THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, JANUARY 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000200070002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
The Situation in Cambodia, January 1974
Secret
CIA No. 7992/74
February 1974
Copy N?_ 135
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THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA
JANUARY 1974
1. This report is the seventh in a series of quarterly reports prepared
at the request of the Vietnam Special Studies Group. Its purpose is to
review military, political, and economic developments in Cambodia during
the fourth quarter of 1973.
2. Care has been taken in the selection and processing of the data
used in this report, but even the most authoritative information from
Cambodia frequently is unreliable. For example, military statistics covering
FANK strength, casualties, and other factors are based on largely
unconfirmed field reports. Likewise, the significance of economic data is
clouded by uncertainty over the methods used by the Cambodians to
calculate their statistics.
3. Because of the method of disseminating field reports, some of
the military data for December were not received in time to be included
in this report.
The Military Situation
Developments
4. Combat activity during the fourth quarter of 1973 started at a
high level but decreased sharply in November as the Khmer Communists
(KC) disengaged to prepare for their dry season campaign, which started
slowly in December. Communist pressure was concentrated on Phnom
Penh -- their principal objective -- and the main lines of communication
(LOCs) leading into the capital. KC initiatives elsewhere in the country
were aimed both at tying down FANK units in outlying areas - to prevent
reinforcement of the capital - and securing part of the 1973/74 rice harvest.
Illustrative of the intensity of KC activity, the number of combat incidents
Published by the Central Intelligence Agency on behalf of the Vietnam
Special Studies Group. Inquiries concerning the contents of this publication
25X1 should be addressed to South Asia Division, Office
of Economic Research
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LJL Vi\J.J 1
continued the upward trend which started early in the year and reached
the highest level of the war in September (see Figure 1). Activity in the
capital area also reached a new high in September (see Table 3, in the
Appendix), and about 60% of all combat occurred within 5 kilometers (km)
of major LOCs.
0' 1 I 1
J A S A N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S A N D
5. Early in the quarter, KC pressure in the Phnom Penh area was
concentrated against the isolated garrison at Vihear Suor, east of the capital.
FANK relief operations were generally unsuccessful, and on 30 November
the garrison fell. This facilitated KC access to the east bank of the Mekong
and allowed them to move a small number of rockets and artillery pieces
into positions opposite the capital. As a result, indirect fire attacks became
an almost daily occurrence in late December and early January. The range
from which the attacks were being mounted - at least 10 km -- and the
FANK response to this threat limited the military, but not the psychological,
impact of this shelling.
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6. To the south of the capital, KC units pulled back to rest and
refit, leaving a two-division FANK force in firm control of defenses south
of the Prek Thnot River and along Route 1. The situation remained stable
until late January, when KC attacks forced FANK north of the Prek Thnot
and KC artillery shelled Phnom Penh from a distance of about 10 km for
several days.
7. Northwest of the capital, the KC mounted a major threat in
December with the objective of destroying FANK's 7th Division and
bringing Pochentong Airport and the petroleum storage facility at Prek
Phnou under fire. Although the 7th Division was under heavy pressure,
the defense line generally held, and only limited harassment of the airport
has been achieved to date.
8. KC initiatives against Phnom Penh's vital LOCs met with mixed
success. The KC undertook no major efforts against the most crucial LOC --
the Mekong. Only 10 of 35 northbound and southbound convoys were
attacked during the quarter (compared with 17 of 39 in the third quarter),
and no major damage was caused. (Mekong convoys and the status of
Cambodia's three principal highways -- Routes 1, 4, and 5 -- during 1973
are shown in Figure 2.)
9. The KC, however, maintained the interdictions of Route 1, which
was closed throughout the year, and Route 5, which has been closed since
early September. A previous interdiction on Route 5 in Kompong Chhnang
Province was expanded, and in October and December the KC accomplished
interdictions less than 15 km from Phnom Penh. The success of this effort
allowed the KC to assign responsibility for the more distant interdiction
effort to local force elements, freeing a number of main force units for
deployment closer to Phnom Penh.
10. Through October and early November, the KC achieved only
intermittent interdiction of Route 4, and eight supply convoys reached
Phnom Penh. However, with the commitment of a multi-regimental force
in mid-November -- most of which later deployed to the Phnom Penh area --
? the KC managed to close and hold sections of the road through the end
of the year. A cautious FANK attempt to reopen the road with a reinforced
division finally succeeded in early January, but the highway was quickly
interdicted again.
11. Action elsewhere in the country was generally light. However,
two large FANK outposts at Srang and Tram Khnar (about 40 km
southwest of Phnom Penh) fell to the KC in the first week of November,
with a substantial loss of men and materiel. Later in the month, the KC
increased the pressure against the provincial capitals of Takeo and Kampot.
3
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=k.JtL" I
Neither city appeared to be in imminent danger of collapse at the end
of the year, however. The KC also initiated scattered "rice grab" operations
in Battambang and Pursat Provinces, but because of the poor state of
readiness of the KC units involved, they accomplished little.
Disposition of Forces
12. Countrywide, FANK has an estimated combat strength of 110,000
to 130,000 men, compared with a KC combat strength estimated at 50,000
to 60,000. (Comparative combat strengths, by military region, are shown
in Figure 3.)
13. The largest concentration of combat forces currently is in the
Phnom Penh area. By gathering forces from many areas of the country,
the KC have increased their manpower commitment to the capital area to
the highest level of the war. About 12,000 to 15,000 KC are targeted against
the city's defenses -- roughly equivalent to the force committed last
summer -- with a total of 20,000 to 26,000 KC within 25 km of Phnom
Penh. In opposition, FANK has a combat force of 27,000 to 29,000 in
and around the city, but they are nearly all committed, leaving little reserve
for dispatch to trouble spots.
14. In the rest of the country, FANK holds a more decided manpower
edge, but the KC retain the initiative and could easily achieve localized
manpower parity or superiority. With both sides heavily committed in the
Phnom Penh area, the KC probably are unable to redeploy sufficient units
quickly to alter radically the situation in the countryside. However, some
important changes in the status quo could occur as the result of the gradual
erosion of FANK defenses around towns such as Takeo.
Status of the Government of the Khmer Republic
Military
Manpower
15. There were a few bright spots in FANK's manpower picture in
the fourth quarter, but a substantial shortfall in recruitment left many units
still understrength. At the end of the year, the Army
conscription /recruitment drive, which began on 10 October, had garnered
slightly more than 13,000 new troops, well below the target of 25,000.
An additional 3,000 personnel enlisted in the Navy and Air Force, probably
hoping to avoid the more distasteful and dangerous Army service. As a
result of the influx of new troops, FANK's training capacity was strained
during the period, but it nonetheless produced more than 15,000 trained
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Figure 3
FANK and Khmer Communist Combat Strength, by FANK Military Region
thousands
1 Phnem ihbeng
Meanc hey
0
FANK 15-18
KC 5-7
Jim Neap 'r /
qNattamgang
rung Koh
Kong
V
FANK 0
KC 1-2
Senmonoromo
- Military region boundary
i Miltary region capital
Total Combat Strength
FANK 110-130
KC 50-60
5
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VIII-
FANK 3-4
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personnel, compared with 9,500 during the previous quarter. Partially
offsetting these accessions, however, were FANK losses (killed, wounded,
missing, and deserted), which totaled almost 4,000 for the quarter. FANK's
total trained strength at the end of the year was about 150,000, roughly
75% of total strength, which was estimated to be about 205,000 as of
1 December (see Table 1).
25X1
Estimated FANK Strength
as of 1 December 19731
Total
205,000
General Staff/Ministry of Defense
24,400
Army
159,900
Deployed in-country
159,200
MR I
7,800
MR II
36,400
MR 111
25,700
MR IV
20,000
MR V
0
MR VI
16,400
MR VIII
4,100
Special Military Region
48,800
Out-of-country training
700
Thailand
600
Other
100
Navy (including Marines)
13,200
Air Force
7,500
Army
16. Cambodian Army operations in the fourth quarter remained
defensive and reactive. As shown by the disposition of FANK battalions
(see Figure 4), most of FANK's combat strength remains concentrated
around Phnom Penh and provincial capitals or along major lines of
communication, thus giving the KC control over wide expanses of the
countryside. In fact, the FANK effort to maintain control in the countryside
dropped precipitously as units were pulled back to defend threatened urban
areas. Both the absolute level of Army presence in the countryside and
the level relative to earlier periods (both expressed in battalion-days of
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Disposition of FANK Battalions,1 December 1973
Pllrsel4---
ILI,
-- ----------
Koh
Kong
Phnom n oinpoyg opll
Figure4
of l _S '` } tr ~~.ra l+. _ g
7
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== v
No
Kur Krang Koh
b neon
Military region boundary
Military region capital
% 50 Miles
25 50 Kilometers
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presence) are at the lowest points on record (see Table 4, in the Appendix).
Recognizing the need to increase its capabilities in the countryside (as well
as around the cities), FANK has reversed an earlier program of reforming
battalions into company-size units (primarily used to guard fixed positions)
and has begun to reconstitute battalions from the manpower in those
companies.
17. As has been true throughout the war, the great majority of Army
units still rely on fixed, defensive positions -- frequently ill-prepared - and
rarely conduct extensive patrols or shift deployments to meet changed
situations. This lack of mobility was particularly apparent throughout
1972-73, and in November 1973 the index of FANK mobility (expressed
as the percent of FANK battalions moving more than 20 km per month --
see Table 5, in the Appendix) fell to the third lowest level on record.
18. In contrast, Cambodian Air Force capabilities expanded and
improved during the fourth quarter. The Air Force for the first time showed
an ability to sustain heavy, well-coordinated support of ground operations
with the launching of Operation Thunderstrike in late October. The
eight-day operation, designed to provide direct support to units holding
Phnom Penh's southern perimeter, apparently was effective in discouraging
KC initiatives. During the operation the Air Force launched about 60 strike
sorties per day, well above the average of 45 per day for the quarter.
(Monthly strike figures are shown in Table 6, in the Appendix, and the
locations of air strikes for the quarter in Figure 5.) Three subsequent
Thunderstrike operations in November and early December were more
limited in scope and less successful.
19. The 19 November bombing of the Presidential Palace by a
disaffected Air Force pilot, however, has led to the placing of severe
limitations on the ordnance carried by T-28 strike formations. Flight leaders
are prohibited from carrying bombs and are required to monitor the
activities of the others in the flight during strikes, thus reducing the impact
of Air Force attacks on KC units. It is unclear when or if these restrictions
will be lifted.
Navy
20. Improved leadership and morale continue to characterize naval
operations. During the quarter, the Navy continued its resupply of Kompong
Cham, initiated a series of resupply convoys to four other isolated cities,
and provided effective support for Mekong convoys. In addition, the Navy
provided vital transport and fire support for ground operations on the east
bank of the Mekong near Phnom Penh and for an unsuccessful attempt
to recapture the seacoast town of Kep.
8
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Cambodian Air Force Strikes, Fourth Quarter 1973
Kpmpong ghom~
Koh
Kong!
ompong Fopil
rey 4en
9
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Figure 5
Military region boundary
? Military region capital
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21. The most significant aspect of naval operations, however, has been
the formation and deployment of additional Marine battalions. With a total
complement of more than 3,500 men, and further expansion under way,
the Marine battalions have provided badly needed support along the Mekong
and, in part, can be credited with the failure of the KC, to date, to mount
a serious threat against Mekong convoys. Deployed in numerous small
positions along the riverbank (other Marine units are stationed along the
seacoast and near Kompong Chhnang), the Marines have patrolled
aggressively and, with. naval fire support readily available, have acquitted
themselves well in engagements with the KC.
Auto Defense
22. Another bright spot on the government side has been the
expansion of the Auto Defense Program. At the end of October, Auto
Defense strength was more than 65,000, an increase of 8,000 since August.
Despite the lack of support or recognition from central authorities, an
additional 2,500 troops have been enrolled in two autonomous provincial
programs.
23. Auto Defense performance has been uneven and the units are
no match for regular KC forces, but they have proved a valuable adjunct
to the Army. In areas around Phnom Penh, for example, Auto Defense
personnel occupy exposed forward positions, and at the Port of Kompong
Som they are an integral part of the overall defense plan. In Siem Reap
Province, task forces composed of Auto Defense and Army personnel have
occasionally undertaken limited offensives against relatively weak KC units.
24. The most important role played by Auto Defense forces, however,
has been protection of the rice crop in Battambang Province. With a strength
of more than 10,000, Auto Defense forces have been given primary
responsibility for security in rice-growing areas. Dispersed in small units
and conducting sweeps in conjunction with Army units, Auto Defense forces
have had at least limited success against the weak KC units in the area,
and they now are the principal target of KC propaganda broadcasts.
25. In Battambang, as in most areas, the major shortcoming of the
Auto Defense Program is the Army's inability to provide adequate backup.
Battambang, for example, has only one Army battalion available for
intervention, and one isolated 100-man Auto Defense force has to rely on
a force of only 30 Army troops 11 km away for support.
26. The long-anticipated resignation of Prime Minister In Tam and
the subsequent formation of a new government headed by Long Boret,
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In Tam's former foreign minister, highlighted political developments in
Phnom Penh during the past few months. In Tam stepped down on
7 December and Long Boret assumed office within three weeks. Boret,
however, did not take In Tam's seat on the ruling High Political Council --
which now consists of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Cheng Heng. The new
16-man cabinet is smaller than its predecessor and appears to be relatively
well qualified to tackle the country's increasingly severe economic problems.
Moreover, Boret's recognized political skills should help him to move toward
these objectives, as should his solid standing with President Lon Nol, who
has claimed that he will give Boret considerable authority.
27. Internationally, the UN General Assembly voted on 5 December
to defer action on an Algerian resolution to seat representatives of
Sihanouk's "government" until next fall, thereby assuring government
representation in the UN for at least another year. Despite the slim
three-vote margin, the postponement represented an important victory for
Phnom Penh and its supporters. The Sihanouk challenge was endorsed by
the Algiers non-aligned conference in September and had the backing of
China and a substantial number of the non-aligned states at the UN. Later
in the session Phnom Penh also survived a parliamentary maneuver by
Sihanouk's supporters to challenge the government's credentials.
28. Meanwhile, no discernible movement on either side occurred
toward a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of the Cambodian conflict.
The newly installed government quickly affirmed its desire for peace and
reissued the peace proposal of 6 July calling for an immediate cease-fire
and talks. Sihanouk and the KC again quickly rejected the proposal and
reiterated their opposition to negotiations with the government on anything
short of its total capitulation. A poorly conceived and ill-timed peace plan
proposed by former prime minister and would-be "third force" leader Sonn
Sann in early January drew heavy criticism from both sides.
29. The most significant economic problems with which the
government had to deal toward the end of 1973 were tight supplies of
key commodity stocks and accelerated price increases that pointed toward
an annual inflation on the order of 275% to 300%. Because the preponderant
role in commodity production and supply belongs to the private sector,
the effectiveness of particular government policies is necessarily limited.
Notwithstanding this fact, the government -- with ample US assistance --
performed reasonably well in preventing runaway inflation, meeting key
commodity requirements, and providing some support for the heavy flow
of refugees.
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30. Considering the hyperinflation with which it must deal, the
government showed remarkable restraint in fiscal and monetary policies
during the last quarter of 1973. Despite pressures to grant additional salary
increases as an offset to continued sharp price increases, expenditures did
not increase above earlier projections. Nevertheless, efforts to reduce
expenditures have been difficult because the military situation remains
precarious and military expenditures continue to take up some 60% of all
public spending. Thus the 1973 budget may be in deficit by as much as
16 billion riels, 60% more than originally planned. The rate of growth of
the money supply was remarkably modest in the last quarter and for the
year. Between the end of 1972 and October it increased by only 32% and
was up only an estimated 40% during the year (see Figure 6).
CAMBODIA: Indexes of Money Supply and Prices
Price for Working Class
Families in Phnom Penh"
'Excluding cash in the bank and small sums on the current account of the general treasury.
"As reported by the Cambodian National Institute of Statistics.
31. The final quarter also saw a continuation of fairly effective efforts
to keep import demand within Cambodia's limited foreign exchange
availabilities. Total foreign exchange sales were just under the $36 million
allocated for the Exchange Support Fund (ESF). Import demand was quite
heavy during most of October, threatening exhaustion of ESF funds before
the end of the year. The reimposition of advance import deposits, equal
to 300% of the amount of exchange requested, helped reduce import
demand considerably for the rest of the quarter.1
1. Reimposition of advance import deposits, while reducing import demand, also reduced the flow
of goods into the country, thereby adding to inflationary pressures.
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32. Exchange rate policy was also used more aggressively during the
final quarter. In particular, during the period of heavy import demand in
October, the riel was devalued twice from 250 riels per dollar to 302 riels
per dollar (see Figure 7).2 Earlier, the value of the riel had not been changed
during February-August, despite strong demand for foreign exchange and
a black market rate some 75% greater than the official rate.
CAMBODIA: Weekly Foreign Exchange Sales by the Banque Nationale
Du Cambodge and Effective Exchange Rate
33. Delivery and distribution of US-supplied goods were relatively
effective, as attested by the 25% decrease in the free market price of rice
in late December and resultant slowdown in the rise of the consumer price
index. Prices of non-rice foods, however, did not show a comparable decline,
but here it should be noted that the government has little control over
the flow or distribution of most such items, which reach Phnom Penh from
outlying domestic areas.
34. Despite some progress in framing counterinflationary policies, the
government has done little toward developing a comprehensive approach
to income distribution problems. With the large numbers of people arriving
2. An additional 20% devaluation -- to 377 riels per dollar - was announced in early January
1974, indicating continuing awareness of the importance of maintaining some purchasing-power
alignment.
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?7L' V1t~ . i
daily in a capital city that already has an army of unemployed, the prospects
for civil disorder have become progressively stronger. The average refugee,
lacking skills or training, has been forced to accept employment that
provides him barely enough for survival. Available statistics indicate that
in the past three years minimum real wages have fallen by 20%, and working
classes have been forced to increase the share of incomes spent on
foodstuffs. Government wage increases have several times been awarded to
civilian and military personnel, but increases for non-government workers
have probably not been equivalent. In contrast, the incomes of middle-
and upper-echelon workers probably kept pace with the cost of living, while
some businessmen were able to take advantage of commodity shortages and
a glutted labor market. Although upgrading of the military personnel system
has reduced the formerly high level of "phantom" troops, many military
officers still reap some benefit from manipulating payrolls.
35. As the year ended, and with prodding from US advisers, the Prime
Minister announced a new program to counter economic disruption caused
by the war. Although few details are available, the program is known to
include cost-of-living allowances for civilian and military employees,
improved rice distribution, increased agricultural output, refugee relief,
limitations on the budget, and tax reforms. Given the present military
environment, the need to maintain heavy defense spending, and constraints
on domestic resources as well as foreign assistance, it is highly unlikely
that such a program can do more than bring about a modest slowdown
in the recent rate of inflation.
Military Equipment
36. During the fourth quarter, a major effort was undertaken to
increase FANK's supply availability through the delivery of MAP-funded
weapons, ammunition, and equipment. More than 30,000 M-16 rifles and
substantial numbers of crew-served weapons and artillery were delivered,
as well as more than 700 trucks and nearly 80 armored vehicles. (For data
on the delivery of selected items, see Table 7, in the Appendix.)
37. Although FANK ammunition consumption rose during the
quarter, to the highest level of the war in early January, enough ammunition
was delivered to increase FANK stocks by about 50%. (For a comparison
of ammunition deliveries, consumption, and stocks, see Figure 8). At the
end of the year, FANK had a 42-day supply of small arms ammunition
and enough mortar and artillery rounds and bombs to last between 23 and
30 days. The only ammunition type in short supply was aircraft rockets,
with only a 10-day supply on hand. The current goal is to have a 30-day
stock of all ammunition types.
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J A S 0 N D J F
1973 1974
38. Petroleum stocks threatened to diminish seriously during the
quarter as a result of the Arab oil cutback, but, by the end of the period,
at least 30 days' stocks were on hand for most civilian product categories,
and about 60 days' supply for military categories (see Table 2).
Table 2
Stocks of Petroleum Products in Phnom Penh
Days of Supply
29 Sep
13 Oct
13 Nov
20 Dec
Gasoline
15
16
13 (58)1
22
(58)
Kerosene
24
21
2
6
Automotive diesel
12
8
12 (34)
28
(61)
Industrial diesel
41
28
29
46
Fuel oil
22
16
23
19
Jet fuel
49
62
56 (70)
42
(56)
Aviation gasoline
85
59
68 (55)
101
(54)
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Government discussions with Cambodia's three suppliers -- Shell, Caltex,
and Summit -- led to a reversal of announced delivery cutbacks, which could
have created a year-end shortage of numerous oil products. Shell and Caltex,
suppliers of about 70% of petroleum imports in 1973, agreed to continue
petroleum deliveries at significantly higher prices through May 1974, when
current contracts expire. Summit, on the other hand, defaulted on its
scheduled deliveries for the first half of 1974 because of a shortage of
supplies.
39. In view of the uncertain supply situation, the government
instituted several measures to conserve existing stocks. On 23 November,
gas rationing went into effect for all vehicles except those used by the
government and public transportation. Two weeks later, prices of all oil
products were increased sharply. A National Petroleum Institute was set
up to monitor fuel procurement and consumption, and the military was
ordered to reduce consumption by 15%.
40. The extremely tight rice situation that prevailed in Phnom Penh
during late summer continued into the fall. However, deliveries of
US PL-480 rice from South Vietnam by the end of October eased the
situation and prevented government stocks from slipping to dangerously
low levels, such as had prompted the severe riots of September 1972. Later
deliveries of Thai rice and PL-480 rice from South Korea helped the city
support reasonable consumption rates, until the arrival of large PL-480
shipments from the United States in December.
41. Efforts to bolster rice stocks to a minimum of 45 days by the
end of the year were successful, despite some disruptions in delivery
schedules. By the end of the year, government supplies in Phnom Penh
were sufficient for about three weeks' consumption, with an additional three
weeks' supply waiting to be moved from Kompong Som to the capital.
Status of the Khmer/Vietnamese Communists
Military
42. Developments late in the fourth quarter greatly eased the logistic
problems that hampered KC operations earlier in the year. Command and
control shortcomings and recruiting difficulties, however, are still restricting
KC capabilities and have adversely affected their early 1974 dry season
operations. While the KC have been able more easily to mass forces around
Phnom Penh from all parts of the country, they apparently still have not
developed the capability to coordinate multi-regimental formations on
several fronts, as demonstrated by their inability so far to launch
simultaneous attacks on all sides of Phnom Penh.
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43. Manpower also remains a cause of concern for the KC. Although
they have largely replaced the heavy casualties suffered last summer (the
government claims to have killed an additional 800 in the fourth quarter),
the KC have been hit with widespread illness and have had to resort to
forced conscription in some areas, thus decreasing the effectiveness and
reliability of many of their units. In Kratie Province, for example, the KC
have had great difficulty in recruiting troops, primarily because of the large
numbers of ethnic Chams in the province. To overcome this problem the
KC began to forcibly induct Cham youths into the military in October.
44. Currently, the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia consists
primarily of administrative services troops -- about 20,000 -- most of whom
are supporting operations in southern South Vietnam. During the past two
years, the Vietnamese have substantially reduced their combat strength in
Cambodia, and we now estimate that only a few thousand combat troops
remain (including some personnel maintaining liaison with KC units).
Although none of these are thought to be engaged in combat against FANK,
occasional clashes between the Vietnamese and the KC in border areas are
still being reported.
45. In the southern provinces of Kampot and Takeo, for example,
the two sides continue to engage in scattered skirmishes. Both sides have
chosen to ignore the agreement reached last August that provided for a
formal delineation of zones of administrative control in the two provinces.
Instead, each has tried to expand its control over territory, population,
and economic resources controlled by the other. Local KC units have staged
small-scale harassing attacks against Vietnamese units in an effort to push
them across the border into South Vietnam, and Vietnamese troops have
been instructed to enlarge their areas of control and have been ambushing
KC troops. Despite these actions, casualties have been relatively light, and
recently there have been tentative indications that KC and Vietnamese
Communist officials have again been seeking to reach an accommodation
in this area.
46. Sihanouk's fragile relations with the KC took another turn in early
November, when the Prince announced that all portfolios of his Peking-based
Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) -- with the exception of
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs -- would be transferred to KC leaders in
Cambodia. The move was made in part to remove the "exile" stigma from
the RGNU. All that apparently remains of Sihanouk's Peking operation is
a small "mission" to receive foreign diplomats and dignitaries.
47. Sihanouk's failure to attend farewell functions in Peking in
November for leng Sary and his public cancellation of plans for a visit
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to the "liberated zone" in 1974 made it clear that considerable ill will
remains between the Prince and the KC leadership. Despite Communist
efforts late in the year to smooth over their differences with Sihanouk,
he has continued to annoy them by taking a pessimistic public line on
the KC's chances for achieving a quick military victory in Cambodia.
48. The past quarter was characterized by continued attempts by the
KC to maintain strict control over the population. Recent information
indicates that the KC have created covert "leagues" to oversee more closely
the activities of particular segments of the population. In Svay Rieng
Province, for example, at least four such leagues currently exist -- the
Farmers' League, Youth League, Children's League, and Workers' League.
Reportedly created in January 1973, they are administered at the district
level and below directly by Khmer Communist Party members. Mass
associations, such as the Farmers' and Patriotic Youth Associations, are
organizationally subordinate to the various leagues and serve as the overt
vehicles through which high-level KC policy is implemented. Although
leagues have been reported only in Svay Rieng and Pursat, they probably
exist in other parts of Cambodia as well.
49. Discrimination against particular segments of the population also
persisted. In Kampot, for example, the KC have waged a campaign against
Chinese merchants and farmers to prevent them from selling supplies to
the North Vietnamese. In Kratie, Kompong Cham, and several other
provinces, the KC have imposed a harsh rule on the ethnic Chams, including
such measures as prohibiting or sabotaging religious ceremonies, forcing
families to contribute to the KC organization, and communizing all
property. In the case of the Chams, however, a number of villagers have
organized armed resistance and, in at least one area, are seeking FANK's
aid. Support by the local population for these anti-KC operations reportedly
is running at a high level.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICAL TABLES
19712
38
19722
1st qtr
34
2nd qtr
48
3rd qtr
24
4th qtr
31
1973
Jan
36
Feb
61
Mar
77
Apr
125
May
139
Jun
186
Jul
182
Aug
98
Sep
213
Oct
154
Nov
82
1. Data are from the OSD/DDPAE Khmer Computer File.
2. Monthly average.
19
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FANK: Battalion-Days in the Countryside)
Index
(December
1970 = 100)
Percent
of Total
Battalion-Days
19712
139
49
19722
1st qtr
127
49
2nd qtr
115
44
3rd qtr
115
42
4th qtr
123
41
1973
Jan
125
41
Feb
113
41
Mar
130
42
Apr
122
45
May
129
46
Jun
117
43
Jul
121
43
Aug
111
41
Sep
103
38
Oct
94
38
Nov
81
33
1. Data are from the CIA FANK Computer File.
2. Monthly average.
20
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Percent of FANK Battalions
Moving More than 20 Kilometers per Monthy
19712
21
19722
1st qtr
12
2nd qtr
15
3rd qtr
16
4th qtr
15
1973
Jan
15
Feb
8
Mar
7
Apr
22
May
14
Jun
17
Jul
13
Aug
16
Sep
17
Oct
15
Nov
10
1. Data are from the CIA FANK Computer File.
2. Monthly average.
21
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Tactical Strike Sorties in Cambodia I
19712
19722
1st qtr
1,902
2nd qtr
1,150
3rd qtr
1,336
4th qtr
948
1973
Jan
1,378
Feb
773
Mar
4,024
Apr
5,010
May
5,719
Jun
6,002
Jul
6,744
Aug
4,124
Sep
1,326
Oct
1,327
Nov
1,187
Dec
1,806
1. Including Vietnamese Air Force sorties through January 1973 and US sorties
through 15 August 1973.
2. Monthly average.
MAP-Funded Deliveries to FANK, Fourth Quarter 1973
(Selected Items)
M-16 rifles
30,586
Machineguns
569
Recoilless rifles
32
Mortars
284
105-mm howitzers
30
155-mm howitzers
12
Trucks
744
Armored vehicles
79
Naval craft
2
22
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25X1
Secret
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