my gue~s would be that the ~na~or~ty of the electorate is probably in favour of NATO continuing to rely on nuclear deterrance to war, some of ~t based ~n the simp~.e view that, if any potential enemies have them, so shot~ld we. But we should not be comFlacent about that. The dangers seem t~ me to tie that, first: if there were a serious rise in tension, which made war in Europe look a possibility, NATO itself, and its constituent members, ~.*4uld be torn apart by having to face up to the possibility of ni+.cle~r weapo~s actually being used; second, that dislike of reliance on nuclear weaporis affects defence generally, and antinuclear �eelings ca;1 and do becume ar~ci-defence and anti- military feelings; leading to the third: that popular support for NATO's defence and its membars' defence pollcies ~till be eroded; and, fourth, that this could undermine America's willingness to continue its supp4rt of European defence. If that were to be seriously called into question, ~nd indicators of their - intention to withdraw appeared, no amount or nuclear weapons, independent cr ~ not, wauld, in my ~pinion, prevent a general slide of western European nations into NATO an accommodation with the Soviet Union. So what shuuld we ~dc~? I have no doubt that the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the USSfi deters them both from going to war with each other, and that it is the commitment of both to the security of Europe, one - to the West, the other to the East, that has kept and continues to keep thz - peace in Europe: that stops the kaleidoscope from being re-shaken. 5 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLV But if that deterrence ~aere to fail, and then failed in its secondary purpose-- - to stop both sides from using nuclear weapons against each other--the nuclear war that followed, even if only a tiny fraction of the weapons available to both sides were actually used, would destroy E~.iropean civilisation. T.t is ' only keeping the risks of war high that dissuades nations from embarking upon it; but there are far too many nuclear weapons and delivery systems than are needed to achieve the~ aim of deterring war in the first place and then deterring '-.he use of nuclear weapons if that fails. We must find some way of reducing tl~em, and of ensuring that, if deterrence were, tragically, to fai1, we do not .tnevitably slide into a nuclear war, perhags following the mistaken idea that the use of nuclear weapons can stave off a conventional defeat and result in something better than that would involve. It is of great importance that we should propose practical measures to bring this about, and practical measures to improve our conventional defences so that _ HATO can :onfidently and [wor~ indist3nctJ rid itself of the delusion form wh.ich ~ it has suffered Eor over 2Q years, that the possessior.- of nuclear weapons at - every level compensate~ for an inadequate conventional defence. Only when - we can do that, sha~l we be able to defeat the threat from the extreme left and right, which are in danger of undermining Europe's security. COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 14 December 1981 CSO: 3120/27 6 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 ENERGY ECONOMICS ITALY DELAYS IN COMPLETION OF HYD'ROELECTRIC PLANT AT PORTO TOLLE Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italisn 20 Nov 81 p 7 ~ [Article by Marco Moussanet: "There Is a Power Plant at Porto Tol~.e"] [Text] Bureaucratic and political problems are preventing the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] from activating two groups of 660 Mw on which the necessary tests have been run while estimates on inter- ruptlons in electric energq supply are getting worse. Porto Tolle. Winter is dxawing near and al1 Italy is wondering: Will there tie any interruptions in aur electric energy supply? And, if yes, will they be gre~iter ' or lesser than estimated? Conferences, gatherings; meet-ings of experts, civil servants, and politicians have followed each other in rapid sequence, drawing a pictur~ which leaves little room for hope and none for reliability and certainty. In the meantime, in the middle of the Po De1ta at Polesine Camerini, 800 inhabi- tants, a small portion of Porto Tolle, 10 lan from th~ county seat, a thermoelectric - power plant, brand-new, capable of putting out trillions, is waiting to go into - operation. With its four secti~ns of 66~ Mw, each, it could, at full speed, turn out l5 billion kw per year, 8 percent of the country~s total energy needs. It is not , easy to explain its forced inactivity. It all began in 19i1, when preliminary work was started for the construction of the povae~, plant as such, with the necessary research, surveys, land surveying, and geological prospecting. Tlio~e were the years when people began to talk widely about energy problems and wtien the ENEL started looking for sites for coal~-powered, nuclear, and thermo- electric power plants, looking into the regions, provinces, and co~nunities, a search which was later on stepped up considerablq. In the Lower Polesine section, 20 years after the flood and with all of the problems which tHat tragic event brought and which are as yet unresolved, the first appr~?als were obtained. And Pnlesine Camerini was picked; the real construction arork began in 1973. Now people are th~nking of how to supply fuel oil to the plants_: With a pipeline starting from Ravenna, going through the Comacchio valleys, going all the way to Porto Tolle. The first blueprints were drawn up, prepareci by SONE, the Northeast Oil Pipeline Company, charged by ENEL with building and managing the entire plant, said undertakings to be studied by the local governments so as to introduce any possible modifications. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500010007-8 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Amid red tape and policy delays, the pears passed while the power plant greW. That brings us down to our time: The tests have alrea_dp been completed at Porto Tolle with gas-oil;(which is more expensive and les~ efficient than fuel oil); these tests were made on two sections and test runs for the third section. are being completed; the estimates tell us that the fourth group should also be readp to functioa in June 1982. All of this was done unde~ the supervision of the plant manager, a man by the name of Fasolo, who was appointed by ENEL some ti~e ago.. ~iut Porto Tolle will not be started up that year either. The work on the oil pipe- line has not yet been started and the supplq of the power plant with the help of lighters is not yet possible because the reaponsible cownunity goverrnnent has not yet given its go-ahea~ for the boats to tie up and for the operation of the lin~ from the government electric power facility on. "To release the necessary authorizations," said communist msyor of Porto To11e, Danilo Stoppa, we are waiting for the ENEL and the Ministry of Industrq to follow through on their com*nitments; Unemployment fund f.or the 1,000 workers who are facing the risk of losing their ~obs after work on the power plant has been com- pleted; reimbursement of damages c.aused to fishermen during the construction of the plant; and start o� work on the construction of the oil. pipeline." Out of the 2,000 c,rorkers employed on the construction of the power plant, about 1,000 are employed by the contractor company and are not facing anq risks. The others, hired specifically for this type of work, could be laid off. The documents rzquesting the special unemployment fund, sui~mitted by the l~bor union federation of the province of Rovigo, is currently at the regionaZ labor office in Venice, awaiting the raport from the provincial inspector. It will then be forwarded to the Labor Ministry which in turn will submit it to the CIPI [Intermi.nisterial Com- mittee for Industrial Policy Coordination]. The prob~em thus lc~ks as if it could be solved easily. "Last 8 July;~ says Giorgio Nonnato, presidene of the province of Rivogo, "we signed an agreement in Rome in which tl~e minister of industry pledges ta speed up the processing of the unemploy- . ment fund. We believe that, once the bureancratic problems have been solded, everything else will have been resolved." - But the mayor of Porto Tolle is not of the same opinion: "If we once again were to be faced with 1,000 unemployed: continued Danilo Stoppa, "we would be facing the un- expected detexioration of a~ob crisis which for q~site sotne time has been leading to - the forced emigration of people from Polesine and which registers a figure of 10,000 without work out of a district population of 250,000 inhabitants. And then there are - the commitments which were made at the time for the development and upgrading of the area's characteristic activities, such as fis:~ing, touris?n, ~nd agriculture, which could absorb 500 or 600 workers." - Anottier unresolved problem is the problem of compensation. According to the agree- ment signed by ENEL and the Province of Rovigo, wh.ich is authorized to handle the issue as the holder of the fishing rights, the electric power outfit should turn over to the provincial funds 3 billions, 2 of which are already due. This is a figure which the ENEL obviously is not pr~~pared to turn over until it gets a11 of - the licenses and authorizations it needs to start the power plant. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 Once a~ain we get ~ack to Porto Tolle where the lighCe~rs should be tie;ng up with. 1,350 t. of fuel oil, cor~ing from Venice. Although it has discharged all of its _ commitments a~id although it is now facing a situation which it cannot change, the ENEL has alrea dy made provision for restoring the major roads in Lower Polesine to - build a bridge, to construct basins, moorings, and everytiiing else it was able to do in this regard. "After all that," says Giancarlo Lizzeri, the agency's administra*_or adviser, "the community cou ld not possibly prevent the supply of the potaer plant with fuel oil. This situation is no longer tolerable." - But everythin g is closed down and Porte Tolle is loudly asking for the start of work on the oil pip eline which has been suspended because of conf licts over the actual line layout which arose between SONE and the community of Comacchio. "The initial line layout submitted to us by SONE," said Cesare Luciani, Comacchio deputy mayor, " called for running the eel ponde under the eel fishing installations. Apart from the hydrogeological disturbance which would have derived from:the con- struction of t he plant, we were thinking of what might happen in case of a leak. That would have been the end of Valli di Comacchio. We theref ore initially asked for shifting the trace to the west of the fishing installations and, after receivir.g a negative rep ly from the company charged with the construction work, we confined ourselves to askjng for shift of the line by 1 km to the east of the Romea federal highway toward the sea. On that point we got approval from the SONE engineers and we are now waiting to see the final olueprints before releasing the authorizations. In the meantime~ SONE could start work." But the contractor company working with the ENEL will certainly not give the go-ahead for construction work until it is certain that it has the necessary approval for the project (and that requires a new ministerial decree to cancel the one issued earlier). The people at the ENEL recall that the initial lin~e layout was accepted at the time by the commun ities involved and by the Reg:t.on of Emilia-Romagna and that only there- after first Ravenna and then Comacchio asked for modifications in the line layout. This is the s tory of Porto Tolle, full of questions, misunderstandings, and indecision. A power plant with 2,600 Mw is idle. COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editore Il Sole-24 Ore s.r.l. 5058 CSO: 3104/46 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � - ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BRIEFS FOOD EXPORTS TO USSR--West Germany will export DM 1BN (233M pounds) worth of agricultural products this year to the Soviet Union, a 50 percent increase over 1980. The West German Agricultural Marketing Board said the record sales resulted from greatly increased purchases by the Soviet Union of beef, sugar, flour and - groats (crushed grain). According to Herr Claus Boecking, head of the board's foreign department, the Soviet Union is now buying food on the basis of political decisions wherever they can get it." West German butter exports to Mcscow had collapsed this ~ear, he said, and were replaced by sales from other European countries. [Excerpts] [London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 24 Nov 81 p 6 PM-- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) COPYRIGHT: The Financial Time3 Ltd, 1981 CSO: 3120/23 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540010007-8 _ FOR OFFiC~AL USE ONLY ECONOMTC FRANCE BRIEFS CHANGES CONCERNING NATIONALI ZATIONS--The goverinnent is admitting that it wi11 have to amend the law on nationalizatione at the re quest of the Constitutional Council. There is a readiness to make some concession.s on the dividend payment - in 1981 and in the manner in which indemnification is handled. In business circles there is hope of going still farCher--without going too far, for a brutal political conflict is to be avoided. Thus, the Constitutional Council could consider the Delors plan calling for eatablishing the bank nationalizaCion fl.oor at 3.5 billion [francs] in deposits (rather than at 1 billion) go that foreign banks would automatically be unaffected by the law and not make the French banks feel discriminated against. This would keep a certain number of French banks within the private sector ( as the Banque Hervet, the BIMP and the Monod- - Francaise de Banque). On this latter point, the gover~ent is quite reluctanr to go along but the Constitutional Council doubts that Mitterrand will unleash a big political offensive (by resorting to a referendum) for so litt].e. The necessity for it would not be understood by the public, it is believed. [A - comment included with this article asserted:] Decreasing the number of banks to be nationalized may constitute, in the eyes of some of the more moderate elements of the ruling ma~ority, the "signal" that wou~ld bring about a detente with tl~e business community. [TextJ [Paris LA LETTRE DE L"EXPANSION in French 23 Nov 81 p 2] COPYRIGHT: 1981. Groupe Expanaion S. A. CSO: 3100/153 11 FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500014007-8 FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF ~JERMANY ALLENSBACH POLLS SHOW POPULARITY OF PARTIES, POLITICIANS SPD Popularity Declines - Allensbach ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE ~n German No 22, 1981 pp 1-2 [Institute Report: "Movement in the Party Scene--CDU/CSU Above 50 Percent--SPD Reaches New Low--"Greens' at 5.8 Percent] [Text] Allensbach/Lake Constance, Middle of October 1981---On its downhill slide since the last Bundestag election the SPD has reached a new low: with a share of the votes of 33 percent it now ranks about 10 percent below its showing of _ 5 October 1980. In other words: within the period of one year about 25 percent of SPD voters have abandoned the party. The Social Democrats have not done this badly even during the final phase of the Brandt regime. At that time, A1.;_ensbach found the low point of the SPD at 34 percent (March/April 1974). Two parties have profited from the vote upheaval during the last few months. The CDU/CSU - showed an improvement of just about 6 percent during that period. At 50.3 percent it now commands an absolute ma~ority of the votera. The "Greens" have climbed from 1.5 percent in the Bundestag election to 5.8 percent, their best showing to date. The Free Democrats were unable to profit from the SPD's decline. A 9.7 percent share of the votes equals less than the 10.6 percent they received in the Bundestag election and corresponds with the average for the last few months. Number of people interviewed: about 2,000 Polling period: 19 September - 2 October 1981. COPYRIGHT: INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH 198~ Genacher Most Popular Leader Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Nov 81 p 1 [Article: "Genscher Is Considered The Most Popular Politician"] [Text] Bonn--FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) i~~ considered to be the most popular politician; 65 percent of the population over 16 years of age have "the highest opinion" of him. Second to him in popularity i~3 FRG Chancellor Schmidt (62 percent), followed by CDU Chairman Kohl and Berlin's Governing Mayor von Weizsaecker (48 percent each). Those are the results of a poll conducted 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500014007-8 NOR OFF[CIAL USE ~NLY _ by the Allensbacher Institut fuer Demoskopie. High esteem is further enjoy~d by Hans-Jochen Vogel (46 percent) and by Lower Saxony Minister President Albrecht (44 percent). The are followed by Schleswig-H~l~tein's Minister President SC~ltenberg and by Deputy CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group Chairman Leisler Kiep, ~i~h 43 percent each. Willy Brandt, who led the popularity scale in 1972 with 66 percent, has dropped to 40 percent Strauss and Bahr have for many years brought up the rear. 9273 CSO: 3103/130 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440500010007-8 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE ROCARD REVIEWS PLANS FOR NATIONALIZED, PRIVATE SECTORS - PM041523 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 4 Dec 81 p 2 ~ [Interview with Michel Rocard, minister of. planning, by David Housego and Terry Dodsworth: "Rocard Quietly Rebuilds Influence"] [Excerpts] Paris--"I don't know if it will be possible," says Michel Rocard, France's minister of planning, "but I would be prepared to wr3te into the five year plan (1.983-88) an economic growth target for France twice that of West Germany's." He reacts strongly against public statements by his minj.sterial colleagues implying that the Planning Ministry--M Rocard was put there partly to keep him out of the front line of executive authority- will have a subord3nate role in deciding and implementing the pc~licies of the much enlarged nationalised sector. "In the spring," he says, "a bill will be put to the national assembiy setting out the procedures for drawing up the plan. At tliat moment we could have some difficult decisions on allocating responsibilities. Until those have been taken , there is uncertainty. But I shall see there ie no uncertainty after that.. I may win or losc but I won't let the uncertainty continue." _ M Rocard believes that the Ministry of Planning will have a substantial role to play. His idea is that the nationalised sector should be divided into two--public services, such as railways and utilities, on the one hand, and companies exposed to international competition on the other. An inter-minister:tal committee would translate the government's pri.orities in the plan into contracts applicable to diff erent state enterprises. The task of actually negotiating the contracts and seeing that they are carried out would lie with the ministers concerned. For example, the transport minister would deal with railways and the minister of industry would handle the manufacturing sector. "But there will also be a record of these negotiations and a staff to pregare it. That will be the job of my ministry," M Rocard pointedly adds. The Planning Ministry would also ensure that state enterprises followed common methods. Thus, the Planning Ministry would be concerned with the extPrnal 11+ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010007-8 FOR OF`FICIAL USE ONLY balance of payments of each group; its exports and overseas requirements for patents and research licences; with the "social" policies it pursued; with its research policy; and with the decentralisation of inveatment. M Rocard adds that he has a front-line function in the latter area because of his shared responsibilities for decentralieation. M Rocard stresses that state enterprises must be run on a competit3vp basis. If the state asks them to perform public services, like running uneconamic bran~h lines for the railways, the.n it must compensate them. "I gave a long standing fxiendly respect for Tony Benn," he says. "But I don't share his economic philosophy. Our philosophy is strongly competit3ve.... Each time the state asks a company to do more than sound competition would _ require of it, then the state must compensate it.... A company that is run at a permanent loss adopts a ment~lity of security that is no longer produc- - tive." In spite of his tongue in cheek ambition that the French economy should run at twice the pace of West Germany, M Rocard has not much faith in planning bases on macro-economic forecasts. M Rocard's two-year intermediary plan (1982-83) has been criticised by employers' organisations and trade unions for its lack of an economic framework to help cnmpanies make decisions. More cynically, they believe it reflects some of M Rocard's possible doubts about the two years ahead. M Rocard says that his decision to omit a macro-economic framework was deliberate and carefully weighed. H~ believea that m~cro-economic forecasts amid the present uncertainties of the world economy do not have much value and that, inev3tably, the change of government in France has added an uncertainty of its own. Rather than face the risk that such forecasts bec~me untenable, he prefers to try to accustom French public opinion to the liroad goals of 3 per cent growth a year over the next two years, a hoped for reduction in the rate of inflation and stabilising unemployment next year before bringing it down in 1983. For M Rocard, the "great ~amble" of the immed3ate future is whether private manufacturing investment ~~ill recover. "The strategy of the two-year plan," he said, "is based on private investment taking off. 5o is the government's 1982 budget. One of the areas in which planned expenditure is to rise fastest is in the value of. aid to industry." M Rocard believes that the private sector's reYuctance to invest ia a"temporary psychological problem," reflecting employers' distrust of a socialist government. M Rocard is concerned ttiat th e higher growth will worsen France's import b311 and hence its baJance of payments. He points oLt th~it France imports 24 per cent of what it consumes. In the long ' run the only answers,as h e sees it, to this structural weakness are to make ~5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USF_ ONLY savings in the nation's energy bill and to develop French industry where imports are abnormally high--he mentions wood, leather and machine tools. He believes the government should take a strongly 3nterventionist 13ne over machine tools, slimming the industry to companies which can compete abroad or hold their own in the domestic market and abandon the rest. COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1981 CSO: 3120/25 ' _ ~ - 1.6 - FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010007-8 POLITICAL ~~A~Y LA~30R UNION BUREAUCRACY ANALYZED Milan IL MONDO in Italian 13 Nov 81 pp 28-33 [Article by Lorenzo Scheggi] [ Text ] Tlle union agent~~ s trade : ,trike manager. With his bat-� lunchpail gathering dust, today~ s unian has become a technocrat. But he~s frustrated, fair game for countless critics, and ill-paid to boot. Has he ` picke~d a career with a future? If so, what kind of fu- ture awaits him? - On the rim of a pond, a frog is getting nowhere in his wooing of a - lady frog. �Why won't you have me?'~ he asks in desperation, when he sees the futility of his endeavors. "Because~" replies the lady frog, haughtily, "actually, I~m a princess. A wicked wifich cast a spell on me, and turned me into what yo~a see. "Well, " replies the frog, glimpsing a ray of hope~ ~~if that~s a11 that~s bothering you, I am really a metalwdrker." "Honestly?" inquires ~he lady frog, with avid curiosity. "How did it happen?" "Well," replies~the frog, "that I really couldn't say. The guys from the union took care af the whole business." That story has been making the rounds in labor circles for some time. _ Evsn now, thou~;h, anybody who dredges it up and serves it at a mee~-- ing of the local or even at a congress knows it~s going to make a hit. The reason is that the irony of the joke cloaks a painfully deep-seated malaise. The faat is that the ixnion cadres right now are the targets of venemous challenge, mainly though not exclusively from the rank and file. Luciano Lama~ addressing the congress of the Rome Chamber of Labor, hurled blazing thunderbolts at union ap- paratchiks: "In Lazio," he charged, to deafening applause, �we have 600 union officials. There are far to~ many of them, and the fria.its of their labor are not commensurate with their numbers." Just a few days previously, in his report to his unionTS congress. CISL leader Pierre Carniti was no gentler: "The crisis in union repre~entation," . he argued, '~can be attributed primarily to the urnchecked growth of a bl.oated full-time apparatus built up during the years of struggle~ but increasingly beyond the reachl of checks and controls.~~ 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR OFF1C[AL USE ONL`~ w'hy are the union agents in the eye of the whirlwind? Why are they under simultaneous attack from the membership in the plants and from their national summits? Why do we suddenly see this burgeoning of boaks, articles, magazines (the latest of these was the entire fourth issue of LABORATO1tI0 POLITICO~ the magazine of the communist gadflies~ run by Mario Tronti) devoted to them~ to their history, their jargon, - their problems? The one-word answer to all these questions is, once again: crisis. The economir, crisis. The reason why the union agent today is no lon~er the man who hands out the goodies, but the guy who is often forced to agree to layaffs, restructuring, retreat from long-secure positions, surrenders. The political crisis~ in a labor organiza- tion that has been torn f or years between the lure of a voice in management, recrudescent maximalist demands, the remnants of soli- darity, and ceilings on the cost-of-living adjustment, in an unend- ing April alternation of cl~uds and sunshine; between irreparable splits and wholly unforeseen outbreaks of peace. The consequence is an unavoidable identity crisis for those who live and work in this climate, for the people in organized labor and outside of it who are a11 asking the same question: just who is a union agent? Is he still the lord-high executioner of the hot autumn? Or has he already turned into an icy bureaucrat who manipulates the rank and file for his own purposes? Or again is he, or is he on the way to becoming something quite different from any of ~hese things? = The odd thing is that this i.dentity crisis has hit the union agents at what is apparently a favorable juncture. There are so many of them. Almost a small army of them, more than there have ever been. For the CGIL (see Table 1) there are more than 5,000 full-timP political offa.cials (the leaders, those who actually do the negotiating, the men in the survey and research offices~ right down to the rank-and-file activists who hanci out leaflets in the plants), scattered through the country (in the regions and districts) and in the various categories. In the CISL, though, there are 3~~00 professional union agents (in the CISL they are called agents, ratlier _ than officials, a~ in the CGIL and the UIL). And then ~here are the Z,~00 in the UIL. That makes a grand total of 11,000 fu11-time union agents~ who are backed up~ however~ by another 7~000 people in the technical staff and in the various agencies of the national or-- ganizations. The growth since the late Sixties has been dizzying: keeping pace with the upsurge in paid membership (up from 4~700,000 in 1968 to ~,900,000 in 1980) and the consequent growth in revenues - from praxies, but a disproportionate share of the increment was due to the spiralling numbers of full-time agents. People t~ho quit th~~r jobs to work fu11-time for the union (in the CGIL 38 percent of tHe political staff has signed on since 1968)~ plus a lot more who moved - into or.ganized labor out of cynicism and greed. Everybo~y, to hear them ta1k, deplores such abuses, but everybody in the CGIL, CISL~ and UIL alike finds their presence rewarding from at least the ecanomic point of view, because it means that they have that many 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500014007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY agents work~rlg for them but getting paid by somebody else (see Tables 6, and ~ ) . They are young, and they are educated. Abo!it ~0 percent of the people (see Table a) in the political apparatus of the three federations ~~e between 2$ and 45 years old. And between 40 and 60 percent of them - have high school diplomas or university degrees. They are famous. Television shows us the more familiar faces among them every evening. The newspapers write about them. In the na- tional media, only Lama, Carniti, and Benvenuro get the full treat- ment, but there are hundreds of union agents vrritten up every day in their local papers who have leapt fea:ly across the threshold af anonymity. Debates, roundtables~ conventions~ and interviews.-- no matter what the su.bject, somebody speaking for or~anized labor is a sine qua non these days. His presence is a guarantee of high ratings. They are pow~rful. At they get cards fr~om members of parliament, captains of industry, bishogs~ and prefects. Of course there are still some union agents who do unheralded welfare ~and sup- port work wi~hout any compensation at all. Far more numerous, though~ _ are those in the public eye who talk about macroeconomice9 who are consulted on every labor issue, but consulted as i+rell and perhaps primarily, these days on issues t-.hat have nothing to do with or- ganized labor. And yet it is in these same figures, which look so encouraging, that the crisis lurks. Are there just a lot ot them, or are tY~ere too many of them? True, some of them have been dropping out lately. At the CGIL, for instance, the turnover rate is close to $ percent. "That's very high," say CGIL officials. "The turnover problem~" they - say at the CISL~ too~ "is beginning to concern us." For the time being, ~hough, the problem is not a lack of. people: according to ~ Lama and Carniti, the problem is quite the opposite. Even as late as 19'76, the CGIL was sti11 holding the line on the ratio at one to 1, Oll. It was higher, actually, in the CIBL~ at one to l~ 2('~. On1y the UIL was be~ow one to 800. Today~ th~ugh (see Table 1) even the CGIL and the CISI, have swollen staffs, even though the edema is less pronounced than in the UIL, which, in order to man all the avai.lable slots, must ma;ce up for its thinner membership i�anks with a massive - official presence. There is one datum, though, that applies to all _ of them: the apparatus is spread unevenly, both r~vith respect to geo- graphical areas (high-density zones and others with nobody there)~ and with respect to labor categories. Ar~ they really educated people? Or have they, l.ike everybody else, . gone to school some? "We read so many ne~vspapers~� admits the UILts top organizer in Lazio, Pietro Larizza, "that it is hard for us to find time to read a book, to go to the theater, or to study.~~ There is a plethora of literature on the subject. The union agent is de- scribed as an omnivorous skimmer of the printed page. He walks around with fat bundles of magazines and newspapers under his arm, among 19 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY _ _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 ~OIR n~Fl!~'I.~i. U~E Oi~LY which is baund. to be the Confindustria~s peach-colored SOLE-24 ORE~ plus, un.der the top leac~ers~iip~s elhow, LE MONDE. He has no time to study, to store up inform~tion, because his whole job consists o� - communications to ~he outside wrorl.~.~o messages only he can send. Ana so he spins through his days ~.ike a t~p, parcelling out his ~ime among "local meetings, convention~, conferences, rallies, picket lines, processions, slagans, fliers, telephone calls, telex messages, radio and TV broadcasts, raffles, and photo opaportunities. He must keep on talking, screaming, or ~hanting words: words are his badge of of- fice. _ Are the;,~ really famous and powerful, or ar~ they pror misled dolts, with a predisposition to frustration? The union agent's life is not a happy one. "Physical endurance," admits CISL secreta~y Nin~ Pagani, "is not th~ least of the endawments a union agent must have." Those who work among the rank and file hava to gzt up at 0500~ so as to be at the plant gates when the first shift comes on. - Stress, hoV~::ver, does not spare the highPr echelons: negotiating sessions often last 20 to 30 hours without a break~ iaeetings can run right into one anoi~her, not to mentiQn forays from the Ministry of Industry to the Ministry for State Participation to the Ministry for Labor. All in the same day. And then there may be three, four, or - even f ive crises ~t a time: "The upshot~" an FLM secretary told IL MONDO, "is that we often sit do~~n at the bargaining table without even knowing exactly what the issue is. Clearl3~, that means less for the family. Not very much +,ime for sports. pr for hobbies. Idolo Maicone, former CISL secretary, used to play the violin as a boy. He had to give it up before long. Ottaviano Del Turco', deputy secretary at FIOM~ lessons in guitar and drawing. Bruno Trentin jogs through the quiet streets of Yil1a Doria Pamphili in Romea But they are exceptions, and you can count them on the fingers of your hands. For the rest of them, there is only the union. The other side of the coi.n, though, is that they haven~t got what might be sty~ed g:Lowing career prospectsa For the majority of them, the outlook inside the union ruiis some~hin~; like this: you start in the plant, you get into th~ local executive, and then you~re f aced with a choice: if you're goYng to get ahead, youtre to have to quit your job� Devote yourself full-time to the union. And then you start takiiig traininb courses (see box, page 30). You move up in the hierarchy throug!i the l.ocal executiv~e bod:ies into the national industrial groups. Up and up, until you hit the regional ~xecutive. Beyond that, no more than 300 ar ~.00 of you will ever go. For every- body, though, the road is a long one, except for the oecasional bril- liant career, which wi11 be the lot of only a very few and will be , - the result of factional chemistry, of bonuses for minorities, or Qf local and industry quotas. The prospects outside the union are just as bleak. Particularly nuw that there is a perceived conflict of in- ' terest between political party positions and those in the union, the avenue for~ advancement in politics is no longer open. Not many can ~ fa11 back uii a profession to make a living. That leaves the govern- ment agencies: the National Work Accident Insurance Institute (INAIL), 20 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the National. Social Securzty Institute (INPS)~ and the hundreds and thousands of commis~ions to which the labor unions belong. ~ut as for jobs, as for ~alaries, there is room for a few dozen peopZe at most. The career is n~t exactly tempting, any more than the salary. Union . officials, on the whole, don~t make very much money. So little do they make, :in fact, that there are a lot of them who are opting to leave the union and go back to the pr~duction line. Salaries for national officials (see Ta~le 3) are fairly low (for technical staf- ters, add on family subsidies, which even politicians get, and se- niority increases, which the politicians don~t get). All iii a11, for a high-middle-level union official, the paycheck will come to a net of 1 mill~.on a month. Qf course, those not quite so high up wil.l get less. The story is somewhat different for the top echelon,s in the national federations and for industry-union secretaries genera:~ or for the really big local organizations, where thAre are occasiona~ly bonuses that don~t show up on the payrollo At the nationaZ federa- tion level, insofar as IL MONDO could determine, thP only ones who get such bonuses are the top leaders of the UIL, who roiand out their pay checks with a bonus from the factions (reportedly arrEOUntang to 200,000 to 3U0,000 lire per month~. In the CISL, too, according to some reports, there are some extra unofficial goodies. And then, too, there are the fringe benef its. Lama, Carniti, Benvenuto, Ma- rianetti, and Marini all have personal cars with drivers. Every 3 years, CIS~ secretaries get from the organization a third of what it will cost them to buy a FIAT 131~1600cc. The UIL pays its secre- taries '7$,000 lire a month to cover the cost of newspaper and maga- zine subscriptions, while the CGIL and CISL them directly. - For all of them, though, there is the bottom line of the expense ec- count. Counting it all, th.e richest can get as much as l.s mi?lion lire net per month. When you add to al~ these ~roblems and frustrations the fact ~hat, in , our time, the labor union is an organization where only the men at the summit make decisions (according to same exp~rts in the field~ the union officials who really caiznt� for something in the chess- game of high politics number somewhere betwe~n 200 and 300); that the rank and file is increasxngly inclined to challenge its leader- ship; that the representative essence of the union (witness the case of the FIAT strike) is open to question since the emergence of - new union and professional gr.oups like middle managers and since the startling growth of unaf iliate d union.ism, you begin to se~ the roots of the identity crisis that besets most union officials. The past is far behind them. So are the heroic postwar years, when unn,on officials knew exactly who they were. You coulci pin the ancient- his~tory label on the Sixties, the glory years wheri ~tlie union offi- cials could sail into the plants and learn to barhain over working hours, assembly-line speeds, piecework, and over~tim,e. Long gone are the years of the hot fa11s, when the d.ownhill road looked as if it would never end. Just as distant, though, are the Seventies, when organized labor was carving aut ever-roomier spaces for itself in ?_1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010007-8 FOR aFFICtAL USE ONl,Y - 'che councils of go~�ernment, wl.ien mernt~Ers:~ig was climbing at a stupeT fying rate and the unions' appara~i.:.~