JPRS ID: 10350 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030059-9
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 59
• Content Type: REPORTS

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ruK uhr~~ ~ni. ~~~r. uNi.v
JPRS L/10350
24 February 1982
- Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 763
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10350
- 24 February 1982
- SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
- FOUO No. 763
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- Some SADCC Members Fe,il To Hono:~ Finance Pledges
(Roger Murray; NEW AFRICIIN, Jan 82) 1
Toward Indian Ocean Common MarkE:~
(Jonathan M'Haruia; AFRI~ZUE-ASIE; 18-31 Jan 82) 2
ANGOLA
Coffee Shortfall Noted in Both I'rivate, State Sectors
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET N~~ITERRANEIIVS, 11 Dec 81) 6
BURUNDI
Briefs
Finance Agreements With F'rance 7
CAPE VERDE
Yereira Expresses Fiope on Relatjons With Bissau
(Aristides Pereira Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, l~-.31 Jan 82) 8
Church, Private Interests Seen Affected by Land Reform
(Colm Foy; NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) 1]_
CHAD
Libyans Said To Be Unfe,vorable to Chadian Reconciliation
~ (POURQUOI PAS?, 21 Jan 82) 13
OAU Force Said To Be Playing Gam= of Imperialist Interests
(Antonia Blis; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18-31 Jan 82} 15
Briefs
Habre Advance Disturbs Mi�tterrand 18
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOliO]
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CONGO
Effec~~~ of Petroleum Output on Pc~litical, Economic Situation
(Siradiou Diallo; J~iJPiE AJ'RS QUE, 2 Dec 81) 19
GUINEA-�3I S SAU
Cape Verde Dialogue Needed To Tmprove Country's Image
(Editorial; AFRI~UE-ASIE, 18 Jan 82) 23
Briefs
Responsibility for Racist Reaar:~s 26
Oppositior. to Naguicave S~:ttlement 26
IVORY CO;S:
Ec'r.oes of Impatience With ~COriOII~r~ Politics Heard
(Siradiou Diallo; JEL~IE A;~RIQL'E, 9 Dec. 81) 27
Steac~y Improvement of Ecor.ouLy Re;~orted
(William A. Stoever, Denn:~s J. Conlon; Jan 82) 31
`Jarious Aspects of Petrol.eum Pro~~lem Examined
(MARCF~S TROPICAUX ET I~:TERRANEIIVS, 18 Dec 81) 33
J LESOTHQ
_ Details on Assassir.ation Squad G::ven
(Jasper Mortirler; T'dE STA:t, 22 Jan 82) ~+0
~ MAL.AWI
_ Briefs
Foreign Exchange ResPrves
:~IALI
- Food Productaon, Other Economic I'roblems Discussed
(Jacques Latremoliere; MAItChES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERR~vEENS,
18 Dec 81) 45
Brief~
Algerian Aid fcr Oil 5~
Soviet Cooperation on Gold 5~
idOZA~`~IaU"r:
South Africa Seen Supporting ilRP1 DEStabilization Campaign
(David Ward, Martin Plaut; iV~d AFRICAN, Jan 82) 5~
:oreign Trade Regulaticns, Or~aiiizatiou Reviewed
(~IARCF~!ES TROPICAIJX c'~ N~D~T~RRANEFNS, 11 Dec 81) 57
- � b -
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1VI GE.RIA
- Briefs
Increas e in. Inflat ion 59
Ships Under Nigerian Flag 59
Japanese Loan for Irrigation 59
RWANDA
Briefs
1982 Budget o0
" Tea Factories Frcm Belgitui 60
SEIVEGAL
Briefs
F:amored National Union bl
SOUTH A.~'RICA
Death of Prominent Black Civi1 R:.ghts Leader Examined
(iVE'~1 AFRICAN, Jan 82) 62
ANC's Seventieth Anniversary Mar~;ed
(Abdou Berrada; NE~1 AFRIC~S1, J~n 82) 6~
UPPER VOLTA
Economic gnphasis Said f~Iisdirecte~d
(Guy Arnold; VEW ArRICAN, Jan 82) c7
- c -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SCME SADCC MEMBERS FAIL TO HONOR FINANCE PLEDGES
London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 pp 29-30
(Article by Roger Murray: "SADCC Plans are Hit: Cash Snarl is Blamed"]
_ ( Te~ ~ THE N?NE countriee of the Southern etates" made in a atatement isaued by the
African Development Co-ordination Con- SADCC Council of Minieters at Blantyre.
ference (SADCC) met in Blantyre late The etatement blamed South Africa for
last year to review progreae in funding the destruction af bridgea near Beir~ and
vital traneport and communicatione pro- of navigation~l aids in Beira port. The
jecta. Theee play a crucial role in the
SADCC's overall objective of reducing s~~ment said the timing of the latter
attack appeared to be "deliberately
economic dependence on South Africa. related" to the meeting. Theee attacks,
Despi~e pledgee of about $650-million the statement asaerted, could only be
made at the Maputo conference in 1980, aeen as a"direct responee to the growing
only $180-million has ao far been actu- Auccese of regional transport rehabiiita-
ally raiaed to meet the estimated cost of
tion".
$1,920-million require~ to implemen' 99
regionally-integrated and country pro- The SADCC statement set a precedent.
Thie was the ~rst time that Malawi has.
Since the historic aummit meeting ~n aesociated with euch a strong con-
which took place in Luaeka in Apri11980 demnation of South Africa's policies
at which the SADCC was established, the towards the region. Previously, Malawi
nine participating countriea - Angola, had maintained cloee trade and general
Botewaae, Leeotho, Malawi, Mozambi- economic tiee with South Afi-ics, and had
que, Tanzenia, Swaziland, Zambia end adopted a rather lukewarm approach to
the SADCC.
Zimbabwe - have made ~teady progrese Indeed, Preeident Banda wae not pr~e-
xn implementing concerted action to oec- ent in pereon to open the meeting. At
ure regional caoperstion within their every other SADCC meeting the proceed-
etrategy of economic liberation. inge have been formally opened by the
The traneport and communications p~81dent of the hosc country.
sector hme been given the higheet prior- The st,atement was unuaual in that the
ity eince a fundamer.:s? re-orientation of gpDCC has not previously made public
the hietoric traffic patterne which tie ~8~menta on overtl
- moet of the SADCC etatea to routes y political iesues. As
through South Aft~ica, ie eeen ea the moet ~e ministera themeelvea eaid in the
crucial area to the overall aim of reducing ~atement, they ~ were primarily con-
ex;ating economic dependancy. cerned with development co-
ordination . Yet it was felt imposeibl~ to
~ b~~ paee over in ailence 3outh Africa's
aggresaive actions."
= Thie concern wao reflected in the ~,~rt
etrong condemnation of South Africe for "
allegedly pureuing "a policy of deetabil- The main item on the agenda was to
ieation directed againet SADCC member
review progrees in financing the projects
1
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drawn up by the Maputo-baeed Southern $916�million, an increase over the
African ~ansport and Cammunications ~i792-million cost orig:nally estimated
Commiseion. Though the oost of the pra for the Maputo conference.
jecte presented to international and
bilateral financing ,.gencies at the Telecoaemnai~cations
Maputo conference has been ecaled down
from the original eotimate of about
$1950-million to a1920-million actual In addition aeven related railway pro-
aid diabureements eo far available are j~, ~ncluding the "urgent rehabilita-
sufficient to meet only the cos~ of a emall tiQn" of the Mozambique-Swaziland
number of the projecte. railway, estimated at $84-million, all
Only about $180-million has been require financing. Out of aeven road pro-
firmly committed, leaving a total of
$1,740-million still to be financed in ~l8ted ~"'ith Maputo port, and
order to complete the programme. coating an estimated $200-million, the
Of the total of 97 projects originally anly financing aecured ia $1, million for
presented at the Maputo conference, ~d projecta ia Lesotho. The aituation is
some have been completed, and fmance 8~~ for the other two port rehabilita-
has been secured for a few of the other tion pmjects, at Beira and Nacala.
projecta. A small number of additional ~ong the other m$jor projects for
projects have been added to the original which financing ia still required, ia the
liet, leaving 99 projecta still needing total Lobito port transport syatem, involving
or part financing. rehabilitation o. the port and the Ben-
Most of the projecta for which sufficient quela railway at an eetimated coat of
funding has already been raised, were S7b-million, and the Dar-es $alaam port
not in a real eense new projects, and t~'ane~ort system, involving aeven pro-
- formed part of existing bilateral aid J~ at a total coat of $9b-million.
commitmente. Telecommunications projecte have
For example, the Maeeru iaternational fared better. T~vo have been completed
airport in Lesotho, accorded low overall aince th~e Maputo conference, and most
priority by S_ADCC, already hae $4fr have been surveyed for equipment
million commiL~ed out of total costs of i'89uiremenb� To complete the planned
$60-million. Moet of the fman~e hae b~ n network, three new prqjecta have been
raised fmm Arab donor agencies, ar.u the a~~~ ~cluding 12 microwave link pra
amount provided repreeents a quarter of .1~~ ~~x earth eatellite communica-
' the total funds actually coma~itted to the tione projecte, et en estimated cost of
SADCC ro amme b mainl Western i134-million.
P B=' Y Y If much of the programme cannot be
and Arab donore. implemented due to a failure tu raiee
~ In contrsat, the ambitioua rehebilita- fundi, the efforta to reduce dependency
tion project of Mozambique's ports, and on 9outh Africa will suffer a major set-
the four-country railway eyetem connect- back.
ing them to other 9ADCC etatea, has One concrete development in Blantyre
recsived almost no funding. w8e the formal go-ahead foti the establ- .
According to the dceument prepared is}+.aient of a permanent SADCC aec-
for the Blantyre meetiag by the 'I`rane- retariat at Geborone in Botswana, with a
porE and Communicatione Commiseion, af eight. A Zimbabwean ie to be
the total project cat ia now eetimated at appointed as director~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Maqazines Limited
CSOi 4700/705
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN COMMON MARKET
Paris AFRIi~JE-ASIE in French No 257, 18-31 Jan 82 pp 58-59
[Article by Jonathan M'Haruia: "A Common Market for the Indian. Ocean"]
[Text] While the regime of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam has deliberately tied the
island of Mauritius to the racist regime in Pretoria through a loan agreement
whose provisions are particularly repugnant (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 254, 7-20 Decem-
ber 1981), the Mauritian Militant Movement ;Mr41), although still part of the oppo-
si~ion, is already taking concrete steps to prrmote commercial cooperation and
the regional economy, which the party has always recommended and which the situa-
tion in the Indian Oceau cannot fail to help, even if certain politica.l obstacles
remain.
Everything began, in fact, when the Mauritian Marketing Office, noting a record
' production of potatoes ab aut 14,000 tons, when Mauritian consumption is about
11,000 tons a year planned to export the.surplus, mainly to the Seychelles.
Aware of the poor relations betwp~=: Mahe and Port-Louis, owing to Ramgoolam's
friendship with James Mancham,l and especially their common views the Mauritian
regime has never digested the coming to power of the socialists in Mahe and regu-
larly insults, both publicly and in private, the government of Albert Rene, which
further poisons the few ties that exist the officials of the Marketing Office
contacted Paul Berenger at the beginning o~ November ao that he might enter into
- negotiations with him hia relatione with President Rene are very cordial
- concerning the sale of surplus potatoes.
The MMM, which has always aupported further economic and commercial ties between
Indj.an Ocean countries and which believes that this is the solution to their
development and economic independence from Western metropolises and especially
_ Pretoria, send a delegation to Mahe on 9 November, a delegation made up of Paul
Berenger and Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo, party economic adviser, to undertake dis-
cussions along these lineso
The Berenger mission, which stayed on the island from 9 to 15 November, had no
difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Seychelles authorities for the export
1 The former Seychelles president, put in office by the English upon independence
in 1976 and involved in the recent abortive coup d'etat against the regime of
Albert Rene.
3
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to that country of 1,000 tons of potatoes and 600 tons of onions, beginning in
1982. It also noted the existence of vast praspects for commercial trade between
the two countries, hindered by a basic obstacle: the lack of any regular ocean
shipping line between the Seychelles and Mauritian ports.
Aware of the need to strengthen bonds between the coastal nations, President
Albert Rene spontaneously decided to provicie a link between Mahe and Port-Louis
by the government-owned "5 Juin" boat, which would supply the distant Seychelles
islands. b~rthermore, in order to encourage the development of regional trade,
he decided to give priority to Mauritian products that could be exported to the
Seychelles, especially since these products would replace those still imported
from South Africa by private merchants.
With the pr~blem of the shipping line resolved and in keeping with the policy
still preached by the MMi~i regarding regional cooperation, certain party leaders
in particular, Paul Berenger, I~ader Bhayat and Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo founded
a campany as soon as they returned from the Seyr_helles: INTRACORP (Intra Reg;onal
Trading Corporation), in accordance with the provisions of current law on companies
and in the absence of a better legal structure. It will act as the local repre-
sentative of the company owning the "5 Juin," the vessel which, beginning in
January, will provide the Mahe-Port Louis connection once every two months in the
_ beginning and once a month later. INTRACORP will aZso specialize in regional
_ import-export.
The company, whose establishment renders South-South caoperation a concrete fact,
is basically for the purpose of promoting commercial trade and setting up certain
industrial projects bring the countries in the southwest Indian Ocean together,
mainly the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Comoro Islands and Reunion.
It will effectively engage in commercial activities that will eventually enable
countri~s in Ehe region to get away from an excessive and dangerous dependency
on Western countries for products that they can supply, to tighten their bonds,
bring down certain prices on their respective markets, free themselves from the
grawing inf luence of South Africa, especially in the case of Mauritius, and
iu?prove ttteir economic and commercial situation.
Regarding exports to the Seychelles, in addition to potatoes anci onions, products
that could be exported immediately include edible oils, margar:!ne, soap, frozen
~ chicken and liveatock feed. Regarding Mauritian importa of SEychelles products,
salted fish and coconut, to mention but these two, have already been chosen.
As for the establishment of industrial enterprises, technical aid may be given to
the Seychelles, particularly for the satting up of a color television network on
the island at the beginning of 1983.
Trade between Indian Ocean countries is so paltry that it is a field in which
everything remains to be done, opposition circles in Mauritius state, and INTRACORP
- will not be confined to the Seychelles, but will also extend to Madagascar, Zim-
babwe, Reunion and the Comoro Islands.
The establishment of thls company by IrA~IM leaders met with diversified comments
and reception, both within the Masriti�3n left and government circles. To the
. ~
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criticisms of inembers, party leaders, gr.eatly concerned by the project, answer
that the prime objective is basically political, insofar as the M1~I has always
preached maximum economic and regional cooperation.
- It is also stated that the company's purpose is not profit. It is to enable
MrII~i leaders to better master the de~ails of the import-export business, chartering,
and so on. This explains the presence at the head of the company of Paul Berenger,
future minister of economy, finance and labor if there is an election victory,
and of Kader Bhayat, who would then be minister of commerce in an A41M-PSM
~ [Malagasy Socialist Party] government.
Lack of Arguments
Furthermore, in this new context, the company just founded by the MMM leaders
would be absorbed by the state Commerce Corporation, which will be set up as pro-
_ vided by the government's ~oint program, and would become a specialized department
in regional cooperation.
It must be noted that the National Commerce Corporation ~ust launched by the Ram-
goolam regime is not in keeping with the provisions governing a state corporations
and that its powers are limited to the importation of rice and flour, which the
I~SM deems to be absolutely inadequate.
Lacking arguments and icnowing full well that the startup of the cooperation project
will bring about a drop in prices for certain basic commodities now imported, the
men in the regime accuse the I~4ylM of hatching "sinister schemes," such as the
financing of its election campaign by the Seychelles or even the importation of
weapons! Whatever the case, it is planned that even before the coming general
elections, the concrete results that might be registered in regional trade will
themselves contradict these accusations.
With, on the one hand, the talks that began in April 1981 between the Chambers of
Commerce and Industry of Reunion and Mauritius and, on the other hand, the exces-
~ sively timid gestures to Madagascar and the Comoro Islanda because of the
lack of political determination on the part of the Mauritian regime the proposed
regional cooperation launched by the main opposition party in Mauritius seems to
indicate that the process of building an Indian Ocean Common Market is on the
way. However, political and economic observers in Port-Louis do not hesitate to
point out that the political obstacle to this process resides in the very existence
- of the regime of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who prefers to be the yes man of
Pretoria rather than to serve the interesta of the peoples in the region.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
11,464
CSO: 4719/521
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ANGOLA
COFFEE SHORTFALL NOTED IN BOTH PRIVATE, STATE SECTORS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882 11 Dec 81 p 3324
(Text] Angola's coff ee production in 1981 amounts to no more than one-tenth of the
tonnage produced the year before the country's independence. In 1974, in fact,
according to the Statistical Yearbook of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), production was 225,000 tons. In 1980, the best year since independence,
production was only 36,576 tona. This year, according to a recent issue of JORNAL
DE ANGOLA, it fell to only 21,501 tons.
The "coffee plan" developed by the Luanda authorities for the 1981 season met only
64 percent of its target; it had called for a ceuillette [translation unkown) of
marketed coffee. Both the state and the private sector failed to meet theirtargets.
It had in fact been envisioned that the state sector ~rould produce i:0,677 tons of
marketable coffee, but it obtained only 12,020 tons, including 3,92L' tons from the
province of South Cuanza, 3,667 tons from Uige, 3,118 tons from North Cuanza, and
1,307 tons from the combined provinces of Bengo, Cabinda, and Malanje. As for th~
- ~private sector (including the cooperatives), the plan called for it to produce
12,689 tons, but it produced only 9,481.
- A report from the technical department on Encafe's coffee production emphasizes,
in this connection, that the partial. failure of the plans for the aixth national
coffee season--which began 1 June and hae been over since September--was the result
of lack of motivation on the part of the personnel responsible for the ceuillette
[expanaion unknown] because of pnor material and social conditions. The Luanda
daily did not fail to observe in passing that this deplorable situation recurs year
after year.
"It is time," adds JU1tNAL DE ANGOLA, "to do everything possible to avoid a
- repetttion of the same problem next year. We cannot get along forever on improv-
isation--at least, if we are serious about our production plans. Once again, the
coffee harvest suffered from the inadequacy of transport, in addition to unfavorable
weather conditions."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
9516
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BURUNDI
' BRIEFS
FINANCE AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE--The M:Lnister of Foreign Affairs of Burundi, Lt
Col Edouard Nzambiamana, signed three conventions for financing involving aid
from the French FAC (Fund for Aid and Cooperation) to Burundi on 11 Dec~mber at
~ Bujumhura. These agreements bear on ~:he following subjects: (1) 2.5 million
~ Frer_ch francs for detailed prospectiz;; using geophysical and geochemical means in
the nor*hern zone of Kirundo and in tlie southern zone of Citega-Ruyigi. France
has contributed to the financing of a detailed study of mineral deposits in
- the northeast of Burundi. (2) 3.5 mi:llion French francs for commercial refores-
tation. This sum will make it possib:le to continue a reforestation program
covering 7000 hectares which was begu~i in 1979. (3) 3 million French francs to
protect the Kibira forest. This sum :;hould make it possible to reforest 180
hectares and open up 50 kilometers of additional trails. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 39] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1982J 9855
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CAPE VERDE
PEREIRA EXPRESSES HOPE ON RE'~ATIONS WITH BISSAU
PM080901 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18-31 Jan 82 pp 6-9
[Interview with Cape Verde President ~ristides Pereira by Simon Malley: "We
Are Prepared To Establish InterstatE~ Relations With Bissau on New Bases"--date
- and place not given]
_ [Excerpts) Cape Verde President Ari.atides Pereira was calm, but bitterness,
disappointment and a kind of pain could be detected in his words. The coup in
Bissau 14 November 1980 shook and shocked him deeply.
Indeed the reason why Aristides PerE~ira is still deeply affected by the military
coup is that he is extremely worried about its repercussions on the very future
of a nation, an ideal and a dream to which he has been so closely bound for
- several decades....
Is there not a danger that the cr.isis between the two capitals will grow worse?
Is a confrontation possible or inevitable? What interpretation should be given
to statements apparently made by the chairman of Guinea-Bissau's revolution
council, saying that he would seize Cape Verdian merchant ships by force? The
Cape Verdiati head of state prefers nut to overdramatize those statements, as
some sections of the Portuguese press have done:
"You see," he replied with a faint smile, "we have read such statements in the
Portuguese press. We find them surprising and hope that they are merely a
misinterpretation of various statements. We think it is inconceivable for a
head of state to talk in that way..,!
!
"The main point is that if the Bissau leaders showed sangfroid and realism they
would realize that our decision [to dissolve joint Guinea-Bissau-Cape Verde
_ Shipping C;ompany] is not hostile. They should tackle this problem, which
affects a vital aspect of our economy and trade, w ith the necessary lucidity.
_ When ttie ma,jority of partners no longer wants a company, how can anybody
legally oppose it? What about international law?"
fluwever, Aristides Pereira reEuses to spurn the future. Neither the bitterness
nor thc~ frustre~tton liE feels prevents him from hoping. And when we asked him
whettier the release of Luiz Cabral [Eormer president of Guinea-Bissau's
_ Council of State and deputy secretary of the PAIGC] is not an encouraging sign
dawning on the horizon of relations l~etween the two statest his answer revealed
that glimmer of hope which he does n~~t want to abandon:
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"Of course," he said, "Luiz Ca'oral's release is a good thing. It is a positive
factor for Guinea-Bissau. It reveals some commonsense on the part of the
Guinean leaders, and even a sense of responsibility, while demonstrating the
correctness of the position we had defended from the start. Of course, when
President Luiz Cabral was arrested, along with a numbPr of his comrades, we
~ were still members of the same party and my responsibility as PAIGC secretary
general made it my duty to express my opinion and condemn the coup d'etat
and the arrest of the leaders."
~ [Question] What about the other political prisoners?
- Aristides Pereira: Although we are no longer bound to the same party and hence
do no:. want to interfere in Bissau's internal affairs, we can nonetheless say
that, since the country's main leader has been released, we see no reason for
leaving the others in prison.... It is up to the Bissau leaders to shoulder
- their responsibilities,
We asked a final question on the crisis between the two countries. What about
the slander campaign or racist feeling being developed in Guinea-Bissau whose
main target is so-called "Cape Verdian colonialism"--a quarrel based on pre-
judices inherited from savage colonialism?
"We regret the fact," the Cape Verdian head of state replied, "that the Bissau
leaders have not learned from the Colonial past. Remember the history of the
_ national liberation war and how racism and tribai~~m were used for centuries
by the colonial system and particularly by the penultimate governor,
Antonio Spinola. That also appTies to the occupation and domination of
Guinea-Bissau by colonialism. I say that the Bissau leaders should return to
the lessons of the past, of our common history. The language used befure,
during and after their congress in Bissau was the language of racism. It
would be a terrible thing to unleaslz that process. It would be terrible and
dangerous because, once started, it is likely to bec~:me uncontrollable and get
out of the leaders' hands. Unfortunately that is a'_r~ady being seen in Bissau.
And that worries us a great deal because there are Cape Verdian citizens living
in Guinea and we sometimes feel con~:ern for their safety.
"Moreover, it must be remembered th,it racism can be whipped up by special
socioeconomic conditions. Unless it is stopped, and quickly, we are likely to
see a campaign whose results, we ar~~ sure, will do great damage to Guinea-Bissau
itself."
Aristides Pereira thought for a mom~:nt:
"I do not want to close this subjeci: on a pessimistic note. Al1ow me to tell
you that, although the events of 14 November were, I am sure, felt by both our
peoples as a very severe blow, it m~ist be admitted that we should be realistic.
The coup destzoyed the plan for unit:y to which we aspired so much. We must,
there~ore, act accordingly. The acliievements in the efforts to unite the two
9
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Cape Verdian and Guinea-Bissau peoples were not in vain and should not be
wasted. It is vital that the Bissau officials be realistic and aware of
that fact too. They must rQalize that, although everything was destroyed
- by the 14 I~ovember events, we must start again by other means. However,
if we are to start again we must first normalize relations between the
two states. The achievements by our two peoples form a capital which is
still real and which can be set in motion at any time provided a responsible
spirit is adopted. That is what I~~ranted to say, and it r~flects the deep
convictions of our people 3nd their leaders..."
The interview continued and dealt with many other subjects: Cape Verde's
role in normalizing relations between Dakar and Luanda, the situation in
southern Africa and in Chad, relati~~ns with France, the domestic situation....
We will continue its publication in our issue.
COPYRIGHT; 1981 Afrique-Asie
CSO: 4719/544
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M'l1R OMhIC1Al. li1r. UIV1.t
CAPE VERDE
CHUi:CH, PRIVATE INTERESTS SEEN AFFECTI'sD BY LAND REFORM
- London NEW AFRICAN in Engliah No 172, Jan 82 pp 18-19
~article by Colm Foy]
[E�CerptB] 1982 MAY WELL be ~ make or break With the problem but the document is
year for Cape Verde's agriculture. If Lhe 8uch a long and complex piece of legiela-
past years of these remarkable people tion that it has caused a great deal of
and their equally remarkable political confusion. Last October, one man was
leaders are anything to go by, then, killed and another injured when jittery
despite the enormous di~culties, C