JPRS ID: 10647 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080021-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10647 ~
~ ~July 1982
- ~haran Africa Re ort ~
Sub Sa p .
FOUO No. 780
_ F~I$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SE~VICE
C~
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NOTE
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other characteristics retained.
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mation was summarized or extract~dQ
Unfamiliar names rendered phor.etically or transliterated are
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' JPRS L/10647
~ 8 July 1982
SJ~~~AHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 780
CONTENTS
CAPE VERDE
~ Brief s 1
' EDF Teachers~ Training ~oan
CENTR.AL AFRSCAN REPUBI.IC
Information Minister Gives Views on Abortive Coup 2
(JEUNE AF'RIQTTE, 5 MaY 82)
CHAD
Role of Algerians Arriving in Chad Described '
(F`rancois Soudan; JEUNE AFRSqUE, 12 May 82) 3
- COMORO ISI,Ar1D8
Briefs . 6
F`inancial Situation Studied 6
Dollar Fluctuation Effects
GUINEA '
' Attempt on President~s T~'-fe Said To Have BeeS Mayide,Job�.���.� ?
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFR14UE, 82
GUINEA BISSAU
� EEC Approves .T~oans for ~.shing, Pro3ects, Health Services
11
(NiARCHFS TROPSCAIIX ET MEDITERRANEEN3: 3C~ ~ipr 82)........
MADAGASCAR
Sec~et Report by Mon~a Jaona Recounts Repression of Students 13
(8enne Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQ~~ 2L' Apr 82)
_a_ [III -NE&A- 120FOUOJ
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MALAWI
Bri ef s 15
New Railroad I,ine 1~
Petroleum Prospecting 15
Salaries Increased 15
press Holdings Group
xIOZAi~IQUE
Detai.ls of Coo~peration T~'ith France Reviewtsi 16
(MARCHES TR.OPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Apr 82)
. SENEGAL
- ~ 1}iou.f ~Shows Polit~ical Courage' in Makin12 Ma g82 in�PSa.����� 19
(S~rlviane Kamara; JEUNE AFRIQUE,. Y ~
Signifi~ance of Election of New CNTS Secretary Noted 21
(S~lviane Kamara; JEUNE AFR14UE, 5 Ma,Y 82) .......o....
, ,
New Territorial, Po7.itical, Administrative Organization ~3
(MARCHES TR.OPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Apr 82)
New Administrative Structure for GECAMINES, SOZA~~ 26
, (MAR,CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANF~EN3, 9 Apr 82)
Briefs 28
Port of Banana
- b -
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CAPE VERDE
BRIEFS
EDF TEACE~RS' TRAINING LOAN--An EDF ~Europeaa Development Fund] training pro-
gram (grant of [European Currency LTnite] 550,000 ECUs), for th~ period 1981-
1985 envisages provision of grants for in country studies and for training
courses for teschers and the supply of teaching equipment. The first facet
involves elementary and secondary schoolteachers, while the second concerns
materials for scientif ic and technical courses (physics, chem~.stry, biolagy,
geology, drawing, laboratory equipment, scieatif ic pu~lications). [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERxADTEENS in French vo 1903, 30 Apr 8~ p
1138) [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
CSO: 4719/906
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
~
T_::FORMATION MIIQISTER GIVES VIEWS ON ABORTIVE COUP
, Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1113, 5 May 82 p 61
~L'ex~ There are some Frenchmen who wish us harm." Ttao months later, and
for the first time, a member of the party in power in Bangui has commented oa
Ange Patasse's failed putsch. Lt Col Christophe Grelombe, the gover~ent's
secretary general and minister of information, has the reputation--even if lie
denies it--of being the leader of the "hawks" on the military committee.
Here are the main excerpts from what he t~ld us. .
The failed coup d'etat of' 3: March: "It is to be explained by Patasse's
- devouring ambition, the multiple debts ne had promis~d to repay once in
power, and the well-known negligence of the generals who attempted to carry
out the putsch for him. M'Ba~.koua was a retired military nan and Bozize an
obscure officer whom Bokassa had promoted because he carried his cane."
F*-~nch "collusion": "We diff erentiate between the behavior of certain
Fre~�chmen who wish u> harm and the historical ties which ~oin our two coun-
tries~ Certainly, Minister for Cooperation ~Tean-Pierre Cot has never visited
us. That is his af�air. After all, he does not have exclusive responsi-
bility for France's African policy." (Postponed several times, J-P Cot's
visit is planned ~ for July 1982 .~ILDR) .
The risk of disturbances in the "Patassite" areas of the north: "There will
be no destabilization. The army is ready to intervene energetically. That
having been said, we are a united na~tion, and regionalism is a bavbaric no-
tion."
The Mobutu-Kolingba axis: "T~e have special relations with Zaire. But
ther e~s noth{.ng extx~ordinary about ~hat. We are neighbors, after all."
The return of civilians to power: ."We will see in due time: For the time~
beia g, it is out of th~ question. ~ome people are putting pressure on us
to go in this direction; they forget that harmony in a country is not
ach iev ed by political theory."
COPYR.IGHT: �Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
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_ CfiAD
ROLE OF ALGERIANS ARRIVING IN CIiAD DESCRIBED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Freach No 1114, 12 May 82 pp 36, 37
~rticle by Francois Soudan: "Can Allies From the North Save Goukouni
a Second Time? The Algerians Arrive'?
[R`ex~ Like the Moroccans before them in Shaba, the Tanzanians in Uganda,
and the Libyans in Chad, the Algerian armed forces have thus "gone outside"
their borders. For the first time in Africa, if one ~excludes their partici-
pation in the October 1973 Suez Canal war. Not to the same extent, of course,
~ nor with the same tasks as their predecessors; there were about 200 of theaa,
and their ob~ective was not to become directly in~olved in the f ighting.
Where? In Nd~ ~mena, Douguia, Ati.--thus in Chad. In Chad, furt'hermore,
which seems forever fated to suffer foreign intervention. .'.Approximately half
of these commissioned and noncommissioned off icers, brought in over the
last f ew weeks by regular Hercules C-130 flights to and from ~ouguia (80
km north of Hdjamena) are simply technical assistants: dc~ctors for the armed
forces or engineering specialists responsib~e fnr repairing the main roads
which link th e Chadian capital with the easterr~ front, and for ensuring--in
collaboration with French technicians--the maintenance of the Nd3amena air-
port.
The o~hers, some 150 men, are divided into three groups: "advis~;rs"
properly speaking, who are training Goukouni's troops in the handiing of heavy
and medium arms (machineguns, RPG-7 rocket launchers, Katyushas mounted on
Toyota Land Cruisers); staff officers in charge of organizing the leadership
staff of the Integrated National Army (as the Cubans did before them in
_ Angola and tlie East Germans in Ethiopia); and finalPy personal security
specialists, a sort of bodyguard-advisers assigned directly to Goukouni
Weddeye. .
_ _ - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ - -
. - - -
Th3s "inter~ention," discreet for the time being, is being added to that--
off icial intervention--of the 16 army personnel sent by Algeria as observers
of the OAU peacekeeping force and to the few civilians--much lesa conspicuous--
given the task of transforming the FROLINAT (Chadian National Liberation
Front) into a structured and centralized political party, along the lines of
the Algerian FLN.
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No doubt the decision by the OAU's Standing Committee on Chad on 11 February
in Nairobi, enjoining Goukouni to neootiate with his fraternal enemy Hissein
Habre, had something to do with the haste in which the Chadian presic!ent
went off in search of further outside assistauce. But it is above all the
failure of the counteroffensive, which he personal~.y supervised, that was
conducted by his troops against the FAN [Northern Armed Force~ in th e Oum
Hadjer area at the beginning of March, which seems to have convinced him of
the impossibility of fighting alone against Habre's men, who are better
organized and more mot~ivated--particularly as the complete lack of coopera-
tion by the "southerners" of Kamougue and the very considerable permeability
of the security cordon thrown around Ndj amena by the OAU contingent left him
hardly ~ny choice other than to turn toward Tibesti or the help of a"brother
country."
The Libyans having left, and the E~~Tiiopisns--hinted at since December--having
other upxisings to fight in Eritrea, the hand that was stretched out was
theref~re Algerian. Or, more exactly, Franco-Algerian. Because Paris, since
"the Caacun appeal" launched on 22 October 1981 by Francois Mitterrand, has
not resigned itself to giving up the one to whom it had promised total support.
A matter c+f hanoring one's cammitments, no doubt, but also a desire to main-
tain Goukouni irc an honorable position in the event of a long war against
Habre or of negotiatio~s with him. After having supplied the GUNT ~`ransi-
tional National Union Governmen~ with about Fr 400 million in military
materiel between October ann F~r:bruary, Paris favored Algerian intervention.
If Algiers, which in turn has resolved not to become mired down in the
Chadian bogs appears anxious to obtain pledges in Ndjamena vis-a-vis
Tripoli, there is no doubt that Chadli Bend~ edid has no desire to see him-
self accused at the OAU of "outside interference."
France--which is the petitioner in this affair--probably promised him that
it wou'ld do eve:.ything necessary to allay the fears aroused in its moderate
continental frt.ends, even if this entails emphasizing the assistance--much
more modest so far: a few Land Rovers--supplied by Morocco to Hissein Habre.
Convinced of the reliab ility of the Frer.~h "coverage"--Paris ambassador to
~ Algiers, Guy C:orgy, thoroughly familiar with the Chadian dossier, for which
he was responsible at the Quaid'Orsay, no doubt spared no effort to this end--
the Algierians consequently organized, as of mid-March, the f irst C-130
flights to Douguia (as many as three a day). ~
On 16 March, Adoum Togoi, GUNT minister of defense, and Ngollobaye Allafi,
commander in chief of the Integrated National Army, traveled to Algiers to
refine the technical details of this assistance. On 25 March, an FAN spokes-
man in Europe announced that a force equivalent to two Algerian battalions, ,
that is to say 1,500 men, was sent by truck from Douguia to the Ati front.
Algiers 3eni~d it. Not without rQason, moreover, since the number was grossly
exaggerated, including at that time, one zero too many. All the same, the
Algerians are there, and Goukouni himself does not deny the fact. He stated
that in mid-~April: "We believe that the Algerian Government and the Algerian
people will continue to exert themselves to assist the Chadian people in
freeing themselves of the war imposed upon them by international imperialism.
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We ar e f irmly counting on thi~ support, and we hope that it will become
increasingly substantial." One could hardly be clearer.
~n Sunday 2 May it was learned from official sou~ces in Nd~amena that a
segment of the Nigerian contingent of the OAU force had withdrawn. It is
possible that the Zairians an~d Senegalese will follow suit before the wet
season (i.e., be~ore July), which makes all ground evacuation impossible.
Goukouni has thesefore lost, unless the Chadian president is saved for a
second time by a friend from th~e north: a colonel, like the one before him.
Even if the former has neither Green Book nor Islamic Legion, he has an army
with a diff erent sort of eff ectiveness.
COPYRIQiT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
9824
CSO: 4719/937
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COMORO ISLANDS
_ BRTEFS
FINANCIAL SITUATION STUDIED--From 13 to 17 March, at the request of President
of the Republic Ahmed Abdallah, a delegation led by Bernard Vinay, inspector
general of oyerseas affairs, assisted by Miss Chantal Vie, conducted a study
of the financial situation of the Comoro Islands. They reviewed all elements
of financial activity with officials of the Comoran Government and administra-
tions: federation, governorates, public establishments, state corporations
and mixed economy entities. This assistance which the French Government has
given the Comoran Government in gaining a detailed understanding of all as-
pects of the domestic financial situation reflects the desire to reexamine
the conditions of financial aid to improve its effectiveness. The Comoran
_ Government had recently announced (see MARCHES TROPICAUX No 1897 of 19 March
1982) a number of corrective financial measures whose effectiveness will be
enhanced by this latest detailed study. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Apr 82 p 1165] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1982J 9920
DOLLAR FLUCTUATION EFFECTS--Electricity supply in Moroni was seriously
affected in March by a decline in petroleum stocks. This was caused in part
by the changes in the dollar exchange rate. The rise in the dollar has had
unanticipated effects on regularity in the fulfillment of delivery contracts
from the Arab Gulf. Between the time the funds transfer order is prepared and
the transfer is actually carried out the dollar rate has made the funds insuffi-
cient to cover the supply ordered. The delay involved in obtaining a supple-
mentary transfer also holds up the departure of the tanker. This variation in
the dollar rate also affects execution of the loan con::racts subscribed by the
Comoran Government in order to carry out its program of ma3or infrastructure
projects to give the country modern equipment. The settlement of interlocking
int2rests is also affected, and the additional delay in arriving at an o~verall
I settlement corrESpondingly delays the issuance of later installments of the
loans. Business finances suffer, as well as the work completion schedules.
- [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Apr 82 p 1165]
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GUINEA
ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT'S LIFE SAID TO HAVE BEEN INSIDE JOB
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in'~FYench No 1113, 5 May 82 pp 22-24
~rticle by Sennen Andriamirado: "Sekou Toure Abandoned by His Family'r
[Excerpt~ The master of Conakry has escaped a new
assassination attempt. This time the crime seems to
have been instigated by those in his imonediate
entourage.
"We congratulate the comrade who renovated the premises of the future embassy
of the Popular Revolutionary Republic of Guinea in France. We aolemnly and
warmly invite him to Conakry for the installation ceremonies on 14 May for the
supreme guide of th e revolution, Ahiaed Sekou Toure, after his reelection."
An outcry is heard in the room. Hubbub; then a voice cs~lls out: "But com-
rade, Sekou has not even been reelected S~et, and you are already announcing
his installation?'.'
It was Sunday 18 April, in an assembly room on Censier Street in Paris, 3
~ weeks before the elections on 9 May which were to conf irm Ahmed Sekou Toure
~ at the head of Guinea. The Association of Guineans in France, in favor of the
regime, was giving a reception that day for a craftsman wh~ had completely
redecorated a certain hotel on Faisanderie Street--the Guinean Embassy until
November 1965 (the time of the breaking of diplomatic relations with France),
since occupied by Cuba, and today once more taken over to house the .
Conakry delegat~.on. The meeting that night turned rowdy; even among Sekou
Toure's unwavering supporters there is a sensitivity to protocol and, by
definition, a future election is not yet won.
- He had time to shout: "I've come to avenge Kabassan!"
Moreover, Sekou Toure very nearly did not show up at all. A few days earlier--
8 or 15 May, according to the sources, but "a Thursday"--he had once again
escaped an assassination..attempt. As uaual, the fact was not given off icial
coniirmation. It is nonetheless undeniable. That morning, as the guide of
the revolution was preparing to leave the presidential palac~ (where he
resides) for the Peo~~ole's Palace (where he works) , a young man ~umped over th~
surrounding wall an~l ran toward the private apartments. Intercepted by the
guards, he killed one outri~ght--cutting his throat, sccording to some sources;
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. rvx ~rri~.iAL u~~, vi~t.Y
with an automatic pistol, according to others--~nd wot~nded Aevarr~l ~ c�>r of
whom died during the day. He wae overpawered but had tlme to shout: "I'vc
cocne to avenge Kabassan," before he was sent off to an unknown destination.
Kabassan? The person in question is Abrahaffi Kabassan Keita, dismissed im
March from his duties as minister of public works, marine commander, and
head of the "special departments" (one of the political police forces).
Reason: diverting public funds, with the complicity, it seems, of the
minister of banks. The dismissal of the two men was effective as of 18 March,
but the decision was not "legalized" until 2 April. That Friday morning,
President Ahmed Sekou Toure called a 3oint mee~~ng at the People's Palace "
of the Central Committee of the PDG (Democratic Party of Guinea) and of the
Council of Ministers.
The walls of "OAU City" have been built. Inside, nothing.
As minister of public works, Abraham Kabassan Keita coordinated the first
operations preparatory to the holding of the 20th OAU summit in C~~nakry
(provisionally in May 1983). With material aid frnt~ the North Korcuns, the
_ walls of "OAU City" have been put up. Inside, there is nothing. The supply
of cement has been exhausted. Furthermore, by order of Kabassan, 5,572 drums
of bitumen were removed without explanation from the storage warehouses,
and 1,187 others are simply missing from the inventory. On the other hand,
the minister of public works,..on his own authority, had a superb villa
built at Conakry, and three others at Pita, Kankan, and Kissidougou, respec-
tively. Besides the supplies are the funds; the interior modeling of these
personal residences cost several million, and credit for 800,000 leones (1
- Sierra Leone leone = approximately CFR Fr 300), entrusted to :abassan's
management, was spent without vouchers. Altogether, combining goods and ,
funds, the amount diverted would amount to 20 million silys (1 sily is the
theoretical equivalent of CFR Fr 10).
No sooner had the indictment of [,fnterior Ministe~ Sekou Cherif been com-
pleted when Abraham Kabassan Keita, who had "betrayed the conf idence of the
people and of the Supreme Guide of the Revolution," was unaimously condemned.
The verdict fell: "By decision of the Central Committee and of the Council
of Ninisters, Comrade Abraham Kabassan Keita is expelled from the Central
Committee of the PDG and relieved of his duties as minister of public works.
Commander Abraham Kabassan Keita is dismissed and removed from the ranks of
thP officers of the Popular Armed Forces." An additional inquiry was ordered.
The condemnation smacks of a settling of scores.
While awaiting the f indings, Kabassan was arrested and commi.tted to the cus-
tody of the Conakry police force. An ordinary procedure, indeed a legal
one, were it not that another incident which arose at the beginning of the
year gave this condemnation the appearance of a settling of scores.
At the time, Kabassan, still the minister of public works, was receiving
representatives of international financial backers who had come to make
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inquiries abo~xt the utilization of their finances. In substance he said
to them: "You ask me for an evaluation of the work! But nothing has been
done! For my part, I have seen precious little of your aid."
+ Paradoxically, the "easing up" :~as strengthened the opposition.
= Contrary t~ the advice of those close to him, he maintained the s~~me position
- before President Sekou Toure and--more seriously--in the presence af foreign
experts! At the time he indicated that other~ministers--in this cas~~, the
' minister of urban affairs and housing and the minister of economic anci
financial affairs--were "perhaps" better informed than he concerning the use
of this foreign aid. It was that day, no doubt, that Kabassan sealed his
own fate. For he broke the truce between Sekou Toure's two family groups:
i "the clan of brott~ers" and that of "brothers-in-law."
~ The driving force in the f isst group is the president's half brothers,
Ismael Toure (minister of mines) and Siaka Toure (transport); one of the
- most loyal of them isthis very Abraham Kabassan Keita. The second clan
- joins together the close members of his wife's family: Sekou Cherif (minis-
ter. of internal affairs) , Moussa Diakite (urban affairs and housing) , and
- Seydou Keita (youth). Sekou has always governed (and eliminated) by gaining
= the support now of one, now of the other clan. He had already tried to
~ oust Ismael Tou~;.e in April 1979, but had had to give up the attempt under
family presssre. Nevertheless, Sekou succeeded in relieving his other
brother, Siakou Toure, of the cam~?and of the sinister Camp Boiro by appointing
- him minister of telegraph and communications, then of transport. This time,
after having dismissed Kabassan, he tried the same tactic by proposing to
the same Siaka Toure at th e beginning of April 1982 a post as regional gover-
- nor. The "~lan of brothers" reacted violently and called on some aunts to
- arbitrate.
The "family"--brothers and brothers-in-law, with Sekou at their head--was
summoned to Faranah, the original f ief..The verdict of the elders, both male
and female: Siaka was to stay in his ~ob. A slight success, since Kabassan
had been not only dismissed but arrested, while his supporters' desire for
vengeance found expression in the ridiculous attempt to assassinate Sekou
Toure, caught in a vice between the two clans of his family whom he had set
one against the other for too long.
Th e opposition's part in all th is? It denies any involvement in the attempt,
either direct or indirect--without hiding the fact, on the other hand, that it
has not disarmed. It ~~as thought that the "easing up" proposed by Sekou
Toure in March 1978 would weaken the opposition. The result has been t'ne
opposite. On 14 May 1980, Sekou escaped a grenade attack. Responsibility
for the attempt was claimed by a mysterious Patriotic Front, of whose exis-
tence the external opposition denied any knowledge. But from Brussels, the
opposition, as a group, had been publishing a communique proclaiming: "This
act of great political import must occur again as soon as possible."
It did happen agair.,. On Z1 February 1981, when Sekou Toure was to go by plane
for an official visit to Central Afzica, "bombst� exploded at Conakry
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_ international airport. No one claimed responsibility for the attack. But
the Patriotic Front was once again suspected.
_ The "armed wing of the interior."
A year later, the notorious Front is less mysterious. Since the end of
March 1982, Conakry has been inundated with tracts this time racognizing the
ties between the external opposition as a whole and "its armed wing of the
interior, the Patriotic Front." They call plainly for a popular uprising
and the "liquidation of the PDG-Sekou Toure." Even if the initials PDG are
those of the party alone, one cannot help thinking that the liquidation in
question also cancerns the head of state physically. The call has been
heard: Perhaps not by those whom the opposition was addressing.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
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GUINEA BISSAU
EEC APPROVES LOANS FOR FISHING, PROJECTS, HEALTH SERVICES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ?~3DITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 pp
1137, 1138
[Text] On 20 April, the European Development Fund's Committee gave a favorable
ruling on new pro3ects which will benefit ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacif ic]
countries. These pro~ects are as follows for Guinea Bissau (amounts given in
ECUs [European Currency Units]; 1 ECJ = around 6.2 French francs):
--Development of traditional fishing industry in Cacheu (a grant of 1.5 million
ECUs and a special loan of 470,000 ECUs).
The purpose of this project is to develop traditional fishing in the region
of Cacheu, located in the furthermost northwest part of the country, by means
of several operations intended to increase the amount of fish caught for
domestic consumption, to improve the fishermen's earning capacity and their
living conditions, to create new 3obs in that sector and to expand the distri-
bution network for f ishing products. To achieve this goal, there is a program
to introduce power-driven boats and to increase the number of f ishing vessels;
a program to improve traditional fishing methods and to provide f ishing equip-
ment, and plans to improve the infrastructures for storage and marketing and
to give te~chnical assistance in the execution of the project and in the train-
ing of national cadres. ~
The transition to power-driven boats will be done throagh a~redit system in
conjunction with training on maintenance and repair work. A supply cooperative
will provide the fishing equipment. The pro3ect includes a technical support
facility which will have a sma.'~1 ice factory with silos, a cold storage room,
a wasliing and processing room and so on. This facility will be built after
a speeded-up call for bids; there wi11 be an international call for bids for
the generators and the outboard motors; the boats and fishing tackle will be
purchased after restricted ~onsultations. Some 20 f ishing boats wi]1 be
equipped each year. for a period of 5 years and on a normal year the~Lr output
is expected to be 2,500 tons of dried f ish.
Medical facilities and supply of equipment ( grant of 1.9 million ECUs). The
purpose of this proj ect is to increase the medical infrastructure of Guinea
Bissau by building two local hospitals, each with 34 beds, and four health
centers in localities of the center and east of the country (local hospitals
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in Quebo and Cosse and health centers in Xitole, Pontaingles, Bambadinea and
Banta). The aim of thi~ project is similar to that of the pre~;ious Fourth EDF
Project, namely, to improve health services--to prevent as well as to cure
illness--in rural areas which so fax have been very neglected. To attract
the interest of health personnel, housing will be provided for doctors and for
other ~edical staff. Each hospital will have a pavillion for tuberculosis
patients (10 beds), two hospital wards for general patients (18 beds), a
maternity ward (6 beds), a section for doctors' off ices and treatment clinics,
a laboratory, a pharmacy and annex sections. All these facilities will be
equipped in a simple but functional way. They will be built after a speeded
up call for bids is issued and, for the equipment, there will be an interna-
tional call for bids.
GOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
8796
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MADAGASCAR
SECRET REPORT BY MONJA JAONA RECOUNTS REPRESSTON OF STUDENTS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Apr 82 p 76
[Article by Senme Andriamirado: "Confidential Report to President Ratsiraka"]
[Text] The doctunent of which we are publishing a part was to be classified
"state secret" in 2 weeks by the Malagasy Government (along with other material
on the same subject). It wil? not be so classified, because we are publishing
it--in advance.
What is it about? It is a two-and-a-half page letter (in Ma.lagasy) dated
17 March 1982 to President Didier Ratsiraka from the senior member of the
Supreme Revolutionary Council and, by virtue of this position, the second
ranking state official, Monja Jaona. In the letter, the elderly leader of the
Monima Party--who, among other things, organized the peasant revolt in 1971--
reports on the fatal clashes at the beginning of March in the town of Sambava
(northeast coast), clashes of which the Madagascar public is not aware. The
_ following, summarized in French, covers the essentials in the history of these
riots protesting corruption and the bla~k market as reported by the second
highest official in the Democratic Republic of M�adagascar.
~ For several w~eks (in February), the students of Sambava General College had
been demanding an explanation �rom the local authorities: Their families had
contributed far construction of a new classroom, but construction had never
started and the money had...disappeared. No official explanation, from either
the college.or the town officials. Instead, promises of a meeting which were
never kept by the chairman of the People's Executive Co~nittee (an elected
"prefect"). One day (the document does not say which day), after having waited
for 2 hours for this fine chairman who had again promised to come to the
General College to explain, the angry students decided to march on the town.
They seized and wrecked the Peogle's Coimmittee offices. The next day, the
- money was "found" in the committee's treasury: 5,978,422 Malagasy francs (the
equivalent in francs CFA) borrowed by a merchant. The students stopped their
strike and demonstration. A few days later, students of the town's high school
in turn demonstrated also demanding a~n explanation of the use of their school's
funds. They also complained of shortages, convinced that some town merchants,
protected by the officials, were holding back products in order to sell them
on the black market, naturally at a higher price. On 5 March these young peo-
ple forced their way into shops and found large stocks of items which could not
be faund on the shelves. On 6 March, the merchants and businessmen persuaded
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the authorities to impose a curfew. On Sunday, 7 March, pol~.ce and soldiers
were station~d around the town.
The tragedy, the killing, came on the following day, 8 March. Soldiers in
combat uniform, but armed only with clubs, arrived at the General College at
0700 to disperse students arriving normally for their classes. Exchange of
insults. Stoning. Outnumbered, thc. soldiers retreat, but one of them has
been killed and another seriously injured. A half-hour later, several trucks
pull up in front of the school carrying police and soldiers, this time well
armed. They open fire. The unequal battle lasts from 0800 to 1100 hours.
Four students are killed, others seriously wounded. Some are drowned in try-
ing to escape across the nearby river, still others reach the forest, where
they are tracked by the special commandoes. Order reigns again in Sambava.
The merchants are satisfied with the performance of the forces of order which
call themselves socialist and revolutionary.
Monja Jaona's report concludes with a general view of the economic and politi-
~ cal situation in Madagascar: Shortages prevail, the Malagasy people are in
despair, and they are not informed about riots and repression. This is no
doubt why Didier Ratsiraka wanted to stamp this document "state secret," since
it raises too many questions about the government's readiness to open fire on
the students, and also to protect the champions of the black market who are
making their fortunes in the name of a socialist revolution, which is in fact
a revolution never begun. ~
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
9920
CSO: 4719/949
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MALAWI
, BRIEFS
NEW RAILROAD LINE--The rail line recently built in Malawi with Canadian
financing, linking Lilongwe with Mchin3i near the Zambian border, opened
to passenger and freight traffic on 1 February. Freight traffic has been
running on a trial basis since last July. Elsewhere, traffic should be re-
duced by close to a third during the next few months on the Beira-Blantyre
lin~, due to repair work on part of the track. It has been recommended that,
as far as possible, freight forwarders direct to Nacala some traffic which
generally passes through Beira. /'Fext] /garis MARQiES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITER~tANEENS in ~F~tench No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97~ ~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Pa'ris 1982~ 9693
PETROLFUM PROSPECTING--During its visit to Malawi in June 1981, an American
scientific expedition from Duke University (North Carolina) identif ied areas
in Lake Malawi which might hold petroleum. This is why the Government of
Malawi has signed an exploration contract with Shell which should enable
the country's petroleum potential to be accurately defined. Three-quarters
(30,000 square kilometers) of the lake belongs to Malawi, while the remain-
ing quarter is in Mozambique. ~Tex ~~aris MARCHES TT.OPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97.~ [~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982~ 9693
~ SALARIES INCREASED---Minimum wages in the public and private sectors in
Malawi were increased by 15 percent as of 1 February 1982. The respective
increases are: from 70 to 81 tambalas (1 Kwacha = 100 tambalas = 6.6 French
francs) per day in the cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe; from 60 to 69
tambalas per day in the other cities; and from SO to 58 tambalas per day out-
side the urban regions. /.~ext~.[~aris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97~ [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.]
9693
PRESS HOLDINGS GROUP--The Press Holdings Group, wh~ch until now has been
privately owned by President Banda, has been made a statutary body. You
will recall t-hat through its subsidiaries (about 20) and related companies
(about 30), the group controls the key sectors of Malawi's economy. [fiext]
~aris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p
977~ [~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982~ 9693
CSO: 4719/929 ,
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MOZAI~IQUE
DETAILS OF COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1170
[Text] A general cooperation agreement between France and Mozambique--the
f irst of its kind to be concluded with an African country since President
~ Francois Mitterrand took office--was signed in Maputo, in mid-December, by
Jean-Pierre Cot, minister for cooperation, and by Mario Machungo, his Mozam-
bique counterpart (see MARCHLS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1885 of 25
December 1981, page 3449). By this agreement, it was decided, among other
things, to set up a 3oint conomnission which will meet every 2 years and hold
its f irst meeting in 1982.
This first meeting, which we announced in our last issue, page 1112, was ~eld
in Paris on 19 and 20 April. Eagerly awaited by both sides, the purpose of
this meeting was, in the words of Jean-Pierre Cot, to eaable this bilateral
cooperation "to gain momentum" while in Maputo it was thought that it would
contribute ta "establish French-Mozambican rel~tions for future years," rela-
_ tions which have already made new progress since the socialist government came
to power in France last year.
On a more pedestrian level, the purpose of the meeting was, as is known, to
decide how to use the cradit of 700 million francs allocated for the import
to Mozambique of French goods and services which represent the "second stage"
of bilateral economic cooperation providing for higher volume of loans along-
side easier terms for these loans, some of which are spread over a 7-year
period. A first line of credit was used to f inance a high-voltage power line
going from the Cabora-Bassa Dam to the north of Mozambique and built by CGE-
Alsthom.
On the eve of the meeting, a member of Mr Machungo's delegation noted that
~ Mozambique wanted to apply the bulk of these credits to large agricultural and
industrial pro3ects and to infrastructure projects particularly in the spheres
of railroad transportation and telecommunications.
The French proposals were for the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to
double it~ ~inancial co~nitments to Mozambique f.n 1982-1983 and for the
French Ministry of External Relations [for Cooperation] to treble its credits
- to that country.
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A significant event in the m-eting of the joint commission was the signing of
~ agreements for the execution of five projects:
--Modernization of the railroad line linking the gort of Nacala with Entre-
lagos, on the Malawi border.
--Establishment of a training school for railroad personnel.
--Creation of an agricultural mechanization center in Milalene, 75 l~s from
Maputo. .
--Building of an agro-industrial development comple~ on the middle course of
the Incomati.
--Setting up of a fund to conduct feasibility studies on the cooperation pro-
j ects .
It must also be noted that an agreement on food aid to Mozambique is under
study. This is something absolutely essential in view of the adverse weather
conditions suffered by the country (a drought in the nc;rtih and torrential
rains in the south have destroyed part of this year's crops) and given its
economic dif~f iculties which, as Mario Machungo pointed out, "are compounded
by the destructive activities of South African-trained gangs."
The expansion of French-Mozambi.can cooperation also requires that a solution
be brought to a problem which was discussed by the joint commission: the im-
balance of trade between the two coux~tries. The table below, which gives a
brief comparative picture of trade between France and Mozambique, is revealing
in this respect. Figures are given in 1,000 francs; by "exports" one must
understand F.O.B. exports from France to Mozambique; by "imports" one must
understand C.A.F. imports to France from Mozambique.
Exports Imports
~980 ~ 1981 1980 1981
Agricultur~l and food products 58,055 103,309 23,459 16,898
Semimanufactured products & 38,825 217,727 283 1,660
intermediary goods
Raw materials 1,097 6,413 1,588 8,645
~ Capital goods 99,391 86,206 72 24
~ Consumer goods 17,443 22,479 18,798 28,066
Total 214,$11 432,134 44,200 55,293
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This table indicates two phenomena: on the one hand, a much faster rate of
increase for exports (101.16 percent increase from 1980 to 1981) than for im-
ports (25.09 percent increase fro:a 1980 to 1981); on the other hand, and as a
result of the preceding, an increase in the amount of cover rates (485,99
percent in 198U and 781.53 percent in 1981). For agricultural products and
_ fandstuffs, the cover rate jumped from 247.47 percent in 1980 to 611.36
percent in 1981; for raw ~materials, from 69.08 percent to 74.18 percent on the
other hand, the cover rate for consumer goods declined from 92.79 percent to
80.09 pexcent from one year to the other; for semi-manufactured and interme-
diary products and for equipment goods, there is total imbalance of trade.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
8796
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SENEGAL
DIOUF 'SHaWS POISTICAL COURAGE' Yn MARING CHANGES IN PS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in ~rench No 1114, 12 May 82 p 29 .
~rticle by Sylviane Kamara: "The Moralization Measures Affecting the
Country Should Not Spare the Socialist Party in Power; Abdou Diouf Sweeps
in Front of Ais Door'.r] �
/L~xcerpt~ Nine months away from the presidential and legislative elections,
the secretary general of the Socialist Party (in power), Abdou Diouf, is
more than ever determined to introduce change into the ranks of his own
group. Already, at the co~nunal and regional level, administrators who
thought they were f irmly ensconced in their armchairs have had to give up
their seats. "Renewal has begun, and it will continue," Abdou Diouf told
us. "It is up to the people to decide. It is up to them to choose their
men. Freely, but with discipline." This "grasroots democracy" spares no
~ one. It was seen 18 April in the defeat of the minister of social action,
Babacar Di~gne, whom the activists of the National Confederation of the
Workers of Senegal (CNTS), affiliated with the PS, did not reelect to his
duties as secretary general, prefer'ring Do him the number two man, Madia Diop ~
(J.A. No 1113). This phenomenon can be observed at different levels of the
party. It is not to everyone's taste.
For two reasons: it is the party in power, and it is therefore through it
that one can "arrive." On the other han~, unquestionable laxity had set in.
People closed their eyes. But since the establishment of the court for the
elimination of illegal enrichment and the arrests which followed the budgetary
appropriations affair (J.A. No 1101), they opened them wide.
"As president," Abdou Diouf informed us, "I must fight against all injustices.
Now it is un~us~ and shocking that in an underdeveloped country like ours,
a privileged f ew maintain a lifestyle out of proportion to their merits or
the services render.ed to the nation. The fact that they are in the party does
not change a thing# they should submit to ~the law. I know that the purifica-
tion of our political morals will~rause some anxiety and arouse reactions of
fear. We will exercise restraint in carrying on the fight against corruption.
But no one will be sheltered." Since the PS numbers several black sheep in
its ranks, the purge should 3e of major concern to it. The comanent is heard
in those quarters which feel aff ected that it is "a smart way for the secre-
- tary general to get rid of any who are troublesome--to settle scores with
the representatives of 'the other tetd encies."
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Abdou Diouf's position is certainly an uncomfortable one. The Senegalese
expect him, as head of state, to pursue the struggle against corruption to
the end but, as secretary general of the party, he runs the risk of being
accused of eliminating potential rivals. The advantages of the purifica-
tion campaign are at the same time economic, moral, and political in the
strongest sense of the word. Its disadvantages stem from the politicking
of politicians. Abd:.u Diouf has a choice to make. "I wi11 fo llow the noblest
course," he aff irmed, "and believe me, I have no scores to settle with anyone."
The mode of operation of the Socialist Party has always drawn ironic comments
from the opposition. Bailing out, remote control, and favoritism are said to
be the basic principles. People even go so far as to speak of "gangrene."
The term off ends Abdou Diou~, who prefers "unweildiness." "It is true that
in the past, and we are all to blame, information on what ought to be done
has been wrung from the PS leadership. Some activists expect me to make my
wishes known, to impose men or ideas. That is not my style. In the same
way that I have wanted openness so as to allow a larger number of people to
rejoin our ranks, I want internal democracy. But it is diff icult!"
Because of the existence of divergent opinions, the secretary general
is taking a risk. Not a very big one, because his popularity is very great--
- he has many convinced around him--but enough to be put in an awkward situation
from time to time. As an opposition activist admitted: "Taking place a
few months from the elections, this push for democratization of the Socialist
Party is a f ine demonstration of political courage."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
9824
CSO: 4719/937
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SENEGAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF ELECTION OF NEW CNTS SECRETARY NOTID
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1113, 5 May 82 p 25
[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "The Trade Unions Are Moving"]
[Text) The winds of change are still blowing in Senegal. On 18 April, the
National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS)--which is affiliated with
the governing Socialist Party--elected a new secretary general: the 54-year
old Madia Diop. Mr Diop replaces Minister of Social Welfare Bab acar Diagne.
The latter, furious, left the conference hall before the end of the meeting
to demonstrate his dissent. The election is not without signif icance even
apart from this incident. According to law, the secretary general of the
CNTS automatically has a ministerial post, in the context of "responsible
participation." Doudou Ngom, who headed the central organ of the CNTS until
1977, was minister of national education. But on 18 April, this provision
was criticized for the f irst time, and the CNTS congress adopted a resolu-
tion--proposed by Madia Diop--specifying that the secretary general may no
longer be a member of the government. The CNTS reserves the right for itself,
on the other hand, to nominate members of the conf ederation's executive
committee--there are eight of them, representing two different trends--for
various ministerial posts related to the trade union movement: public
off ices, work and employment, etc. The secretary general, however, Madia
Diop told us, should be at the Labor Exchange. Experience has shown us how
harmful this plurality of offices is. Doudou Ngom and Babacar Diagne both
preferred their ministerial portfolios to the defense of the interEests of the
working classes. Furthermore, remote from the working world and without con-
tact with the rank and file, they reigned over the CNTS like dictators."
Madia Diop, who does not mince words, is a veteran trade unionist. An
accountant and the father of 14 children, he first took up the struggle at
~he age of 20 in the African Democratic Rally (RDA). A member of the
Senegalese Progressive Union (which became the socialist party) from its
inception, he joined the National Union of Senegalese Workers (the future
CNTS) in 1967. His time with the.railroads--whose workers are considered the
best organized in the country--gave him a taste for tough trade union battles.
He took over the Fec~eration of Food Industries at the 1977 CNTS congress.
This trade union is highly combative and--due to the number of its members--
the most important. Madia Diop has been a radical trade unionist and denuty
since 1978, but he was always kept out of the central leadership. "Although
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he was a member of the Socialist Party," they say in Dakar, "he was
'uncontrollable.' For ~iim the interests of the workers came before every-
thing else." This makes him very popular with the working class.
His recent election is no accident. Following the directives of the ch ief
of state, who is also secretary general of the Socialist Party, the democratic
game was played up to the hilt. President Abdou Diuof told JEUNE AFRIQUE:
"I said it was the turn of the rank and �ile activists, w"tiatever my own
preference may be." Apart from Babacar Diagne and the group he represents,
everyone has gained: not only--obviously--the workers, but aslo the govern-
ment, which now has someone to deal with who is a member of the Socialist
Party and enjoys wide support.
The secretary general of the Socialist Party--of whose executive committee
Mr Diop is now an ipso facto member--believes changes will be made in the
CNTS leadership. He also told us: "The styles and personalities of Mr Diop
and Mr Diagne are different. So are their methods of performing their duties.
Finally, and this is important, Mr Diop's election was based on a trade union
renewal."
What is not likely to change, on the other hand, is "responsible participa-
tion"--in other words the ties between the CNTS leadership, the Socialist
Party, and the government. Will Babacar Diagne, who was the symbol of these
ties for 5 years and who has now turned over his position in the PS executive
committee to Madia Diop, remain in the government? "I cannot answer that
question," says President Abdou Diouf, "but I do not foresee any changes in
ministerial posts for now.''
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
9855
CSO: 4719/952
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ZAIRE
IZEW TERRITORIAL, POLITICAL, ADMLDTISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
Paris MARCIiES TROPICAUX ET MEAITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 973
~ext] The territorial, political, and administrative
organization of Zaire, as well as methods for legislative,
regional, and municipal elections and the status of the
citq of Kinshasa, were the sub3ect of three important
statutes signed by President Mobutu Sese Seko on
25 February 1982. Here are the basic points of these
provisions, according to an analysis of the statutes by
CEDIOM in Brussels.
Territorial, Political and Administrative Organization
The first statute, which defines the territorial, political, and administra-
tive organization of the country, repeals legislation of 19 November 1977 and
20 January 1978 on the territorial and administrative organization of Zaire.
It conf irms the unitary democratic, social, and lay character of the republic
and its division into eight regions plus the city of Kinshasa.
The Region
- The region is a decentralized administrative unit with legal status and the
follflwing agencies: the Regional Co~ittee of the Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR); the Regional Assembly; the regional president of the MPR
and governor of the region.
The Regional Committee of the MPR is composed of: the regional president of
the MPR and the governor of the region designated by the president-founder of
the MPR; the deputy governor of the region, designated by the president-
founder of the MPR; the manager of the region; the urban commissioner; the
- regional secretary for mobilization, propaganda, and political animation;
the regional secretary for the status of women; the regional secretary of the
MPR Youth; the judge of the Court of Appeals; the commander of the military
region; the regional administrator of the National Research and Investigation
Center; the commander of the military district; the regional. secretary of the
National Union of Workers of Zaire (UNTZA); and the.regional chairman of th~
National Association of Zairian Enterprises (ANZEA).
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The Regional Assembly is a deliberative assembly which rules by decision. Tt
is composed of: one-third [are to b~ persons from the region appointed by
the president of the MPR, president of the Republic; representatives of the
urban councils elected to the s~cond level, with three members per Urban Coun-
cil; representatives of the rural zone councils.elected to the second level,
with one representative per zone; representatives appointed by business and
- special interest groups, with one representative per group (UNTZA, ANEZA,
ANAPEZA, and all of the recognized religious denominations). In general, the
_ Regional Assembly has the authority to rule on anything involving the region.
Its mandate is for 5 years.
Other Units
The subregions, urban and rural zones, and collectives are also administra-
tive districts, but without legal status. Their agencies are: a Subregional
Committee and a subregional chairman of the MPR for each subregion; an Urban
~ Committee and an urban MPR chairman for each city; a Popular Zone Committee,
Zone Council and chairman of the Popular Zone Committee and zone commissioner
for each zone; a Popular Committee of the Collective, Collective Council,
president of the Popular Committee of the Collective, and head of the Collec-
tive for each collective.
The City~of Kinshasa
_ Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, is a decentralized administrative unit with
legal status. It is subdivided into urban zones, which are subdivided into
districts. The capital's agencies are: the Regional Committee of the MPR,
the Regional Assembly; the regional chairman of the MPR and cit_~ governor,
appointed by the pressdent of th~ MPR, president of the Republic. The region-
a1 MPR chairman is assisted by two deputy governors appointed by the president
of the ~MPR.
'Z'he city's Regional Assembly is a deliberative assembly which rules by deci-
sion. It is composed of: one-third [a~e to be7 members appointed by the
president of the MPR, president of the republic; representatives of the urban
zone councils elected to the second level, with three members per zone;
representatives appointed by business and special interest groups, with one
representative per group (UNTZA, ANEZA, ANAPEZE, and all recognized religious
denominat ions) .
The Regional Assembly of the city of Kinshasa is elected for a term of 5
years; it meets twice a year.
The Urban Zone is a decentralized administrative unit with ledal status. It
is divided into districts and has the following agencies: a Popular Zone Com-
mittee; a Zone Council; a chairman of the Popular Zone Committee, and zone
- commissioner.
Districts are administrative districts composing the Urban Zone but have no
legal status. They are headed by district heads assisted by deputy district
heads.
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Division of Responsibilities
- The statute defines th e division of responsibilities between the Executive
Council and the decentralized units. All questions dealing with the country's
general policy and with national sovereignty are under the sole ~urisdictibn
of the central authority. These include the following, in particular: ~us-
tice; foreign relations; national defense; domestic and foreign state
security; commercial policy; economic stability; currency; the state budget;
the drafting~~of legislation; national equalizations; large national facili-
- ties, especially ports and airports; postal service and teleco~unications;
the ma~ar orientation of national development; overall planning; scientific
and technological research policy; education policy; economic sectors felt to
be strategic: mining, hydrocarbons, and energy; and national public enter-
prises.
COPYRIQiT: Rene Moreux at Cie Paris 1982.
9693
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r~K ~rri~.~n~, u~c vivLY
ZAIRE
NEW ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE FOR GECAMINES, SOZACOM
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN3 in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 974
/Tex~ We know that, at the:same time as some public enterprises are being
made private, Zairian authorities have decided to place General Quarries and
Mines Company (GECAMINES) and Zairian Compa~ny for the Marketing of Ores
(SOZACOI~fj under the overall authority of the president of the republic.
GECAMINES had previously been under the authority of the president, and
~ SOZACOM ~iad been7 under the departments of Commerce and of ~overnment Invest-
ment Holdings.
The new authority will be exercised through a committee composed of: the
state commissioner for finance and budget, the state commissioner for trans-
port and communications, the president's chief of staff, and the director of
the Bank of Zaire.
Unless otherwise expressly provided, authority will be exercised especially
over: the conclusion of labor and supply contracts; the organizing of ser-
vices, organizational structure, status of personnel, and pay scales, as well
as any modifications to them; the annual report; the establishment of branches
and off ices inside or outside Zaire; sales and acquisition of real estate
and stock; loans; investments or sales of financial holdings; the private
accounting program; the budget or forecast of income and expenditures; closing
statements; and the balance sheet.
The boards of directors of the two companies have also been changed. From
now on they will be composed as follows:
GECAMINES: the president and chairman of the board of GECAMINES; the ~
secretary of state for finance; Mr Nda-Ngye Mpia, staff adviser to the
president of the republic; the lst state commissioner's deputy chief of
staff; the assistant director of the Bank of Zaire; the head of the Depart-
ment of Mining; the president and chairman of the board of SNCZ [-Zairian
National Railroad Company7 and the p~esident and chairman of the board o�
ONATRA ~3lational Transportation Offic~ as representatives of the Depart-
ment of Transport and Communications; the president and chairman of the
board of SOZACOM; the technical manager and the financial manager of
GECAMINES.
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SOZACOM: the president and chairman of the board of SOZACOM; the secretary
of state for finance; Mr Nda-Ngqe Mpia, staff adviser to the president of the
republic; the lst state com~issioner's deputy chief of staff; the assistant
director of the Bank of Zaire; the head of the Department of Foreign
Commerce; the president and chairman of the board of GECAM[N~S; the techni~gl
manager and the f inancial manager of SOZACOM.
These decisions were the sub3ect of statutes No 82-011 and 82-013 of 27 Jan-
uary 1982 for GECAMINES,aond No 82-012 and 82-014 of the same date for
SOZACOM.
COPYRIGST: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
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h'U!i Ur'H'1l:lAL U,N. UNLY
ZAIRE
BRIEFS
PORT OF BANANA--The financing of additional studies on the port of Banana,
estimated at 4 million European units of account, was the subject of a meet-
. ing in Brussels last February which brought Zaire together with potential
providers of funds. France and Italy pledged to cofinance detailed port
stu~ies and city planning. Belgium will provide financing for studies of
electrical supply, while after the meeting of the joint German-Zairian Com-
mission, West Germany could pledge to finance the water supply project study.
Upon the request of the Executive Council, the European Development~Fund,
for its part, could finance studies on setting electrical rates for the port
and industrial plants. Zaire will assume the expenses for the study of the
Boma-Muanda highway. Furthermore, France and Belgium have confirmed their
agreement to grant technical assistance to OEBK (Organization for Equipping
the Banana-Kinshasa), and Japan has confirmed its interest in the study and
improvement of the Matadi-Boma railroad. [~`ex~ ~FarisCO yg~~TTRORene~
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 974] [ �
Moreux et Cie Paris 1982~ 9693
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