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Approved For Rele diUTEU DISTFOULON 25X1A Clandestine Communist TE 11M PF The (.:on Part 01 ization list Party Undtl-grot nd LIMITED OISTRIBIIIION ?61 r 77e,c/xee.o.e.5. Rresoirs ibs T7diRrAT 4417- r?A Altg" 7A94/rinirTho 7:41, 77/4- 41/v/ Ze-ro. srhirEs oe Xey?Afo viikeve:e4--- ? JULY. 1949 t r#4- ,?4/710 174 ?, le/roehy7? 71.e41/ssioN 1 Re /4-dxs-/ e a 0 '4)5 ca*-- 114 ? - - SECRET ia8 04 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-7/12% Approved For Release 2001/09/Q6 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS Page GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1 PART ONE: THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDERGROUND 8 I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLETIS A. Police and Party 1. Geographical Factors 2. Population Density 3, Political Factors ... 4. Mass Support for Police 9 9 10 10 10 11 B. Adaptability of Party Organization to Illegal Conditions 12 1. Organizational Continuity 12 2. Cadre Continuity 13 3. Discipline and Security 14 4. Doctrine as Morale?Builder. 15 5. Attraction of Doctrine 16 6. Cell System 16 7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience ? ? ? 0 17 C. Organizational Problems: Adjustment to Illegal Conditions 18 1. Reduction of Party Apparatus a. Consolidation of Territorial 18 organizations 18 b. Reduction of staffs 18 2. The Command Function: The Triad System . 19 3. Compartmentalization 20 a. Party and military branches b. Party and auxiliary (front) 20 organizations ? ? ? ? OOOOOOO c. Party and auxiliary illegal 21 organizations 21 d. Internal Party Compartmentalization 21 1) Elimination of horizontal liaison 21 2) Restriction of contacts 21 3) Functional restrictions 21 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Page 4. Election of Party Committees .... ? ? ? 21 a. Election of Central Committees . 0 0 b. Territorial Party committees and 22 electoral commissions 22 c. Co-optation 22 5. Party Organizations Abroad . . . .. a. Central Committee and Central 22 Departments 23 b. Foreign Bureau 23 c. Regional support centers. . . .. 23 d. Party organizations for emigrants ? ? ? 23 e. Special service organizations 24 D. Operational Problems of the Party Underground. . 24 1. The Cadre Problem 24 a. Replacement of the cadre 24 b. An adequate cadre reserve c. Ideological and practical training 25 of the new cadre 26 d. The protection of the illegal cadre ? ? 26 2. The "Housing" Problem and Communications . 27 a. Internal communications . .27 ? ? ? ? ? ? b. External communications c. Reporting points for liaison personnel 27 from abroad 28 3. Technical Apparatus 28 4. The Security Problem 30 a. Personal security 31 b. Administrative security 31 5. The Financial Problem 32 6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem a. Penetration and control of legal non-Communist parties represent- ing workers and related class 33 elements b. Penetration and control of legal 34 trade unions c. Creation of dummy front organizations 34 or parties 34 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/039106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Page CASES OF COILUNIST PARTIES UNDERGROUND ? 4 A. The Bolshevik Party Underground ? ? e ? 4 35 36 1. Organization 38 a. The Moscow Organization . ? . 39 b. The Odessa Organization 40 2. Operational Problems 41 a7 Security Measures 41 b? Technical Services 43 c. Finances 47 B. CP France Underground 48 1. Organization 48 a. The Party Center 49 b. Territorial Levels 50 2. Technical Services 52 3. Security ? ? ? 53 a. Modification of Structure . 53 b. Compartmentalization 54 c. Security Rules 54 1) Restriction of Contacts 54 2) Security of Meetings 55 3) Safeguarding Party Records and Materials 55 4) Personal Conduct 56 d. Control of Cadres 57 4. Finances 61 C. CP Germany Underground 63 1. Organization. ? ? a. Initial Confusion 64 b. The Failure of Centralized Control 64 c. Decentralized Control d. Attempt to Revive Centralized 67 Control 70 2. Security 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/RH96 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Page D. CP Greece Underground 74 1. Organization 74 2. Operational Problems 78 a. Security 78 b. Communications 80 1) Couriers 80 2) Press and Radio 81 c. Recruitment and Transport 83 d. Finances . . . 83 1) Sources of Revenue 84 2) Expenditures 85 E. CP Spain Underground 87 1. The Party Center Abroad 87 2. Organization within Spain 89 3. Other Party Organizations Abroad 91 F. CP Portu3a1 Underground 92 1. Organization 92 2. Security 95 3. Agitprop 98 4. Communications Abroad 99 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/91/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 ? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECAET MNERAL CONSIDERATIONS The international Communist movement has not merely survived, but has actually flourished, in the face of difficulties which have ruined political forces with less constancy of purpose and with less practical a technique. It has maintained itself as the "vanguard of the proletariat" through Tsarist and totalitarian suppression, armed intervention, two world wars, and a decade of general "'bourgeois" prosperity. In large measure, Communist suc- cesses can be explained by the organizational adaptability of the Communist Party and its mastery over a mass of practical techni- ques. The Party knows what it must do and how to go about doing it, in any given circumstance. This competence was responsible in the first place for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, and since then, for the endurance of the Party as a continuing threat to all "bourgeois" states. Uhatever the political climate, the Party goes on, working openly and legally where it can, secretly and illegally where it must. It is this latter capabil- ity for "Conspiratorial" work which largely accounts for the survival and success of the international Communist movement in the face of adverse conditions. The scope of the "conspiratorial" activities of the Commu- nist Party encompasses defensive and offensive purposes. As an organization of professional and practical revolutionaries bent upon the eventual achievement of revolution, the Communist Party is enveloped by an atmosphere of hostility. Realizing this, the international movement has naturally developed a system of defen- sive measures designed to protect the Party against the police, intelligence agencies, hostile groups and the hostile public, and has been normally organized so as to keep knowledge of the most significant aspects of Party activity restricted to a minimum of individuals. For similar reasons, the Party has made it a gener- al practise to conceal as thoroughly as possible the mechanics of the political controls through which it extends its influence be- yond Party confines. The Communist Party is generally designed SECRET Approved For Release 200-49%06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET and able to operate under any conditions of opposition, hostility and outright suppression. It is capable of going totally under- ground when outlawed, and it is sufficiently security-conscious, even under normal conditions, to conceal many of its "normal" activities. The "conspiratorial" practises of Communist Parties operating in hostile societies are largely defensive in nature. They are designed to preserve political and organizational gains made by the Party, rather than to advance the Party's aims fur- ther. The defensive side of the Party's conspiratorial behavior can be extensively illustrated by its organizational and opera- tional methods when proscribed. Part One of this study deals extensively with this subject -- the general patterns of under- ground organization are presented there, supplemented by de- scriptive analyses of the actual underground experience of several Communist Parties. Defensive measures are normally adopted also by Parties which function more or less openly and legally. "Legal" Parties give their program a maximum publication and expose a great number of functionaries as well as parts of their organ- ization to the public eye. However, even when admitted to the political scene, the Party usually acknowledges the hostility of the society it lives in, and attempts to submerge, auto- matically and by virtue of its organizational principles, the more significant areas of Party work. Every Communist Party is a centralized and centrally- directed mechanism controlled by a comparatively small group of professional, paid and full-time functionaries -- the cadre. Within this cadre-hierarchy the functionaries at national head- quarters occupy the central position and have a monopoly on policy-making and organizational direction. Accustomed to strict semi-military discipline, the lower Party cadre and the rank and file are mere instruments of the Party center. By virtue of its leadership function the Party center normally SECRET Approved For Release 20.01i09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET guards the professional secrets of the Party, not unlike the management of a business enterprise. The Party center, then, puts the stamp of secrecy on such matters as Party finances, particularly on the origin of funds not derived from normal sources; intra-Party communication of more than normal admin- istrative significance; relations with other fraternal Parties exceeding the normal interchange of Party literature and other routine communications and relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or representatives of the Soviet Government and the Cominform, which arc likely to compromise the Party. Experience has further shown that Soviet intelligence agencies frequently channel their recruitment of Party members through individual functionaries in national Party headquarters -- operations which require secure and secret handling. Thus, even 0 under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of Party work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries and are tightly scaled off from the rest of the Party and the outside world. Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department and the Control Commission. These agencies are organizational corollaries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon its cadre, it is essential for the center not only to train, pro- tect and properly assign the professional personnel, but also to preserve constant ideological and security control. Thus, most Parties maintain a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who must often perform counter-espionage duties such as theidenti- fication of police agents infiltrated into the ranks of the Party, and "illegal" support functions such as the procurement of false papers and passports for the cadre. Clearly, the existence of such a Party police force must be concealed, not only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons. The Party is supposed to be run according to the principle of "democratic centralism", and the centralism exercised through SECRET Approved For Release 2001/a9r06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECR4T guards the professional secrets of the Party, not unlike the management of a business enterprise. The Party center, then, puts the stamp of secrecy on such matters as Party finances, particularly on the origin of funds not derived from normal sources; intra-Party communications of more than normal admin- istrative significance; relations with other fraternal Parties exceeding the normal interchange of Party literature and other routine communications and relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or representatives of the Soviet Government and the Cominform, which are likely to compromise the Party. Experience has further shown that Soviet intelligence agencies frequently channel their recruitment of Party members through individual functionaries in national Party headquarters -- operations which require secure and secret handling. Thus, even under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of Party work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries and are tightly scaled off from the rest of the Party and the outside world. Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department and the Control Commission. These agencies are organizational corollaries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon its cadre, it is essential for the center not only to train, pro- tect and properly assign the professional personnel, but also to preserve constant ideological and security control. Thus, most Partie; maintain a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who must often perform counter-espionage duties such as the identi- fication of police agents infiltrated into the ranks of the Party, and "illegal" support functions such as the procurement of false papers and passports for the cadre. Clearly, the existence of such a Party police force must be concealed, not only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons. The Party is supposed to be run according to the principle of "democratic centralism", and the centralism exercised through SECRET Approved For Release 200/9T06: CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET police control methods may be distasteful to the rank-and-file. On the level of "normal" Party operations, secrecy is also unavoidable. Considering the smallest operative Party unit, the individual Party member, it is a well-known fact that many Commu- nists operate without ostensible connection with the Party. This apparcni lack of connection maybe aimed at personal protection or at safeguarding a particular, often secret, mission. In any case, the secret Party member shows up in almost every Party -- one need only recall the case of the Indonesian Socialist leader and government official, Sjarifooddin, who, at the time of the Hoes? putsch in 1948 admitted that he had been a secret member of the Communist Party of Indonesia since 1935. The Party, however, needs not only secret Party members -- it is bent upon the manipulation of non-Communist groups and organizations in order to establish "mass support" as a pre- requisite for revolutionary action. The approaches to this or- ganizational problem obviously vary from Party to Party, and the extent of secrecy with which they are handled is determined by the political climate prevailing in the particular country. In general, however, the Party will attempt to surround itself with a solar system of front organizations in order to attract acces- sible groups, and will further dict its fractions into non- Communist mass organizations -- for example, labor unions and political movements in colonial countries -- in order to expand Party control. In all these cases, it will be a problem of con- cealing Party control over fronts and fractions, a problem which becomes increasingly difficult to solve as the manipulative tech- niques of the Party are exposed in public. Clearly, however, as a revolutionary organization, the Party cannot confine itself to defensive tactics alone. No matter what its status, whether legal or proscribed, the Party must at least plan such activities as will weaken the coercive power mechanism of the "capitalist" state, as well as hostile groups and politi- cal parties, in concrete operational, rather *Ian in general SECRET Approved For Release 20011109/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 T political, terms. No matter what its tactical shifts, the Party can never neglect its fundamentally military-reVolutionarY character and it must attempt to organize support functions.di- rectly or indirectly related to future revolutionary action. This concept, which is by no means clear-cut and free from straight political considerations, involves what amounts to the setting up of intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations and/or operations, with all their operational ramifications. The general operational program of the Communist Party provides for the organization of secret Party nuclei in the armed forces, the police, the navy, the government, and occasionally also within opposition groups in order to specialize and concentrate upon a) the procurement of information which would clarify the organ- ization and capabilities of the hostile power mechanism; b) clandestine subversion within "the citadel of the enemy," parti- cularly in the armed forces. The program may also at times in- clude the organization of clandestine nuclei operating in strategic plants and enterprises to' provide industrial and eco- nomic information systematically -- the productive capabilities and facilities of the hostile society are clearly related to the problems of revolutionary action. Party security in its widest sense may also require a more aggressive approach, particularly when the physical ligaidation of hostile individuals and traitorous or insecure Party members is concerned. Finally, when a revolutionary situation approaches, the Party must provide for a para-military organization to form the executive core of revolutionary action?action, however, which sets into coordi- nated motion the entire Party mechanism and the social forces allied with it. Such and similar clandestine action auxiliaries of the Party have been occasionally observed in operation. Part Two of this paper includes a factual presentation, and a tentative analysis of their significance in detail. These offensive clandestine Party operations probably represent the most significant area of SECRET Approved For Release 20&1/b9106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECA4 T Party work. They perform functions which transgrebs the area of "normal" political action and they may constitute an acute threat to the existing social order. However, it is not yet possible to generalize on the subject. While the normal aspects of Party or- ganization follow a pattern anywhere, it is by no means certain that every Party organizes clandestine action auxiliaries in the same fashion--if at all. On the basis of evidence available at present, it appears that Leninist-Stalinist action theory applies practically to the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries as it applies to any other aspect of Party work. Thus, the actual organization of clandestine military auxiliaries prior to the all-out revolutionary effort depends not only upon such factors as availability of train- ed manpower, leaders and arms, but also upon the making of a clear- cut policy decision that a revolutionary situation, which may be successfully exploited by the Party, is at hand. While it may be expected that all Parties include individuals or even groups who are specialists in military matters, it would be futile to search for a facsimile of the Military Revolutionary Organization of the Bolshevik Party (1917) in the Communist Party of Great Britain at present. Incipient or underdeveloped Parties are more likely to concentrate upon political action in order to achieve mass influ- ence. Parties which have reached a stage of relative mass propor- tions may find it practicable to organize secret military cadres and formations. Again, however, policy considerations and the degree of expectable opposition will affect planning, timing and organization. Similar considerations apply to the organization of counter- intelligence, intelligence, sabotage, liquidation and other clandes- tine action agencies. Materials studied indicate that a stepping- up of such activity and its formalization in special auxiliaries occurs during critical periods considered by the Party favorable to aggressive, revolutionary action in general, such as the middle Twenties and the early Thirties when the "relative stabilization" SECRET Approved For Release 2Q0102/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET of capitalism was estimated as coming to an end. It is considered, therefore, that a definite relation exists between the particular phase of the action-philosophy governing the Party at any given time and the incidence of well-defined clandestine action auxiliar- ies. Informally, however, and in a less pronounced fashion, the Party will naturally never pass up any chance for clandestine work in the power apparatus of the State or in hostile groups and or- ganizations. In focussing upon the organization of underground Parties as well as on the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries, this paper attempts to clarify the problem in terms of both past and cur- rent Party experiences. Again however, this paper must be examined against the totality of the Party's work in a given society -- over- estimation, as well as underestimation, of clandestine Party opera- tions may dangerously distort the terms on which each national Party must be appreciated. SECRET Approved For Releas/g1 6:7CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 S FY 0-41:?E T PART ONE THE COMMUNIST PART. UNDERaROUND Approved For leleasi-Atildi9k6T-: CIA-RDP83-00415R00-3200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SE2RET I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS A. Police and Party On general principles, the Party prefers to assume the form of a "legalu political party, in order to achieve more easily a mass basis. Under "legal" conditions, the entire propaganda and agita- tion apparatus can be employed overtly; front organizations can be set up at will; the Party's drawing power can be demonstrated at the polls; Communists can operate with greater ease in labor union, and enter the government by way of "democratic" processes. The Party will therefore fight desperately and until the last minute to maintain its legal status. It will marshal public opinion with the aid of liberal sympathizers and fellow-travellers. It will employ for its defense sympathetic or crypto-Communist lawyers, who are frequently pooled in international front organiza- tions. It will receive the moral assistance of foreign Parties and the Soviet party-government, making an international propaganda issue of the Party's case. In any case, the Party will seek to delay its transfer to il- legality as long as possible, realizing that its organization and operations will be severely hampered by the loss of legal status. Once driven underground, it will make every effort to become "legal" again. The Party knows that it can be paralyzed by an efficient police. The primary concern of the Party underground, therefore, is with the law enforcement agencies, for these can control the fate of the Party and its leaders. It is often extremely diffi- cult for the Party to protect itself against police penetration, arrests, and searches. Even in areas where the police is not particularly efficient, the Party must spend considerable effort and time on defensive measures. The over-all success of the police, however, is conditioned by several factors, some of which may work to the Party's advan- tage. SECRET Approved For Release 200110%/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECAZT 1. Geographical Factors. In large countries and in countries with inaccessible territories (mountains, marshland, jungles, vast forests), the surveillance and border-control problems are difficult for the police. The experience of the Bolshevik Party before 1917 shows how great distances favor individual escapes and illegal border traffic. More recent events in Brazil, Greece, the Philip- pines, Malaya, et. al., illustrate the same point. 2. Population Density. Overcrowded metropolitan areas with vast slums, as well as port cities, also enhance chances for sur- vival. It is comparatively easy for the underground Communist to shake off pursuit in highly populated street-mazes and among the wharves. 3. Political Factors. Police action against the Party may be hindered or encouraged by public opinion. Under a totalitarian anti-Communist government, police persecution of the Party will obviously be far more effective than under the relatively mild, legalistic approach of democratic governments. Mussolini, for example, took a great personal interest in police and intelligence operations against the Italian Party, and frequently directed them himself -- a factor which clearly increased the efficiency of the Italian security agencies. On the other hand, a loosely controlled police force may grow lax and sock only to make occasional arrests for publicity pur- poses, without seriously affecting the Party's operations. A pre- cariously balanced political situation, such as obtains particu- larly in countries near the Soviet borders, may also affect police operations. A shaky "liberal" government may be forced by in- creasing pressure from rightist parties to soften its attitude to- ward the Party, which might become an ally in case of need. The individual police Dfficiall too, fearful for the future of his position, may feel it unwise to be too strict and choose rather to straddle the fence. SECRET Approved For Release 2064409/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 ? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SE Cat T 4. Mass Support for Police. If there is mass support for the regime and its punitive policy, as in Nazi Germany, police opera- tions against the Party may prove extremely effective. Under such conditions: the police arc able to procure a great number of infor- mers and penetration agents, as well as disaffected Party members who remain in the Party as police agents. Large-scale cultivation of disaffected elements and the development of penetration opportu- nities have been favorite police tactics since the early days of the Bolshevik Party. Whenever it has been feasible to put these methods into practice, they have produced astonishing results. The Tsarist police, for example, were able to recruit Malinovsky, who for a time was second in importance only to Lenin in the Bolshevik wing of the underground Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. In Germany, mass support for National Socialism provided the security authorities with a wealth of informers and penetration agents. The Italian OVRA (originally the CECA) is estimated to have controlled the greater part of the Italian underground Party, exploiting the breakdown in morale which follows vigorous punitive action. The Greek dictator Metaxas greatly con- plicated the operations of the underground Greek Party by setting up a parallel police-controlled underground Party. More recently, CP Malaya discovered that its Secretary General had been a police agent for many years. The greatest danger which the Party underground must face is often not the police itself but the psychological impact of the anti- Communist movement upon the population and upon the morale of the Party members themselves. Nevertheless, various Parties which have undergone this persecution, such as the Bolshevik Party and the European Parties in the Fascist period, have managed, in one form or other, to survive. While the drawing- power of Communist ideology may partially account for the Party's durability, the adaptability of Party organization to illegal conditions is an important additional factor in the struggle between Party and police. SECRET Approved For Release 200149/66 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Adaptability of Party Omanization to Illtl Conditions The model pattern of Party organization, developed by the Bolshevik Party during more than a decade of illegality, was grafted, through the Comintern, upon all foreign Parties. Thus, the basic forms of Party organization, as encountered today, have been pro- tested under illegal conditions. Consequently, when a Party is de- clared illegal, there is no need to alter its basic structure. All that is necessary is an adaptation of organization to illegal condi- tions. The specific advantages inherent in "normal" Communist Party organization, may be summed up as follows: (a) The Party preserves its continuity in terms of organi- zation and personnel. (b) The Party emphasizes discipline and security even in legal periods. (c)' Communist doctrine acts as a morale-builder in illegal periods, and may become attractive to the non-Communist leftist in times of general suppression_of all "progressive" movements. (d) The basic cell organization of the Party, practiced at all times, facilitates underground operations. (e) More than any other "normal" political party, the Com- munist Party has acquired a.backlog of "illegal" experience, even under legal conditions. ? 1. Or anizational Continuity. By its nature as a revolutionary organization, the Communist Party will operate under any conditions, legal or illegal. On the basis of its theory, it considers the transition to illegality an extremely undesirable but otherwise "normal" consequence of the class struggle. This advantage is not enjoyed by the evolutionary Marxist par- ties (Social Democrats) which operate strictly by legal, parliamen- tary-democratic methods. When ostracized and suppressed such parties often undergo severe morale and organizational crises. Because of their fundamental inability (so often attacked by the Communists) to conceive of a revolutionary approach, they interpret their ostracism as "failure of the leadership", "failure of doctrine", and begin to disassociate themselves, psychologically and organizationally, from their past. "In all Fascist countries," states a leading Social Democrat, referring to events in the thirties, "there grows this idea within the Mega (Socialist) cadre: We are something new! We are not a mere continuation of the old party!. The old is dead -- something entirely new must develop now." SECRET Approved For Release 200-1/119/96 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECEET Behind the security of its prefabricated doctrine, the Communist Party does not, as a rule, need to scrutinize its basic philosophy or raison diatre under illegal conditions. Party continuity is taken for granted by the Communists. When the Party is outlawed it does not waste pmcious time and energies wrangling over basic theory and metaphysical issues. It does not have one form of organization for legal and another for illegal conditions. The undpsgrally is the Party:underground. 2. Cadre Continuity. A further guarantee of continuity is the fact that the Party is at all times a "cadre Party". As many execu- tive and administrative positions as possible are occupied by trained, experienced, full-time and salaried functionaries or "professional revolutionaries". While the size, reliability and capabilities of the cadre obviously vary from country to country, the Party . habitually, and as a matter of principle, creates a caste of func- tionaries who are entirely dependent upon the Party center in finan- cial, personal and ideological torts, and who can therefore be depended upon to follow the center underground. The extent to which the individual cadre-man is tied to the Party by personal interest is ably described by A. Rcssi CAzalology_91_LLE French Communist party, Paris, 1948). //The role played by personal interest in this faithful adherence to the Party is greater than one might think... The Party functionary cannot become a functionary without quitting his factory, his office, his profession -- he takes on new habits and lives afferently. He sheds his roots, he becomes a sort of outcast.? Ho has'ontered a new social class, a class sui zanaELE it is true, but still:elevated as only the salaried class of industry and commerce... To quit (this'class) mans to be thrown back into the limbo from where he came.ii As an added incentive for its cadre, the Party also dispenses power, which Rossi describes as frequently greater than that of high- level government officials. Having tasted this sense of power, the functionary is reluctant to give it up. A party run both at the center and at the periphery by a Nell- trained and disciplined cadre-bureaucracy has the advantage of a con- crete and specific approach to the problem of going underground. It SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 13 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECR1T can prepare and provide for the event in terms of cadre protection and replacement. Whatever action potential a Party may salvage in illegality depends less on the extent to which it car protect its rank and file from arrest, than on the success it achieves in sal- vaging or replacing its entire cadre. The disadvantage of the system, however, is that if the cadre fails, the Party fails. The Party undermailLip_the cadre underground. 3. Discipline and Security. The stress on strict discipline which is required under illegal conditions constitutes no problem for the Party. The cadre will have been trained already and condi- tioned to depend on the instructions of the center in any circum- stance. The center will therefore encounter little resistance in strengthening its control over the cadre, and will be able to dis- pense with those features of "democratic centralism" which permitted the rank and file to participate in the selection of the cadre during legal periods. Instructions issued by the iffogal CP France of 1940, for example, stated specifically that the election of functionaries was out of the question, and that only Centralism was to be conserved. While this relationship has the definite opera- tional advantage of permitting co-ordinated action even under haz- ardous conditions, the dependence of the cadre on the center can choke the initiative of the individual cadre-mart and impede the efficiency of the Party. Discipliac under illegal conditions moans not only strict ad- herence to the political and organizational direction of the center, but also rigorous conformity with underground security rules govern- ing the conspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants. A function- ary who has "betrayed" Party secrets under severe police pressure is punished by the competent organs cf the Party for a "breach of discipline", with no regard for the circumstances in which the be- trayal occurred. The maintenance of discipline and security by special Party organs (Control Commission, Cadre Commission, and other specialized sections) is a traditional feature of Party organization which can SECRET Approved For Release 2001/01/416 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 ? SECRET be conveniently adapted to underground conditions. The main factor, however, which endangers the successful preservation of discipline and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of extremely severe police action, morale may disintegrate and result in factionalism, mass defections and penetrations. 4. Doctrine as Morale-Builder. Efficient underground organiza- tion and conspiratorial skill are, of course, the decisive elements in the Party's struggle to maintain itself when illegal. The demands of underground life on the underground Party worker, however, are frequently extremely taxing, and good morale becomes an opera- tional necessity. No matter how much opportunism, adventurism, or- lust for power go into the make-up of the individual functionary or activist, a willingness to sacrifice everything for the sake of the Party demands a stronger motive than these. This motivation is furnished by the Party, ready-made, in the form of its doctrine, the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology. As a morale-building element, doctrine stands in the first line of defense of the Party underground. Thorough indoctrination (which is, of course, a continuous and well- organized process in legal as well as illegal periods) appears to induce the following psychological habits in Communists: a. Superiority Complex. The doctrine is dispensed as "absolute truth", providing the believer with a set of answers for every politicall'social and philosophical.problem. The sincere individual Communist, in possession of "absolute truth", consi- ders himself a crusader, a fighter for a "new world". The longer he stays in the Party, the less he is able to think in un-Communist terms. He feels eternally misunderstood by non- Communists and, when ostracized, feels victimized. In brief, his indoctrination produces the conviction that he is fighting for a just cause -- a definite morale asset. b. Hostility. Based upon the idea of class struggle, the doctrine systematizes and cultivates hostility -generated by social conflict, frustration and maladjustment-. The doctrine is one of hatred directed at the "class enemy", the latter be- ing anyone who does not share the Party's point of view. Such indoctrination, required by the revolutionary-military nature of the Party, pays off during periods of illegality. Hostility . grows with the increasing pressure exerted by the "class enemy" and added to the instinct for self-preservation, leads to vigor- ous resistance. C. Optimism. Communist doctrine has a strong morale- building element in its "soientific" certainty of the inevitable doom of capitalist society. Defeat can be rationalized as a temporary setback, a deficiency in organization, or the result of the work of trators. But it can never be accepted as definite SECRET Approved For Release 2001iS.9/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECAET and final. Optimism is prescribed as the Communistts basic attitude, and pessimism becomes a heresy-. In this outlook there is a modicum of religious strength, an asset not to be underestimated during a period of underground activity. 5. Attraction of Doctrine. In situations where repressive measures are applied to the non-Communist evolutionary Marxist, liberal and progressive parties, as well as to the Commu4st Party, Communist doctrine may actually extend beyond its defensive func- tion and further the growth of the illegal Party. When repression becomes total, as under the Fascist regimes, the peaceful evolution- ists and liberal democrats.may lose their faith in moderate tactics and join the Communists, who always maintain that socialism cannot be established by legal methods alone. Under Nazi control, the Austrian working class felt that the Socialists' democratic methods had brought about their defeat and began to place their hope in Com- munist objectives. CP Austria becamee significant organization for the first time in its history during the term of Nazi suppression; it declined when suppression was lifted. 6. Cell System. Under illegal conditions, when security consi- derations demand the atomization of Party organization, the Party need only adjust its cell system, through which basic operations are effected. The grouping of the rank and file into small nuclei at the place of work, at the place of residence, and in non-Communist parties and organizations ensures the systematic exploitation of the cell member's normal outside contacts for propaganda and recruitment purposes. This is an all-important task in the underground when other Party activities may-be curtailed. The importance of illegal cell activity is intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons are usually reduced to skeletons; hence, for practical purposes the Party underground often consists only of the center and the numerous "front line" cell organizations. There is inherent in this system, however advantageous, a considerable risk of isolation. When communi- cations break down, as they frequently do, the basic Party organiza- tions become ineffective or detached from the Party line. If the breakdown is prolonged, as it was in Germany under Hitler, the Party SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 16 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECA T is reduced to a multitude of isolated nuclei, which can do little more than maintain their clandestine existence for the day when the Party may be revived. It is at this point that the extent to which the Party has accumulated and transmitted lessons learned from con- spiratorial experience becomes effective. 7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience. Through the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational policy of all foreign Parties, and has passed on its own considerable experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its exist- ence the Comintern exhorted and obliged its sections to prepare ade- quately for periods of illegality. By means of its Organization Bureau, headed until about 1936 by Piatnitzky, a leading organizer of the Russian underground, the Comintern furnished specific advice on underground operations and problems. Terms used in the Russian under- ground, such as "technical apparatus" for illegal printing and distri- bution facilities, have consistently found their way into the nomen- clature of foreign Parties. The Greek Party, for example, currently uses a Russian word, "Yavka", meaning a clandestine reporting center. The "groups of three" upon which illegal Party organization appears to be based so frequently, have their equivalent in the Russian under- ground term, "troika" (team of three). The fundamental problems of illegal activity are now widely understood by the various Parties. The practical experiences of many Parties, accumulated during underground periods and pooled by the Comintern prior to 1943, have increased the conspiratorial com- petence of the movement. There is hardly a significant Party which has not gone through illegal or semi-legal phases. Jhilc first-hand experience probably remains the best task-master, it is evident that a pattern at least exists in general outlines, and that a Party faced with illegality acts on it. To what degree this pattern has been created by a centralized effort, or by the appearance of identical problems treated in a similar fashion by different Parties, is a minor point. It is more important to recognize and understand the SECRET Approved For Release 2001/0956 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SE2RET basic Communist approach to the organizational and operational pro- blems of the Party underground, C. Organizational Problems: Adlistment to Illegal Conditions The fundamental organizational problem faced by the Party going underground is this: How to combine maximal security with maximal activity -- how to expose its agencies and functionaries to the police as little as possible. Therefore, the primary concern is with a realistic and practicable streamlining of the bureaucratic apparatus. 1. Reduction of Part Apparatus. The extent of the streamlining process is determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of repressive action upon it, and general policy considerations. A small or underdeveloped P-rty apparatus cannot be drastically reduced; a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organization. Within the limits of such considerations, action nay be taken along the following lines: a. Consolidation of territoriakorganizations. The terri- torial organization of the Party, particularly in a large country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. This makes it pos- sible to utilize staff personnel with greater economy, and to concentrate communications with the Party center. All levels of territorial organization (region, district, subdistrict and sec- tion)-may be reduced simply by unifying the various staff-com- mands, and combining their original areas of jurisdiction. The twenty-eight regional organizations (Bezirke) of the German Com- munist Party before 1933, for example, were consolidated after the advent of Nazi suppression into eight inter-regional organi- zations (Oberbezirke); other territorial organizations were apparently also reduced in number while their jurisdiction was extended. The Party center itself may be less affected by the pro- cess of consolidation: a large Party may need a largc central organization. On the cell level, however, consolidation is not practical. For security reasons, cells must be broken up into small units if they are to escape police attention. Hence, at the same time that territorial .organizations may decrease in number or disappear altogether, the cell organizations in the Party underground may be atomized and grow in number. b. Reduction of staffs. In addition to the consolidation of territorial organizations, the number of staff positions through- out the Party is normally reduced in the underground. The terri- torial Party committees are apparently strongly affected in this respect. According to.a Comintern instruction, the committees of illegal Parties should, as a rule, consist of no more than five people, and a secretary should take the place of the executive bureau. In practise, the composition of illegal Party committOes appears to be more elastic, depending on prevailing conditions. The extent to which the membership of the Central Committee may be reduced is also determined by the actual situation. Members of the Central Committee are elected at the national Party Congress or Party Conference, and their tenure of office is valid for both SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 18 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 legal and illegal periods. Over and above the losses sustained by a Central Committee through arrests and other operational mishaps, there is, however, no general indication of how numeri- cal composition is affected by illegal conditions. It may be as large or as small as conditions warrant. There seems to be a general tendency to eliminate Party Com- mittees during illegal periods, and to assign actual organiza- tional and political work to the executive-administrative appara- tus of the Party. CP Chile, for example, simply eliminated all Committees and transferred the direction of the Party to its executive agencies, as follows: ICONTROL 'COMMISSION' 1 POLITICAL I COMMISSION 1 SECRETARY GENERAL IREGIONAL SECRETARY, LOCAL ! SECRETARY ?CELLS 1 REGIONAL , SECRETARY LOCAL SECREL-tRY \\ 0 CELLS Insofar as the executive-administrative apparatus of a Central Committee is concerned, practical security reasonsobviously re- commend the paring down of staff personnel. If the actual work- load is too heavy to permit reduction, the Secretariat and the various Departments or Commissions of the Central Committee (such as Cadre, Organization, Youth, Agit-Prop, etc.) may continue, while new commissions may be created fox...technical services, re- lief for interned comrades, and the like. In'sone Parties, the personnel of these Departments may be reduced. In others, the staff may continue or be replaced. One Central Committee may dissolve its Politburo and transfer its functions to the National Secretariat. Another may enlarge its membership in order to make up for expected losses in executive positions. There is no gen- eral rule except adaptability to the situation at hand. 2. The Command Function: The Triad System. Consolidation of territorial organizations and reduction of staff personnel can in some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command function observable only in underground Parties. According to this SECRET Approved For Release 2001/01906.: CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET system, at all echelons, from the national down to the cell level, groups of three functionaries may be established with two-fold re- sponsibilities: the over-all direction and supervision of Party work at their level, and maintenance of vertical liaison with each other. In the latter capacity these triads represent the live chain of command in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, these triads have consisted of a) a specialist for political work, b) a specialist for organizational problems, and c).a specialist for agitation and propaganda, or for labor union work. The triads, however, do not necessarily replace whatever other Party organizations may remain effective. They are sometimes mere- ly superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to monopo- lize direction. Triads at national and territorial levels have been known to direct the work of the various administrative and executive departments and commissions of the Party. However, it cannot be clearly determined at present to what extent the nation- al triad may combine executive command with policy-making functions. Theoretically it remains responsible to the Politburo, but in fact it may well become the actual loaderahip of the Party. The triad principle may even be applied to cell organization. Cells can be constituted as three-man groups, each member recruiting and direct- ing another group of three who are not cell members and who comprise sub-cell basic units. The triad represents an effective concentration of the command function in the hands of a comparatively few indivi,',uals. It per- mits ;rooter centralization and compartmentalization. 3. Compartmentalization. Tight compartmentalization is an organization and security problem of the first order, since it is necessary to prevent the police from learning too much when Party members or functionaries are arrested. Compartmentalizationis ap- plied to Party operations as follows: a. Party and military branch. Whenever an underground Party is in the position to create a military organization, the latterts staff comf)osition is kept distinct from the Partyls political mechanism. The two structures merely coordiriate on policy and re- cruitment problems at their highest echelons. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 20 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET b. -Party and auxiliary (front) 0=1.21E.ILInaL As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries (youth-orrardiations, women's organizations, sport clubs, etc.,) remain connected with the Party through interlocking staff personnel -only. They function on their own, as independently as possible. c. auxiliary illqal Party organi- zations, or teams for the performance of such specialized tasks as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of police and . other ,Tovornment agencies, liquidation and terror groups, etc., are established as largely independent and self-contained groups even in legal periods. They are maintained on this basis in times of illegality. d. Internal Part comnartmentalization. Within the polit- ical mechanism of the Party proper, the desired effect can be ideally achieved by the following measures: I) Elimination of horizontal liaison. No cell and no territorial organization is permitted to maintain contact with any other Party or]an operating, on the same level. Liaison may only be conducted vertically with the designated functionary of the superior Party organization, whose task it is to direct the lower organizations under his jurisdiction. 2) Restriction of contacts. The The fewer comrades a func- tionary or activist knows and meets in the course of his work; the butter. This principle is sound if applied realistically. It can, however, be formalized to an extreme degree. CP France in 1941, for example, applied the triad system not only to the organization of the command function, but apparently also, as a security measure, to all Party activities. No com- rade was to know more than two other Party workers. It is questionable whether the French principle can be put into practice rigidly. Even CP France frequently had to threaten disciplinary action in order to push its compartmentalization program to the extreme. 3) Functional restrictions. "The comrades of a group of three must not know anything but (what refers to) their work proper," 'states an instruction of CP Franco (1941). More than over, it is incumbent upon the directors of illegal Party work to define the job of each functionary and activist clearly, so that he may not stray beyond security limits. It is not always possible, however, for the individual function- ary to "stick to his guns".. Nothing is less permanent than an underground organization, and shifts from one job to another occur often. As a result, a functionary may learn more than is good for the Party. 4. Election of Party Committees, The streamlining process ap- plied to the illegal Party organization may not always be extensive, and the direction of the Party may actually lie in the hands of the national and territorial committees and their administrative organs. When this is the case, the illegal election of Party committees re- presents an organizational problem. The Comintern advised its member Parties that in an underground situation illegal Party elections wore possible, though they must take place in restricted conferences and the elections themselves handled in such a way that even the confer- ence members would not know who was elected. It is not certain whether SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 21 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 S E C E T this advice has been generally heeded, as the problems of illegal Parties arc never identical. a. Election of Central Committees. Electing a Central Com- mittee at a conference abroad is one may of circumventing secur- ity'restrictions at holm when the Party is underground. In this way, the Bolshevik underground elected its Central Committee at conferences abroad, attended by delegates who travelled illegally from the interior of Russia. Currently, the Party conferences of CP-Greece are held abroad for practical purpoSes (in the rebel area). This is also true of CP Spain at present. On the other hand, conditions prevailing in a particular country may pertit the holding of large illegal meetings at home. For example, the illegal Central Committee (38 members) of CP Yugoslavia was elect- ed in that country ata national conference of more than 100 dele- gates in October 1940. The Party may not be able to hold a national Party Con- gress for the election of the Central Committee, but maybe able to convoke the smaller national conference. Again in the case of CP Yugoslavia, special dispensation was granted by the Comintern in 1940 to allow the election of 'a Central Committee at a national conference instead of a congress. b. Territorial Party committees and electoral commissions. Special electoral commissions have sometimes been created for the purpose of electing members of territorial Party Committees, A Comintern document refers to two types of such commissions: 1) An electoral commission chosen by the Party confer- ence for the counting of secret votes cast. The commission checks the votes but does not announce election results to the conference. 2) A small electoral commission, elected by a Party conference, together with a representative of the next higher Party committee; actually "elects" (i.e. appoints) the new Party committee. In this case, the Party conference does net cast votes for candidates. It merely elects the commission. c. Co-optation. Elections of Party committee's at-all levels can be replaced by or combined with "co-optation" --i.e., appoint- ment to its membership by a specific Party committee. This practice, however, appears to be regarded as an interim solution. Under normal conditions, all members of Party committees are sup- posed to be elected. One of the most severe of the criticisms directed by the CP Soviet Union against CP Yugoslavia in 1948 was that the latter had carried over a disproportionate number of 00- opted Central Committee members into the legal post-war period. Administrative-executive Positions may also be filled by co-opting responsible functionaries. 5. Party Organizations Abroad. When repressive measures become severe, the central Party organs, as well as special support centers, often have to be established abroad, working from the outside into "illegal" territory. This method of salvaging and maintaining cen- tralized leadership abroad has been traditional with the movement since the days when Marx and Engels wrote in exile, and when Lenin and his staff abroad laid the foundation for the CP of the Soviet Union. The types of central organizations commonly transferred to, or created upon, foreign soil are the following: SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 22 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SE CRE a. Central Committee and CentraLLIEudimatai The Central' Committee and its administrative-executive apparatus (Politburo, Secretariat, Departments, Control Commission) may be transferred, either in their entirety or in their salvageable components. Such was the case with CP Germany under the Hitler regime. At present, the central organa of CP Spain and CP Greece are func- tioning in the same manner. The freedom of action enjoyed by centers outside the home country obviously varies with the atti- tudes of the government and nolice of the host country. Party centers abroad are often forced to operate illegally or semi- illegally and are therefore not always effectivo. The current solution to this problem lies, when practical, in transferring the center to the Soviet Union or to-satellite areas. The cen- tral organs of CP Spain, for exaMple, are apparently at present being moved from Paris to Prague.The central organs abroad, as well as performing a corn.- mand assignment, must also provide the Party at hems with propa- ganda and indoctrination material, printing equipment, funds, specialists in underground work, a central repository for files and archives, training facilities for the illegal cadre, communi- cation services, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and financial support for exiled Party workers. In short, the central Party organization abroad becomes the chief operational support center for the home Party. It must therefore frequently create new types of auxiliary and administrative organizations.. . b. Foreian Bureau. The Bolshevik Party abroad and the Italian Party during the Mussolini era (the ufficio Estero in Paris) are known to have established Foreign Bureaus. This organization represents a central administrative-executive agency charged with the direction of support functions, such as commu= nications? production and distribution of press and propaganda, etc. Theoretically, the supervision of the Foreign Bureau' rests with the Central Committee, but in the casesat hand, the Bureaus have been the real directing centers. c. Bp_gonal support centers. The apparatus of the Central Committee abroad may prove unable to handle all its workload, particularly when it must operate into a country with long frontiers. Consequontlyl.the command and support function may have to be decentralized, and several support centers, operating from various countries into sectors of the homeland, may be created, The central organization of CP Germany, established abroad in the thirties, created such regional support centers in the form of regional comman0 posts (Abschnittsleitungen), which operated out of several countries bordering on Germany. Coordii. nation with the Central Committee was effected through the assignment of Central Committee members to the regional centers. d. Party organizations for emigrants. Special Party organi- zations for exiled Communists, such as the "Emigrantenleitungen" of the German Party organization abroad, may be created. They do relief work and carry out the indoctrination and training functions of basic Party organizations. They also furnish person- nel for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides, etc.). Party organizations for emigrants should not-be confused ' with front organizations created by the Party abroad. The latter, sometimes set up instead of special Party organizations for emigrants, serve political propaganda purposes from which the home Party may benefit. They are convenient money-raising instru- ments for the Party under the pretext furnished by the frontls ostensible purpose. The far-flung organization of the Free German Movement during the war was such a front constituted abroad. The German Central Committee in Moscow practically merged with the Free Germany center in the USSR; other Party nuclei abroad, particularly in Latin America, Great Britain and the United States, followed suit. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/0b06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET e. Special service organizations The Party Center abroad usually has to create special organs to facilitate communiCations with the homeland. Communications may be expedited througha border-crossing mechanism, either under direct control of the center or manipulated by a regional support station. The produc- tion of printed materials and their diAtribution via special com- munications routes may have to be entrusted to a separate organi- zation, usually referred to as a Technical Service or Apparatus. These groupsl-indispensable for the effective LInctioning of the illegal Party, will be discussed in greater detail below0-as they are characteristic not only of Party organizations abroad, but appear in the home country as well. Party organizations abroad fulfill extremely, necessary and sensitive support functions. Their efficiency is frequently raised by the assistance obtained from the CP of-the host country in the shape of funds, living space, safe houses, courier person- nel, etc. Their opci-ational problems, however, merge with those of the Party at home. Failure to solve these problems may spell the death of the Party. D. Operational Problems of the Party Underground. While the Party is legal, it normally exposes most of its cadre to the public eye. Once it is outlawed, therefore, a certain number of functionaries and activists have to be withdrawn from active duty. Those ranking functionaries who are indispensable must be safely housed or otherwise protected from the police. The compromised cadre must be replaced, and new personnel has to be trained for the various new functions which are characteristic of underground work. In view of the hazardous conditions which prevail in the underground, a special type of cadre must be developed: self-controlled, self- sacrificing and intrepid. More than ever, able cadre selection and supervision become the problems of the Party's personnel agencies (cadre departments and commissions). Numerically, a balance must be struck between a cadre which is too large -- and therefore in danger of exposure -- and a cadre which is too small -- and therefore in- capable of mass work, shrinking into insignificant study and discus- sion circles. 1. The Cadre Problem. a. Replacement of the cadre must be undertaken as a pre- paratory measure before the Party is actually outlawed. Sensi- tive functions maybe secretly transferred to an "invisible cadre" of comparatively unknown individuals. The Comintern strongly advised the creation of an invisible cadre, an "illegal 17 directing core", which must be kept distinct and separate from the Party Committeels legal apparatus, and thus ready to take over numerous supervisory functions when the Party goes un- derground. This cadre, according to the Comintern, was to be formed from those Communist leaders who were comparatively un- known to the police and the rank and file of the Party, but who SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 24 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 were well trained in practical-Party work. According to the Comintern, the process of developing and bilging into play an invisible cadre should be applied to the entire Party structure and its auxiliaries, within- trade unions and other legal "revolutionary" organizations. If, by the time the Party is outlawed, these invisible cadres have been strategically placed and properly trained, the most sensitive functions of the Party apparatus, as well as Party documents, can be handed over to them. Hence, when the police seize Party premises, very little of the Partys activities and few of its personnel will be revealed to them. It also becomes necessary to deceive the police further by divesting ostensibly important functions of their significance. The Secretary of-a Party committee, normally the most important functionary, may, in the underground, be degraded from political leader to administrative officer. The Comintern instructs on this point as follows: tot only is it not necessary for the secretary of the Committee of a Communist Party to be the political leader of the Committee; blit as a rule he should not be its political leader.... Ilhy is such a rule essential? It is important because the secretary of the Party Committee in illegal or semi-legal conditions is the person upon whom, above all, the blow of action will fall. If that person is the political leader of the Party Committee, his arrest will affect the work of the entire Committee.... The political leader of the Party Committee should not be connected with the technical functions of the Party apparatus." Uhether or not this principle has become general practise is not known; it would certainly need revision in the case-of small Parties with insufficient cadre material. There are, however, past and recent indications that Parties expecting to go underground do prepare invisible cadres for underground work. In 1927, for example, when' centralrecords of the illegal CP Italy were seized in Genoa, none of the regional leaders whose names were revealed had previous records as Communists or Party members. In January 1949, Togliatti, Secretary General of CP Italy, reportedly instructed a leading functionary to make a tour of the regional organizations in Northern Italy and to nominate new regional secretaries, who would ()potato under il- legal conditions if the Party should be outlawed. The extent to which an invisible cadre may be created ap- pears in practise to depend largely upon the availability of a reserve of trained but unknown Party workers an:: crypto- Communists. b. An adequate cadre reserve must be maintained by the Party underground in order to have the means for re-constituting the Party. It is not always possible, however, to defer good workers from active duty, especially as the Party becomes pro- gressively decentralized. Larger numbers of active functionar- ies are required in an illegal than in a legal situation. "The cadre requirements of our Party are unlimited," the CP France organ Vie du Parti stated in late 1941. The discovery of new cadre material, so necessary for repladement purposes, is no bureaucratic affair in the underground. This responsibility does not rest exclusively with the personnel (cadre) officers. A. aossi (op. cit.)points out that the CP France in 1941 recog- nized the fact that the recruitment of cadre personnel must preoccupy the entire Party and could not be loft, as in legal times, to individual (cadre) functionaries. The French Commu- nist functionaries were instructed, at that period, to give up bureaucratic methods applicable to legal activity; only through an over-all Party effort could a new and capable cadre be developed. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 25 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SE CR T c. Ideological and practical trainin of the new cadre must also be de,:bureauFfarzec in e underground, This is necessary. for the simple reason that it beComes extremely hazardous to run Party schools and not very practical to send large numbers of militants out of the country to attend courses arranged by'Party organizations abroad. Only specialized technical training, such as radio operation, is occasionally' conductedabroad. Ideologi- cal training may be acquired in the course of cell work, simply by reading and discussing the'illdcal press, and the standard works of Communist literature'. Functionaries, who are well- versed in theoretical matters, may merely pass on their knowledge to small croups of other comrades (sometimes no more than two), and create ',within the Party a multitude of small schools whose students may, in their time, become teachers of other Communists." (Rossi, O. cit.) On the whole, however, ideological training is likely to be pushed into the background by more pressing operational problems. The current emphasis of the Cominform on the ideological re- training of the Eastern European Parties is based, at least partially, upon the neglect of ideological matters during the il- legal war years. The Party undergrounddoes afford considerable opportunity for practical, on-the-job training. In the course of its decentralization (for example, CP Franco with its multitude of basic three-man units), the Party may require nom law and medium level functionaries than usual. It may be forced, as a result, to assign Party workers to resonsible positions without regard to bureaucratic considerations. Although admittedly low in the hierarchy, this new cadre may in the long run receive batter and more valuable practical training than it could obtain in formal Party schools. Similarly, the'Partyls special underground ser- vices (communications, housing, production and distribution of printed matter, etc.) must be established ad hoc and require new personnel who rust receive their training en rarchant. Thus, an illegal period, if it can be successfully weathered, nay prove' beneficial for the Party. Upon emergence from the underground, the Party may have a cadre larger than in the normal legal period and possessed of practical experience not -Previously available, d. The protection of the illecal cadre must be given top priority. Defensively, the cadre (and with it the entire Party) must be protected against police agents and un- reliable elements into Party positions. Obviously, this is not special problem of the underground, and it may be effectively handled by the national and territorial cadre departments (com- missions) which are normally charged with the investigation and loyalty program of the Party. In Communist terms, however,' loyalty is an elastic word. Deviations from the Party line, factionalism, lack of discipline, foolhardiness; breach of secur- ity rules, and lack of initiative constitute acts of disloyalty as reprehensible to the Party as the actual work of a police agent. Consequently, the cadre department may also be charged with the political supervision of the Party functionaries. Dur- ing the war years, when CP France was illegal, the "Cadre Responsible" of the Paris Inter-region attended certain meetings of the responsible regional triad, and reported to the political "responsible" at national headquarters on the political conduct of the regional functionaries. Disciplinary action, including expulsion, based on the investigation of the Cadre Commission, rests with the National Control Commission in local as in illegal periods. In operational terms, however, cadre protection in the underground requires the provision of false papers, as well as the maintenance of an adequate number of safe houses and apartments where the functionary may live or hide out from the police, and !-Jake his professional contacts securely. This is an S -CRET Approved For Release 20012/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 S E CRlt ? elementary underground requirement, especially since functionar- ies and militants must frequently change their domicile. 2. The "Housing!' Problem and Communications. The provision of safe shelter for illegal Party functionaries and fugitives constitutes merely one aspect of a much larger problem. The Party underground re- quires numbers of safe houses or apartments for a variety of adminis- tration and operational purposes. Archives,,files and Party corres- pondence can no longer be kept at "legal" premises, and bank deposits cannot be maintained in the Party's name. In fact, the entire process of "going underground" and of sustaining an illegal Party machine can be reduced to the prosaic but intricate search for safe space: homes of unsuspected sympathizers, shops and offices of crypto-Communists, houses and farms in the country, and the like. Particularly important is the safe housing of communications. a. Internal communications., Liaison between the illegal national and territorial organization -- whether constituted on a "normal" basis or reorganized as triads -- requires safe meeting .and contact places for representatives of the higher and lower echelons. Reporting points. The Comintern advised Parties under- ground to establish special addresses or flats where at appointed times representatives of the cells and fractions of the mass organizations could meet representatives of the Party committee for consultation and instruction, Such reporting points may be established at all echelons of the Party underground. Even a legal Party may find it useful to create clandestine reporting points whenever the legal Party premises become insecure. Pro- tective measures include the establishment of safety signals and special passwords for verification purposes. At the central - reporting point of the Bolshevik underground Party, for' example, different passwords were used for rank and file workers, for district functionaries, and for functionaries of the central apparatus. Lotter drcops and contact )oints for couriers. Written communications between higher and lower echelons presuppose the existence of safe addresses where "mail" can be delivered and picked up. The Cominternts instructions specify that such safe addresses must' notcoincide with those of reporting points. By the same token, special addresses may establi6hed for the use of intra-Party couriers carrying verbal messages. b. External communications. Communications with the Party organizations abroad pose special "housing" problems. Bordou-atossiu mechanisms. There must be established on the borders special conduct points and safe houses (such as overnight stations) for the use of couriers, instructors, and the various special services of the Party, as well as for fugi- tives. In practical terms, the Party must either use the homes of "safe" Party =doers or sympathizers in the border regions, or buy the services of non-Patty individuals who may helpful by virtue of their experience. In the Bolshevik underground it SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 27 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 was common practise to hire smug;lers operating in border areas. Recruitment or bribery of individuals employed by border-control authorities may also be attempted. Fishermen, barge-owners, and maritime workers may be utilized when the crossing of waterways and maritime frontiers is required. The connections of Danish fishermen with their German friends in the Hamburg area were exploited in the thirties by the regional support station of the ' German Party in Denmark for the infiltration of liaison personnel. Security considerations demand that Border-crossing mechanisms remain specialized and compartmentalized. The Party must create as many of these as possible: special border-crossing points for couriers, for Party emissaries from abroad, for the transportation of propaganda material, and for escapees. They may exist side by side. So long as they are separate, if one mechanism is discover- ed, the others will not be endangered. c. Reporting.22ints for liaison ersonnel from abroad. The success of liaison personnel sent by the foreign support station into the homeland hinges upon a very simple requirement: the mnn must know where and to wham to report securely. In the CP Germany underground during the Hitler regime, such liaison personnel (referred to at that time as "instructors9were assigned the ad- dresses of trusted Party workers (Vertrauenspersonen) inside Ger- many. The provision of adequate shelter for such liaison officers from abroad adds to the num6rous housing difficulties of the under= ground. 3. 2221/01221,LmalIaa Maintaining and distributing illegal Party newspapers) information sheets and propaganda material necessi- tates the establishment of additional safe space for production, storage and distribution. Since considerable security risks are in- volved in the running of an illegal production and distribution machine ( or "technical apparatus"), the importance which the Party attaches to this work merits attention. The function of the Party press in the underground is, in Lenints words, that of a "collective organizer". As such, it not only organizes the mind of the reader along Party lines, but also groups the readers around the distribution personnel in loose, but neverthe- less important, nuclei. In some cases, the Party may be reduced to just this level of operations: an illegal newspaper and several cir- cles of readers connected with the center through the workers who bring the sheet to the house or factory. Further, the Party press tangibly demonstrates the strength of the suppressed Party. In highly organized Parties, the press serves the center as a vehicle for political direction on a mass basis. The abilities of Parties to maintain illegal publications vary. On the one hand, the il- legal CP France was able to produce large numbers and many editions of national and regional nqwspapers, leaflets, factory SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 28 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET papers and reviews within France. On the other hand, CP Germany under Gestapo suppression had to rely almost exclusively on the production of its foreign support centers. In general, however, an attempt will be made by the Party to follow Comintern instructions: gAll Communist Parties must without fail have an extensive' apparatus for the publication of illegal Party literatt re, printing plants, various kinds of rotary machines, copying machines, mimeoraphs and simple hectographs in order to publish illegal literature, newspapers, leaflets, etc. In particular it is absolutely essential that the local Party Committee guarantee the-publication of the factory paper for the factory cell..,0? In addition to the production apparatus a special distribution mechanism must be set up. For security reasons, the technical appara- tus of the illegal Party must be divorced from the center and compart- mentalized on all levels; it may assume the character of a semi- independent Party section. According to Comintern instructions, special personnel must be brought in for this purpose; special ad- dresses are needed for the safekeeping of literature from the press and for passing it along to all levels of the underground; and only one member of the Party Committee should be made responsible for publication and distribution. The production process itself is dependent on the availability of paper, equipment and trained personnel. The acquisition of paper is often a troublesome problem. At times it must be stolen or pil- fered by a Communist employee from his place of work. Equipment must frequently be improvised. However, when production is on a pro- fessional scale, as it was in France, the process may be broken up into as many component parts as possible; decentralization of the pro- duction of a leaflet provides better security. Depending on the scale of production and its decentralization, the number of persons engaged in technical work may vary. Three types of personnel, however, can be distinguished: 1) the responsible functionaries who supervise and direct production and distribution, 2) the skilled technicians (typesetters, printers, etc.), and 3) liaison and distribution per- sonnel. The function of the supervisors appears to be restricted to technical problems; the writing and editing rest with the political functionaries. Liaison personnel may be needed in increasing numbers SE CR T Approved For Release 2001/9y/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 when the production process is decentralized. Six liaison agents, for example, were reportedly involved in the production of an illegal French leaflet, taking the text from the editor to the typesetter, and so on, down to the central storage place and distribution point. Final distribution of the product apparently is undertaken by the political organization (local Party committee, etc.). The tech- nical apparatus merely brings the product to the political section. If the center of the technical apparatus is abroad (as in the case of the German nReichstechnikumn), it must provide its own courier and border-crossing service. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the techni- cal apparatus ends when the product is delivered. Special function- aries of the local Party organization may be in charge of the ultimate storage places and distribution to the rank and file. The distribution process itself, according to the capabilities of the . technical apparatus, may be put on a mass or on a selective basis. If there are only a few copies of a paper available it is obviously essential to distribute them among persons with good contacts, capable of passing on the information to wider circles. In any case, it can readily be seen that the housing of the technical apparatus constitutes a major problem. Homes must be rented for the keeping of equipment (even if only a handpress and a typewriter). Paper must be stored. Central and local distribution points must be es- tablished. Couriers must be sheltered. The component operations of the production process must be safely installed. There has not so far been any evidence to indicate that there is a pattern which various Parties follow in treating the housing problem. Each Party organization, whether political or special, national or regional, appears to handle the problem according to its needs. 4. The Security Problem. The severe impact of security consid- erations on the organization and operations of the outlawed Party has been amply demonstrated in the preceding sections. Two special . aspects arise to be treated: personal and administrative security. SECRET Approved For Release 2001t09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET a. Personal securita Functionaries and members alike must adhere to certain "conspiratorial rules" if their security 'i to be protected. All Parties evolve a set of practical regulations affecting the member's entire way of life under illegal conditions. These cover such details as alcohol consumption; behavior in case of arrest, threatened or actual; private correspondence; selection and change of apartments; storage of letters, notes, newspapers clippings and literature in general; 'attitudes towards wife, girl friend, children, unreliable comrades, etc. Provision is also usually made for the use of fictitious (Party) names. In the CP Portugal, for example, members in close contact over a long period knell: each other only by such pseudonyms. Some Parties advocate the creation of a "Party language", prohibit the use of telephone or mail for Party communications, advise the frequent changing of clothes and coiffure, and even of posture and gait. Particular ' attention is paid to security at meetings which should, as a rule, he attended by small numbers and should not last long. Playing cards may be displayed on the table to give the meetings a social appearance. Resolutions taken at meetings should be as succinct as possible. A breach of security constitutes not only a breach of disci- pline but also a major political crime: "To be a good Communist under the present circumstances means above all to apply strictly the rules of illegal work, it means to understand that each fail- ure in this respect represents a danger for the Party and a veri- table crime against the working class." (Vie du Parti, 1941) b. Administrative security. Over and above the need for safe storage space, special security measures maybe introduced to protect party records, Paper work is necessary even in the underground, although'its reduction to minimal proportions is a constant prescription. Membership records. Preparatory to going underground, functionaries will usually destroy membership lists and ecords indicating the affiliation of individuals with the Party. Some Parties may stop their'recruitment program altogether, or for a certain period of time. During illegal periods, the issuance of membership cards or books and dues stamps is often discontinued. In some cases, the responsible personnel officer may simply rely on his memory to keep track of the members. The consequences of failing to carry out such an elementary security measure are il- lustrated in the case of cr Germany. The Gestapo was able to seize voluminous central records, *hich had been allowed to re- main stored at Berlin headquarters. Intra-Party communications. Written reports from lower to higher echelons and instructions from above, when permitted at all, will be as brief as possible, They should not contain any specific details of police interest, such as names of func- tionaries, cities, villages, and addresses. Confidential com- munications may be composed in code or ciphers, and written in invisible ink. Documents will generally be forwarded by a trusted courier, and delivered at special reporting points. In case of arrest, the courier must attempt to destroy the communication by all-possible means. In the underground, Party functionaries will not, as a rule, sign with their names: they may use their initials or assigned numbers. Biographical documentation. The Cadre Commissions ( or Departmente) may find it necessary to increase their bureaucratic activities. Cadre control in the underground Is essential, and detailed biographical statements may be requested of each func- tionary and militant, particularly replacements. Such biographi- cal reports may be transmitted by special couriers of the Cadre ' Commission, which may be in charge of safe-guarding these records. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 31 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET The actual volume of administrative paper work will depend chiefly on the size of the Party. A mass Party will not be able to function effectively without substantial administrative records.' 5. The Financial Problem. Operatinc underground is much more expen- sive than operatin.,:, locally. What is more, the "normal" sources of income dry up. On the one hand, illegal conditions impose a new and often heavy-financial burden on the Party. a consequence of the atomization of Party orDanizationsand the specialization of personnel, cadres must be increased-- and payrolls with them. Functionaries and militants must be constantly on the move, either to escape the police or to minimize the risks of their work. They may have to change their domicile, sometimes at the slightest alert, and must not be handicapped by a lack of money. Rentals of safe houses and apartments, storage places, etc., may be considerable; one individual may frequently have to rent several apartments, uadh under a separate false identity. Printing and distribution costs rise; equipment is constantly being seized by the police and must be replaced. Further, the Party must aid the families of arrested functionaries and mem- bers, an expense which may be extremely heavy in the event of mass arrestw. On the other hand, the collection of dues is hampered. Contri- butions from sympathizers dwindle; front organizations, through -which fund-collecting campaigns are channeled, may wither; the sale of Party literature decreases; and commercial ventures of the Party may fail. Thus, Party finances frequently become a priority operational problem. Preoccupation with financial questions is shown in the instructions of the ( illegal) CP France, calling for a discussion of finances at. the beginning of every cell meeting. Tight budgeting can partially solve the dilemma, but essential costs cannot be eliminated. CP France in 1941 considered the following categories as essential; a) propaganda material -- paper, equipment; b) travel expenses; and c) couriers. The same Party further advised all echelons to budget as follows: 50% for propaganda costs (paper, machinery, etc.) and 50% for organizational expenses (salaries, indemnities, travel expenses, rents, etc.). SECRET Approved For Release2661/159766": CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET In view of the scarcity of funds in the underground, the Party must frequently look for support from abroad. Party centers in foreign countries, or Party auxiliaries with foreign connections, such as maritime Party units, are particularly suited to collecting funds with the help of fraternal Parties and their front organiza- tions. Prior to the dissolution of the Comintern, underground Parties could also present their case to the Budget Commission of the Commu- nist International. Vhile it is difficult to estimate the current financial policy of the CP Soviet Union towards foreign underground Parties, it is probable that if a significant Party should be forced underground in the near future (CP Italy or CP France, for example), direct or indirect financial support from the Soviet and satellite Parties would be forthcoming. Mhatever the origin of underground funds, their administration poses a critical security problem. Party funds, in possession of the national and territorial finance departments or finance officers, can in some cases simply be placed with trusted Party workers.- Again, security considerations recommend decentralization of hiding places. Mien practical, dummy accounts and dummy corporations can be created. The administration of funds may also be taken out of the hands of territorial organizations and centered upon the national Party treasury, when the latter operates in safe territory -- a procedure recently reported to be followed by CP Greece. 6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem. The party's financial difficulties may be overcome, and the Party machine may be salvaged to a certain extent. Even so, deprived of its legal outlets, the Party's basic strategy of developing into the directing force of the entire working class and other susceptible strata, will be severe- ly hindered under illegal conditions. Fronts and auxiliaries fall by the wayside in a state of political suppression, and the entire propaganda and agitation apparatus must restrict its operations. The strength of the Party as a political force is based upon free access for its propagandizers and organizers to wide masses of workers, farmers, intellectuals, minority groups, etc. The legal Party can Approved For Release s .1ata:11A-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET obtain a maximum of mass support; the illegal Party may fall far short of this basic objective. "The fundamental deficiency of every illegal Party," in words of the Comintern, "(is) that an illegal Party appara- tus makes contacts with the masses difficult - and yet the bandamental task of the Communist Party is to have close contact with the masses." There are several methods by which the Party may attempt to surmount these obstacles. a. Penetration and control of legal non-CoMmunist parties representinr, workers and related class elements. This approach has only limited possibilities. In the first place, during severe repression all "progressive" or "liberal" parties may be outlawed, and another illegarparty is not worth penetrating be- cause it is itself restricted. In the second place, Communist efforts to take over a non-Communist "Workers' Party" will meet with considerable resistance wherever these parties are control- led by Socialists. The attempt made by cr Austria to take over the Austrian Social Democratic Party as a whole, through a tacti- cal alliance made by the two parties during the middle thirties, met with failure in this way. b. Penetration and control of legal trade unions. This is a tactic recommended by the Comintern. Even if control cannot be achieved, Party fractions working in letal trade unions can exert a certain degree of political influence. Illegal trade unions are clearly less valuable than legal outlets. The penetration' process of the trade union movement is a permanent requirement, no matter what the political status of the Party may be. c. Creation of dummy front or anizations or_pp.rties. As a rule, this method has little chance of success because it is usual- ly too transparent. Exceptions may occur when suppression is not severe (such as currently in Brazil) or when the Party is in a position to exploit a national emergency (such as foreign occupa- tion or colonial unrest) and to marshal national or colonial "liberation" movements. The fact remains that no matter what political alliances the Party underground may conclude, or what additional strength it may Gain in illegal membership, it still is not a legal Party and cannot fully develop its potential strength. Tie "combination of legal and il- legal methods" is never adequate; ultimately the illegal Party must attempt to become legal. The passing from illegality into legality, however, may only be possible in acutely revolutionary situations. The Party may have to organize military-revolutionary action (as in Russia, China and Greece), or it may have to wait for such an inter,- national crisis as World War II, during which the regime suppressing the Party is destroyed. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 34 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SiCRET II. CASES OF COMMUNIST PARTIES UNDERGROUND This section contains analyses of six Communist Parties during periods of illegality, showing the particular organizational and operational problemb which each of them faced and how they tried to solve them. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOREIGN BUREAU EDITORIAL BOARD 1 TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION RUSSIAN BUREAU (after 1910) REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS CITY ORGANIZATIONS MOSCOW MILITARY ORGANIZATION MILITARY TECHNI- CAL BUREAU FINANCE COMMISSION LECTURING AND LITERARY BOARD DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS SUB- DISTRICTS CELLS OOOOO SECRET I Bolshevik fraction I in the Central S-D I ? I Students Organiza-- tion. Moscow Trades- - Trades- I ___ Union Bureau. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2Henci.,: CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 THE ODESSA BOLSHEVIK ORGANIZATION (1905) ODESSA PARTY COMMITTEE (5 members, headed by a Secretary, with organizers for each of 3 Districts, and an Agitprop functionary) ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITTEE TECHNICAL APPARATUS BOLSHEVIK STUDENT ORGANIZATION] CITY PERESYPSKY DISTRICT DISTRICT COMMITTEE COMMITTEE (No sub-districts) CELLS DALNITSKY DISTRICT COMMITTEE SUB-DISTRICTS FONTANSKY VOKZALNY 666 66666666 666 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET THE BOLSHEVIK TECHNICAL MECHANISM Frontier TECHNICi SEP= Instructions, copy, literature; organizers, couriers, etc. Ir BORDER GROSSING STATIONS Reports, refugees, couriers, etc. PUBLISHING AND DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS (Decentralized) ENGRAVING SHOPS COMPOSING PRINT SHOPS CENTRAL STORAGE Copy from the local Bolshevik organization LOCAL STORAGE 0 0 0 AAA,A, Dissemination Copy from the local Bolshevik organization 9 FUNCTIONARIES 00000 (Centralized) aid Paper Mill Bolsheviks in factories and shops where supplies could be got PRINT SHOP STORAGE PLACE RESPONSIBLE \44\1 FDORISTRDII DISTRIBUTION Dissemination SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET A. THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY UNDERGROUND In setting up the basis of the Bolshevik Party, it was Lenin's view that its organization must be stable, solid and continuous, and that the personnel engaged to take part in the enterprise must be pro- fessionally experienced in revolutionary activity -- so well trained in subterfuge and conspiratorial devices that the police would not be able to undermine their organization. From 1900 to 1917, Lenin never swerved from this concept of the Party; and in 1917, when the big chance came, only the Bolsheviks among the several opposition factions possessed the necessary self-confidence and organizational efficiency to enable them to take power and to hold it. The development of factions within the original Russian Social- Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), which was comprised of a large number of local Marxist organizations ,arose over organizational differences in 1903. Lenin insisted on restricting Party membership to a relative- ly small group of devoted, single-minded, well-disciplined militants, leaving sympathizers and revisionists to the Party's auxiliaries and mass organizations. He wanted a "monolithic and militant party with a clearly defined organization." Following the split, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks constituted two separate parties in fact, if not in name. They vied with each other for control over leading organs and over local organizations in Russia. They held separate congresses in 1905; and finally in 1912, the schism, which had continued to widen during the 1905 Revolution and the reaction which followed, was made permanent. Until Stolypin's death in 1911 all opposition parties were severe- ly repressed except for a brief period in 1905. Against the Bolsheviks, the Government was, if anything, inclined to be less severe, because it underestimated the capabilities and staying powers of the Party and because it correctly believed that Lenin's splitting would weaken the other revolutionary parties. These others, along with the bourgeois reformist parties, were considered by the Government to be much more dangerous than the Bolsheiiks. The Tsarist police made mass arrests and kept the Bolshevik Party under close surveillance, of course, and police agents penetrated all major Party organizations. Trade unions, SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 36 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET the proper subject for Party work, were tolerated only when organized on a local basis. Among those measures of the Government which hinder- ed Bolshevik activity were internal passport requirements and the registration laws. Travellers and people changing residence were re- quired to sign the register at new lodgings. However, lower police functionaries, when they were not ignorant, rzre likely to be corrupt- ible. It was often no great task to bribe a prison guard, frontier patrol, or local police chief, or to "talk"Oneself cut of a tight situation. Other difficulties faced by Lenin in the building of the Party along the highly centralized lines he had laid down, were imposed by the long distances over which command channels were stretched, both from abroad and within Russia itself. Transport networks set up by the Party's technical services the employment of couriers, and the use of ? special communications devices overcame such troubles in SUM measure. Considerable aid was rendered local Russian organizations from abroad, not only by the Party's Foreign Centers, with their propagandizing- indoctrinating-money-raising auxiliaries, but also by foreign Social- Democratic Parties ( particularly the German) and by the International Socialist Bureau. Within Russia, bandit gangs ("Expropriators") operated for Lenin's benefit, sending him funds with which he could construct his system of organizers, couriers, and agents, who succeed- ed in taking over the conttol of many previously non-Bolshevik Marxist groups in Russia. Stolypin's death brought some relief from repression. Pravda, a general propaganda paper, and Zvezda, a weekly political journal, both Bolshevik organs, began to appear legally, along with several others. Those were tolerated as long as they veiled their revolutionary intent, subject to a relatively liberal censorship. Violating these conditions, Pravda was repeatedly suppressed, but each time reappeared with only small changes in name, none in content. The Bolsheviks elected six members to the Duma in 1913. They formed a coalition with Menshevik deputies at first; but they soon broke away to form their own fraction. With its legal press and its Duma fraction, and with some influence on ? SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 37 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET a number of labor, social, and welfare organizations, the Party pursued legal activities. It continued its illegal work at the same time, build- ing up its Party organizations, issuing illegal, inflammatory leaflets. ? carrying on secret revolutionary work among the masses. The Party was again forced wholly underground with the outbreak of the Mar in 1914. It devoted its energies to preserving what remained of its own strength and to sabotaging the Russian war effort, to which end it formed cells and committees in the armed forces for agitation) encouraged insubordination and fraternization among t he troops, etc. Men the March 1917 ("bourgeois") Revolution overthrew the Tsar, the Bolshevik Party emerged into full legal status and resumed publi- cation of its various periodicals. In April, Lenin hastened to Russia from Switzerland, through the charity of the German Government. By November, what with the incompetence of the Provisional (Kerensky) Government, the chaos brought about by Russian military defeats, and general economic and social debilitation within Russia, the Bolsheviks found their small, well-disciplined machine able to achieve a new Revolution, from which the Party emerged victorious. 1. aganization. (See Chart, "Organization of the Bolshevik Party.) The Bolshevik apparatus was marked by a high degree of centraliza- tion of command and decentralization of structure. It consisted of those organs of the RSDLP which the Bolsheviks controlled at any given time. During most of the period to 1912, and from then until 1917, these were the Central Committee, the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, and the Editorial Board of the successive central newspapers of the Bolshevik faction. After 1911, the Bolsheviks were able to cen- tralize their machinery inside Russia through a Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, and were able to develop command channels running down from the Russian Bureau through territorial echelons -- Provincial, Regional, City, City District, and Cell organizations. The Latvian and one section of the Polish Social-Democratic Parties supported the Russian Bolshevik Party. Some of the other independent Communist group: in the Empire sided with the Mensheviks, whose leading organ was an Organization Commission. ? SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 38 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Most important of the Bolshevik organizations inside Russia were . those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, and a few other large cities. These received some direction, when communications permitted, from the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. Howevv, the Foreign Bureau and the Editorial Board, headed by Lenin, carried the decisive weight with the local organizations inside Russia. The Central Committee was elected by occasional Party Congresses, most of which were held abroad and to which delegates were sent by local organizations according to their numerical strength. The Central Committee elected at the Prague Conference in 1912 consisted of six members and five alternates. Stalin was coopted into membership after the Conference. Membership of the Editorial Board varied between three and seven, but the Board was always headed by Lenin. All Bolshevik organizations enjoyed the right to co-opt new members into their com- mittees. The following analyses of the Moscow and Odessa Bolshevik organi- zations show the structural principles followed by the Party during these years. a. The MoscowSsysanization. In Moscow, three Party units worked practically independently of each other, although their activities sometimes overlapped. The Moscow City Committee worked exclusively within the city; the Moscow Regional Committee administered the Pro- vince of Moscow; and the Provincial Bureau of the Central Industrial Region comprised several Provincial organizations. The Moscow City Committee, consisting of a Secretary and several District organizers and one trade union organizer, administered the work of several city Districts, which, in turn, were divided into Sub-Districts and factory cells. Auxiliaries and Party organizations attached to the City Committee included: 1) Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau, a Bolshevik organization with some strength in many of the illegal labor unions; 2) Central Social-Democratic Studentst Organization; 3) Lecturing and Literary Board; 4) Finance Commission; 5) Central Technical Organization for production of passports and production and distribution of literature; SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 39 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET 6) Military Organization, actually 'independent of the City Committee, but with interlocking membership with the latter. 7) Military Technical Bureau, also independent of the City Committee except through liaison with the Secretary: responsible for the procurement and preparation of arms and other weapons. b. The Odessa Organization (See Chart.) Osip Piatnitsky, the veteran organizer, has described the organization of the Odessa Party for the benefit of post-Revolutionary comrades and for foreign' Parties who were, at the time of writing, "in great straits because they cannot find a suitable guise in which to clothe their local or- ganizations under illegal conditions...." "The organization of that t line, in Odessa as well as in the rest of Russia, was built from top to bottom on the principle-of co-optation; in the plants and factories and in the workshops, the Bolsheviks who worked there invited (co-opted) workers whom they considered to be class-conscious and who were devoted to the cause. The regional committees of the large towns had divided among its members the work of uniting all the Party cells of a given district (or sub-district), and of organizing new cells where there were none. The organizers of the sub-districts in- vited the best elements of the cells to the sub-district commit- tees. Ilhen a member of the sub-district committee dropped out (if he had been arrested or had gone away), the remaining mem- bers co-opted another with the consent of the district committee. The district committees in turn were composed of the best ele- ments of the sub-district committees. Tho city committees were formed by the union of the various groups and cells of a given' city and were subject to the approval of the Central Committee. City committees had the right to co- opt new members. VI= a city committee was arrested as a body, the Central Committee of the Party designated one or more members to form a new committee and those appointed co-opted suitable comrades from the workers of that region to complete the new committee." Piatnitsky was himself co-opted into the Odessa Party Committee. The Central Committee had notified the Odessa organization of his ar- rival from Germany, and the co-optation had been effected even before he reached the city. He was appointed organizer of the city District. The Odessa Committee possessed a large illegal printing plant in the city, and was able to publish numerous leaflets on political events. The Committee also distributed literature received from the Central Committee and Technical Apparatus abroad, sent speakers to factories and meetings, and chose leaders for advanced circles in the districts. Piatnitsky gives the following description of the way in which the Odessa organization functioned: SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 40 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET ?Each member of the District Committee was connected with the groups and cells of the trade in which he worked at the time; and through the groups and cells he vt in touch with the workers of that same trade. Thus there was direct contact between the Odessa Committee and the workers of the plants, factories and work- shops at Odessa; the district organizer connected the city commit- tee with the district committee, the members of the district com- mittee in their turn were connected with the groups and cells, the members of which carried out the instructions of the Odessa comit- tee and the district committee among the workers; they in their turn informed the Odessa committee and the district committee of the mood of the Odessa workers. The district committee met at least once a meek; often more frequently. The members of the district committee were sufficient- ly well qualified. All questions were discussed fully and in detail .1' 2. Operational Problems. Security measures and communications techniques for cutting across the difficulties imposed on the Party by the Government developed slow- ly, through painful experience. Some of them were taken over, from the practice of older revolutionary groups, such as the Narodnayn Volya, which had been crushed in the 1880's. a. Security Measures. SecurIty precautions were directed to two chief ends: to prevent exposure and imprisonment of cadres, and to prevent exposure of plans and police interference with Party activi- ties. Some of the devices used in maintaining security were: 1) Codes, cyphers, and other communications techniques; 2) Assumption and frequent changing of false identities; 3) Secrecy of meeting places and lodgings, which were changed frequently to avoid registration with police; 4) 'Restrittion of Contacts among members (letters of intro- duction, intermediaries, restriction of plans to minimum circula- tion); 5) Techniques of avoiding police surveillance (wearing of inconspicuous clothing, dodging police shadows, etc); 6) Careful disposition of records (encoding, safekeeping, committing facts to memory, provisions for quick destruction, etc); 7) Ube of contacts within police as counter-intelligence producers, (ineffectual and very limited, as it turned out). 8) Compartmentalization: especially applicable to comrades ' engaged in "conspirative" work (as in the technical organizations), who left "day-to-day" work severely alone. Meeting places and safehouses. Large meetings were held with a minimum of publicized preparation, usually in the woods several miles from town: SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 41 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Men it was necessary to call more or less general meetings they were arranged under the guise of excursions to the country in the name of some educational society'. After leaving St. Peters- burg a couple of dozen versts behind, we would go 'for a walk' into the depth of the forest. We would then place patrols who would direct the way only by a previously arranged password and then we would hold our meeting." (Krupskaya, Memoirs of Lenin, II, 129) Measures taken by functionaries in the carrying out of organiza- tional business were more strict. Piatnitsky (Memoirs of a Bolshevik) describes those adopted in Odessa: //Comrades arriving in the city used-to report to'the secretary of the Odessa Committee, Comrade Gusev. He himself, except on days when the committee itself met, had a different meeting place every day where we, the members of the committee, could find-him.- These meetings were in cafes, restaurants, private dwellings, etc. Com- mittee meetings were very frequent, at least once a week. They took place at the private houses of sympathizing intellectuals. At these meetings the instructions of the Central Committee, the political situation, and the progress of political campaigns, were discussed.... Decisions passed by the committee were communicated to the district meetings by district organizers. The Odessa organ- ization maintained several safe meeting places where members of the Central Committee, of the central organ of the RSDLP, and of Party organizations in neighboring towns could stay and moetiii Police restrictions on travel called for the expenditure of consi- derable energy and ingenuity. Piatnitsky emphasizes the time and effort wasted in changing lodgings every night to avoid being discov- ? ered through the regular police inspections of residential registers. Fake and doctored passports were prepared by technical units serving Party organizations in most oft he large cities. Communications. Codes and cyphers, some of them quite complicated, were employed for written communications. Piatnitsky recounts a two- day struggle to decypher addresses sent to him in one letter by the Secretary of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee. Other tech- niques included the use of invisible ink (cobalt and sulphuric acid solutions, milk, lemon juice) written in the margins and between t he lines of innocent books, letters, bills, etc.; the marking of words and letters in innocuous literature; hiding of letters in picture frames, in the spines of books, etc. Written communications were carried safehand by couriers or sent through the posts addressed to reliable sympathizers or to general delivery. More important communications were transmitted orally. Penetration by Police. Extensive penetration of IP he Party by police agents did much to destroy the effectiveness of the most SECRET ? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 42 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 S'ECRET careful observance of security measures: there was not a single local organization into which some provacatetr had not crept. Every man regarded his comrade with suspicion, was on his guard against those nearest to him, did not trust his neighbor." (Zinoviev, History of the CommuniA122z.r. Mile recognition of the danger of police penetration undoubtedly helped to keep Party members security-conscious, the suspiciousness engendered must certainly have impeded efficient operation. There is little doubt that the Tsarist police knew practically all important details of Party business, and it was only because of their incident- al belief that the Bolsheviks were not nearly so dangerous as the other revolutionary parties that even more severely repressive meas- ures were not taken. Roman Malinovsky, Lenin's trusted intimate, member of t he Cen- tral Committee, and Vice-Chairman of the Social-Democratic Duma Fraction, was a police agent for years, and caused the arrest of in- . numercible Party members. So well did he conceal his purposes that Lenin refused to believe charges levelled against him. Even Burtsev, who had several good police contacts and who acted as a one-man counter- espionage service for the various revolutionary parties, failed to find him out, and a special Party commission created to investigate rumors against Malinovsky could not uncover any real evidence. Mhlinovsky was only the most prominent of many police agents within the Bolshevik Party. b. Technical Services. As noted above, the Moscow City Comittee maintained a Central Technical Organization for the procurement and preparation of false passports, and for the production and distribution of illegal literature, including the regular Party press and occasional pieces. Similar technical mechanisms were supported by other city com- mittees and by the Foreign and Russian Bureaus of the Central Committee. The Central Committee operated border-crossing systems as part of their technical services (See Chart, "The Bolshevik Technical Mechanism"). . Passports. The procurement of passports was a continuing pro- blem. The following were the types of passports used by the Party members with police records: SECRET Approved For Release 2001/9j06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET 1) False passports with forged seals, in which all details were fictitious; 2) Copies of genuine passports of persons mithoui police records; 3) Genuine passports belonging to persons without police records. The third type, called "Iron," was considered the most reliable, but, was the most difficult to obtain with descriptive data appropriate to the illegal bearer. Another important function of the technical organ- ization was to exchange passports and copies with other centers. Production and distribution of Part literature. In 1906 Piatnitsky was put in charge of the central technical organization of the Moscow Committee. The printing establishment produced about 40,000 copies each of various leaflets, broadsides, posters, and, at the time of a Duna election, a list of candidates for t he voters. Located in the basement of "The Caucasian Fruitshop," the printing plant was equipped with an American press. A bell was rigged to give warning of the entrance of customers to the fruitshop, which was licensed fictitiously. The operators of the fruitshop were registered under false passports. Procurement of newsprint and distribution of the literature pro- duced were serious problems. Piatnitsky was given a letter of intro- duction to the manager of a papermill, from which he received credit and large quantities of paper. A recommended book-binder cut the paper, which was stored in an intermediate warehouse, then taken to a second storehouse (a "depository"), from which it was taken as needed to the printing plant. Printed matter was carried from the shop disguised as fruit in wicker baskets, and was taken to a bakery operated by a sympathizer; there it was called for by a functionary responsible for distribution, who took it to a house where distribution couriers from all the Moscow Districts picked it up. The Moscow Committee, through Party members in various factories, was able to s upply the technical organization with needed production materials. After the Caucasian Shop had been raided by police, a make- shift establishment was set up with type and other accessories supplied by members working in commercial printshops. SECRET Approved For Release 2064119/156 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP0-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Piatnitsky recounts techniques of distribution of printed matter received by the Moscow organization from St. Petersburg: //We asked.... the St. Petersburg comrades to pack the litera- ture in boxes and send It as merchandise, and to send us only the receipts. As soon as we received the receipts 101,re picked out two comrades to get the boxes. One of them would hire a carter, to whom he gave the receipts for getting the merchandise out of the station. The carter was given a fictitious address to which he was to deliver the boxes. Another comrade would keep an eye on ? the driver, following him about wherever he went with the receipts. If everything looked safe, the second comrade would inform the first comrade of this, and then the latter would meet the carter on the road and direct him to the right address. If we suspected that the comrades were being watched, three comrades were selected: one hired the carter; the second followed him all the way to the station, in the station itself, and on the way back; the third acted as a courier for the second comrade. He informed the first comrade whether it was safe for him to meet the carter. The fol- lowing precautions were also taken: even-if the two comrades dis- covered nothing suspicious at tho station, they nevertheless changed the address given at first for another fictitious address. (In such cases we used to give the address of some acquaintance The driver was dismissed, and later, if there was no hitch, the literature was sent to the depository and from there to the various districts.) It sometimes happened that the carter would be called to the gendarme office at the station after he had produced the luggage receipt. In such cases the comrade who was watching him warned the other comrade not to meet the carter on the road; and he him- self stayed to find out what would happen. Occasionally the gendarmes let the driver pass with the merchandise but senda de- tachment of spies and gendarmes at his heels. However, in view of the fictitious address given the carter, their labours were in vain. Several consignments of literature fell into the hands of the authorities, but nobody was every arrested." The printing plant operated by the Tiflis organization was even more elaborate, eventually becoming the largest underground plant in Russia. It served both Menshevik and Bolshevik factions of the RSDLP. It was set up by Leonid Krassin, manager of the Government power station in Baku, who served as a member of the Central Committee of the RSDLP and who carried on illegal activities so successfully that for four years neither the management of the power company, nor the police, nor the workers suspected his real role. He arranged for the smuggling of literature, forging of passports, raising of funds, and the setting up of the clandestine printing shop. Krassin was able to find reliable printers who would not only work long hours, but live in the plant as well, dispite its discomforts. Through an arrange- ment with Krupskaya, who was Secretary of the Foreign Bureau, he re- ceived each issue of the RSDLP organ, Iskra, from abroad, and managed to publish 10,000 copies of it in Russia. The secret plant also SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 45 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET produced the Communist Manifesto, Kautsky's Erfurt Program, and over a million copies in all of leaflets, pamphlets and periodicals. A deluxe edition of one hundred copies of the Efurt Program was made up for sale to wealthy sympathizers at a high price. Illegal literature was also produced by more primitive means by individuals and small orranizntions -- handwritten tracts circulated a few copies at a time, and, on a slightly larger scale, those rum off home-made hectographs. After 1912 the Parties were permitted legal organs, subject to a partial censorship. Revolutionary literature presented transportation problems be- cause of its bulk. Uhen the censorship was partially lifted, printed material could sometimes be sent through the mails, disguised as in- nocent material. During most of the pre-revolutionary period, how- ever, it was customary to smuggle literature in false-bottomed suitcases, in "breastplates" (false bosoms), or sewed into skirts. All travelling members and sympathizers were pressed into the service of this "express transport." The problem of bulk was later resolved by printing on onion skin paper with narrow margins. As the underground organization developed, Russian editions of papers printed abroad were run off from imported copies or matrices. Border-Crossing. Communications with foreign centers necessitated elaborate border-crossing establishments. In preparation for the establishment of a transport service operating out of Berlin, Piatnitsky made arranrements for the lodging of visiting Russian functionaries with Gorman Social-Democratic elements, for the storing and processing of smuggled literature, and for the creation of border- crossing stations. The transport service in Germany had its counter- part on the Russian side of the frontier. A second such system, operating out of Leipzig in 1910 and also set up by Piatnitsky, illus- trates the methods employed. The Leipzig Social-Democratic organization supplied him with several addresses to which communications could be safely sent and where visit- ing Russians could meet and find lodging. He was given the use of the attic in the building of the Leipzig Social-Democratic newspaper SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 46 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET for storing and packing literature. Two reliable comrades living near the frontier were hired to do the actual smuggling. Both systems worked with a very small staff. This organization, as well as the persons who acte2, as connecting links, remained unchanged until 1913, although the legal daily, Pravda, was already being published in Russia, c. Finances. Funds for both legal and illegal Party activities were secured by conventional means: donations by well-to-do Party mem- bers and sympathizers, and contributions by foreign Social-Democratic parties and the International Socialist Bureau. Support auxiliaries, such as Committees of Aid for Iskra were set up abroad. Leninis bene- fits from organized banditry ("expropriations") and counterfeiting also gave him access to large amounts of money which enabled him to build up and strengthen Party organizations under his own authority. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 47 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET ORGANIZATION OF THE PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE "TRIANGLE DIRECTEUR" (A Triad, possibly consisting of chiefs for Political, Organization, Propaganda work.) CONTROL COMMISSION Political Cadres ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS Technical Youth Propaganda "Clandestine Action in tip Pam Service Soldarite INTER-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Special groupings of intellectuals, students, and immigrant laborers. "PR 6" "PR 6 bis" Internees iiEGIIONAL ORGANIZATION "F" "0" "D" 'Ix,' SECTORS SECTIONS Sub-Se?ctilpris CELLS 666 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 "Wu Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET TECHNICAL SERVICES OF THE PCF PARTY CENTER Political Apparatus National Responsible for Propaganda Inter-Regional Responsible for Propaganda = Intermediary (Courier, cut- out, etc.) Technical Apparatus NATIONAL RESPONSIBLE FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES INTER-REGIONAL RESPONSIBLE FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES Sections Cells TYPOGRAPHICAL MAKE-UP 'PHOTO-ENGRAVING SH OP (plates prepared) PRINT SHOP PRINT SHOP CENTRAL DEPOT ENTRAL DEPOT BUTION \ DEPOT/ DEPOT DEPOT/ DISSEMINATION RESPONSIBLE for photo- engraving a composing RESPONSIBLE for print shops and central depots MILITANTS in charge of transport a procurement of paper, ink, a other sup- plies. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET B. CP FRANCE UNDERGROUND CP France (PCF), supporting the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 24 August 1939 and pursuing an anti-war policy, was legally dis- solved by decree of the French Government in September 1939. With the Armistice of 22 June 1940, the Party entered a brief period of "semi- legality," during which it collaborated to some extent with the Ger- mans and was tacitly permitted a limited activity, including the regular publication of Party literature. It was again suppressed when Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941. The ambiguity in its policy removed, the Party hastened to take the lead in the resistance movement. Marxist demands were soft-pedalled in favor of "National Liberation" -- harassing the German occupation forces, discrediting Vichy, and cooperating with the British and the Free French of General Do Gaulle. Large numbers of enthusiastic patriots were drawn into the movement through such auxiliaries as the guerrilla.Francs-Tireurs, The Comites Populaires, and the Secours Populaire. Party propaganda called for a new National Front and for sabotage of the sections of French economy which supported the Germans. During the years of active resistance the Party completely rehabilitated itself, strengthening its.cadres? perfecting its organization and tactics finding wide mass supp,.)rt. It emerged from the period of illegality stronger than ever before. 1. Ornanization. (See Chart, "Organization of the PCF") In the spring of 1939, the Party's Central Committee decided to take precautionary measures against the inevitable period of illegality. Felix Cadres, head of the Organization Section, was instructed to group the seventy Regions under a number of Inter-Regional organizations. For some reason, the work was not completed until the Party had already been declared illegal, a failure which contributed to the general demoraliza- tion of the ranks which the flagrantly anti-nationalistic policy of the Party had already begun. Given a second chance during the period of semi-legality, the reorganization was apparently carried through. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 4 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET a. The Party Center. The Central Committee was reduced to a small. illegal Center that moved frau one city to another. Directing authority, in the hands of a "Directorate of Three" (Triangle Directeur), censistine of chiefs for Policy, Organization, and Agitprop, adminis- tered Party ffairs through the following National auronsibles (see Chart): 1) Political Res onsible and Assistant (Felix-Cadres and Andre Pican'in 1942): charged with over-all supervision, and, in parti- cular, with the political education of cadres. 2) Responsible for Cadres and Assistant (Pierre Brossard and Gilbert Delhaye at the end of 1942): charged with supervision and ' protection of cadres (frustration of police actions and penetration, disciplinary measures, etc.). The Assistant was, in particular, charged with furnishing ration cards, false identity papers and other documents to Party militants. 3) Technical Resnonsible and Assistant (Roger Payen and Leon Kammeney in 19425-7- charged with all questions of printing materials and equipment. The Assistant was, in partiCular, responsible for purchasing supplies and for paying salaries. 4) Responsible for Youth (Danielo Casanova at the beginning of 1942). 5) Propaganda Responsible and Assistant (Georges Politzer and Daniel Decourte nanche at the beginning of 1942): responsible for the editing of literature at the national level. 6) Responsible for' clandestine action in the Public services (1.1arcel Paul, and later, Emile Pasquier . 7) Responsible for "Solidarite" (Ilariu-Claude Vaillant Couturier at the beginning of 1942): supervised the technique and activities of the regional Responsibles for "Secours Populaire." 8) Responsible for Internees (Depollier in'1942): concerned with all questions relating to ru internees and, in particular, with the preparation of escapes. In addition, the following functionaries have been identified at the Inter-Region level: Responsibles for Uomen, Immigrant Laborers, Peasants, and Enterprises. It is not known whether their counterparts operated at the national level, or whether the functions were directed by the eight Responsibles already enumerated. The majority of the old, well-known leaders of the PCF, unlike their opposite numbers in Germany , did not flee the country. Instead, they apparently retired from active leadership in the illegal Party. Real Party work was delegated to less well-known figures -- an invisi- ble cadre. For example, Jacques Duclos delegated political responsi- bility to l'areeau until 1941; later to Cathelas, then to Felix Cadres. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 49 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Benoit Frachon, Organization Chief, turned this work over to Carrel and then to Desire. AdminiStration of Cadres devolved upon Maurice Treand, Leon Dallidet, and Pierre Brossard. Pierre Villon, Responsible for the Northern Zone, gave this work to :laucherat. Georges Cogniot, Cadre Responsible for the Southern Zone, delegated his functions to Gerard Beslay. b. Territorial Levels. The territorial echelons of the Party were ranged by Inter-Regions, Regions, Sectors, Sections, Sub-sections (in sone cases), and Cells. Paris was divided into two Inter-Re,:ions (designated "PR 6" and !pa 6 bis"), each comprising four Regions, each of which was designated by a letter. Outside Paris, a Region corresponded to a De- partment of t he Civil Government, A Region comprised five or six Sectors, each of which was further divided into three or four Sections. (In Paris a Section corresponded to an arrondissement). Sub-sections were sometimes intercalated between Cell and Sec- tion. During the lega10.pre-war period, cells normally numbered from twenty to thirty members. From September 1939 until the 1940 Armistice, they were reduced to Three-Man Groups. During the period of semi- legality the cell size was again expanded to eight or ten.riembers, ex- cept in Algeria, where unrelieved suppression forced the continuance of Three-Man Groups. In the fall of 1940, with increasing pressure being brought to bear on Party activities, size was again reduced -- to six members in September, and to five in October. Finally, in January 1941, the three-man cell Was reinstated. In the FCF oamphlet, Comment se defendrel circulated at the beginning of 1941, the following instructione were set out for the or- ganizational basis of the Party: "We must decentralize our cells with method and intelligence, in such away as to facilitate the work of the masses of Our adherents. Specifically, this means that, in'the factory, decen- tralization should proceed by way of the shop, part of'the shop, or even by bench. It moans that, in the neighborhoods, decentral- ization should be by groups of stteets by street, by groups of households, and even by apartment. With such decentralization, the organizations at the base of the Party, small in membership, and immersed in the masses, are able to influence them, to gauge their tempers and to enable the Party to understand their thoughts and feelings." ? SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 50 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET One Regional organization of the Party circulated the follow- ing instructions to its Sectors and Sections: "In order to have strict control over the members, to avoid ' repression, and to achieve the greatest activity, it is necessary, in spite of resistance (on the part of militants unwilling to re- vise their way of thinking), to organize'the Party according to the principle of Groups of Three." The Groups of Three were pyramided, doubtless in the same man- ner, as the following directive circulated in September 1941 for the formation of roments Comites Populairs prescribes: "The first task for the Responsible and Secretary of the Com- mittee is to find two othet comrades to help her; thus is the first triangle constituted. Each of the two comrades should find two other women for the propaganda of our committees; thus, two new triangles are const ituted. These three triangles form the first link of the chain which should be extended throughout the city. Each new adherent should know only the two other members of her triangle and the two friends whom she leads. It is the Responsible of the triangla'alone who receives the directives, the literature, the dues.... From triangle to'triangle? the instructions circulate throughout the committee." Centralization of command and compartmentalization of work was represented at all levels by the institution of the Triad, which com- prised Responsibles for political, organization, and either trade union ? or agitprop work. The following scheme was set forth in ComMent se defendre for the division of work in the Sections: 1) Political Responsible, charged with the application of the Party line by organizations and by the press. In addition, he concerns himself with matters relating to youth, to women, and to the fight against capitalist repression. 2) Organization Responsible, chatged with Party organization at the factory and in the neighborhood. He has charge of prepara- tion and distribution of propaganda, and is also concerned with various mass movements peasants, middle-classes, old workers, local Popular Committees. 3) Trade Union Responsible, charged with supervision of the work of Communists'in the syndicates, and with factory and miners' Popular Committees. As a further measure to centralize control over Party elements, "Democratic Centralism" gave nay to "Centralism," with suspension of elections to Party organs. Functionaries were now appointed from above, and were co-opted into leading Party organs. Command channels operated in a strictly vertical direction, with instructions passing from a Responsible to his opposite number at the next lower level. Liaison between functionaries and between organizations at the same level was reduced to a minimum. Approved For Release 200*1)9106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Functionaries at the Party Center also directed the activities and organization of separate technical and military mechanisms. These were organized and opergted independently of the PCF political appara- tus, with which they had contact only at top levels. 2. Technical Services. (See Chart, "Technical Services of the PCF") Preparation and distribution of Party literature was effected by a special technical mechanism, whichwas kept entirely separate front the political apparatus except at those points where contact between them was indispensable. The political line of all literature was, of course, controlled by ranking functionaries in the political organiza- tion, and a Responsible for the technical apparatus served on the national HF staff. The chart slams the points of contact between the two networks and the high de7ree of decentralization obtaining in the technical service. The Party published L'Humanite, its central organ, regularly. L'Avant-fomrde organ of the Young Communists and the trade union publication, La Vie Ouvriere, appeared fairly regularly. In addition, no less than 38 local and regional publications were put out by lower Party echelons between June 1940 and December 1941. !Tony of these were ephemeral, in some cases appearing for only a single issue. ath the reimposition of illegality, all but the central organs and those of the largest regional units were abandoned. Some of the lat- ter appeared only in irregular "special editions." Energies, cadres, and materials were now the precious to be expended on any but the most important publications. The importance of the central, official party publications as moans of liaison and direction cannot be overemphasized. Every issue carried the "mots dlorder" -- indications of the general political line of the Party Center -- down to the smallest compartmentalized unit. The normal agitprop function was fulfilled as much by the enormous volume of pamphlets, broadsides, posters, and wall-writings as by the central press.. Simplicity in preparation and distribution made the occasional piece much less hazardous a medium than the more elaborate SECRET Approved For Release 200.1/92/0B : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SEC.a.ET periodical. The hectograph was a favorite fo14 this reason, Vie du Parti printed detailed instructions on its manufacture. It made no noise, was easily concealed, and supply of ink and paper-was a rela- tively simple matter. The mimeograph was somewhat less favored be- cause of t he difficulty in securing special paper. Presses neces- sitating elaborate installations and security measures were generally used only for the large editions of the central organs. It was occasionally possible to print pieces clandestinely on legal presses, sometimes with, sometimes without the cooperation of the owner. The problem of getting paper in sufficient quantities was diffi- cult. Small quantities could be pilfered by members at their offices or factories. But it eventually became necessary to organize burgling expeditions among the largest available stockpiles, local governmental offices being favorite targets. Distribution of literature was somewhat simplified by the printing of small editions and by an increased use of the mails. 3. Security. Police measures against the Party took two main directions: (a) Systenatic-subversion of members and penetration of Party organizations, including the utilization of spies, pro- vocateurs, and informers; (b) Direct suppressive action, including mass arrests, assassination and other terroristic methods aimed at paralyzing Party activities and immobilizing cadres. To counter these, the Party adapted its policies and structure and took steps to perfect its control of cadres and their activities, to maintain security, and to prevent provocation. a, liodification of Structure. As noted above, the PFC re- organized itself on the basis of the Triad, or Group of Three. .s further security, control passed in a vertical direction, and contact among functionaries and between organizations was reduced to a minimum. The following instructions for the implementation of these principles were published in Vie du Parti for the second quarter of 1941: nAll efforts of a group of three to establish contact with a similar group will be considered suspect and sanctions in conse- quence will be taken. Liaison between organizations of the same echelon is absolutely forbidden. (The groups of three should not know each other; cell should not know each other; there should be no horizontal liaison.) SECaET Approved For Release 2004/W06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECaLT No meeting of more than three comrades should be held. The groups of three constitute the basis of organization of the Party cell, and all efforts to establish groups of more than three mem,- hers should be treated as violating Party discipline.. This principle of compartmentalization should be applied to the Party in all instances. The group of three should be the basic compartment of the Party. The groups of three should be hermetically insulated, one from another. The comrades of one group of three should be familiar only with their own -work. Groups comprising more than three adherents should be decentralized immediately." then the PCF became wholly illegal, it even became necessary to divorce regular Party work from that carried out by the mass organiza- tims. These served as excellent cover for members, and it was con- sidered relatively safe for those who were known to the police as Com- munists to work within them. Employment of known comrades within the Patty itself, however, carried hazards which the Party sought to mini- mize by a strict enforcement of security rules. Especially, partici- pation of known members in the Party's technical apparatus was dis- couraged. In general, known members were to avoid contact with other conr.7des who had no police record, and the latter were to reciprocate, bein7 especially car( 1 not to be observed at or near the residence of a known member. b. Cannartmentalization. This has already been discussed in the section on organization. Briefly, it involved a prohibition of horizontal liaison between Party units at the sane level, a reduction in the size of units, restriction of contacts among individuals, and various rules surrounding the security of meetings which are discus- sed below. c. aLlaily_LIpla. "To be a good Communist," declared Vie du Parti, "it is first of all necessary to apply scrupulously the rules of illegal work." Party publications reminded members periodically of the dangers of falling into "legal cretinism." Rules 'ere laid down in various pamphlets and periodicals for personal conduct, for meetings, contacts, and other communications, and for the safeguarding of documents. 1) Restriction of Contacts. The separation of "legal" from "illegal" Party work, a standard practice for all Communist Parties, was complicated when the PCF was declared illegal in all respects. Comrades engaged in activities which would be illegal under any SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09406.: CIA-RDP83-00415R603200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET circumstance -- such as sabotage, espionage, strong-arm self- defense, etc. 2 -- continued to operate within organizations which were separate from the Party's political mechanism. They left i;olitical work severely alone; kept their identities and activities apart from all Party political units; did not engage in the work of the Party's mass organizations. The purpose of this separation was to preserve, not only their own security, but also that of any "legal" comrades with whom they might come in contact. 2) Security of MeetillgaL The following regulations governing clandestine meetings were posted in Vie du rarti and in the pam- phlets Comment se defendre and Soyons hardis,soyons prudents early in 1941: a) Never more than three comrades at-a meeting (two, in the case of very important functionaries), which should never last more than an hour. b) Be on time! To be ahead of time at a rendez-vous is to call attention to one's self. To be late is to call atten- tion to the comrade who must wait for you. To arrive on time is the first condition for good clandestine work. c) Never arrange meetings in cafes or at the residences of known comrndes. Meet at the cinema., in t he street, in the country, at the sea-shore, out fishing. d) Do not use the same meeting-place repeatedly. Sooner or later it will become a trap. Rather, change the place as often as possible. e) Beware the mails, beware the telephone! Never arrange a Lieeting by telephone, and, as a general rule, do not use the telephone at all. The telephone and the post should be banished as means of transmitting meeting arrangements. f) 2:meeting should not take place in the presence of ? outsiders. g) A militant Communist..., should never go to a rendez- vous without being, certain that he is not being followed. Take little-frequented streets, in which a "shadow" must reveal himself. You cannot be sure that you are not being shadowed until you know that no one is behind you, Never go into the house of a comrade, nevtr go to a meeting without being sure you are not being followed. The police do not always arrest immediately those comrades revealed by their spies; they orient themselves with the first information received, to discover and round up the whole organization. 3) Safei7uarding Party aecords and Materials. The location of Party records should be a closely guarded secret, restricted to the smallest possible number of persons, warned the tract, Renforcons la surveillance: "Two comrades only should know where SECRET Approved For Release 20(7)479/156 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SEORE the materials and presses are kept." The keeping of records was discouraged, but when this was unavoidable, it was required that lists of names and locations of Party units and other details of organization should be encyphered: "The compiling of lists in free text is rigorously prohibited by the Party and should be con- sidered an act of provocation." ,laterial of this nature should never be kept in the regular residence of a Party member. Provi- sion must be made for quick and easy destructionef all records. 4) Personal Conduct. In addition to scrupulous observance of the rules which have already been outlined, the militant was con- stantly admonished to preserve the security of the Party organiza- tion by keeping himself inconspicuous and refusing to answer any questions which might compromise the Party or other comrades ir any wily, in case of arrest. Vic du Parti denounced those militants who, "although little known before the war, instead of preserving a strict anonymity with persons with whom they came in con- tact, behaved like pretentious, irresponsible bourgeois." Other publications carried those instructions: "An illegal militant should never describe his work, either to his wife, or his friends, or to anyone. Still less should he make known his meeting places or where he works. Never tell anyone any more than he must know to carry out his work." "Militants have no choice between family and Party," one phamphlet declared, At the first sign of danger, he must chance his residence and give up seeing his family, who are likely to be under police surveillance. Inconspicuous disguises, such as modifying, the style of ()nets dress or coiffure, affecting a different gait, etd., were recom- mended in case of necessity, and even more claborate disguises in certain instances. "It is better to err by an excess of vigilance than by imprudence," militants were told. Howeverlthe best de- meanor 1/1.-_s to be natural, "to resemble the rest of the crowd." Communists were warned against drawing attention to themmelves by too consniratorial a manner: "Don't slink. Be natural." The conduct which a militant should follow in case of arrest was described in detail in the Party press during 1941. The burden SECilET Approved For Release 200409/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 ? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECAET- f those instructions was that nothing should be revealed which would lead to further arrests. First of all, the militant should keep his head: "Don't be panicky. Every militant knows that he may some day be arrested. The event should not surprise him." He must reveal nothinc which could help the police in any way. Until brought before a court, he should preserve a strict silence. Like Georgi Dimitrov at Leipzig, the PCF member on trial should take advantage of the ppportunity to turn the proceedings into a *veritable indictment of capitalist society." He should not attempt to defend himself against specific charges, leaving that "delicate" function to his lawyer. The lawyer should be chosen from among those recommended by the Party, and under no circum- stances should he be permitted to argue the case in such a way as to throw discredit on .the Party or to compromise any of its members. d. Control of Cadres, New organizational forms imposed by il- legality worked in the Partyls favor in the development of new cadres and in their control. Decentralization of structure, based on the Triad system and correspondingly smaller superior units stimulated the development of previously untrained militants who emerged to assume command of the many new units. Centralization of direction ensured rigorously close supervision of their work by experienced superiors, an immediately personal surveillance which entailed con- tinuous investigation and verification of character and of qualifica- tions. There was an endless search for talents and patient training; a constant reshuffling of functionaries and refinement of technique. Finally, illegality forced a close attention to detoil and to planning, as well as a clear recognition of the necessity for strict discipline, for personal safety, as well as for Party security. It is testimonial enough to the flexibility of structure, to the ability of individuals, and to the effectiveness of principles followed, that the Party was able, within a few months, to reconstitute a strong, disciplined cadre structure from what had been badly de- moralized elements. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 57 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET The task of controlling the cadre and its activities fell immediately to the Cadre Section in the PCF Center, which exercised this obntrol through the Cadre Res')onsibles at all Party levels. These were charged with the selection and supervision of functionaries, with checking their work, and with the vital task of verification. The constant threat of police infiltration was too great and the im- portance of the selection of cadres on Party morale too profound to trust to chance. The Cadre Res onsibles themselves could not be expected to carry on the work alone. The Political Responsible at each level was specifically charged with double-checking his Aes-)onsible for Cadre: "The problem of the cadres is infinitely large. It is the rolp21,..e_LnofthewItr. Each Responsible MuSt know the com- rades who work directly under his supervision.... A Regional Responsible should be acquainted with his co-workers in the Sec- tors and Sections, but with discretion. He should seek out the "reserve" who will replace him should he fall, or become sick. He must help'the Responsibles who work under him to select their replacements. The Cadre Responsible seconds him in this task and accomplishes the myriad particular tasks of selection and verifi- cation." Cahiers du bolchevisme, 1st Quarter 1941) Cadre Responsibles also kept close -bobs on the political ap- paratus. The Cadre Responsible for one of the Paris Inter-Regions attended some of the meetings of the "Triangle Directeur" of that Inter-Region, reporting on these to the National Political Responsible. Presumably, the reports dealt with the efficiency and ideological security of the loaders of the political mechanism. The Party Center was in this way given a double chock on the calibur and integrity of its middle and lower cadres. Of the devices at the command of the Cadre Responsibles in the execution of this work, not the least innortant were the card files and statistical surveys which they compiled from autobiographical reports and periodic organizational reports. From these, it was easy to deter- mine the status and condition of the Party organization at any given time. It was also possible, by having on hand a militant's sworn statement as to his family and his personal and political background, to check these statements with confidential reports by other comrades and with facts of public record. Thus, the Cadre Commission and lower SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDF'83-00415R003200100001-3 - 58 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Cadre aesponsibles came close to performing functions of counter espionar,e, such as were set aside by CP Germany during this period to its Abwehr Ressort of the illegal "Apparat."* Examples of the Autobiographical Report and periodic Organi- zational Report follow. 'AUTOBIOGRAFHICAL SCHEMA Family Status 1. Date (year only) and department of birth. Do not give name or address. 2. That education do you have? Vihere did you study? 3. That is your occupation? There have you worked since leaving school? 4. That is the occupation of your Parents, brothers, sisters, uncles? Have they engaged in political activities and do they belong to any organizations? 5. Are you married? That is the occupation and nationality of your wife? Of her parents? That are their opinions? 6. Have you any children? How many? Their ages? Do they belong to any organizations? T. In your family or in that of your wife are there any Nazis, Socialists, or Trotskyites? 8. In your famAy or in that of your wife, are there any policemen, rgendarmes, or police informants? Persons with ques- tionable means of existence? if so, what are your relations with them? Political Background 9. How did you become a Communist? At what date? 10. Have you been a member of any other party or organization? 11. Hnve you ever been a Free-Mason? How and when did you quit that organization? * The Abwehr was reportedly transferred to the Control Commission after the disbanding of the "Apparat," which apparently took place, in 1935. Thus came to an end a particular separation of a normal Party function under an independent Party mechanism. The KIT was the only CP in our knowledge to have made this precise separation. CP France, like other Cl'is in similar circumstances, delegated the normal, con- tinuing work of verification, along with such counter-espionage pur- suits as this involved, to its Cadre Commission. It is recognized that -ads account, containing references to the unique KPDorganizationis semewhat out of place here. However, it would seem worthwhile to clear up confusion which appears to exist in certain quarters over the pro- blem of verification as a normal function of all CPIs, whether legal or illegal. SECRET Approved For Release 201)19,406 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 StCRET 12. What have been your successive Party functions? What is the nature of your current Party work? 13. Did you militate actively during the war? Where? 14. Have there been any interruptions in your Party or syn- dical activity? When and why.? 15. Have you attended Party schools? Which ones? What books have you read of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin? Have you studied the History of the Bolshevik Party? Do you read the pamphlets and books of the Party? 16. Have you had contact with Trotskyites? With the Barbe- Color group? Have you had any relations with Doriot, with Gitton, or any other excluded person? Have you any acquaintances in their camps? Of what kind? 17. What disciplinary measures have been taken against you in . the Party or in other organizations? When and why? 18. Do you have a police record? Have you been sentenced under the common law? When and why? 19. Have you been subjected to political repression? Have you been arrested? Condemned? When? After how- long and how were you liberated? 20. Have you ever been to the colonies or abroad? When and why? 21. Have you previously filled in a biography? Do not pre- serve the duplicate copy of this. Do not sign it. A note accompanying the form forbade its reproduction or retention and warned that false answers to the questions would render the offen- der liable to action by the Control Commission. Party organizations were required to return weekly reports on their activities and the general conditions undervihich they worked. A model report circulated in February 1941 suggested the following as worthy of filing: Situation: current public temper; signs of unrest; demonstrations; movements, etc.; Proparanda: literature received and produced; status of printing apparatus; OrPanization: expansion or contraction of units and their consti- tution; collections, etc,; llass Work: progress in the struggle of the workingman, in the formation of women's and ether auxiliary groups, and in penetra- tion of bourgeois institutions; Repression: arrests of members and functionaries; nature of charges and evidence; morale, etc.; Solic:arite: collections and methods for relief; liaison with prisoners and their families and with camps and prisons. SECRET Approved For Release 208143/86 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3' Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SERET Instructions for filing the report called for brevity, security in preparation (including the use of numerical designations for re- spondent organizations and preservation of anonymity of personnel) and transmission, and for quick destruction in the likelihood of police seizure: "The weekly reports should be brief and concrete. It is use- less to co into detail over steps taken or activities pursued in connection with a particular task of a temporary nature. Tea us only of actual facts and happenings of the week, along with're- sults obtained. For greater clarity, classify the subjects. Avoid giving names and Party names in the clear or in full. Re- read your report always, checking it with this in mind: What would happen if it were exposed? Take the necessary steps to minimize dangers: put names and identifiable landmarks into cypher. For& yourself to reduce your text to the smallest pos- sible volume. Never give any indication of your own name, nor of that of a town or Sector. Use the number assigned to-you. Your number is . Keep in mind that, in case of necessity; the liaison agent should first of all try to save -the report, to'pre- vent its falling into the hands of the police, to destroy it, if necessary ( usually, by eating it). 4. Finances. With the end of the period of semi-legality, the PCF underwent a financial crisis. Clandestine operation entailed difficulties in the Ivey of collections, and abnormal expenditures. Large-scale money- raising drives were temporarily out of the question. Militant cadres, driven underground, could no longer be expected to earn their own liv- ing by normal pursuits and had to be put on the Party pay-roll. To maintain their morale, it was necessary to guarantee some financial support to their families in case of imprisonment or execution. Large sums were expended on organizing escapes from concentration camps. Maintenance of safe houses and a courier system were expensive. The police seized quantities of agitprop materiel) including expensive printing presses, whiA had to be replaced, with a corresponding drain on the Party tr An economy drive was oralered. A circular at the beginning of 1941 had this to say: "Vie must cut expenses. Economies must not-fall on the propa- ganda apparatus (purchases of paper, equipment, etc.), or on travel or the courier system, which lie at the heart of the whole organization. They must, then, be imposed on salaries. Henceforth, the following rule should-551mm our budgets at all levels: half for propaganda expenses .... half for organizational expenses (salaries, indemnities, travel, rents, etc.) The question of SECRET Approved For Release 2006109/06,: CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 S.ECREI mutual aid (solidarte) is independent of the others. Although restrictions here are painful, they must be made in order to se- cure maximum efficiency: for example, by placing militants so that they can earn part of their living while continuing to work for the Party. We can furnish them with supplementary aid. ileg- ister with us your proposed budget, bearing in mind the above considerations. T7e will settle upon whatever subsidy is possible to give you, and let you know by the next courier." It is in teresting to note that such subsidies from the Center amounted to two-thirds of the income of the local organization hypo- thetically stipulated in a model monthly financial report published for the guidance of local secretaries. Other receipts of local organizations were derived largely from dues, special assessments, c ontributions, etc. The Party Center re- ceived some aid from abroad,Lespecially after the British began to subsidize the Free French and other resistance elements. What the extent of Soviet aid was is not known. The model report mentioned above is appended here in order to show how the Party imagined, various sources of revenue and objects of expenditure. MODEL OF A MONTHLY FINANCIAL REPORT On Hand as of 'l December 1940 5 000 iZeceipts. Dues, contributions, recovered lossesletc. 3 000 Subsidy from X 6 000 14 000 14 000 Expenditures Salary for X..., secretary 2 000 for X..:0 typist 1 500 Aid for family, PX 500 Lodgings. Clothing for security. Disguises, BX; rent, BX, etc. 1 000 Travel and food, purchase or repair of bicycles, etc. 1 000 Propaganda. Materials. Equipment. Establishing stock, purchase of press. 5 000 Aid to prisoners and their families 1 000 Total 12 000 12 000 On Hand as of 31 January 1941 2 000 SECRET Approved For Release 108i/-9/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2ffopt: CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 ORGANIZATION OF THE KPD UNDER CENTRALIZED CONTROL CENTRAL COMMITTEE (Z K) POLITBURO ORGBURO REICHS- TECHNIKUM DURCH- GANGSTELLE REICHSLEITUNG (A triad, consisting of Polleiter, Org- leiter, Agitprop- leiter.) SECRE- TARIAT CONTROL COMMITTEE NORTH- WEST INTER-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (OBERBEZIRKE) NORTH BERLIN- BRANDENBURG SOUTH SOUTH GERMANY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 1 (BEZ!RKE) 1 I . . , I I , 1 II , . I , . I I I I I MIDDLE GERMANY DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS (UNTERBEZIRKE) SUB-DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS Stadtteile, Ortsgruppe CELLS ocioboo SECRET CENTRAL Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 EAST Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET THE KPD FOREIGN DIRECTORATE NETWORK SWEDEN ENGLAND NETHER- LANDS ? POLAND GERMANY FRANCE 172.1.02.Y"I ? SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET OPERATIONS OF A KPD FOREIGN DIRECTORATE (AUSLANDSLEITUNG) INSTRUKTEUR ZIRKELLE1TER GRENZMANN False papers IIIPRINT SHOP The AL Newspaper 0091 "Responsible' for "Responsible" for "Responsible" for "Responsible' for "Responsible" for Security Finances Youth Trade-unions Rote Hilfe GRENZSTELLE SECRET GRENZABSCHNITT NO. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 CP MMANY UNDERGROUND C. The case of Cripermany (KPD) is of special interest because it illustrates the various ways in which a highly-centralized, supposed- ly "mature" Party may attempt to adapt its structure to illegal con- ditions. The fact that, of the attempts ofthe KPD to maintain its organization under Hitler, none succeeded is testimony, both to the effective repressive measures which a police state can command, and to the debilitating effect which a long period of bureaucratic com- fort may produce on Patty cadres. The failure of the KPD cannot be laid to a failure to explore all possible devices. Centralized control exercised by a central authority inside Germany failed; cen- tralized control exercised by a Party Center abroad was no more suc- cessful. Decentralized direction through a number of foreign support centers was somewhat more rewarding, but was spiked by the Nazi advance into countries from which such centers could operate. The failure lay less in the principles which the Party projected, than in its inability, from both internal and external causes, to carry the projects through. 1. Or.-anization. The OD leadership passed through a period of confusion following the rise of Hitler to complete power in the Spring of 1933. Internal factionalism and a totally wrong estimate of the political situation played directly into the hands of Nazi security services. Though out- lawed.and suppressed, the Party could not believe that Hitler was in to stay. As late as May 1933, the Central Committee (a) passed a resolution reaffirming the interpretation which the Comintern had put upon the Nazi phenomenon, namely, that a revolutionary situation existed and that the new regime was purely transitory. The KPD would, as Pieck put it, ride to power on Hitlerls shcAplders: "Nach Hitler unsere Zeitl" The Social-Democrats remained the chief enemy, and the KPD actually abetted the Nazi rise to power on the strength of this notion. SECRET Approved For Release 20.0t/99106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 .15_22E1 a. Initial Confusion. Prior to the Machtdbernahme, the KPD pre- sented featurefcommon to all irbolshevized" Parties. A thirty-man Central Committee (ZK), a ton-man Politburo, a' Control Commission, Orgburo, and a Secretariat with elaborate departmentalization for Party affairs, all sat comfortably in Berlin. Work in the provinces was directed through familiar territorial echelons: 28 Regions (Bezirke), Districts (Unterbezirke)? Sub-districts (Ortsgruppen and Stadtteile), and Cells. The structure was highly centralized in every respect. Direct Comintern supervision over the KPD was exer- cised through its Western European Bureau (EB), with headquarters in Berlin. Preliminary counter-measures. Although confident that the Nazi power was transitory, the KPD had addressed itself to the pro- blems involved in a possible suppression, however temporary. In response to a report made by Hans Kiopenberger in July l932 the Central Committee instituted preliminary security measures. A courier system was organized; the mails were given up as a communica- tions channel; the Party in Saxony ordered a house search of its mem- bers for the removal of all compromising material. The Berlin or- ganization set up parallel dummy and secret offices in November. Such plans proved quite inadequate. Continuing to make light of Nazis, the KPD was surprised by the violent suppression which followed the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933. Indeed, the Central Committee met in Berlin the same night, and retired in ignorance of the disaster. The mass arrests which followed cut deep into Party cadres. Communications were disrupted. Party ranks were driven into confusion by fear and lack of leadership. The Center delayed moving its vital records out of the Karl Liebknecht Haus long enough for the police to seize them. b. The Failure of Centralized Control. The first reaction to the suppression on the part of the KPD leadership was to attempt to perpetuate the highly centralized control of the past. Two Polish Communists were dispatched on Comintern orders to instruct the Party on underground work. One was an organizer, the other, a specialist Approved For Release 20g1/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET in underground press work. They accomplished nothing. In mat, John Schehr returned to Berlin from Moscow with Comintern instructions to set up a central directorate (Reichsleitung) in the form of a Triad (Dreierkopf), consisting of himself as Polleiter, and two others as Orgleiter and Agitpropleitcr. This system was reproduced at all lower Party levels. (See Chart, "Organization of the KPD under Centralized Control.') Schehr was arrested in November, and a new Dreierkopf appointed. Several such triumvirates followed in rapid succession. Finally, with the arrest of the entire Roichsleitung in /Larch 1935, the idea of a centralized leadership within Germany was given up as impractical. The territorial organization of the KPD was decentralized by the intercalation of eight Inter-regional units (Oberbezirke) between Reichsleitung and Bezirke. The other levels were ret:ined as they had been, except for reduction in size. In reality, as a result of Nazi suppression, local Party units functioned independently and often in ignorance of each other's existence. Gradually, whatever direction they received came largely from the foreign support centers set up in adjacent countries. Meanwhile, the leading organs of the KPD (Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat) had been removed abroad for safety. The Central Committee and Secretariat not in Prague; the Politburo met occasionally in Paris. In 1936, headquarters were established in Paris. In 1937 the Central Committee dissolved the Politburo, concentrating authority in the Secretariat. The latter development represented a shift of emphasis from policy-making to organizational work, for by this time the foreign support centers had practically taken over control of KPD affairs within Germany. Liaison between the Party Center at Prague and units within Germany was maintained through two separate courier systems: the Reichstechnikum and the Durchgangstelle network. The Reichstechnikum engaged in typically technical pursuits -- production and distribution of illegal literature -- and in the opera- tion of a chain of couriers. Its Reichskuriere carried instructions SECRET Approved For Release 2Q01/99L06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET back and forth between the Foreign Center and Berlin, as well as literature and copy for local reproduction by the Berlin Technikum. The German security services understood that the Reichskuriere smuggled instructions, materiel, and funds into Germany from neigh boring Soviet diplomatic establishments. The Durchayipstelle (transit stations) offered an alternative courier system. Like the Reichstechnikum, Durchgangstelle headquarters were originally in Saarbrlicken; later they moved to Holland. The Durchgangstelle operated its own couriers, one for each of the eight zones of Germany. Each reported weekly io the Oberbezirksleiter to whom he was assigned for materials and communications. Monthly re- ports were made to Durchgangstelle headquarters. Communications abroad were effected largely through the German. branch of the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) under Ernst Wellweber. The degree to which centralized control disintegrated during the early years of illegality is illustrated by the case of Heinrich natrek. Comrade Wiatrek, a KPD militant since 3_922, trained at the Lenin School in Moscow, was dispatched to Berlin as an organizer by the head of the Foreign Directorate (Ausiandsleitung) at Prague in 1934. At Berlin he not his contact, a Communist from UUpperthal_who offered him the post of Bezirksleiter Niederrhein. "Ho met the two tadviserst (Oborbffrter) for Western Germany at Dilisseldorf: One of these advisers was responsible for Party activities, and the other for trade unions. They came to the con- clusion that natrek was too inexperienced and placed him in the No. 2 position (Orgleiter)'tc a man from Hamburg known only as tFritzt. aatrek, however, became Bezirksleiter a month later when I.Fritzi was summoned to Prague. According to natrek, there was no clear-cut delineation of functions within the Bezirksleitung. In his position, he was re- sponsible for Ddsseldorf and Solingen. His Nos. 2 and 3 were assigned to other areas, and apparently acted very much on their' own. Within his own area, natrek took charge of all activities, producing a paper which he wrote largely himself, and even acting as cashier. A courier from Berlin visited him regularly up to February 1935, a fact which indicates that the Reichsleitung man- aged to keep contact with at least one Bezirk until within a few weeks of its extinction. After that, he received his instructions from ;-,mstordam, via a woman courier who left them with the Bezirksleiter of Mittelrhein, from whom Wiatrok picked them up every Monday. Ho also had a weekly meeting with his Instrukteur from the Auslandsleitung. S 7ClET Approved For Release 20009106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET The Instrukteur showed him an illegal publication which originated from the region and established the existence of a Communist croup with which Wiatrek should be in touch. When Wiatrek did succeed after some weeks in making contact villith its leader, it proved to be the Leiter of the Unterbezirk Dusseldorf- Bilk -- one of his subordinates. This man, however, was extreme- ly suspicious, and Wiatrek had great difficulty in establishing that he and the Instrukteur, who was also present, were not Gestapo agents. They succeeded in obtaining his cOoperation only after Matrek had agreed to ahnumber of conditions, whose substance was that he.would leave the Dusseldorf-Bilk area completely to its own devices." c. Decentralized Control. The failure to maintain a centralized direction of the KPD in Germany was recognized at the "Brussels" Con- ference, which was actually held in Nescow in October 1935. A new and enlarged Central Committee was elected, and it was decided to de- centralize control by means of the Foreign Directorates, the Auslandsleitungen. The Auslandsleitungen. (See Charts, "The KPD Foreign- Directorate Network," and "Operations of a KPD Foreign Directorate." The AL's, which had been set up in various neighboring countries from the beginning of the illegal period to serve as intermediate super- visory-communications centers between the Central Committee and Party elements in Germany, had assumed increasing importance as the structure in Germany disintegrated. Central Committee supervision over the work of the ALls was assured by ZK-Vertreter (representatives) who sat on.them until January 1937, at which time the Triad system was introduced. By 19340 each AL was responsible for a specific area of the Reich, to which it dispatched Instrukteure, each assigned to a particular district. The following ALts have been described: 1) AL-Zentrum, located first at Prague, then in GOteborg, and in Stockholm from 1939. It covered Berlin, Saxony, Hanover, and Brunswick. 2)* AL-West, Amsterdam. Covered Niederrhein, Aachen, Hagen, Siegen, Ruhrgebiet? and Bielefeld. 3)' AL-Nord, Copenhagen.' Covered Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, and the Baltic coast. Was also responsible for Communist refugees in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland. 4) AL-Sdd. Covered South Germany. 5) AL-Saar7,ebiet. Covered the Saar. 6) AL-S6dwest, established at Brussels in 1936. Covered Mittelrhein. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 -"67 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET ? AL composition varied from place to place, but generally in- eluded the following personnel: ZK Representative, acting as chief Chief of the Technical Apparat Chief of the Border Station (Grenzstelle) Chief of the Emigrant Directorate (Emigrantenleitung) Representative of the German zone being serviced Representative of the Red Aid (Rote Hilfe) In AL's Holland, Belgium, and Denmark, the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) was also represented. Although under nominal Central Committee supervision, the AL's necessarily acted with a fair amount of independence. As the AL's gained in importance after 1935/ and especially, from 1937, they built up extensive organizations. AL-Nord, headed from 1937 by Wiatrek, consisted of the following functionaries: No. 1 (Polleiter) (Jlatrek) No. 2 (Orgleiter) No. 3 (Agitpropleiter) Transit Agent (Grenzmann), responsible for conducting Instrukteure into the Reich and for the dispatching of illegal literature published by the AL. Technical man (Techniker), responsible for false papers. Editor, who published the AL's paper, Norddeutscher Tribune. Responsible for Youth and Abwehr (the latter, concerned with Party security) Responsible for Transport and Communications. Responsible for Finances. Responsible for trade union work. Three representatives of the Rote Hilfe (a welfare organi- zation commonly used as cover for espionaje activities). Three Responsibles (Zirkelloiter), each in charge of one of the three areas under the AL. Instrukteure for each of the above areas. The Instrukteure were given their orders by the Zirkelleiter, who told them what places to visit and what instructions to give there. All of these functionaries lived illegally in Copenhagen. The AL was supported partly by local contributions, partly by subsidies from the Central Committee, partly by the sale of Party literature. The work of the AL's was divided between organizing KPD and mass organizations among German emigres and supervising the work of KPD elements in the area of the Reich to which each AL was assigned. The organizing work was accomplished largely under cover of the Emigrant Directorates (Emigrantenleitungen: EL's) which were set up under AL supervision. For communications, the ALls operated their own courier system, which was apparently separate from those run by the Party Center, SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 68 - Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 2EC4ET The EmigrantenleiLLA:acali The ELIs gave relief to German emigres and organized them into KPD and mass organizations. They maintained close contact with indigenous Communist elements and served as convenient cover for AL activities. They were fruitful sources of recruits for AL courier and other work. The EL Triad consisted of Polleiter, Orgleiter, and Agitpropleiter. The EL Pol- leiter sat on the AL, from which he received instructions. The AL Communication_aystem, The Border-crossing Stations (Grenzstelle) of the decentralized AL's consisted of a loader, a 2K- Vertreter, and representatives of the Border Sections (Grenzab- schnitte) under the particular Grenzstelle. The lay-out of the Foreign Directorates, with their appendage Grenzstelle and Grenzab- schnitte, as German security services believed them to exist in 1937- 1938, is shown on the accompanying diagrarls, ("The KPD Foreign- Directorate Network"). It will be noted that, while most adjoining countries sup- ported only two Border Sections, Czechoslovakia boasted no less than ten (one of these is not shown). The sections in Switzerland were based on Basel and St. Gallen: the Dutch sections, on Piaastricht and lij.jnwegen. Locations of sections in Belgium and Denmark are unknown, while Stockholm is thought to have had a border section operating in the direction of Stettin and KC;nigsberg. The activities of Lothar Hoffmann, a Moscow-trained function- ary of the Copenhagen EL from 1939 to 1941, illustrate the services performed by such foreign support centers: doffmann secured the services of a member of CP Denmark, and of two fishermen, one Danish and the other German. The Danish Party member, serving as courier, went to Hamburg, where he established contact with the KIT Bezirksleiter. Hoffmann furnished the Dane with literature procured'in Copenhagen. The Dane carried it to the Danish' coast, where he turned it over to the Danish fisherman, who, in turn, de- livered it to his German opposite number outside Danish waters. The Danish courier; going to Germany unencumbered, picked up the material again, this time from the German fisherman, and delivered it to the Bezirksleitung in Hamburg. HoffmannIs duties also included work within the EL, instruct- ing German emigrants. From 1940, there remained in Copenhagen besides the leaders of the EL and AL, only about twelve emigres. These were S E I" L JA " 91 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 69 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET organized in four groups, each of which had street contacts and held secret meetings. The EL maintained some contacts with CP Denmark. The work performed by Paul Helms, who was (presumably) Orgleiter of the Copenhagen AL, is also of interest. In the Surmer of 1937 he began to recruit reliable KPD militants (Vertrauensleute: trusted persons) still in Ger- many to carry on organizational and propaganda there in small groups. He maintained contact with these elements through Instrukteure. One such Instrukteur, who had conneations in Hamburg, made the trip from Copenhagen some ten times. He met with workers and small business men and received reports on public opinion' and morale and furnished his contacts with illegal literature. Returning to Copenhagen, he would report to the AL to get new instructions. Once, he received a false passport. At first, literature was smuggled into Germany by the ALls "Grenz- arparat," which employed Danes-for the purpose. Later, the Instrukteur carried it himself. His reports were written up and evaluated by the AL, then forwarded to the Central Committee. Another Instrukteur had contacts'among Hamburg port workers which he was charged with exploiting. He attempted to organ- ized them and carried into Germany illegal literature hidden in pocket mirrors and pieces of soap..* d. Attempt to Revive Centralized Control., As Georgi Dimitrov, Secretary General of the Comintern, Pointed out to a KPD conference held at Uoscow in January 1940, the Party in Germany had largely dis- integrated. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact, which had been signed the preceding August, however, raised the illusion that the Party might begin to function more or less normally inside Germany. The "January platform," therefore, called for the reestablishment of a Reichsleitung at Bcrlin. It should consist of a more or less overt dummy Secretariat and a real, secret Secretariat. It was even thought possible that the latter might build up and direct an extensive mili- tary organization for espionage and sabotage work. With this project in view, the A1,13 were officially dis- solved. Actually, they continued to function as before, until forced to close down by Nazi military advances. Kngche1, to whom the task of preparing the field for the Berlin center fell, dispatched three Instrukteure into the Reich. Early in 1942 he went in himself, setting up shop in a safe-house secured by one of the Instrukteure. Here he installed a duplicating machine from which he ran off a number of illegal papers. Liaison with some local S:ECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 70 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET KPD units was established and maintained for a time by the Inetrukteure, who reported regularly to Kn6chel. Instructions reached him through a post-box address in Dusseldorf, through a number of couriers, and by small boats plying on the Rhine. His own correspondence was received by his fiancee in Amsterdam, who gave it to a Dutch Communist known as "Der Grosse." The latter radioed these messages abroad. An attempt to set up a transmitter in Berlin cane to nothing, but KnOchel was able to receive genoral instructions from Radio Moscow and from other stations. This meager establishment was finally broken with Kngchells arrest on 30 January 1943. Thereafter, whatever foreign direction was exercised over the small, disconnected KPD groups in the Reich seems to have come from Stockholm. Establishment of the Free German Movement. Three methods of control over units in Germany having failed, KPD emphasis now shifted to the establishment of a mass organization abroad. The "Free German" Movement was begun at Moscow in July, 1943. It was composed of anti- Nazi prisoners of war and KPD emigrants. It published a weekly news- paper, Freies Deutschland, and beamed propaganda broadcasts to Ger- many over "Free German Radio." On July 1943, a separate organization, the "Union or German Officers" was affiliated with the Movement. Free German Committees were established on a mass basis all over the world. Chief centers were New York, Mexico City, London, and Stockholm. In South America, a "Latin-America Committee of Free Germans" was formed by the amalgamation of various anti-Nazi organi- zations in 1942. The chief value of these mass organizations to the KFD was in converting German prisoners of war to Marxist principles. The inten- sive propaganda carried on in prison camps in the Lissa through the Antifa training courses won over recruits for the post-war Party and SECRET _ - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 71 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET the administration in the Soviet Zone.* 2. Security. KPD unpreparedness made it vulnerable to police repression from the first. Seizures of complete membership lists and of elaborate central records led to decimation of lower cadres, while agents-provo- cateurs invaded Party organizations and even built up numbers of decoy organizations into which many comrades and sympathizers were enticed. When the trap became full, it would be sprung, and the gulled comrades thrown into concentration camps. The arrest, in October 1933, of the Agitpropl.eiter of the Bezirk Berlin-Brandenburg, for example, led to the exposure of the whole Unterbezirk network, and to the arrest of the Bezirksleitung and many members of the Unterbezirke. A courier was arrested and found to be carrying papers concealed beneath a knee- bandage and under the grips of the handle-bars of his bicycle. The latter contained roughly oncyphered lists of the meetingswhich he was to hold during the week. The persons whom he had arranged to meet were nearly all rounded up while on their way to, or at, the designated meeting places. As a counter-measure, the KIT dopted elaborate security regulations. "The party organization must be decentralized," a functionary declared rather belatedly in 1935: "In place of the old centralized system there must grow up many independent little local organizations which must be capable * Recent reorganizational stops taken by the SED (Socialist Unity Party: thc amalgamated KFD SPD Party in the Soviet Zone) and the KPD may have produced a degree of confusion. They may have led some to conclude that the KPD is about to go Underground and that these steps were taken in preparation for this. The KPD in the Western Zones has been officially separated from the SED and has set up a "West Zone Directorate" at Frankfurt. The Bezirk has been abolished as an inter- mediate echelon between Land and Kreis. Ten-man Groups have been pre- scribed as the basic KPD unit. These measures would be perfectly natural ones for the KPD to take in response to the crystallization of the East-West division within Germany. Streamlining the Party structure, as the KPD has done, should not be taken as prima facie evidence that it intends or expects to go underground. There is no evidence to show that the steps were taken with such a specific expecta- tion in view. Whether or not the KPD intends to go underground is be- side the point. The reorganization probably would have been made in any case. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 72 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 S E 11 E of carrying out the party line on their own and of leading the masses in their respective areas. " Bearing cover names and changing residence frequently, militants maintained very limited party contacts to prevent such large-scale exposures as had overtaken the Party in 1933. Functionaries were appointed from above, rather than elected, and they habitually worked in areas where they were not previously known. To ensure secrecy of communications, instructions to lower units were relayed through intermediaries. Thus, an Unterbezirksleitung appointed a committee of three from among the leaders of its several Ortsgruppe. This commit- tee represented the only contact between the Unterbezirksleitung and its subordinate groups. All members known to the police were forbidden to take any part in underground .work or to have any contact with functioning militants. Meeting places were changed often and their locrtions closely guarded. Signals discernible from a safe distance were used to indicate security, such as flower pots in (or missing from) a window, or the position of window shades, etc. It was forbidden to carry incriminat- ing documents to meetings or to keep them at members' lodgings. Safe houses were established for hiding personnel and materials; letter- drops and cut-outs for communications. Party cards and dues receipts were no longer issued, aecruits were carefully screened and their records checked with the Central Committee, which had access to the blacklists of police agents and traitors compiled by the Party's illegal Apparat. l!enbors who had over given signs of defection, or who had been released too soon by the Gestapo, were treated with sus- picion, and sometimes, with beatings or liquidatioh. These security measures were all valid in themselves, and if they had been applied at the beginning of Nazi suppression might have foiled the Government's efforts to wipe out the Party. Coming as late as they did, it is doubtful whether they were effective in helping the Party to pick up many of the pieces. SEr- T Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 73 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET ORGANIZATION OF THE KKE (/946) CENTRAL COMMITTEE (includes representatives of major City Committees and Regional or- ganizations, and Responsibles for EAM, ELAS, EPON, EA, AKE, MLA, KOSSA, The KKE Abroad, and intellectuals.) APPARAT" (an advisory council) FINANCE COMMITTEE POLITBURO SECRETARIAT CONTROL COMMISSION Agit- prop Organi- zation yVORK I COMMISSIONS Technical Syndical Women Co-opera- tives CITY ORGANIZATIONS KOA (Athens) KO P (Piraeus) KOTh (Salonika) CITY DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS (ACHTIDES) Government employees a KOSSA REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS I I PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS CELLS (K013's) CELLS (KOB's) ObiabOOO 6666663 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET ORGANIZATION OF EPON Responsible for EPON on the CC/KKE CENTRAL COUNCIL (6 members) EPON PIRAEUS Technical Mechanism Finance Committee Local Districts It] [?1 Labor Local Students' Sections Sections Sectors Heavy machine shops Light machine shops Kokkinia Kaminia Tambouria Central Elementary Schools Secondary Schools Technical Schools TECHNICAL MECHANISM Printing- Press Dis- tributors (the Mourikis Ei!..?others) SECRET Atheri EPON Secretary, a member of the Central Council. .11111M11111111W EPON ATHENS Technical Mechanism Finance Committee Students' EPON Local Athletic Sect Ors Students Sections Groups Kallithea High School University Poly- technical Higher Commercial "Pantios" Kallithea Petralona Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 OPASA EPSA Excursions Approved For Release wan,: CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 KKE CONTROL OF THE OENO KOP ACHTIDES 4 CC/KKE Secretary, OENO KOB's EA OENO Offices EA Brotherhoods Abroad Abroad AAA OlOcbic3c3 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET THE SALONIKA RECRUIT-FORWARDING SYSTEM \Funds, Instructions, etc. RecraRs Funds from KKE press and enterprises in Salonika SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 )3 CRET D. CP GREECE UNDERGROUND With the formation of the Markos rebel Junta in Dccember 1947, and the resumption of serious guerrilla warfare, CP Greece (KKE) went wholly underground. Illegality was no novelty for Cie KKE. It had been suppressed during the dictatorships of Pangalos (:1925-1926) and Metaxas (1936-1941). Many of the Party functionaries arrested then were released when the Germans occupied the country in 1941. A new Central Committee was formed and the Party bent its energies to the creation of a united front resistance movement the EJ. The EMI's guerrilla force, ETJ,S, which was constituted in February 1942, co- operated with other resistance groups and the British to forward the fight for liberation. From the time of liberation, October 1944, until June 1946, when the Government promulgated a Law for 2Ublic Safety, ?providing for powers of search, abolishfng the right to strike, and setting up special police tribunals, the KKE enjoyed practical freedom of action. During the months from June to December 1946, it prepared itself for illegality by strengthening discipline and re- , organizing. So far as its political mechanism is concerned, the KKE effort has met with failure. ladle the rebel forces have had sone notable successes, the political structure in all areas but those held by arms appears to have collapsed. During 1948, the Greek police uncovered many local Party organizations, and most of the leading cadres have either been arrested or have fled to the mountains. 1. Organization (See Chart, uOrunization of the KKE, 194 Except for having established, through its resistance period, a number of political, and clandestine action auxiliaries, the KKE was organized along familiar CP lines prior to its suppression in 1947. Centralized control was held by a seven-man Political Bureau, a four- man Secretariat, a Central Committee, and a Control Commission, extend- ing successively down through Regional and City organizations, Districts, and Cells. 'lost recently, the ilebel iladio (DABS) announced that as a result of a decision of the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee, held in the Gramms Mountains on 31 January 1949, Markos SECaET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 74 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET had been relieved of political responsibilities and has since been re- placed as military commander by Ionnis Ioannides. A new Politburo, elected at the same time, is composed of five regular members and three alternates, headed by the long-time Secretary General, Zachariades. Chryssa Hadjivassiliou, once head of the KKE organization for penetra- tion of the Armed Forces and State Security Service (KOSSA), was also relieved of her Politburo post. The KKE organizations for the three major cities -- KOA, Athens; KOP, Piraeus; MTh, Salonika -- have traditionally stood at the region- al level. As police interference .has tightened around Party communica- tion channels, they have come generally to represent whatever organiza- tion coherency is left to the KKE outside Rebel territory. If the "normal" breakdown of KKE city administration by Districts, and Cells (KOB's) still obtains, it does so loosely. The average District (Achtis)eomprises a small bureau,.. most of whose members have been co- opted rather than elected. It meets infrequently, and it administers very few KOB's. An attempt was made early in 1948 to sub-divide the KOB's into three-man groups (pyrines), but nest recent. reports indicate that the KOB'sr comprising anywhere from. four to twelve members, are themselves too small to admit of further purposeful division. KKE auxiliaries such as tho.AKE (Agricultural Party), EAM (Nation- al Liberation Front), EPON (United Youth Organization), and EA (Mutual Aid), are theoretically organized along lines similar to those of the political mechanism, and have also suffered disruption. The underground organization of EPON is shown on the attached chart. The organization of the military auxiliary, the "Democratic Army: and the clandestine action apparatus of KOSSA and MLA, will be dis- cussed in Part 1ND of the present study. In October 1948 the Central Committee of the KKE announced the dissolution and replacement of the Athens Committee (KOA) on thg grounds that the latter had, failed to execute properly the recruitment and sabotage program directed the previous March for support of the military action. The present constitution of the KOA, is not clear. A "Central Committee Delegation" reportedly coordinates and directs KKE SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 75 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET affairs in the city. During the summer of 1946, as a counter-measure against the numerous arrests suffered then, the Central Committee of the KOA was enlarged from nine to fifteen members. Power was concen- trated in a new, four-man Secretariat, consisting of the following: First Secretory Second Secretary (Organization) Responsible for Fractions Responsible for Woments Work The Central Committee of the KOA in 1946 consisted of the following functionaries: First Secretary Second Secretary Responsible for EAR' Responsible for Security Responsible for Clandestine Organization Responsible for Intellectuals Responsible for Trade Unions Responsible for Fractions Responsible for MA's Responsible for EPON Responsible for AKE Treasurer Enlightener The KOA administered several independent KOB's and sixteen Achtides, nine of which were organized on a neighborhood basis, and the remainder, according to occupation, as follows: Civil Servants Students Street Vendors, Bus and Taxi Operators Bank and Clerical Workers Intellectuals Transport Workers Hospital and Veterans Organizations 7orkers Membership of KOB's was also reduced at this time. The KOP of Piraeus and, probably, the KOTh of Salonika, were similar- ly organized, as were the following Regional organizations: Macedonia and Thrace Epirus and Ionian Islands Thessaly Sterea Crete Aegean Islands Dodecanese The Achtis was abolished as anorganizational unit in the countryside during the 1946 preparation, rural members being absorbed into local AKE organizations. The former Provincial Committees of the Regions were transformed into city committees, administering Achtides and KOB's withil towns. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 76 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET The structural decentralization adopted by the KKE as a standard counter-measure against police action during 1946 proved ineffectual. As a result of many arrests during that year and the next, many local Party units were destroyed. A recent interrogation throws interesting light on the state of disintegration into which the KKE political mechanism had fallen. In July 1947 the KOA sent Maria Manousaki to Chalkis as Responsible for the city organization there. On her arrival, she discovered that it consisted of a four-man bureau, administering three neighborhood KOB's and three factory KOB's, with a total membership of fifty. Each KOB was directed by a Bureau headed by the Responsible, who acted as First Secretary. In some cases, arrests had reduced the Bureau to the Re- sponsible alone. Each KOB comprised from four to twelve members. According to Manousaki's statement, the work of the Chalkis political organization consisted solely of the preparation and dis- tribution of printed material. However, as Responsible, she worked closely with representatives of the KKE auxiliariesI.EAM, EA, and EPON. The EN had only fifteen members in the entire city. The Responsible for "vigilance" (epagrypnisis: internal control, including aspects of Party intelligence work) in the Chalkis KKE or- ganization had not been able to carry this function down to the KOB's? presumnbly because of a shortage of qualified cadre. He was also, however, Responsible for the technical mechanism, which consisted of himself, an assistant, one flat mimeograph machine, and a typewriter. As Responsible for the political organization, Manousaki dictated the policies of the technical mechanism. She also took charge of the cen- tral distribution of the printed matter which it produced. Liaison 7?ith the KOA and with local KOB's was maintained by couriers. Contact with the KOA was interrupted during the winter of 1947, when the Bureau of the Regional Committee of Central Greece, in the competence of which the Chalkis organization technically lay, suc- ceeded in establishing an irregular liaison with Manousaki through Andarte units in Evvia. It is interesting to note that, while recogniz- ing the nominal guthdrity of the Regional Bureau, the guerrilla'head-. quarters tried to assume some direction over the Chalkis organization. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 77 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SEC-RET The present composition of the KKE at the national level, and cur- rent territorial organization are not clear. In the face of trying communications difficulties, it seems likely that the rather elaborate picture which was drawn in 1946 would be meaningless today. The Politburo and Central Committee are stationed in the mountains. While many of the functionaries who in 1946 filled posts for myriad Party affairs may still maintain their positions, it is highly probable that their administrative activity is nominal. 2. Operational 'rob] a. Security. The KKE and its auxiliaries have adopted familiar security measures for the preservation of their cadres and for what limited action they can achieve against police interference. The actual practise of these measures is best demonstrated in the details given by interrogated KKE members. Meetings. This is how meetings were arranged for Zoi haniatil a fairly low-level courier working for Maria Lanousaki: In May 1947 Maniati was sent by the Responsible of the Chalkis organization to Athens to deliver a note. She was instructed as to her Athens contact and the proper password, and given money for expenses. Arriving at the Athens per,- fume shop to which she had been directed, she gave the sigh, "Is Mrs. Samils perfume ready?" To this the owner of the shop gave the countersign, "It is ready and it costs 15;000:" He told the courier Maniati to return the following day, when she would be given her contact. The next afternoon she return- ed to the shop, where the owner shortly indicated a man pass- ing the shop as the contact. Maniati met the man in the street and delivered the message to him. He gave her 500,000 drachmae to take back to the Responsible of the Chalkis organization. Manousaki has described several meetings with other Party functionaries, from which the following characteristics emerge: 1) Meetings were pro-arranged whenever possible. This included the furnishing of addresses where initial contacts could be made, such as the residence Or business establishment of a sympathizer or secret KKE member. It also involved the use of such recognition devices as passwords. 2) When regular contact places had not been established or were not known, meetings were necessarily casual. Thus, Manousaki made contact with the KKE organization at Thebes through the mother of an old Party acquaintance. It is interesting to note that the KKE term for safehouse is "yavka," an old Soviet intelligence word for a secure meeting place or reporting center. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 7 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Meeting places were often fitted out with secret hiding places in case of police raids. One such was behind the false back of a ward- robe closet. It was large enough to accommodate four persons. Sympathizers and their families frequently provided "yavka" for visiting functionaries, who sometimes were forced by police.sur- veillance to "hole up" in these safe-houses for weeks at a time. Occasionally, having provided lodgings at the request of a friend or relative, the host might even be kept ignorant of the character of his guest. Personal Conduct on Arrest,. As a guide for conduct to be followed when arrested, the Central Committee allegedly issued the following (paraphrased) instructions: 1) Never admit your Party affiliation, or reveal any details'of Party work, organization, or personnel, even under torture. Confine yourself to a denial of the charges made against you. Anythinr. further gives the police a good check on previous information and on the work of their agonts within the Party, and enables them to make further arrests. Do not associate with anyone connected in any way with the police. 2) Fear is your worst enemy. Signs of nervousness or cowardice encourage the police to torture you in the hope of getting detailed confessions. 3) Do net acknowledge even apparently insignificant ' points. Thus encouraged, the police will resort to torture, so that finally, you may confess to things you have never heard about. Do not forget that this is the first step to- wards treason. From the very moment you have acknowledged something which the Security asked you to acknowledce, how- ever insignificant this information might appear to roul you have already confessed to treason, and nothing can save you. 4) Those arrested together mast defend each other. If another comrade is being tortured, make noise and demonstrate so that you will be heard outside. A passive attitude, while a comrade of yours is being tortured, will not only not 'help you when your turn comes, but will facilitate the work of the torturers. 5) Do not avail yourself of the opportunity which the Security may offer you to contact anyone on the outside. You would only give away other comrades. 6) In case Party documents or other incriminating records are in your home, do not reveal your address, so that your family or organization will have time to destroy them. 7) Remember that police agents may be planted in your cell at prison as "convicts." Never talk to fellow prisoners about Party affairs. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 ? 79 ? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SE CRET b. Communications. Liaison among KKE elements and between t he ICKE and foreign nnmmunist centers hf's been maintained through couriers, P7'rty,pmiess, and radio. 1) Couriers. The use of couriers has already been touched upon in the section on security-. No material is available at this writing describing any systematic KKE courier network, except for that which operated out of Salonika. If 4 network covering the whole of Greece has ever existed (and the fact that Chryssa Hadjivassiliou was reported in 1946 to be responsible for the - transmibsion of Central Committee directives to all provincial organizations may indicate that it did), it has most probably dis- integrated. Those courier operations outside of guerilla-held territory which have been described have all been informal affairs, with agents recruited and commissioned as the need arose. It is otherwise with the courier system operating between Greece and foreign countries. This service was performed by KKE members of the Party-controlled Federation of Greek Maritime Unions, the OENO. (See Chart, "KKE Control of the OEM"). It was partially destroyed by police in September 1948. In addition to its courier ser -os, the OENO performed the following functions: a) Infiltration of Greek MariUme services, including the Navy, for intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and sub- version purposes; b) Raising and transporting of funds from abroad; c) Recruitment for the Rebel Army; d) Supply of equipment for the Rebel Army; e) Publication and distribution of Communist literature. The OENO operated out of Piraeus. It had offices or agents in Marseille, Genoa, Cardiff, Sydney, Antwerp, New York, and in Durban and Johannesburg, South Africa. In New York, the President of the Brotherhood of the EA of Seamen worked with the CPUSA- sponsored Committee of Aid for Democratic Greece for the collection and forwarding of funds and equipment to Piraeus and to Markos by way of Genoa. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 80 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET An examination of OENO records seized by Greek police reveals that, of the approximately 6,800 seamen members of the OENO (i.e., about one-third of the total Greek Merchant Marine ranks), 315 actively served KKE interests. These agents worked aboard ship as firemen, sailors, stewards. They were members of the following KKE cells under the Piraeus City Committee (KOP): KOB of tubercular seamen KOB of coastwise lines crews and lower crews of the Merchant Marine KOB of sailing vessels KOB of local lines KOB of lines abroad These KOB's constituted the "5th Seamen's Sector" of the KOP. The KOB members were later incorporated into the "Seamen's Partisan Committee" (KEN). The KEN controlled the OENO through the latterls secretary. In March l948, the KEEL, a short-lived successor to the KEN, vas in turn superseded by the "4th Sector for Transport and Communications" (AE 4: i.e., the 4th Achtis) of the KOP. 2) Press and Radio. Preparation and distribution of printed KKE material is the function of the Technical Mechanism which operates at all levels down to the Achtis. Party publications serve communications, as much as agitation purposes. With the breakdown of liaison channels, Party units have apparently come to rely upon instructions, relayed orally or through print, broad- cast by the Central Committee over the Andarte Radio (DABS), which is now probably located in Bulgaria. The way in which this radio channel has been used is illustrated in the following extract from an interrogation of an important KKE functionary, a secretary of the "Aftoamyna" (MLA: Mass Popular Self=Defense) for Athens: "Early in 1948.... the Markos radio station passed in a forceful broadcast the line that the armed movement must be intensified in the cities with sabotage and the execu- tion of political personalities. In one broadcast a Polit- buro letter was read, the contents of which were later dis- seminated in limiting and verbally to all party organizations of the cities. One letter came into my hands On the basis of this letter from the Politburo we tried to put into effect the orders but without results because of therepeat- ed deteriorating blows suffered by the Aftoamyna." SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - l - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Two points are significant in this statement: the extent to which the communications system had broken down, that such im- portant instructions had to pass by so public a channel; and the really great potential use to which radio can be put in Party work under illegality, without endangering the precious lives of militants. No material is at hand to illustrate the workings of a technical mechanism of the KI E at a level higher than the Achtis, Those described by Manousaki are all of this caliber. The Mechanism of the Athens Fifth Achtis consisted in 1944 of a print shop utilizing two cylindrical and ten flat mimeograph machines. That of the Chalkis organization in 1947 consisted only of a flat machine and a typewriter, hidden in an attic over a bakery. A second flat machine, hidden in the base of a wardrobe closet, was not used because the house in which it was hidden was under police surveillance. A recent description of the technical mechanism of a KKE auxiliary, EPON, (See Chart, "Organization of EPON"), is more in- teresting. Mechanismsoperated at the national and city level, set up as follows: .,11exandros Thomiades was technical 'responsible' of the Central Council. Pantelis Divans (a member of the EPON Cen- tral Council) had given him 80 gold sovereigns with which he rented a house in Old Faliron (in the outskirts of Athens). lath the assistance of Theofanis Paspaliaris, he had installed in an underground crypt a new mimeograph machine and a large quantity of paper and ink. Tho crypt also contained the entire enlightenment archives of EPON and a considerable quan- tity of leftist books. This crypt had been constructed in such a fashion that it was impossible to discover it by a cursory search. Within this crypt were printed the illegal publication of EPON, Nea Gcnia and proclamations of subver- sive content. The technical mechanism of EPON in Piraeus was-also housed in an underground crypt. It indLuded a hand press, two cylind- rical mimeograph machines and a considerable quantity of paper and ink. In addition, the Responsible for Labor in Piraeus EPON also operated a flat mimeograph machine in his house. The shop of the Mourikis brothers had undertaken to provide the typographical installations for the Communist organizations. They not only sold printing presses, but also transported them on the firm's motorcycles. The press installed in the house of Thomiades was brought there by Konstatinos Mourikis. When the shop was seized by Piraeus police, it contained three presses intended for the KKE.' SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 82 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECREI c. Recruitment and Trans2ort. A network for the channeling of recruits for the Rebel Army has been described by Manousaki. It was directed by Savvas lgyropoulos, who wtbi uhtil Ahnousakils arrival: Responsible for the Chalkis political organization. Argyropoulos despatched couriers (the same persons employed by Menousaki in her political liaison with the KOA) to the same perfume shop that was used as a reporting center for Chalkis-KOA liaison. There the courier was put in contact with the prospective recruits and would arrange to meet them at the Chalkis railroad station. If a boat was available when the recruit arrived at Chalkis, he would be des- patched immediately, hidden in a apace constructed within a load of bricks, tiles, or other cargo. Sometimes, recruits had to be lodged in Chalkis for some time, until the next boat loft. Presumably, they would be landed on the coast at a point from which they could easily join a guerilla unit. During the winter of 1947-1948 p Salonika police uncovered and destroyed a network for the channeling of recruits, refugees, and instructions from the Salonika area to Andarte elements in Pieria and the Chalcidice. One George Kazakis was in charge of the "entire illegal organization" in Salonika. Assisted by his wife, he kept liaison with Markos and with local guerilla organizations, and he operated at least two recruit-forwarding systems, one working by sea to Pieria and the other, overland to the Chalcidice. The Chart, "The Salonika Recruit-Forwarding System," shows the major links and direc- tions taken by these systems. The Kazakis organization maintained safe-houses in a thee- repair shop, a provision shop, and in a sympathizer's apartment. Dur- ing the period of its operation, it forwarded about 100 persons to the Audartes, 19 to Pieria and 81 to the Chalcidice. d. Finances. Financial affairs of the KI E in 1946 were directed at the national level by a ten-man Central Finance Committee, which was divided into five functional sections, viz: (1) Income . (2) Expenditures (3) Enterprises (4) Underground Mechanism (5) Enlightenment and Propaganda SECRET Approved For Release 200e9106 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET The Cashier of the Committee was also Secretary of the EA (UUtual Aid) and President of the KOA Executive Committee. Finance committees also operated on the Regional level. In February 1948, it was reported that the Central Finance Committee would confine itself to the area accessible to KKE officials in Athens (that is, to the KOA, KOP, Aegean Islands0 Crete). It wqs to consist of six members, three of whom, headed by Chryssa Hadjivas- siliou, would direct all financial affairs. How finances in other areas mould be administered was not covered in the report. Presumably, a finance office operates at Party Headquarters in the mountains under direct supervision of the Politburo. 1) Sources of Revenue. In addition to more prosaic sources of income, such as dues, membership fees, and the like, the KKE has received large amounts from abroad through the EA and the OEM. Between June 1945 and December 1946, the OENO brought in -- 3,671,064 English Pounds 80 Gold Pounds 1,769;012 (Egyptian?) Pounds 2,060 American Dollars These sums were transported by OENO agents. One member of the crew of the American SS SOUTH UESTERN VICTORY, for example, delivered to the OENO finance office in Piraeus 04,200 collected in the United States. A second courier delivered 268 Pounds in British banknotes collected at the OENO Antwerp office. Altogether, the Athens Finance Committee reported the fol- lowing contributions from abroad in the period September-October 1948: Drachmae Great Britain 19,200,000 Western Europe 12,500,000 OENO branches 18,750,000 United States (sent by the Editor of the Now York Greek-American Tri:ypia12) 7,500,000 Cyprus (sent by AKEL) 5,000,000 Australia (sent by local EAM members) 1,8000000 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/W06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0032001000013 The above items represented about 13% of total revenues for the period. Other revenues included contributions from the central treasury in the mountains, from local donors and organizations, and proceeds from Party subscriptions and due's and from the operations of various business enterprises in the Athens, Piraeus, and Attica area. Total receipts for the period were 502,900,000 Drachmae. The following business enterprises were operated by the Kazakis organization in Salonika: Cooperative for the manufacture and sale of shoes, Dairy Products Business, Automobile Cooperative: operated busos and trucks until end of 1947, when sold, proceeds going to Kozakis; Printing shops, Popular Book Store: sold Party literature and stolen stationery till end of 1948, X-ray Laboratory, Nail Factory, Motorboats: two boats, presumably operating on a com- mercial basis; Silk Basihess: 360 kilos of silk cloth bought in Albania for resale, but impounded by Salonika police; Kotoula Machine shop: allegedly manufactured 11 printing presses which were sent to various KKE organizations; fliscellancous sales: of the rugs, foodstuffs, etc.) appropriated during ELS regime; proceeds from sale of three KEE and E2.11 newspapers after these were outlawed. 2) Expenditures. A detalled account for the area administer- ed by the Athens Firrnce Committee during the period between 1 September and 10 November 1948 shows total expenditures of 1,038,150,000 Drachmae, principal items being the following: Salaries, lodging, travelling expenses cf KKE functionar- ies, including couriers; Rents and other housekeeping expenses of KKE political organs; Equipment for technical and military mechanisms; Salaries, overhead and printing expenses for publication of Party literature; SECRET Approved For Release 2001/Q9/# L.CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET, Financial support to auxiliary organizations; Financial support to non-KKE functionaries and families of auxiliaries; ? Financial support to KKE organizations (KO, KOAtt, and the KEE Regional Committee of the Aegean Islands), including .SECRET Approved For Release 2001/03/0%CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SEiRET E. CP SPAIN UNDERGROUND CP Spain (PCE), along with the autonomous Catalan and Basque CPIs, wris driven deep underground with the victory of General Franco in the Spring of 1939. Party cadres scattered, some to Latin America, some to the USSR. With the liberation of France, a Center was established at Toulouse,* close to the Spanish bordor. The official weekly publi- cation, /fund? Obruro, soon began to appear clandestinely in Madrid. In March 1947, the third.PCE Congress met at Paris. It elected a Cen- tral Committee, which set up headquarters in Paris under Dolores Ibarruri as Secretary General, For some time the PCE =trolled the National Spanish Union (UNE), a resistance coalition whichwas dis- solved in 1945. It held posts in the cabinets of Giral and Llopis in the Republican Government in Exile that was established in Mexico City. The Party has always worked closely with CP France, and has sot up branches all over the world. The PCE center is presently at Paris; latest reports indicate how- ever, that sections of it may have boon already removed to Prague. A bewildering number of fronts, auxiliaries, and penetrated organiFations under varying degrees of PCE control operate out of France and other countries, some of them maintaining underground organizations within Spain. The Spanish police have oxerted so strong a pressure on those undergrounds as practically to nullify such small works as they may attempt. Numerous guerilla bands carry on desultory and largely unco- ordinated operations in the mountains. Some of them are undoubtedly controlled by t he CPIs; many are auxiliaries of other outlawed parties; most are apparently simple banditti. 1. The Party Center Abroad. Late in 1945, tho Madrid police arrested a number of persons * Recent reports alleging existence of a formal PCE training school at Toulouse seem to be without foundation. It is possible that a cer- ? tain'amount of informal cadre training is carried on in he Toulouse area, but present anti-PCE action by French police would scorn to make operation of any sort of a centralized school impossible. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/kff : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET alleged to represent a Central Committee at Toulouse, and confiscated 0 a printing press, 5,000 copies of 1lUndo Obrero, and two radio trans- mitters, but mans of which contact with the Toulouse Center had been maintained. The PCE Center established by the 1947 Congress at Paris consists of a Central Committee, Politburo, Control Commission, and Secretariat, supervising the work of several administrative departments. The principle of co-optation has applied throughout the Party since the Civil War. Whatever political apparatus functions within Spain is quite decentralized, reportedly ranging through the following eight echelons: Region, Province, Local, Comarcal, District, Sector, Radio, and Cell. The Basque and Catdlan CP's maintained separate Politburos, although both were represented on the Central Committee of the PCE until Decem- ber 19480 when a unified Politburo was set up for all three Parties. This new Politburo reportedly consists often members ( as compared to six members previously), headed by Secretary General Dolores Ibarruri ("La Pasionaria") and Political Secretary Vincent? Uribe.. It is most recently reported that part of the Politburo is about to remove to Prague, where Ibarruri a nd Uribe have been for some months. Comorera.may stay on in Paris at the head of some sort of organi- zation there. Whether this presages an eventual complete removal to the Czech capital, it is too early t o judge. French police have lately begun to interfere with Spanish Communist activities. Never- theless, it would seem unlikely that a complete transfer of operations will be effected. France is too convenient a base for the manipulation of such wires as the PCE still has into Spain. In addition to those secretaries named above, Antonio flije also sits on the Politburo as Organization Secretary. Both Liije and Uribe are aided by Politburo Assistant Secretaries. Administration below this top level is something of a mystery. Several reports of dubious merit list such unlikely administrative departments as "JuriSprudenceo and "Commercial Relations." One enumerates no less than 26 separate working sections under the Central Committee. Another cites 18 sub- sections functioning under three major departments, viz., "Coordination SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 88 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET and Information," "Political Affairs," "Military Affairs." From such descriptions, it is possible only to deduce that the PCE maintains a standard administrative set-up, with nections for Agitprop, Organiza- tions, Cadres, Youth, Women, Finances, Labor, etc., to which there have possibly been added such departments as may reasonably be expect- ed tb function in an underground party -- Liaison, Military, Mutual Aid, Security. Many of the departments allegedly working at the Party Center pro- bably exist as paper entities. It is indeed doubtful that such appal- ling bureacracy as has been sot out in these reports would be coun- tenanced by such well-schooled Communists as those who currently lead the PCE. It is significant in this connection that most of t he mem- . bers of the new Politburo have spent some time in Moscow and have extensive training in practical underground work. Ibarruri was a member of t he Comintern's Executive Committee in 1935. Uhatever the had composition of the central organs, it is unlikely that top eadres expend serious energies in matters of such relative levity as "Economic Studies." 2. Organization within Spain. Information concerning organization within Spain is even more nebulous. There is probably some sort of central headquarters for coordination of affairs in the peninsula. A "Central Executive Comr mittee," "Executive Politburo," and a "Central Committee Delegation" have been reported at various limes as fulfilling such a function. A central organ may have worked in or near Madrid in 1947 (see above). Thus, Agustin Zoroa Sanchez, on trial in December 1947, admitted that, as Secretary for the Madrid area of the PCE, he had handled all incom- ing and outgoing communications between peninsular organizations and France; but that he had supervised propaganda work in the Madrid area only. (This latter included the preparation and distribution of Mundo Obrero and guerilla leaflets and the operation of a Party radio station), The State prosecutor charged Zoroa with having been head of a central organization for all of Spain, an accusation which may very well have SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 89 ? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET been true, but which the defendant persistently denied. In any case, he admitted having received several monthly shipments of 60:000 pesetas from France. It is possible that a central organ may still function in Spain. It is also possible that it may operate from same place across the French border, Toulouse being the most likely location. The nearest approach to a genuine territorial organizational breakdown at hand is a report on the Basque CP in the Province of Vizcaya in 1946. Here a Regional Responsible directed the work in three subordinate Provinces, including Vizcqya. The Provincial Respon- sible was assisted by Rosponsiblos for Agitprop, Political Affairs, Organization, Syndical Work, and Finances. Couriers and cut-outs ef- fected liaison between various Party units. Trials of other Communists have revealed the following details of organization at lower levels: Niceto Carcarmo Gonzales admitted having been Propaganda Secretary for an (unstinted) organization. As such, he supervised the work of five "groups." A mimeograph machine was found in his possession at time of arrest. He received a regular.salary of 1,900 pesetas per month from the "organization." ? Francisco Lepez Garcia, as Secretary for Propaganda, directed fifteen "groups." Others directed one or two "groups" or acted as liaison agents. The'above were all under the direction of Antonio Villasenor Gallego, who was Secretary General of (appdrently) a Radio consist- ing of fourteen cells of five members each. Luis Ferranes ( or Fernandez) Carrera was "Number Three" (i.e., Responsible for Propaganda) fot either a Radio or a Sector. He was in contact with various Radios. Antonio Ivias Peredas was "Number Two" (Organization? Political Affairs?) of "Sector II." ? Eusebio Cabanillas Alfaro (?) was sent to Spain from Franco on instruction from the "Organization in Madrid." Jesus'Yonzon Neparas, Governor of Alicante and Marcia during the Civil War, fled to France via Oran (the toute taken by many of those tried). Was made a member of the CC/PCE. Charged with having pre- ' waded Zoroa as head of the apparatus in Spain and with having sent the latter to take over in Madrid. Dix-lied that the central organiza- tion at Paris directed work within Spain, claiming that it was responsible for affairs in France only. 'Claimed that an "entirely separate commission" functioned in Spain. Others were charged with having transported arms from across the French frontier. Raquel Pelayo, for example, entered Spain clandes.L tinely in 1944 and was sheltered by a certain Conchita in Barcelona. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 90 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRE'l Conchita.led her and three (?) other women to a place in t he Pyrenees, where they picked up aims, which they carried to Conchitals house for safekeeping. 3. Other Party Oromizations Abroad. In addition to the Paris center and the local organizations in Spain, Communist exiles set up their own organizations in many other countries, chief centers being the USSR, Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina. Some Spanish Communist refugees stayed on in the USSR. "Free Spain" radio broadcasts on a variable frequency around 11,620 kilo- cycles from some place near Moscow. Most of the leading Party cadres4 however, have left the USSR for France. In Mexico members of the Basque CP and of the PCE set up local branches. These work closely with CP Mexico, but receive direction from Paris, with which they are in regular communication.* Principal front for Spanish Commurists in Mexico is the CP Mexico-sponsored FOAM (Federation of Organizations for Aid to the Spanish Republic). Leaders of the Basque CP and the PCE serve in executive capacities in the FOARE. Manuel Delicado reportedly supervises the work of Spanish Com- munists in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, making frequent trips around this circuit as newspaper correspondent for Ce Soir and Humanite. He receives regular contributions from CP Argentina for the financial support of the groups in the three countries. Spanish Communists in Uruguay work chiefly within such fronts as the Casa de Espaiia and the JHUPRE (Spanish Junta of Uruguay for Republican Spain).** The Argen- tine branch of the PCE which has only about 100 members publishes a newspaper which has a reported circulation of about 1,500. Spanish Communists in Argentina utilize a number of fronts for their activities. * Intercepted letters have been addressed to the Politburo of the PCE at Paris by the "Information Bureau of the PCE," Mexico City. ** Until this year, Spanish Communists in Uruguay could belong to CP UrUctlay. In February the CPU decided to cease issuing membership cards to the Spaniards because the latter had occupied themselves solely with collecting money for their own groups. They may continue to attend CPU meetings, however. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/9?1_,CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO SECRETARIAT (a Triad MILITARY COMMITTEE Treasury ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS Radio Library Agit-prop Technical Maritime BEIRAS PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 1RUPPER IBATEJO ALGARVE DOURO REGIIONAL ORIGANIZATIIONS 11R" Hyll "BA" "To" 'BALI' (Coimbra (Upper Bi (Lower (Upper (Alent* a Beira Lower Beira) Alentejo) Alentejo) East) Litoral) "Yr SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS "TO-C" (Upper Alentejo, Central) "10-0" (Upper Alentejo, West) "TO-L" (Upper Alentejo, East) I I 1 I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS I1I I 1 2 4 L9CAL. ORGANIZATIONS 2 3 4 CELLS 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET V, CP PORTUGAL UNDERGROUND CP Portugal (PCP) has been officially illegal since 1935. It has been suppressed since 1926. For all practical purposes destroyed dur- ing the extreme repression practised by the Salazar regime in its first fel/ years, the Party was not able to reorganize until 1941. Two years later, the "First Illegal Congress" elected a Central Committee. In 1943, also, the National Movement for Anti-Fascist Unity (MUNAF) was established under PCP domination. It was soon outlawed. In 1945 the Movement of Democratic Unity (BUD), a formation of liberal opposition, was set up. The PCP soon gained control over it. The MUD was not denounced by the Government until April 1948, although the police closed its Lisbon headquarters in February 1947. Meanwhile, the PCP underground spread out and strengthened its organization. In 1945 the police again clamped down on the Party, and during the succeeding years destroyed. large segments of it. The PCP does not constitute a significant threat to the Salazar Government, and is a relatively insignificant Party. Nevertheless, certain aspect:. of underground organization are better illustrated from the activity of the PCP than from any other Party currently underground. I. Organization. (See Chart, "General Organiszatien of the PCP") Little; is knowil-abOUt the 16-ding (national) 'organS.of the 'PCP, So far as they are known they seem to fit into the -standard pattern. Location of Party headquarters is not knowr4-it undeUbtedly moVOS around from one place to another to escape the police. Loading organs are the following: -(1)- -Secretariat: a Triad ConSisting'Of Alvaro'Barreirinhas Cunhalrecently arrested), Francisco Miguel Duarte,,ancl Manuel Guedes.- (2) Politburo: 6 members, elected at the "Second Illegal Congress" September 1946. (3) Central Committee: 9 members known. In thisj each of the Regional or Provincial.Cohatteos is represented by one Member, who controls work in his area. Other functional organ i which may possibly Operate' under the Secretariat's supervision are the following: SECRET - 92 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 (1) Treasurer (2) Radio - (3) Libraryi (publications?) (4) Technielal council (printing and distribution?) An Agitprop section has quite reasonably and reliably been reported to function on the Regional level, and it is not unlikely that a corresponding section operates on the National level as well. A separate MilitarTCommittee has been described as operating at the top level. It is responsible for the penetration and supervision of Party fractions within the armed services and publishes several mimeographed sheets directed at these (A Voz do Soldado, Sar-enla Official Miliciano for the Army; 0 Lone for the Navy). The following positions have been held in this Committee: (1) Responsible for the Committee to the CC/PCP; also in charge of passwords and identifications; (2) Responsible for fractions in the Navy. (3) Responsible for fractions in military units stationed West of Lisbon. (4) Responsible for fractions in military units stationed East of Lisbon. Jose Soares was reportedly made Responsible for Party maritime work in 1946. .He set up cells for stevedores, lightermen, warehousemen, and unloaders. He directed a "strike commission" and regularly distributed copies of the PCP organs Avante and 0 Militante among his cells. PCP structure throuohthe Provinces is decentralized through the following territorial echelons: Province, Region, Sub-region, Zone, Local, Cell. In some areas, there is apparently no Provincial organi- zation, controlbeino exercised directly by Regional Responsibles sit- ting on the Central Committee. Likewise, the Zone and Regional Sub- committees do not seem to be constant features in all regions, Two further subdivisions have been reported: District Committees between Regional Sub-committees and local committees; and below these, an "Advisory Commission", which seems to be merely an informal grouping of several local committee Responsibles for cooperative action. Party com- mittees at all levels above the cell consist of from 3 to 5 "function- - ariosu (i.e., paid functionaries), one of whom is the Responsible, the others controlling one or more subordinate units. It appears that SECRET Approved For Release 2001f39/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SEC-RE T Responsibles for organizations on each level occupy seats on the next higher committee. An account of ottanization and activities of units under the Pro- vincial Committee for the Beiras may clarify the picture as shown on the chart. The Provincial Committee was directed by J. P. Jorge (Central Com- mittee and Politburo member). The Provincial Committee administered two Regions, "Y" (Coimbra and the Beira Litoral) and "R" (Upper Beira and Lower Beira). Region "Y" was directed by Agostinho da Conceicac Saboga. It comprised at least two local committees,"Yl" (Coimbra) and wf2" (Figueira da Foz). The local Committee for Coimbra was set up at one time by V. A. de Andrade, Dr. A. R. de Cunha, and J. R. de Freitas, working under Sabogals orders. As an initial step in its organization, Saboga met Andrade secretly in the outskirts of Coimbra, giving the latter the following assignments: (1) To control PCP organization in the offices of Posts and .Telegtaph, in the shops of Auto Industrial Lda, and among chauf- feurs. (2) To set up a cell in the printing trade. Cunha, who was Responsible for work among intellectuals, put Andrade in touch with several persons who would take over the actual work of organizing the cells and with "Tom", who would carry on the work of distribution of Party publications to those cells. Later, when Andrade, still acting on Sabogats orders, severed his Party relations to devote himself to work on the MUD District Committee, he turned his cells over to "Tom". The same Jorge, as Central Committee Responsible for the North, supervised PCP work at Oporto as well as Coimbra. He was PCP delegate of the Regional Committee of MUNAF at Oporto; later succeeded by F. S. Martins, who acted as liaison between Jorge and Dr. J. A. D. de Oliveira, Responsible for Party work among intellectuals in Oporto. A safehouse in which Jorge was living in 1945 was raided, yielding Party records and a few arms. Jorge himself escaped arrest, being in the south at the time. Another safehouse was rented by Oliveira on Jorge's instructions. This house was used by one PCP member after his SECRET Approved For Release 2009/89706 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 61A-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 sE2Ltgp esco,pe from prison and was later turned over to a Local Committee of the PCP for its use. i - The connections noted above between the Pc? and MUD and MUNAF recur in many cases. There can be no doubt that these organizations have served as Party auxiliaries. Key posts on all organizational levels are held by individuals who are either admitted Party members or who have technically severed connections with the 'Party. The usual line of control in cases of record, passed through a "Funcionario" sitting on both PCP and MUD (or MUNiLF) committees. Sometimes, a mom- hex' or members of local auxiliary committees have been nominated or appointed to these committees by a rcP functionary, who may thus exer- cise an indirect control over several subordinate auxiliary groups. MUD is organized along lines similar to those of the PCP; is divided between MUD Youth and MUD Adult organizations. It has had (at least in Oporto) Feminine Committees, whose place in the over-all structure is not quite clear. To all intents, the above organizations operate as branches of the PCP, agitating, recruiting for eventual Party membership, raising money, printing and distributing propaganda. Not the least important purpose served by s uch fronts has been their usefulness in shielding Party cadres. In a strike at Barreiro in April 1947 , not a single member of the PCP factory cell was implicated, although the cell had initiated the strike and had given the orders for its termination. Responsibility could be fixed by the police only on non-Communists. Other fronts and auxiliaries, such as the "Gloria Football Club" of Vila Real (an organization which reportedly has never held a sporting event of any kind), the "Circulo de Cinema", and various Party and auxiliary "Aid Committees", have served money-raising, recruiting, and propagandizing needs of the Party. 2, Security, In September 1946, the Secretariat complained that the Party had suffered heavily from failure of individual members to practise ele- mentary rules of security. The directive circulated recited several SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 95 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECREI cases in which arrested members had given away organizational details by which the police were enabled to break up large sections of the Party structure. The Secretariat recognized its responsibility for having failed to put into effect adequate security measures and criticized many middle and lower cadre-men for corresponding errors. These may be reduced to the following: (1) Permitting unnecessary traffic into safehouses and per..:. milting their locations to be too generally known among members. (2) Storing documents in residences of members; failing to make provision for quick destruction of records. (3) Using "a means of transportation (-the boat between the Praco do Commercio in Lisbon, and.Barreirolexpressly forbidden and condemned by the Secretariat". (4) Using a "condemned" and too "elementary code describing the site of a meeting". (5) Ignoring a warning signal that all was not secure in a house entered a member engaged in illegal work -- such contact itself being especially prohibited. (6) Failing to take 'recommended precautions in changing from one safehouse to another. (7) Failure on the part of a Responsible to give adequate' warning to other members of his organization when one of them had been arrested. (8) Giving, and inducing others te give, information concern- ing Party work to the police upon arrest. (This criticism was levelled against no less a person than a Candidate member of the Central Committee). (9) Giving information to a police agent who had been planted in the prisoner's cell. Some additional information is available on safehouses and on techniques employed for meetings. Meetings. The following instructions were given in a PCP document seized in the summer of 1947: (1)* All leaders must be very careful about meetings with other members. (2) For every meeting the place and time must be previously thought out; all who are to"attend should have advance knowledge of it and not make others wait. (3) The places for meetings should be secure, so that members can discuss all problems pertaining to the organization without having to worry about self-protection. ' (4) The place must be known only to those attending, even after the meeting has taken place. (5) It must never be communicated to ankone, not even to mem- bers in whom we have the greatest confidence. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 96 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R00320010000173 SECRET Meetings between individuals are prefaced by an exchange of identification tokens (most commonly, simply a card or piece of paper torn into two matching pieces, each scrap being given by the supervis- ing functionary, who is the only one knowing both persons) and letters of introduction certifying one to be a "person of confidence." Apparently, rather large meetings -- of whole committees and ob- servers, e.g., -- are held with regularity, the members depending rather overmuch on a strict observance of pseudonyms. For example, so important a functionary as Jorge once visited the home of the Responsi- ble for the Faro District Committee of the MUD Adult to reprimand him in person. There is little questioh, however, that most of the large number of militants so far arrested have been quite in the dark con- cerning the identities of their associates and superiors, knowing each other only by party names. Safehouses. Important meetings take place in safehouses, of which the PCP has had a large number, both for this purpose, as well as for housing "funcionarios" in hiding and for the safeguarding of necessary records. Probably most of these houses are rented through intermediar- ics -- sympathizers, secret members, friends and relatives, and adherents of auxiliary groups. Such a house, at Praia de Granja (7 km. south of Vila Nova) was rented for a monthls time by an intermediary employed by Jorge, Politburo member responsible for the area north of Lisbon. This house, which has not been further described, was used by the Central Committee for a Week's meeting in which 16 persons participated. A two and one-half weeks' course in organization, agitation, and strike preparation was given at a second safehouse near Lisbon. To preserve the secrecy of t he location of the house, the following extra- ordinary precautions were taken: the car in which the students (cadre in PCP maritime work) were taken to the house followed a devious route, driving blackout as soon as the open country had been reached. The "funcionario" conducting the group instructed the members to close their eyes during the trip, keeping close watch on them the while. Even after leaving the car to walk the remaining distance to the house, the SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 97 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET students wore supposed to keep their eyes closed, joining.bands-to keep from stumbling. 3. Lilama Publications. The per and its auidIiaries have published the fol- lowing: Avante: Official Party organ. Small, thin paper; minute type- set which is quite legible. General propaganda. O Eilitante: Internal orgqnizational bulletin. O Campones: MUNAF peasants' publication. Ressur-imento: ruva periodical. Patria Livre: A now mimeographed publication intended for personnel of the armed forces. First issue, August 1948. Alleged- ly put out by the Military Committee of the PCP. O Expresso: Intended for railroad workers. Libertacao Nacional: Mimeographed sheet put out at Oporto by the PCP organization in the North. UNIR: A pamphlet. No material is at hand to illustrate techniques of printing such editions. No less that 10 central printing establishments have been discovered and confiscated by the police since 1941, but no descrip- tions of their physical setup or methods are available. It is likely that relatively small editions of such regularly published papers as Avant? and 0 Militante arc printed at several different locations. A student at Coimbra University, resident in Oporto, was arrested for buying mimeograph paper in "large quantities" in Coimbra and transporting it to Oporto, where Libertacao Nacional and UNIR were published. A sedond Coimbra student, member of the District Committee of the MUD, also had a mimeograph machine from which ho used to run off MUD Youth circulars. He refused to say where he got the machine or other supplies. Occasional pamphlets and flyers were also printed by a PCP member on the mimeograph machine of the import-export firm which employed him. Distribution. Central distribution of PCP literature is effected through the regular Party machine, from a Responsible to his subordin- ates,, on down the line. Couriers, intermediaries, and storage places S E C R E T Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 98 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET are standard fixtures in the distribution system. Local distribution to inaviluals is managed by cell Responsibles and sympathizers, especially those having establishments (e.g., grocery stores, baker- ies) in which secure storage is available and local traffic not likely to arouse police suspicion. The case of da Luz Taqueliu will serve to illustrate the observance of security measures in the matter of distribution. Taqueliu, (member of the Regional Committee #1 under the Provincial Committee for the Algarve), was instructed by "'Ricardo" to set up a distributing apparatus at Lagos, where he was Responsible for the Regional Sub-committee. Through an identification token given him by "Ricardo", Taqueliu contacted one Ribeiro to take up the actual work. Ribeiro used the token to establish contact with the portion from whom he was to receive the literature to be distributed. Pre- sumably, he also arranged for people to distribute the material to cells and other auxiliary groups around Lagos. The PCP also has done its share of street-and-wall writing. In Lagos, the same Taqueliu prepared black paint from coal for walls, and white paint from lime for streets. He and the three members of the Local Committee proceeded to paint slogans around the town, possibly employing stencils, such as were commonly used for the purpose. A certain amount of literature is imported from abroad, notably from Brazil. Brazilian and Portuguese ships with Communist crew ITI2M..- bers have brought in SOMD publications, probably those of CP Brazil. Literature from Spain and France comes by way of Morocco and Tangier, carried by small boats plying between Portuguese and North African ports. 4. Communications Abroad. In addition to occasional contacts that maybe established by Communist crew members, as described above, the PCP is believed to hold fairly regular communications with CP Spain. Refugees from both sides of the frontier are harbored by the co-operating CPIs. Border- crossing stations have been operated at several points: Volga Mea, SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 99 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 SECRET Casas de Monforte, and Cambeda. These three "support points" were at one time controlled by Fernando de Oliveira, at Chaves. J. P. Jorge made several trips to Chaves to meet Spanish refugees, many of whom stayed in Portugal only long enough to make arrangements to join Spanish ruerrilla units. Other "support points" are believed to have operated near Bustelo and Sqmadarcos, in Spain. Safe-conducts, issued by various Spanish authorities for travel- lers to the frontier and elsewhere, have been returned to PCE units for use and re-use by other refugee comrades. Cyphered letters to persons abroad have been discovered among PCP and PCE documents seized at the frontier by police. Small boats sometimes carry Portuguese and Spanish Communists between peninsular ports and Morocco and Tangier. S'ECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3 - 100 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP83-00415 00100001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :?CIA-RDP83-00415R003200100001-3