NORTH VIETNAM'S ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF MAINTAINING IMPORT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000200060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1969
• Content Type: IM

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6R7
SENSITIVE
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
NORTH VIETNAM'S ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF MAINTAINING
IMPORT TRAFFIC
SENSITIVE
OCTOBER 1969
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BEST COPY
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Directorate o 1--i-e=._i ~~-erce
6 Ccuuober 1939
No_2th Vietnam' s Alternative Means
of Mai ntaini nq import Traffic
'h is memorandum is our reply to a req',,.est that
we assess certain measures that might be taken by
-North `?Zietnam in response to a US raining program.
le analysis in this memorandum is focused s-.-..cif
ically on the means by which North Vietnam would
attempt, by using alternative transport routes.,
to maintain the large volume of imports that n..__-
,:ally enters the country through the port of
Haiphong. The following assumptions are used in
making the analysis:
1. An extensive US mining program
has successfully denied access to North
Vietnam's major and minor ports, as well
as all feasible lighter-'=- areas, to
both oceangoing and coastal shipping.
2. The North V:"- :,-name: e have opted
not to contest the mining p:_ogram and
to transfer all import trade to the
overland routes from Communi. -,- China.
. 3.. There is sufficient Soviet and
Chinese cooperation that strains in
t- heir relations are not a limiting
factor in facilitating the overland
.movement of tra
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3cnsitive
North Vietnamese Dependence on Im orts
1. The limited size of its modern economy and
the fact that s always been a food-deficit
country have tth Vietnam highly dependent
on imports . This c`ependence has increased greatly
during the war becE_i_. -e North Vietnam has had to rely
almost completely on external sources for combat
materiel and has had to diver--- large amounts of
manpower to nonproductive, war-related activitie~, .
Level of Imports
2. North Vietnamese imports during the 12 months
endin in June 1969 totaled 2.2 million tons. the
traffic of this tra~zc -- about 85 percent of total
imports -- was brought in through a port of
Haiphong. Although rail imports amounted to only
a small share of the total, transport is of
particular significance as the principal channel
for the import of combat materiel.
3. Estimated seaborne imports or the period
1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969 are shown in the
following tabulation:
C:oods
d ii s
='ooustuff
et__ 31eum
General and
miscellaneous
Total a/
1 average
USS2 and
Eastern
Europe
Communist
China
Other
Total
330
500
50
60
-
53
290
4~ 0
-
3 3
30
:50
150
30
530
690
17/3
1,890
5.
a. 3ecaz.se is not add to
r "Ls n?OIJn
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4. North Vietnamese seaborne imports reached
._cord totals this past year because of sharp in-
creases in imports of foodstuffs and petroleum.
During the 12 months ending in June 1969, for
example, imports of petroleum were about 2.5 times
their 1965 level. Imports o foodstuffs show an
even greater increase, being some seven times
greater than they were in 1965.
5. Estimates of rail imports by North Vietnam
are much more tenuous than those for seaborne
imports. On the basis of rather limited evidence,
we estimate that rail imports during the period
July 1968 - June 1969 were on the order of
300,000 tons, of which only about 50,000 tons were
combat materiel. About 40 percent of total rail
imports are estimated to come from the USSR and
Eastern Europe and the rest from China.
6. More than 97 percent of North Vietnam's
imports are from Communist countries. The USSR
provides the greater share -- 44 percent -- of
these imports, while Communist China accounts for
almost 40 percent. The Soviets provide about one-
third of North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs,
almost all of its imports of petroleum, and about
one-half of its imports of fertilizers. The USSR
also provides a.oout 40 percent of North Vietnam's
imports of general cargoes such as construction
materials, industrial machinery, metal products,
and transportation equipment. Communist China's
trade with North Vietnam is dominated by food-
szu r , which accounted for almost three-fourths
of the volume of seaborne imports from Chin _
during the past year. China also provides substan-
tia_ imports of industrial machinery, construction
materials, and transport equi per: __ "Borth Viet-
namese economic imocorts from Free i7crid countries
are doming ed by fertilizer imports -- mostly from
Japan -- and by timber imports from Cambodia.
Foodstuffs
.7. North Vietnam's domes '.-L .'- ^nt of rice
has declined steadily from - tons c=
S shed rice 5 yon cons i - 968
Since 1965 a .
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increased by about 5 percent in addition, the
war effort has required more arcs harder work
:requiring a greater intake of calories. To fill
the widening gap between production and consumption,
North Vietnam has been forced to increase imports
of Foodstuffs substantially. Imports of foodstuffs
by sea increased from about 120,000 and 80,000 tons
in 1965 and 1966, respectively, to about 460,000 tons
in 1967 and to more than 890,000 tons for the
twelve months ending June _.969. Imported foodstuffs
now supply one-fifth of the estimated total calories
consumed by the Nort_~ Vietnamese. With per capita
food consumption at close to minimum levels, the
continued accessibility to food imports is essential
for the maintenance of the population's health and
productive capacity.
8. Seaborne imports of petroleum during July
- June 1969 exx:n-c. informat .ewr --
when combined with aerial phc-,graphy, data on
ammunition expenditure rates,, . 6. changes in the
enemy order of battle -- to per = es im =. of
the volume c. military -_.port ,ates
have proved to be compatible .. ocher
occasionally obtained from c wteral sour 1n
the intelligence estimates coat
all o- setnarlm ` s impor-cs o content materiel
and major military hardware items are delivered by
rain. rather than by sea. LargE: amours-..:: of ar-
suppor .. g materials such a. ck
do, .or ver, enter i`orv .
of laaip zor
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-_0. By the end of 1968, adjustments to the cessa-
tion of the US bombing of North Vietnam, which
permitted a reduced level of im_Dorts of military
moods needed for air defense purposes, had probably
been completed, and imports of military equipment
are now estimated to be at relatively constant
levels, though well below level of the first
half of 1968. The high number of attacks flown by
US aircraft in the Panhandle of North Vietnam
between 1 April and 31 October 1968 and the con-
tinued attacks against Laos after the 1 November
bombing halt indicate a relatively constant North
Vietnamese requirement so that imports of military
goods such as ammunition have probably remained
fairly stable during 1969. With the limited
evidence on hand, we estimate that in volume terms
deliveries of military goods have probably leveled
off at an annual rate of nearly 50,000 tons.
Adequacy of Stockpiles
11. There is insufficient direct intelligence
to permit a precise quantification of North Viet-
namus reserves of essential economic goods or its
stockpiles of military goods. The information that
is available, however, supports a general conclusion
that with but few exceptions the stockpiles of
essential economic and military goods are main-
tained at relatively high levels.
Economic Goods
12. Photography of the port of Haiphong since
t.e bombing halt has shown increases in the volume
of cargo in open storage despite a faster emoval
of cargoes from the wharf area. About 60 percent
of the area was occupied by cargo at the time of
the total bombing halt in November. Although the
monthly level of cargo in open storage has fluc-
tuated considerably since then because o. changes
in the discharge rate and the effects of monsoon
weather on land transport and lightering, at the
ena of August 1969 about 70 percent of the avail-
able area occupied by cargo.
1,. Significant increases in imports con-
Ut (~~tostl `;! .. v eni01as ,
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and earthmoving equi p:nent since the total bombing
halt have considerably altered the types of cargo
observed in open storage. Prior to the halt the
open storage area was dominated by heavy equipment
and machinery, stockpiles of sacked grain, and
stockpiles of tires, most of which remained in the
area for many months at a time. Since 1 November,
much of the heavy equipment and machinery and tires
has been moved out of Haiphong and replaced by
incoming construction materials. Turnover of most
of the cargo stored in the open has been at a rela-
tively higher pace than before November, and this
has been especially true of foodstuffs.
lz_~. With but few exceptions, we~ estimate that
North. Vietnam's stockpiles of economic goods are
sufficient to sustain the economy for several
months at present rates of consumption. Food
supplies are currently at a low level, but the
harvest of the tenth-month rice crop will be
available next month. Industrial equipment needed
_or restoring and/or maintaining industrial output
has been imported during 1969 in increasing amounts,
and limited observations of storage areas in August
1969 showed a variety of industrial equipment and
materials on hand. A high level of petroleum
imports and a well-developed dispersed storage
system also point to the availability of adequate
supplies of petroleum.
Supplies of Foodstuffs
15. There is no direct intelligence on the
stockpiles of foodstuffs in North Vietnam. It is
apparent, however, that supplies of rice are
usually abundant immediately after the two rice
harvests in May-June and October-November. More-
ove:._ some subsidiary crops that ar?e harvested
beta,;. the rice -crests help to take up the
ac:. Assuming measurable carryover of food-
s--uffs before the 1968 tenth-month rice harvest,
an estimate of the food balar_ce, :::aced on estimated
_roduction, irc orts, and cons-.-: i.on, shows the
cna in t-reserve situation :..u-sing 1969 ,ice
As t h- table show~=supplies on hand
~..._~ a low 1eve in Octoobew _ncrease ._,ignifi-
c tly a er in November.
/v
T1 _- a ~. w... .._.. ... _.. _ooasul.~ 1s .. _ es most critical
dur1 1,_,_-:D' -he Ye
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Supplies of Petroleum
16 . On the basis of North Vietnam's i m-Dorts of
petroleum during the past year and estima-,:.es of
consumption patterns, we estimate that the stocks
of petroleum on hand at the end of June totaled
about 100,000 tons, equal to about 100 days' supply
at the estimated 15,18 consumption rate.
Industrial Supplies and Equipment
17. Scattered references to stockpiling of in-
dustrial equipment and supplies indicate that suf-
.icient levels are on hand to meet North Vietnam's
requirements for several months. Although current
consumption requirements are difficult to gauge,
the large amount of such goods peen in photography
of known storage and distribution areas suggests r
that there is sufficient stockpiling throughout
the country. For example, photography of mid-1969
of the Kinh No transshipment and storage depot north
of ranoi, one of the major storage areas in the
country, revealed more than 100 mobile generators;
large quantities of mobile compressors, cables, and
pipe; and large stocks of crated industrial and
agricultural equipment. At the An Khe Barracks
and Storage Area near Cat Bi Airfield, August photog-
raphy showed twice as many vehicles as in May,
inclucng significant numbers of farm tractors and
construction and military vehicles. A similar high
level of supplies and equipment has been noted in
other storage areas in Hanoi and Haiphong.
Construction Supplies and Equipment
Most supplies for use in construction
_"upear to be at low levels, although there are
stockpiles of construction equipment and structural
steel. Numerous articles critical of the progress
of the cc nstruction _ndustry have appeared in the
North Vietnamese press s~ --ce the beginning of the
year. Domestic producti~ of building vials
such as bricks, tiles, and cement has .rcpt up
with increased construction requirements. Cement
;~rcd ~i on, for exa__::ale, is esti..:atod have bean
On. out 210,000 tons '.fo- e fi-- ._i a ont =s
c,~ .. less tram the consumption of cement
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for a comparable -)eriod in 1165 and 1966. The
tight supply situation in construction materials
is not critical, however, since reconstruction
projects can be deferred or the pace of reconstruc-
tion slowed if imports -;re den?__ or reduced.
Military Supplies
19. Military stocks in North Vietnam appear to
be maintained in very large amounts. Data on North
Vietnamese imports-; information on the flow of
supplies into Laos and South Vietnam, and photo-
graphic intelligence suggest that the North Viet-
namese have successfully implemented a logistics
d
t
i
oc
r
ne that provides them a deep cushion of
military supplies.
20. We know
that North Vietnamese logistics
planners call for "combat reserves" (supplies pre-
positioned on the battlefield) to be adeq-~-.ate for
three months of combat. "Campaign reserves"
(supplies maintained in rear areas close to combat
fronts) are planned to be adecuate for six months
of combat. In addition, the North Vietnamese
r,taintain so-called strategic reserves which are
massive and diversified stockpiles located in safe
areas in Laos and North Vietnam.
"_. There are many indications that large mili-
tary stockpiles have been accumulated in North
Vietnam and Laos. Although our estimates of imports
of ammunition are subject to a wide margin of error,
the data that are available indicate that during
1968 these imports were on the order of four times
greater than the amounts expended or lost by enemy
forces in both Laos and South Vietnam. Even though
ammunition imports fell sharply following the
cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, the
stockpiles of the particular types used in Laos
and South Vietnam are apparently being maintained
at ::-::_gh levels. Reliable intelligence on shipments
_o st one of the several logistics stations in
or Vietnam handling traffic funneling into the
I.ac -an Panhandle inc:__ -.:as a standard storage
v,_. of about 7 j to o ax,_-, unitlon. This
1 amount
o a meet the esti:ma tea North V_ a-originated
ec_h re,:,ents for al: U ng/' - m_.. .... 4t7 ~1Ur~...: V_ cvi..ia c-..,.a:se
- J
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Sens _ give
?,orcas in southern Laos and Vietnam for
eve .j weeks . Another of r: l_- Lary stations
in 4- "-
ea Laotian Panhandle res "nc_-s-ble o= the trans--
_ hi )meat of supplies to ~?oL.tii Vietnam had over
, 200 tons of supplies i.i cc .;e near the end o
ay. The reported stoc. ~_1es ?or combat elements
operating in Laos are also Analysis of
recent reports from thirteen anti, __rcraft battalions
indicated they had a six months' reserve of
ammunition .
The C-verl and Option
:2. This section of the memorandum analyzes the
mnplementation of a decision to maintain North
`.'iennam's import traffic by exclusive reliance on
-and transport routes. It discusses the impact of
.he diversion of seaborne imports on the transport
of the USSR, Communist China, and North
Vietnam and estimates the capabilities of these
sys c.1s and the time required to normalize the over-
land transport arrangements.
.Impact on the Trans-Siberian Rai Zroad
2-1
I'. The diversion to rail traffic of Soviet
and East European exports'to North Vietnam would
have a surprisingly small impact on the capabilities
or the Trans-Siberian Railroad. More than 70 per-
cent of Soviet seaborne trade with North Vietnam
currently is shipped out of Vladivostok, so that
e greater part of the trade has been part of the
tabiished traffic flow on the Trans-Siberian
:~ilroad:
24. The normalization of overland traffic would
mean that slightly more than 3,000 tons a day would
routed by the Trans-Siberian R_-:ilroad. However,
only about 1,200 tons of this traffic would be
c..,rqo diverted from normal movement through European
res. This would be a light burden on a rail line
ic- is estimated conservatively to have a minimum
_~ac-.ty of about 50 trains, or 100,000 tons, each
day. The addition of 1,200 tons a day in
terms is the ecYa` valen^t~ Hof only one additional
.wa:E... :r day. On-_/ a.ioi '- l Utz aCti:.--- rail cars
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would be required,*
of more than one . _: _.
additional cars
would amount to o___.
15 , 500 tazk__ cars
limiting factor o-n,
restrictive section
'tal Soviet inventory
About 400 of the
;e e tank cars, which
~e.rcerit ~. she
:ov:_ inventory. The
China would be, the
e = , which lies just.
the east of Lake
290 kilometers is ca?_I_
each way per day, o:- -
However, the app ro:?::__:
~a l y
would be routed on -__ 'ra-:~ _berian is well below
5 percent of the r in :: c y; city avail4lb e. On
the basis of frag . _ da ~~_ , however, our best
estimates indicate
capacity of this sects.--
road is used for eco;~_,-
of one train a'day s . be easily absorbed.
25. Because ~_-affic --to Communist China has
declined so drastically in recent years, and the
transshipment facili have been kept intact, it
seems unlikely tha=n nss=_p ,ent of cargoes from
Soviet to Chinese ra:._roacs would delay the movement
of this traffic to any significant degree. The
minimum capacit^' of th?:a rail lines servicing the
two major transshipment areas at Manchouli and
Erhlien, China, is 50,000 tons per day.
26. Based on the above, L 't- seems likely that
the reorientation of traffic from Black Sea or
Baltic Sea ports to the Tra_-s-Siberian Railroad
could, with the requisite priorities, be accom-
plished in about two weeks. By the end of a two-
week period, therefore, overland traffic to North
Vietnam via the Trans-Siberian Railroad should be
pretty well normalized. Even if the adjustment
period were to take twice as long, the flow of
supplies on the Trans-Siberian Railroad would be
completely reestablished well before there was a
significant diminution of North Vietnam's stockpile
of essential goods.
Baste " on an average haul of 2,500 kiioraeters_,
20-deny ~._.onaround time, and an average of 35 tons
per carload -- 40 tons per?c:r for petroleum tank
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c . ...,-an 65 ;percent of the
of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
tra---ic. Thus the addition
of approximately
dl, _ ng only 30 trains
100, 000 tons-.
h'0 tons per day which
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Impact on Chinese Rai 1roafs
27. The convergence o`IE :- orth Vietnamese
import traffic on t r.'_=..:Dads would rep-
resent a daily vo_um of C, 0 tons c.f goods.
This volume is ec^__v lent to what can cc .;a_=ie,_.
by about 200 sta.--,a_ard-ce_uce =e` cc:__a or about
1,800 trucks a day. she additive burden to the
Chinese railroad s1 stem would be something on the
order of 5,300 tons a day, :__cldir_g about 1,000
tons a day of p: eum. This traffic .could require
the allocation of about !,-,100 : -eight cars
constant operatio and about e prole:: ts__k
cars. In each case these all ocar=ons are .. .1y
about 2 percent o'- C" 's s inventories of freight-
a-_-.:a tank cars. The i nvento__y of freight cars in
Communist China has increased abut 21 percent
since 1959, but u-ansportatic:_ performance is 'Less
now than it was in 1959. Although the rai-._-oad
system is not operating as efficiently now, tie
evidence we have suggests China has amp-le
freight cars and would have no difficulty in making
the required number availaale to transport the
imports of North Vietnam that formerly moved by sea.
28. Combined Chinese rail line capacity -'Co North
Vietnam totals about 11 z_-00 tons each way per day.
The major and most direct route, via Province,
connects Wish ta? dual-ga ge ra_. system at Dong Dang,
providing an uninterruotad standard-gauge road to
within a few miles Hanoi. A more circuitous
route through Yun__ar_ _ irce connects with the
meter-gauge rail system at Lao Cal in northwestern
North Vietr_::m. This la'c.~._: rail _ ne most likely
would perform as overflow or alternate route in
the event of problems a__ising on the primary reel
line. Although we cannot judge precisely how 1 ..__.g
it would take to -reallocate the treific to Chinese
railroads o it would teem that the ad j ~:,stments could
be made well before any shortages would develop i._
North Vietnam because of the ce-sation of sea
imports.
Movement from the Ch'~n_ e Borden
s to, rail and seaborne
i.:: or"L_S du'~ " - _....: s t od
anted to aye' ay .
dal 1 r:'co f._,or, South China. The
700 tons of d -o ou n :na
d no
move th h Fort Bad rd. Js _ Lmat: ar?e a? on
the line:,. feet of z h 'c e~ u -nce _ 'pod
into s to-7-c ge it would rcG .,tic
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increase th ~ sea c.-~s :.:- f _orrt the B_Gc_ Sea a-,--d
Nor-.-'n Sea ports &_r-d _ =oxide the shc_"~-est
rail route to North Viet: The wh~._-forge area at
Tort Bayard is limited 'Co only two large carco
vessels; however, -.here are anchorages for an
unlimited amo.nt c_: -essais v?'_.ere ligh.teri__g cculd
take place and increase the port handling capacity
substantially.
2. RaiZ Routing
=4'6 . The rail c stance _ rora _'ort Bayard to
P .i.".;g-hsiang of 3 mil -ould result in a turn-
around time of ap prOxm:..ate~V four days . C onia.ering
this factor and an average load per car of- .'J) metric
ton-_s, about 530 cars and. 35 locomotive 2d be
required in cons t operatat all o car r1
4 ,500 metric tons per day of imports (du ca? o
plus POL) that wog.-d move iron --ort _ ay _rd, repre-
sent-ing far less than I . - :en t of the Chinese
ifiv ntOr-V of rail and __ocomotives . This
of ";-..sffic would __o ._ t to 75 "percent of the daily
car _ci ty (6,000 tons) of the rail line from the
port to she North The
capac__my of Fort would be a t the port,, 'now-
eve-_-, because any short -fie rail cE."ypaci ter c; uld
easily be supplemented by rucking or t"l-le r._l
cap .city might be increa.f