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December 4, 1979
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Director of {'cntral III te IIigcnrc Turkey: A Troubled Future A7F. 191.1-79 4 I)tremtvr 1979 Cor) 251 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 NIE 29.2-1-79 TURKEY: A TROUBLED FUTURE Information available as of 4 December 1979 was used in the preparation of this F'stimate. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT. Th. following inl llii nc. organlzatlons participai.d in the pr porallon of lh. Eslimat?r The Control Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence orponizotioni of the Departments of State and Defense, and the Nctional Security Agency. Also Participa+ingr The Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, Deportment of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intehligerxe, Department of the Air Force The Deportment of Commerce Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 CONTENTS Page SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 5 THE ATATURK LEGACY ............................................................................ 5 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION: A BALANCE SHEET .......... ................................................................................................ 5 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FLAWS ........................................................ 7 MUTUALLY REINFORCING CLEAVAGES ................................................ 8 Modernizing Center and Traditionalist Periphery ................................... 8 Sunnis and Alevis ............................................................................................ 8 Ethnic Turks and Kurds .............................................................................. 8 Class Cleavages ............................................................... ................................. 9 GROWING POLITICAL POLARIZATION ................................................. 9 FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION .......................................................... 11 Domestic Determinants .................................................................................. 11 International Factors ...................................................................................... 11 New Departures .............................................................................................. 12 TURKEY'S FUTURE .......................................................................................... 13 Growing Social Strains ................................................................................... 13 Slow Economic Recovery ................................................................................ 13 Continuing Violence ....................................................................................... 14 Can the Politicians Cope? ............................................................................. 14 Toward a More Authoritarian System? ...................................................... 14 What Role the Military? ............................................................................ 15 Whither Turkish Foreign Policy? ................................................................ 16 Conclusions and Unceri,.inties ........................................................................ 17 ill SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION The Turkish experiment with democratic rule has never been an easy one, given the weakness of some of the essential cultural, social, and economic underpinnings. Nevertheless, Turkish democracy has worked well in many important ways. Since 1950, when a truly free election first took place, Turkey has had frequent elections and democratic changes of government; a vibrant and broadly based multiparty system has developed; numerous organizations representa- tive of competing interests have emerged; and a freewheeling press has adopted the role of protector of Turkey's democratic achievements. At the same time, the strains of modernization, often muted in more authoritarian systems, have been magnified in Turkey by the pluralism that the democratic process both fosters and reflects. The Turkish polity has experienced intense systemic stress as disparate groups have pressed conflicting demands on Turkish governments that have at times been incapable of meeting them. The extreme partisanship of Turkish governments, moreover, and the virulent competition among political parties and other groups have tended to compromise the working of the system. The growing polarization encouraged by these factors has culminated in three major economic and internal security crises in the last two decades. The first ended in the 1960 military intervention and the second in the 1971 "coup by memorandum." The present-and most serious-crisis, which began in the mid-1970s, has left the country nearly bankrupt and torn by spiraling political violence that claims more than a thousand lives a year. It has caused the downfall of two governments within two years-Suleyman Demirel's coalition in December 1977 and Bulent Ecevit's in Octobe-, 1979-and it may bring down Demirel's new minority government and several others before it abates. 'I urkey has been variously described as the least developed West European country or as one of the more advanced of developing states. It is in fact a transitional society combining some features of both. Cultural norms and cleavages characteristic of traditional societies- such as an authoritarian value system and intensely felt sectarian, ethnic, and urban-rural rivalries-are still prevalent. Even though the modernizers are clearly ascendant and are likely to remain so, the struggle between them and the traditionalists that began with the Ataturk revolution some 60 years ago persists. At the same time, economic development has produced new economic groups with t SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 SECRET clashing interests and political ideologies, introducing a new and deep cleavage along socioeconomic lines. Turkey's democratic institutions have been a source of strength even as they have given free play to such clashing views. Together with the opportunities provided by economic development, they have channeled much discontent into constructive give and take. Nonetheless, prospects are that Turkel will continue to suffer the growing pains of modernization. These are likely to be accompanied by a high level of social unrest and acrimonious politics, especially if, as seems likely, the current economic difficuliii s aitd slow rate of growth continue. And so long as no one party or coalition of like-minded parties becomes ascendant, weak and ineffective (and profligate) governments, such as those of the last five years, are certain to be the rule. Such a prospect could again tempt those in the military and elsewhere who value efficiency and order over freewheeling politics to intervene openly in the governing process. But such political intervention by the military would most likely be temporary and relatively limited in nature, given both the residual strength of the democratic ethos and Turkey's participation in Western defense and economic systems. No matter what government is in power, Turkey is likely to pursue a more assertive and independent foreign policy. Turkish leaders will see this as the most effective tactic for securing the desperately needed military, economic, and political support from a West that is perceived to be increasingly parsimonious and more inclined to attach unaccept- able conditions to all three. They will also see it as facilitating the improvement of relations with Communist and Third World states that has been made necessary by political realignments in Turkey or which has been encouraged by hopes for grea'er economic and political aid from these quarters. In sum, Turkey will be faced with serious and growing social, political, and economic problems during the time frame of this Estimate-that is, well into the 1980s, These problems will sorely lest Turkey's democratic institutions and perhaps temporarily compromise them. Another military intervention could occur. These problems will also make Turkey a difficult, demanding, and, to some degree, unpredictable ally. Some of the advantages still enjoyed by the West in Turkey may he lost-to the residual benefit of the USSR. The US arms embargo, in particular, so impaired the close relationship between the United States and Turkey that Washington can no longer count on support from Ankara on international issues unless Turkey's own national interests are directly involved. 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 The uncertainties of Turkey's social dynamics and its exaggerated expectations of and need for Western support could produce an even more troublesome outcome. They could conceivably lead to a social upheaval, followed by a prolonged period of radical civilian or military rule. They could lead to a degree of alienation that might trigger a fundamental reorientaton of Ankara's foreign policy away from the West. We believe, however, that chances for this are a good deal less likely than the prospect of a troubled but still basically democratic and pro-Western Turkey. 3 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 DISCUSSION THE ATATURK LEGACY 1. Modern Turkey's major characteristics derive from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who sought to forge a Western-style nation state out of the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after Word War I. His greater emphasis on cultural and institutional modernization rather than on wholesale social revolution created gaps in Turkey's development that are a main cause of Its instability today. 2. As conceived in Ataturk's "six principles," repub- licanism would provide a new legitimacy in place of Ottoman dynasticism; nationalism would reflect an ethnic Turkish Identity and assertiveness in lieu of the Ottoman multiethnic character and servile foreign policy; populism would ensure class harmony and cooperation in pursuit of national goals; seculartsm would separate the country from its traditional Islamic institutions and values; etatism (state capitalism) would provide the rapid development that the private sector could not sustain; and reformism would em- body a commitment to change. 3. Ataturk and his colleagues were elitist, tutelary, and autocratic. The regime found support primarily an.ong the bureaucracy, the intelligcrtsia, and the military in tacit alliance with the landed gentry. All these groups were represented in the Republican People's Party, whose function was to organize the elite and mobilize the masses, I. Implemented in a gradualist and pragmatic man- ner, Kemalism was effective in establishing the basis for a modern nation-state. Traditional Institutions and vale: s ?a ere curled, Western models were grafted onto srciety, and the country moved more rapidly towar.I industrialization, particularly In the latter part of the Keinalist period. 5. Kemalist precepts, however, have serxe(l much less well the later integrative and distributive phase of modernization as the rna,.ses have come to demand full share in and benefits from the political system. Nor has Kemalism Ire ii entirely congenial 1xith multiparty democratic politics or the more advanced stages of economic development. 6. The elitist and exclusionary nature of Kemalism, compounded by the societal differentiation brought on by economic development, produced an alienated counterelite that undermined the consensus necessary for political stability and compromise. Kemalism's emphasis on urban areas and neglect of the country- side initially accelerated the evolution of "two Turkeys," a developing and modernizing ore in the cities, and a still traditional and backward one in the countryside, particularly In the east. High-growth etatist and autarkic policies, effective so long as Turkey had an undeveloped and controlled economy, became irrational and inefficient strategies as the economy developed and became more open and interdependent. 7. Although Kemalism formally separated the mili- tary from politics, its mandating of the officer corps as guardian cf the nation has inclined the military to act as a state withir a state. Similarly the re rvasive nationalism that sometimes makes Turkey a prickly associate in the Western community has often com. peted with the Kemalist emulation of Western cultural arid institutional features. Finally, while Kemalist classless reformism provided Turkey a philosophy of change to compete with Marxist models, Marxism can seem to some Turks an extension of Ataturk's ideals. 8. So long as Turkey remained an authoritarian, one-party state, the paradoxes of I:emalisrn seemed unimportant. Once internal pressures and its desire for Western defense support against the Soviet threat had transformed Turkey into a multiparty democracy, however, these paradox?s intruded Into the political system. They now are major causes of the recurring malaise that has become characteristic of ccontemlxe- rary Turkey. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATIONr A BALANCE SHEET 9. Turkey's democratic credr nllals are substantial, esIK?cially under the more li1r: rut Second Republic of 1961. The ('onstitution guarantees freedorn of thought and expression, a,ul obl!gates the stale to advance 5 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 soxcial and economic rights. I he system of checks and balances includes a bicameral legislature and an autonomous judiciary. Turkish democracy overall pro- vicics substantial outlets for criticism and dissent. I0. Encouraged by the proportional representation system introduced in 1961, political parties have grown from three to eight since 1950 and offer the electorate clear choices. The two major parties are durable and broadly based. The Republican People's Party has currents running from left of center to the left, while the Justice Party is moderately conserva- live. Among the minor parties on the right, the National Salvation Party combines a religious orienta- lion with a forward-looking, quasi-socialist economic program, while the Nationalist Action Party is essen- tially neofascist, On the left, the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and a myriad of smaller parties have had greater impact-especially in the labor move- ment-than their meager electoral showing world suggest. Avowedly religious and Communist parties are proscribed. 11. The Turks consider the selection of their leaders a right. There have been eight national elections since 1950, and, except for occasional irregularities, they have been conducted honestly. Elections have been followed by changes of governments, and still other transfers of power have followed from shifts in par+ia- mentary alignments. 12. 19 the past three decades, voluntary as"ia:ions that support and amplify th^ link between state and masses provided by the political )allies have proiifer- ated. liepiesenting business, professional, labor, trade, agricultural, and religious interests, these groupings reinforce diversity. They have a vested interest in the safeguards that democracy provides. 13. )list as Turkey's democratic institutions stand kill weld by some measures, so too dc. its social and economic achievements high-growth and industrial- isation strategies, supported by massive foreign assist- ance from Fast and West alike, have given Turkey one of the highest gross th rates among the countries of the Orgauization for Economic (;ooperation and Develop- ment, men though it is still the least Industrialized intmlwr and its per capita annual Ineame ($1,200) is the losscst. Turkey led all 01:(:I) countries in real grosslh rate during the last five years and ranked second user the last 10. It Development has changed the face of titles and countr$side alike. City and village have becu brought closer together by transportation and conimunicatlons and the agricultural sector has become more mecha- nized. Improvements in health care have increased life expectancy. In a country where education is the principal entree to the elite, the educationally quali- fied have overtaken the placement opportunities. Overall there has been an absolute improvement in the standard of living for most Turks. 15. The forward thrust of Turkey's democratic and economic development, however, has frequently been interrupted by interludes of political and economic retreat. The "miracles" of the early 1950s that trans- formed Turkey into a vibrant and prospering democ- racy gave way In the latter part of the decade to growing polarization, student unrest, economic crisis, and, ultimately, the military intervention of 1960, which put a damper on politics and brought a degree 9f economic retrenchment. 16. The military's nearly complete withdrawal from open i;rvolvement in politics in 1961 and the accession of the moderately conservative Demirel government in 1965 began another period of more normal political and economic activity. But by the late 1960s politics had degenerated once more into con- frontation and the economy again went into decline. Prompted in particular by a more ideological and systematic violence between leftists and rightists that seemed to challenge the state, the military intervened in 1971 for the second time. For two years thereafter whey monitored politics from behind the scenes and imposed a harsh-but only temporarily effective- martial -iw regime against the battling extremists. 17. Although a third period of relatively open politics begaa in 1973, the trends-both political and economic-have remained sharply negative. None of Turkey's six governments since 1973 has been strong and cohesive enough to deal Imaginatively with press- ing problems or to rise above partisan concerns. The rhetoric has grown increasingly shrill, and political inunohilisrn has been accompanied by a gradual resur- gence of political violence that took more than 1,000 lives in 1978 and an even greater number this year. 18. While most such violence has been urban gang- like warfare Ix'ti,reen left and right extremists, the 'Turkish elite and Americans have also Ix-come !argots. Unrest in Ihe less developed ceIern provinces has led to clashes between Sunni and Alevi Muslims and betsseern Kurds amt ethnic Turks. The martial law no`s in effect In 19 of the 67 provinces has failed in its relatively benign implementation to lntlrnidate the terrorists, and has led to frictions iwiween military and 6 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 political leaders and to further politicization of the police. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of incidents has actually surpassed pre-martial-law levels or that most of them are occurring ir. marital law provinces, 19. On the economic side, the third expansionary cycle has likewise again slid into crisis. After 1973, successive Turkish governments-committed to the goal of an industrialized economy-continued to pur- sue rapid economic growth despite the oil crisis and world recession. The resulting inflation, however, combined with unrealistic exchange rates, made im- ports more attractive, stifled exports, and discouraged private investment. The balance of payments deterio- rated sharply as Imports outstripped receipts from exports and worker remittances. 20, Turkey'r high growth rate has been financed by massive, mostly short-term borrowing and by dras- tic drawdowns of foreign exchange reserves. Foreign debt jumped from $3.3 billion in 1,973 to $13 billion in 1978. Yet, for want of foreign exchange, industries have bctin operating at less than half capac- ity. And-given the huge oil and debt service costs-the debt rescheduling, standby loans from the International Monetary Fund, and new credits pro- vided this year by private institutions and friendly governments in response to a major Turkish devalu. ation of the lira and other austerity measures seem likely to provide at best a brief respite. 21. For good reason, growing numbers of Turks have begun to wonder whether there Is not something fundamentally amiss in the country. Specifically, they are questioring whether Turkey's very liberal brand of democratic forms and institutions is not a serious obstacle to its continued development as a stable and progressive society, given that thee have not been matched by as rapid and thorough a transformation of antiquated economic and social structures. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FLAWS 22. Turkey's recurring economic difficulties cto in fact arise in good measure from anachronistic develop- ment strategies and economic policies. The traditional emphasis on rapid industrialization under state owner- ship and coritrol-even by governments claiming to oppose such pxilicles-stems from the Kemalist convic- tion plat economic sovereignty is prerequisite to politi- cal sovereignty, So long as Turkey remained a one. party state with a rudimentary economy, that strategy was efficacious. The state could marshal the scant personnel and material resources then available to create an infrastructure while forgoing gratification of immediate needs. 23. More recently, however, the autarkic approach has seemed increasingly at odds with the growing complexity of Turkey's economy and its open political system. Arbitrarily selected import substitution indus- tries intended to increase self-reliance themselves re- quire substantial imports of machinery and raw mate- rials. Yet adequate foreign exchange to pay for such imports cannot be generated from agricultural exports because of government underinvestment in the agri- cultural sector. Manufacturers for their part have had few incentives to develop markets for exports. Turkish industry, moreover, being capital intensive, produces few jobs, despite the need to absorb a fast-growing labor force. Government policies, financial difficulties, fuel shortages, and poor planning have led to power and transportation bottlenecks. 24. Turkey's import dependence has been aggra- vated by a historically overvalued lira that keeps import prices low and discourages export-led growth and tourism. High tariff barriers protect industries well t.eyond the infant stage, delaying competition and modernization, and sustaining firms that cannot export. In addition, Turkey's negative attitude toward foreign investment has deprived the country of the management and marketing expertise needed to real- ize a program of rapid export expansion. 25. The prime beneficiary of Turkey's economic policies is the state sector, which accounts for about half of fixed Investment and industrial production. State enterprises enjoy privileged tax treatment, easy access to credit, and price subsidies that provide few incentives to operate efficiently or profitably. Their number, manning levels, location, and pricing policies are determined as much by :.vial welfare, political, and ideological considerations as by economic impera- lives--for good reason they are known as "election factories." 26. As part of the drive for a strong and inde- pendent state. Turkish governments until recently sough! to foster population growth. With a population of 44.2 million and a 25-percent yearly increase-the highest in Europe-the surge in population has ken a major caase of Turkey's problems. Population pres- sures in the countryside and the attractions of city life have led to rapid urbanization, overcrowded cities surrounded by s4luatter settlements, and emigration 7 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 abroad. Population growth has partly neutralized eco- nomic advances. 27. Despite recent emphasis on rural development, the socioeconomic disparities between town and countryside and between west and east-sharply ag- gravated by the Kemalist emphasis on creating a Westernized urban elite-are still great. Composite indexes of development, using such measures as liter- acy, income and urbanization levels, and number of persons employed in industry, all show that the most developed western provinces outrank the !east devel- oped areas in the east '.)y ratios of 2 and 3 to 1. MUTUALLY REINFORCING CLEAVAGES 28. The negative impact of seine of Turkey's devel- opment policies has been compounded by the persis- tence of several mutually reinforcing social and cul- tural cleavages in Turkish societ;. Modernizing Center and Traditionalist Periphery 29. A cleavage between the elite and the masses, between the ruling center and the peiiph?ry, has been a traditional feature of Turkish society. The centraliz- ing policies of the Kemalist regime, together with economic neglect of the periphery, initially widened that gap. Although the growing political power of the peasantry has made politicians more responsive and bureaucrats less haughty, the animosities persist. O. Reinforcing the division between center and periphery is the cultural cleavage between moderniz- ers and traditionalists that runs along the same di+ide. The Westernizing and secularizing policies of the Kemalists had their greatest impact In the urban areas while large parts of rural Turkey remained kss af- fecteel by either. Turks in the cities have donned Wester)-styde garb and mores, but the peasantry has remained tradition bound and heavily influenced by Islam. This fissure tax) has tended to close somewhat. Fir thw modernizers, rejection of Islam has become a less important litmus test of Western identity, while moderni-ing influences hale gradually penetrated the countryside. Sunnis and Alevis 3I. The cleavage lx?Iween the Surni Muslim major- ity and the Alevi minority also lingers. The Sunnis represent Islamic orthcxl!)xy aria tradition. The Alevis. comprising perhaps a fourth of the population, sub- scribe to more heterodox religious practices and to mysticism. 32. Sectarian dirferences have F,een reinforced by the Alevis' enthusiastic response to Kemalist reforms, particularly secularization, which they saw as an es- cape from Sur,ni repression and domination. Most Alevis still support the i epublican People's Party, within which they form a cohesive and influential minority. Their relative poverty has also inclined them toward the left of the political spectrum. The more prosperous Sunnis have gravitated toward the right and provide the core of support for the justice Party and the more conservative minor parties, 33. Urbanization and industrialization have brought the traditionally rural Alevis into the cities where they come into close contact with the Sunnis and compete for jobs. The frictions this causes were no doubt a factor in the mass outbreak of sectarian violence in the southeastern city of Maras last year, which resulted in more than a hundred deaths and prompted the i)npo- sition of martial law. Sectarian violence, reinforced by economic and political factors, continues on the upswing. Ethnic Turks and Kurds 34. The Kemalist emphasis on nationalism and Tur- kisliness, along with its centralizing and secularizing features, widened the fissure between ethnic Turks and the large Kurdish minority of 44; million and sparked several Kurdish uprisings. Turkish authorities have since sought unsuccessfully to eliminate all rnant- festations of Kurdish culture and national identity, including the Kurdish language. 35. With the advent of Tr. kish democracy, govern- merit policy has favo,ed co-optation over suppression, but this has been slow to evoke and has produced only limited successes. A portion of the Kurdish elite has been accepted Into the ruling class, and most political party delegations in parliament include at least sonic Kurds, with the largest number lined up behind th. Republican People's Party. The Ki; ds. relatively im- pxiverlshe: like t:,,'. Alevi sect to which a third of them belong, are attracted to that party's social democratic programs and are repelled by the more communally based appeal of the far-rightist parties. 36 Regardless of Turkish attempts to assimilate them, however, most Kurds still remain outside the in sinstream of Turkish sur.,iety and pose a potentially serious internal securil$, threat. Kurdish aspirations Ior 8 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 nntnnnrny and indrix ndrnce s1Ill persist and are gross- ins( In intensify. They have been spearheaded by leftist youth organitalinns and fueled by the separatist actisi? Urs of Kurds in neighboring Ircdp and Iran Although efforts to inol,illrr the Kurdish masses a(: hampered by tribalism and lack of organization and leadership, acts of sinlcnc(- against Turkish officials are likely to continue to 1(.t gnvcri.-nrnt authority rn the Kurdish regions. These vo-nld lead to full-scale clashes between Turkish troops and Kur'Jish bands that would almost certainly vsoke a strong reaction f?orn the Turkish military to forestall any incipient uprising. Class Cktravogss 37. The newest and perhaps most consequential cleavage for Turkey, however, is that along class lines. A formidable business and commercial class of ethnic Turks emerged in the 1940s and I9iOs, challenging the Kentalist soldier-bureaucrats and their etalist policies. They were followed! in the 1930s and especially in the 19Ci0s by the rise of a gent labor movement, with interests antithclical to both business and the state, neither of which had been particularly generous to workers. 38 The intelligentsia also expanded during this period and turn(-(] to Marxism in reaction to the social injustices they perceived, and because of the exalted status It promise) them. Effntts by lalx>r in league with the leftist intelligentsia to get a larger slice of the national economic pie evoked the alarm and rev;stance of I-usiness. 39. Meanwhile, the p ropettied middle class of small husincssm'n, merchants, and artisans-seeing itself s(quiee,el between big business on the one hand and tl;P growing lalxir movement on the other-developed a greater class consciousness and set the stage for the emergence of a violent rightwing reaction. 40. While political life has thus become increas- ing!, dominated by Ideological and socioeconomic issues, there is much about the Turkish character itself that coexists uneasily with open and competitive pxoli- lics Turks have an in group/out group orientation that inclines them to look upon others as friend or foe. This leads to strong commitments to one's ossn group and intolerance toward others: politics is a zero-sum game. The notions of moderation in the exercise of power, of loyal opposition, and of merit in compromise are foreign. 41. Ti.rl y remains instead a "courate cullrire," which pw , i premium on strength and daring cud pro voke' + -vrcatio'rs in the streets and chambers of parlianwi alike. Thus, attempts at free and open competition frequently degenerate Into pxtlaritation and violence. And even though these attitudes and lehasioral patterns are being diluted by moderniza? lion, they still help account for Turkey's difficulty in mastering the finer points of Western democratic practice. GROWING POLITICAL POLARIZATION 42. The struggle letweth center and periphery, between modernizers and traditionalists, will remain a significant element in Turkish polies:s. Nonetheless, as the transformation of Turkey has proceeded, the Influence of the newer socioeconomic cleavage has been Increasingly felt. As new economic groups have congealed, political turtles have become realigned alone a conu?rsalise-liberal continuum and tmlitical ideologies have come to the fore. New, ideologically oriented parties have emerged on the political ex- tremes-others have been given new life. And the gap between the two major parties that was reflective of the older cleavages has wIdened somewhat as they base sought to hold on to their more radical followers and to m-opt the emergent forces on the periphery. 43. The rise of ideological and class-oriented poli? tics in Turkey dates back to the turbulent 1960s. when labor and leftist political forces took advantage of the liberal features of the new constitution to organize themselves, An avowedly Marsis( party, the Turkish Labor Party, appeared on the scene simultaneously with the revisal of the labor movement after workers sere given the right to strike. The lalx'ir Party was attractive to students and to the intelligentsia, who thought the Republican p'eople's Party too ossified. The trade union movement, assertive in securing benefits for its members, now represents about one- third of the labor force in the Iwo confederations, Turk-is and the smaller, Marxist-oriented DISK. Nci- ther political not labor left has hesitated in resort to dlemnn'lrat ions and violence to achieve its goals. 44. The left's rising fortunes set the stage for the rightist reaction that was organize] primarily by Alpaslan Turkes, An authoritarian-inclined personality who helped mastermind the 1960 coup, Turks trans- formed a small conservative party that he joined in 196.1 into a highly delicate(], wall-disciplined political force with its own paramilitary youth group and 9 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 rcnanuyl it the Nationalist Action Nits, Drawing surryxirl i-rirn.nils front the s-nall shopktelxcr and aitisan class and to stone cstent front the south, lout financed III part by, big businessmen alarellrti at the grossing Influence of the left, the patty conll-hi(Yi ardent natioualisrn aril anti-( nrlantuvisin Milli tortlin, list ecr-r-nrnic txillcies. Its southfal follo%sers have lx'Va the principal source Of slolenec froth the right. I The ennergence of Ihese forces on the, lollitical fringes has had its Impact on the Iwo major parties. Alanntvi by the defection of its prised intelligentsia to the Lalx)r Party, the Repxuhlican People's Party pro- claimed itself in 19(i5 a "Icft?of-center" parts and adoplt'cl a more ptr-gressisC platform The patty scent a step blither in I9fi6 in electing Relent l ecsit, the head of Its "prt-gressive group," as general secretary. That protnptetl the mote conservative sling of the party to Ixlt, t'%r utually to form the Ilepliblic..n Reliance Parts. But the scllisrii also freed the 111'1' to pursue a more social democratic program, to aplx?al to the working class and other disadvantaged groups it had formerly shimmed, and to win back the support of the intelligentsia. 16 Similar ferment likessiw proclucetl schisms in the Justice Party. in reaction to Sulesman Ikinirel's mrxlerate co liscrvatism nnil its Toss of a power struggle, the party's right wing defr.ted and formed the Uerno- cratic? farts. mrxleled after its I93(h namesake. Jus- tice's grossing ties ssith big business, moreover. it ronlptetl mans small businessmen to shift to the N;iinnalist %ction Parls and to the National Salvation- ists, show .anti-hig-lousiness rhetoric a(ounts for as inuth of their supix-rl as their Islamic fundamental- icnt Tn retr-up sonic of these hoses the Justice farts itself espanded further to the right, both in leadership and in prroszrarn 17. Trrrkes Is still feeling the effects of this ongoing realignment at the electoral bases of the il`'lital putties. ['rider H:c?evit's leadership the Republican I'eojle's Parts, with its new social democratic plat- form. made a comeback from the dark dais of the 19541s and the cven darker I96(h, when, save for 1961, it never won a plurality-. 13y contrast, the party svon pluralities in 1x0th 1973 and 1977. Over the long term, its appeal to those groups, such as labor and the salaried middle class, that are on the increase could ixsrtend the rwrs ibility of eventual Rill' dominance. .14. In the short term, howeve', the sharp setback the Republican People's Party suft'.'red in the partial Assembly and Senate elections in October 1979 sug- gests it sill pas' a heasy price for iiaslug presided over the wuntrs,'s ssorst economti' and lx-htird crisis to elate. Sloreoser, Its attempt to dorninate the entire left of the political slxrtruin has left it Milli crirnp,cting faclioils rangink from center-left to Marsist. heading among them hohhled I':cevlt'i government and Mould prol-ably do Ilie wine In a rnajr-rits. Republican gov. ernnlent. There is a r'mote lxossibility that such factionalism may again cause the party to fragment. 49. After No decades of political dominance In the lOWi and 19ti(h the ixilitical forces on the right of the lxlilleal spectrum remained divided throughout the 1970% To be sure, the Justice Party It a formidable itolitical machine Midi broadly based electoral sul-- ioorl. It bounced back from It low 29.8 percent shosslog ire the 1973 election to a respectable 343.9 Iwtcent in 1977. and Its sweep of the partial elections of Ortol-rr 1979 has returned it to power. 50. Working against the Justice Party's longer tarn recuperation is the difficulty Its leadership sill have in co nvitiving voters that it has any solutions. The patty, took a buffeting in the 1973 and 1977 national elcc- Puns from the Republican People's fatty on the left and from the more strident minor parties to its right. Ili- plaslug down Its elitist Image and Iaming toward socialism, the Republican Ieople's Patty has won over much of labor and the salaried middle class, wit It had previously supported the Justice Party. On tiw right, the Nationalist At-lion Party and the National Salvation t'arts', whose support Is crucial for the s+rrsival of the Dcmirel government, feed on Ilir resentment of those w1u s either opixwe mrxlerni,ation or are suffering from it. 51. The Nationalist Action Party In particular is enin',ing a surge in popularity In central Anatolia and in such destloped provinces as Izmir by appealing to those who see a strongman and greater authoritarian- ism as the answer to Turkey's problems. It doubled its share of the vote between 1973 and 1977-from 3.4 percent to 6.4 percent-and may do substantially better in the nett general elections, which must take place no later than mid-1981. 52. The National Salvation Party has captured the hardcore antisecular and pro.-Islamic vote, and its performance in 1973 and 1977 made it Turkey's third largest party. Its success, however, is less indicative of an Islamic resurgence than of the persistence of a sentiment that could not be articulated so long as parties were prohibited from making openly religious appeals The party's xenophobic nationalism and anti- 10 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 big-business and antllabor rhetoric, nwreover, allract the sari..' grouts from sshich the NAI' draws suptorl, and this too ac"ounts for some of its showing .$3 Moth Iarites are likely to remain on the seen.' for souse time although the Nationalist Action Party may well replace the National Salvationists to the third-place slxrt. Neither Is likely to replace Justice as the principal conservative tsatly, but the latest Ju>ttce government may be hostage to their whims; they may prevent it from recouping its former majority-. Nor Is It likely that the three former coalition partners could achieve such a majority by merging, given the sharp Ixvs,nality and ideological differences that separate Ihcrn A prolonged perkxl Of Republican People's Party rule might have that effect, but such a c nglom- crate would suffer the same divisive tendencies now present to the Hill'. FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION 54. Like its domestic politics, Turkey's foreign pol- icy has undergone important transformations over time and is not without paradot. Ataturk's drive for Westcrniration was aimed at creating a stator strong enough to defend itself against further encroachments from any quarter-including the West. lie did in fact find a way to coesist with the new Soviet regime to the north, and his successors would probably have been content to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy follow. ing World at II, but for the Cold War and Moscow's territorial ambitions against Turkey. 55. In turning to the United States and NATO for protection and accepting huge amounts of military and econc:nie assistance, Turkey focused its foreign Wlicy on the requirements of collective security and gave the Alliance virtual carte blanche use of Turkish tertitorl. Moreover, military cooperation spilled over into greater icleraction in political, economic, and cultural fields, transforming what began as an instru- mental relationship into a sexioemotional o,ie, particu- larly for the Turks. It became more important to them to Ile "Western" even if they continued to feel apart and uncertain of their acceptance. Domestic Determinants 56. Domestic developments as well as the changing international environment since the mid-1960s tease both impinged on this commitment made :30 years age. 57. The greater social and political differentiation among elite and masses alike has, or example, pro- duced a diversity of views on what Turkey's foreign Iollcy ouplnt to be-even within the major pasties, The emergence of i political left, mainly the lefr wing of the Republican P'eople's Party, has cr~aleo pressures to Icx-sen ties with the West and improve those with the Nast. At the some time, the growth of Turkish social democracy, whose adherents make up ` majority of the Republican People's Party, has led to calls for closer ties to West European socialist or Third world states, On the right, parochial and Islamic-orier,ted !trees in the two minor parties have pr!saed for a more chauvinistic foreign policy and for a turn toward the Islamic world. These pressures to some degree have been transmitted to the right wing of the Justice Party even though the thrust of that party's foreign policy remains pro-Western. Because recent Turkish governments have been so weak politically, they have felt compelled to be responsive to such sentiments. International Foctors SS. Ankara has likewise found it necessary to adjust to substantial changes In the International environ- ment. Faced with growing parsimony on the part of its traditional aid donors at a time when Its requirements fo- economic and military aid and energy are still growing, Turkey has had to look for alternative sources of help. The switch from threats to blandishments in Soviet policy, along with the general easing of Cold War tensions, has tended to diminish the Importance of NATO in the eyes of the Turks. Cyprus and Aegean disputes with Greece, moreover, have created a direct conflict of interest with the Alliance as well, inasmuch as NATO is interested In compromise solutions while the Turks (and the Greeks) seek masimum advantage. But Turkey has Ixvn angered both by the perceived absence of Alliance support and by its p)crception that its allies-the United States in particular-are being manipulated by Greece. 59. The Turks resented and were deeply scarred by the US stand against them during the 1964 (:)pros crisis and were initially highly suspicious of the US mediation effort during the crisis that followed three years later. And, while they took some comfort from the tacit Western acquiescence in their initial Inter- vention during the 1974 (;yprus crisis, the condemna- lion of the second phase of that operation reinforced their feeling of isolation. 60. The greatest shock to Turkey's sensibilities, however, was the Congressionally imposed US arms embargo and Western Europe's inability or unwilling- 11 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 I)(-%% to reslxend ade?eluak ly to Turkish netivls w bile the eirthargeo as in force. The effect of the embargo was to ctiaisince the Turks that they could no longer lx, sure of U!i or NATO supIxort for Turkey's vital interests, nor could they afford to c nttime such totaI deixwndence on US ~nIIilary aid. I he legacy of That etlx~rience is that the once close US-Turkish relatioii- ship has ken so impaired that Washington Van no longer count on Ankara's tuppxorl on international issues utdess Turkey's own national Interests are di? rettly invol ctI ill. Not have the Turks beat pleased stltli the return from their associate status in the Foiropean (;eorntnuMty, whicli they envisaged as preparation for full tnernlx-rship b1. the 1990s. They also hoped for preferential access to a major etpxorl market, large credits, and a permanent source of employmerit for Turkish wotkers. Instead, a negative trade balance has developed, srotkcr migration has been ~urlxd, mid financial assistance has seemed grudging to Turkish eyes. The It's \esbtcriancan policy and its agree- ments with other countries hate watered down the significance of Turkey's associate status, while Greece's approaching full membership raises the spec- ter of Turkey's isolation from Europe. Should Ankara sexon hid for equivalent status, the (;ommunits's in- cs itahle hesitation would only declx'n Turkish frustration 62 The pnschologlcal fallout from Turkey's ver- ceptions of the international ensirenment could over time Ix?come a ,till larger factor in its policy positions. It can contril,ute a lack of realism to the pursuit of alternative sources of suppxort-such as etaggerated espectations of financial assistance from Arab slates, or the notion ads.1ced by National Salvation Party leader Ethakan that Ankara could get along quite well ssithout the F(: if Turkey verc to become the indos- trial hcattland of some Islamic grouping. Turkish negotiators often convey an egocentric impression of the place Turkel- occupies in Western preoccupations. They are frequently reluctant to accept the implica- tions of Turkey's need to Inc economically more self. reliant, and they show a well-known disposition to blame others if Turkey, by "holding its breath." should go blue in the face. New Departures 61 In responding to these domestic and interna- tional developments, Turkish leaders have pursued increasingly nationalistic foreign and defense policies, 12 SECRET esix'cially since 1974.75. On balance, these trends have been eiettlmental to US and NATO interests. 61. Tire essence of this "new hook" In Turkish foreign policy is that Turkey, while remaining within the Westvrn defense and economic systems, will pur? sue indeix?ndent policies within them and cl ser rela- tions toward other states: Turkish national Interests must not as a matter of principle he sulxordinated to Alliance interests. In practical terms, this means that Turkey will give greater priority to Its own concerns over US and NATO Interests. - Turkey will seek to enhance its as ins production capability to avoid reliance oil a single source, To this end the Turks have been particularly insis- tent on Alliance sutopott for coproduction of certain categories of NATO arms. - Turkey's contribution to Western defense must he commensurate with the economic and mili- tary assistance it receives from the Alliance. The closing of US bases while the arms embargo was in force and their rcopwning on enly a provisional basis pending a hew defense cooperation agree- ment is a case in point, as is Turkey's refusal to go along with the Alliance's long-term defense program. - Turkey will qualify its tole as an outpost of the West in the region. The implications of this are evident in the recent etpansion of political and economic ties with the Soviet Union-high- lighted by the signing in June 19718 of a political document and significant new economic ac- cords-and the Turks' more recent unwillingness to hermit SALT 11 verification overflights by the United States without Moscow's consent. _Turkey will seek to strengthen political and economic relations with Third World states, par- ticularly the Atab oil producers. Signs of this are the greater support for the Palestinian cause and 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 rlenc?r evotiomir lies and Nrnited military exoot t r? a1 ion with l.i617 that are at.o coiniwting with one another in a Ilghten? Ing Mb market. TURKEY'S FUTURE 0. 11mspu?cls that Turkey will evermore its pro- longed and ssorscming malaise are not promising. Not will T'urkey's formerly harmonious relations with its allies, the United States In particular, be fully restored. The outlook thus Is One of cYOntinueel domestic instabil- !ty and uncertainty In foreign policy. Growing Social Strains fifi. Social and economic tensions are bound to remain high. The modernization process, marked by rapid urbanization, growing industrialization, and ris- ing levels of education, has broken down many old social values and evoked deriands for a better life. The Turks kook increasingly-and ensiously-to Western I itop a as a reference point. Yet the prospect is that public expectations will outpace the country's ability to meet them. indeed, growing domestic and inletna- lional constraints portend an actual reduction in state resou recs. 67. %%'itli population increasing by more than a million a scar, and an age structure pointing to a further surge in ixopulallon pressure. Turkey will have to run hard Just to stand still throughout the 19`30s. The economy must grow 3 percentage points annually just to provide lot the additional population, jet by limiting casings and straining resources to meet ex- panding social needs, population growih will slow economic development. uS Prospects therefore are that the proportion of Job opportunities relative to labor force growth is likely to continue to diminish. And the trend toward rising unemployment at home will occur at a time when continued slow growth in Western 1-:urope means that migration Is unlikely to provide the relief it did in the 196Os and early 1970s-even allowing for expanding work opportunities in the Arab world. fig. Population gross th and the appeal of urban life are also likely to keep high the rate of urbanization that has already outstripped the capacity of cities to absorb the newcomers and to provide them with adequate social services or employment. The effect will be to further concentrate a potentially volatile mixture of different religious, ethnic, and regional groupings that manifest longstanding animosities and Slow Economic Recovery 70. These structural problerns and basic social Ien- sions are likely to be exaocrl.ated by a slow and erratic recovery from the present crisis. For Turkey to escape from the cycle of supply shortages, burgeoning unem? ploy ment, accelerating inflation, rising energy costs, and slow economic growth, substantial assistance from abroad will not be enough. Indeed, it is the perennial dilemma of foreign lenders to ensure that aid provided makes it easier for Turkey to take the tough measures recruited without at the same time making it easier for Turkey to avold them. 71. Among the needed changes are greater induce- merits for expxorls of goods and services. Exchange tales should be geared to the creation and mainte- nance of conditions In which Turkish industry can compete with imports without perpetual protection and also sell profitably abroad. This would ensure that foreign exchange receipts would rise sufficiently to sustain an expansion of economic activity and service a growing foreign debt. But, at present, Imports are severely restricted by nonprice mechanisms, and Turkish producers find domestic sales much more profitable than exports. 72. Demand restraint is also a must. Public rev- emres will have to be raised substantially through a combination of higher taxes and higher prices for goods and services produced by public sector enter- prises Otherwise, Turkey will go on having the exces- sive monetary expansion that in recent years has Peeled inflation and contributed to the deterioration in the balance of payments. Public investment projects need to be chosen in a more selective manner and fi'?n'ed without undue recourse to the central bank. Ideally, the public sector should be reduced, but at a minimum it must be more efficient. 73. Though a good beginning, the recent economic reforms will have to be supplemented by additional austerity measures over the next few years. Turkey's foreign debt burden is now so large--on the order of $15 billion, as compared with the 1979 current ac- count receipts of roughly $5 billion-that the country seems destined to suffer at least several more years of payments difficulties. To be sure, there are leaders in both major parties who privately accept the necessity of some pause in the headlong pace of Turkey's 13 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 development Ihat these difficulties implt. hilt escrl gosernnn?nt fact - a web of conflicting vested intermit wIthiis the bureaucracy, the private business c niiinu? uity, and the agricultural sector. And since each of these interest grouts has a voice in parliament, every government Is har'l pill to meet Turkey's Immediate hiternational c onrnitrnents or to undertake hang-term ecomo Cie rcfurms Continuing Violence 74. Political violence is likely to grow In scope and intensity, ssllh grossing nunshers of the Turkish elite and Americans as targets. The extremist groups are aril orr6nized, their members are highly c mmilted, they are Caught up in the growing momentum of the breakdown of Turkey's Internal security, and they are intent on destroylog the country's institutions as Nell as each other. Such groups-on the left and right- hase a ready source of new recruits: in the universitles, where antiquated methods and poor employment nrostx"cts base a radicaliting effect; in the shanty- towns ringing the major urban areal, where second. generation youths see the gcocl life of wealthier urban- ites hot cannot break into it; and in the impoverished east, where overlapping ideological, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries produce a steady flow of converts to radical viesss. 75. Because Turkish violence springs from funda- mental social and economic conflicts, it admits of no case solution, even with establishment of a garrison slate. While the military might eventually curb ix)litl- c:a) violence, they would not he able to tackle its underlying causes. Con the Politicians Cope? 76. Such massive social, political, and economic problems would he a formidable challenge for any national leadership and polity. They are especially so in Turkey, where political comxetition is ferocious, i.:)litical forces fragmented and increasingly polarized, and the economy distorted by structural flaws and ideological sacred cows. 77. Neither fccvit nor the lcmirel coalition that preceded him had the strength to tackle Turkey's many problems head-on, and Demirel's present rein- carnation may prove even shakier. At the same time, political leaders have been quick to etploit them for political profit. Risky decisions, even when made, have been grudging, piecemeal, and often taken in response only to eternal pressures. Ilad F,cevit lmplemenied its austerity measures during the early part of his s'.lnt In office, for esample, they might have conlalned the slide and offered a greater prospect of recovery. 7t?. Political leaders have also approached the rpues- Ilon of political violence cautiously, fearing that Ic,o heavy a reliance on the military Mould erode their own authority or alienate some of their follorcrs. Fcevlt, who was forced to declare martial law only when violence was out of hand, held back for Ideologi- cal reasons as well. Only Nationalist Action Party leader Tutkes, who would actually prefer a more authoritarian slate, and the conservative wing of the Justice i'arty seem Indifferent to such concerns. 79. Perhaps most revealing of Turkish political leaders' ingrained attitudes and intentions are the goals of Turkey's fourth five-year development plan (1979.83). Essentially it calls for continuation and acceleration of the traditional vollcy of high growth and industrlalizatio-i by means of a constantly expand- ing state economic sector, the main cause of Turkey's recurring cycles of boom and lust, 80. Overall, the e,iirnosities among Turkish political leaders-arising from personal and historical differ- ences, Intense ideological commitments, and the desire to retain the spoils of office-portend the continued primacy of politics over good government. The chances are not good that political leaders will rise to the level of statesmanship that would permit, for example, the once-vaunted "grand coalition" in which the major parties would come together to solve the country's problems. 8I. The outlook, rather, Is that Turkey will continue to he governed by -creak and ineffective govern- ments-if politics is allowed to ruv its present course. And should the parties agree to-or events necessi- late-a new national election before 1981, use see little reason to expect in either case a new constellation of power that would provide a government substantially more effective than those Turkey has endured for nearly a decade. Toward a More Authoritarian System? 82. The prospect of continuing immobilism amid growing social tensions, economic hardship, and politi- cal violence will i?evitahly reinforce the desire for fundamental changes. These Could include: an above- parties government backed by centrist and moderate forces in loth major parties with some kind of man- 14 SECREt Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 date to try to lift Turkey out of its nutlaison; further lnodifiealion of the 1%I cv)nvtitution to stress 0.11111111. pity rights and order over Individual rights and liberty on grounds that the present chatter Is loo Iilxval for a Iransilional and troubled xx?icty; abando,mn: nt of propw-rtir.nal tcprescnlal'~m and return to a single. inenmlw?r majority system; and/or an even larger gov. etnrnenial role in the evo omy to allocate resources. K.3 Pressures to move in such directions will pow serious dilemmas for Turkey's px)litiea1 leaders. An alx)ve-panties government and curbs or. civil liberties would signal an end to the freewheeling politics to N huch they have been accustomed. It would also mean an end to the spoils of power for Ihese in charge. A switch to a majority system would be opposed by all parties except justice. The Republican People's ('arty, already dominint in the left-of-center spectrum, could not espec?t to gait, substantially, and the rightist minor parties would be badly hurt bi losses to the justice Party. On the other hand, justice-the home of most businessmen--%.ould be leery of greater economic controls. M. Yet the degree to which political leaders can somehow co-opt these pressures and sentiments and re corwile therm s. ilh their own s?a;:tes and political Imperatives it the nest few years may well determine the fate of Turkish democracy as well as their own. Umvillim)gness or inability to respond may Impel the military reluctantly to consider expanding further its political role. Whet Role the Militory? 83. Present conditions in Turkey are similar in many ways to earlier crises that brought on military Interventions. Although the military has in general worked with civilian leaders in the enforcement of martial law, there have also been signs of discontent. The economic squeeze, the persistent violence, the political constraints under which the military must operate in dealing with violence, and the politicking of civilian leaders seem to the military a threat to the strength and unity of the state toward which it has a guardian role; they offend the military's 6w-and. order sallies; and they are also beginning to threaten the military's corporate material comet-ins as well as those of individual officers. 86 There are also some differences with earlier periods. The 1960 and 1971 praetorian experiments showed the difficulty of governing the country; they politicized the officer corps and undermined its pro- fessionalism; they damaged the military's standing among certain parts of the elite and electorate, and esacerbated political polarization when the military returned to the barracks. Siutce then, political leaders hive become more feisty, while their pnapnt?day military counterparts are less politically minded. And the military establishment-perhaps mindful of the ambiguous experience of the Creek junta-must wonder whether Turkey's Western aflies would he more or less inclined to lend security, economic, and diplomatic support to a Junta in Ankara. 87. Nonetheless, the country is In such bad shape and political leaders to uncertain of how to cope that the military may take on a larger role during the period through the mid-1980:. This has already tran- spired with respect to Internal security policy. The military's greater involvement would most likely be of the behind-the-scenes variety. Military leaders will be frequently exposed to temptations to exceed the spirit and letter of their constitutionally mandated advisory role on security Issues, to proffet "advice" on broader policy matters, and perhaps ultimately to suggest who should govern. M. If a mote openly political intervention should occur-and we consider that there is an even chance that this will happen if civilian leaders are perceived unable of unwilling to cope-it would likely follow the pattern of 1971, when moderate senior military lead' ers forced the government to resign and replaced it with a military-backed, above-parties government. A direct military takeover, similar to that of 19130, would probably take place only after a prolonged period of anarchy and economic crisis or In the event of another Kurdish insurrection which the politicians seemed unable or unwilling to contain. While direct interven- tion would probably also be led by the senior military leadership, it might be instigated by more radical elements from below. 89. Given the law-and-order values and basically conservative orientation of the officer corps, its en- hanced political involvement would push Turkey to- ward a politically less liberal society and a more controlled economy. The military would likely insist on some of the changes currently gaining public support, such as a more authoritarian constitution and a modification of the electoral system. It would also compel adoption of more stringent economic austerity measures, although it would still try to satisfy its oven corporate requirements. A military or military-backed government would continue Turkey's current policy of tS SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 pursuing es%entially a ratification of the new slams quu In (,,ti)rus and a substantial revision of the status quo itt the Aegean It Mould, however, be more responsive to hriwder Western defense Interests if sufficient lit Ilit ary and ecoi ornic assistance %ete offered as quid. Whith. Turkish Fottioign Policy? im. Regardless of Odell, of the preceding domestic political scenarios is placed out. Turkey's political, etiutomic, and security ties -A 1111 the West are likely to remain the frxus of its foreign lolicy over the nest several seats. Nonetheless it Is unlikely ever again to Ix? the accvnnrnrxlating and even submissive partner it once w as; neither domestic nor international Itends are working in that direction. 91. The fragmentation of txilitical fort's suggests that the foreign policy debate, in the absence of tenewetl Fast-West tension, will broaden rather than narrow; the former consensus on the "prirnacs of c+llectisc security" is unlikely to reemerge. The pres- pect of continued political and economic malaise, moreover, will incline Turkish governments, whether weak or strong, civilian of t,'ililary, to be Importunate in their Insistence on support. In short. Turkey's domestic political environment will put a premium on "standing up" to the West. 92 or is it likely that the "'est will be able to entice the Turks Into being more cooperative. The prospect of grossing political and economic constraints Is apt to make Alliance and F:C members more cautious in providing military and economic assistance to the Turks. And the likely persistence of the emotion-laden Greek-Tutkish quarrels. with their eco- nomic and security Implications, will continue to make the : oo's honest-broker role suspect in Ankara. All of these factors will incline the Turks to try to parlay their strategic assets into more generous help from the West, 93. Turkey will also continue to see advantages in trying to use those same strategic assets to finagle economic and political support from the Soviet Union. i3ec?ause Turkey is such an important country, Mos- cow's interest will likely remain high. Yet there are limits beyond which the emerging Soviet-Turkish rap- prochement is not likely to go. haven if Moscow were able and willing to provide Turkey with the hard currency and credits its economy will need, the Turks would be well aware of the political strings associated with such assistance. Most members of the Turkish political, economic, and military elite would be highly sensitive to the risks of ix'rmiltirig Turkey to become a Soviet client. 414. The prospect of a nonaligned Turkey-which, In light of its geography. would be opera to more direct Soviet pressures-is aln oat as remote. Nonalignment apix-als to only a small minor.ty on both sides of the political spectrum, and it is doubtful that s.ny future Turkish government will we much of a payoff in casting its lot with the Arab or other nonaligned stales, other than to ensure Turkey's energy supplies and whatever diplomatic support can be elicited on its quarrels with the Greeks. On neither of those issues have such states been particularly forthcoming, brven Turkey's own history as a colonial power and its more recent association with the West--factors that still grate on Arab and other nonaligned states. 9.3. Turkish foreign policy will in fact almost cer- tainly operate within some broadly definable param- eters. Turkey will likely remain within the Western defense and economic systems, slaying within the military wing of NATO, retaining the bilateral defense tic with the United States, keeping its ties with the FC, and possibly applying for full membership. Only the West can provide Turkey with credits and hard currency in amounts anywhere near what the Turks will require to finance their development plans, and to find an effective and politically acceptable alternative to Western, particularly US, arms would be difficult. But Turkey will pursue its national Interests more actively both within and outside those systems, by, for etar,Inle, placing further restrictions on its parlicipa- lion In NATO activities and on the use of US bases. 96. Tr.:,key's pool economic prospects Into the 19HOs and its woefully olso!h scent military establish- ment suggest that Its dependence on the West in those areas is likely to increase rather than lessen. And though Turkey's quarrels with the Greeks have loos- cried its ties to the West, those quarrels also ensure that Turkey would he reluctant to loosen them further lest it concede Western support to the Greeks. 97. Turkey's foreign policy parameters, moreover, are not set only by instrumental factors. Most Turks still place a high value on their Western identity and on the cultural and Institutional credentials that flow from it; geography and history have instilled deep distrust of the Russians; and beyond very vague feel. ings of Islamic brotherSood they feel they have very little in common with their Middle F sst neighbors. However fractious the Turks may be, and however hard they work their link with the West for what they 16 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 can get out of it, that link reflects a ?i mrnilmeirt that Is nest likely to be abandoned. Conclusions and Uncfartalntle: I)1i The thrust of our prognosis, therefore, is that i'urkcy sill face estraordinatily difficult challenges in the 1940%, but that moderate Ix)htleal forces sill likely retain the tiplxCr hand; that Its democratic Institutions are likely to provide a safety valve for the groulng dix.enlenl that in more authoritarian societies might already have led to a social upheaval; that, if the military sloes intervene, its goals sill be limited and its Tenure brief; and that Turkey's instrumental, organiia? Ilonal, and emotional ties to the West are likely to keep Turkey on an essentially Western course. 9(j. While this is the shape of the Turkey that we are inost likely to lace over the nett several tears, there are circumstances that could ptoxluce a more troublesome outcome. One element of uncertainty is the difficulty of fully comprehending the longer term consequences (if the dynamic social change so chatac- Ieristic of Turkey today, the impact it will have on mass psychology, and the resulting possibility of social upheaval. Combined with the activities of tiolence- prone elements and perhaps stimulated by develop- ments, in neighboring countries, mass discontent child conceivably reach a critical level of unrest either in the urban areas or in the eastern provinces. Should such an outbreak occur, or seem imminent, the mill. Lary intervention that would almost certainly follow could usher in a longer lasting period of military rule-a period, moreover, Involving more radical doe meKtic changes in the direction of authoritarianism. 100. Also critical to Turkey's domestic trartquilllty, as well as to its foreign orientation, is the quality of Its overall relationship with the west. Regardless of -Alto holds the reins of txiwer, any solution to the economic Ixohktns compounding -Turkey's social and political Iurrnoll is difficult to Imagine tithout substantial economic auistance from the West. Without the provl? Won of substantial military assist ?e, the West is not likely to retain the influence it has had with the Turkish military. To an Important degree, moreover, the basic psychology of the country is and will remain dependent on how the West seems to come down on the Issues Involved in Turkey's continued rivalry with the Greeks, 101 Yet Turkey's demands will nearly always et? cod shat the %Vest is at)( to provide. International financial assistance is increasingly consu.:ned-not only by the real shortage of futxls but by the grossing skepticism that Turkey sill meet the performance standards attached to it. The tweeds of the Alliance and the underlying uncertainties in Greece's situation have likewise set limits to how far the West can go in tilting tosatd Turkey. The upshot is teal an element of uncertainty in the situation sill continue to he West- ern policy toward Turkey and Turkish perceptions of how well the West Is measuring tit) to Ttrkev's performance standards. If Turkish leaders perceive their political, economic, and military support from the United States And the West as increasingly In- adequate, their estrangement from the West may grow. In that case, effective Turkish membership in NATO co'.-Id not be taken for gtranted. 17 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5 1. Thu doc men$ was diuamMated by the National For** AueumaN Comer. 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