Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 31, 2003
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 15, 1950
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9.pdf12.74 MB
NTRY Albania CT PA..)132.123E9-7--DiAllaanim 25X1 . 1 : Agpr~gilAqieatdrOgi02/19. ?,CIARDP83100415R00610020600-2,..9,: , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT ANUIRED DATEAOP 11,TFo: :47o.;PlwZrez. - 71' 25X" DATE DISTR. 15 Septembe-r'1950 NO. OF PAGES 1 ' NO. OF ENCLS.3. 25)(1'. (LISTED BELOW) . sf,4 rOj SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1 25X1 REPORT NO. eclass/Release Instructions On File* Declassification/Release Instructions on File THIS 'oci'6:iiiitii*CoNTAITIS'INZONMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THUU,NITED sims -WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 AND 32.A5 AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION pr ITS CONTENTS, IN 'ANY .MANNER 'TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO. iiiii.TED.Arg LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION *Documentary 25X1 25X1 25X1 We are forwarding you for your retention the attached cop Y of A Survey of Alban, compiled by the 17th CIC Detatchment, Trust. 25X ? WCOld appreciate your Comments and evaluation of the above-mentione survey. 25X1 25X1 25X1 CLASSIFICATION NAVY AIR NSRB TVIS . .DONOTEit.R RETURN TO ARM IMMEDIATELY SECRET DISTRIBUTION ' 33/a ed/Dikailise'7:2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 oved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415RQQ6100200002-9 17m CIC DETACHMENT TRUST Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET TAW Cl' COVVI'S PAM I HISTORY, SOCICLOGY AND GEOGRAPHY - 1. Early History 2. Sociological Survey 3. Geoaaphy PAM II PAGE 4. Political 1447 5. How the Community Achieved Hegemony in ALBANIA 17'4.3 6, The Yuzoslav Allian.:e 3.3:2 T. The Conspirac, of General EON IOU 2er.24 S. Russian Interest 24-25 PAM III GOVERNMENT 5. Structure of the Peoples Republic of ALBANIA 25..28 10. Statute of the Albanian Workeral Py 213-32 PAPS IT IIPEELOE, RUM AND ifORK" 11. The Compunist Conception of the lour Preedons 1.2. Suppression of Religion in ALBANIA 3;:, 13. Albanian Political Parties in Zx.110 39..13 PART V ALBANIAN MILITARY SITUATION ? 14. Nature]. Defenses Section A. Defense Possibilities Wk. Section B. Albaaian Natural Defense and Possible Invasion '350 Routes Section C. The Coastline of ALBANIA. 50-52 Section D. Military Defense of ALBANIA Section 3. Soviet Military Mission *-54 Section P. Ground Parcels 54-55 Section G, Rates c Pay and Rations of Albanian Arsw personnel 5-56 Section H. Order of Battle 5617 Section I. Organisation of Armed Poroes 1!- Section J. Technical Equipment 1-63 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :Slete8FROE1T006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 TA! 07 CORTIXTS ( contd) Section B. Section L ? Section 14. Section i. Section 0. Section P ? PART TI SECRET Maw 8.-td Cor.stal Defenses Marino Infantry and Ocastal Defense Coastal FortificAtions Air Force General Mobilisation for Pre-Military Training Albanian Army Ins/pile of Ronk, and Uniforms ALBLE'ILIT MEOW 15. Mineral Wealth Section A. The Basin of LieCT0--Dta11, Section B. Basin of Law Section 0. Tranc.portation, Storage and 013. Research Section D. Minos Mines. of Zuke. aad 2. Chromium Minos 3. B it11131311 Mines 4. LOU Area Section!. Bydroalectric Power Section 7. Miscellaneous Industries 1. lima 2. :? .P.111F.1.1 b? 1.012112 T. It. Jelling industry Trans,?ortation and Traffic 1. Maritime Traffic a. Railroad Comsamice.tions 3. 10?411bWcY Communications 4E, 44vallacts 5. P rincinal Bridges which were rebuilt. between 3.9411 end 1546 Section I. ACriculture Section 3. Ports Section G. Section IL 1. 2. 3. Other Parts Section I. General Economic Is:demotion Section L. teed Ration quotas Approved For Release 2004/02/19 tbed8R0e1t006100200002-9 pao ro..i. U) 70.7 65-Ss 6s-70 7c)74 74-lb 05 ts6.4q 117 117-08 a 66 8545 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET TIL Z 03' OONTZSTS ( contd) PAN TX! CONCLUSION 4.11banian Version of lorsign Intelligence Activities vithiii ALBANIA Miscellaneous Information Possibilities of Revolt ANN= - A ALBANIAN Military Information obtained from an Albanian Refuges. idDI0 report dated 7 August 1950, Reference No. M-.905 ORATED I Possible Invasion Routes Into .ALBANIA ? Exhibit I Breakdown of Albanian and. Soviet Armed. Porces in ALBANIA Exhibit II Breakdown of Soviet Military Mission anti Albanian Wax Ministry Exhibit III Breckdown of Soviet Military Mission and Albanian National Defense Division Exhibit IT Breakdown of Soviet Military Mission a.nd Albanian ITaval Headquarters in Alma, Exhibit V Albanian Road and Rau System Exhibit T1 Ports of Vigo* and. 2aggg2 Exhibit VII Relief Map of ALBANIA and Division of the Territorial Surface Exhibit VIII Climate Exhibit IX Hydrography Exhibit X Geoloa Exaibit XI Agriculture and. Torests Exhibit XII Density of Pcr:4u1ation Exhibit XIII Po?ulation Statistics of 19111 Approved For Release 200462/E :ei4;12 1;7, Page No. iii 81100415R006100200002-9 92-100 100-101 101-103 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? SECRET .z20,1A /atiltles Is bens le Par. V. TN 90 - 219 Mai 90 October tan. which primula that the Me- aleeira of the mature, Boomed Si even the eels. bow of Collator latMligfroce incymatloa, to WINS Mat!mod in Cauniar lotsClmmo? Re- ports, or to other penes* not noimaily eatttled te arch informatics may In made only whim bkarlY IgtbMild by tn. DIrscto of latibutiena? aistral Staff. Utited ttates Army or higher oothorlfy. Weatherly:6d disclosure it such lifer- notigg va ho o...id.r,da yMtstisit of AR Soo4. In presenting the following material on ALBArIA, three principal objectives were kept in mind; (1) to give the reader a simple and concise account of the historical background; (2) to present a cross- sectional analysis of the Communist Party governmental pattern; and (3) to submit added and timely information to those groups primarily interested in this field. In various instances, extracts were made from filed reports since this information appeared beet suited to illustrate particular points throughout the survey. Although far from presenting a comprehensive summation of the subject, the practical utility of this report it.. in the coverage of the most important aspects of modern, ALUM, An effort has been made to demonstrate the developMent of =ANIL by the USSR for political and military reasons. Inasmuch as the Soviet foreign policy has incorporated ALBANIA for the ultimate purpose of providing the USSR with an outlet to the Mediterranean, it is reason- able to assume that eventually Yugoslav Macedonia will have to be sacri- ficed to realize this undertaking. In view of the intornational sit- uation today, and of the aggressive attitude assumed by the UN., it may be some time before this Russian ambition in the Balkans can achieve fruition. The possibility that YUGOSLAV/A will do an about face and return to the Comirform fold cannot be discounted. ALBAN/Ms importance stems from the geographical factor rather than any national accomplishments or contributions. Ru strategic imp- ortance weighs heavily in the balance of power in the Ueditarransan and the Near Best. Per collateral reading Which coincides in part with this reports it is recommended that the 17th CIO Detachment TEUST:3i-Weekly Intell. igence Summarg, 1-17 Pub 50. page 5, SaceStraik, be consulted. Approved For Release 200g2k9dhlyia-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET History, Sociology and Gaogrdplly 1. Surly Histori STRLZO, the Roman historian, mentioned that the Albanians as a people settled in the trans-Caucasus flatland in the era before Christ. The Romano had established contact with these people during the century preceLng the birth of Christ. The Albanians, meanwhile, had obtained. possession of the fertile valley of the Cyrus niver (at present known as the Kura, in Amertaijan). By means of a militant agreement concluded with the Albaniene, the Boman. used. Albanian con- tingents during their were against MiTHR/DOUS, King of POMO. According to STRABO, at that time the Albanians were al- ready an important ethnic group, since they were able to form an army of approximately 80,000 men. An excellent cavalry formed the strongest component of this army. The people lived dispersed throughout the Cyrus River Valley, and also occupied territory in sections of the mountains north of the river. Various tribes had. a similar language. but there were considerable differences in dialects. These tribes were ruled by chieftane whom 8TRABO called ',kings", however, it is difficult to empire this term with its contemporary meaning. The Albanians were heathens, like the nomadic peoples who invaded their territory, and they differed from these nomads by race rather than language. Mb historic documents remain from that time, therefore, it cannot be determine& at exactly what period Albanian de- fense of taipir.on country became possible. /t is certain, however, that pressure from the souiranreast became so strong that further defense of their territory could not be carried on by the Albanians. In conjunction with other racial groups from the last, the Albanians began to migrate toward the Mediterranean area. By one route they travelled across Asia Minor (0apadocia. Galatea, etc.) and the San of Marmara, reaching Tracia (Thrace), south of the Rhodope Mountains: and by another route the Albanians crossed the Aegean Islands and reecho. ed luboea, Attica, and. Bootie. Vntil this day, strong Albanian racial characteristics are perfectly preserved in the irlande which are now part of MEM However, the northern wing of this migration, not hay- ing found conditions suitable in Tracia, first turned to the north to- ward. Macedonia where part of this original group has remained to the present time. The remainder of the group gradually spread until later it had reached the coasts of the Ionic and Adriatic Seas. The unsuit- able conditions pointed out above concerned tbe inadertibility of these people in cultural and. social fields rather than in any dislike of the climate or environment. Approved For Release 2004/02/15 &CIDRE0T5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBAITIA Page 2 In their new eountrd, the Albanians were mixed with other racial groups and elements wMbh had attached themselves to the main body of AThe.niaas tho process of mtgraUea, either by mesas of protec.V.7e arrcm&ements or siAal contaC.4 Upon their ar- rival in what I now knovn as ALPAITIA. the Albanians found PeiaBgie remnants of a euper..lor celture and civilization, Which influenced their own evolution consitterably.,, If...ether ox. net these Pelasgic peoples who ha& preceded the Albanian ia their migration to the Mediterranean had orig:nelly belonged to the some racial groups is a problem which has never been solved. While the ancient history of the Albanians cannot be estab- lished, with certainty, ethnographers believe that they were part of the large Indo-European group which had migrated from ASIA arriving in Tracia and then Bottling during the following centuries in the impenetrable gorges of contecrposaL7ALBANIA. In an ethnic sense, ALMYLL occup!es nearly all of the territory surrounded by the bor- ders of the country ane. also the areas which extend into the littoral of erne. Gera (Moatenegro) (Rumija Mountain, Point 1593, TIMSLAMIL, 1:250,000, Sheet T-4. 090933)9 and from there across the Ibex River into the &andjak Region near lievi Pasar (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-31, 810331), then to tho flatland R-kossovo Ptlje, well to the other side of krIstina (YUGOSLLVIA, 1:250.000, Sheet T-58, 858273). The ethnic border then fellow the Vardar. River, grazing Skoplje (7UGOSIATLL, 1250,000. &est T-4S, 873903) until it reaches Iltov Veles ( UGOreAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet T-48, 300870). from where it turns to the southwest toward Strnga (C-C, 18250,000, Sheet 0-1, 203C18) on the northern shore of Lake Ohrid. The ethnic border then cress the political boundary of omon and AntaLA., following a line between Str.ya, Grammes Mountain (Paint 2192, ME= 1:250,000, Sheet G. 4, 21271D, 'Erie vicinity of 4eninrt(GRE2CE, 1:250,000, Sheet 0.-4, 202650), and the Greek coast at PEtrga (map not available). Albanians living in the Albanian-Greek territory between Ognokastre (onna, 1:250,000. Sheet 0-4, 146701), and Par are mixed with Greek ethnic stook. Actually, it cannot be stated with certainty that these are ethnic Greeks, but the cultural contacts these people have had during the last ten centuries with purely Greek elements have left their mark, since there is a great resemblance to the Hellenic civilization. The Orthodox religion has also exercised a profound influence, while the people in SOM8 of the valleys have aisumed the Greek language as their own. Southern Albanians also live in contact with ethnic groups of Muco-llahsn (Roumanians) residing in the Pindue Mountains of angle while there are ten of these ethnic groups living within the borders of ALBAITLL itself. Approved For Release 2004/0Stee-WE3110415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of asAnk cnonvo pegs 3 The Albanien lazzuno of i:oday preserves some phonetic forms belonging to theeo peoples who had come from Trade. This shows te conne3tion with the ancient inhibitante Of Traci* while enroute during the migration toward the Adriatic-. The BmvIn Zrapire had vlb4ugated ALBLYIA, but had never Sue- ceeded in assimilulne hor population. The conquered Albanian territory was organteally detached from the rest of the Boman !Sp- ire. /t is a very significant fact that the Albanians were the Only barbarous people along the Mediterranean coastline who had the strength to resist national and cultural consolidation by the BOaant. Albanians lived in the mountains and Boman civilization *Dula penetrate only with the utmost difficulty, since it followed 411 the roads. Boman culture coated in influence where the roads ended. Therefore, the Albanians remained in their priiitive 'state ins to the lack of roads. In the maiS. oMan culture was established along a narrow coastal strip and along the valleys of the lain Ain't*. Since the Albanians had chosen mountainous areas in ihroh to live (possibly due to a healthier climate) their Main :Within obracteristics remained intact. tt is known that the /bMina Select. eft the easiest routes of penetration for their politica int &am, ercial activities. These routes did not cross 'broken giOna, as a rule, except in cases where there were no better piseagia441111110. Therefore, the Albanians had practically no relation* With the 30mans. Bmman culture, which had left indestructible MonuMenti in the form of public works in some valley areas of Argml never succeeded in impressing its meet on the AlbanieniPitit, language, and traditions. Due to this zealous nurturaef tftditien, the Albanians have remained somewhat primitive gilled the Aiyi Of the Romans. Judging from the nature and character of these people, it requires but elementary deduction to discover that they bail' not been very progressive in advancing toward what t4 iialeideaCiUmeeit of civilization. Undoubtedly there has been 's proaaroriiko" Innon, but it has been quite independent, tithing its partial:if I? thin this molecular cell of universal culture, and biol.& o? ien"Y ratio influence. h 1, In approximately the year 395, which masjthe yea- S ision of the Boman Mmpire into the Oriental and Obatetar ALBANIA was assigned to the Oriental iplre SwiWi'' ation took place on paper and did not rap sea' itiMiiirre616, Rite* AZBAITIA at that time was nothing mora than a feria if" I gU, Praia domains which were more or less tribult - 0 swigs which were then being formed in ot r peal-art in ITALY. Approved For Release 2004/P/1: cA110;33-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBLIT/A (c07,420 Page f This situation was a result of the fact that both the Aalkn and *Intern states aspired to the possession of the Albanian coastline and the Straits of Otranto, either to establish protection for their . camerae or to penetrate further into the Mediterranean. The ftret large-scale barbarian invasions of AL2ANIA took place in the 5th cent- ury, wheh the Goths invaded the country in 493. Believer, in 535 the Goths were driven out 17 JITSTINIAEUS. Various invaeions of Auatit br Slav tribes took place immediately after their arrival in the BalkVn Peninsula. Turing the latter part of the 7th century there were sev6. oral small Serbian principalities in ALRCIA, slicjects of the Byzantine lapin), but independent to a certain degree. The Byzantines., who con.- trolled but a narrow coastal strip, could only exercise a very limited Influence and their power in the central parts of the country was of a purely fictitious nature. The Albanian coast was ape divided into two arise at that time: the coast or virus in the south. and the sone in the north extending as far as Deka Ketorska (=MATTA, 18250,000, Sheet Y-35, 080930). The 9th century brought an event of great hpleerical importame in regard to ALBA:TA. It was during,thie period OFI,;,trit IPPrO4444A the country was made by any of the talien states, ,2610 1444w4 $4g ginning of commercial traffic between ALBANIA ani tO,APP0444 et,VAN4p and Atemiti. The lopubic of Amalfi established a spetX,deeein at while the *notion Beriolic established a hold overakeder,444 (117008101A, 1250,000, Sheet Y-46. 423$94). The Norpans, Obe_hV COM- selidatod the southern part of the ;Wien Peninoic ender thftr *404 also intervened as a consequence of family ties which connected t4Pm with the Japeror of the Byzantine Tmpire, Vic:heel VQ4. In WA& was succeeded by Alexis O0MZ3N0S, who Came to the 4440tanee Of I* Republic of Venice and who was euccelefe In eliatlAWAS Ow...SOW" ? from ALUM. Although the Norman attempt to settle ed, it signified the beginning of their hegemony through the estab1i41. ment Of the Kingdom of Naples. 4..-? ? 4 : Along the coast, the influence of the yeheIta4 $01404; wwi !PP, . arent. since the Venotiens wanted to safeguard their sea routes, 7The . Albanians who were settled along *4e coes.t came into contact with W77. Um/ institutions which the Venetian, hai imposed won theee4e0ple4 but the greater portion of the population continmei to live in mo.mto defending themselves from invasion.; by people in the lowlands derived some benefit frOP, ern world, but continued to remain. spite immune eee. The Venetian Reinb110 diintAict the north, Using the Bepehlioe.; Y-35, 035957) which was the and which remained in oPntra4*:14 and oOltural exchanges., ?snipe, kTAIL and Una during,tbk ? influence was limited to the ,1 Approved For Release 2004/02/11 6R00610020060.4!'=' ? ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SEC Ft ET A Survey of Anal.TA coet'd.) Pace 8 Imring the Igth Centnry, the lipoleonic Impotial Invasion occurred in ALBAMA, Enwevnr," this expedition was unsuccoseful, as were a number of ?41v0.tii w1.t1lit the Albanian forces of the Turkish Uwe% These revolts were ormiced 17 tribal chieftains who'were desirous of expanding porsonha power. The most important of tease insurrections was that lei by,Ali ?AS HE TEPELZDA, Lord of ;Mena. , After the and of the Napoleonic Sits, during which the Turkish Government remained extramtly alet%, Mabee& n decided that once and for always, the rebelling generals of the Albanian forces would be forced into suhmiision. 10 managed to win the support of the Christians and:Greeks, than began a long sand bitter campaign which terminated ia 1S2O, when Ali PUNS T1P1LEIL was killed at Janina. , Although Ali PURI cannot be Mowed to SildriltANIG in re. gard to military and glory and noble ii** ht is undoubtedly ono of the most remarkable personalities in Albanian history. Atter his death, many Albanians migrated int, DUNCE and, valiantly fought ag. ain't the Turks baring the Greek insurrections in 1821 and 1817. The movsoent for the liberation of the Moll nations ralich. composed the !amain pert of the Ottoimi impirs had started under the leadership of MIS814, which are**, it that tine claimed to be the 'Protector of the Slav Nations of the Talkanss and placed the Albanians in a veryprecdrious polition. This was duo to the fact that the Albanian population was made up of Moslem, Catholic, artd Orthodox elommats. lerthernors, the convenient location of =ANIL excited the inperialistic aims of the small lialkan states seeking en outlet to the Adriatic, an& simultaneously expanding their tones of influence. The Albanian struggle elver' had. an ant 1416v abaft*" eT, litnco Slavin represented an eternal menaeo. This is the Amin moo why the Albanians, who had fought betbioally against the Turks it elMnber if insurrections and revolt* fought under the Turkish flag against the Passion armies in the Cilmain Mir. 'Later they lepght against the united Russian and 1u1gatian fortes. In MTN Prank NU WIC Prince of the Mitata 'Vibe, who had been defeated a year previouily by the Tema against whom he had led an armed retolt, refused all effete by Widen agents and fought with his fellowers (all Catholic*) in the teak* of the turkikhArmy, both at pleven end at Sipka Pass. Pacts like these pteeent 091dmoce that tfio national spirit of AlaCIA has telienetreted staititiens of vitality elute unity. SW: bee tebognisell the. !Otte tavardhor own interests independent of religion Whenever suCh-dualita was allowed b7' prevailing conditions, eine* the religion* factor had, as it still, has, a great importance in all of the lalkate. Approved For Release 2004/0AM 0 i1f5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (contd.) Page 6 ? A source of this report is not of the same opinion. He claims 'with some certainty, sinco he has lived with these people and knows them well, that the idea of nationalism has been fully reserved, although restricted, during the course of the country's political strife, to areas where invaders never were able to maintain themselves for long periods of time. However, the particularist of individual groups is still very much alive, A combined survey of the medieval and modern-history of ALBANIA reveals that utile the country vas always divided by conditions imposed from abroad, it was also divided by disagreements between.individmal chieftans. In spite of the factors, LIZ= has always been extremely jealous of her independence. The survey also reveals that requests. far assistance addressed to the small states of the Italian Peninsula were always favorably received, particularly in Naples and Venice. In 1230, ALBAYLL wi. conquered by the Bulgarian Omar, /van ...alien II, 'who extended the Bulgarian Empire to the coast of the Adriatic. But this invasion was of very short duration. The Bulgarians were forced to withdraw because of an alliance formed between the Serbians. 311Yeautines. Hungarians, and Tatars. With the departure of tho Bulgarians there foll- owed a short period of Serbian domination. But this too, we. short since the AMU Dynasty in expanding its power, invaded Luau daring the year* between 1272 and 1279. In 1279 all of Aim1Tt4 was firmly held by the Iingdom of the Two Sicilia,. The Serbians fought for years against the ANJOU without achieving any success. Venice, however, succeeded in re- covering the city cf Mauler. Turing the latter part of the 14th Century, AZBALIA was divithS4 into a large nunber of miner feudal domains. Those waged permanent were against one another and they would not be reconciled, even by the ToOkier menace, which was growing increasingly imminent. Someterritoried, like the city of Jenina, became subjects of the Ottoman 3mp1re of their ova accord. NeWiii-i'Venice as anxious to save its territorial possessions in ALIkink. George OLSTRIOTA, better known as nSaNTME4Mall, bacons the natio*. al hero of ALBANIA when he succeeded in uniting hie campatrioti in the common war against the Turkish invader and defeating the Turks on several occasions. In 1443, exploiting the victory Of :antug soUTus over the Turkish Army in the vicinity of Ill (=Osumi. 1i250.000. sheet T-39. 923340), sumps= hadhimeelr nominated Govownewajuldg (IUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46,133662). In the spring of 1444U-formed the 'League of the Albanian Peoples* at id*, which was supported by the principal ohieftans and the Venetiane Werner' of /1014 phkeder. and Durres. SLOBBIBBE then began a series of brilliant?asagatigos against the Turks. STINDIRUG first defeated grosar avoriar. sh Throes on 29 June 1444. The fighting than ceased for a pori o it to.,'years when .1-4, it was resumed in VAT, ant lasted 'Gatti 1453. 4:!: reOblve4 a Appratild PUtakillSatiNVOZII/02009.48110:11WPM-IlegliedleaddpC0111108t-Iraples. !MORE T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBAith (cont,d) Page 9 After the political events of 1878, ALBA= demonstrated other proofs of an admirable national conscience. The Berlin Treaty (June WS), in appeasing Russian denands,_assigned the Albanian torritorios of Vranja (71100SLOLit, 1250,000, Sheet T.39, 3175) and eursumlija (11,00SLUIA, 1:250,000, Shoot Y-38, 612325) to PIM: Bar (11100SIAVIi. 1:250,000, Sheet r-46. 981932) and the districts TPiav (11MOSLAVIA, 1:2,0,000, Shoot r-37), Trepca (TooSIAVIA, 1:290,000, Sheet T-36, 714296) and Ouminje (YUGOSISVIA, 1;250.000, Shoot T-37, 749274) were assigned to CESA GORL (1:orTzmao), while a part of the Moira* sons given to mum The ',Albanian 'Aegean vas formed in protest against this division of Albanian territory. This organization vas both political and military in nature. The "Leagues decided to resist the occupation of these territories with aras,aad was supported by Albanians of all throe religious areal who were without any differences On this occasion. The Turks, recognising the Treaty, withdrew their forces, then these were immediately replaced by forces of the *league' and who were ready to resist occupation of these aroas.Bavever, the powers which had signed the Berlin Treaty, led. by GMT ammirs, were anxious to conclude the political contest with RUSSIA, therefore, they sent an ultimatum to the Turkish Court. In response, the Turks sent a force of 30,000 men, led by Dervish PASHA, against the Luaus% gents. The forces of the "League' wore defeated aad its leaders kill- ed or exiled. The Mirdita Prince, Prenk BIB DODL, was retained se a hostage. At that time. Anenianpatrietio publications began to appear all over the world. Arberi / Ili (Free Country), the first newspaper in the Albanian language, was printed under the direttlen of re *IC the /talo-Albanian poet; Cakondar, published in Wia, under the direct- ion of piste LAUBASI (a =saber of an old AnaniirifFunily fro* yirana); the magazine Albania, published in Brussels: Bel I (The Sun), at Beaten; and LdetIMISati, (The Albanian) publiehWITConstantiruzaa. _ . The 'Albanian Leagues appeared again in 1869 led by the 'tribes of Roti, eastrati, and Skreli who revolted agliast the Montenegrin occupation of the territory of Pe ri (TUOOSUVIA. 1:250,000. Sheet y-46, 700265). On this o?ceiori citheIics clad Maoism* fought side by side in defense of their territory. Movements of a similar chaz. actor emerged during the events of the Greco-Turkish Mar (1897). the FRASKERI Brothers, Abdyl and Smmi, gathered Albanians in a patriotic movement based on a fedora program. In 1906, the revalution of the Meng Turks" took place. The . Turkish Government at gonstentineple again sent an expeditionary force honied. by Shefket MOOD 15ASMi to pacify =AIM- The Albanians meld have utilize& the unstable situation daring the revolution of the "Young Turks". Paradoxically enough, the mahout demanded that the Turkish aspire be preserved rather JIM destreYed. since 041e Balkan states, in attacking the repira, wait have divided up ALBAVIk as a Turkish province, with UREA, MOSIMICIM, and GR3n0.1 benefiting,. Approved For Release 2004/02/18 erACDRE0715R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALDAITA (coat' d.) In an efioze; to ?stabil:ill claims to areas of Southern ALBANIA. GRZECZ used deliberate methods in confusing the issue. The Greeks claimed that there were many people living in these areas Who were of Greek nationality or of the Orthodox religion. The Balkan War presented a great &Inger, since the Albanians resented the treatment given them by the Turks, and were still per- turbed by the memories of 'the acts committed by the Turkish expedition-. ary forces under Sheiket PASBA and Dervish PASHA. Simultaneoasly, the collapse of the Ottoman Zmeire would. cause ALBArIA torn to pieces. The Catholic elements of northern Al3KCIA, formerly the vanguard of the oAlbania: League' and, as such, suffered most of the inhuman methods of Turkish oppression and reprisal, deserted the Turkich forces during the Battle of ELIEsneve (YUGOSLAVIA, 11250,000, Sheet TaAl. 298917) and join- ed the 0.?:11-2-1-g-arbian forces. Sko 1 e (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, ghost T-48, 27 ??7) and Monastir (latol G CZ, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1,255797) were taken by theSerbian Army, ich also invaded Albanian territory and reached the Adriatic Sea at rres (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1, 103044) and Shen Win (YUGOSLA :250,000, Sheet Y.-:48, 106873) by menas of a Ain maneuver. At the some time, Montenegrin forces be- sieged Shkoder (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46) uhidh, at that time, was the nein city of ALBANIA. Albanians ofCatholic, Moslem and Orthodox creeds then arrayed themselves against the Serbs and. Montenegrins during the second phase of the Balkan lihr. In 1912, an uprising took place in the Kossovo utder the leadership of politicians and militawmon, each as: Rasan DMUS ee ...vttnn12W...ATIO.Napywar-r. van:. ? r!e:.747_atee-LL4ote: Isa BOLETIITI conquered Skoplja and Prishtina, and national independence vas gained on 25 Uovember 1912. Although the Ottoman Zmpire WO app- roaching its end, ALBAUIA was still in danger of the Slays. Even though sovereignity was recognised in max:u, her ethnic territory was cut nearly in half. The tribes of Heti, Gruda, and part of the Clementi wore completely cut off Albanian territory. The flat- land of Podgorica (Titograd), and the ports of Bar, andTAT.Iwere in MONTWZGRO. The fertile flatlands of Pee (EnalETZUGOSLIV/ 1:250.000. Sheet Y-37, 787200) and Nakovica (YU651a-rIA, 1:250,000, Shoot Y-47, 195553) had also been given to 11011747EGRO to enable her to maintain 411 independent economy, and in doing se, the ethnic and national factors of the Albanians living in these regions were completely disregarded. The flatland of Zossovo, with its cities of Prizren(YUGOSLAV/A, 1:250,000, Sheet T.-47, 218532) and Prishtina (YUG0309777:250,000, Sheet T-30, 059273) were assigned t7711137 -for sentimental reasons since those cities were reminders of the Battle of Leesovo, whieh had dost the Serbians their independence. The right bac of the Black in River up to and across the city of Debar (Ddbr.2)(YUGOSLOIA, 1:250.000, Sheet Y-40, 4152 1948) was given to-117FLA, while all of the Virus with the cities of Janina and ,Ciamurija, became part of G. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 SIERCEROE1TR006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ,2:.,177A (contld) Page 11 Three Albanian provisional governments were formed in order to prevent more harm. Ono was located in /lono and headed by the prominent /tuail quemal 7LOBA: tho second Zrreeated in )irdj%a, and was headed. by Fronk (Prince) BIB IOU; while the third. vas fit .;tranci, and headed by lead PASHA TOPTANI. the Defender of Shkoder. During the course of the same year (1913), the Ambassador's Conference was held in London under the chairmanship of Sir MY, with the participation"MsTveral power,: ITALY, ErGIAND, AUSTRIA, 7BAVOE, RUSSIA and Mint The purpose.of the conference concerned reaching an agreement et the Albanian .problem, By lanuary 1914, a conmissiOn VMS established for the delimitation of the Albanian bor- ders, /n March 1914, William WIWI a German wince, was sent to ALBANIA as its soveroi4n. However Prince MID sae forced to abandon Durres in September 1914 aboard AU Italian Vessel in order to escape an insurrection provoked by lea4PASHA, an Albanian general Who was assassinated in tot...is a few years later, 2. Sociological Survaz As mentioned in the preceding section, the Albanians have preserved almost intact certain social institutions which have be- come quite uncommon and virtually non-existent in other Btropean countries. 'While fighting for their independence. the Albanians naintained themselves in their inaccessible mountains. There they preserved certain traditions and characterisitics which may be Prim.? itive and antahronistic: institutions which might bo unacceptable in other countries: but which prove that the Albanians have remained genuine and that their race has remained pure. It is well known that the family is the basis of society. and When the family ceases to exist, the nation itself is subject to collapse. In the sopcific instance of AZMANIL, which was so hard pressed /tun all sides, the state had to retreat leaving the defense of individuals to small, collective groups. Althowill in feudal form, which corresponded to the ttme, these groups mannged to solve the problem by retreating into the mountains, organizine Small groups, and subjecting them to a severe moral and military discipline. The aim of this policy was to protect the primitive cell, the family. /f the family had been allowed ,o disintegrate and disappear, the Albanians as a nation would be nonmexistent to- day. For example, the Btruseans disappeared leaving no doscondants, only a few remnants and monuments of their civilisation. Tho Berlin Treaty appeared to have boon largely affected br the general belief that the disnito4ration of ALBULA was already a completed fact, and that a division of her torritaTios eould_be made without causing any difficulties% However, as events proved, just the opposite transpired. Mainly, this was due to the extra:aft:miry vitality of the Albanians, who, while giving ground to the secular rale progressing in the valleys, preserved intact their ethnics struetureittto 04- un- Apprsaymj IterM en ere 0 VTIL Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of (contid) pago 12 rosistanco, which corresponded to 65 tribos. At present, the most imp. portant of those are; the Mati (25,000), and tho Lardita (18,000). Tribos are ruled by an "assombly of fathers" (family chiefs) in which a particularly fow chiefs who merit tho honor, hold places of predominance. /n tho areas under Moslom influence, tho chiefs are called "Bey" or "Beg", while the foremost carry the titlo of "Bajraktar". These titles area carryover from tho days of SONlaRBEG, when the titled wore called "Ddkos","Counts", and. "Captains". "Bajraktar" be- ',came a hereditary title, and is still in uso today in central and north,. ern ALBANIA. The authority of the chioftan, or Bajraktar, has remained un- touched in tho northern areas, particularly among the Catholics, in spite of tho fact that the Communists have tried to diminish or comp. pletely abolish their personal and historic prestigo. However, there is reason to believe that rosistanco to tho authorities today has not yet cease& in the northern mountain areas, sinco the government has not as yet been able to ponotrato tho territory. /t cannot be deter.- mined as to how popular a successful resistance will be, since tho Com. mumist regime uses deception to a great extent, which is a weapon never employed against these people, oven by tho most violent of oppressors. Tho "Canon of the Mountain" (Kanuni i Leko DMAGIIIVIT) which was coded during the 12th Century by an obscure membor of tho great family of the DUKAWITI, and widely spread during tho timo of salaam by an- other member of this family, Lek (Alexander) =AMY!, constitutes tho codification of the mores. Daring that period, all ALBArIA was undor the influence of the law. It has been altered slightly by Turkish and. Slav influancos, but basically remains the same. The basis of tho Kanunl i /Joke DUKAGJINIT is tho law of "Blood Revengo", which imposes upon tho next of kin of an assassinated person, a ndutyw or "task of honor" to redeem to dead relative by killing the assassin, or ono of his family who is "ablo to carry arms". Fuluded from this law of revenge are women, children, and priests, sinew they are considered unable to carry arms. Tho redemption of a human life by payment of a sum of money is considered unmanly and is allowed only in unusual circumstances, and then only by tribes considered as unimport- ant. Tho Luria and Mati Tribes oxcludo this practice altogether. al- though they maintain the institution of "spontaneous pardon". This allows blood revenge to raapended by mutual accord, but not abandoned. It may be suapendod in every instance whereby the assassin is under tho protection of "hospitality", which is a sacred institution in ALEArIA. Hospitality begins the moment the "Family Chief" allows a guest to pass the threthhold of his home. The guest, no matter who he is, is given all possible caro and attention, moro so if ho is a strong.. cr. A ny escorts of the guest are also immuno from twang? or inhospit- able treatment. Approved For Release 2004/02/1t tACOR3E01111.5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of At:cat:LA (cent' d.) Page 13 The woman le shown absolute respect. No man would Aare dis- turb a woman. Women may travel unharmed, even though they travel for several days, through variout regions strange to them. It is an unwritten law which provides authprization for a woman to seek hos- pitality in any village through Which she may be passing, and it is the duty of all concerned to accept her and give her the utmost at- tention and care. Based upon the Salm& i /eke DUKAWIN/T is another important institution, that of the oath given in the form of a word of honor. It is known as the news (noses moans word). By taking it, one assumes the duty to protect and to keep in safe custody a person, to defend a locality, or to fight in the national interest. To break onols whose' would expose the offender to the unlimited contempt of his fellowmen. The judges or enforcers of such laws as those were the chieftains, to whom the collectives owed blind obedience, particularly in the case of a call to arms. Such tradition of command existed until the arrival of the Columnists, although the authority of the individual Boys had previously deagenerated somewhat since many of them had adopted the Western wo.7 of life, especially after 1913. In wanting to give their eons a more cultured background plum a formal education, they were sent to various European capitols. There tho sons came into contact with mentalities quite different from those they were familiar with, and re- turned home with many new ideas. King TOGU was a prime example of a dual education. Ho had spent some time as a youth at the Court of the Sultan in _Ltir_mktConstar , and later was attached to the Court of 20110er CARL in Vienna, thus providing him with the necessary ezpifirionca to be- come a ruler. He had learned both Oriontal and Occidental principles of government and montalitios. It may be safely assumed that none of the Communist social in- stitutions could penetrate the areas occupied by the Clamonti, &strati, Kraisniqi. HUba, Bityci, DUkagjini, Ktumal Luma. and. Mirditi tribes. Those tribes of northern ALBANIA, pressed between TIT on the north and the Tirano government on the south, find themselves in an identical situation as prevailed &Snag medieval times. Their resist- ance, in addition to purely physical efforts, is maintained by a shrewd political sensibility, Which is a result from the times when those tribes wore forced to employ to the best of their knowledge, a sense of polit- ical and nilitary intelligence in order to centinue their defenses. In approaching thu center of ALBANIA, the predominance of ruse over physical violence and overt defense becomes more noticeable. This in particular reference to the tribes of Malakastro and Musacis. This is trao of the Malakastro tribe more so because of their poverty 'din& fortes them to bow to therCommunist authority in order to physically survive. Tho Musacia tribe is the center of a Communist collectivizat- ion experiment (duo to the stealth of this group), and is sypervieod quite rigidly by a large nurbor of Owimuniets, . ,.s.WM,. . ?,.. . ? .. ? II .40 . 0 / ??? ??? ? . ..blo t -di, ..4 , ... 4 ..... Approved For Relea_se 2004/02/S eitRytit01415R006100200002-9 s. .... -1.? ? 1P ..., _ .. 4. I ''' ' ?4'. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBYLTIA (cont d.) Pogo 14 3. Geography (Soo Exhibits V/I, VIII, IX, 14 XI, XII, & XIII) ALBA= is nn oxtremoly mountainous country, averaging more than 3,000 foot above Ben level. Tho Dinaric Alps in the north and northeast, and the Pinch's Mountains in tho south and southeast form the walls of a huge amphitheater which encloso a marshy plain along tho Adriatic Sea. Sevoral rivers cross the narrow coastal plaint flowing rapidly because of their relatively short courses, sinco they avorago 130 kilometers in length in their stoop doscont from tho mount.. ans. Tho most Important rivers aro; tho Bojana (tho only navigable river in the country), the %bite Drin; the Black Twin; the Mati; tho Xrsoni; the Vojusa; and tho Shkumbin. The last named river separates ALBANIA into two separate regions, with the Ghegs living in the north, and the Tbsks in the south. There are small, fortilo wallop and bas- ins, and toward, the hinterland, there are wide valley' and plateaus 'which contain the centers of population. The Albanian climate is Mediterranean; summers are hot and dry, and winters are moderate. Coast- al tomperatures are higher than those inland. There are boeoh, pine, and fir in the highlands, and large areas of oak, valnut, chestnut, and elm in tho coastal plains. Mineral resources, although relatively unexploited, are boliev- ed to be considerable, and include aluminum, petroleum, lignite, iron, bitumen, asphalt, gypsum. and copper. Only a small part of the inter. ior is arabic, although nearly the entire population is engaged in a combination of farming and stock raising. Chief crops are; corn, rye, wheat, barloy, tobacco, oats, spelt, olives, and citeas_fruit. PART II Political 4. Throe events have occurred Which, although external to exi. ternal to A/BLE/A, are likely to have an important influence on her internal situation. Diplomatic relations have boon rom,opened with ITALY; the Greek Weals have announced that for the present they have called off military operations; and MYGOSLATIA has formally denounced her treaty of friendship with aum. In more fortunate countries, the welfare of the people depends mainly upon tho effectiveness of tho government's internal policy and administration. In ALBArIA, to a quite unusual extent, the life of the poople, oven dotal to tho adequacy or inadequacy of their rations, is affoctod by the actions of neighboring countries, by their relations with her, with each other, and with the Groat Powers. Wer since tho final departure lf the Turks in 1913, ALBANIA has required the expend. ituro or investment of foreign money to keep her tamodiately supplied with consumer goods, and to carry through tho lonsAorm dovolopment of her resources which may one day make her economically independent. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 ? CIA-RDP13- ECR E4jr006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey -f (cont,d) pogo 15 Therefore, ALBANIAto foreign policy consists primarily of tho search for a patron and a rmoal ticket". This is, in a most literal sense, the trade by which she earns her daily broad. In King ZOGUss time, ALBAITIA was functioning on Italian loans. A beg- inning was made in the establishment of tho state framework and in the dovolopmont of her minerals. But tho ITALY of MUS9DLINI wanted repayment in tho form of strategic control, so tho indigenous MM.. archy was expelled, and. ALBANIAls-precarious indapendonco isises- tinguishod. The now rogimo undor ITALY was not more noticeably op- pressive than its prodecossor, its greatest handicap was that it mom foreign. Economically, ALBANIS flourished as tho favorite child of Fascism. Building and dovelopment wore emphasized, the people wore furnished adequate foodstuffs, and tho shops wero well stocked. As later developments rovoalod, tho prico of this investment and proe. parity never had. to be paid. ITALY lost tho war boforo she could either colonist) tho land, or recruit Albanian conscripts for her gar. risons or ovoreoas armies. ITALY had /lono and Bann Island (Sasono) under her dominat- ion from 1914 On. "Mang tho First *rid War, she extended hon coo- upation over to Eurres and control ALBANIA, whore /bad PASHA had for- med a temporary governeent with Italian aid. Apparontly tho Italian aim was to limit Austrian influenoo in tho Moditorranoan. /n 1915 AUSTRIA occupied !mt. Losh, Shkodor, and Durres: while Bulgarian troops penotrated-te-labasan. ?071.7-Doconb7-1P0ox, the Ambassador** Conference in Paris recognised the constitution of tho Albanian gov- ernment. In 1f7C-ZOOU mado his ontranco in Albanian politics OA Minister of tho Interior. ZOGU was born at Burgajot on S October 1895. He is a descend... ant of an old feudal family. Ho spent part of his youth at tho court of William IVIED, and during tho First %bad War was appointed "colonel ad honoromr by tho Austrian IMperor CARL. In 1922 ZOGU performed a coup d'etat, and brought ordor to the country. Ho then became Prime Minister. From 1922 to 1924 Albanian history depicts a chain of in- surrections, with ZOGU having the chance to display tho characteristics of an energetic statesman. In 1924 ZOGU failed to suppress the move- ment of tho National Party led, by Theofan S. NOLI. As a consequence, ZOGU was forced to escape to ol rade. Thestan S. NOLI then became Prime Minister. ZOGUIs unexpott sit in Bel ado was a favorable event in regard to YUGOSLAV/A's policy towar 741. Nikola PASIO, a very capable Yugoslav statesman, gave ZOGU arms and money and asked him to roturn to ALBANIA. On 24 DocLmber 1924 ZOOU returned to ALRAIIIA and forced VDU to escape to ITALY, from whore ho want to AUSTRIA, tho USSR, and later to the UN/TED STATES where ho lives at present. On 31 December 1925, ZOGU announced the constitution of tho Albanian republic. sp was then elected president, and among tho first laws hs introduced was one which called for six months compulsory military service. Approved For Release 2004/02/1S EAGERE01.15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey -f (contld) page 15 Therefore, LIBANIA's foreign policy conoists primarily of the search for a patron and a sacra ticket". This is, in a most literal sonso, tho trade by which she earns her daily broad. In King ZOGUIs time, ALBAITLA was functioning on Italian loans. A beg- inning was made in the establishment of tho stato framework and in the dovolopmont of her minerals. But tho ITALY of MUSg)LINI wanted repayment in tho form of strategic control, so tho indigenous mon- archy was expelled, and. ALBATIAls precarious indopendonco was exp. tinguishod. The now regime undor ITALY was not more noticeably op- pressive than its predecessor, its greatest handicap was that it was foreign. Economically, ALBAN/8 flourished as the favorite child of Fascism. Building and dovelopment wore emphasized, the people wore furnishod adequate foodstuffs, and tho shops wero well stocked. As later dovolopments revealed, tho price of this investment and pros. perity never had to be paid. ITALY lost tho war before she could either colonist) tho land, or recruit Albanian conscripts for her gar. risons or overseas armies. ITALY had Vlono and Sas= Island (Sasono) under her dominat- ion from 1914 On. During the First World War, she extended. hor occ- upation over to pumas and central ALBANIA, whore Egad PASHA had for- med. a temporary government with Italian aid. Apparently tho Italian aim vas to limit Austrian influence in tho Mediterranean. In 1915 AUSTRIA occupied ;raja. Losh, Shkoder, and Durres: while Bulgarian troops penetrated to Inman. 7;717-tocaria;771?70, tho Ambassador,. Conference in Paris reeognised the constitution of tho Albanian govi- ernmont. In 15-17-ZOOU mado his entrance in Albanian nolitice as ZOOU was born at Burgajot on 8 October 1895. He is a descend.- ant of an old feudal family. Ho spent part of his youth at tho court of William ZED, and during the First tbrld Whr was appointed ',colonel ad honoraria,' by the Austrian Emperor CARL. In 1922 zoau performed a coup dfetat, and brought order to the country. Ho then bocame Prime Minister. From 1922 to 1924 Albanian history depicts a chain of in- surrections, with ZOGU having the chance to display tho characteristics of an energetic statesmen. In 1924 ZOGU failed to suppress the move- mont of tho National Party led by Theofan S. NOM. As a consequence, ZOGU was forced to escape tto Vo1va4o. Theotan S. NOLI than became Prime Minister. ZOGUis unaxpotted visit in Bel ado was a favorable event in regard to YUGOSLAVIAls policy toward. . Nikola PAS/O, a very capable Yugoslav statesman, gave ZOGU arms and money and aaked him to return to ALBANIA. On 24 December 1924 ZOOU returned to ALBALTIA and forced NOL/ to escape to ITALY, from whore ho wont to AUSTRIA, tho USSR, and later to the UN/TED STATES where he lives at present. On 31 December 1925. ZOGU announced the constitution of the Albanian republic. No was then elected president, and among the first lave he introduced vat one which called for six months compulsory military *orrice. Approved For Release 2004/02/S:EPOIR8E0o1 5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (contld) Pag0 16 When ZOGU came into power, he turned toward ITALY for assist,- ance in solving his economic and political problems. An agreement to this effect was signed on 27 NoveMber 1926 at Tirane, by the Albanian Minister of the Interior, Eye= VBION/ and the Italian Minister Pompoo A/OISI. This agreement favored a political, judicial, and torr- itorialltetatue quo" in AIBANIA. ZOGU knew that a reciprocal political interest could only be based upon a military alliance between ITALY and ALBANIA. On 22 November 1927, a military agreement was signed at Tirane. /t is natural to consider that zoauss policy was not dictated by love for ITALY, but more because he was only too well aware of YUGOSLAVIAls aspirations toward ALBANIA. On 1 December 192, after having previously obtained tho consent of the National Assembly, ZOGU was elected King of ALBANIA with the title of ZOO, the First. Financial support was necessary for the reconstruction of the country. YUGOSLAV/A and OBEE0.1-=re :In ao liosition to grant tho funds needed by ALBANIA. Therefore, King ZOO again turned to ITALY. In 1925 SVIEL (Societe Sviluppo /Conon/co ALBANIA, Association for the Zconomie Development of ALBANIA) granted a credit of 243 million lire to be re- imbursed over a 40 year period. In 1931, although Malin, had not paid the interest on the first loan, ITALY granted another loan of 100 mill. ion lire under the co tion that ITALY be permitted to supervise the finances of ALBANIA.. It was then established that this new loan should be gradually settled bach time the balance of the Albanian government exceeded 50 million lire. The Italian request sounded like an insult to King ZOG, who then endeavored to find now markets, The Italian government then wasted no time about the matter and pronptly dispatch.. ?"be r9 navy sh1bsIMEMPINF0.931). Eirt6 II,I'T WA4 :44en advised to sfl.. tie the matter in a 71337ful manner. It is quite possible the Italian MOW was initiated by the fear that King Zog night negotiate a secret agreement with YUGOSLAVIA. Loyal pelitical and economic relations bo- A/BArIA and ITALY wore virtually ended, and there began an atmosphere of ',nerves" until April 1939. (-1.,_t was then that tho moment of groat events began, and ITALY thought ft-necessary to invade ALBANIA. Piton 7 to 17 April 1939, Italian troops landed in Aussu while ZOGU fled to OBIEGE, taking with him the national treasury. YUGOSLAVIA remained silent about the proceedings mainly because of the agreement signed earlier in the year between MUSSOLINI and the Yugoslav Primo kinisfer Milan STOJAIENOVIC. Tho only resistance to tho Italian invasion was conducted by Alas run, who led the Albanians in a brier novanont by utilising the troops stationed at Durres and Vim). ITALY soon consolidated her position in the country. It should bo mentioned that the Italian act- ion has boon preceded by a (systematic preparation, Francisco JACONGUI, Italian Ambassador to ALBANIA, very efficiently handled the diplomatic angles. He secretly contacted antis-ZOGU elements who agreed to coll.. aborato with him, blinded by his promises (which, incidentally, were never kept), of sharing in the government. Approved For Release 2004/02/1 00200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0061002b0002-9 SECRET A Surrey of ALBANIA (contld) Page 17 During the latter part of his reign, Mr indulged in a rather dangerous policy, since he had closed all Catholic schools, and failed to observe the formation of the first Comaunist cells in ALBAN/A. In failing to see the infiltration of Communists into various promo:MI departments ZOGU allowed a situation to begin which would have ultimate:1T cost him his throne had the Italians not beaten the Oommunists in expel. ling hin. ZDGC appeared to be more interested in ereatinc an antagonism between the Christian and Moslem trill's of the country, in view of the fact that the Italians weresupportig. the Catholics. He Swung his sup- port to tic Moslems thereby creating a situation which undoubtedly would have registered sufficient repercussions had. not political moves dowel.. ?pod earlier. 5. How the Qemunists Achieve Hegemony in ALBANIA The organisation of the first Oommunist eons, known asnommuaist groups", originated in 1931-32. There were three groups and their res. pective centers were in Shkoder, Tira and Ince. Iron those thi'ee centers, branches wore oi571-4-in other towns and cones, PropagOada material (books about MARX, =LS, mar and STALIN) was brought into the country through various channels which included mysterious visitors who came every week from 11100112AVL4 Contacts were made with Albanian elements abroad. /n 104, ZOGUis adninistrattee policy wab ahtaken when he decided to close all Catholics schools. This move brought about dis. estrous psychological repercussions among the youth.. _A 60.1ete cheat reigned in the Albanian State School Systeme. especially in 1- The Minister of Public Education, Mirash /VAULT, was the Maur One may of all Catholic Schools. Taking advantage of this 'liberal policy", 111)anian officials who up to this time were not known to be extremists, appeared on the ? political meg administrative scene, Some examples are: Zef R/BDITA, a high official in the Ministry of the Interior/ lenet TOTO, former high official in Shkoder; Professor Skonder LOW' (at present a member of the Agit-Prop in Tirane) who used to deliver long speeches on social progressive theory to groups of his students after classes. The most fanatical Albanian Communists graduated from LAUBASIgs school, 'cone then: qemal STA7A, National Hero, killed on 5 May 1942 by the Italians; Gjevalin LCZA, at present a Deputy; Xhemal? BIWA, at present an official of the SIOURIMIT; lrok MO!. at present-in the Officers School in XIfesevaa Vasil MUNI, at present a member of the Albania3w4oviet CultuxU itteet Cin SOMA (killed in an automobile accident in the fall of 1949); Vojo KUSH/, National Hero, killed in combat at Tirane,1944; Zija at present the Albanian Consul in llacaue; Mark ULL at present lint Sec. retary of the Albanian Legation in Paris. The following is a list of those persons who collaborated during-We first years of the formation of clandestine Communist groups at Shkoder and who have important pos- ition, in Tirane at present; a. Ink JAKOVA - a carpenter's apprentice in 19431 today he is a Vire Prime Minister, Major Goma itabanian Army, sod a member of the POLITBUBO. ApprovearorRelease2004/e/teRt81.00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survo7 knArIA (contld) Pago 18 b. Mark HIM - Member of tho Albanian-Soviot Cultural Committoo, and nembor of the SWUM (Shognija Per Milne Ushtriso e Mbrojtjes - Association for Aid, Army, and Defense). C. Kolo JAEOVA TUkts brothor, a mambo:* of the Albanianp-Soriot Cultural Committeo. d. Arif 47YLI - ilomontary School Teacher, at present a high Party official in Shkoder. The group in Korea boasted such membors as: Xoxo ICON; Enver BOEHM and Mottle Tho groups from both Tirano and Kora? had lesser idool- ogical preparations, but had a more devonirrpolitraradhosion among tho followers due to those factors: a. Southern ALBANIA was particularly hostile toward EMU, who had neglected their region, and had failed to include any southornors in his goveraeont. b. A rather liberal, but not very religious Character of tho pooplc o. The war, Which totally inpovorishod southern ALBANIA. Although those Communist groups wore in contact with each other, they wore pormeated with sectarian and opportunist fooling.. Tho Party in ALBANIA is a Yugoslav product, and without tho aid of tho Yugoslays, there would bo no Communist Party in ALBANIA today, Boforo tho arrival of Milan FCPOVIC and Dusan HUGOSL, who wont to ALBANIA to organise, and euide Albanian Communism, the existent groups were rathor insignificant. There wore discrepancies in their policies and they indulged in a continuous and bittor struggle. The situation dominating these groups of Albanian Communists of the time was definod by Milan POPOV/C in 1949, as follows: !NO had faun& a roal chaos. Altogether thoro woro eight groups of Trotskyists. Zech of them struggled for supremacy over the others. Frequently they cane to sec us and accuse the others. Discussions with these groups lasted from ten to twenty days. WO went from one illegal meeting to another. lb discussed with the group in vorco in tho houses of Enver BOMA and !Coco TASSKO. This group attenptod a rofusal in any admission of its err- ors. They claimod to be wthe Party,' and considored the others as groups, but we succeeded in persuading them that they should accept tho Consitut- ion of the Party. The highest contributions from tho group in rare? were given by KeCi XO XE and !Cristo PAIDIN. 6. The YUgoslam,Allianco lexischis ruign, ZOOU showod pronounced. ability, and his great- est success was the organisation of the police force :those connanding officer WEIS a British Officer, Colonol BILL. t- Approved For Release 2004/02/R.:SIAL4R2t88.1k04415 oo6vo2000bm... Q. ? ? - Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoa of Al*?ArTA (cont' d.) page 19 ZOGU kn.)w his people better than any other Albanian. He MMO not loved, but accepted. His greatest ctiticiem would lie in the fact that he did not exproos tho peoples will through a more representative government. He hold a virtual monopoly of governmental poets, and ho failod'in including representatives from all over the country in his cabinet. Tho fact that ho developed the Mati area his own birthplace and strictly Moslem, above all other areas in =ALA showed a favorit- ism which rankled, in the South. For reasons such as those, tho eland- ?stifle groups of Communists were making rapid headway. They had. much to offer in the way of propaganda even beyond tho ordinary Communist teachings. The alliance with 7000SLAVIL was made possible because Albanian Communism is a movement developed almost exclusively in tho South. Bad the northern Ghoge been in power, they would have undoubtedly looked askance at such an alliance: A few reasons Why there would have been no such alliance are: YUGOSLAVIA is in possession of large tracts of land Which aro inhabited mainly by Albanians, both in the wheat lands of Metohija and Kossovo, and northwestern Macedoniat in 1912 tho Serbs and Montenegrins endeavored to obtain possession of moot of northern ALBANIA, including the city of Shkoder* and the way of life in the North did not lend itself to the Communist way of life. However, the Communists were recruited from the Tooke, whose fear of foreign domination stemmed from the other direction, GAIZOTa They turned to YUGOSLAVIA as the only available aid, since ITALY had been beaten and was discredited, and GREECE waa taa spa.. tho Yugoslav Communist party was tho channel through which directives from the Kremlin were reoioved, and the two or throe sinister figures who briefed laver BOA during the struggle for power wore all Yugoslav Communists, Milan PQPOVIC, Dusan MMOSit, and later on, Svotosar VUXMANOVIO. alias "Tempos, were tho creators and the ggides. They were in truth the real loaders of the Albahian Commuaist party. They smoothed, as much as they could, the conflicts, brevet discipline, organised die.- tricts, appointed loaders, and issued orders. They Insisted that a National Liberation Army be formed. As soon as the let Brigade was assembled, Mehmot SHIM was appointed Commanding Officer While his advisor was an MUCOSA, the virtual dictator. SHIM/ at present, is the Minister of the Interior, bolds tho rat* of Major Gsleeral, and is a member of the POLITBURO; On a coatain occasion, Milan POPOVIC made the following state- ment. "Before we left for YUGOSLAVIA, Dusan MUCOSA. was invited to the Assemtly of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, and it was at this time that ho announced that General Spiro wasru was not adequate and that his place should be taken Over by !aver HOXA, Oemmm issar of the Supreme Command, The Control Committee approved MOOCals suggestion, and daring the course of tho conference held in Normal dtp. lag May 1944, EOM was appointed Supreme Commandant, with raa-o? Col- ApprovenITOPSWISMse 2004/02/19 efleePiter006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBAN/A (cont' d.) Page 20 Yugn41av u:' 3t5. complotely dominatod tho Albanian Con. munists. When MUGOSA roturned to YUGOSLATLA, Albanian Communists correeponaed with him. A paragraph from a letter written by the present Minister of Interior, Mehmet eeretT reads as follows, !We did not have aParty, but merely a confused state of things. With Yours and POPOVIC1 instructions we were able to form our party. You helped us; you taught UA; and cured us as does a mother with her child,. Major Genoral Bedri SPARIU, present Attorney General of the Albanian Peoples Republic, wrote, !WO learnod from you, !Sale (alias of MUGOSA), what was indispensable for as. Therefore, I personally, with everyone else, fool something of you in ourselves. Our lives as Communists are bound with yours!. Expressions of servilism are containod in letters written from Enver EOM, Zoci XOXE, and Ramadan CITAZU, which reached their peak in the words pronounced by HURL at tho Assembly of tho Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party hold at Borat, in Novabbor 1944, !Comrade Blazo (Blaso JOVANOVIC, dologato of Control Committoo of tho Yugoslav -Communist Party for the Albanian Central Committee) contrib.- utod a groat deal to the conference, 31azo was for UA as GOD from hoavenif. Diving the Italian Occupation, Communist groups wore pass. ive and thoir only action was the publication of a manifest on 8 Nov- ember 1941, issuod on the initiative of POPOV/0 and EUGOSA by the Communist Group of Shkoder, on tho occasion When HITLER attacked tho Soviet Union. The manifest read, !The chances to start an armed re- volution against tho Italian occupation IncreasoS with BITLERPs agg- ression against tho Soviet Union!. Rowevor, duo to lack of politio- al activity and organization, the manifest wont unhooded, Luring the course of tho first conforonco for the formation of the Albanian Opm. monist Party (8 November 1941), and in the resolution of the first conference of the Albanian Communist Party held at liabinet. in April 1943, the passive attitude of Communist Groups was sovoraly admonish- ed.. During the conference at Labinot, it was montionod that, !the struggle among the various groups of Albanian Communists impeded a favorable action during the following historical phases; a. b. C. Occupation of ALBANIA on 7 April 1939 by Italian troops. Other internal Albanian affairs. Second World War, and during the war doclarod by ITALY on YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE. In 1939 !Bali umbetars (Eationa Pront) was founded on the basis of a ravtautionary program Which included* liberation of the country from the Italian inscist Occupations and tho establishment of a democratic regime with applications of economic and social re- forms which were to bring real liberation to the people. Tho form- ation of this organization was duo mainly to British policy Whieh was designed in AIBArIA to harry and obstruct the Italian occupation. Approved For Release 2004/02/u :1 1/48E0811?15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBZIA (contld) Imago 21 In 1939.4D, tho British had daily contact with the exponents of !Belli Nombotarig. During this period, Colonel B/IL (organizer of ZOGIs Gandarmerio) was living in Tirane Whore ho had become very cog- nisant of the political probloms, the people, and their language. "Mali Xembetarw was responsible for propaganda which was off- icaeious in promising to struggle for the wlreo and Independent AMMAR, which was to have a republican governbent, with a social policy baba on freedom for everyone under stato control. The policy further in* e1mdai a "Greater ALBANIAN which meant the return of Metohija, Kessovo, and Ciamurija, tho first two from YOWSLAVIA, tho lot tor from GCI. It is quito Clear that tho political program of 'mem Kambetarw had nothing in common with Communist aspirations. Tho following are some passages written by Milan POPOV/0, published in.wYugoslav*Albanian Relationship, pago 78: nThe leaders of the ',Bali Kombeimer, disregarded (every other organisation and considorod the Central Committee of the National Liberation Resistance as a typical Communist organisation. Bev? oral discussions took place with members of tho *alio but these failed to produce any results. Seleamegbers of tho Central Committee Of the Albanian Communist Party, among Whom were Shyer ROXRA., attributed too great an importance to these discussions and noglectod the activity which should havo been perforaed among the masses of thenalliw and aiming to disclose their reactionary leaders". The Albanian Communist Party refused to apply the decisions taken at tho General Conference in Labinot, regarding tho organisation of a Communist Army or n National Liberation Army, without first hav- ing reached an agroomont with wMalli Kambotae. Svotorar VUIMANOVIC and Blazo JOVANOVIC exerted pressure on tho Albanians along-Obbinrliiveggi because a few days after the Pirst General Conference, VUXHABOV/C arr- ived in Labinot, where part of the Central Committee was gathered, and in comPar7YEER :OVANDVIC, they urged the Albanians to examine the mil. itary problem. VUEMANOVIC did his utmost to convince the Albanians of the necessity of forming a ',Supreme Command of the National Liberation Army" without waiting for the conclusion of negotiations with "Belli KombetarN, which was organising its own army and intentionally daliging tho discussions with the National Liberation Movement. *Unless a Supreme Command is formed immediately, it means that *Belli Kombetar, plans are being followed. Some of the members of the Albanian Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party did net under- stand tho situation, among them being Enver Emit and. Dr. veer tassErca, which clearly shows their lack of political intuition. Because of the same reasons, some members of the Central Committee of the Albanian com- munist Party were against the organization of mobile units. VUINANOTIO suggested that field caapanins (which lid not load a military life) be converted into partiSen detle%monts, with regular military discipline, In a continuous offensivo status, and =say moved from one place to another. /t was further suggested that larger units be formed without delay". Approved For Release 2004/02/a: EAdIffer 5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA ( cent' d.) Page 22 The Supremo Command was organised four months following the Tint Sonoral Conference, and tho first brigades woro mobilisod fivo months later.. Mobilo and assault military units were formed after the intorvontion of Svetosar VUEMANOVIC, who in July 1943, whilo ra. turning from GREECE stoppori at tho village of Eucako (in tho ricinity of Estee) and submitted his opinion to the Con1761-Tommitteo of the Albanian Communist Party.' "I ropoatodly insistod on the fact that it vas necessary to immodtately convert field companies into partisan do- tachmonts, which could, in turn, be convortod into larger and mono mo- bilo units. Tao to tho fact that the organisation of forces in liber.. atod territories vas rather neglected., I urged thorn to form a military authority in the hinterland, boforo the am& of tho discussions with "Balli tombeeer". Aftor his suggestion was accopted by the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, VUKMATOVIC left for Nacodonia. On 1 2 August 1943, the exponents of Milli Eombetar" gathered at Mukaj, whore they met the leaders of the National Liberation Movement (Communists) to decido about the policy to follow in connection with future military oluorations against tho Italians. It vas then that tho "Committoo for National Salvation" vas formed and vas given full power to wage var., Ins toad of the motto wfreodom to the PeopleaDeath to fascism", tho Committeo chose tho words "Tooth or froodom". They drafted a progron for the Committeo which contemplated tho organisation of a Groator ALBUM. following instruction from high and official sources in YUGOSLAVIA, TUENABOVIC dissolved tho agreement roaohod at and. croatod a strong antagonism within tile Albanian forces, vh1Wlit that timo, were struggling among thonsolves. Subsoquont to the breaking of thoAgreement, Nohmot SMERUand DO= MUGOSA were leading a num:iti troops in the vicinity of Zushn4a Whore they suraininded 16S soldiers belonging to "Boni Kombotar", and massacred all of that. By omploying all sorts of roses, doviations of pelicy, dishonest pract- ices, and all other moans to further tho Party Lino, the Albanian Oomp. muniste with the aid of tho fugoslav Communist., achioved hegemony in the country. Germany never administered the country. !or a year, and for purely military reasons, sho occupiod ALBANIA with troops and held tho ring while the Communists, who wore pledged to fight the Sermons, wore liquidating antisuCommunist forcoo against the day of liberation. Tao British wore instrumental in aiding this practice since their into:vet was rofLoctod only in tho groups who wore capablo of killing tho most Serums. Tho wLugalitoti" (Abas EUP/Is Nogiot forces) and tho Xembotar" were not as wall organised or oquippod as tho Communists, therefore it was the better part of British disorstion to rapport the group who producodtho greatest results. To Complicatts matters a lit furthor, tho Communists wore recognised as allies, since EMU was fighting with tho United Nations as an ally. Approved For Release 2004/02/1 00200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoy of ALBANIA (cant' d.) Page 22 The Supreme Command was organized four months following tho Pirst General Conferonce, and the first brigades wero mobilized fivo months later.. Mobilo and assault military units wore formed after the intervention of Svotozar VUKMANOVIC, Who in July 1943, while ro. turning from GREECE stopped. at tho village of Kucako (In tho NIcinity of Reece) and submitted his opinion to the Control Committeo of the Albanian Communist Party: "I repeatedly Insisted, on the fact that it vas necessary to immediately convert fiold companies into partisan do- tachmonts, which could, in turn, be converted into larger and more mo- bilo units. Duo to tho fact that the organization of forcos in liber- ated territories was rather neglocted, / urged thorn to form a military authority in the hinterland, before tho and of the discussions with !Mani Itimbstssm. After his suggestion was accopted by the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, VUKMANOVIC left for Macedonia. On 1 - 2 August 1943, the exponents of "Balli Kombetarn gathered at Mukaj, where they met the leaders of the National liberation Movement (Communists) to decide about the policy to follow in connection with future military aDorations against tho Italians. It was than that tho "Committee for Nationol Salvation" was formed and was given full power to wage war. Instoad of tho motto nTroodom to the People.Doath to Fascism', tho Committee chose tho words "Death or Proodomn. They draftod a grogram for tho Committeo which contemplated the organization of a Greater ALBANIA. Tollowing instruction from high and official sources in YUGOSLAVIA, VUKMANOVIC dissolved tho agreement ranched at Nu and craated a strong antagonism within the Albanian forces, which at that tine, were struggling among thonsolvos. Subsoquont to tho brooking of tho Mukaj Agreement, Moot SIM and Lilian MUGOSA wero leading a numbor of troops in tho vicinity of Lushnja whore they surrounded 165 soldiers belonging to nBalli Kombotarn, and massacred all of them. By employing all sorts of rusos, deviations of Vilicy, dishonest pract- icos, and all other moans to further tho Party Lino, tho Albanian Com- munists with tho aid of tho Yugoslav Communists, achioved hogomony in the country. Gory never administered the country. For a year, and for purely military reasons, she occupiod ALBANIA with troops and hold tho ring while the Communists, Who woro pledged to fight the Germans, wore liquidating anti-Oomrunist forces against tho day of liberation. Tho British wore instrumental in aiding this practico since their interoSt was rofLoctod only in the groups who wore capable of killing the most Germans. Tho (Abas KUPI's &gist Porcos) and tho *Boni Kombotarn wore not as weal organizod or oquippod as tho Communists, therefore it was tho bettor part of British discretion to rapport the group who producedtho greatest results. To complicate tatters a bit furthor, tho Communists were rocognizod as allies, since 2U3S/A was fighting with tho MAW Nations as an ally, Approved For Release 2004/02/16 ditkeR3FIDT5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Itarvoy of ALBAFIA (cont d) Pogo 23 Had RUSSIA's policy domandod that ALBANIA should becone ono of tho fedoral ropublics of YUGOSLAVIA, BMA and his associates would undoubtodlyProt have objected! but as it happonod, RUSSIA was hoping that ALBANIA isculd be admittod to tho Unitc4 Nations Whero another veto would have boon added to tho Wetorn liBloc,la To nako quito certain the Yugoslav Allianco would be accoptod by tho Partisan soldiery and tho enthusiatio Communist youth, an intone() pro-Yugoslav propaganda was car- ried on, complete with fraternal visiting, presentation of bronze pla. quos of the Thgoslav dictator, and exuberant shouts of wEnver-Titow. Economic cooperation with 'YUGOSLAVIA was not unfruitful for ALBANIA, Evon if tho formor backward by Wostorn standards, she is richer than ALBAVIA in technicians, and could hp in exploiting tho copper and ohromo, and even sond groups of yiuthful voluntoors to 'work on ALBAN/Als long-promised but never oonplotod railway. *et important, YUGOSLAVIA sont wheat from tho Kossovo so that tho Albanians had anaugh broad. Some of tho Albanians may have rofloctod that undOr the Axis Yoko, that sumo *boat was coning from an Albanian province. But no one racily worried about it just so long as tho Wheat continued to arrivo. Tho entire situation %las oltorod by tho 7hgoslav broach with tho Coninform during tho sunmor of 194S. At tho critical moment, AMYL& did not align herself with her partner, but switchod to a moro distant rolativo, STALIN. Iron tho standpoint of choice to tho Alban. lane, the Russian appeared more attractive. At that time, T/TO was not expected to make good his robollion. It was gonorallyacceptod by ovory- ono (Communists includod) that oithor T/TO would bo forced to nako his Irdiuu'inTh 1343 brought back into tho fold by a moro obodiont Communist loader, But oven without this oxooption, any Albanian Communist politician would, have boon strongly tempted to sots? the chance of freeing his country from a patronago that is boginning to bocom axtronoly irksaao. Acoopt- anco of outside influnonco inovitably brings withit a noasuro of for- oign inflame in tho administration of a country, and this factor has always boon resontod by xonaphobic Albanians. Thus, 21 tho first con- stant element in Albanian foreign policy is securing foreign aid, tho second is normally to rid tho holper of any influence in her affairs. 7. Tho Conepiracy of General Koci X0X2 The most dramatic incidont marking tho decision to stand with RUSSIA, was the fall (sudden) of tho tftnistor of tho Interior, Gomm. issar Lieutenant Gonoral Del NOKB. In view of tho assiduous pre4tgo- slav propaganda, it is not strange that some of tho servants of the ro- gin? had. adhered quito closely to a policy of cooporation with the YUgoslavv. As a consquenco, when tho Party Lino changed., thoso poaplo wore considered as politically mrolinble to carry on in their posts.Tho persons who %%yr? most irt.otrlo-7711:7 ._,:,:n!.ttod had to be liquidated. The switCh-over vas occompun',c1 by crops of arrests, which wore followed in duo course by treason trials. Approved For Release 2004/069ECCFRPE5-35415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET 0. 21 A Survey of AVIA-71.^. (conttd) P,13 4 In all this, tho principal casualty vas tho nan who had boon alL.poworful as Ministor of tho Interior, and as Chiof of Mbrojto Papollorolt (Political Police).. The fall of =XX is typical of polit- ical life in ALBANIA. His liquidation cams as a rosult of outside imp. tervention rather than any internal force. Howovor, tho conspiracy which led to his undoing vas his own idea, and from an impartial view. point, he earned exactly what ho had worked for. In a Conmunist rogino thero is always an olomont of chance in the selection of a supremo loader from tho list of Party bosses. In ALSANIA, savor BOTHA was choson. But ho was not such a connanding pers- onality as to rule out the possibility of a replacorent by a favorably placed and determined man, ospocially when that man was already his Deputy. XDXS was the only Lieutenant General inALBANIA, and as such, . ho was the highest ranking officer under Colonel General SOW. 10XS had presided over tho first treason trial of inportanco when 60 *war erimiaal and anemias of tho peoples vero tried in 21m1 in April 1945 astor tho nmsinum amount of publicity. Sevontoon of thesetried were shot. A. year later, XOXS suceoodod in elininating the veteran, Mann. trained ComMuntst Elegulloh MAW:HOWL During tho first half of I9'8, =XS succeeded in surrounding RCM with his own spies and police, so that the nominal loader's real power was reduced to practically nothing, and ECM was under what amounted to house arrost. All that was !meal. ary was more tine and SCIBi could havo been suppressed altogothor, and with no difficulty, succeeded. by TOXL 2: f$ that loci =XS failed, when success seemed within his grasp, was not that he was insufficiently clover or strong, but that he was ars-Yugoslay. Tho Russians !Loaded that they needed a reliable man of their own ?Waco to suit their own purposes, to be head of Albanian affairs. Unfortunately for =XS, ha wasn't selected since the Soviets preferred IDSVA. Whon tho Dustin Mission gavo the word, IOU was arr- ested., thus restoring EOM to his former power. S. BUSSIA had :lover triken much interest in ALBANIA, except at cor- tain, particular nononts. /t wao XOXIts mdefortune that his arrest was one of those mononts. Tho Soviots attached oonsidorablo importance to the harrying of OHMS by rebel forces, then undor tho leadership of General MABXOS. Par this activity, they required unimpeded use of Alban. ion soil. As the unreliability of =Ca= bacon? more apparent to BUSSIA, the importance of ALBANIA increased, and it was from tho latter that the Greek operation was conducted, General IIAXICOS had his rain base, hoadvarters, armies, and wren his wireless station moved there. All this was too valuable to the Massimo, since they could rt afford to allow ? ALBANIA to parullel the legoelav action. This was tho main reason for ro.instating the docile =SA, eliminating the ?liable IMS, and re- aligning AIMAXIA with tho Cominform countries, AT41tA represented to STALIN exactly what she had represented to mum= a jv=pine-Off point for attack on MEL Tho Yugoslav Alliance, for all practical paz. poses, vas aide4.. ALUM*s now potTon was BOSSIA. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : SekeDetrE9,006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 a A Survey of ALBAIRA (cent' d) Pago 25 Inver NOMA was received with honor in RUSSIA, and most imp- ortant of all, Russian advisers were sent to ALBANIA in ever larger numbers, Russian and Roumanian ships began to strive with greater frequency at Burros and View Meanwhile, the Albanian and Greek rebel amiss wore kept mobilised and supplied, and at convenient mo- ments, the latter was sent across the Greek frontier to bring war and desolation to the Greeks. The Battle of the Grammes, 1941, cane and want. The Greek Amy, in an ardums eanpaign, drove the rebels fron their positions and *pacified, northern GRUM But the operation was not permanently successful since the rebels retired to their refuge,. there to rest and re-equip for the next season's campaign. In 1949, they appeared once more in GRUM in the region of yltaij and driven from there, they retired across the frontier, nove47iTrowkilemotors to the vest, and again anorged upon the Gramme. this tiqp, however, they had to contend with a fine soldier, Yield Marshal PAPAGOS, who in 1940, had defeated another and larger invasion from the same direction.. The Bat- tle of the Grannos,1949, was more decisive than its predecessor since fewer of the rebels escaped. The Greeks moreover, adopted a much more menacing attitude toward Albanian troops who used cover fire across the frontier, and for a tine, it appeared that the Greeks night aron pursue their enemies across the frontier into ALBANIA itself. Tirane Radio ahnounced, as it had a year previously, and with equal trnth, that arnod Greeks arriving across the frontier wore being interned. Tho Battle of the Grannos,1949, was docisivounot only for the Greeks, but also for ALBANIA. ler the time being, at any rate, it lad. the Russians to write off tho Greek rebels as ineffective, and the sus- pension of military efforts was announced by General VAMPS. PART III Goverment 9. Structure of the People's Republic of ALBANIA s. The Albanian Government and the Albanian *ricers' Party (Communist) are constructed on a pattern familiar in all Oominform countries. The structure may be described as vertical, with the Gov- ornsont and Party forming two parallel and nominally independent cob. umns. Although unrelated in theory, the leading positions in both the Government and the Party are occupied by the same, small group of mon, and the party exorcises a dominant influence over the Govermneut. Tho various witont Organisations', are independent in principle, but aro in fact subsidiary to the Party and constimte instruments for the furtb? ?ring of Party interests among specific aliments of the population. b. The Presidium (Presidium) is technically the highest govh. orning body of the Albanian Republic, and its members are elected by the' People's Assembly. The President (president') of the Prosidiva, ApAvecPPEAttigne 00at2Ir le?Pkelltl!ASANkilftik,006100200002-9 t7Y 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANTA (conttd) Pago 26 e. The Penplois Assembly (guvendi Popullor) is conposed of deputies (Deputot) fron the ton Prefectures of ALBAKIA, The Pros... tient of the Assonbly is Ymor MISEN/CA. Tho Cabinet (Oabinoti) consists' of sixteen portfolios, currently hold. by thirteen ministers. Those arot BMW. laver .TAKOVA Tuk SIDEV Mohnet VMS/ Gogo =UZI Aldyi ray= Kite ICISOMI Hanel =MA Spiro MEM ?ego SSW Abodin 7/LI Karam= SPAM' Bcdri Premier (Iiryemitister) Minister of National Defense (Minister i Mbrojtjes Ihnbetare) Minister of YoreignAffairs(Minister 1 Punewet To Jash- Vice4Premier (Nonpayeminteter) tone) vice-premier (Nen-Bratninister) Minister of Internal, 'Affairs (Minister 1 Panovet To Mbrendeshme) Minister of industry (Minister i ininstrise) Minister of Finance (Minister i 31mancavet) Minister of Commerce Master WOW:dial Minister of :lade() (Minister i Drojtesise Matter of Connunioations (Minister i.Xemunikao- sonovet) Minister of Agriculture (Minister i Itujosis) Minister of Public Weeks (Minister i Punevet Beton)) Minister of Ziacation (Minister i Aresinit) Minister of Social *Afore (Minister i Mimes Shopere) e. Also on cabinet level are the Control Commission (Ibmisjoni 1 Pentetllit), under the PTesidoncy of phthi =SC, and the *commie Planning Comnisnion (Ibmisonji i ?adult Skonemik), under the Presidency of Spiro TOLIMA. . f. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministgy of 110144eal Wiese ie theAmv(Ustrija) under Chief of Staff Wrote? f Shtabit Meatier) Mehmet SUM. g. Undetthe jurisdiction of the Ministry of Pitternai Affairs are the political Security Police (Siguibteit), the poiitical Direction (Drejtorija Politike), and the following regional unites Prefectures (Prefekturet); Sab?Prefectures (Nempitefekturat); Communes (Nenunet); and Cities and Villages (Qytete Die Pshate). There ton Prefectures, twenty-nine sub...Prefectures, and 161 Communes in'AilailA. ' h, The highest organ of the 'pikers* Party of AMNIA (Pertija e pontorovet Shqyptaro), formerly thpAUtenian Communist Party (partija "monist? Shaptare), is the.Secretarlot (Sekretarija), composed of the following members, TIC . - NOM *war Seer, 404eral tfiokretai I roregthoban) AVM Zak Seco 8oOtiotOt ti**Acretai) illIEU Metrast Sec (8.**41, 8:001tr WA Secretary (Sekrotar Approved For Release 2004/02/1? EAdDpit 01.15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Survey of ALSAIII. (contid) 1, 5211: 70,13,76;.aif.ag body Politburo,(Politbluo, or EloTativa has nine menbers: HOKEIA Enver ? :UM Tuk SEIM Mehmet IMAM Bari NOLA Spiro Page 27 of the Central Committee is the Co:mitt:10 (Reniteti Eksfkutiv). It NAPO EYsni Bil4SE0 liri SUL= Begir NUSE/ Gage t j. Tho Orgburo (Orgburo), or Organisational Committee (Xemiteti Orgenisativ), is the Central Committee body dealing w4th Party administrap. tivo problems. k. The Central Committee (Xemitoti gendreur) is the General Assembly or regional dologates of the Vbrkors, Party. /t consists of nineteen members today, tho twentieth, /SIAM! Stasi, was killed three months ago: Committee: EOM Enver JAKOVA TUk SEEM Mehmet SPABIU Bari EAPO HYsnd BEL/SEDVA. Liri RALLUKU Beer ' NUM Gogo EOM/ Nesbnijo ICOLECIL Spiro mar Abodin BEKTESEI Sadik HES/ Toodor EON= Manol PER/STERI Pilo DUKE Potrit ALIJA Banis MYPTItUfazraoh PRIM Mihal There are also nine Caaidate Members of the Central Bagir LOSE Raxhi 1:31LNGOLL/ Ramadan man NegtdP OldiANI Salt HAMITI Sejnol SOCAZ Soak PANO Spiro NUL= shawl 1. The Control Commission (Eamisjoni t ontrollit) is the bodr of the connunist Party authorised to adjudge the correctness of measures taken by the Port,? Whether by the Secretariat, Politburo, Central css. nittee, or may other committee ? and, whore 1t coosfit, to condemn the decisions. In this sense, it constitutes a Party supreme tritmnal, and stands apart from the direct chain of command. u6 A nuMhor of specialised committees exist within the Central Committee inelueng: The Ihmenis Committee (Komiteti Pomnuar); the Youth Corittoe (omitsti I 3inis)1 The Albanian Molar Cultural COO. ante? (icniteti Nultura Popullore Shoptare); The A4itoqrep Committee, 1.0, the Committee for Agitation and PreEmSandd (Lgitimaro.P. cnitett Agitacjan e Propaginde); and the Press and Propaganda Committee (IMaiteti Shtypit /he Propagandist). Approved For Release 2004/02/16: ELAelfit0f5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ROMA layer Colonel General, General Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party since its foundation. Born: 1908 at Gjinokastre Iducation: llementary School in Giinokastre, and High School in Wis. In 1931 he enrolled at the University of Montpelier (FRANCE) where he studied Natural Science for a period of a year. Was expelled from MEW because of immoral conduct. tnrolled at the University of Brussels (BELGIUM) where he studied Law for one year. Was apointed as Professor of Prencn: at the High School in Korcg. where he remained from 1936 to 1939. ?ecame a member of the Communist Group at Korea in 1937 along with IOCI X0xe and Fan' Iristo. During the Italian Occu?etion of ALBANIA. HOA managed a cigarette store in Tirana. Toward the and of 1942, he was in the sone around I.abinot. working with the :3mmunist organizers from YUGOSLAVIA: POPOVIC Milan and MUOOSA Dusan. In 1943. ROMA was in contact with the exponents of NBALLI KOKIIITARI with a view toward bringiag about an aMeeMent concerning joint operations against the Gorman*. Approved For Release 2004/02/19CFR : F3006100200002-9 : , Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET HOXHA Inver (continued) During the same year, he had contacts with Julian AWRY of the British Secret Service. In the Fall of 1943, ROM met TUMANOTIC Systosar alias "TEMPO", and JCVANOVIC Blau). These two were also Aity organisers from JUGOSLAVIA, and they appointed NOM as Chief of Staff of the Albanian Army. After the war, HOXHA became Chief of the Goveramon reign Ma- later in conjunction with being Chief of Staff. In 1946, he went to Paris as leder of the Albanian Delegation which attended the Peace Conference. He has received the following decorations: the Albanian order, "NATIONAL ROO"; the Soviet "ORM OF SOVOROV (1st Class); and the highest Yugoslav order, "ZA HRLEROST" (ibr Courage) ts well as several other lesser 4corations. In 1947, he went to PSCOW for the first time. In December 1949, he again went to *scow bit this this with a request, for a peace treaty and a mutual assistance padt. Itp. to the ptesent, all negotiations based on HOXHAls requests of 1949 have rommiaod wishful thinking on the part of the Albanian Government. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 biti FET0415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2 JAKONTA Ttik Major General, Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party Born: .1314 at Scutari Education: Five elementary grades Profession: Carpenter. Was employed by the "Vllasen Daija", a carpenters enterprise, to December 1942. Political and Military Careers: 1935 - Became a member of the Scutari Communist Group. 1",;41 - Member of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party. During the war, he was Brigade, Division, end Army Corps Political Commissar with rank of Colonel. After the war, he held the following pos- itions: Deputy at Scutari; President of the General Albanian Syndicate Union; Albanian Minister to Belgrade; and Minister of Industry. 1950 - President of the Albanian Workers Party, and also Vice Prime Minister. Has been decorated with the Albanian order "NATICKAL HEROTM, and by YU;OELAVIA and RUSSIA. Approved For Release 2004/0p.119 t-ritler5R006100200002-9 4 , 20. Approved For Release 2004/0 : 15R006100200002-9 SHEHU Mehmet Major General, Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party. Born: 1913 at Corrush (Mallakastra) Education: Soviet Military Academy "VCROSHILOV" Military and Political Careers: -1936 - A volunteer in SPAIN (International Brigade) 1943 - A crididate for the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party. During the war, he became a Bride Commandant pnd Division Commandant, with rank of Colonel. 1946 - Chief of Staff, and Deputy at Tropoja. ln4g - Minister of the Interior (holds same position at present.) Has been decorated with the Albanian order "NATICNAL HERO", and several other lesser dic- Approved For RcIriptf219114Q2/1VirlArystljOffT06100200002-9 4?11? tn. Approved For Release 20 .7.-6ii J415R006100200002-9 SPAHIU Bedri 1-1,ajr General, Secretary of the Workers Party, AL7A7IA. Born: 190g at Glinokastre Education: Military School (Artillery) in 171 at Tirana Military Career: 1935 - ApLointed as a Warrant Officer Political Career: 19h1 - Secretary of the Communist Party, Gjinoknstre 1943 MemtE,r of the Plenum of the Central Commissar of the Headquarters for the Zones of Valona and Gjinokastre. 1944 - Minister of Reconstruction, an elect- to the PCLITFURO of the Party Central Committee. 1945 Public Attorney, Special Trilunal in Tirana. 14 Public Attorney, Albanian Pe:;le's Republic -(Holds same position at gre- sent time.) 1949 - Minister for Social Assistant-e. Approved For Release 2/005i02T191T:ittilltintr111 - 1*c. 00200002-9 Approved For Release 2004(0249i RE1100415R006100200002-9 biLL KOLEKA Spiro I:ember of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee the Worrs Party, ALBArIA. T?crn: 1906 at Vuno (Himara) cat norletri! rnronal ITALY, and Civil 2ngineering Faculty, Pisa, T7kLY. 1--)litic-a1 Career: (Date Unknown) - Deputy at Himara 1.47 - 1948 - Minister of Public and Scientific Institutes. - Minister Of Communications 1,50 - President of the Ste icon- Ic Commission. Approved For Release 2004/0241 -mem tir?a 06100200002-9 Approved For Release 200 /02/19 v-Cin8.3r15R006100200002-9 S KAPO Rysni Major General, member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, ALBANIA. Born: 1915 at Terbac (Valonl) iducation: High School Political Career: 1941 - Political Secretary of the Party Regional Committee, Valona. 1943 - Member of the Plenum of the Party Central Committee. During the war he was a Brigade and Army Corps Commissar. After the war he was appointed as Minister to Belgrade, and as Aide to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Became a member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, and a Deputy in Valona. 1950 - President of Political Direction for the Army. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :(CIA-R1111 IA100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/1 006100200002-9 BELISROVA Liri Member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, ALBANIA. Born: 1926 at Mallakastra Education: High School Political Career: 1943 - Secretary of the Regional Com- mittee, Albanian Communist Youth, Tirana. 1344 - Member of the Central Committee, Altantan-worKers rarty. 1946 - Political Secretary of the Central Committee, Albanian Communist Youth. 1948 - President of the Albanian People's Republic Youth, and a candidate for the POLITBURO of the Central Commit- tee of the Party. 1949 - Member of the POLITBURO of the Cent- ral Committee of the Party. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : 111000200002-9 gra Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83700415R006100200002-9 ' I BULLUKU Beqir Major General, member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Phirty, ALBANIA. 7 1144 P1E,.141% ram High School Career: 1943 - Brigade Commandant 1944 - Army Corps Commissar 1945 - Commissar at the Headquarters of Hinterland Units, Division aommandant and Deputy, Tirana 1948 - Chief of Staff Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :da-RDP8K0i0AiR006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP93-00415R006100200002-9 ?TSAI Gogo o? the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of Wor rt Party, ALBANIA. : at Vuno (Was) /It Biirh. School 11 Carlin.: 1543 - Political Secretary, Party Regional Committee, /ir*Ass and later, a member of the Party Central COMILi'. tee. 1945 - Deputy at Nimara 1947 - Minister of Commerce 19.48 - Miniatar of Indus t rr 1949 - Elected a member of the POL.- ITEM? of the Party Central Committee. Approved For Release 2004/02/ Tvt?C -RDR83 00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/069EIORRIE01p15R006100200002-9 A SurvortfALPAUTA-(centta) ?go 28 The structu:o of the Albanian Workers! Party below the direetw tonal lovol follows that of the Albanian Governmont, Prefoctura Exp. ecutivo Committees (Komitoti Eksokutiv 1. Profokturos)smist on the prefectural lovol, formed of roprosontativo fran the Oul?Profoctural Committoos:(Komiteti i 1on4Prefo1cturos), which in turn arc ?looted by the Communal Offioos (2yria o Komunevot). Tho Cell (Colula) constitutw os the lowest lovol of the Party structure. Every Prefecture has in its Party organization an Economic Committoo (Ibmitoti lkonom4) which is composed of various soctiona (Sokcjoti) doaling with linances, 30ot* omit's, Sanitation, etc. n. Tho front organizations servo as instruments for CoMmunist penetration and indoctrination of specific elomonts Of the 0:01,4a.n pop- ulation. They are designed to gather into Party dontrolledorgAnisow tions those parsons who aro not eligible for Party msbhorship.' Tho structure of thoso organs parallels that of tho Vorkors8 Seri. pig include; Ths Union of Albanian tbmon (I*.shkimi I Gravot Shqyptarslt Tho Committoeof Albanian ler Casualties and Partisans (Tomitoti las validet Shqyptaro dhe Partizonot); The Albanian Trado Union Amain! tion (Sindakatat); Tho Union of Working Youth of ALBANIA (liaah.ilcimi Rinis se Punos Shqiporiso), formerly tho Communist Youth of4211ANU (Einija Komunisto Shaptaro); sdslaiary to tho Union of *?I tath ,of ALBANIA is tho Pionoors (Pionori), an organization for Chililtron under twelve years of ago; the Albanian Pod Cross Coni 1.24:84yptar); Tho Albanian-Soviet Union Coltural Association (Shocini3a Per $001hkapun1m, in 'Cultural Shqypni.US); The Association for Physical iducotlon and Sport (fisikultura o Sporti); The Union of Albanian Antt-Yaoeist Youth (Bashkimi 1 .nisAmWshisto Shqyptaro), with a much broadarrumObori. ship than the elite Wbrking Youth; Tho Professional Union (3ashki9st Profesionalo); and The Association for Assistance to tho,AM to-4 tense (Shoqnija per Mime Vehtrise Dho Mbrojtjos) or SkNUN, an ore. anization designed to proparo Albanians for military oervico and for officiont national defense. 10, ittxtl....ltua'ALA1,1o1)04da,a Vbrkerst.Porty,. Yellowing is the text of the *Statute of tho Albanian tbrkere, Party", rePortedly approved by the Albanian Communist 06:nee's during tho early part of 1949. As Statute of tho Albanian Markers! Party: 1. The primary af,im of tho Statute ts tho astonishment of a Socialist and Communist social order in ALBANIA. 2. The Albanian Vbrkorst Party, with record to its activities, is guided by the thoorios of the founders and motors of Uninism and Marxism, namely: Wine !BULB, Lome and Ale present stato of devolopmont of Alamo the Albanian Ito ;WV' adbiliaas and directs the class of 'forger', peasants and other typos of worker' of 4 ; p riaS? * Approved For Release 2004/02/19 CIA-R14183-00415R0061.002900V-91? ? a* ? ? SECRET ? ; ? Approved For Release 2004/ ..;=; E ok-Ra3:0415R006100200002-9 A Survey of .."..72LII/A (conttd) Page 23 tho country in their struggle against the romnants of Fascism and Yeudalisn; against tho mentality of the bourgoisio and of the re- actionaries; for the dofonse of national independence and territ- orial inviolability; for tho consolidation of donocracy and of the might of the people; for the edification of the country by neans of its industrialization and electrification: and for the odification and development of the Statels economy and of 000poratives. Ity work. ing toward these aims, it will be possible to achieve higher economic, cultural and technical standards for the working class and for the wholo nation. 3. Tho Party gives its full support to the development and education of the Proletariat and of the generation. /t directs tho democratic front (Pronti Denokratik) and all organisations of the workers and of the Statets onployeos, also the efforts to inprovo living conditions of all the workers. It fights for the strengthen,- ing of the democratic cause, against warmongers, against racial die- crinination, for a defense of the ethnic and democratic rights of tho minorities, and for a consolidation of the international solidadtiry of the workers of all countries, 4. The Albanian bbrkorst Party concontsates all its efforts toward a closo cooperation within the democratic anti-imperialist field and primarily toward a sincere friendship with the VSS24 tho guide in this fiold, and with tho countries which have a Peoples Democracy, 5. Tho Party donands from its members proof of their act- ivity and self-dendal in tho performance of the work for the real.. ization of the program and the observance of the Statute. This is necessary in order that the Party may effectively curry out the pro- gram and insure unity among the ranks of the Party, B. Duties and Rights: 1, pi is the duty of each member: (1) to fight for the pro- gram of the 'arty; (2) to bocono familiar with the basic doctrines of Marxill and Zeninism; (3) to observe discipline, unity and vigilance; (4) to be an example of good conduct and moral(); (5) toact in accord- anco with the norms of labor (planned according to tho Passion brigades system) and of the States laws; (6) to become perfect (to improve) in tho skill of h$p profession; (7) to strengthen the ties with the masses and be sympathet$0 to their wishes and to guide thom and to elucidate to them the Party line policy; and (S) to be a mombor of one of the mass organizations or a labororst organization and to establish tho organization Where it does not exist. 2. The member has the right to participate in discussion, to attend meotings, and to take part in the activity of the Party press. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 200,52eGIRRIE81700415R006100200002-9 A Survey of (cont d.) Page 30 In the couvao of Party meetings, be has the right to critic.. ie the activity of any member. He has the right to elect or to be elected into any of the party bodies, He has the right to refer any question to any Party body, including the Central Committee, C. Admission to the Party: 1. 4.910r0On cm u to namittod. to the party art,vw he has bean a candidate for one year, In the case of indaotrial workors and candidacy is only nix months, Tho candidates attend. tho Party meetings and have a consulting vote. They are bound to respect the same rules as the Party members. Nocossary ago to be admitted to the Party (mem. berShip or candidacy) is eighteen years. Persons exploiting the labor of others are not eligible to bow= nombors. 2, Admission of workers as candidates must be accompanied by a recommendation on the part of tun members who have to their cred? it at least one yaw of activity within the Party. Poor poasants need a recommendation by one Party member whet has had one year of activity within the Party. Moderately wealthy peasants (small holders) and art.. miens (handicraftsmen) mood a recommendation by two Party mombers with two years activity within the Party. Intellectuals need a roOommon6. ation by three Party members, each of whom must have had throe years activity within the Party. 3. With regard-to the first two categoric., the members recommending the candidate must have known the porton. for at least six months, Ilth rogard to tho last categories, this teriod must lc at least OW year. 4. Tho suggestion to admit a person to the Party is made by the basic organization Of which the candidate Is a:member. His adm mission as a Party manor must be approvod by the noarost higher comm. itteo, 5. Expulsion from the Party is usually decided in the baste organization mooting and then approvet by the nearest higher committee. Tho expelled members can submit an appeal against the expulsion decision to any Party body, including the Central Committee. D. Structure and Democracy: 1. Tho structure and organization of the party is based upon the principles of democratic contralization. Tho Party loaders who represent the various organs of the Party are elocted by secret ballot aad are obliged to render account to the masses by whom ther hare boon elected. Decisions are discussed liberally however, when adoptod by the majotity, they aro to be adhered to by the minority without question. The decisions taken by the suprdmo organs are comm. pulsory for all subordinate organs. Local probldms are solved by the respective organisations, according to the principles of autonomy*, with,. out &taping the general course of action of the Party: Approver or e ease 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDH3g04r006100200002-9 SEC Approved For Release 2004/0139ECCRITE0111415R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALIMITIA cent, (3.) Page 31 Tho supremo body of the Party is the Congroes, Which olocts the Central Comnittoe and tho Committeo on Revision. liar the cities and their administrative sub-divisions, the supremo body is the co- rrosponding Conference, which elects the eonmittee; While for tho basic organization, it is the General Mooting, which elects tho Soo- rotary Genoral or the Bureau, In cases Where the majority demands, or Whoro the Central Committee wishes to verify its policy, political iSSUDS of the Party cam to submittod for discusilion by all in tho Party. E. Superior Bodios (National); 1. The Congress of tho Party gonerally moots evorY three years; tho Central Committee may, however, convono tho Congress for Ivor usual oases or by a one-third vote of the participants of the last Con- gross, The Congress ratifies the work performed on the part of the Control Committee, it modifies the program of tho Party and the Party Statute, it elects the Central Committee and the Gommittoo on Bovision, and it fixes tho number of their components, 2, Tho candidates of the Central Committeo attend all moot. ings, having tho right to express their consultative opinion, The Cent,. rel Committee elects the Politburo for the porformanco of tho general work and it appoints a secretary for current affairs, The central Com- mittee moots every three months. Every year itcalls a conference of the representatives elected at tho plenary zwetinGs of tho Spocial Comps mittoe for the purpose of deciding on important questions of the Party aad it may call an additional conforonco if onosfifth of its mambos." wore deprived of representing the Goomittoo, Tho Commission col 30- vision chocks on the !peed and accuracy in which tho Party affairs are being handled, as well as its financial situation. F. Party Bodies within Citios, Districts, and City Districts: 1, In these Party organizations, the highest body is that of tho Conference, which moots onco a year. Special nootings are hold following a decision of tho corresponding (city,city district) Control Committee, or the Committee or the delegates to tho Congress, The Goo. mittee elects a Politburo and two socrotarios with at least throe yoarst activity within the Party; their appointment to be approved by the Party Central Committee, 2. The basic organization of the party is established in every working cloister, military unit, public institution (organization), or villago Where there are more than two members of the Party, The basic osganization organizes the masses and conducts tho agitation and propaganda activities according to the Party lino policy. The cell 04- ucates tho membors and is responsible for the working plan bang cam- nod, out according to the mission; it mobilizos the masses toward a. realization of the working plan; it fights against deficiencies and works toward the improvenent of tho material and cultural standard of the masses Approved For Release 2004/02/19 ? CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004528 el/R21E8r00415R006100200002-9 A Surrey of ALBArIA (cont' d.) Page 32 Each basic organisation totalling less than 15 members elects only one secretary, while those totalling a higher membership elect their own Politburo, The *Were' Party directs the organisation of the youth, and it provides for their education in conformity with the principles of Marxism and Leninism. 3. A member who fails to obey orders from superior bodies, or who commits actions considered as crimes in the opinion of the Party, can consequently be admonished, with the punishment entered in the off. onderls records, or he can be temporarily deprived of the right to occ. upy a leading position with the Party, or as a further punishment ho can be expelled from the Party. The members of the Central Committee can be expelled from the Central Committee or from the Party itself by twe-thirds vote of the plenary meeting, 4. The financial resources of the Party are constituted from contributions and income from Party enterprises. The contributions range from 5 lok to 3 per cent of the monthly income of the member. PART /V 'Peace, Bread and VOrkw 11. The Communist Conception of the Pour Proodons A. Yellowing is a resume of a statement nado in the Albanian Refugee Camp wRaxhi.Qirjakow in Piraeus, GREECE, by Mehdi BERM. an Albanian Who escaped from his native country to GREECE in 19471 1. Wtor almost insumountable difficulties, / succeeded in shaking off the Communist yoke and finally reached Piraeus. /t vas no easy task to circunvont the Albanian Communist frontier guards. New that I have regained liberty, I fool it incumbent upon no to reveal to the world what is going on in ALBAS/A, and to disclose the hardships that a proud and distinguished nation like ALBANIA. has to endure. Under pretense of democracy she has been deprived of her liberty by the barbarous sup- porters of the Bolshevik:program. By April 1947, the jails of Eerat were overcrowded with political prisoners who were serving sentences-argard labor. Guarded by armed Red agents, any attempt to break away would have proved suicidal. Those moral and material sufferings natured in us the determination either to regain liberty or die. It so bepponed that about forty of the internee had formed a group, and on 17 April 1947. When re- turning from their work, attacked their armed escorts in the vicinity of Beret. Eeying main() pistols and band grenades, these desperate men wero soon engaged in an embittered handr-to.hand struggle with their guar- ds. Only three of the prisoners survived and finally reached the Greek frontier. / loss one of themP. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/0259 IIERREE0715R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBAr/A (contd.) Page 33 2. The First rays of the Bed Regime After /t Had Assumed Power "It was common knowledge that Communist bande had been organ,. ised under the pseudonym "Nacional Olirimiar" (rational Liberation) head- ed by two Slav agents from Belgrade, and known only by the names 1,34/LADIr* and "EOM". They wore foilowed by fanatic Albanian Communists who blind.- ly obeyed-orders thoy received. After a complete victory over the Alban- ian democratic Nationalists, they entered Tirane and immediately comma- ed carrying out the program of the Russian Revolution of 1917. This evil? ent was marked by the mass executions of intellectuals, workers, merchants, proprietors, and ecclesiastics. Persecutions and arrests ware a daily 000urence. The Red bandits justified their barbaroui methods by placard- tug these crimes as a struggle against Nazt-lascist collaborators and traitors. No time was wasted in establishing.a Democratic 'rent by moans of intimidation, such as tortures and arrests, thus separating the pop- ulation from a regime which had fought for the liberty of AMNIA with un- remitting valor. On 2 December 1946, an election day. I was jailed and deprived of all my civil rights, Today, i am in a position to testify to the =AY terroristic acts and measures that were reverted to on that specific date to ensure amajority of votes.- It must be mentioned at this point that not even the slightest opportunity was offered to the population to exp- ress its own opinion or to vote against the solid electoral body of the Red Regime. But, in spite of all that, there were many who remained un- dauntedly true to their patriotic sentiments and either butned their bal.,. lot-papers or Otherwise refrained from voting, The Red Government, in order to complete the number of votes, forced minors to the voting booths, with the result that on 2 December 1946, a regime was set up that bore the brand of a legal, self-nominated government, constituting the basis of the Peoples' Republic of ALBANIA, though practically built up on Sovw. let Republican principles, Thus, 2 December 1946 became the date that doomed the liberty and independence of the Albanian nation and actually was the date of issuance of a death warrant for the population., Thus ALBANIA became part of the governmental machinery of TITO (STALLIT) in a political, military, administrative and economic sense. All orders and directives emanated from the Wrenlin via lielgrado, 3. The Disintegration of Albanian Culture and Traditions "Under the now regime all existent laws were abolished and substituted by acts dictated from Moscow. This was followed by burning all private and public libraries and. otherbooks, which caused an irr- ?parable loss to national culture. New books published wore pervaded by Marxist4eninist propaganda. Traditions that had been Bo jealously guarded by the Albanians and respected by previous occupation forces had to yield to a destructive opposition characterised by showy con.. ferences and theatrical performances. Where legal measures failed to attain the desired effect, executions and arrests sealed the fate of "reactionary elements"; Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/0 VECt- FRIDE-11415R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBANIA (contsd) Page 33 2. The First Doors of the Red Roane After /t Had Assumed Power nIt was common knowledge that Communist bands had been orgnn.. trod under the pseudonym 'Maclean]. Clirintarft (National Liberation) head.. ed by two Slav agents from 3elgrado, and known only by the nanos nIKILADIP and 'TUSSAH% They wore followed by fanatic Albanian Communists who blind.. ly oboyed.orders-they received. After a complete victory over the Alban- ian democratic Nationalists, they entered Tirana and immediately commeno- ed carrying out the program of the Russian Revolution of 1917. This oil* ont vas marked by the mass executions of intellectuals, workers, merchants, proprietors, and ecclesiastics. Persecutions and arrests were a daily occurence. The Red bandits justified their barbarout methods by placard? ing those crimes as a struggle against Nazi-Fascist collaborators and traitors. No time was wasted in establishing.a Democratic Front by means of intimidation, such as tortures and arrests, thus separating tho pop- ulation from a regime which had fought for the liberty of AMNIA with uxp. ranttting valor. On 2 December 1946, an election day, / was jailed and deprived of all my civil rights, Today, I an in a position to testify to the many terroristic acts and measures that were restrted to on that specific date to ensure a majority of 414014 It must be mentioned at this point that not even the slightest opportunity was offered to tho population to exp- ress its own opinion or to vote against the so/id electoral body of the Red Regime. rut, in !pito of all that, there were many who remained tap. dauntedly true to their patriotic sentiments and either bullied their bal.. lot-papers or Otherwise refrained from voting. The Red Government, in order to complete the number of votes, forced minors to the voting booths, with tho meat that on 2 December 1946, a regime was set up that bore tho brand of a legal, self-nominated government, constituting the basis of the Peoplesi Republic of A/MANIA, though practically built up on Soy.. tot Republican principles. Thus, 2 December 1946 became the date that doomed the liberty and independence of the Albanian nation and actually vas the date of issuance of a death warrant for the population. Thus ATZAITTA became part of tho governmental machinery of TITO (sTato in a political, militapr, administrative and economic sense. All orders and directives enanated from tho Kremlin via 041grader 3. The Disintegration of Albanian Culture and Traditions "Under the now regime all existent laws wore abolished and substituted by acts dictated from Moscow. This was followed by burning all private and public libraries and. otherlooks, which caused an irr- eparable loss to national culture. New books published were pervaded by Marxist4oninist propaganda. Traditions that had. been so jealously guarded by the Albanians and respected by previous occupation forces had to yield to a destructive opposition characterized by showy cox.' ferences and theatrical performances. Where legal measures failed to attain the desired effect, executions and arrests sealed the fate of AaPBMIVERRekatarlaM/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/069Ecepre0tit15R006100200002-9 A Survey: of ALBANIA (conttd) 4. The Elimination of National Emblems "Changes in this direction were begun by adding !pikes of grain to the right and left of the Albanian bicipotal (two-headed) eagle and adding a red star on top. The tombs of earlier martyrs that cam. enorated Albanian history were done ay with. The Albanian nation had been !pending a fortune on the maintenance of those sacred symbols _of the past, but the iron heel of Connunism, with merciless indifference, destroyed these shrines leaving no trace of monuments to those whose nanes appeared on the national roll of honor. All this happened in the wake of Connunism in which the Albanian nation had. placed its only hope for justice and libertyl. Pogo 31+ 5. Destruction of the Traditional Honor of the 7amilY "One of the most virtuous features of Albanian traditien is the education of womanhood. These were customs anxiously guarded by parents during the pest centuries in order to give to the nation mothers capable of begetting a sound generation. /t was duo to these mothers that the characteristics of the Albanian nation were preserved throughout the past, turbulent centuries, One of the salient traits was the practice of moral duties based on rigid. patriarchal principles. It required all the cunning and intelligence of the Conmunist agents to unrp domino these traditions, and in part, they surcooded. Albanian women wore drafted to serve in Partisan units: some more used in the espionage service: others, actuated by overindulgence in Communist doctrines even wont to the extent of denouncing their own parents and causing their ex- ecutions. Prostitution, which had boon unknown in the past, became ramp. pant, being promoted by Communist comnisears. Brothels were later abol- ished, and in their places cultural centers wore sot up whore conteroms cos were supposed to be hold. Remover, those centers served as meeting places of amusements. Drastic measures were in store for those parents mho objected to their daughters frequenting these circles, for they wore taken care of by the ROMA, police of both sexes. Marriage, a sacred mat* ter in A/aAN/A and celebrated in accordance with ancient traditions, bor.. cane a thing of the past. Parents had no voice in planning the futures of their daughters, /n March 1945, on tho occasion of the demobilisation of Al- banian women, Major General Bodri SPAM addressed his audience in a !pooch. After having eulogized the active part taken by the Albanian women during the war, and having *trailed their loyal attitude in emit..ice' situations, m6 bade farewell to the demobilised women, Who, as he said, were returning to the domestic ftres$de, On this occasion, ho promised every demobilized soldier or Gommuntst civilian 'filling to con.- tract marriage with a demobilized woman alseqium of 6,000 francs, equal to 60,000 bk. The number of women was conliderablos many of theolloing conscious of the welcome they mould be accorded duo to their past mid,. uct, refused to return hones The led Government was forced to cancan- trato these homeless women at Durres, and later oompelled them to get ApripaggeddEoTrItrregnilintrr.tb&-n-gaiRreOnt0200e010621. E Approved For Release 2004/021S :e1ellirEOTI5R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBANIA (contld) Page 35 In the village of Tatzat in the Delvina District, for instance, a father shot his partisan daughterto vindicate the disgrace brought upon the family. Similar occurrences took place in other parts of ALBABIA and serve to prove the corrupt methods practised by the Communists to destroy the traditional patriarchal ties". 6. Public Instruction wEducation as practised in the past has been abrogated. Sch- oolsand educational institutions that had been conducted on national principles and western mothods were adbstituted by Communist schools, characterized by n revolutionary and politlitai program of action aimimg at the individual considering himself as a simple means and not as a factor of civilization. The Russian and Serba-Croat languages have become obligatory in Albanian high schools. The educational prograin of politics, economics, history, and socialism has been adapted to that practised in the Soviet Union, with special regard to the biographies of Yugoslav and Soviet personalities who took loading parts in the revm olutions. national songs or hymns have been prohibited and intonations on the Soviet Revolution have taken their p1a.0". 7. Agrarian Ream and. Expro riation of Land "The promises made to the Albanians as a means of satiSfying the demands of the partisans were not kept. On the contrary, they were deprived of their principal tights. The Agrarian Reform was put into.pr- netts?, thereby ignoring justice and the democratic spirit. The land was simply taken from owners who were suspected of reactionary sentiments ibutoitausuLig those who enjoyed the confidence of the govern.. mcnt. This procedure had a killing effect on the bourgoisio, and gave birth to a new ideological class. /t was the mountain population that was primarily and most seriously affected by,the now agrarian reforms. They openly voice their discontent, ?specially of the fact that they were not accustomed to the change in climatiticonditions; that they were not housed properly due to lack of housing facilities and guf- feted undue hardship; and that they had been deprived of their agricult? ural implements. The Albanian press did not fail to give tho matter a twist, in that it prominently displayed those reforms as meaoures taken along lines of extreme, justice. The objective was to in the confidence of the population and to throw sand into the eyes of foreign observers. But as with all other jugglery, these tricks perfumed by the government were soon unmasked.. Later on, all farm products were de.. clared as property of the state and had to be delivered to the authorit- ies. The farmer, having been left with inadequate supplies to cover his own personal demands, was compelled to bey products at cooperative stores and at higher rates than those paid to him", 12. .....MESuSIEELELat_2211C12.4-1n-giWU A. The following information WAX obtained from an Italian AppregtrPhgelta t, ittlts 68O9 returned to SECRET Approved For Release 2004SE CliFillE85r00415R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBAN/A (cont d) Page 36 B. In 1944, after the Communists gained control in ALBANIA, persecution of thn (.'hfllic clergy commenced. The Communists, aoo? ording to the above=ntioned 0ource, have executed or imprisoned tho following Catholic priests: 1). Franciscan Padre Anton RAPAR/ was given a trial in Tirane and charged with being a member of the National Regency during tho Gorman Occupation. In spite Of tho intervention of tho Catholic Apost.. olic Delegate, S. NIGRIS, in the Autumn of 1945 Padre HAPABI was convict- ed and shot. 2) Padre Alfonso MOM, of German extraction, was sentenced and shot to death at Shkoder in August 1946. The reason for his execut- ion is unknown. 3) Don 'CURTI, of Tirane, was sentenced and shot after having boon accused of collaboration with the German and Italian Occupation forces. 4) Monsignor? Vincence PP31NUSRI, Bishop of Durres, died in jail, February 1949, while serving a sentence for alleged subvorsivo act. ivities. 5) Monsignor? VOLA:, Bishop of Lesh, was shot by tho Albanian Communist Government for reasons unknown. 6) Franciscan Padre Gjon SRLLAZU was shot in 1947 for having disobeyed government orders. (Typo of orders unknown). 7) Padre Lek? SIRDANI, of 220., was slain in 1946 for having refused sumort to Communist Partisans, 8) Franciscan Padre Franc XIX was shot in 1947 for having allegedly concealed firearms. 9) Padre Anton KIRT was shot in 1947 for reasons unknown. 10) Padre Tome LAW was sentenced to servo a prison torn for having sympathized with anti-.Communist movements. 11) Padre Mihel xoLicli. of Shkoder, was sentencod to 30 yoars at hard labor after being tried for collaboration with the German and Italian Occupation forces. HO is now in forcod labor near /lbasan. 12) Franciscan Pedro Agostin Asam was sentenced to 20 years at hard labor for having possession of firearms. 13) esuit Padre Giacomo GARDINI was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor in the concentration camp at PUka. 14) Franciscan Pedro Gasper SUMA, of Thothii was sontonced to 10 years at hard labor for having opposed Commuaa-7evornment orders. Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/181E G-RFED-T5415R006100200002-9 A Survoy of d) Page 37 15) jesuit aro li&BLPI Mark was sentenced to 20 years in prison for ns o 16) 1:a.e r4cL Doutit is confined. in prison for unknown reasolis, 17) Jesult Padxo GM:1n PAUTELL&i.en.s sentenced to 30 years for collaboration vith the Germans ezd %'oaaic..ms. This prlest attompted an escape from prison, but was unsuccessful and died of the wOunds recoiv- e(1 when apprehended.. 1S) Franciscan Padre Cook AMA has been jailed for unknown reasons, 19) Franciscan Padre /njac Mk= has boon jailed for unkaown reasons, 20) Luigi PIOI was an Albanian priest who was known to have collaborated with a group of National Communists in 1947. Bbwover, he was tried and executed by a firing squad. O. The Source., of this report estimated. that approxbnatoly forty priests have been executed since tho and. of the war: D. /n the Spring of 1946, the Apostolic Delegate S. NIGBIS was expelled from =Ara on a charge of having resisted government orders, This action was in aacordance with an Albanian directive which grants the police a free hand in the removal of strong adversaries. Z. During. the Autumn of 1946, the Albanian Government issued an order to close all Catholic sonvoftte and seminaries in the country. On 20 December 1946, one group of nuns were told to vacate their convent on a half hour :9 notice, and were allowed to carry with them only a ainirrum amount of their belongings.. This convent, on ?la Shen Mehilli 45, Shkoder, was then occupied by the D.M.P. (uniformed police). In view of this action, the nuns had. no alternative bat to turn to the civilian pypulation for hospitality. They were AO longer allowed to wear the garb of their order. The Franciscans shared the same treatment in having to vacate their seminaries, monasteries, etc, Their monastery on Via Washington, Shkoder (now palled Corso 1101B4 Inver), has been converted into a food ratioking office. The Bishopts residence at Shkoder has become a tobacco warehouse, The Shkoder parish house ler7es as a school for apprentice shoemakers, while the Vomit Seminary has teen converted into a medioal clinic. The Salesian Sisters were also evicted and their convent in Shkoder, located at Via G1Th007 Shtjefea 411, has become a physical train.. ing center for the nPioneersT! (00munist ahildrens Organization). movable assets of the Jesuit property at Bardhonlore have been requis- itioned and are now state-owned lands, 7. Among the ecclesiastical properties which were confiscated by the state. were the librariee of the Franciscans and Jesuits, and '? ?f SECRET Approved For Release 2004/0SECCIEPEI-C1415R006100200002-9 A Survey of =AMA (contld) Pago 3$ Padre PUHA, such as tho fflAhuta o Maoist! wore also destroyed. Those books weno burned because there was no room in the Communist curriculum for such consorvativo teachings, The Museum of the Itanciscan Padres at Shkoder and the Physical Institute of tho Jesuits were also confiscated by TErstato and declared government property. In addition to the above- mentioned properties, the printing estaYishment of tho clorta Ddoc =W, known as tho ffTipografia Nikajff; the ffTipografia Zoja a Paperlyemoff of the Jesuits, and tho ffTipografia Prancoskanoff were all turnod into state-owned enterprises, G. Visits to hospitals and jails by are pormittod only in case of doath or during religious holidays. Sisters continuo to por. form their duties in hospitals but are compelled to year, stroot clothes. The governmont has plazod no restriction on attondanco of the Catholic Church, although this practice of attonding church is considered reactionary. H. Tho Albanian Govemont favors the Orthodox Church but 'it is rumored that a purge of certain elements within this church is projected, in view of objections raised in regard to tho states interference in re. ligious mattors. The hoad of tho church has been substitutod for by an. othor man whose nano is unknown at the moment, Tho Orthodox Church in ALBANIA, is a national institution and the government is oxpocted to pro- tect her since its follawors aro the most faithful in their attitudo to. ward the state, rotoworthy to montion is tho fact that members of tho Orthodox Church sinultanoously act as loading oxpononts of the Communist Parts*, I. The Popo ss ox.communication orders concerning Communists have produced sensible moral repercussions among tho population. Truo to form, tho Albanian press interpreted tho decision takon by the /Patio= as an indication of fear on the part of the Church,and the Albanian Communist Govornmont has disrogarded tho ban imposed by tho Vatioan and will not permit any compliance with tho clauses contained in tho em.conmw unioation ordor, J. The following is a list of known Catholic clorgrnen who have boon authorized by tho Albanian Communist Govornmont to pursue their eco. losiastic works in that countrYs Padre Zof sitRoi, a Josult Pedro Etmesto 002A4 at Shkodor Pedro Marin simmars, a Pranciscan Pedro Pordinand PI, a Franciscan Those priests rocoivo identical troatmont as tho gonoral pub. lie in rogard to rationing of foodstuffs and clothing. /1-, is intaTest. ing to note further that approximatay throe Igcr d?x.i.; of the A:bailian Catholics hold government positons, and arc) ilza of the !.'ord7:nkst Par. ty. Other than Padre luigj PICT, who linm cItcoutc,as Ss,4rce nc.111c1 nnmo only Sister Margherita GjOEL as a known coliaLora the Albanbmn Communist Party, Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIAlli8e4j5R006100200002-9 S E C Approved For Release 2004/02/8:EalftE0T15R006100200002-9 A Survey of AL2ArIA (contsd) Page 39 K. Tho Albanian Mohammodans have also been subjoctod to pox. secutions, but within certain limits. They form tho backbono of tho Albanian Population (70%)s therefore, tho government is anxious to ayoid reactionary currents among thou. Thcy hrxo ignorod tho ordinance against the voil and fe7, have coritinuce. eibovf_,. their 'Mohammedan festivals, such as the !Matron i Vogel% 1110 weaithy class of Moslems, the wBole- tashis have boon affoctod most severely by the reforms of the now rogimo. They have had to pay heavy contributions to tho state and have had to part with their movable assets, which woro nationalizod. Tho wShoherlitosn, who are tho poorer class, and chiefly inhabit tho north- western regions of ALBANIA, have given full support to tho Communist Goths ornmont, 13. Albanian Political Parties in Wlo A. /n tho sPreo ALBANIA Committee tho following parties in exile are ropresented: 1, Bali Kombotar (National Front) 2. ALBANIA Agrarian Party 3. Legalitoti (Monarchist Party) B. Other parties in exile, but not bolonging to tho above committee aro; the Bloku,Kombetar Independent (The Independent National Bloc); and The Prizren League. These latter groups aro politically to the =trace right and philo-Italian, in accordance with tho conception that history and geography tie ALBANIA to ITALY and that without ITALY, ALBANIA becomes a paralytic ethnic unit, . 4 . 00 (Thief oxpononts of the Indopendent National Bloc are: 1) Dr. Ismail %MAC!, son of Shot:got VEREACI, Prim Min., toter during tho Italian Occupation of ALBANIA, presently residing in Nome. Ismail VERIACI is undoubtodly pro-Italian, and he 'advocates tho forhation of an anti-Communist front, regardless of the form of govern., mont, Mopublican or Monarchist. Be has considerable authority and finds many followers, particularly among the youngor elements with 7.1hom he is in constant contact. Consequently, ho is much feared by the present re- gino in ALALICA, as well as bytc prospective candidates of a future democratic governmont, Tho policy adopted by VERLACI to justify his prow Italian sympathies is in substance as follows: 'Ono must seek support from ITALY because the Italians are the least interested in the de.nationp. nitration of our people and tho partition of our territory; the Italians have only economic interests in our cautst114- and it is to their vital ire. terest to advocate a united ALBANIA?. For those principles, /smail VZBLACI has been math, the object of attacks from the Communists. VESXACI has been and is still in touch with tho former prefoot of police in TIrE PAPALILLO, an ablo politician, about sixty years old. 2) Narita Gjoni WW1, spiritual head of tho resistance movement in Malta (Northern AIMAN/A) and prince of that zone. 0:0117 advocates tho formation of an united anti-Communist front, and several Approved For Release 2004/02/g :Eltlikpet 5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19SECPREITZ006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBANIA (contld) Pago 40 times ho has contootod'All Boy KLIMA, the most prominent exponent of Boll! Reactor, lg.. rn e2ort L;,7) a.:hieve this. According to GTONI, the Monarchist issue ubLule7. -no &at.e4.th by moans of a public osferondua aftor the CorculAsi:i, ?Remo been cn poutr. Eowcvers no positiyo results wore reacd to the uncomrranisftg att.. Itwie of the Balii gombollaro vhich refusod to giw up it:, ropubilTan principle?, alleging. that this weold mean a weroning of the *national front* and. place KLISIM in the background. KLISURA is at prosont al. liod with the Britioh, whilo WON1 ie onttroly devoted to tho national cause of 'wan and does not approvo of British intorforoned in Alban. tan affairs, GJONI is sonsidered by many to bo the most suitable pers. onatity to bring about the overthrow of the Oommunisto in AMNIA, both as a patriot, and a practical man. Several members of his family-wero killed during an uprising in ALBAN/A, In regard to tho Greok torritor. tel claims on ALBANIA (which are supported by some powors), GJON7 tains at alsolutoly uncompromising attitude in not admitting any torr. itefial concessions of any nature. 3) Professor &neat KOLA!, during tho Italian Occupation vas Minister of Public Rducation, President of the Chamber of Deputies, and currently ix professor of Albanian Litoraturo at the University of ROL= is the most educated and perhaps tho most Intel? gent in the Albanian community in Rome, Politically5 ho is anti.Communist and. ho has no pa7MInce botween a monarchy and a republic; advocates only a free and independent ALBANIA, In this ho is uphold by the Italianilloreiga Office, Which seems to give considorablo moral supp. ort to the muse of an indopcadont ALBANIA. (withott, however, any pro. cis? viewpoint on the question of Albanian frontiers). Becauso of his world.wido fame as a scholar, =IQ; has much influonco, both in Romt and abroad. D. Tho best knout exponent of tho Prisron League is rooter MAI who was Ministor of tho Interior during the Gorman Occupation. DM is a violent chareuter, urging military action against tho Communists: it is rumorod that he is presently organizing MNMO guerrilla Ilogionsff of Albanians and. Macedoniane. it is tho general opinion that this is only a bluff, for ho lee littlo authority and cannot rely on resolute in. dividuals duo to tho vigilanco of tho Albanian Army along tho Grook border, and also the activity of the 110j0 Populloro (Communist Popular Militia), whiah, has many informants among tho Albanian refugees. It is known that Ta7k has mado proposals to tho British aad4noricane for ob. taming a supply of arms, 12Wit who is now an Iimptian citicon, is not on good tome with ELISUBA and the groups of =MAU and KOLIQI. Z. Objectively spooking, these Albanian parties wore all creatod by political interests %latch sock contool ond hegemony over the Palkans? Thus, the nations taking active interest in the welfare of the Tarim* parties are as follows: Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 -SECRET Approved For Release 2004/51ECk-Re3-1-0415R006100200002-9 A Surrey of ALBANIA (contt d) (1) (2) (3) ;(4) (5) Page 43, Iegaliteti (Monarchists): ENGLAND Balli tombetar (National Front)? =GLAND Albanian AgrriviaL. Party: YUGOSLAVIA Independent Aational Bloc: ITALY (and indirectly the United States,) The Prizren League? ITALY The structure of the above parties varies as do the foreign interests in the Balkans, and it follow that instead of any collaboration among the parties, there is only suspicion, intrigue and rivalry. 111. The National Front (Belli rombetar) managed to gain the upper hand in the "Committee for a Free ALBANIA" When this committee was formed in Paris in August 1949, after a quasi formal consultation among the vprioul, party representatives responsible for the policy of the committee. As the dominant party, the National Front has been mostly responsible for the policy of the committee, Within the ranks of this party it was believed that Colonel Fitzroy MACLEAN had reached some accord with TITO in regard to A/2AM. A few considerations bore out this belief. For example. TM, had given some signs of a plan, the principal aim of which was to bring pressure to bear on Enver =Ws Cominformist government - probably by stirring up some activity on ALBANIA's northern border. Actually TITO delegated this task of harrassing the Albanian government to Serbophile Gani =Tau, head of the Albanians in KOSSOW and brother of Sail ENEEZI14 leader of the Albanian Agrarian Party. (The Kossovo. ethnically Albanian, was assigned to YUGOSLAVIA by the London Conference of 30 May 1.91.!,) This MACLEAN accord and Xossovo plan weigrgEer substantiated suffickinai se that the National Front modified its policy within the "Committee" and in Albanian circles. Fearing possible developments of the TITO-MACLEAN accord, and fearing further isolation from the prizren League, the National Front toned down its policy of domination and hesitated in making earelear de- cisions and in taking any definite action. This has naturally hampered the activities of the Committee, G. Meanwhile, National Front exponents also fear that the British may bring pressure to bear on ALBANIA through GREECE, who Claim a part of southern ALBANIA (Eorce and Gjinokastre). TITO has had his own troubles and has not been able to do anything on the northern border not even through the Albanian exiles, Thus, the Albanian government, fearing the threat from the south, has concentrated two divisions along the Galoak border, /n the meantime, the Soviet Union, seeing ALBANIA thus isolated and encircled, foments disorders in Macedonia, promising and intending to set up an i:Aspendent Macednnian state, /n National Front circles, it is known that roads are being built in ALBANIA with the purpose of joining Abasan with the Greek-Yugoslav border in the vicinity of Lake Ohrid, This mig4t be the result of a plan Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/0S9ECFR'Es0T415R006100200002-9 AL Survey of ALBA= (cont' d.) Page 42 nods by the Soviets to jcin BULGARIA and AIMAN/A. through a corridor in Macedonia. ltLo.i toa:poi:nes tu be very diffieult it would solve . the problem cf the by the Ge.-.10t if it were to succeed, f-A Nathal c::.e.clee it is bOieved that in order to-defeat this threat, V.i.LA j-ree;:s., -wexa on by the Alliee, might break through the southeast l!oraer of AXIIAYIL and mnrch on 171one? thus cutting the route of the Coa-inuniste. (:1:t .4.11 be remembered Trial; a state of war still exists between ALBAMA and GRaCZ, since no peace treaty has as yet been signed.) I. According to these some ciecles, the National ?rent is attempt. ing to infiltrate Albanians into the fatherland throuch GREZni in order to spread propaganda the ranks of the Albenian exmy in favor of a free =AMA. Other Maninn Parties, r3.0 of the Belli Kombetar, have not shown nny enthustwel over this ventuee, These latter parties believe that the hypothel;leal oerridt,-e of the Sovloes in Macedonia is nothine; but politie, cal pressure and an atte7ipt to embarrase. Tl'LO he Sa0 JaVlotal. ?rent (sources reveal that some mcmbers of the Datienra /ront (about 25 persons) are present7y in Malta waiting to be sent to A:ABA:Mt, Although this type of expeditien should firot of all result in information of a military, political and economic nature, the members of this eepedition will probably spread propaganda in favor of their own party, and nothing more, This is another example of thellact that an effeetive collaboration among the par- ties is impossible. J. Members of the Belli Ibmbetar believe that a policy of patience elould prevail, eines the USSR is daily seen to be In more difficulty in furnishing suppliee to ALIALIA,, From information gathered in ALBANIA, these members have learned that ncrale in the.X.brrnian Army is extrezaly low, and that of the civilian population even lower. The economic situation of the country is bad, inasmuch as the USSR, in exchange for wow materials, sends an infrequent shipment of cereals and arms. K. The National Erent-, in Committee circles, shows itself willing to collaborate with the ronarchiots, only for opportunistic reasons and in order not to be isolated. Ite,2ing ZOGU is perfectly aware of the intentione of the National Front and does not fear them. ZOGU is represented on the Committee by his trusted servant, Abas KUPI, who recently left Rome, to join the Xing in EGYPT in order to discuss possible developments of TWAlbanian situation. L. The NatAharont members believe in eventual victory of their own party in the Free ALBAN/A moement, because of their social and man,- tionary ideology. They believe that King ZOGU is an English pawn, to be used in case of failure of the Pepublicans (the Netional Front). Such a failure they exclude on the grounds that the Yugoslays could not suffer the restoros tion of the monarchy in ALBANIA because the ideological differences would Approved For Release 2004/02e glepret15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004S': CrARDE3'T0415R006100200002-9 A Survey of A-A.::" Page 43 be dangerous te the countries of poular democracy. AAA when the time comes for the fuvaaing of a new Albanian government, the National Tient leaders hope for foreign support (lheish and Yugoslav). M. The most pri:minent exponent of' Belli Kombetar is Ali Bey KL/SUTIA, now in exile in Ws. During the constitution of ALBANIA, KLIMA was the closest collaborator of VUrredin Bey VIM, and with him held a position of command within the provisional government of Vlone. Later, how ever, he tried to undermine the prestige of VLORA, turning first to ITALY and then to GERMANY. MIth the assistance of GERMANY, KLIMA mamoged to set up the cadres of the Belli Kombetar at the very beginning of World. Whr II, organizing a small army (which assumed a definite anti-Italian attitude) In Zaneari 1943, KLIMA, and other members of the Balli Kombetar were cap- tured. by General BOXRAis Communist Partisans, These partisans were organiz- ed with the assistance of the British (Major SEYMOUR), However, Britain was at that time still uncertain about the policy to adopt with tho two Albanian factions; therefore, KUM% was set free. After tho war he vent into exile, and is now the most influential representative of Belli Kombotar. PART V A/BANIAN MILITARY SITUATION 14., Natural Defenses (See Exhibit VII) A. A rough topographic survey of AI MANIA might at first lead one to believe that the Albanian defense position is good, since mountains surround all of its continental borders. However, if examined in detail, thp situation proves to be anything but favorable, since there are many possibilities of invasion Which could all be fully exploited by enemies of AIMANIA. It is assumed that both YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE must at present be considered enemies of ALBANIA. These two hostile bountries cover the entire length of the Albanian continental borders and close ALBANIA entirely*. If the military action of its enemies were to be conducted. simultaneously, ALBANIA would be unable to put up a successful defense in the proper sense of the word. . The Albanian territory in a very short time wOuld be reduced to a few pockets, disorganized and divided, which could only continue to molest the enemy forces by a more or less successful guerrilla esniaige. By successfully performing the initial phase of their offensive and establishine a single brealo-throughalong the easterh border of ALBANIA, the Yugoslav and One* armies could essfIr reach the coast in a relatively short time, not exceeding twelve days, and divide he country into two or more pockets, even if such a maneuver were not aided by a simultaneous amphibious operation along the coast. This would certainly break, or at least greatly weaken, the organised defense of the Albanian Army. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIAlity5R006100200002-9 S E C Approved For Release 2004/081?13-FRPE-61.415R006100200002-9 A Su.rvoy of 4ra..z:,.:6(cult I d) Page 44 The Aabanion Army, even if it were equipped with up-to-date equipment and trained, which it is not, is numerically too weak to resist blcw doll-fared at certain points where the enemygs reconnais- sance would reveal a lesser resistance, :n the case of ALBANIA, the prob. ing of the reeietance along the border and the following delivery of the main blow at exactly the right point, still assuming that the enemy had the initiative does not constitute a too difficult tactical problem, This is partieilanly clear if one keeps In mind the fact that the nembetcal strength of the Albanian Army, without considering its fire power, is so small that it could not efficiently cover all of Ito long border line, Boosting the Albanian Army tette maximum potential and rein- forcing it with CominODW Wigades, Which would certainly aid' Enver NOZHAts regime, a forec nnt elTnes!ing 200,000 men would be obtained. This small force would have to cover not lees that 700 kilometers of border; Pen if not one man were assigned to the defense of tholong coastline, this is an unsustainable preportion. No army in the world could defend so vast (territory with so small a force, from Which a large number of rear perseetii and reserve troops must be subtracted, Besides this, guerrilla forces, composed of Albanian regulars and irregulars, would find in their enemies elements equally well suited for guerrilla warfare and able to counter their operations with a comae? pending counter-guerrilla operation. Such movements would, be conducted by light and mobile units, quite similar to the Albanian guerrilla forces, but lodttai B. The survey of the continental borders should best start at the north (see Chart /), This part of the border line is extremely important, since the most important .attempts to invade Albanian territory, eine? the beginning of modern warfare, took:place in this area, This occurred during the ?trot Balkan War and the attempted invasion of ALBANIA by the Algoslav forces during World War II. A.chain of mountains, usually called the Albanian Alps, forms the border of YUGOSLAV/A (i.e? the YUgoelav National Republic of erne Gora), starting from the flatland north of ghladaK* at the village of mg Hotit (IUGOSIAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 138, l26), and. forming with its peaks both the hydrographic and the political boundary, The mountain chain rises steeply and reaches a height of 122g meters only about 10 kilometers north of Lake Scutari* Towards the north it constantly rises, reaching the height of 2173 meters with the peak of Glieva Glom, It than crosses the Vile Mountain (Point 2093, YUGOSLAV/A, 1:100,000, Sheet 129* 303746) and maintaining its general northeoouth direction, leaves the locality of Guelele in Orna Gore (Nbntenegre) reaching a height of 2550 meters about 15 kilometersnorth of 94....103. (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet 7:)i6, 741255). Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/0I1E efrt.310415R006100200002-9 A Survey of 47:14:k 1.cntld) Page 4 Tho mountath chain then follows the boundary, at heights yams mg from 2,500 to 2,600 metres, and ends in Idaravica (Mat 26561 YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, T?37, 77326g), abruptly falling into the flat. land. of Pee, in the :ietohija regilne This mountain chain, clwAng the north side of Lake Scutari along a length of not less than 130 kilo-. metres, is without any roads or valleys, with the single exception of the valley at Vermoehe (YUGOSLAV/A, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-,36, 742270, across the LitriiNc-r?,- Since this valley is enclosed in a circle of high mountains, it possesses no strategic value. Another mountain chain, also following a north-south direction and forming an appendix to the abovementioned principal mountain chain of about 60 kilometers in length, starts with theapixElloa and ends in the 1,9g9 metres high BeshtriA (Point 1959, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000. Sheet Y.35, 200934). This mountain chain leaves open a valley about 5 kilo- metres wide through .Which the White Prin River flows. A road runs along the river through this valley. Immediately to the south of this valley is another high mountain, the Koritilk, 2,394 metres,(Point 2394. YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet /?.47, 202919). Koritnik is connected with the large chain of the Korab Mountains, but there is a passage for the small, but fast river Luma, Which flows into the White Drin about 5 kn. ?metres east of Itkes (YUGOSLAVIA, 11250,000, Sheet Y.7, 159921), cross. tug the road between Prizren (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet D.47, 189921) and Makes, under the bridge of Uta Vezirit (YUGOSLAVIA, 1;250,000, Sheet Y-47771922). The encirclement of this area of defense, composed of imposing mountain bulwarks connecteti by irregular heights, might be carried out easily by launching a bi?lateral maneuver, of which one arm would take Prizren, to be used as a jump-off point to follow the %bite Kirin valley, cialinlo second would penetrate into the flatland of Shkoder from the Montenegrin isthmus. Both directions invite fast movements by means of excellent roads, of which the first connects Prizren, iNkee, Shenmrie (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y.447, 176923), Leithiz (11160eLAVIA, It 250. 000, Sheet Y.47, 16$924) and Puke (YUG0SLA.V/Ar1M000, Sheet Y..47, 145920)1 while the second leads irrom Bar and. Shkoder to Bk.t. Both roads were built by the Italians, are well suited for trucks and other heavY vehicles, and allow fast motorized columns to maneuver rapidly by means of which the Albanian forces, arrayed within the semi?circle of north and northeast ALBANIA, could be encircled. The second natural defense system of =CIA, closing the east- ern border towards YUGOSLAVIA (mainly the Republic of )(acedonia) is come. stituted by the Kora Mountain chain. This imposing mountain has a len- gth exceeding 70 kilometres and extends to the bay formed in the locality of Debar (Dibra)(ITJG',DSLANIA, 1,250,000, Sheet T.47, 194858). Its peaks have heights not less than 2,100 metres, while the two highest, the Koral(Pvint 2764, YUGOSLAVIA, 1050,000, Sheet /?47, 199557) and. Dost (Point 2374, YUGOSLAVIA, 11250,000, Sheet Y.-47, 195871) reach heights of 2,764 and 2,375 metres respectively. Approved For Release 2004/02/13:e,-wh&IPCRECI2115R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/ ce- 115 - tir4 1 5 R 0 0 6 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 - 9 A Survey of page 46 , The Ez:rab ts a veritable natural well, and if considered from a military point of view, cquld7.epresent a considerable strategic ad. vantage tc ./.01W1-7LL, rlinco th mnntain shortens the border to a de- gree and 4,13v t: ops vaoh wrald have been necessary to defend the area could be deployed. elsewhere. The numerical weakness of the Albanian. Army would. mean that the border could not be defended equally, and the usage of all natural advantages would be to the Allanianstbest interests. In the event of a bi-lateral invasion coming from prizren and. Debar, the Drab Mountains would immediately become a negative position, glace: (1) it would fall automatically should. any of the two abovenention. ed positions become indefensible (which is probable) and (2) since it could not be evacuated in time by means of an organized retreat and would become a rocket of annihilation. A good road connects Debar, it YUG0SLAV4 with pshkon (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet-Prf, 188877). This road follows the Black Drin Elver. The locality of ToTojan (YUGOALAVIA, 1:250,000s Sheet 74.47s 187865), which is quite near the horder (12 kilometres) and easily reached, and the locality ofIerean are connected with 3arra1iTUG0STAVIA, 11250,000, Sheet Y.47, 152871) by a road crossing the v=e7rof the Mati River and running through ptloizee (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 04, 169658), Prom 1=01 a good mountain road leads to Eruje, Terre (MEC& 1;250,000, Ahoe'T 121851), Tirane (GREECE, 11250,000, SEM-0-11 132642) and Durres. ,Thellac.k,Drin.River leaves YUGOSLAVIA to enter ATANLA. in the vicinity of Debar:. It forma a valley about 5 kilometres wide, and this valley aprearViiilt opening the Drab Mountain wall, This entry, if used as a point of the main effort, would offer considerable tactiaal possibilities to forces coming from the east, Another defensive will, formed by a mountain chain, extends from II:Oar to /eke Ohrid, leaving Stru 11250,000, Sheet 0.1, a3.8 in Yugoalav territory and n GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 0.1, 199807) in ALECUIL. The mountain chain is formed by the pecks of :ablanica (Point 2187, GVZIO36 11250,000, Sheet 0.1, 186824) and Belies, (point 2257, Gann, 1t250,000, Sheet 0.1, 1918210 and is uninterrupted4 varying in height .between 1,260 and 2,180 metres, with the highest summit reaching 2,257 metres, it dominates the road coming from rronstm, roughly following the western shore of Lake Ohrid. The road ascends to a fair height, then descends gently into the Shkumbin River Talley, crossing the important mineral zone of 9akee (ME(iZ, 11250,000s Sheet 0.1, 182810) and. gbrashd. (On2C14 1:250,000, Sheet 0.1, 172823). A. penetration of ALBANIA with streng.forces taking off from Strmga would not be too promising, Better possibilities are offera to a potential invading army by proceeding along tho southeast shore of Lake Ohrid. Although there is no ftrst Olibss highway in this areas the entire region is flat, 4th a good community road connecting the town of Ohrid with the Monastery of St Batsm (0 CE, 11250000, Sheet A ittk;vica .2009g7forntragr Vo;' ? .4,000 est O. 96769). 04250,000, Approved For Release 2004S2/E :01/RIE81-00415R006100200002-9 A Survey of (If Pap 47 The area to the coutheast contains the best road net in all ALBANIA. Durin7 the secona IIIVIPO of World War II, after the capiti. lation of 11PLY, tLio G:,/lJant; ut:.ld this road not for their operations . Which led to the oecuration of he country. The maneuver is conduct- ed by the let Mountain Division (Erste Deutsche Gebiergsdivision) com. mended by General Ton STETTNER. The border area described above lying between YUGOSLIMA and ALUM, is extremely unfavorable for the Albanians to hold should the Yugoslays take the initiative. In. a case like this, the Yugoslays would undoubtedly execute a pincers movement, with lower Orna Gora serving as the take-off point toward Shkoder, and the White in Valley as the route of the second. arm. Such a pincers movement would be an exact re. petition of the first Yugoslav attempt which odeurred during World War II. The only difference to the abovementioned maneuver was that the Yugo slave sought to conquer northern ALBANIA without using both arms of a pincer movement in a simultaneous flanking operation. Just one route Of invasion was used since the Yugoslav General Staff, which should have co-ordinated the movements, had disintegrated in the meanwhile. A series of diverting operations could be conducted by the Yugoslays in the .L..1p.41 (Dibra) area. This would ease the conduct of offensive operations in the naTE- and would offer opportunity for an advance toward the heart of ALBANIA, and the Adriatic, itte advancing army would have already occu- pied rrmia, Maim, and Tirane. It has been pointed out, however, that all possible Yugoslav offensive operations against ALUM would depend completely upon the time and tide of events in the Balkans. The probable successes of the Yugoslav Army on the Albanian front would be of secondary importance if compare& with the main sector situated further east, ire, Macedonia, If the Yugollav Army were to lose the initiative, then the chances of success in this area would. be greatly altered. The Yugoslays would then be forced to conduct a retreat along the lines of communications existing between Lake Ohrid and the Kossove flatland. The matt effort in this instance would have to be diverted toward northern =AMA if the Yugoslays were to check any advances into their territory from that direction. It would be to the vital interests of the Yugoslays to keep an enemy force out of the flatland of Orna Gera, and also from reaching Boka Ketorska. The best means of accomplishing this would. be for the Yugoslays to have an alliance with MUD, and to oo-ordinate their military moves in such a manner as to keep any offensives conducted against either or both, from sOlidifying. If such were not the case between YUGOSLAVIA and =mac thea the south of ALBANIA would remain independent and poulii be used as a base for more extensive operations against the Yugoslays,. The reverse would be true in respect to GCE. The Greco-gabanian border, including the area which crosses Lake Prespa. is 230 kilometres long, Within this distance are high mountains and open valleys of the rivers which flow into ALBANIA. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 200628 CIRE8T00415R006100200002-9 A Survey of (cent' d) Pago 48 The juncture of the Greek, Yugoslav, and Albanian borders lies in Lake Prespa, The SeUhagara sector, wedging into the lake, belongs mainly to MEG& The buttress of the mountain of Souhagara with its slopes southwest of gorovo, does not represent a valuable strongpoinf of defense, Point 172g of Soughara (031130g: 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1, 21776g), however, protects the crossroad of the highway communications between Stenja (MEM 11250,000, Sheet 0-1, 220790), Resan (GRESCID, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1, 230S06) and Bito1A(GRS3a. 1:250,0010, Sheet 0-1, 255797). This mountain faces north and is fort- ified with infantry trenches and field fortifications, Its left flank adjoins another fortified system, presently held by the Albanians. This is the system of the Mali i That (Point 2035, GRISCE. 1:250,000, Sheet 3-1, 21777E) which peetects and controls the national highway leading from Pogradec and joins at Gabravioa with a road fell. owing the coast of lake Prove. The road then continues to Korea, one of the most important centers of ALBANIA, This was the invasion route used by the Germans during the second phase of Wbrld Whr /I, That in.. vasion was simplified by the fact that the Italians had evacuated the area of Point 2035 on Mhli i That in January 1943, and limited them,. selves to the defense of the locallttbse around Starove and pogradoc, and in the flatland of 'Corm The Italian forces7E;;;Ter, mintained. an occupation of Point Wor(GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1, 213759)1 about 6 kilometres east of Mborja. This point was maintained and for- tified with the solo intention of keeping the rEndattess Partisans, commanded by the Greek General =VAS, under control. The border, starting with the eastern corner of Lake ?renal follows along the mountain of Kosik, its highest point of 1,549 metres being in AIMANIA, then follows a line Which crosses the road coming from the entreahhedrftbrig6f7lorina (GREBM, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1, 260769), which belongs to the so-called MUTAXAS0 Line. The border then descends across a gorge into Bilisht (GEBBOE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1,:22,755) an entirely Moslem settlement, and then into the upper valley of the Devon River. The border area south of Korce is defended by a mountain chain, the Grammes, Which has become universally known by the important role it played du2ing the recent Greek revolution and civil war. The Grammes follows the border for about 50, kilometres, and protects the valley of &sake (GREECE, 1:250,000, 194727) width is the most dee- sely populated region of =AMA, The Grammos (G3SECK, 1:250,000, Sheet 0.4, ranging between 205734 and 200723) has an average hetght of over 2,000 mitres, with heights of 2,036 metres in the north, 2,519 metres in the middle, NUL, 2,041 metres in the south. A tributary of the Vijose River, very rapid in the first 25 kilometres of its course to Permet (MOS, 1:250,000, Sheet G?=4, 165717) but Which slows down later at Kelcyre (GleXCE. 11250,0009 Sheet G-4, 15372g), has a source which originates in the springs under the south peak of the OTOMMOB. Approved For Release 2004/02i ilPeRDWecf5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 20044A gARDR310415R006100200002-9 A Survey of A/ZAMA (coat' &) Page 49, The Grammes area is very poor in made, and it may be safely added that no road communications exist between ALBANIA and GREECE in this region. There are mule paths which are of no military imp. .ortence and Which could be coverell by light arms. Touard the eolith is the Sarandaporos River Valley, descending toward the bridge of Perat. This valley contains an excellent road which begins at Kanbaki (GAZECE6 1:250,000, Sheet 0.4, 186694), The Albanian terr- itory in this region is entered by two roads, of Which runs in the Vijose River Valley in the north, while the second crosses the Etaii Bridge (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet a.4, 163681) to the met and pene- trates the Ehrino River Valley. The two valleys aro separated by the Nemereke and Luarleries Mountains (GRIMM 11250,00a, Sheet G.4, from 163713 to 181690, and the latter from 150715 to 167688). /he first val- ley leads toward Petmet and ppolen. (GC!, 11250,000, Sheet 0.4. 1315726), while the second reaches t s important center of Gjtnokaster. The border between the two valleys (both of Which are very fa- amble routes of invasion) is defended by Ifacriewate Mountain reaching a height of 1,671 metres (believed to be Point 1650, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 0.4, 162699). This area is the most dangerous point of the en- tire GreelemAlbanian border, and the most favorable for a possible Greek offensive. Xakavt is a fortified position which is reinforced with concrete emplacements, and faces southeast. /t forms a unique defensive position together with the Strugara Mountain system (Point 1601, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 04, 153672). About 10 kilometres north of this position there is an aperture formed by a small tributary of the /trines River, which has its springs below the Strugara, This opening offers particularly good possibilities to enter the wide and fertile /brine Vnlley, where the opportunity for the maneuvering of large units is quite good. It should be pointed out that the thrill? River nearly dries out during the summer drought. It banks form an excellent ground for maneuvering armored Ves. .hides and taWrs. It is entered with comparative ease either from pikavi or along the small tributary across from Doljana? The population of the Petmet and Pored regions is composed of Albanian Moslems, who have pronounced agnil:Mek sentiments. Conversely, the inhabitants of the areas nearby Winokaster and pkav speak exclus- ively Greek. The Moslem elements are attached to Mali i Ojer (GEMS, 1:250,000, Sheet 144691) on one side, and on the other to Mali User, immediately above Libohov (ammo 1:250000, Sheet 0.-4. 157696). The relationship between the two ethnic groups living in this region is far from cordial. The Greek speaking population had suffered greatly from Moslem gangs who were openly collaborating with -the Germans after the capitulation of the Italians during the late war, A penetration into the sector between G inokaster and Peraet would not be too difficult since rolican (0 1t250,000, et 165706) can be reached by means of a provingial road starting at Ltbobov Shikidpoptkdffar7ayKase 2 into the an leripay4Cligliaeglig00121- d wedging Approved For Release 215/Fit RIEDRE3-00415R006100200002-9 A Survey of AlIV071.1 (contld) 'Pogo 50 Rstlyine (GRIME, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-4, 1)42688) is reached by a road from 67.77gost (G2=02, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-4, 155685) cros7ing the Murtine ;g:17E0M, 1:250,000, Sheet 0.4r 150(1) Bxidge of gaillintIA.fGwn, 1050,000, Sheet 0-41 1476E:7). nx2 -anot-Eif-itird Aet-..enls toward. Saeanae. The StruzLlra IfouAtain zox:, just west of the Greco-Albanian border, isdifficult to defent. Its mount- ains are suitable only for a short defens), temporary in nature, and would serve better as a tako-off point for an Albanian 'offensive laun- ched against the towns of Oalamas and Tiliates (0RE3C3, 1:40,n0, Sheet G-4, 156647). Point 1804 which Waraas the flatland below, Would be particularly well suited for this purpose. This route was ? used by the Italians in their attack upon MEM and even though the Italian campaign proved disastrous to them, their defeat .e not due to improper usage of the terrain. O. Tae Coastline of ALBANIA The coastline exceeds 350 kilometres in length and forme a second negative factor in existing political and hilitary circ- stances. With boraersand coastline to be defended, it will prove quite a task for a nation of 1,180,000 population to handle. Considered from this point of view, it is problematical as to how successful a de. tense ALBANIA could establish. It is true that an excellent highWay parallels the coastline from the Montenegrin border to Sarande. The greatest part of this road is asphalted and would ennbl?pid. move.. ments of troops to be oarried out to any sector of the coastline in the event of an emergency. In spite of this, two important problems remainio be solved, and these are: (a) the lack of equipment to supply defense positionsl and (2) the exceedingly short distances from the coast to the highway. The first problea needs no explanation since it is an obvious and generally known fact. With regard to the second problea, it is evident that the Albanian roads in the coastal areas ,were built primr arily for econemil roans without regard for military considerations. The fact that the Albanian defense strategy is under the sue. pervision of the lusslans deco not alter the gravity of the situation resulting from thelo c%ortconings. An enormous expenditure wo,11A be requirol.to offset thsee shortoomince in improving the line of defense. It is not expooted that t10Rtltsiain would bo willing tc carry out any cuchrrogran at direct exmense to themselves, lt may be aseumed that tny moaera army equkopea vith an arrhnious fcTne could effect land. ings,in most sootors botwoen the tauth vf-the Pajama River ani the Vijose R1.707. Uuttvng thc main hie.awny at laTiVile points woald coLtribute to the tctli ci3oorganzaticn of cDastel I:Vienne; aria would revire the esti. ablisTAcrit of now linos. rue to tha marshy?fIist te=ain of the country., the .eicleanse lines would prt-,brIt1:7 ?viva to be chg 11% the foothills of the mrroupding nourtatns, In oiiiloitinz the valleys in thees mountains, sono of the de2eneinc torcea could, be out off or by,4passed foraIng thon to conduct a guerrilla ler rather than one of organised Of9reff8?For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00_415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004SE C1Rfi8r00415R006100200002-9 A. Survey of ALBANIA. (contid) Page 51 Soviet defence preparations in the southern sector, the areas of Vlone, Bimar, tLnd on the fortified island of Sazan (which Ins been taken over d!,roc,t4 the Soviet General Staff' i nuot be uonall.:Aed az being of a pixmannt and stationary nature. Thesz fortifirb.tio. ,Jca- list of woollens pp)rted by permanent positions, concrete emplazJms and. undergrounl artillery opplacements, In spite of this, it is lzubt- ful that a long defense could be conducted in this area, since the entire area, although extremely well suited for defense purposes, is so narrow that there is no possibility of a long defense after the adjacent areas are attacked and occupied by tho enemy, The Soviet General Staff is, without 'any doubt, aware of this precarious situation. The Soviets have launched one of their usual political and mil- itary maneuvers in announcing through the press and radio that the Sov6. iet Military Mission is about to retire from AMNIA. The nature of this withdrawal was not explained in detail. However, some otioorvers attempting to ',read between tho lines?, of this announcement have came to the conclusion that this act on the port of the Soviets is due to the realisation that this advanced postm of the USSR cannot be success- fully defended. One observer believes, however, that this statement hides a fact that the Soviets are anxious to conceal, In .tho even, of complications in the Balkans, the Soviets would take the initiative by mesas of a large-scale offensive extending over the entire Balkan area. The first blow would be directed against Yugoslav Macedonia (provided tho 7Ugoslave maintain their present attitude toward BUSSIO in order to permit Oominform forces to penetrate the heart of the Balkans, to join forces with the Albanian troops, and by occupying ALBA= they could relieve this southern bastion and supply though arms and amw ition to carry on a defense, Meanwhile, should the Albanian coastal de. fense fall to pieces, enemy troops penetrating from the sea, Montenegro or GREECE would be confronted with Soviet armies. Ngoslav armies, Mr vancing through the valley of the Vhito in and those advancing from Debar would find themselves attacked from the roar by Soviet armies out of BDIGGLAIL. The poor defense possibilities of ALUM as explained previously would, in this case, lose their validity. A situation such as that des- cribed in the preceding paragraphs would also prevent any possible mils. itary allianne between =Mink and Gnszcs.:. The Greeks would prefer to maintain a state of watchful neutrality, hoping all the While that the Western Powers would continue to preserve their bridgehead in GRZECE from a Cominform invasion, by sending military assistance. In the event of hostilities in the Balkans, the Soviets would be anxious to prevent my Allied landings in ALBANIA? It would try to prevent anything like this through the usage of submarines and and mil- itary operations. Previous reportz that mention the construction of secret submarine and torpedo craft baseu are true enough to the extent that these reports should receive the maximum of attention. Approved For Release 2004/51E te-FelE3/8415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02 5g0115R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBAYIA cont d.) D. Military Drone of ALBANIA Page 52 1. OrganIntion of the Ministry of National Defense (ArnY) (See Wiibit I) Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National De. fonse is the Army (Ushtrija), totalling approximately 60,000 to 70,000 men, under Chief of Staff (Kryetar i Shtabit Ma/1hour) Mahn:4 SKEW. Under 'tho Army are the following specialized sectionsi a) The Navy and Marino Forces (Marina) b) The Air Porcd(Ajrit) c) The Political Direction (Drejtorija Politika) is supervised by Rysni EAPO. _A Political Commissar and a Vice?Commissar are attached to the headquarters of each of the throe divisions (and presumbaly to all other comparable groups). A Political Commissar is also assigned to each regiment, battalion and company, d) The Military Security Police (Sigurimit) is one of the infantry divisions, and is widely distributed throughout the country. The Sigurimit handles espionage and counter?espionage . work in cooperation with the Peoples' Security Committees in each villo4f. e) The Division for popular Defense (Divizjoni i )(brojtios as popullit, or IMP) formerly was responsible for ccuttov0e5pionage, but now constitutes an elite military unit, roughly the equivalent of the former Nazi SS troops. f) Tae Paramilitary Organization (ftraushtaraket) is designed to educate boys of 14 to 1S years in the preliminaries of mil? itary discipline and the handling of arns prior to their compulsory mil- itary service. The names and positions of some important Albanian military and naval leaders aro as follows: Colonel General Enver ROM ? Reed of the Government and Chief of the Army. Ma3or General Mehmot 6721311.- Chief of Staff and former Commandant of the Partisan Units (in the south). Major General Spiro monru Chief of Operations of the Military High Command. Major General Muco ZIHNI Inspector General of the Alt/. Major General Rristo TIMEIKO General Political Commissar. Major General Mehmed TORMATI Chief quartermaster. Major General Bajram SINAJMER/ ? Chief of Artillery, Commander Terlani XTRDO Rich Naval 00Emand. Approved For Release 2004/02/1 00200002-9 Approved For Release 20082E9CIRRE81:00415R006100200002-9 A Siirve c. Page 53 Rexhep RAZ (rank "irk:1mm) - Ordnance Ctaxim ANIMA (rank unknown) Ordnance Teedor ZSIOTI (rank unknown) - Oommading Officer of the Air Pomo. ;smajl XBEVAR/J (rank unknown) - Military Engineers. E. Soviet Military Mission It is an established fact that this Mission is much more than its capacity as an advisory group reflects, since it is a military command charged with the following responsibilities: a) Training and organizing the Albanian Armod Perces. b) Preparing and maintaining the defense of the nation. c) Exploitation of the economic possibilities of ALBANIA ace- ording to the general pattern of Soviet military and aeon- omic policies. The Albanian General Staff, while seaming to maintain its independednce, is subordinate in all fields to the decisions of the Soviet Military Mission or ',Command*, The main bases of the Mission are in Tirane, Vlone4asan. Himare, Durres and Shkoder. There are less- er commands established. wherever there aro AlbaiTaTgladquarters, and also minor supervisory personnel in some areas which aro considered of intelligence interest. The entire system forms a tight not which is operated by many capable Soviet agents using Albanians in various cap- acities. /t is estimated that there are about 12,000 persons att- ached to the Headquarters of the fortification works which are being developed particularly in the coastal areas, Those projects are repm arted to be under feverish haste toward completion. There are entire military units employed on nothing but construction of defensive posi- tions along the coast. It has been ascertained that the majokity of Russians in ALEAN/A were shipped by sea to the Port of Vlone between January and March 1949. Other unite have boon flown in from BUICIARIA, always arr. iwing by night at either Shkoder or Tirane. These Russian units are equipped with the latest in weapons and faultlessly dressed. The art- illery batteries aro of the newest types. To the superficial observer, the great difference between the Albanian and Soviet military personnel in weapons, dross, and preferential treatment has been a source of major discord between the two. rue credit should be given the Soviets for purposely allowing the Albanians to remain poorly dressed and equipped since this prevents any possibility of having them to contend with should the Albanians decide not to fight with the Russians When the time came, Approved For Release 2005a9CPIRReir-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 20046/E :GPREE83100415R006100200002-9 A Survey of ,cd; Page 54 Tho lupremo Command of the Marine Infantry and Coastal Wong() Artillery units has bee: aimed by a Soviet Navy adniral, whoso head- quarters are on Sazan Island- The admiral is in charge of all island and coastal defonso fortafications. However, ho is subordinate to the Soviet General Hoadouartors of ALBANIA located at Durres, and commanded by a Red Amy general. All armed forcos in the ceuntry are subordinatod to this command: Soviet forces directly, Albanian indirectly. Most of the Soviet forces in ALBANIA consist of Marino Infantry, Coastal Art- illery, and Anti-Aircraft Units. There are also units of ground forces belonging to the Rod Army. Strong contingents of civilian "tochnicians" have also been obsorved, which, in addition to other duties aro the orig. anizations of political security for tho military hoadquarters. Tho Soviet Military Mission attachod its instructors to Albanian regiments and delegates to the higher headquartrs. ladh battalion and regiment of the Albanian Army has one such instructor. This instructor is also the officer6-chargo-of-training, and is in charge of all Albanian officers in the organization to which ho is attached. The Mission also has assumed control of tho entire Sanitation Service of the Albanian Army. F. Ground Forces (1) General At tho present time, the Albanian Array consists of 45.000 men trained for combat. The oxprossion "trained for combat" in the Alb.- anion conception, means that a man has a more or loss proper uniform, a few dayst food supply, and a weapon with some ammunition. The Albanian ' Army givos the impression of being well organized and that it is composed of rerular military unite from plations to divisions. Althouch the Alban,- Ian troops present a military-like appearance, sono are dressed in Mo.. slay uniforms. The Albanian soldier is inclined to bo dirty and disord- erly. This fact is olto obvious When the troops aro in town on pass. Draftees, When subjectod to rigid discipline, obey reluct- antly. The draftees are in continuous training, with long and tedious military problems generally being oarried out in rocky aroas of tho mount- ains, or the exact opposite in the valleys. During those probloms, thoy bivouac in the open with no protection whatsoever. Loading Albanian off- icers are those who woro partisans in former Communist brigades. /t is considered a rroat honor to these officers to kayo been a member of a partisan brigade. Al]. generals in the Albanian Army havo been selected from partisan ranks. Albanian high-ranking officors were not sent abroad to YUGOSLAVIA or RUSSIA for military training bocauso of national pros- tigo. Many still hold the ranks they held while neribers of a partisan brigade during the Gorman and Italian occupations. Many of these high- ranking officers are illiterate, and duo to tho basis of soloction, thore are many high-ranking officers. Approxinatoly Goo lieutenants and etc- tains woro sent to YUGOSLAVIA for short military courses. Upon their ro- turn, they formed the core of tho entiro army. Many of then hold posit... ions comparablo to those of non-commissiohed officers. Approved For Release 200e0E9aR*PW-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/61E GRFE3-76415R006100200002-9 A Survey of cent' d. ego 55 Thor:, arc cases where a mall company is commanded by a 11010- enant colonel, while the adjutant of a regime:Tit is a captain who, by virtue of his attendance at a military course, rates this assignment. This fact was quite noticeable at Eormeti, Where the 13th Infantry flogiment Headquarters aro locatod in former Italian barracks: It is intorosting to note that tho former Yugoslav Mission had oponod three month courses for the inetrdction of low ranking Albanian officers prior to tho Yugo sinV-Albanian Split. Before the conflict between TIO and. the Cominfotm, praetically otery Albanian unit was commanded by Yui-mslav officers. Due to the sympathy elicited from their troops and the people in tho towns, these YugoslaV officers psychologically infiltrated the rank and file of the popualtion and eon today, the mehories of tho Yugoslays are not com- paratively uppleadaht. Upon tho arrival of the _Soviet Military Mission, a,new atmosphere Soon became apparent. The oompleto"assinilation of, command by the Euesi- lane asserted itself ell down the ranks. There) are fiVo Soviet officers &deigned to each infantry regiment, eild d SoViet counsollor bohind each infantry commander where' once this pOsition was occupied by an Albanian4 -ruo to the fact that tholustian cothse1tor nUit use an intorprot- or, understanding bOtiteon the 00Uneellor and the Albanian officers is often quite difficult. RoweVor, tho Albanian Army has acquired a mueh more normal pattern as a consequence of Eussian training, aad the att. amont has boon' considerably improved. Tho Albanian Army in its present condition is much bottor equipped to fight a guerrilla war than a rege.V. ar military oporation. One main reason is the difficulty in moving troops itea-one atality to another dao to lack of motorized oquipmont. It is also a proven fact that the Albanian is a bettor fighter when be fights alone. Ho is a stoic, coura;mous and resistant, but only when ho fights alone. These, troops cannot be relied upon because they aro ond products of an individualistic, sectarian socioty, and thoy fight for 'ghat they coseidor their own territory rather than tho nation as a whole, There aro some exceptions, and those mon aro from tho arms of the Zrino, Policani, and Korea Valleys. Shoso mon aro more Grook than Altimian since they practise the Orthodox religion, speak Greek, and think politically as Greeks. During tho war, thoro wore many of these troops who were attach,- ed to Greek:partisan groups. The mountaineer of Sho Shkoder and Mirdita regions is not friendly with the philo-Greek of the 817LTERTailo the Moslem from Malakastra distrusts his comrades from the Mhlissoria. It is known that tho various tribes of ALUM consider the pre- sent military and political situation as temporaty. A minor military failure by tho Albanian Army is enough to make the average soldier desert the army and roturn to his village, to take up arms thoro in defense of his home aiminst the mom, G. Irktes of Paul 1.t ions of Albanian Army Personnel Monthly #:ttes of Pay - Albemian Army off /oars are paid accord- ing to tho following rates; (Note): 1 leko equal 8, Italian lire) Approved For Release 2004/0%19ECI61141-4.415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/?1 &-ggt3T0415R006100200002-9 A Survey of cents d) _ 2nd Lieutenant lit Lieutenant ? Captain . Major ? Lt. Colonel Colonel an " Monthly *A.tions for Officors Quantity 4 # Coo loko 5,500 s 6,500 g,000 10,000 11 12,000 tt (All ranks) Price 7 kg, of peat 56 ligkO Pqr. kr.... , 4 kg. of *ries, .,..-. so loke'por hg,. : 2 liters o:f oil 52 loko par liter 4 kgs: of pasta 36.140. per.. licc, 1.5 kg. of narrialado 100 161co.por ki.. 3 lg.:. of sugar ,. 46 ldko per ' kr1 - 1. :' ? As of 1 March 1950, the daily ration of broad for Albaniien Army officers, as well as tho enlisted personnel, was decreased. fren foto grans to 600 groxyli Cigarettes are not en the military ration nor s there any free issuo of cigarettos. Albanian officers enjoy certain fa* PP?* regarding the purehaso of various foods and articles of c1othtngwicl?.. Aro obtainable by then in spacial military stores which are located. in najor area of population, Every officer is entitled to purchase one n- tor and one sunnor suit (nilitary or civilian) and a pair ef shoos 17. H. Order of Mattlo (Seo ROchibit II) It is reported that the present 4lbania/IA=1y is made UP of four divisions, with individual headquarters and components located a0 follows: Ike 0.,18p6r2.a.t.ail?w,ivision LrIlao ls, antry ent AO 3rd Infantry Regtaent Tirane 13th Infantry Regiment Egli let Artillery Regiment Tirane rth d, /ntantg Division More0 Infantry Regiment KOTT7 '- 1h t Infantry Regiment Cil=ee 26th Infantry Regiment ?peradoci 3rd irtillory Th9gimont Korea ft.1.24rA, vi 7th Infantry Iginent 19th infantry Regiriont 31st Infantry Regiment 3rd Artillery Regimont Approved For Release 20t1tt9tFE13-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :SAEDelibeffi06100200002-9 A Survay pf .ALBAINIA ( con.tt d) Pac-,o 57 Eq., Military and Political Dafonse Division Tirano lit Infantry Ror,imont Tirane 2nd. Infantry Rocimont Shkoder 3rd Infantry Bpginont Korea This divisicn reportedly has no artillory: the regiments, however, have some armored cars and. protoctive units. There also is a rogiment of Frontier Guards, with headquartors at Slikodor. Prontior Guard. units aro located at Anioti, Vermoshot Tropoia, Bicai, Piscopeia, and. Oboti. Thu lit and 2nd Artillery Regiments aro composed of three groups. The weapons are war booty 75= and 100 no caliber (mako un. known). Infantry reginents aro composed. of 3 battalions. "la& batt? alion is made up of 4 companies, plus a headquarters unit. A company has 3 machine gun units (light machine guns). Each =chino gun unit is composod of two weapons. Protecting weapon: 1 t65A17 gen (horse carried), plus a mortar unit (Slmm, French typo) I Jar: mako; 2 mor- tar units (45, Brizia type). I. Organization of Armed Forccs 1. Broakdown a) General Staff A.t.47.?? Deputy Commandant Albanian Army Political Commissar Chief of Staff Chief of Operations b) Division Division Headquarters Three Infantry Rogiments One A.rtillory Mgimont c) _ant Regiment Headquarters Three Infantry Battalions ?? C4.104142 ,74neral ^ major General Major Gonoral iL Major Goncral ^ Colonol Approved For Release 2E4AINi:gAgtitEl006100200002-9 Approved For Release 200?2P9 clag8T-00415R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBANIA (cont, d) d) Battalion Battolion Headquarters Three Rifle Companies One Support Company Ono Signal Platoon One Supply Plapong e) Rifle Company Company Headquarters Pour Rifie.Platoons One Supply Platoon f) Artillery Ro,ginent Regiment Headquarters Throe ArtillerY Units (3 batteries each) One Signal Conpany One Supply Company g) Artillery Unit Unit Headquarters PoZe Three Bettorios (4 guns each) NOTE: In ease the battery is composed of heavy guns, it will Signal Platoon have only two guns. Supply Platoon 2. Armament and. Personnel of AIM Units a) Army Headquarters 40 Officers - 35 ]Ton.-Coma - 120 Corporals and Privatos 75 pistols - 100 rifles - 5 machine guns-25 sub-machine guns 20 automobiles - 22 motorcycles - one radio station connected with all units. Approved For Release 2004/028 EICIR8EXT15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/?:gAgAg0715R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALUM (contid) Page 59 b) Division Headquarters Armament 15 Officers 18 pistols 12 Non-Coms 20 rifles 25 Corporals and Privates 12 suboachihe guns 5 machine guns Other- 5 automobiles - 8 motorcycles c) Naginental Headquarters Armament 12 Officers 18 pistols 12 Non-Ccms 33 rifles 20 Corporals and Privstet 8 machine guns Other 12 sub-.machine guns 2 automobiles - 5 motorcycles - 5 bicycles d) Battalion Headquarters Armament 4 Officers 2 pistols 6 Non-Cons 4 rifles 6 Corporals and Privates 2 machine guns Other 8 sub-machine guns 1 automobile - 2 motorcycles - 2 bicytles e) Company Armament 5 Officers 15 pistols 10 Non-Coms $O rifles 150 Corporals and Privates 20 machine gums Other 55 submaschine guns 4 automobiles - 4 motorcycles ? 10 bicycles f) Support,CompanIr 5 officers - 10 no.coms - 120 corpotals and privates Approved For Release 2004/02/8 tbeelifetOr 5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 gff-A1TR006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBa/A (cont' d) Page 60 Armamen.t 25 pistols - 50 rifles - 5 heavy machino guns 8 light mathine Cults 10 sub-nachine guns - 8 mortars Othor 2 carts - 20 horses - 6 riding horses 0 Signal Platoon . 1 officer 1 non-con 30 corporals and privatos Armament 5 pistols ? 20 rif/os - 3 nachino guns - 5 sub-machine guns Other 1 autonobile 1motorcyclos- 5 bicycles 2 oarts - 4 horses. tolephonos . 2 radios h) Supply Unit 2 non-cons - 40 corporals and privatos Armament 5 pistols. 20 rifles 2 nadhIne guns 5 sd14machine guns Other autonotilos 2 motorcycles 4. /0 carts 20 horses I) Artillory Bogiment Sane as infantry Poginont j) Axtillory Unit Same as Infantry Battalion 3. Axmamont of the Albanian itrrly The Llbanian Amy is oquippod with Soyiot, Gorman, and Italian woapons, raring the ',ours? of this 'oar, nost of tho Gorman and Italian weapons will be roplacod by now Soviet womons, Infantry units and mount. ain artillory will ospocially be equippod with now Soviet weapons. Approved For Release 2004/0219:15/611138415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02A q1c418g0X15R006100200002-9 A Survey of ALBANIA (contld) Page 61 Types of Weapons ArtillsE 150mm Gorman guns Simm Wretch mortars 120mm Gorman guns 80mm Soviet guns 105mm Howitzers "T` Soviot mountain guns 100m11 Italian guns 47mm Soviot autiltank guns S8mm Gorman guns (AA) 37mn Soviot anti-tank guns There are also no Italian mortars of different caliber. All mortars and anit.saircraft guns are to be replaced 1001M by now Soviet guns. Machine Guns Soviet, Italian, and Gorman 9mm typo. Sono of these units aro armed with British machine guns reooiVed by partisan groups during the wom: Rifles and Pistols Rifles for the most part aro German and Italian, with the lottor only recently being replacod with now Soviot rifles. Most of the pistols are Soviet and German, of various calibers. 4iirMiti/PNOIMMIMONERVO Motor Vehicles Most of the vehiclos used by the Albanian Army are of German or Soviet manufacture which TUGOSIATIA dolivered to ALBANIA prior to the Cominform disagreement. A considerable prmber of those vehicles are in bad condition in view of the fact that there are no workshops in the count.- ry capable of maintaining these vehicles, Spare parte delivered by Soviet RUSSIA are being used only for the vohieles attachod to Soviet units. Thor() has been sone dismantling of vehidlos which havo loon ott of order for some tine due to the lack of spare parts. ,...),??????1?0/4/Or Technical Rqutpaont There is a considerable lack of technical equipment. Sven now, old German. end British radios, which baraly oporato, ean be seen. The number of radio sets delivered by RUSSIA is very small and limited. As yet, there has boon no indication or any action on the part of the Soviets to supply the Albanian Army with now oquipment* J. Unite Directly SubordinatO theondcami let Rom Artillory Regimont, partially motorised; guns of 100mm caliber or Larger are concentrated at Timm, Approved For Release 2004/02/1 00200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/1b t-elk3E415R006100200002-9 A Survey of A/3'177k (cont,d) Page 62 let Armored Regiment; Tirane, has approxinatoly 130 ,arnprOft cars. let Engineer Regiment, Tirane. There are four motor pools, one oach at Durres, Shkoder, Korco, and Gslinokaster, ?glinted with naterial from varlaTiburces, and. all quite Old. a) Organization of IMP (Popular Defense Division) (Soo Skilibit III) Headquarters Tirane Tank Reginent Tirane Engineer Regiment Berat Heavy Motorized Lrtillery Regiment YrRE0 1st Infantry Beginont Tirane Infantry Battalion Tirane Infantry Battalion Masan Infantry Battalion Brat 2nd. Infantry Regiment Shkoder Infantry Tattalion WOW Infantry Battalion Durres Infantry Battalion 3rd Infantry Regiment Kora? Infantry Battalion Karoo Infantry Battalion Vgicastor Infantry Battalion llone Transportation Contingent (Regiment) Tirane Detachment (Battalion) Durres Detachment (Battalion) Korce Detachment (Battalion) G inokastor TruCk Repair Shop (Regiment) Durres b) 0.3. of Soviet Porceecin ALBA= Soviet Milittry Mission Heatguarters Military Delegates Military Instructors Tirane Soviet Medical Services Tirane Headquarters, Mountain Infantry logiment Leskovik Mountain infantry Battalion teskovik Mountain Infantry Battalion Pode Mountain Infantry Battalion Brzoze Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Survoy of ALBANIA (clout' d) Page 63 Mountain Artillery Ttorimant Ereeze liarine Infantry Regiment Satan Island. c) Military Radio Transmitters The following is a list of known Albanian Army mobile radio trans- mitting units which wore supplied by RUSSIA during may 1949$ a) lit Mobile Radio Headquarters is located on the Tirano Airfield on the right side of the highway that connects Time with I:R=0*p b) aad. Mobilo Radio Headquartors is locatod at Shkjesi, a locality on Mount Taraboshi approximatoly 4 kilometres from Shiroka, on to Lake of Shkoder, c) 3rd Mobilo Radio Headquarters is located in the immeidiate vic- inity of qinokaster near the Convent BeIctaski (Moslcn Soot) Tegje Saba Salim d) I:nowt fixed military radio stations aro located atWIL.ti in tho iroujusa *non at Karoo; and at tho 3rd. Artillery Rodnont - quarters at Gjinokaater, in tho arifenotian castle that dominates tho city. K. Okvy and Coastal Defenses (Soo 21hibit 1, kyr and Coast Guard. Tho Albanian Naval Headquarters is located at Larrof, and is stiffed by and. Soviet navel porsonne4. .In addition to its reg- ular duties, the Naval Headquarters is also in dhargo of Coast Guard ations and of tho Merchant Marine, The Albanian Naval Force in Durres is made up of approximate- ly six or seven minesweepers (Italian typo) and about six motor launches. Al]. of the minowoopers have a displacement of about 50 tons, and. are armed with 3 maChino guns of an unidentified caliber and typo, and. hairo crews of about 20 nen each. Two of the minesweepors are ogripted with adlitonal arnamont in the form of two cannons each (caliber and nako unknown). The motor lainchos have a cruising speed of ton or twelve knots, tind are armed with one machine run each, and each having a crow of six, The coast Guard is not a separate branch of tho armed for- des in ALBANIA but it is a joint responsibility of the Navy and the wag- urimits, inpfar as every craft assigned, to a Coast ?card mission carrios two to four sSigurimite agents in addition to the re(ular comploment. Tho Albanian coastline is dividcd into four !ones, and those are as follows: a) Zone NO.1 ? Shionds Prom Pulaj to Shen G in. b) Zone Jo, 2 tenis from Siva GJtnto Durres. 0) Zeno No., ? Rxtonis from rcs to SaiarTiland. d) ZODO NO.4 tends from ME-Island to Sarando. Approved For Release 2004/02/1 00200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of A7rAriti, (conttd) Paco 64 Guard and patrol duties aro perforned by VO lounchos of the -Albanian Navy. Those launches average an approximate speed of gem knots, are arned with three machine guns of unknown caliber and Oak% havo each has a complemont of fivo or six sailors in addition to two or throe IlSigurimitit Agents. Theso craft are of various types hnd none of them are equippoi with radio receiving an& sending sots. iuty Bohr edules of these boats are not known, except that in Zone No.1, betwoen Puiai and Shen G in, there are more patrols operating than in any of tho other zones. o reason givon for this movo on tho part of the Albanian Govonamont is the doeire to premont any of tho morchant oraft or othor typos from escaping to YUGOSLOLL or MALY. In bad weather or homy seas, Coast Guard duties are seamed by the minesweopors in all four panes. The following particulars of theso minesweepers wore obtained* Displacement 2 to 4 tons Armament - 1 hoovymachino can 2 light machine guns (German) Maximum rpeodp-12 knots Complement os 10 to 15 mon 2 to 4 ItEigurimity agents Ono of tho minoswoopera is a seven ton craft and is ogaipped with an AL machine gun of unknowm typo, and two light German machine guns. She also carries a radio recoiming and transmitting sot. All of tho minosweop. ors:used-by tho Coast Guard have been suppliod by 7DDO5IA.Vii after *rid War II. The motor launchos usod by the Coast Guard wore capturod from tho Italian forces after the italian capitulation on Soptomber 1943. Ono of tho launchos, tho Mftho Uloinakult, is usai on runs of 24 hours duration betwoon Pula4.and Sarando . Tho particulars of this launch aro as follows* Displacemont? 5 tons Length 30 meters Width 5 meters lnginos 2 U.S. built sNorculest, typo, 250 hp ' each MAximum Speed 15 to 18 knots Armament 1 cannon, typo and &Mew unknown 2 Germarrnado twin.barrol AA machine Pins (probably 20mn flak 28) Complement 10 to 15 mon plus 3 or 4 sSiguricitf ntledio rocoiming and transmit,- Sho has an iron hull and carrie ting set. Coast Guard rognlations prohibit Albanian Morchant Marino vessels and fishing boats from 1aaving any Albanian port during the hours of dada. nose. Soots belonrIng to the Coast Guard that loave ports during tho night must inform thoir rospoctivo oommmads as to tho simals they will use to idontify thomsolvos prior to departing fram port. important ports (iurros, for example) aro off limits to all civilians not in possession of sigfa-7- pormits issued by the sSigurinitft. Tho goardinc of ports and their inst- Appr8401VeRtfefig?26008-2WW18 3tors?tiRctrotialPial62-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of N7ArIA (contld) Pogo 64 Guard and patrol duties are porformod by 20 launches of the -Albanian Navy. Those launches average an approximate speed of seven knots, aro armed with three machine guns of unknown caliber and Make, havt each has a complement of five or six sailors in addition to two or throo oSigurimitn Agents. Thoso craft are of various types and none of them are equipped with radio receiving and sending sets. Duty Behr edulos of those boats are not known, oxcept that in Dy.no No.1, betuten Pulaj and Shen Gjin, there are more patrols operating than in any of tho other zones. Tho mason given for this move on tho part of the Albanian Government is the dosire to prevent any of tho merchant craft or other typos from escaping to YUGOSLAVIA or /141a. In bad weather or heavy seas, Coast Guard duties are assumed by tho minesweopors in all four zones. Tho following particulars of these minesweepers wore obtained: Displacement.. 2 to 4 tons Armament - 1 hoavymachino run 2 light machine runs (German) Maximum speoa-12 knots Complement ?? 10 to 15 non 2 to 4 ffSigurimitn agents Ono of tho minoswoopera is a seven ton craft and is oquippod with an AA machine gun of unknown typo, and two light German machine guns. She also carries a radio recoiving and transmitting sot, All of tho minosweop. ere:mood-by tho Coast Guard have been supplied by YUGOSLAVIA after *rid War II. Tho motor launchos uood by the Coast Guard wore captured from tho Italian forcos after the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943. One of the launchos, tho "Who Ulqindican, is usod on runs of 24 hours duration between pulaj, and Sarando. Tho particulars of this launch are as follows: Displacement Length 30 tons With 5 motors Engines 2 U.S. built, ',Hercules', typo, 250 hp ' each Maximum Speed 15 to 18 knots Axmament 1 cannon, typo and caliber unknown 2 German-nado twin?barrol AA machine runs (probably 20mm Flak 28) Complement 10 to 15 men plus 3 or 4 *Sigurimitff agents. She has an iron hull and carries a radio receiving and transmit- ting sot. Coast Guard rogulations prohibit Albanian Morchant Marine vessels and fishing boats from leaving any Albanian port during the hours of dazb- ness. Boats belonging to the Coast Guard that leave ports during the night must inform their rospoctivo commands as to the signals they will use to identify themsolvos prior to departing from port. Important ports (Durros, for oxamplo) are off limits to all civilians not in possession of special permits issued by tho oSigurimittl. Tho guarding of ports and thoir inst- Approved For Release 200470t/P .Eft*.irc Ilit.0001151a16131)02-9 allations is also a fun Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (cont* d.) Pao 65 L. Marino Infantry and Coastal Dofenso A Soviet Navy aeniral whose headquarters are on Sazan Island, is in suprane command of Marino Infantry and Coastal Deans? Artillery units, and also supervises all work concerning fortifications and coastal deonse. 1. It is believed that that the Albanian coastline is dividod into 'sown coastal defense sectors, a garrison company located within each. Centers of those defense soctors are as follows: let Sector Durros 2nd Sector 'nen? 3rd Soctor Sazan Island 4th Soctor Porto Palorpo 5th Soctor Sarando 61h Soctor Butrinto 7th Soctor Shen Win (,) Every contor of coastal defonso consists of tho following components: 2 motor launches, armed with one machino run oach; 3 motor? sailing craft, with one nftchino gun each; and one garrison company deployed along the coastal sodtor. :Bach garrison company consists of 1 officer (con, pany commander), and three platoons led by norrcemmissionod officors. A com.. pany consists of 60 men. Each company is equipped with one mountain gun which is emplaced on the most prominent position of the respoctivo sector, and two machine guns. Means of communication consist only of visual signals. M. Coastal Fortifications 1. none ? This port is ocaupiod by a military force of five to six thousand men, mainly personnel of a unit of Coastal Artillery.. The troops are billeted between the city and the port of Vlono. Their barracks consist of about 30 or 35 buildings, located approxinatoly two kilometers from the port. Tho so ?aal/od "Central Barracks" are located about 500 yards south of the port, and consist of throo or four buildings. Those barracks accomodate about one thousand enginoor troops. A quartermaster dunp is lo? catod in the immediate vicinity of the barracks occupied by the Coastal Art.. illory unit. The area of Vlono has boon closely ruardod for the past two years. Its population is subject to political security checks and many of the inhabitants have 'boon removed, NO persons may approach this zone if not in possession of a special permit issued by the Soviet Comnand or the "Tochnioal Branch" of the "Sigurinit". Recently this zone was described in an official document (proclamation) as a "Military Prohibited Zone". The reasons for thil security arot secrecy of fortification works; loading and unloading of munitions, armament, and other supplies arriving by sea. In Vlono, there is a Technical Defense Comnand which draws the plans for a defensive system of Linguetta Peninsula, Hinarol Sazan Island, and Vlone Day. Approved For Release 2004,0site_RDE310415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of AIOAITIA. (conte d) - Page 66 2, Sazan Island has a rocky and in some placos, 0. procipitous shore line Which is quite conducive to tho construction of submarine pens and. shelters for motor torpedo boats. Sono of these works are being mended and improved at prosont. Tho-purpose is to add. towacd making Vlono May a bulwark of defense as well as offenso. Tho island is located about ton miles northwest of the port of Vlono, and is about 15 to 18 kilometres long, and about 10 to 13 kllonotros wide. Tho island is rocky and mountainous, reaching an altitude of 400 metros. It &min,- atos the entire Strait of Otranto, and its stratoGic value is onhancod by tho fact that it is a defense position for the ontrahco to V1one 3ay. Installations and sono of tho fortifications built on tho Maud by the Italians during their 24 years of occupation (1919-1943), wero heav- ily damaged'by the aozpans during lbrld War II. After tho war, YUgedlav and Soviet engineers repairod the damage and incroasod the fortifications. There are about yo buildings on the island which are used as barracks, offices, quarters for officers and their familios a power plant which was repaired. in 1946, and a radio receiving and transmitting station. Those installations are located along the eastern side of the is- land, facing toward none and the Albanian coast, The island has its own port Which consists of a quay. 120 metros long, with a depth of 6 to B nom. tree. The port will accomodate one ship not =witting 5,000 to 6,000 tons. In the event of bad weather, vessels of the Albanian Merchant Nbamb. me aro permitted to anchor out or tie up in the harbor of Sazan. Ilat it is not pernissibleundor any circunstneos for crows of such vessels to go ashore. Communication on the island is madd possible by moans of good roads. Soviot tractors havo been observed from the port area of tho island while boing.Ilsed in the maintenance of the roads. There is one Soviet rogimont stationed on Sazan Island (reported to bo either Coastal Artillery of Marine Infantry). Provious reports in. dicated that there were MD Albanian troops present, all of thom having been replaced about two years ago by this Soviet regiment.' In Potraary 1950, however, an eyewitness observed Albanian military personnel on the island, and this source ostimated the Garrison strangth at &boat 1,000 nen. There is a Soviet frigate stationed at the island which may be used as a torpedo boat or nine tender. According to ono source,there are 70 artillory pieces defending the island. Those gunz occupy omplacenents which havo boon built in the rock in such a position that their fire covers the northern, western, aid southeastern approaches to VlezezlatY, The greater part of the artillery positions are concentrated in the soUthorn sector of the island in order to cover the straits between Sazan and Kepi i Closes (Linguotta, Gama, 1,250,000, Sheet G-4, 0787)47). In addition to the hoary artillery, there are Epplacements of 04121216110- at.d. AA machine guns. located along the bolts of the island, forming a second line above the heavier artillory ions. Thole are reportedly two 'batteries of AA artillery drawn bY treas. Approved For Release 2004/028 :EICZSI8EOW15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Survoy of ( ?outs cl) Page 67 The Sazan Island pArrison is also equipped with light AA guns of tho nOorlikonn typo or similar. Strong nosts of Minn AA guns are locatod in the southorn'part of tho island, with at:munition sholters having boon cut out of tho rock. Machino guns havn boon emplacod along tho ontiro coastline of the island, forming an advance guard of tho do- fens? line. An observation post is stationed atop the highest point of tho island, and is located in tho northern part of So,zan. A winding road loads up to the OP. Southeast of Point 361, a rookot launching station has boon constructed. It is bolievoi that thorn are 24 rocket launchers on the island, and those nay be moved to any of tho stations by moans of a narrow gauge railway. Tho lounchors are stored in sholtors dug in the rock. Tunnels which shelter submarines, fuel, and annunition have been built underneath the island. All tunnels havo entrances facing east, and have be built in such a nnnnor as to fully exploit all opportunities for camouflage offored by the rockm. Since tho son in this aroa is about 30 net roe deep, submarinos nay enter and dapart without four of being noticod except from the air. Thor? aro roportodly four tunnels: Nos. 1 and 2 aro locate. in the northern part of the island, whilo Nos. 3 and 4 aro in tho south. Each tunnol is supposed to be able to accomodate 15 submarinos of medium sizo. /n addition, tho tunnols contain tho following facilities: NO. 1 ? A Mesa oil dopot, built into tho wall of tho tunnel. It is divided into eight tanks, each having a capacity of about 500,000 liters with a combined total of about 4,000,000 liters of resort? fuel. Nb. 2.. A modern workshop, capable of oxocuting all types of re- pair as well as installations on subnarinos. No. 3 ? A gasoline and diesel pil depot also built into the wall, and divided into six tanks of which each has a capacity of about 500,000 liters, and a total capacity of about 3,000,000 liters. NO. 4 . Supposedly an annunition storage tunnel. Possibly torpedr. oos, nine's, etc., say be stored here. (NOTE: Nbt considorod practical to store torpedoes or mines in such a damp aroa). Amnunition for all kinds of weapons which are on tho island is storod in undorground caves which aro toliovod to be in tho southern part of tho island. Tho narrow mum railway groatly faalitatos the supply of ammunition to individual opplacroments. Tho island has no natural *Mgr springs, thoroforo, fresh wator must be shipped from the nainland at Wi I /Motet, Food supplies, %tutor, nail, equipment, otc, are all transported to tho island by noans of an American built tug, which runs fron tho nainland to tho island six tines daily. Tho tug is also used. for transporting troops. Tho tug has a die- placament of about 50 tons, powered by a diosol engine, and suppliod to ALIA'ITIA by tho UNRRA in 1946. Approved For Release 2004/0389ECtIRPE-11415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALDAFLA (cont' d.) Pogo 60 3. Linuotta Peninsula - The hoights of Linguotta are boing porforato& with tunnels. Largo emplacements of hoavy, lonr-range art- illery weapons have been constructed along the windward side of the ' pehinsula, which slopes westward from the Earaburu Mountains. At the present tine (Doe 49 - Feb 50) thore are, in a distance of not mom than 15 kilometros, over 20 batteries of 150nn guns. Tho zono of Capo Glossa (Kopi i Moses) is particularly wail fortified. In woll hidden caves, there are six battories of 100nm guhs of Soviet-Czech manufacture. All those weapons are rapidl-firo pins. Thom are ammunition iholtori hidden in the rocks. About 100 to 150 metros cloy? tho artillery emplacomonts aro 20mn AA runs whoso task it is to dofond the artillory piecos below. At present, a control ammunition depot is being excavatod to en- sure an adequate supply of ammunition to all gun emplacements. In order to soeuro wifficient amounts of drinking water for tho garrison, concrobs water cisterns are being eonstructed along the loouard side of the pomp- insula6 Food deposit* aro also being sot up. Special water barricades with seCtot entrances will be laid botWeen ICapo Karlovet an& tho southern point of Sazan Island. Those barricades will be protoctod by a nino field, 4. Minors Gulf.; (Submarine :Ate) Pour submarines of iirla ton,- nage have been observed hero, Thoir exact location When in a theltor can,- not be learned sinco it is felt that those shelters aro alit into tho rock nt water love', in the northern and southern sectors of tho bay. These subs are reported to bo part of the Soviet fleet of sixteen wdbs of diff- erent types. 5. Sarando - Tho city is occupied by about 3,000 Albanian troops which include: Infantry, Artillery, and Engineer units. Personnel of the units are housed in barracks located 1 kilometer north of tho town. It is reported that strong fortifications have been installed along the coast south of Sarando. 6. Gulf of Durres - The Gormand of a Marine Infantry regiment equipped with a larrv number of 150mn guns for coastal defenso is located in Durres. The city is also tho pArrison for a, special artillory contin- rout eqpippeA with rockot launchers which consist of seven 210mm barrels. Those weapons are vehicle-drawn. The two battalions are lc.- catod along tho coast from Oapo Pali south tillr Eurros (the center of de- fense) and from hare on sotth to Cap? Cadi. Tho southern battalion, which defonds tho marshy flatland of Dzung, is oquabod with numerous anti- tank rifles, which aro also noant to be usod in tha event of an enemy land- ing, A third coastal defonso battalion, armod as tho abovemontioned, is stationed. between Capo Cadi and Eravasto. N. Airforco 1. General Tho Commandinr Officer of the Albanian Air Force is Col- onel (or Major) Teodor =Tie a Communist of Greek ethnic origin Iron tho Approved For Release 2004/SE: CAREE33T00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey 0g17-:71A (contld) Pago 69 Albanian zone of Zooispolk. His functions are purely those of inspoct- ion, since a prono-,. Albanian Air Force is not yet in oxistonoo. Thom are five Italian aircraft, old and repaired, which woro left in Tirano after hlving becin &mood after an Anorican air raid. There are-a76- somo nrm3rioal1y insignifiemt Albanion Air Groundforco units in Tirano, but their strength doos not oxcood 150 mon. Sono of those mon have boon sent to 1700sIA for air training. Six Albanian pilots have returned from Krasnodar, in tho Caucasus, arta from Poltava, whoro thoy rocoived train- ing and bocano connissionod pilots. At the prosont tine, those six pil- ots, together with Colonel Zan, form the comnand of tho Albanian Air Force. Tho Air Force Command. maintains close) contact with tho Polish Military Mission, which is made up of four officers (two nald grade, and two captains) with hoaaquarters in Tirano. This mission has four nodern reconnaissance pianos. According to reliable information, tho Polish nission will bo recalled to POLAND.(Jan 50). However, the air- craft of the Polish Mission would ronain in Tirano, since they wore sold to tho Albanian GaTernment. In addition to tho four Polish officors of tho Mission, there are about eight non-cons who are oallpd nspocialisten. In the near taturo, a shipnont of 18 pursuit pianos for tho Albanian Air Force is expected to arrivo from RUSSIA as payment for ninF- orals which had boon doliovorea to the Soviot Union, As a rosult. the First Albanian Air Force Grow would be fornod and would be nado up of about 30 pursuit and. roconnaissanco pianos. Thato would also be 12 hydro- plahes (origin not givon) for coastal patrol and coati:al defense work. Tho absonoo of a short or long? range bombor group in tho Albanian Air Force will handicap any future air oporations of any sizo. 2. Albanian Airfields a) Losh Airfield- located west of the Losh-Durres highway on tho flatland of Gajusi i Zojnonit (YUGOSLAVIA, 17156,000, Sh 1454140846: b) Durres Airfield - located in tho vicinity of the city. o) ravajo Airfield located in tho vicinity of Kavep (GMEECZ, 1:250,000 Sh 0-1, 909828) along tho Burros - Lushnjoio Vlono hiehway. This is an auxiliary fiold, d) Libofshe. Airfield. - locatod near the town (GCE, 1:250,00( Sh 0-1, 105790). This vas once an auxiliary field, but has since boon convorted into a pormmnont airarone. o) !Ism AirOold looabod near Vlono. This is the largest pernanont airfid(an =AMA. f) Einara Alrfind located. at Einar% (OEM, 1:250,000. Sh G-4, 113710). This is an auxiliary field. ZICR-111 boing convortod into a permanent field, and to be oquippod with nodorn installations. Approved For Release 2004/02/5 :BIG[R8EAT15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALDANLA (cent' d) Pao 70 g) Sarando Airfield - located at Sarando (GREECE, 1:250,000, Shoot G-4, 133650). This is permanent installation a is used by tho Air Force. h) Shkoder. Airfiold - This is a pornanont field and is oquippod with goniometric and other nodorn installations. . 1) PruJe Airfield - at Krujo (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Shoot Y-46, 133861). A permanent field, usod by tho Air Force, and equipped for day and ni(llt j) Tirane Airfield A permanont fiold usod by both the Albanian and Soviet Air Forces. Modorn equipnont. It) Elbasan Airfield. an auxiliary field which is Icing ccnvorted and having the runways extended.. 1) Kucove Airfield... (GREECE, 1:250,000, Shoot 0-1, 135753). An auxiliary field. m) Urn Hasan :out Airfield- (Hasan Bout, GREECE, 1:250,000, Shoot 134750). An auxiliary field. n) Gjinokmmter Airfield (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet A .4, 146701) is located east of tho road. between Gjinokastor and VLono, in tho Dhrino River Valley. o) Derat Airfield - (GREECE, 1:250,000, Shoot G-1, 137772) locatod along the road leading to Elbasan, A former auxiliary field now boing con- verted.. p) Dutrinto Airfiold - located on tho northern shore of Lake Butrinto (GREECE, 1:250,000, Shoot 0-4, 133664). q) Eukes Airfield . located at tho junction of the :lack in and the White Drin Rivers, not very far from the Yugoslav bordor. r) Igkop112:Airfield - located. near the town (TUGOSL4VIA,1:250,00 Sheet Y-47, 7 75) which lies near the Yugoslav border. A permanent field which was in existence prior to World War It. s) Korce Airfield. - a permanent fiold near the town (GREECE, 1: = 2% POO, Sheqmg1--206757) vite agi!pped with darn installations which were 101T py zhe Lie s'auring t) Starove Airfield - (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 0-1, 2)0757) near the border junetion of AL:ARIA, GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA. O. General Mobilization for Pro-Military Training On 12 Deconber 1949, the Albanian Communist Party held a meeting at Tirane for tho purpose of organizing an association for the aid of the Albanian Army and to promote national defense moasures. This plan for Approved For Release 2004/0g tee-RFE310415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A. Survey of ALBANIA. (contsd) Page 71 mobilizat,7. to te Ir.wn as oSbnoquija Per Ndihmo UshtriseDho Mbroj- tjose (Tho Aowoir.tion for Assistance to tho Army and Dofonso). Tho con, 'Throne? was inaugurated by tho chiof of thc political direction of the Albanian Army, Major Gonoral Hyoni HAPO, with 105 dologatos in attondanco and roprosontinz 111 scotionr of tho country. Those dologatos toprosentod 1,305 Communist or ?i; oombinod monbcrohlp did not =coed 41,500 porsons. The nooting was also attondod by thc following officials: Dr.Onor NISHAN/, President of the Prosidiun of tho Pooplosl Republic of ALBANIA.. Tuk JAEOVA, Socrotary of the Albanian Workers' Party. Bocar BULIMIC; Major General, Chief of tho Goncral Staff of the Albanian Pooplost Amy. Hysni KAP; Chiof of tho Political Direction of tho Albanian Posplosl Army, Gogo NUM, Chief of tho Contra Committoo of Profossional Un- ions (labor unions) of ALBANIA.. Liri BEGISHOTA, monbor of tho Albanian Politburo of tho Control Connittoo of tho Albanian Communist Party, Tho Sh.N.U.M. will be open for memborship to all Albanian citizens and has tho follewing program: 1) It will bo the honor and duty of the Association to aid tho Albanian Army, promote dofonso measuros, and educate tho Albanian juvenile massos for their future activity in tho Army.- Tho young monbors, prior to their boing draftod for military service, must be trained in handling a rifle, automatic weapons, maehino guns, and above all, mast be apprenticed in a special lino of tho Arny, such as wireless operators, telephonists, motor nochanics, and drivers of cars and tractors. In this naancr, tho Sh.N.U.M. will contribute to the ?Moloney of tho Albanian Arm and will become rosorvo forces. 2) It will also bocono tho tain task of tho Association to educ- ate tho population in air dofonso and in anti-chonfal warfaro. In additior to the members of the Association, an active part in carrying out this pro- gram, will be porformod by the juveniles and by non and women of thc country. Mapor Gonoral Hysni KAPO will give the roqpisito instructions to tho population in rospoct to precautionary noasuros to betaken in tho event of air-raids and first aid to tho wounded., 3) Another important iton incumbent upon tho Association is to promote the growth of military sports. In this connection, first consid. oration should bo given to target practico, this boing the main rovisito in educating tho massos for tho defense of thoir country, All mentors of the Association mast bo trained in the use of fire arms. Tron their ranks the boot Darksraen will be soloctod (snipors) "Snajpors-Shonjuss to dallourw. IA addition., automobile and motorcycIo exports must be dovolop. od. Approved For Release 2004/t1t elfrIK)415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoy of ALBANZA (contld) Pago 72 4) will also introduce military tactics into schools and u?).11..1n ciyltcln of tho %Magas, and organizo tho training in handling motors, radios tolc.graphic oquipmont and tolophonos. 5) The task of tho Association will also be to train their nenbcrs in laying ninos, thus constituting oxcollont support to tho ninclayors and sappore in case of war. 6) If circumstancoe pornit, the Association will educate their nombors in handling sea and aircraft as pilots and mochanics. In ardor to mako tho foregoing program operative, it will be ossont? ial to obtain tho roquisito instructive matorial and moans of oduoation. In the principal cities, circles of tho Association will have to be ostabliehod At those clubs or centers, litoraturo or libraries of a military character would be availablo, and oxhibitions ofylilitary significanco should be hold. At factories, shipyards, at schools, in villagos, in pub. lie and governmental institutions, mooting placos of tho Association should be creatod for mcnbors pf tho Association, with material available for tho accomplishnont of tho program of actin of tho Association . At schools and educational institutions, tho handling and firing of arms should be practiced: moroovor, cities, villages, factories, shipyards, and all enter- prieos should have their own centers whore rifle and targot practice can be carried out. At such cantors, nombors of tho Association should bo drilled in oporating machino guns, automatic rifles and other firearms. ThoAssoctttion will nothodically organize and introduce nombors of tho Association into technical and military technical scions?. At tho moot tug places, thoorotical training in tho use of firoarns will be givon. Tho success of tho work porformod by tho association will depend on tho talon- onto convoying tho instruction. Tho Association will, thoroforo, audit in all ways poseiblo the educational olononte in their efforts to attain pork. foction. As a genoral rub, tho Association will select inetractors iron tho ranks of domobilizod soldiors. Tho work porformod by the Association can show no pesitivo results without tho active support of tho Albanian labor unions, tho juvonilo ing associations in ALBANIA, Albanian wommas associations, tho Albanian Rod Cross, and other mass institutions. In tho first instanco, tho A4800. iation will have the support of the Albanian Labor Party, tho creator, ora... anizor and lender of tho Association in Aid of tho Army and Dofonse. In tho porfornanco of its work, the Association will bo guided by tho doctrines of MARX, IINGSLS, LMITIN and STALIN. Tho funclamontal organizations, in their ?ours') of action, will be guidod by tho decisions taken at tho General Amsombly of tho nombors of the Association. Tho basic organizations for directing the work of their nombore will elect their executives for this purpose. In tho districts, tho suprono organ of tho Association is tho District ?onion:moo, which ol? octs tho Association District Council and tho various commissions on vb. vision, which performs tho work during tho period botwoon conforoncos. Approved For Release 2004/0SeCe-R1640415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoy of ALBANIA (conttd) Page 73 Tho Association is basoa on a democratio-socialist structuro. Tho ?roans of tho Association and their chiofs aro olocted along domocratic linos with tho right to voto boipg given to all classos. Thc aloctod will be rosponsiblo to tho voters for their actions. /t will be incumcnt upon tho diroctivo organs of tho Association to educate an. cooporato with tho mombors of the Associations promote initiative, ana foster tho aavolopmont of tho program. It will be thoir tin& to cultivate interest in tho program by Moans of intoresting spoochos, loam n from positivo oxporionco, ana to listen to suggostions of tho mombors. Mvory Albanian citizen be alio. iblo for membership in tho Association in Aid of tho Arny and Damao. During this conforonco, Colonol Noxhip VINO= promisod unlimitod support on the part of the Pooplos Army to assist tho Association in poi... forming the duilos assignod to them. The diroction of the Association con. sists of tho following porsonalitioss Haxhi MESH', Major Gonoral, President Kolanoci TKI, Socrotary Kahroman YLLI, Ministor of Education (Public Instruct*. ion) Sadik BM/ESE', Vico Prosidont of the Control Council of tho Profoosional Unions. Modar SETYLIA, v AIN I Taal ?AMA Nefo MYETIU Masi LIPIVANI, Prosiaont of tho Committoo of Physical Maucation in ALBOIA. Mark =ODA Nash? UATHANAILI During tho noottn, Liri BELISHOVA, in seconding the program of tho newly created Association.,strossod the many advantagos of this organization and the many aids it will provido in support of the Albanian Army and for tho defense of tho country. Continuing, she stated. that this institution will promote sport and enable thoAlbanian nation to taco whatoror situation may arise in caso of an amorgoney. With this and in view, tho creation of this Association in Aid of Army and pofonso is of foremost importanco, and it will be tho patriotic duty of every citizen of tho Pooplots Republic of ALBANIA to take active intorost in this organization in order to promote its growths Major Gonna KAN) then rose to speak. Ho commondod the init- iativo taken by the Control Committoo towards tho organization of thoAssoo- iation, whoso coming into being has boon wolconcd by tho enthusiasm of the Albanian youth and 1 tho working classos. As all mass ori7anizations, which in their foundation followed. tho principlos of MAMISMZENINISM, so ale& tho structure of tho Association is basod on this doctrino, and will haro its footing in Albanian inaustrial centors, in tho shipyards, enterprises, and. govornmontal inititutions, in villages, and in oducational circles, and in all gphoros of action. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 5IERGER0E1TR006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (contta) Pao 74 P, !about= Armv Insitnia of Bark, and Uniforms 1. ()Moors ana soldiers sorving in tho Albanian Army arc issuod two uniforms, one for summor wear, and ono for win4or. Thc follow- ing is a doscriptinn of those uniforns: Albanian ()Moor's Sunnor Uniform: Whito cotton blouse with a high nock. Gray trousors (Yugoslav Army stylo) mad.? of cotton material. White garrison cap, with shiny black visor. Low cut shoos, of black or brown color. Albanian ?Moor's Vint or Uniform: Dark gray wool blouso and trsusors. Dark gray officer's avorcoat (Yugoslav stylo). Black boots. Garrison cop with rod star. NOTE: In 1947 and 1948, part of tho Albanian Army woro Bulgarian uniforms. Albanian Soldiorts Swimer Uniform: Brown cotton blouso with a high nook. Tho blouso is worn avor tho tronsors, with a loathor bolt around tho waist. High black toots. Brown cotton trousors, trousers aro worn tuekod into tho soldiers boots. Yugoslav stylo cop, with rod star. Albanian Soldiorts Winter Uniform Tho Albanian soldiors now woar two difforont typos of winter uniforms. Ono is of tho Soviot stylo in brown wool, while mono wear tho Yugoslav stylo in gray wool. Wool cap with rod star. Howovor, many soldiors woar tho garrison cop instoad of tho avorscas cop. Overcoats aro of tho Yugoslav typo, dark pTay. 2. Tho insignia of rank for Albanian onlistod porsonnol and officors is as follows: Albanian Army Enlisted. Porsonnol: Albanian onlistod porsonnol wear thoir rank in the form of cold colored ohovrons on tho opaulots of their uniforms. Bank is not worn on tho sleeve of tho shirt. An Albanian corporal wears 1. strip? (strip? is pattornod as follows:'-). All Albanian sergeant is distinguishod by two stripes, whilo a motor sorgoant wears throo stripos. Approved For Release 2004/02/19EICPR-EL471ER006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Campy of ALBAITIA (conttd) Pogo 75 Tho opaulot worn by tho Albanian onlistod porsonno/ is of tho ammo natorial as tho uniform (opaulot is of cloth and not stiff liko tho ones worn by Aldhnian officers), Howovor, tho opaulot is of a solid color according to tho soldier's branch of sorvico. InadAltion to tho colorod opaulot, Albanian ahlistod porsonnol also wear a snail irianglo on each Bid? of tho collar, and thoso triangles are the Ban? color as tho opaulot, tho color indicating tho soldiorts branch of sop. Vico. 9. Moor Oadbtai All Albanian offioor eadots are distingaishod by a solid gold colorod epaulet, with two snail, raised gold linos running along tho gth of tho opaulot, closo to its ?Igoe. The opaulot also has a small gold star, on the socond gol4 bar near tho am. In addition, the branch of 110r Vice is indicated (Army, Navy, Air Corps) by a small, colorod line near the odgo of tho opaulot. I. Albanian Array &floors: 2nd It, Solid gold opaulot, with ono gold star near tho arm. Branch of Berrie? is indicatod by a small, colorod lino around tho indido of tho opaulot., 1st It, Solid gold opaulot, with two gold stare running park. allol to tho opaulot. Branch of sonic() is indioatod by a small, colored, lino around inside of epaulet. Oaptata ? Solid gold epaulet, with three gold stars running parallel to tho epaulet. Branch of service is id... icatod by a snail lino, colored, around tho insido of tho coadlot. Major Solid gold epaulet, with throo gold stripes placed at opal intervals, running parallol to tho epaulet. One gold star on tho middlo gold stripe. Tho star is worn at the half it of tho gold strips. Branch of service is indicated by a snail, colored lino around the inside of tho epaulet. Oolonol ? A solid gold opaulot, with throe gold stripes placed at equal intervals running parallol to tho length of tho epaulet. A gold star on tho niddle stripe (same position as on Major's 'Ansi) and a gold star on tho first gold stripe, mar the arm. Indication of branch of sorvioo is sane as provioutiy doscribod for Albanian officors. Colonol A solid gold opaulot, with three gold stripes (as above). Ono gold star on the niddlo strtpo (as a Mad. or) and gold stars on tho first and third gold stripe near tho arm. Branch of sorvioo indicated as boforo. Approved For Release 200445/E lifeer00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? SECRET A Survey of ALBAN/A (conttd) Paeb 76 5. Color pesell-ption Indicating Branch of Sorvico: Rod?Albanian "Sigurinit "(State Socurity).. Officers and agontr of "Sigurimit wear a largo red star on tho loft am, half- wny botwceu tho shoulder and the elbow, Artillory Light Groan . Infantry Tallow ? ?lima/ Belie? 6. Tho following aro awards now oxistont in the Albanian Ar': SontIority Bronzo Modal b. ocmrago Bronze, Modal or Liboration. Silver Modal d. National Koro ? Gold Modal Tho first throo decorations (a,b, and o) aro allowed to be worn at all. time. Nowovor, tho National Horo docoration is worn only during national fosttvitios or nilitary parados. Tho National Eoro d000rh. ation is &vat to very fcw parsons. -In fact, the last time) this docoration was awardod was in 1947, to a corporal of tho Albanian Navy who killod two Albanian soldiers who woro attoopting to oscapo in a small boat from ALBANIA, PAW VI Albanian,Ecomizt 15. MiumilizglAt 1. The najor industrY of ALBANU is constitutod by to exploit. ation of underground rosouroos. Various foreign ontorprisos contribute, a, groat deal toward tho dovolopnont of ninoral rosourcos sine? 1918. In that year, S.I.M.S. (Sociota Itoltana Minioro di Solcnica? Italian Mining Indus, try of Solonica) exploited tho extraction of bitunon (6.000 tons annually), which was transpo7tod to Vlono by a narrow gaugo railway. In tho erudo oil field, intense research was oarriod on by Standard Oil, AnglaZorsian Oil, and Sindicat Iranco.albanais. All throe companios obtninod-importont con.. cossions, while other consossiont wore granted in 1.925 to S.I.Gat. (Sootots. Italiana Giacinouti Lignite..., Italian intorpriso for Lighito), aniA.IrrrA. (Amionda Italiana Botrolio Albania ? Italian Enterprise for Albanian Crud? Oil). Thous two Italian companios had 164,000 hodtaros undor their super. vision. A.I.P.Ar constructal a ptpolino (annual capacity 500,000 tans) 71.1 kilonotres long which connects tho oil well of Licove with tho port of now, Approved For Release 2004/02/t:E1CIIIVE0115R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALEASLA (contld) Page TT S.I,M.S, $_7-xched for crude oil in thc zone west of Manic? and Dovoll. 5.I-L. had the sono around pro? under its suporvisiom for the production of lignito. After 1925-27, copper, iron, chrome, coal, and bitumen were being, mined in the area of Mallakastra; 'bauxite was coming from KruJa district; asbostos from ;orce; and ccmcnt from . the area of Vlme. 2. Albanian oil wells have a monthly output of about 40,000 tens of crude oil. Crude oil is now obtained from two sources, the first being the basin of.gnaoro Pcroll, which surrounds the city of Nucor() (Gamcm, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 134784), whilr the socond is the basin of Patos (GRZ20, 1:250,000, Shoot G_1, 111767). Thc most import- ant nines in ALBAYLA are the bitumon nines locatod in Splonico ((RCB, 1:250,000, Sheet G.1, 110755), the copper and chrome mines located. at Brubig fYUGOSUVIA, 1:100,000, Shoot Y-45, 320910), and the coal ninos of :Prieco and Kraals (GR270, 1:250,000, Sheet 1.1, 148427). Tho Basin of Zucavo. Poroll: At present, then, are about 4,800 to 5,000 oil wells in op,. oration within the (All field of Xucoro Doroll. Those wells are apori. atcd by moans of electrical pumps, receiving their power from a powor plant locate! at Poore. The op:Tom/mato monthly output of this basin amounts to 13,000 tons of crude oil. Tho Kucovo- Dovoll oil basin en- ploys about 7,000 to 8,000 workers, operating on a 24 hour basis, using throe 8 hour shifts. Technical personnel of the fibld inCludo Soviet, Roumanian, and Albanian nationals. B. Basin of 2atopl Tho oil fields of 2atos arc located ablaut 30 kilometros southwost ofaaono, and. are now given a certain priority, since no o1. octrical power is roquirod for the exploitation of oil. At prosont, there are only about 200 - 250 oil walls in operation in this area, but search- os from this point aro conductod daily in tho quost for new fields. The Pates oil fields have an output of about 27,000 tons of crude oil per month, onploy about 8,000 workers, operating in throe 8 hour shifts daily. Those omployoos includes a number of Soviet, Roumanian, and Albanian enginoors and. export:4 The best known Albanian engineer working in this area is Bin(!inoor Namol =0I. During the latter part of Navonbor and the early days of Poo- anbor 1949, fire Soviet ships unloadod at the port of PUrT08, a total of about 25,000 tons of oil well oquipment, mostly steel pipos about 12 to 18 metres in lon17th and unspecified diamotor, all dostinod for the oil fields at Patois, nest of the equipment has arrive-1 at its destination by now, although a small part of it romainod in storage in Durros. The oil well oquipnont was shipped. to Batos by rail and by roadway, using trucks and trailers. Approved For Release 2004/02/g :Elteliik8E01.15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Sarver of ALMAMA (centid) Page 78 C. TlEo8p1rtltion4 Storam and ArEesearch Crude oil is leaded on 004 In the port or Vleno, by moans of a special pipeline which has erdallZ leading capa.3ity of approximataY 10,000 to 12,000 tone of oil. The loading pier is located about 1.5 Tines south of the port of Vlono and is known by the nano Uji i Itofot (Erionero, OR=OE, 1:250,000, Sheet G.4, 0957)1.5). Oil is usually loaded on Soviet or Roumanian tankers, of which one arrives weekly. Crude oil roaches Vlone by means of a pipeline 74 kilometres in length, This is the pipeline that originates in the KUCOVO oil fields. A second pipeline, about 40 kilometres long, extends from Pates to Vlonq. In addition to the 500 to 600 oil storage tanks located within the ell Mild., there arc oil storage depots Located at Boskgree, (OREB02, 11250,000, Sheet 54. 117770 about 8 kilometres from the town of 116514 (GRICBCE, 1:250,000w Sheet 0.1, 104770, Seleroc, and nag, the last named being an underground dump. Each of the latter four storage points has a capacity of approximately 4,000 cubic meters. Research for unknown oil deposits is now being earried on by Soviet and Albanian experts in the areas surrounding ;wee, =AL, (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Shoot 1,46, 129809 and 127869) and Plastniftliti, 1:250,000, Sheet 0.1, 136756), the latter being located !bout 16 kilometres from Beret. D. Minos (Sec Exhibit X) 1. Mine( of Eukos and Krum This group of nines is located in thc northoestorn part of ATAMILL, in a vast area which is divided by the White Morin River. Tho tiro groups of mines oan be roughly divided into those located north of the river, with their center being the Viran Kale Mountain (Point 1)132, YUGCOLAV/A, 1:250,000, Sheet Y.47, 192929), and those located south of the river inside a bend of the stream, and having thikr center in tho mountain eretem of Suke o &mat (Point 828, YUGOSLAV/A, 1:250,000, Sheet Y.47, 1S7617). The ere layers appear on the surfaces of the mountain slopes in the form of rings. The clementine depositisform the basis for metal ere layers, while the latter are covered with a calcareous deposit. Those stratums ato eon. posed of brown hematite, in a compact form, with a variable quantity of other oxides, especially mew:Alto. This ere occurs in quite an extensive area, and there is a deposit ealy 2.5 kilometres from the Yugoslav border at Marine (YUGOSLAVIA, 11250,000. Shoot Y.)47, 251927). In'Ole region of km ORMOSLATIA, 1:250,000, Shoot Y.47, 188919) located about 6 kilometres southeast of &grab the nouatain=of Sake e Mensit contains a calcareous structure with horizontal stratums, resting on ser. pontine, at a height of about 500 motors above sea lurel. Anmproximato depth of 6 meters of brown hematite covers on mon ti. not less than five square kilometres.' Approved For Release 2004/02/11 : ClAnalf8gt5R006100200002-9 SEC Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBA,NIA (contid) Page 79 Arouncl Tru1:10, (Zoint 1007, YUGOSLAVLA, 1:100400, Shoot 1140, U35145), about 3.5 kilomotros eoutbsost of Mount Suka o Mansit, there is also a calcareous mass rooting upon serpentine. Ai about a height of 650 motors on the eastern side of tho mountain, facing the village of Sorroi (YUGOSIAV/A, 1:250,000, Shoot Y-47, 165913), there is a vast sur- face layor of oro lying botwoon tho calcaroous and serpentine deposits montionod above. Await oxplorations of the vostoro slopo of tho mountain have revealed a groat quantity of ninoral wealth. This indicates the. continuity of tho minoral stratum on the entire surface of tho hillside, amounting to about two square kilonotros. Tho thicknoss of tho notal oro layer in this area amounts to at least 40 notors, of which moro than 10 are conposod of excellent homatito in a very pure and compact form, eon. taming over 55% iron. In tho :mono of MalkIres, thoro io a third layor of honatito loo- otod. on the southern slope of Suka o Manoit Mountain about 3 kilonotros from tho White Drin River, in tho immodiato vicinity of tho villago of USW. Compact layers of hanatito, 7 notors in thicknoss, oxtond for about 2.5 kilometres at an average height of 700 nacre abavo soft lovol. In the sone of Icruuo(INGOSUTLA, 11250,000, Shoot Y-47, 192933). a :fortes of surfaco stratums of iron oro, extending fron north to southwost at a height of about 570 motors, start four kilonotros southwest of the village. In this instanco, tho ninorals aro also looatcd balsa= layors of calcareous and serpentine, with tho latter scarring as a-Aaso. Tho nm.. oral in this area is brown hematite, with sono nagnotito wodgmd in. The con- tent of iron is botwoon 62 and 64%. Tho ninoral oxtraoted from those nines (tho exploitation is partioulatly intensive in tho nines nearest the road leading frooLgakol to bird:. to Shkodor. Minerals are transported by truck to spon Win, a small port, from whore thcy aro transported directly to the Soviot ports in tho Plack and Baltic Seas, including Ileni There are a group of nines located between (ikrO and Prealophi, and this area is in tho central part of eastern ALBANIA near Lake Ohrid, be.. Wean tho sources of the Shkuntin River and the lako. Those deposits have already boon intonstvoly studied by tho former %Ionia Mineral Motalto6 /talioni" A.M.M./. "Italian Walt? Minerkls Rnterprisels Tho sone between rormadoo and mum contains mineral deposits at a high altitude. Those deposits aro also located botwoon layers of caloar- oous and serpentine rooks. Tho deposits axtond for a length oxce6ding 20 kilouotros, from Pooradoo to Rugamja(GRszaz, 1:250,000, Shoot G.1,190612). This stratum is brown hanatito of "pisolition and "oolitic' char. actor, and nixed with a largo pordentago of nagnotito. The content of iron is between 55 and 60%, and oontains no harmful impuritios. Tho oro extract. ed from sono of thoso ninos contains ohrono and niokol. The mining is fac- ilitated by a thin Ianr of calcareous covor. lacilities for transporting tho ore are good sinco tho minas are located near tho national highway which connects with Slagacal, iron whore tho railroad runs into Durroi. Approved For Release 2004/02/18 tek-e9VE04t5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (contd.) Page 80 In tho zone of :1onlishto the nines are locatod six kilonotros fron Pogradoo, west of tho road loading from Strugp, on tho slopo of Mount Mokrc. Thoso deposits aro also conprossod botwoon layers of calcareous and serpentine rock. Tho oro lies at a height of about 500 notors above tho surface of tho lakc in this area. In tho Corvonaka Valloy, there are sizaaho quantitios of oro lying very near tho surface, being covcrod onlY by a thin Ivor of humus. Thoso layors have thicknesses of not loss than 4 rioters, while tho avorago thickness is much highor. It is bcliovod that tho tIS nines which are presently boing qporatod bore contain 20,000,000 tons of oro rosorros. Tho oro is brown honatito containing 58 to 60% iron. Tho Bbnoshi area is a continuation of the Corvonaka deposits. Strat- ums of oro, six to nine motors thick and anboddod botwoen layors of oa1car6. oous and sorpontino formations, appear for about a length of 2 kilonotros. This oro is brown honatito with strong inlays of nagnotito and. comp. tains about 60% iron. Tho Wonishto group of minos arc located about teo kilonotros west of Lako Ohrid, consist of 6 nines. This group has an ost- inatod reserve of 6t000000 tons of brown henatito mixed with chrono and. nickel 9re. Another group of ninos are looatod about ton miles wost of Loki) Obrid. Thoro are three mines in this area which aro being oxnavatod and those arc estimated at having a rosorvo of 8,000,000 tons of brown hen- atito. Tho deposit is about throo kilonotros long, an& seven looters thick. The Promlos. and Ptolii group of mines forn an important mineral deposit. They are locatod about two kilomotros south of tho highway con- necting Liaand. Alma, Tho voins art about two kilonbtros long and one kilomotor wide, and ostimatod at 3,000,600 tons of henatito. The oro ar11- oars in a very puro form and contains about 55 to 60% iron. About two kil- ?motors further south there is anothoenineral deposit of onbadod honatito, (F0203) almost on tho surtaco, covered May with a vorp thin layer of oarth. This deposit is Tory puro and is known to contain approximatoly 5,000,000 tons of ore. In ordor to utilizo those supplios of oro, a rail- road will bo built from =aim to Librazhd, following tho Shkumbin River Valley. 2. Oihroniun Minos Chromium oro ninos aro also found in tho principal ninoral aroas and usually quite near tho iron deposits. Some of those arc as follows: a) Moja o Rind Mountain- this deposit is in the northeastern bor. dor area of ALBAKIA, along the Yugoslav frontior, end. lies in a mountainous area facing tho Statina Rivor, a tributary of tho White Drin. Tho area of chromium deposits is not loss than 30 square kilonotors, with its contor at tho villago of Zonod (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Shoot 139, 828460), Research for minorals has boon carried on in this area, nanely along the weetorn slopos of Mount Maio Uristor (Point S57, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Shoot 139, 7775111 the Kodra o Luxha (Point 1236, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Shoot 139, 740524 ; and Maja Plounit (Point 1157, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 139, 745514) mountains, with tho result that rich doposits have boon discovered thxougbout the area. An ?valuation of tho ore contained in this area could not bo nado, since tho layors are not continuous and lie in pockets of var- ying site and contents, OP =iftsz Approved For Release 2004/02/W: la'A 3-801215R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (contfd) Paco gl This area represents an enormous reserve for tho futurc since tho lack of transportation pakos the oxploitation of the oro on a largo scab, an ippossibility. Howevor, according to experts, this area con. tains the most important chromium deposit in all EUROPE, and perhaps, in tho world. The ore is =chant, containing 4g to 50% chroniun oxido. b) The Kukos KrunoATCa located north of Kukos and divided by tho Wbito Drin River. The monthly production of this area is around 2,000 tons. The oro is transported by road and on vory primitive vehicles. Upon arrival at tho main highway, tho ore is ro-loadol on trucks and shipped via Shkoder to Shen Win and Durros. Tho entire out- put is transported to tho USSR or one of tho other Iron Curtain countrios, particularly czrenosLowszu. c) Lake Ohrld Area . A nine syston is being worked in tho MonlistO area, a tow hundred motors from tho provincial road, and quite close to tho shore of the lake. Chrono is also found horo in pockets of varying sizes and content. Sono of these pockets may contain thousands of tons, while others produce but a few hnndrod. There arc nines near Hodoristo, which is also located along tho chore of Lake Ohrid. Other nines are in the Pojska Valley nearby, and along tho Yugoslav frontier. There arc sono important deposits near Pren.los, near Peshkonj., near Skrosha, and Imes. /t is amavatod by primitivo nouns. The quality of oro in the Lake Ohril ro. glen is slightly inferior to that of tho northern region. It contains about 48 % of chroniun nanidridon. /,' 3. Bitumen Mines Important bitunon ninos aro located near Solonicsu about 30 kilonctors northeast of Viono. Tho nines consist of about 70 to CO shafts, with varying longths botwoon COO and 4,000 meters, Daily production of this area is not known. There are about 2,000 - 2,500 miners enployod horo, including an unknown number of porsono who havo boon sentenced by tho Albanian Govoranent to tarns at hard labor. Prisoners have boon observed working hero for tho past throe years. Tho mines are oporntod on an LI hour shifts. There is a rill which transforms bitunen from its raw state into a finished product in tho vill. ago of Solonico. Tho mill employs about 300 to 400 qualified workers, on.. orating on throo C hour shifts daily. An unknown number of Soviet and Rounanian technicians supervise production at both the nines and mill. A narrow gauge railroad running from So1cnico to *non? carrios the entire output of the nines and mill. Tho monthlt production of tho nines runs between 20,000 and 30,900 tons. From VIono, the total output is load. od aboard Soviet, Polish and Rounanian vossols for delivery to unknown destinations. 4. Rnblg: Area An important location for chroniun and copper ores. A smelting plant is also in oporation horo. Moth tho nine and s7lolting furnaces employ betwoon 2,500 to 3,000 workers, on a throo 5 hour shift basis. Production figures for tho nine or tho plant are not known. Coko for tho furnace is imported. from POLAND. /n February 1950, largo quantities of snolta& copper, 70-00 continoters long, and about 50 kilos in wiight woro soon in purros awaiting shipment. Approved For Release 2004/02S EcCFME.-5415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Survey of ALMANIA (contld) Pao (13 f) 'Than ? a brio buildi ig conpany, and tho largost ontorpriso of this to in the country. At t, ; moment, this company is engagod in tho construction work at Dalti, oe tho largo pnwor plant proviously non.. tionod. This plant is in the vi ty of Tirano. g) Miscollancous facto ) op a spaghetti plant employing 250 work,. ors; 2 cigarotto factorios, or (ng about 200 porsons in oach; 1 oltvo oil refinery, employing about a, workers; and 1 brick yard, using about 150 workers. In addition to these factories, there aro two power plants in Tirane. 2. Shkodor a) A conent factory, located on the bank of the Mojana River, 5 kilonotors outsido of town. Tho factory has a daily output of 50 to 6o tons of conont, and opploya about 200 to 300 workors. Thoro aro throe S hour shifts daily. Soviot and Albanian tochniciana diroct tho work hero. Tho factory has oloctrically oporatod oquipnont in additon to that powered by di000l onginos. Tho coko is shipped in fron POLAND. b) Other industrial ostablishnonts in ahkodor include: 1 olive oil refinery, amploying about 50 workers; 1 loatbor factory, 30 ? 140 work,. ors; 1 alcohol distillory, about 30 workors; 1 porfuno factory; and 2 span.. hotti factories. Thoro aro also 2 soap factories, employing a total of about 150 workers (ono of tho factories is tho nonuao which is tho laracat soap factory in tho country); .3 cigarotto factorios, tho *lora", tho NDriniN, and tho ffShkodrall, employing a total of about 600 workers; and 1 diesel oil :oporatod power plant, locatod northeast of tho town. 3. ;Como The town contains 1 browory, onploying about 700 ? COO workorsi 1 sugar factorY, annual production about 2,000 tons, onploying Itoo 5001 workors; 1 textile factory; and 1 power plant, also unknown. 4. liori Tho industrios hero consist of 1 spaghhtti factory; 2 olivo oil rofihorios; and 1 power plant, size unknown. 5. kUrros 1 cigarotto factory, tho 1Tolat Nom", onploying 250 to 300 work.. more; 1 loather factory, omploying about 200 workers; 2 spap,hotti factories, omploying a total of 300 to 400 workers; 1 rico plant, 50 to 60 workers; 1 rubber shoo factory and tiro repair shop, 70 to 50 workers; 1 shipyard with a capacity Of 4 smiling boats of 500 to Goo tons displaconont; and 1 powor plant of unknown capacity. 6. nal% Approved For Release 2004/02/5 :E1eR8E0W15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A, Survey of ALBANIA (conttd) Pogo 04 a) ?Skanderbogn Distillery; 1 olito oil refinery and soap factory in conjunction with the distillory. The distillery produces brandy, puro alcohol, etc. Tho factory roccivos its power from its own 150 bp thorn?. dkoctrie plant which gonoratos power of 250 kwh. Tho distillery omploys about 2,500 to 3,000 workers. b) Another power plant of unknown typo and capacity. 7. Dltasan The industries of the town include 4 olive oil refineries; 1 opaghotti plant; 1 eigarotto factory; and 1 powor plant. 5. ;orat Tho following industries aro located_ hero: 5 oil rofinorios; 1 automobile ropair shop; 1 loathor factory; and 1 power plant. G. njaag.ludgmEd Tho fisbing industry is an important economic factor, since 5,000 to 6,coo poreens are cogagod in this work. The fishing industry was formerly an individunlly oporatod enterprise, but in 1949, the indust. ry was centralized by the Govornment, bocame stato.owned and operated. The main offices for the industry are in Durres. Tho Director Genoral of the fishing industry is Muai 20DGOR/Oh. Affiliated officos, each controlling 4 :section of tho coast, aro located in: Sbkodor: 212L21124 Vlono; Sarando; 7.7orundoc; Butrinto; and ISmEtstax,. Tho fishing floot is operated by the main office and its affil. iatos, and the typos and numbors of craft are: 12 motor vessels of 60 tons Oach; with Ansaldo, 0M, and diosbl onginos in than; about 30 craft of 5 to 6 tons each, poworod by gasolino and diosol engines; and about 100 small boats without oaginos, displacing about 2 or 3 tons oaclu Cold storago spaco and rofrigorators are located in Dnrros; coder; 71ono; Zraqlq and ghgaAtta. The rofrigorators wore obtained In 1945, and wore part of the MBA supplies furnished to ALBANIA. In fact, most of the fishing oquipment now being used in ALBAITIA was suppliod by 'MIMI with the =caption of 'what was purchasod fron YOOSLAVIA. The daily catch amounts to botwoon 300 and 350 tons, but most of the fish aro oxported to unknown destinations. Tho sale of fish to the poaplo is quito limitod, as a rosult of this exportation. Deoplo can ii'.. chase fish twice a month on a ration coupon basis. Tho fish ration anounts to 250 grams per parson cvory two weeks. Sea fishing is permitted only des,. ing the daytino, and no boat is pormittod to fish more than 15 nilos off shore. Each boat of any sire is accompaniod by two or throe "Sigurinito troopers, who are armed, with se.nachino guns. Yishing an Sundays is pro- hibited. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/019CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (contid) R. Tranaaortation and Traffic 1. Maritime Traffic Page 65 During tho latter half of 1949, about 25 Soviot? 15o1ish, and Roumanian ships oarried supplies into arm. The Soviet vessels un. loaded ceroals, comont, coke, Zia tracks and trailers (5 to 10 tons), track ors, and iron. Polish ships, which arrtved nost frovontly, brought Bopp. lice of annunition, food and clothing for the Albanian Armed Porcos, and during tho last four months of 1949, food and clothing supplies woro dol. ivorod for tho Greek rofugoos in ALBANL1. Tho Roumanian ships dolivorod supplies of sugar, conont, oats and paper. None of those ships nado tho return journey without taking 'a cargo aboard. The conmodltios which taken out of tho country includes chronian, copper, bitumen, wool, loather, crud? oil, tobacco, scrap iron and tinbor. Sinco tho oaport colder for crude oil is Uoas, thowoekly schoduled Soviot or Roumanian ship eallod there for a cargo. All ships have direct ordors not to approach tho Yugoslav coast. Ship crows are instructod that in case of an encounter with a Yugoslav patrol boat, to dierogard Yugoslav oriors and try to prevent tho shipts capture by stab. tug it. 2. Railroad Communications (Soo Exhibit V) There are two main railroads in .A.LEASIA, ono is 95 kilometers long and connotts Tirano with Darrow: while tho second is 57 kilonotors in length connecting Darros with Vooin. The latter lino is of particular imp. ortanco since it servos to transport chrono ore fron 2044 to Durros. A narrow gaugo railway connects Vpno and Solonico, and is Land for tho trans. portation of bitumen. Tho entiro railroad system uses a total of seven locomotives, of which throo wore obtained. from CZEOHOSLOVAK/A, two from YUGOSLAVIA; while the origin of tho romaining two is not known. There are about 250 railroad oars, and those include let, 2nd, and 3rd class passenger cars, and froight cars. A depot for railroad cars is naintaincd at Shkozot, About 3 kilomotors south of Pam& The train schedules aro as follows: A combination passenger and fratght train loaves Tirano at 0630 hours, arriving at Durres at QaQQ hours. Tho train, on its re.. turn journey, loaves Durres at 1700 hours and arrives in =am at 1930 hours. On tho Durros ? kagia ran, a combined passongor.froight train loaves Pecan at 0600 -hours, arriving in Durres at 0900 hours. The return journey starts at 1105 hours, and arrives in ?coin at 1510 hours. Any other regularly scheduled trains aro unknown, but it is believed that in pito of tho daylight schodulos of the above trains, that thoro aro trains which run at night. Approved For Release 2004/02/19!5CE-IGFIR-E415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALBANIA (conttd) Paco 1. 3. Highway Comrnrications The most important roads in ALBANIA arc dividod into three oategoried: a) National asphalted roads - those roads aro six and sono. tinos seven rioters wide. Thero aro but fow instancos whoro thoy narrow to five motors in width. Stades arc variable according to tho torrain, in mountainous ariefothoy roach 7%. Por tho most part, tho ballast of thoeo roads is composed of a base of 20 en pebbles or stones; above this 20en of rubblo and 3 cm of sand; and the surface is 1 on of asphaltmititunon. Those roads, for tho not part, aro in tho control areas and along tho coast. b) National naciadoxiood roads . basin= width of thoso roads is six motors, and at times they arc five motors 'Ado. Most of this typo havo boon constrUoted in mountainous areas, c) Roads built on natural foundations - thoso roads aro well built, with a maximum width of four to four and a half motors. Tho nowost road of this typo has boon laid through tho mountainous aroa botwoon Burrolli and /mat. Most of this road has boon out into tho mountain lidos. Tho road betweon goPliku and ,Okol has rocontly boon improved and is now approximately four motors wide. In gonorale tho condition of all Albanian roads is bad since thoro has boon no maintenance during tho last fow years. Tho only road that is reported to be in good condition is the one between Tirano and Durros. Tho highway botwoon Shkodor and Tirano, 120 kilometers long and asphaltod, has boon hoavily danagod betwoen BeltoA9 (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000e Shoot Y-46,, 715920) and Litth (YUGOSLAVIA, 11250,000, Sheet Y-46, 723C94). Thoro is another section of this road which is need of repair. This is a 30 kilo-. motors strotoh botwoon hkalla Kakarriait (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Shoot Y-46, 723,199 to 71(907). The portion of road near Uta oko (mum, 11250.000, Shoot 0.-1, 129556) is in very bad condition also. ,No vohiclo may =god a speed of 20 milos per hour at any of thoso points. Tho bridgo crossing tho Mati River, formerly known as tho ZO(U Bridgo, was repaired in 1946, but can acconodato only one vehicle at a time. Tho road connocting Durres and Toro? (140 kilometers) has tho foll- owing damage: 32 kilonotor strip botwoon Rrogorthina (GREMCB? 17250,000, Shoot 0-1, licay) and Elbasan: tho road botwoon Librashd and Ilia (2C MI. onotros) GREECE* 11250,000, Shoot 0.1, from 172023 to 199506) is also badly ,danagod. Tho road leading from ?oatadoc to tho Bridge of Mille (GREECE, 11250,000, Shoot 0.1, 200767) is in very poor condition. Tho 136 kllonotors of highway botwoon Vleno and Glinokaster is in such poor condition that spools of 15 to 15 mdlos per hour cannot be exceeded.. The road botwoon Shkodor and Apt Eotit (SUOMSENVIA? 1:250,000, Shoot Y-46, 711257) a distance of 32 kilomotors, is damaged between Vraka (YUGOSLAVIA, 11i00,000, Shoot T33* 152324) and:gm:14 (YUGOSLAVIA, 1$100,000, Shoot T35, 110430) a distance of 11 kilometers, and for a distanco of 7 kilomotors between LoglIK and Eastrat (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000. Shoot Y.3J, 0(5499). Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :0S-EDG3Kg5X06100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET 4. Survey of ALBANIA (contid) Page s7 Since ALBANU lacks an adequate railroad communications system, travelling is done mostly by buses. Tho typos of vcOiclos usod on the bus linos aro mainly Piat. Isotta, and Tatra. In 1949, about 10 busos wore shipped in fran HUNGARY. A few of the bus linos arc: Tirano-Vlono: Tirato - Shkodor; Tirano Glinokaster; Tirane - PoshkoPi - Pkos: Tirane - Elbasan: Tirane Koroc: and Tirane - Borate It is believed that who'd- Ules aro operated on a daily basis. are: 44 Louoduti The following aqueducts arc known to oxist in ALBANIA: AguedAd gamaitz (liters per second) Tiranq 75 Shkodqr 36 Borat 11 Korco 50 ilga2 30 glipAcastor 10 Piori 15 5. Tho principal bridges which wore rebuilt between 1944 and 1946 pridLength (in motors) Buono River 100 av.onci 140 Drini River 100 Irag_i_kplqi 150 Zech 120 Milott 52 parsluik (1) lo 21agill (2) 10 Kolal 25 3.111422112 6o :aslant iso Pru 412 45 01401 20 Lana 12 Dimuti 140 Daman 65 ?Ikaakkxavaies 45 Durcti 45 Buno gage 30 iilleAm 45 Monk lmo &am/at 100 RroRozhino 260 Sinal 25 Emil 100 Approved For Release 2004/02/16 EACDRA0715R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoy of ALBANIA (contld) Fago Xucit 100 U2a hasan Bout 110 Broe,ar 110 11 250 140 45 35 Dvatna 35 Konsilcop 110 . Agriculturo (Soo Exhibit XI) When the problem of economic reconstruction arose in 1924, competent authorities woro appointed for tho specific task of dsvolop- ing the agricultural potential of ALBANIA. This is not meant to infor that the Government undertook an agrarian reforms, but simply proceed-. ad. according to a rational plan ef amelioration. In 1925, an association was founded and called (Sociota Sviluppo Economico Albania - Assoc- iation for the Economic Development of ALBANIA), whose task it was to supply tho hecessary moans to tho government to moot tho requiromonts of the vast now program of public works. New Italian copporativos and ag6 ricultural enterprisos wore created, such as: nE.I.A.A. (Association of Albanian Industry and Agriculture), which received 3,000. hoctaros as a concession, for a period of 99 years. This grant was in tho flatland of Shjak, in tho vicinity of parua. (Sociota Anonina Prodotti Industria Agricola Society for the Industry of Agricultural Products) retetva 200 hectares in the vicinity of Tirano. The GRUPO & BUPA= Enterprise received 3,000 hoctaros in the vicinity of Tirano. S.I.F.E. (Societe Italiana Forosto Albania - Italian Enterprise for Albanian 7or.. oats) handled tho exploitation of forests. There are no oxact statistics availablo, but the following are the approximate figures for tho average annual production in tho agric- ultural field from 1932 to 193C: Grain 450,000 quintals Cattle 2,500,000 Tobacco 20,000 " Horses 110,000 Corn 1,900,000 Chickens 1,000,000 Rico 10,000 Hogs 15,000 Wtapos 14,000 Bee Hives 47000 Olives 11,000 J. Ports (Soe Exhibit VI) 1. Purros - the most important port in ALTANIA, reportedly absr inr 6o% of the commercial traffic. The port has two.hugo artificial pie with a combined length of 2,500 motors. Following modern requirements, piers wore built during 1927-25 by tho "MUMMA Co." The installatior wore heavily damaged during the last war, and at present, only one pier, 160 motors long has boon complotoly repaired. Another pior, 250 motors long, is under construction. Approved For Release 2N4/020 RItRir83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Sura y of AMANIA (contod) Pajo89 Two wall cranes and two narrow gaugo railroad tracks wore in. stallod after the war. At prosont, Soviet technicians aro handling tho installation of a large crano at tho end of tho ropaired pior. 2) um& - the eity'is located a few kilonotors from tho bay. In 1949 a pior, 400 motors long, was conploted. It was constructod of re. inforcod concroto and is aboUt 14 or 16 motors in width. Two 10,000 to 12,000 vossols can tie up at one tine. Oil is loaded with special ?quip- nont at A;1040ro, south of nonce 3) Other Ports - south of Vlono aro tho ports ofPaco? and ?arando. Lack of piers or other docking facilities nocossitatos tho usage of floating docks. Shen GAia is the only port in northern ALZZLA., Until rocontlyi tho activitY in this port was vory low. It was used. mainly for the dnloading of coal and naphthol for factories in Shkodor (mostly for tho conont factory)s Two wood= piers, one 80 notors long and tho other 120 lotOrs long, were conplotod ih Jivoiary 3.950. Tho port of Shkodor is ro- lativoly dninrottant since it can only be used during tho fall and Wintor, 401 oven then, it cannot acconodato vessels oxeoeding 1,000 to 1,500 tons. K.2?29211,Es2 Russian supolios for AMANIA havo been woefully inadoquato, / mon during tho period whoa tho country was being handled quito diplonat- ' iOtay wypaisi Soviets. Tho ships that passed through tho Dosphorous and Paranollos, and rounded the tip of GREECE wore far moro heavily ladon arms and military oquipnont for tho Greek rebels rathor than with for. the Albanian people. What food was brought was, in a largo memo- tostinoctfor tho Albanian Arny and. the Greek rebels, Tho sporadic otpjf food which arrived for the people woro paid for by minerals ? *. ? -,,jiro4Uot,s which could bo spare. Sinco tho rupturo of ocononic wilOUGOSLAVIA., those soaborno imports have acquired a dis- P ... ? significance for the Albanian oconopy; and during tho past -17.* s boon a drastic roduction in tho nuabor of ships calling at Al.. -. ports. Tho people and tho government aro wondering anziously about thoir economic position. There sews to be no doubt that, at pros ant, ALOADIA. is unconfort. ably short of food. Dread has always boon a problon, because without tho Koesovo rogion, tho Albanians cannot grow sufficiont amounts of grain. Tho mat situation is loss markoil lamb, goat, and fowl used to bo plentiful, i.e. those with nonoy could oat as nuch as they wanted, while the pooror classes could at last afford an occasional noal which included neat or fowl. Tho main problem, from tho point of view of providing basic comm. oditios and staplos for tho avorago person, is tho supply of such foods as: pasta (macaroni); beans; rico; sugar; and olivo oil (which is univers- ally used throughout tho country as a nodiun for 000king)6 Provided that tho stock of goats has not been too greatly reduced, thoro should bo a fair supply of goat's milk or "'Iwo". Approved For Release 2004/02/19 SIERGIRCE1006100200002-9 Approved,For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoy of AL:ANIA (contift) Page 90 Tho general ocononic situation in ALLANLI is growing increasingly worse. Tho ganoral poverty of the country is increasod by the fact that the gosornmont centers its attention on the armed foroos, particularly the "Sigurinit". The population is fooling the lack of food supplies sinco the rations issuod for ono month are hardly enough for one week, while articles on free sale are obtainable only through payncnt of exorbitant prices. Thor? is a particularly gravo shortago of nodicinos and nodical supplies, A nodical proscription is iognirod to obtain a single aspirin. The poreentagos of illnoss increase daily, and the hospitals aro overcrowded with tuberculosis patients. This latter disoaso cannot be combatted bocauso of the lack of nodical care. Streptomycin nay bo obtain. ad at prices varying botwoon 7,000 and 0,000 lake. Prices of Rationed and Froo Artictog: Food Products Free Market ?rico Rationod Price I kg of wheat broad 1 kg of corn bread 70 gr of hard bread 1 kg of pasta 1 kg of rico 1 kg of sugar 1 kg of marnalado 1 kg of noat 1 kg of coffee. 1 kg of butter 1 kg of potatoes 1 kg of honey 1 kg of cookios 1 kg of choose 1 kg of beans 1 kg of olives 1 kg of fish 1 kg of fish eggs 1 kg of peanuts 1 kg of figs, dried. 1 liter of wino 1 egg 1 kg of prunes, dried 1 Hoer of milk 60 loko 6 lako 30 loko 4 loko 10 lake 100 loko 36 loko 200 lako 50 loko 350 loko 46 lcko 150 loko 100 lcko 150 loko 50 loko 1,500 lake 900 loko 40 loko 25 loko 350 loko 500 loko 300 loko 60 loko 32 loko 60 ldko 45 lake 50 loko 50 loko 200 leko 100 leko 50 loko 200 loko 130 loko 110 loko G loko 5 loko 65 loko 60 loko Prices of textiles obtainallO with ration coupons or on the free narkot, as of 13 March 1950: Articles Cotton, 1 motor of various shades 40% wool cloth, 1 motor, nadc in CZECHOSLOVAKIA Proo Markot Price 700 loko 5,000 lckc liatjapod Price 36 leko 1,500 loko Approved For Release 2004/02/19SERmot?4iR006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SEC FRET A Survey of 411=1 (contld) 10% wool cloth, 1 meter Lining, 1 motor Handkerchief, 1, cotton Cotton towel, in x 30 cn,various Raw wool, 1 kg Hose, 1 pair Woolen socks, 1 pair Cotton socks, 1 pair Folt hat, standard typo Cloth cap Pullover swoator, hone-woven wool 2,500 loko 510 loko 150 lokc colors1,500 lekc 700 leko 1,300 loko 600 loko 40r) loko Goo loko 350 late 1,500 loko L. Food Ration gnoIal 1. 7.3abics, up to six months of ago: 250 Pagc 91 900 leko 96 lcke 30 loko grans of milk daily. 2. Children, up to throe years of age: Childron under this catogory re- calve tho following monthly ration: 1 kg of sugar 2 kgs of rico 3 kgs of dark flour 2 bars of soap 400 grams of laundry soap 250 grars of cookios In addition, children rocotvo ono egg Emory day and 550 grams of neat every weak. 3. Aftor children havo attained tho ago of three years, thoir rations aro docroasod to 250 grams of sugar monthly; two eggs per weak; 250- grams of moat per week; and 0.25 liter of oil per month. Tho quahtitios of tho other food items ronains unchancod. 4. School children, children in this category aro classified, as light workors and rocoivo the following rations: 600 grans of corn broad daily 500 grams of pasta monthly 400 grams of sugar monthly Wo grams of moat or fish (optional) per rook 4c,') r7sua3 of olivo oil-month 2 (r.,78 per wook 5. Elementary school childron also roceivo one cup of mak and 100 grams of 1road and butter, distributed daily in tho schools. This ration is froo of charge. 6. Office porsoanel are classifihd in tho wino category and receive tho same typo of rations (light workors). 7. Category "ordinet" includos all persons who have at least ono member of tho family employod by a state agency. Tho ration for this category con.. sists of 4o0 grans of corn broad daily; 250 grans of moat or fish wools.. ly; 250 grams of olive oil per month; 500 gra& of pasta por month* Approved For Release 2004/02/1A.: pAdDpee115R006100200002-9 c: Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Servoy of AICANIA (cDnt!d) Pogo 92 250 grans of sugar per month; 10) grans of soap per month; 2 oggs per week. In 1949, .:ersonnel undor this catogory wore ismod threo notcrs of wool cloth and three netors of cotton material freo of chargo. 0. Category of heavy workers, such as; port workers; railroad laborer; drivers; nechanics; carpenters; etc.: 900 grans of corn broad daily 500 grans of neat or fish wockly 500 grans olive oil -monthly 1,000 grans of pasta monthly 500 grans of sugar monthly 4 eggs weekly 110 r7rans of soap monthly 100 grams of shaving croon nonth4 400 grans of laundry soap monthly Previously, menbors of this catogory rocoivod ono suit of clothes per year, froo of char.-o. Howevor, in 1950 th000 suits will bo sold for 700 ldko each, 9. Merchant Marino Category, valid only for personnel at sea: 900 grans of wheat broad per day (prior to 1 January 1950, merchant soamon ro- coived 1,000 grams of wbsat broad per 14y); 4,000 grans of at or fish nonthly: 500 grans of olive oil per nonth; 1.5 kilos of pasta per nonth; 750 grnns of sugar per month; 45 os per month, 100 grans of soap per month; 100 grans of shavinig soar per month; 400 grans of laundry soap per month (marino onginorrs receive t100 grans of laundry soap per month); 250 grams of butter Dor month; 2,000 grams of rico monthly; 1,000 grans of sausago por month: 1,500 grans of cheese pm...month; 600 grams of narnm lado per nonth; 500 grams of cookios per nonth; 2,000 grams of boons por month; 4,000 grans of potatoes por nonth; and 7,000 grans of onions por month. With the excpption of broad ration coupons, sailors aboard ship ham no ration coupons. Their issue of food is free of chargo. Soanen have receivod only one suit of clothes sinco 1945, but are ontitlod to purchaso ono pair of shoos annually at the prico of 1,0 leko. 10. Minerls Category, this includes minors and workors employed in ostablishm ments attached to nines. Their ration ontitlos then to 900 grams of corn broad daily; 750 grans of fish or neat weekly; 1 liter of nilk por ftay; and a monthly ration of 500 grans of olive oil; 15 oggsi 100 grans of soap; 100 grams of shaving soar: 400 grans of laundry soap; 1,500 (Tans of pasta; and 1,500 grans of rico. 'PART VII fealkalla The firs' section of this part of the survey is comprisod of inf. ornation derived from an official source of this organization. The nator- ial contained herein was published by the Albanian Goverment for dissenm ination anongst various Party groups in foreign countries, Albanian loget- ions, and for the obvious pur:,oso of informing foroign observers that osp- ionage aetivitios in AL2APIA arc short-lived duo to the "socurity polico and the faithfulness of the ;lassos to the People's Govermacnt% Approved For Release 2004/0259E0e-FRFE-40415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIAADP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of =AMA (conttd) 0, ? Page 92 250 grans of suoar per month; 100 gTors of soap per month; 2 cogs por wook. In 1949, ocrsonnel uador this catogory worc issued throe notcrs of wool cloth and throc motors of cotton material free of charoo. Category of heavy workers, such as: port workors; railroad laborer; drivers; nochanics; carponters; etc.: 900 grans of corn broad daily 500 grams of neat or fish weekly 500 grans olive oil'nonthly 1,000 grans of pasta monthly 500 grans of sugar monthly 4 egos wookly 110 grams of soap monthly 100 grans of shaving croan 400 grans of laundry soap monthly Previously, nonbors of this category rocoivod ono suit of clothos per year, free of charoo. Howcvor, in 1950 thoeo suits will be sold for 700 ldko each, 9. Merchant Marino Category, valid only for personnel at scat 900 grans of whoat broad per day (prior to 1 January 1950, merchant soanon ro- cotvod 1,000 grams of wheat broad per day); 4,000 grans of moat or fish monthly; 500 grans of olive oil per nonth; 1.5 kilos of pasta per nonth; 750 grans of sugar per month; 1.1.5 oggs per nonth, 100 grams of soap pm month; 100 grans of shaving soar por month; Iwo grams of laundry soap per month (marine onginosrs receive SOO grams of laundry soap per month); 250 grams of butt= per month; 2,000 gra ra of rico monthly; 1,000 grans of sausago per month; 1,500 grams of cheoso per month; 600 grans of narn. lado per month; 500 grans of cookios per month; 2,000 grans of beans per nonth; 4000 grams of potatoes per month; and 7,000 grans of onions per month. With the =caption of broad ration COUV0118, sailors aboard ship have no ration coupons. Their issue of food is free of chargo. Soamcn have received only one suit of clothes sinco 1945, but aro entitled to purchaso one pair of shoos annually at the price of 1,C00 ldko. 10. Miner's Category, this includes minors and workors apployed in establish. milts attached to nines. Thcir ration entitles them to 900 grams of corn broad daily; 750 grans of fish or neat weakly; 1 liter of milk per day; and a monthly ration of 500 grams of olive oil; 15 eggs; 100 grans of soap; 100 grams of shaving soap; 400 grans of laundry soap; 1,500 grans of pasta; and 1,500 grans of rico. PART VII 40clusion The first snction of this part of the survey is conprisod of inf. ornation derived from an official source of this organization. The mator- ial contained herein was published by the Albanian Government for digital. ination amongst various Party groups in foreign countries, Albanian logat. ions, and for the obvious purooso of informing foroicz observers that esp- ionage activities in AL:AITIA aro short-lived luo to the "socurity police awl the faithfulness of thc :lassos to the Teoplels Govornmcntn. Approved For Release 2CO/E/e: pliee11783-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 20041021W: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of Aran& (cantle") ra(? 93 The natoriel appoars hero as a vorbatin translation and in no way has it boon altorod, with tho exception of grammatical dorroctions of tho translation itself. (This report will *roar as SOI 9)3-33C)? FACTS REVAALED IN win TRIAL OF TEE STIES DROPPED ny PARACHUTE INTO AL7ANIA On 24 May 1950, throo spios, Eton CAKO, Kamen ZHUPA, and Linkman LUPTIU wore triod in Tirana. Those non had been drorpod by parachute into ALBANIA fron an Italian piano on the night of G July 1949. Tho loader of this group of subvorstvos was Eton OAKO, a fornor small businossnan, who later bocarc a corporal in tho police forco during the min() of King ZOO, and in 1942, join4 od tho DALLI KOMBETAR. As a collaborationist of tho powor in occupationt as a chief of a group of crininals bolonging to BALLI; and later in his capacity as polio? comm. issioner for tho District of %Wino.; Eton CAKO connitto& many ?Tinos during tho war. Atter having boon in tho oorvicos of SIM and GESTAPO, OAKO wont to GERMANY toward tho end of tho wart elbsoquontly ontorod MALY and placed bin. golf at the disposal of tho American intolligonbo sorvico. Thoso subvorstves ogrood to carry on ospionago activities, followed a spacial course of train. ing in ITALY, bocano activists of tho subversive party known as MALL' KOCETAR, which servos the oronios of ALMANTA, and woro finally droppod by parachute into ALZANIA with tho assignod tat* of sabotage :and ospionago works Innodiatoly aftor their landing in ALnANIA, instead of finding support fron the poople, thoy wore pursued by thon and by the polioot and capttitod. A coppanion of theirs, Zybor LECA, was killed. Afpor tho eaptuio, they woro forced to naintain connoction by radio with tho /talihn Socrot Service, under tho control of tho State Polio?. /ho dofondants woro oontoncod to death IRF tho High Court.Martiale Crinos Committed by Theo Saes During tho War as Menbors of waa The leader of this gang of Spice, Eton uro, admittod in court that in March 1943, ho joinod tho connittoo of MAUI for tho Polvina, area and in Juno 1943, was appointed a nonbor of tho District Comnittoo for GAinokastor. Bur. ing tho course of the trial, 0=0 related many of the critics, robborios and nassacros committed by the BALLI groups under the protoction of tho occupier during tho war. No described tho Glints Massacre, ordorod by tho Italian, Colonel MURGIA, and approved of by tho dologato of DALLI for tho Olinalpstor area, in which 26 peasants woro shot. Eton OAMO also statod that tho MALLI ordered their groups not to take any action against tho Italians. "On the con- trary, the Italians woro to bo aided in their fight against tho Partisans," ho added. "Upon the arrival of tho Gornans,(relatod Eton CAKO) I booamo a batted. ion commander. In January 1944, following tho order of the maaa Control COM. nittoo, Ismail HAKI TATZATI told no that it was nocossacy to jotn the Gormans, for tho Communist novonont of national liberation was gaining too much mound. In compliance with tho orders of tho Central Connittoo, I was appointod police commissioner for tho Dolvina District. During that ported, I adnit boo. ing porpotratod robberies, tortured pooplo, and issuod orders of arrest. Hoy. over, I deny having porsonally shot anybody". Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :SPele8RNEE1M006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALIIVIA Pao 94 Tho prosecutor proves tho oxocution of pooplo with writton evidence from which it is rovoaled that in tho home of Eton CAKO woro found rings, earrings, and gold tooth which had boon taken by him from tho victims. Fur- thor avidonco discloses that Mom CAKO, in his capacity as a ZALLI connandor killed. Vase MARTO from Eakodbioi and tho brothor of Kanbor HAXNT, who diod as a result of tortures. In addition, four more persons from tho village of Taztat woro also killed by CAM, no also admitted to having arrested. 30 persons at Taztat, from whom ho took 1,000 gold napoloons: in ZUkovo ho arrostod 4o persons and robbed them of another 1,000 napoloons. Tho prosecutor read many statomants concorning tho robborios, arrests, and attempted housebroakings committed by Eton CAKO. Most of those crimos woro adnittod by tho defendant, Eason /BUPA also admittod that in 1943 ho escaped from tho Fascist Militia and joined tho nazi KOM2EMAR groups with the rank of corporal, As a member of DALLI ho participated, in conjunction with tho Germans, in many operations against tho National Liboration Army (Communist), such as; the action at Muzina, whero tho entire population of the village was deported and 30 porsons arrostod; tho action of Sonica, whore tho partisan Jashar LUCI and Pastor Hamli DERE wero murdored; tho action at Eranosa, whore tho ontiro village was sot on fire; and tho action at Shen Vasijos, whoro 400 persons wero arrested. and 6o of them shot. Tho Dritish, Italian. Grodk and Yugoslav Socroi Sorvicos, Together With ram xacrun and Other War Oripl.nals Under tho Cortland of tho Amerim Intelligence Sorvico. Are Plotang Against tho Pooplols RoPublic of AL:ANIA. After tho war, all these spies and criminals woro cotton together in tho "Santa Maria di Louca" Capp in ITALY. There, the Anglo-American imper- ialists attempted to roorganizo thorn, putting them in tougJawith onomios operating inside our territory, and sotting up an armed force with tho ul, timato goal of overthrowing the peoplols power in ALDANIA. At prosont, tho crininals.at-,largo have become a small groups of agonts caring only to serve thoso who pay then boot, even though apparently they aro dividod into several dissenting groups. Tho Amorican Intelligence has direct contact with :ALL' KOMBETAR; tho British with LEGALITETI (Monarchists): tho Italians with moo MBE= IND/PENDENT: tho Titoists with PARTITOAGRARIO; and tho Greeks with that small group of mombors of MAUI KOMZETAR which are lied by tho subvorsivo Atas ERMENI. During the past few months, in order to gain control directly over all the abovomontionod groups, the American imperialists forme. tho "Connittoo of Free ALMN/A", put Midhat MASHER' in as its loador, and subsoquontly replaced him with Masan DOSTI. Tho spies dropped by parachuto into AL:ANIA constitute only a part of tho criminal activities conducted by the Anglo- American imperialists and. their collaborators against the Albanian Republic and our people. The facts revealed in the course of this trial prove onco more tho criminal intentions of tho Anglo..Anerican imperialists, their 0011.. aborators, and tho Albanian war criminals in their service. Tho loador of this gang of spies, Eton CIKO, has oonfossod all those activities before tho court, giving full details. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 s14ERGER0E1TR006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of AL3AH1A (contid) Anglo.anerican Intolligonce Activitios rage 95 The patron of all tho intriguos diroctoa against the Aabanian peoplo is the Amorican Intelligence Service, under whose guidance, all other groups aro cooporating. Eton CICO nado tho following remark, "the Anorican Intelligence Sorvico attempted on several occasions to oroanizo tho war crininals assombled at the "Santa Maria di Louca" Camp, and failing to obey tho orders dictated by the Americans, they throatonod us with handing us over to the Albanian Governnont. A commission wont to tho Vatican to ask an intervention in our favor, and was advised by Padro VALMITINI to accept any order from the Americans, and to show then that we wore a political force strong enough to bring about a chango in the Albanian situation. This proved to bo an American move, becauso when I cane to know Hasan DOSTI, ho told no, "'Montt caro about gossip, look at plain facts". Subsequently, Eton CAKO explained how the num KCNBETAR was orp. anizod by tho Anoricans under tho throat of deportation to ALLINIA: "In tho courso of a meeting hold in Septcnbor 1945, Zof PALI suloittod a proposal and appointed a mission which was sent to Rome to moot an official of tho American Embassy, a Mr. .ANDERSON, who advised not to accept in tho direct- ion of tho party pooplo who woro "much conpromisod", such as Eolo DIMAtota. Later, Mr. ANDERSON sent a "British oxpert" by tho nano of HERBERT to the "Santa Maria di Louca" Camp. This latter nanod sunnonod to tho villa #45 tho following personalities; Hamm DOSTI; Loc =I; Vasil ABDONI; Prof. PAPALIKO; Zof PALI; Soli MYFTIU; Xhonal MMCO, and gave then indications and 6uggestions concerning the organization of BALLI. A certain numbor of crin- inals under tho leadership of Padre /TART' and. Eolo =IDA took tho advico of tho Vatican; Shougot VERLACI and Ernest KOLIQI consulted tho Italian Min.. ister of tho Interior, SCBLDA; while zum asked the advice of the Italian Foreign Office. Those individuals decided not to accept tho viewpoint of .1:ALM and proceeded to forn tho party known as "BLOM ECUDETAR-INDIPENDENT". Evidence disclosod in court clearly indicates that tho organization of tho war criminals is nothing but an espionage ccntor supportod by to enemies of ALflANIA, and socking to cono to powor in our country. After tho organization of tho BALLI, tho Anoricans sot to work in order to join to- gether all tho war criminals in a single connittoo. Consoquontly, they schoduled a mooting in Tut, whore :ALL' KEMBETAR, LEGALITETI, and IL= KONI2TAR INDIPEEDENT woro roprosonted. In Turin, tho discussions concerned the problem of assembling all tho Albanian rofugoes who woro still at largo, 1,)rming a committoe to reprosont then and guide then in tho struggle against tho Govornmont of Tirane. This noeting of criminals under tho protection of the American intelligence resulted in the formation of tho so-called "Comitato Albania Libora" -(Froo AL:ANIA Connittee). The attempts of the Inerican ospionago not developed into tho expedition into ALBANL1 by tho euavorsivo gang lod by Eton CAKO. This action was conducted with the direct participation of tho Italian Secret Servico. Driofly oxplaining his arrival in ALBANIA, criminal Eton can said, "In the ladt woCk of October 19141 was aunnonod by Easan DOSTI who told no that, following tho docision of the Anoricans, some groups had to be fornod and sont into ALBANIA. Approved For Release 2004/02/1 00200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Survoy of Arzzu (contld) Page 96 After having chosen tho olononts, contacts wore ostatlished in Manias with an Italian, riotro GRILLI, and later with anothor Italian, DE AGOSTINI, who was in chargo of tho ospionago training courses under Amorisan super. vision. I subscribed to a declaration which was subnittod to no by tho in- structor, DE AGOSTINI, under which I accoptod to work for thoAnorican olligonco Sorvico for a period of ton yoarin. After Piotro GRILLI had providod Eton =0 with false identification under tho nano of Giusoppo PICK], Eton GAN? and. his companions connoncod tho training course which was hold at Villa Linda, sixklIonotors fron ;ad, Upon tho tormination of tho oourso, they woro furnished with two radio transnittors, 300 gold sovoroirAs, and civilian clothes to be worn in =ANIL. Bowovor, nano of those items helped then in their dosigns of tree. son bocaueo our people know bow to dofond tho power conquorod with our blood, and know how to retaliate when it cones to any attompt of tho ononios to destroy tho indopondonco of our country. Activitios of tho Italian Socrot_Porrico Among the acttritios conductod by tho inperialist agonts agAinst the Republic of ALBANIA, a proninont post is hold by tho Italian Soorot Sorvicav Tho fact that tho gang of spies led, by Eton GAICO was trained in /TAU, sent into ALBANIA in an Italian plane, and was linkod by radio with tho Italian Ministry of the Interior, proves that IT= has bocono an inportamt base for the aggression of tho Anorican inporialisn against tho Albanian republic. Tho Albanian war criminals are not only oupportod. by tho Italian Govornnont in their activities against our country; they Imo also farmed a party of thoir own, lei by tho son of tho rich landownor Shougot VERLAG', and known as tho mcw ima. .0 IND/PENDENT. About thoso old Fascists, Eton GAKO stated, rTho nonbors of BLOCI =GSM INDIPENDIUT are paid by tho Italian Garornmant according to tho functions which they porfornod in ALBANIA; sono as ninistors, mono as police connissionors, etc. Many of then have rocoivod largo suns of nonoy as an adjustment of arrow's. So, for instance, Neshat HOLUM.; Hysaa LEPENIGA1 Ws= PRISIZTINA, each r000trod 1,600,000 lire each, while Eanbor ?ROGAN? rocotrod 1,000,900 liro. Menbors of BALLI are not paid on a rogular basis, however, they rocotro rocomponsos. in tho form of bonusos and subsidios, such as that of Mrs. EMRDERT who gar? Midhat /MASHER' a van of 1,500 pounds in 1947, and which anount was appropii. iatod by the loaders". Tho noroonarios of MALL/ and tho othor subvoriolvoa sold to tho aaony, provo once again that for rrood of mown they are ready to trample upon any intorosto of their country, as they did with tho Italians and tho Gornans during the war. The Italians also koop in touch with tho criminals of TALL! KOICEEIR, in order to botttx coordinato tho action arAinst tho Albanian Republic and use BALM information and other sundaes. In this rogard, Eton GAKO spatod that Hasan DORI, Midhat 7RASEM11, ani other loaders of TALLI have kept in constant touch with. tho Italian Minastor of the Interior, Mario SOELBA, with tho Ohiof of Polico, NMGLIORI, and in sono instances, aron with Pronior Alcido DE GASPER'. Approved For Release 2004/0ffideat-EFE-M415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A. Survey of ALLIFIa. (contid) Page 97 Those intrigues cane to full light when, aftor tho oapturo of the gang, Eton CAKO was forced to naintain liaison by radio with tho Italian Ministry of the Interior, under tho control of tho Albanian State Polico- In 110 cipher mossages oxehangod botwoon Sten 0= and tho Italians, tho latter askod information ?oncoming the military strength in tho town of Giinokastor; this, just before tho attacks launched by tho Grock Fas- cists on tho southern bovdor. Information was also rognirod coneorning the dovolopnont of those events: tho mono whore agents woro dropped by parachute; the ornament of tho Albanian Amy; tho guorrilla bands, etc. When Eton CMO roquosted batteries for his wireless sots, foodstuffs, etc., two Italian pianos readily calo ovor tho scone and droppod tho re- quostod items. Tho public prosecutor revealed, during the courso of tho trial, tho existence of military plans given to mao by the Italian spy in tho service of the Anoricans, DE AOSTINI. This fact was confirm:1d by 04110 himself. However, duo to tho secret nature of those docunonts, tho court session was hold behind closed doors. Al]. thoso facts rovoal with tho greatest avidonco tho hostile activitios of the Italian Gavornnont against tho Peoples Rppulic of ALBLNIA. Tho Italian Govornment, follow. ing the orders of tho Americans, and in cooperation with tho war erininals and the British, Greek and Yugoslav secret sorvicos, attonpts to overthrow Our powor. Greek Intelligonce Activitips In its wide not of spies, Greek intolligonoo also trios to porforn its designs to tho prejudice of AIZANIA. Greek intelligence works in close cooporation with the Amoricar4 British, Italian and Yugoslav agoncios, and koops in its *employ, several criminals of aux KOICDTAR. Thoro is a cloar indication that tho Anoricans have agrood to tho cossion of Southern ALRATIA. M to GREECE. Nov it is up to tho subvorsivos of tho AMI to work in order to realize tho droans of tho Greek chauvinists. In regard to this, Eton =0 made tho following statonont, "The loaders of MI TAT,TI woro consider. ing tho Anerican project of coding Korco and Giineknetor to GREW'S, and sine? this was tho American docision, wo had nothing to do but approve of it. Howovor, for political reasons, this dooision had to be kopt secret% "An exhaustive explanation about tho agroononts botwoon tho loaders of 7ALLI and tho Greeks was given to no by Ens= DOSTI in 1946, when I was destined to go to GREECEn. In his statenonts, Etou OSKO stressed tho connections of mulla with tho Greek intolligonco sorvico. "Tho convor. sations with the Greeks", said 0M0, "took place in no, at tho Greek Logp ation, and in lithila with porsonalitios of tho Grodk Govornnont, anonc when I recall one ririmas, of tho Foreign Office. Negotiations woro in. itiatod early in 1946 and ammo to a conclusion in Sopteubor of the sane year. At that Mina, a spocial envoy of the Greek Gavornnont by tho nano of Kostas HIMARJOS, moo to the Greek Legation. His conversations with MAdhat FR&SHEBI, Eason Dr)STI, and Loc USTI were conductod socrotly. Approved For Release 2004/02/155CE-10:111-541-5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of ALUM (contfd) Page HIMARJOS accoptod tho following toms: 1) tho brook Govornnont agrood to put at our disposal tho entire bordor lino for futuro aporations, undor certain conditions, among which I ronobber wore thoso: all tho subvoreivo activities of our groups had to bo controllod and sopervised V tho Greeks: groups entering Albanian territory must refrain from any propaganda aepinst tho intentions of tho Grook Government concerning southern /MIA: all tho Albanian groups sent into Albanian territory through tho Grodk border plod.. god. thonsolvos, upon their return, to furnish tho Greek Secret Sorvico with all available information concerning =MIA. As a counterpart, GREECT agreed to establish bases at Korfu, Janina, Kostur, or Follonia, to bo ago& by 2ALLI KCICETAR, Tho convorsations wore secret, howovor, and I lammed their contonts from Hasan DOSE, duo to the fact that I was ohoson as tho man in charge of tho base at Janina, arm added. that I was to collaborate with a Major ZAHARIADHIS; one Miltiad.h HUN (who prior to 1939, was in tho Greek Consulate at Winokaster), and sono other persons whose names I do not rocall. HasanDOSTI explainod that tho task of tho Janina bingo was to praparo and send agents into ALBANIA, whore they would carry on propananda against tho Govornmont at Mama and spreading tho rumor that its days wore numborod because it was not liked by the Anglo-Amoricans, and that it would bo attacked by =BO soon. In addition, those groups had instructions to ,nardor proninont nonbors of tho Govornment, in doing so, ?mato a panic and a stato of unoasinoss all over tho country: to porforn sabotage by dostroy- ing dopots, bridges, etc.: sot firo to vital installations, etc. Purthcm- morn, those agents wtro instructod to pick up any information on the nil. itary, political, and ?canonic ritwations in ALBANIA, To secure false id. ontification papers, they had. to kill innocent poasants and grab their doo- umonts". For unknown reasons, Et en CATO was not sent to GREECr. Eton CAKO was aware of tho fact that, in 1946, one Musa KRAJA had boon sant to ALBANIA from tho baso at Korfu by Haki HUSHITI and MUZACIITIS, a.Grodk lioutenant colonel, Musa KULA was given orders by Hasan DCSTI to moot ono Isot MUD( in ALLANIA, who was at largo in tho region of Karzglsih. Once together, their task was to sot up sabotage work. Howovor, this nision failed bocausc Musa KRAJA returned from ALBANIA soon after ho net Izot VRAZHDO them. Eton CAKO also related about another group formod by Bak/ =HITT, MUZAQ/TI, Dhimitor MAKS& KULLI, and PANARIM; who wore salt to ALBANIA. This group murdered Kieo Nicip, and wore attacked V tho Border Guards leaving 4 dead, 6 wounded, and 14. prisoners in our hands. Eton wo also oxplainod about tho anti-patriotic activities of BALM KCMDETAH in relation to the territorial integrity of ALBANIA along tho Grook bordor. Ho stated, 0Tho Amoricans gemo us directives to obtain evidence against tho Albanian Govorn- nont and report it Ogo tho Inquiring Commission. To this end, Midhat FRAMER' assignod to no the task of proparing a docunont in which it stated that tho Albanian Gavornnont shippod war natorial to the Greek Oomnunists. I acct.. ad this job, asking to know sono particulars ?oncoming tho concentration of Grook troops along the bordor. Then What SITZal GM70 no a letter for Kosta HIMARJOS at the Grook Lotion in ROMA% 0 wont on explaining how ho not Jani GJKA and how they worked in tho hone of EMI= ?nits inportant documont which bad to be subnittod to the ingaising ()omission. Approved For Release 2004/0259ECGFRP15-T415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survoy of ALBANIA (contlid) Pogo 99 Other contacts botwoon BALL/ and tho Gronko occurrod in 1914, when Midbat PEAS= went to Athons with a diplomatic passport issuod by tho Italian Govornmont, In Athons, TRASEER/ mot an official of that Poreigl Office, P/PINFMIS, and a liver, Vangjol qmo who was later sect to agu by tho GToOk Ministry of tho Intorior. In anan, QIRK0 not tho Albanian criminals and on 2C Novombor, ho dolivorod a sponoh to than full of hopo in tho aliborationn of ALBANIA. Tho roprosontativos of =LI in =EOM are led b' Alos MEDI, tho e7oatost criminal of then all, Ho rociovos 1,500,000 drachmas por nonth. Amtivitios of to rumgixay Intollikonco Service Tho gang of Sten OW rovoalod once again tho links 'caisting totwoon 3A1KC/7/01s secret servioo awl tho inporialists. Tho revrosontattvo of tho Yugoslav Intolligonco in this 'oup was Lluknan VUPTIU, who livod In GE= since 1945, aftor having osoapod frongOssavo. Iron Gannon bo was aunt to tho Italian oamps ty tho Anoricans. Thio camps woro whore tho othor ion criminals warm confined. Thom, Liftman num joinmd tho ranks, of MAUI xclozTa. in 1946, ho was ongagod ty TITO1s agont Bogir MALOCU, an ox-colonel in tho Royal Yugoslav.Am, and iquostoroo undor tho Italians at Gioova. LUPTIU signed tho contract of crigaganwrt, took tho cover nano of itV and adopted tho password liZASTAVAN. Ho r000tvod a sun of money and continued his activities in tho service of TITOts govornnont, In 1941, Qonan arsu, a nonbor of MALLI, advised LUIPTIU to attend an intolligonco training courso at the tornination of which ho would to droppod ty para. chute into ALTANIA. 'Upon tho approval of his Titoist mastor? Lluk GUN!, LUPTIU signed, tho contract bitting him to collaborate with the Amorioan Secret Sorvioe for a poriod of ton years. Ho oopplotod tho training ?ours? and in duo tine was dropped into ALBANIA in coppany with othor spies who also bad mado arrangagonts with TITOts clique. LUBTIU stated that all tho activities conducted by RANKOVIOts agonts along tho Albanian borders; all the provocattsms4mAsso0aganda, aro croatod ty ardor of the Amorican mastorss Tho trial also revealed tho actiVitiOs of King ZOG and BALM in thoir combined efforts against the Albanian Ropablic, under tho ordors of foreign powers. A conference was held at Opiro, where ZOG stated that tho Oro* Goveranont had wood to tho concentration of Albanian refugees in Grodk territory from whore thoy night start an attack against ALBANIA. Eton =CO alsodSwiesitod tho kind of propaganda nado ty ULU and consisting of tali* statomonts tondinc to prove that MALLI had fought the occupiers of ALMIIAN. nil? discussions were in propxoss at tho U.N. concerning the acceptance of ALBANIA as a nonbor, those falsitios wore also subnittod to tho Socrotary of fho U.N., in an ati,enpt to dony tho entry of ALWIA into that mania.- tion. Witnmssos at the trial furnished ample ovoidonoo of tho crime con. nittod ty those spies during the war wbmn they fought agoinst tho people in tho ranks of a= KOIC17aRp and for tho powers In occupations The counsel for defense, acknowlodging tho guilt of the defendants, app. oftlod to the court for clamaney, and so did tho dofondants thomsolvos, who Approved For Release 2004/0159ECCFRPEZ415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Surroy of AL:211A (contra) Pogo 100 ploadod guilty A;rolizted all their crimos and treason in dotailod stato. moats. On tho basis of incontestable avidonco obtminod? and pursuant to Articles 4emd S of Law No, 372, &Ito& 12 Docombor 1946, concenniag tho orimos connittod aminst the pooplo and tht Stato, tho Eigh Couxt-Nartial sontoncod tho throo spies to death by shooting. The Albanian pooplo woro indimant against tho epics and thoir motors, who are tho sworn onomios of our country, sinco this has boon confirnod .4Y their crininal doodle. * * * * * * * * * 2. Sono tine ago it was roportoa inATMLITLI. that tho Western Powers had instructed tho Groeka not to cross tho Albanian frontior in their pum- suit of Gook ratan. or a number of soldiore, this mado dosortion into GREECE morally pormlssiblo and irresistibly tempting. It was pewnissibilo bocauso so long as thoro was no danger of invasion, they no longer felt bound to hold theasolvos in rcadinoss for tho dofonso of their country; and it was tenpting bocauso tho prospoot of roma() from nnvor 111NBAls r(N. gimo suddenly bocano moro rotate. Sono of those dosortora who wore quest. Ione"! by United Nations obsorvors roportod that tho military authorities aro having incroasing difficulty in preserving disciplino? Tor tho Communists in ALDANIA, tho throat frogORMECE is =tram?. ly convenient, booaaso it procures for thon support of antiACOmmunists who hate tho Crocks more. Pron tho nationalistic point of viow, tho policy of provoking WEDGE is disastrous, because it aIUnatos synpatby in tho mattor of tho Crook clans in Southorn ALZOLl. Your time in forty yoars, intom. national commissions established and confirnod tho frontier whoro it is now; yot, all this nmy go for nothing if tho wholo Mostorn world sidos in with GREECE against so 111-bohavod a noighbor. In ZOGis tine, when relations with GREECE wore socuro in comparison to talky, Crook claims on what they called wilottborn irue" appealed to a linitod section of the Croaks and to no one olsi. 3. PeContly-a prose report of unknown reliability fron &mg states that Marshal TITO is making his own arrangononts for tho *liberation" of ALDANIA, and has sot up a rival "Liboration Connittoo" in Dolp.rmlo. Tho Chairman of this comnittoo is said to bo Gani 1t233ZrUe brother of Said, who =cc:may finished serving a five year prison sontonco for tho offense of fighting tho Gormans in Kossovo without placing himself undor tho orders of tho loon' Yugoslav partisans. It is roportod that anotter =bow of the connittoo is Con Elosi =EU, who with his sixteen sons playod an active part during tho war around Dibra (Dobar);_tho Germans bUrnal his houso, aftor a battlo, for harboring Colonol Potor KEMP (a mo)*or of a Dritish Mission in ALLANIA at that tino). If this report is true,it is interesting that a trib. n1 chieftain floning from Connunist ALDAUIA shuld now bo avolcono refugee in profossodly anti-Coninforniat YUGOSLOIA. Approved For Release 2004/025 EtcoRREOT415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of AL=ANIA (contld) Pao 101 At present, Envor EO- 1 is faced with starvation, incipient nutiuy, and isolation, 'while his prospoctivo saccossors nako thoir proporations on foroign soil. It was oxpoctod in Bono quarters that in thoso circum. stances ho would make his peace with TITO: but this ho ovidontly could not or would not do, for the Yugoslays gavo as their reasons for donoun, cing tho Treaty of Mondship with ALBANLA last Novonbor that tho Albanians had not only croatod border incidents,, but had rojoctod an offor fron YUGOSLAV/A to rosune ocononic cooperation. 3:Ivor 20:01& has taken another course, it appoars, and has sot afoot a roconciliation with ITALY, thus bringing tho whoel a full circlo to tho situation twenty five years ago. However, this tino it is a different ITALY to be dealt with.- dcno- erotic, poacoful, and not entirely froo fron tho danger of Connunisn. It nay be? of course, that the Rnssians aro purposoly allowinc; =AVIA to bo maintainod at sonoono olses expense, but will want to mako uso of her at a lator date. Meanwhile, EOXEA nust roach sone sort of arrangonont with ITALY to procure aid as quickly as possiblo, in odor not to force tho Soviot hand in domanding that they mond him supplios. AIOAVIA has much to offor ITALY in exchange Cor hor patronage. Oil is boincproducocl in iTroator quantities than boforo iron tho wells of rucovo: and tho chrono, eoppor and coal are also bottor davolopod than they wore the last tino ITAtY was interest ad. in ALOANLI. A bonovolont and unaggrossivo ITALY is now indood, tho obvious and proper country to he AL:1ITI.4.01 patron, to their mutual advantago. Tho two oountrios have alroo4y oxehangod Diablo tors, and Count SIM= has oxprossod in tho Italian Parlianont his country's disposition toward ne.intaininclaallilAls indopondoneos 4. Possibilities_of Rgyolt It is interesting to spoculato on the chancos of a succossful rovolt in ALOiNIA. Ooforo the TITO.Coninform split, it soonod qnito vious than that any such anterpriso would bo suppressed by tho Yugoslav Per a year aftor that, thoro was sono probability that RUSSIA would 1-onstir herself to protoct tho Albanian rogiao. It moons likoly that tho 000pio at large aro not so much intorostod in the dispute botwoon tho two brands of Conmanisn? as the:, aro in getting rid of all Connunists whatovor, .H)oth TITOta and STALINIs tYPos? Tho taro possibility of a successful rebellion has greatly on, .;ouraf7od tho Albanian oxilos. Sono of tho more naiivo, woory of oxilo, do- -i to return homo, whore they wore pronptly arrested. Others, in accord. with Albanian political tradition, reallowod their difforoncos and .r1.171()(1a now movoment of liberation. The loader of this movomont was tho Jiflortyl litorary man of Wostorn culture and unblemishod ideals, Midhat At one tIno ha was Ministor in Athens, but olvo Up his diplomatic 7t1-c:or bocauso of a disacroonont wit-A Ktn. ZOG. Eo thou operated a bookshop Ii rono, under the nano of "nuno =MEV, Ho mvo oncouragonint to young -.11(Itmts. and his burning love for his country nado him an inspiration to .111ntan youth. Dur1m7 tho war, ho foundod a republican rosistanco movonont, KOW17TAR (Nntional Front), and for a tine, actually took to tho mount. , Approved For Release 2004/021- r 119 i:.-7-7CFRPg-0-6-415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Survoy of ALnkru (cont,d) Pogo 102 BALLY, which conbinod nost of tho best republican ?lancets in tho country, was militarily defoatol by the Connunists (who usal weapons and supplios given to then by tho Allios to defeat thoir futuro politioal 0110M10.14 although thay woro killing noro Gornans than tho 10tI), forced into a moasuro of collaboration with the Germans during their occupation?, and duo to this, they wore discroditod. Midbat TRLSEERI and a hundrod of his followers retired into ITALY, where ho nover (mood to work for tho well boing of his follow adios, and taward tho ovontual liberation of his country. In August 1949, ho succoodod at last in forning a united nave- flout. YEAS= had four oollcagues in the lhoouttvo Oommittoo of tho novo- mont. One of thomous Major Abae KUPI, tho nilitary loader of the Royalist "LEGALITZTIN Parti. Another, Zof PALI, a Roman Catholic who was a teacher from 8pkodor. A third, tho son of Mostar' ECM, one of ZOGIs prino ministorw who died recently in a Communist Prison. nna117, sad larsznr lnads a Par- ty calling thonsolvos Social Donocrats, combining tho younger and noro pro. mosstre olononts among tho oxilos. Said Boy is tho youncor brother of the bettor known Gant KRYEZI14 and also of tho late Cana Ley, brothor.inw law of ring ZOO. Omni and Said fought tho Gornano on the Massaro frontier until that wore sabotagod by tho Communists. The Oorraittoo paid a visit to ;tondo; towards tho and of lataust 1949, going on to Washington in Soptembor. Returning to ITALY, tbo Oonnittoo loft its loador bobind to opon pornanont offices in thotmunD STATES* The novo. ;' nont then sustainod a torriblo blow, for the universally lovOd and respected Midhat 72ILSEERI, who was sixty nine, died suddonly on 3 October 19h19. What Does own party, MALTA EC1C3TA3, pronptly appointod as its now loador, Eagan DORI. to was also tho MLLLI roprosontattro on tho hop. uttvo Committoo. MOSTI, howovor, does not onjoy tho sane reputation as an "older otatoonang as did. PRASHERI, and tho Oomnittoo was unwilling to accept hinas its prosident. Yor the moment, tho Chairman/Wm of the Oonnittoo is to rotate among its raombors, thus probably playing into 'ha kends of King ZOO (now living in oxilo in Lioxandria), sinoo no other olomcmt in the novo. Dont has producod as yet a loader of comparable standing* As far as activo resistanoo groups within =ARIA aro concornod, it is difficult to ostimato their strongtb4 but it is known that sone pockets of rosistanco do exist. Macy small clashes botwoon guerrillas and Oommunist authorities have boon roportod daring tho past few months (Jan 1950). Gum,. alas aro reportedly carrying on armed resistance in the hills of tho so. called Mirdita Zone (YUGOSLLYIL, 11100,000, Shod Y.45, from 300100 to 400090). Rumors 'proud anong tho pooplo have listpd Oon !UZI, Ran RCM, Colonol Salo B&NUSHI, ant nano relatives of Primo? Ojoni Marko WONT as the loadors of tho anti...Communist resistance. On 5 Maroh1950, a clash botwoon anti-Communist resistance forces and "Sigmrinit" unite is reported to hawo taken placo in tho vicinity of Milot. Allegoily there was a nunbor of cab. unities on both sidos. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Sunray of ALZIVIA (contd.) Pao 103 /t is rmthor apparent that any succossful raiolt in ALZADIA today must dovolop out of a combination of forcos rathor than sporadic outbursts which servo to animist) tho main offorto An tInost impostiblo situation =lots today in comparison to tho timos during 1943.44 wttn offorts wore oxpondod in tryinn to consolidate a singlo nardmont *pint tho Italians and lator, tho Gormmns? Then, there wore somblancos of resistanoo groups, which, if brought togothor under a Singlo loador or groui4 could havo done a groat doal noro than was actually,acompplishodt Today. it is difficult to ascortain tho scope of tho rosistanco navonunti who ate tho loadors'in. volvod4 where tho groups oporatoi and what claims oxist to Consolidato thoml An, tindorgrofind marohont would roquiro h loader of leadoff; of such staturo that anY ptoblWaS involtod in dovolopingfl sdacoset1 navonont would have a fair opportunity for solution. It is doubtful that any such rosistantd leadorb exist taXMITIA today4 Tho boot bldboati aro in mil*, and thusi tho problens of revolion a succedgfill pit:molar? nultipliod. Thoratoro, tho only alternative which could sorvo to olininmto tho prosont rokino would bo tho roporcussion of a Third World War in which tho Atlantic Powors woro succossful, Should a rovolution bogin in AT LA, it is noro than likdly that Russian or Dulgarian troops would bo on tho scone within a roasonablo time, sine? those troops would have to cross dither break ar Yugoslav territory* Such a rovulution would than sorro as tho pre. ludo to a third world war. , 3IRTC11 30 Spacial a.t, 0/0 VIM /MIT= //E IVIY-CH Spooina dgcmt, 01U APPROVED& / rf 04' P A MIA Opirat ions Office? For the 0o=aelaing Officer Approved For Release 2004/0259 eel:BIDE-arm 5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET A Survey of A7,BANIA contd) 7 August 1950 Ref. No. M.903-5 ANNEX "A" STJBJECT: MARA, Petrit (Albanian Refugee) 1. The following military information was obtained from SUBJECT who is presently under interrogation by this Office: (F-6) 2. Military Information: The present strength of the Albanian regular army is estimated approximately to 90,000 men (including the Sigurimit division). This information was casually given to MARA, Petrit by Major AMAMI, Bego from Veloric, attached to the general staff of the Albanian Army in num. Same information has reportedly been confirmed to MARA, Petrit by Capt. SELMANI, Nuri, a political commissar. presently attached to a battalion stationed in yermert. On 25 April 1950, a considerable movement of Albanian troops has been noticed in ALBANIA; these troops came from and Elbasan and proceeded to the following localities in neitella eastern ALBANIA: Legg, aitt,kagal, and Opkoder. The strength of these troops was approximately 15,000 men, all Albanians. Immediately after the movements were completed, Major General BALLUKU, Boqir, Chief of the Albanian General Staff. iroarlf..! the troops bud their new quarters, together with a Aussian general. The divisions of the Albanian Army and their respective headquarters are stationed in the following localities: let Division - Tirang (Barracks "Ali Rise" and Spital Rd.) 2nd Division -Spree 3rd Division - Giinekaster 4th Division - phloder (also SiguriMit units included) The commander of the 1st Division stationed in Tirana is Colonel CAR) Hito; the commander of the Alta garrison, Major General MOISIU, Spiro; the commander o gar. risen, Colonel SPAHIU, MUhamer. At least 80 per eigetrthe equipment of the Albanian Army is Russian material, the remnant Yugoslay. The type of uniform is the same as that of the Rustian army: gray color; military tunic worn outside the trousers, with Approved For Release 2004/02/S :EICRIREOT15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET L. NO. M-903-5 dated 7 August 1950 (contd) Page 2 belt; shirt, of Russian make; trousers of the skier type. This is the summer dress, of cotton,. The winter dress is also gray, with tunic and long trousers. The officers' uniform is ltke the Russians: all wear black top boots. Rank badges are worn on the epaulets, both by officers and enlisted men; the former wear stiff epaulets and the latter limp ones. There are no Russian units in ALBANIA; however, there are approximately 50 Russian officers ranking from major to gen- eral; they are employed as instructors of the Albanian army, and belong to the Russian Military Mission in ALBANIA. The Russian technical staff in ALBANIA may be estimated to 3000 - 5000 persons, stationed in all major induetries, ship- yards, mechanical works, etc. The headquarters of the Russian Military Mission is located in Tirana, Durresit Street, neer the Russian legation. The Chief of the Mission is General SOKOLOV. TCHUVAHIN, Dimitri is the Soviet plenipotentiary in ALBANIA. Russian officers are always active; they keep Albanian drivers with them, armed with pistols; however, TCHUVAHIN's driver is Russian. In each Albanian division, Or regiment, there are Russian officers as "instructors"; they give orders and supervise any activities of the Albanian army. Within the Al- banian army there is also a Political Office, headed by Major General KAPO, Hysni (Albanian). In the same office there is a Soviet general who dictates all the policies. There are also many Russian physiciaT1.1MmAkkpallagAmtaisiworktmftiatt. ,there are appr.xlmateif7707assian advisers among all the minis- / tries, planning commissions and control commissions in ALBANIA. In addition, there are also an estimated 200 German technicians. A German ex-colonel, who is an engineer specialized in repair work and spare parts of plane engines, works in the plant "Enver" at Tirang. Soviet technicians get a monthly pay of 13,000 to 25,000 lek; in addition, they are issued with special cards for food and clothing. A Soviet engineer gets from 25,000 to 38,000 lek per month; a physician, 35,000 to 5040Cerle4 an Albanian technician earns a monthly salary not exceeding 5,000 lek; an Albanian physician 6,000 to 7,000 lek. Tirana with scow with the regular air line The airfields in full efficiency are: Vr8110 and is connected , e -pfiq On the WNW airfield always a heavyigber (Russ an, three-engines); this plane -takes off from Tirana at irregular times and returns to the base within the same day of departure or on the day after, at the latest. The plane coming to lima from jescoy is Hungarian and so are the pilots, who beloftto-the Civil Airlines. A Soviet civilian plane also arrives in Timm) from Prace on a regular weekly seri, vice. This plane carries civilian personnel. The runway of the Approved For Release 2004/02/5:EAGIR8EO6E15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Ref. No. m-903-5 dated 7 August 1950 (contd) Page 3 and /gm airfields is made of concrete and is 1200 to meters -Yong; the airfields are provided with modern hangars, signal and wireless installations. In =Am, the ground per- sonnel number approximately 200 personti-WII-Albanian, including the officers. There are approximately 200 Albanian pilots, all .cfficers with ranks varying from second lieutenant to major. The ----uniform is like that of the Russian fliers. The Albanian pilots have been trained, and are still being trained, at :tau, RUSSIA. Albanian Army: The Albenian army effects maneuvers once a month, em- 'gloying one regiment at a time. The localities where these dril- lings take place are: 2gritut, Oate Sbtapbp, QfeKrale, and along the Yugoslavfrontier on the northeastern part oFALBANIA. The armament used in these maneuvers is a se- condary one, the weapons being constituted of machine guns, sub- machine guns, light artillery and mortars, anti-tank and anti- aircraft guns. 80 per cent of these weapons are Russian, the remnanA Germane Italian end Yugoslay. Maneuvers on a wider scale occur three times in a year, involving the participation of the divisions, in rotation. On these occasions, the Russian military mission is represented by 2 or 3 high ranking officers. New fortifications are being built along the Yugoslav northeastern frontier, .recisely, in the localities of Pres, aka and -z_5,., ; the reason: fear of YugosiWittacks. Laborers employes ? ?ese works are all Albanian; the technicians cre Albanian and Russian. The concrete used in these works comes from POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. On the Island of Saseno, there is a garrison of approxi- mately 2,000 to 3,000 men, all Albanian and belonging to various branches of the army and navy. It is not known if there are any submarine bases at Saseno. In regard to submarines, it has been learned that, after the Cominform Resolution against TITO, some Soviet submarines made their appearance in the Albanian waters, and they even entered the ports of Durazzq and Algal staying there for a short time. During the-current yeat4-from January to April, Soviet submarines have also been noticed three or four times in ValonD and Durazao. There are no new fortifications along the coast, however, the existing installations are con- tinually repaired and imprlved. The sone of Porto Palerme has been placed off limits to everybody, having been declared military area. Works are in progress there; however, no indication as to the nature Of such works has been disclosed. The possibility exists that the works consist of submarine pens or installations for long-range weapons. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :SPee8RE151?006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Ref. No. M-903-5 dated 7 August 1950 (contd) Page 4 gUlizA i Barracks) on Durresit Street; those of In ALBANIA are large ammo depots; Source recalls those of the Truck Po-61, near e Tirana airfield, and the ammo depots in - ? 4,; near the barracks). There are food supply depots in 4(near the tomb of the queen mother); in mingn (near the p ayground); in (port area); in Maeda:if (behind the hos- pital)i- and in oulevamd Emistokli-Geltonis at the end, right). Conditions of roads are very poor; at present the con,. struction of an asphalted road is in progress between ?hra and pkoder; the road is presently completed to grj, and Zee 35 km from Tirana. Source is not aware of any amphibious maneuvers, past or present, conducted by Albanian troops. The Greek Partisans left ALBANIA in three groups., during the nonth of March 1950. It is believed that the amount of men involved did not exceed 10,000 men. They were concentrated at Iihrlighgl, ure1 and CYrja e Elbasani%) with their families; They all belongedto combat units and were equipped with ver materials and cattle. They left .ALBANIA via Murarp on board Russian and Roumanian boats. Before their departure, they were disarmed and all their armament remained in the hands of the Albanian government. At present, there are approximately 1000 Greel,:s in ALBANIA, including children and old people. However, there are still some Greek Partisans, who are continually crossing the border into GREECE and return to ALBANIA very often. The exec; number of these Partisans is unknown; they are causing in. cidehts and probably act as Informants; they are dressed in civi- lian clothes. There are even some Greek Partisan officers left In Tirena; one of them has often been seen at the Hotel Dajti in the company of members of the Albanian Central Committee, among Which is one ALIJA, Ramiz. "Resistance" movements are almost insignificant; it 10- rumoeed that Colonel BAJRAXTARI, Wharrem is at present in ALBANIA. Approved For Release 2004/02/19SCE-GPM-541-5R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ??, SECRET Possible invasion routes into ALBANIA 1 ../ RI Tt, AA/ ' , OM I .1 /I. i 44444 IAN Ns UM:4VAC SJVA RIJEKA TAKAPOSH NT SCAM ( PKIZREN (.1 TETOVO ? ,;;;;;,?,...., /1109TIVAR 41? mgevo CAPE KAU ".."'"" SKOPLJE MITOLJ ..????44,. CHART I AJIMICT?E?ALORIRL. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-0 415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 0 DU 0 r 71 L.SASAN IA rri.f ? PAlf 04irli ? -4 .. ?^1,r, p RE AK DOWN OF ALBANIAN AND SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN ALBANIA (JANUARY 1950) LEGEND ' Ii= HINETRY OF THE MEW FOWLS ..,,a--m-,..- . mirniu.--- iDIVISION P.FANTRy MIMENT Ci6 MENEM molt" 13 lotA0.. t POPM.T. DINOITIN NMI" lirLdelialT TIMM A WEFT' . KIANT.""Or"IRMINIPT I .1:. NMI MAWR WWII" MADAM TARR MEOW .... KAMA gar, cam.. i ARTRLERY REOPEET 'maw I Won' TELEGRAPHY GOASE _. ---,DEMO aortas rl E POW.' ?!.c PIECRAMCS 1:15 COURSE FOR RAIM? I Amur RILE RUTALPON liallatiuneRERS1 Ampotat COMMENT 6 MODIRANIDA DA PS 'WNW Cb SHORTIEND WATER COURSE A GPM"VCIF' MOTE 'ICZP RUNWAY AIRPORT MIDI AlIFOXOLE KAMM 11851451110040,0 1AL.0014 G) AIRPORTALCOLLIARY .1:: * 'UlICNI71...""M"INIUTa"AR741Da 11111441.". .8"6A ;TIRO.= AIRPORT FOR C3 FIGHTER MERAri C.-- GORSTRuGTIGH A,,,,,,, ,,,,,ca . it : lo.......HaemasrooiloNEARKE A_?-t. am. ROMMEROM ,, mom IZ) EA PINtS 1Mt.NGSC.16NEDARNIKIOIPTAN TAKEOFF KCA.1 CINENT MK PILL! H of AT TRENDIES -0 PILL- BOX .1111, ED OMR woo SAILOR X x XX. RAE ENTANGLEMENTS AlFANTRY TRENDIES MpThN ANOINIMMOill ? P ir N ?L-rIliti,:--,..E.1.., : ....,-.3 t1 ,1 f ." 4 ??,,,Z9 oot4E4r:?5'"A6'. S"'- KNOT IIfr 01],f 1,4 '-i .4::::::.' F I'. K, ?-rr.tr [4; ...6. r BAIND. ? w 'Plii 1 : [EXHIBIT -1- A SURVEY OF ALBAls. i 1A.' (.3 4, ?) \ 4, .,? .1:"...v) .cr ..o, 0 o.t Rif of ? 4-) 1114,11 ArIN nr.10: Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA4' /8.-9061,00200002-9 MILNER. 0111.00/11100 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND ALBANIAN WAR MINISTRY SOVIET MIUTARY MISSION MEDICS/ N.ATIONALI 1111 WAR MINISTRY COURS S NAND FENS'. DMS \171RMY CORPS SOVIET AmiLDEL.E.Ganu SOVIET MIL DELEGATION SOVIET AMILITARY INSTR. SOVIET (5 IN EACH REG.) DIVISION ilL ARTY REG. (UNKNOWN) REG. ARTY.REGT. UNITS UNION/OWN) 1- 2. TTALION MILITARY INSTRUCTORS COMPANIES 1 TO EACH EIN) r/ r 1 4 RIFLE MACHINE GUN 4 SQUADS HEAT( MACHINE GUN PLATOONS MORTAR WIT EXHIBIT r A SURVEY OF ALBANIA SEC RET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 BOt '%1-117 OF T SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND ALBANIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION SOVIET MILITAIRY MISSION SOVIET MILDELEGATION MV D. M.P NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION SOVIET MI INSTRUCTOR (5 TO EACH REGI) FILOIN tiOT. ARTY. 'REST. 11 TO EACH BN) , 6, ECRU' Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 DMP NATIONAL OMNI EXHIBIT el" A SURVEY OF ALBANIA AUTO NEON. 'NOP AUTO UNITS Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ci A OF SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND ALBANIAN NAVAL HEAD QUARTERS IN VALONA SOVIET MILITARY MISSION SOVIET I DELEGATION MIL. CORVETTE I. NAVY HDQS ?4, I. 2. 3. PATROL CRAFT 6. VIEW TUGS DEFENSE 3. MOTOR SAIL BOATS GUN ? GARRISON CO. MACHINE GUN I SQUAD GUN BOATS EXIHI BIT " A SURVEY OF ALBANA I Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ALBANIA15K PONICIRCARYTOGRAL9 Y u SY ST EM 0 X ODPIAAIIANuel ? ''''' ........ ......... MOSER 7 0 0 rn whin .'?'??????? ASPHALT HIGHWAY RIAD-ADAM - UNPAVED ? ...- NORMAL GAUGE RAILROAD 'NG CONCRETE GROWS sovIET NIIUTARY. CONTROL ZONE sulotoc EXHIEIIT?T A 9JRVEY CIF ALBAtiA SE RET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 PORT t DURA:70 yA LO N A BAY AND OIL _PIPELINE (PIPELINE 74 KM, DIAMETER ,200 MN,CAPACITY? )000 T4111 DAILY) (UNDERWATER PIPELINE , LENGTH- 250161,ENINETENNOWA. CAPACITY- Sou TONS PIN Nou4 .12.0Azzy PORT WATER SURWAGE U MEGTAREIVAS NETRE3 OW OMR TO TIM WEST; IN NIA SEWER SMALL AND News? Pan; 1140 N LONG; A EGO M LONA IINEANNATER TO 7111 101714, SZE Al LARGE Pill TO TINE WEST, HON LANSING SINN IN TIN GEpiTER; DEPTH 341 N MORTN-EAST OP TOE SWAT. tfilEND TO DRAWING OR OVRAZZO PONT) p.m.? DI PONENTE- WESTERN Will NI01.0 DI LEVANT! -EASTERN PIO A:1RLO*, ARAM PIAN-LARNMS SUITS IOR Lama sops moLo l mezzowavio? sovIKENN Pill 4 Miff " VI" I SECRE cl-EY Ow. ALSAVA Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 (IT IN 0 k-Afr8 M ET RELIEF MAP OF ALBANIA AND DIVISION OF THE TERRITORIAL SURFACE z 744 CURVE SHOWING CONFIGURATION OF -TERIIMIN MOO _ (in KoRAII 0764 IQ 200 TERRITORY OF ALGAN111 100 T. 714 N ARIA. 11,742,47 0 isoLLARE 10000 20000 N U ME RICA L DATA 30000 HEIGHT III *AFAR! NI *KIM KN. V. OF TOTAL NAME MOWN THAN 141111401 IN WAR' RV. 11 OF 111/11FARI OVER 170o II 0, SI - 0700 N 0,81 - FROM ?40011 TO 1700 al 10,40 0,1 1100 li 14,41 0,1 . 1100 11 " 2400 IA 117,08 4 2(00 111 ,50 co ' !Soo Id ? 2100 II 610,0? 1,1 1500 061,17 1,1 ? 1600 N " 1400 id 1,1110,11 0,6 i600 1461 ,30 OP ? 1E00 li * 150011 30110,60 ION 1100 NIA JO t 5,5 * SOON * $0011 4313,61 111,1 000 1141,71 14,1 ? 40011 ? 400 11 5017,66 17,6 1140 141165,00 61,7 * 1100 N * GOO N 6000,71 15,7 100 10141, II 70,4 0 IA - Soo V 6600,14 15,4 - - AREA OP TERRITORY ?47 101411411URRACI 247411,47 MON % OBTAINED SOON THE WORLD NAP, 1.1,000,000 AND THE LOUIS, 1.100,800 NOTE, IN "NUMERVGAL DATA TAKE AU. STATISTICS ARE SHOWN ERRONEOUSLY USING COMMAS INSTEAD OF DECIMAL POINTS.- PROW ON To 10061 ? too * 40011 ? SOON ' 100011 ? 1000 11 ? 100011 ? 1500 ? ? 0000M 0582 111011 I_E_XHIBIT "VII"! A SURVEY OF ALBANIA ?: d Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SIUE1 CLIMATE MEDIUM TEMPERATURE DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1851 and 1900 (Compiled by HANN and CONRAD )- 2 600 191117 10.17' ? I '119 1 ' j S0.1' I les' 110 90047' 19?111' 110?W 10.0' NW ---... 411' WI ' 411' 4' 4111/1' 40.111' eas so IS 114 NI -.. 40?41" SI I 1.1 11.3 4.9 4,0 1.0 4,1 1,1 9,3 --. 7$ 9,9 7.1 1,4 44 1,9 11,7 . IV - 141 11,0 *0,4 7.1 4.1 9.9 940 . .1-1;1-" . . -. 11,9 14,1 14,1 11,1 10,1 91/1 11,1 11,3 ILI 19,1 17.4 11,1 ike ie,e IL? ' ike 1 al,s KS NIA 16,0 11.5 10 11,0 11-,1 --. Imo siip U.S _ vet &Le au Ka I, asp-- 11$11,1 SO ei.s mi SSA 114.11 f - ---? S0,1 11,4 10,1 17,9 111,4 op :5.5 eiA 1 OA 117,0 I 11.11 11.1 11.3 OA Hy 1111,1 i MA 10,I 11.11 10,4 I 1$ 11,4 9,1 7.7 0.1 7,4 IA 1,1 40 7,0 IV 14,1 11,1 10.1 11,5 10,4 1449 1U 111.4?. 1 LONSITUCK {AU 40091 LAT I TANI NORTH 1200 'WENT IN MITRES 44 toe. Ik thaii IND 0 14 14 lerin lots JA/WANY 119111 ANY 11-40314- APRIL NAY JUNI JULY , AU1111117 - - *mow 1000 9.07011111 NOVINIIIN 800 11161114111 AU. YRIAN LAYRRAIR I 1600 12 1000 90 kirk 145? 0 krue i796 (nirtar,de 600 Grorniii (arileo 193 0 1?9 (colon. P Poisrmr's'.\\ isst 1601:4, 0 Jonh guarani, olierrneti iete .1M11 9NICINTATI0N IN NIW10IT113 1600 000 1200 400 AVERAGE NUMBER OF RAINY DAY! 1 I I I I I 1 1 JANUARY II 111 10 11 9 1 II ? /11111/A1Y e II 10 14 11 5 19 IS N ANN $$$$$ 7 II 7 AMIN. 17 4 1 $$$$$ NAY 7 9 9 4 II IS IS 11 II JUNE I I 10 II 7 11 0 JULY I 1 I 1 1 I I 1 MINT 1 1 4 111111191111 3 1 007051111 9 II II 11 10 11 le 4 1103111011 17 IS 10 ie 103 le 17 17 SI 10 11011110111 ALL TUN AyERAgg II 117 SO 91 111 109 IT 100 19 II 111 In III IS AVERAGE MONTHLY TEMPERATURE IN TIRANA I JAN IS NAP NA% NIH MAX ON OM NUN 10 7 0 07 .6 134 0 C T NOV ii. III 41 KU 4 113J1 ill NCR MO 30,3 11 NO 0 to -4 4044407 1341743, _ 4,4 11,11 0.3 IL '1 Approved For Release 2004/02L1ir.a AP NAT JUN AN. NM III NAX SIN 111011 INN NM INN 1(11010 IHN 17 4,I1 Se 9,1 NJ 13.3 NilST I7,0 ?;i 110. NA PLEASE 4.NSTI1VTI 01161111111. POINTS Wald C011111111 APPEAR IN TIN AIME 14111$- ? SURVEY OF ALBANIA - EXHIBIT Vied 08,15R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 isECRET LB ANI A /. 011.04410011 Of Tilt AINASele PIIPOD 1.. ? . ] 01301.1.403.0141 .1 ? ?. ? &ANN li[= PI.SeeN1 I liM 101313111 CALE?11(001 OP 11?11 /MALT MAT 0 !MU, .11401111011' MIS ilE= . E3 kalOve 13.303 ( AND 101.31.11 11111. .041,111104. 111100 0440.440440.44CALC 331.3011e0110 Of TNe 1141011116"471010101 0011.10 1 ED SLATS 1 1 ill K IAM, OUNOZ, MMO on 04007411.111104007411.1111WALT / en CALCANIOUS ealtPeNTINI MK g 111 PH TAMAN eM.CMKOUS { 1111 PORINallY ANC P MINERALS TN" Main 00001111001010 TO TIC LOCATIONS Se POI ATTAPIell ek01.00111 OM. 1000 PTiliT111,301031111e, MG PreiTle . 11111.041 1.11,11,4. oval s, 04410110-,P (48,14% moo, skssses.ssush 11,4; 1110030. Y10114.14- 13; 1111003.3 , 1.11104.11-- NI I AO% (RON, 10111% WWI ass sumo.) DALINITII: le 1 GIMONITe. le - Nun LI , 41% 010144. 110004141 AND ?401100101. 33 00411 LIIINITe , ill PAM ? fellOOVIA, 0411.10111, PIO 101011701 SOSOITIOIt 04, 000? AIWA Pete' PI ININPLIS ; el 0101144111,10,01.10. eiTuilim. 00 111.0010*. 0111441. DITUIMIN (ITN V0-00% IROOKINAIII, NOMA II 0?010,00 SOLP11104 041110.1101 0110001 (ITN e0-00% . KAHN 40710010 CO '4 AY lie PIO 10401117111.80. OIL , it. 00. 00.04 - TsRAUOI 0740011111 IIICANSIMOS 00010141 WITII NNW OISMOATIONIS ?00 PNISSLINII, 00 00% 001400 0 plum.. MINERAL_PROOUSTION IN "11011(7h ITeLtaNs N00001 et pe? !MU" 1101.1111 SOTIPANY Of e11.111133 131010111. 10,000 1000 110 1I7U010 PON. PAVINS, esT000I001111 NUM, 411/1-110111 SAMSON, ASO 0III41A1 C0001 0017101 -ASII004 ITALrANA 01111/01.1 1.? ITALIAN ALSAMAII PATROL 001I0AN7P UP TO DI DEC Mile PULLED OP 'AMOY 011.1.004 140441401. 300.010 CCCCCC PINFOITATED IASI DePTII VARYING 0110111 ? 110111110 OF ISO WOOS TO ? MAXIM Of 600 IL 01100101101- I?31 TO 0E0T. IN tete MI WILLS CONITRIXTED 101,1101.110 swamis's, prioDUCT,ON? To 31 010 I030, 1101,100 T000 of IPPON !NATO TONI WPM 100011110 IN 1011 UAW 10013 OP IPPON 04,000 7000 0100 1010001131. NOT S 0LN0nr? 0 SCOLueICALLT 7000e0 00 MGM NOW, 00111100000 iNpoLl op CALCAlitOul OF TIE 1111007003 AND ALLUVIAL GLOB OP TOO Pe RIOD (NuPtive 000011 00 TOO 403e10011. 1/11I04*140 STONE Aso sows MUMS. IS ad' A SURVEY OF ALBANIA EXHIBIT *X" Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET ALBAN' A HYDROGRAPHY AREA OF THE PRINCIPAL FRESH WATER LAKES (PARTLY SELONSINS TO ALBANIA) SCUTARI (IKADAIN1001 LAKE 14.171 OSCTAHIS OCHRIDA 10111031(0) LAU 51,100 " PRESS* IPRESPANSICO) LAKE 30.1111 TOTAL AREA OF WAIT,* maxis , MASHIES, CO4STAL. L , ORS) MINN THE POLMCAL BORSERS or ALUNIA 1341,110 14107A8es AREA OF THE PRINCIPAL CIR AMASS BASINS I. 1 4 ? SOVTA111 LAU A0 OCIANA VIR 011111 NmST 'mous KRANA AND Sill ORIN MVO BASIN 141.1100111 COAST DITYRIEN 111111 MATI ovine MAT1 RISE SAWN 11. 00AST 10TWUN MATI AND ISM 7 ISM RIVER 11A5I0 S. COAST DETWEIN 1111M AND AP= 9,1210 1114111 BASIN COAST BETWEEN A021111 00 SCUMS 11. SCUMS! mini ItastN It- Ii IA IL 111. 17. IS 111. 10. SI. U. 7.1 14, COAST KUNO $CUMS PAID 1E0E01 AND KRAVASTA MASSIFS 1111041 DAMN IALSAINA) 00AST IMITY/1101 KUM *110 0010158 0011.011A 1111/1111 SASIN 1.1110041 AND SAY at VALOIS 00011 UTERUS CAP LINIWITTA AND BUTRINTO SAY DANN AND OUTSET? LA40011 PAULA SASS COAST SETWEEN PAULA AND MIA* BASIN SEMEN 1111.111 AND POINT 010 LIM RIVIR SAWN (ALBANIA) BASIN OP PRIMA LAKE (ALBANIA) CASON OF virritizza TOTAL SWAIM OP ALIANIA 1:1 VMS dll=.1111.00 1111W1r 44 110 104 TO so 147 SN,V4 10,584 MAN 411,(144 SPAN ? ILST4,941 ACC01101NS TO OFFICIAL ALOANIAN STATISTICS, 1111 TUSITIORIAL SURFACE OF ALBANIA AMOUNTS TO 1,701,000 05*7*011 ESTIMATE OF THE EXPLOITATION OF ALBANIAN Minns SEMENI-DEVOU nrogns 111,000 OSP ORIN mom MO BLA0111 111,X: HP SCUMS *150 mum WPM 1 HP LEGEND; 01010111 SIETWEEN 08*I8A111 DAMNS 010 RIVEN SYST11S. 1 ir-gf i4 1/4., LA L_fl K" Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 EXHIBIT ? IX" A SURVEY OF ALBANIA r 0-4,080, r'.00 , MEAT I MIALET. MD 1 CORR 1 PASTURES. FILIOCAL I Poolelne, ROOS 7011111000 ' PRODUCT* POTATOES . 49114 SO VISIETAISC4 RD 0TE _ _ MAW CULTURES T.LLIO 11110UND KOSSOVO taxon PASTINNES, 1..FIESTS, NON., 0,140GLICTIVE 1,1160 SO 11?1 otSTFaCT, , WHEAT SARLET,9ATS CORN 70111ACCO ' POTATOES VUIVIA11105 RTC FORME GULIIMES TILLED GROOM(' r,LtNR_PEr.0414OPIA)01S7 PIRA? s.0.60,0an CARP 11.04.001) POTATOES sWel?AOSS PRIAM TOLTEPELIES mom 307 FRAN Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 5 161.1101. 26 0.1 643 it' 175 OUR4=0 ceSTRioi. - NNW ? p?of MSS, ITIALET S. PIPIESTSAR COON I PROSTIERVII MEM POTATOCS 4 VINITARDS COTTON MO PLAIT tRINIE GILTIO1111 STE TAASILIERIMIL ? .5 DIspilcT WILAT ASS , SARLET r on, COON 1,5.6u6156 .L7 ?? ,A? ? ? 24 7016006 WOOLS veNE9M1011 OA FamitaMMEIL___MA mule mane 11.1 mou. ef.f.tA7 ct.iTRiq2 /MONA 64 NM INANIT,OAT5 35 COM 101 Rol 4 Tomo s? POUT.= VIRAY?166 64 Iii 2 RVILOILL-11- num wow Se. DIST R MOUT ,OSTS GOON TOINAGO 1110E marls RIDS PILIISTAILl GAM 3 !awe . 'nuts maim 160 maiRocas-r RO DISTRICT' et al eis ? voltrAms eye suersse 11111111M1-1111- Tn.410 DIRMS me IRAs PASTURE$, IMOKT.0171 PONIPTS, == Tolswa? memo POTATIMILS 211 1;9131717.A_DIS:T RIOT west wear seep POT ATOSS PROTTAASS I ? RTE IT fiRDIELIMIStal. TRA*0 UMW. 454 Ea 5.0 1 II DI ?T FORESTS sevitic) espooneCT Woo? HECTARES FORESTS (BEECN,FIR, PINE) SCUTARI e. VINES 106,756 PIECES CLAIE IMES 41041 N1114.226 OUVES 10 230.69i papAzzo AVMS FORESTS &VINES DISR A VINES 156040 TIRANA OLIVES No 1454110 1?ECTOAE 1 KOSSOVO ? (KuKEN 1104900 411,33 A LBANIA AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS (SURFACE.) STATIST= OF /934-1107 QUANTITY essouno.oeme.-os WITH CULT6ATEDIROURO , 3319: 6 IS WHEAT 40,0114 ,--- -.... GROUND C3 .IL OF 7910 73 USE FOR ASOCULTLINE 301 911 II [' ARLEY . _ PASTURES 0 2.60 40 30 OATS , FOFESTS S MOWS 9 9I.65 M LAKES ? P01105 1 '6O 5 NON ?1900JCTIVE 1 65,2211 TOTAL SURFACE 73S00 100 P(SNKOPIA) OLIVES 75 PIECES ! NE EL BASAN FORESTS 13CEGN O. VINES NFN10,850 326545 BERAT. CLIPPIES N. Zi 4,563 OLIVES MA 306, 98S VINES N11 6,014 OUVES 296,543 VA LO NOTE UMW %%?51111/TE DEONIAL POINTS Pall int 00101?111.- FORESTS (FINE ,OAK) AR CI ROCASTRO ????,. FORESTS I BEECN , PINE) CORITZA VINES 11499,637 f' /***"-' ) CITRUS FRUITS 11?11,500.r.,--- VINES 10 465.597 ? OLIVES /01154,354 SPELT RYE CORN RICE VEGETABLES ,LEGulamOU51 VETCH, LENTIL NEDICAL HER5S COTION ANC FLAX TOBAGGO POTATOES ONIaNS AND TOMATOES WA7ER - N6L.UN 5 VINEYARDS WF_ADOWS AND OTHER FORAGE CULTURES TILLED GROUND 11,61.7 ,661 0.1 9i 976 ET9 467 , 0.1 955 09 045 ,),2 205 0,1 2,063 O. 506 OA 1,231 0.4 1,104 0.3 3,955 I, t i61,552 41.5 331,456 100,0 TILLED GROUND 3,315 SO KR GROUtio CAPABLE OF USE FOR AGRICULTURE 3,029 SO KM 1 I 1, 1 LAKES 60 FORDS iT1051'. ? FOR(STS AND MOODS 9,914 SO KM *OK FROOUC- TivE T1.5a ? ? ? PASTURES 6,26! 50 KIS TOTAL SURFACE E9S3,11100 RECTAPES EXTENSION OF DRAINAGE WORKS CONDUCTED In ZADRIMA 7,700 tweeter*, la PEZA Flatland 2,500 hectspes DEVCA-I Valley ana sgaucr Lau 5,000 hectares A SuivEY OF 14.11NRA Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 EXHINiT )(1"1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET ALBANIA - DENSITY OF POPULATION 1941 DENSITY PER SQUARE KM. ISP TO OINamumn 111 POI SO. OIL On ICHN "III iron OS PIO OS NO. ? PIKTIOTtNO1 OCAO01111111.11.11 _ POBIBMIO OOVNIASIT EXHIBIT XII Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 RFT16. ?tk. ALBANIA POPULATIGN S7ATISTICS GF 1941 13 093 22130 le ? / Trap* : 5 .230o: : C4i,? 4, t, Kodra / C., 2656 4101U2A-41A iku UTARI $ Co,soo., C. Poi, DURA 7 3, ;411 \.) AIRLONA _ 1:;,1 Teeleni .,\P\., 2050 TDy% _DA Cobensi Himabn ARGIR ? 447f, e8\', Dlvin \:\ Santi Quaranta St) 61)49'44 7tv- 1. 000l 1645 (1 C4 NUKE' 1 s91 / uka ?""" 66 1983 A .:0000 14 1 R 1N"9";172 iSSIO ?i1roa, 3 icaj PESHKOPI 625 - Burreli o , ,2020 'ANA?. ?I885 ........ ^ 114 "'? N., ... BASA Pepin 110 01.,,Ast ?)! . ?err- 1 2764 2 584 2553 Gramshi 9 Ouproo. ? ..... lay, O? 0,4 do PfloVINCE CAPITAL $O .KM3 CENSUS 1941 DENSITY -.? ARGIRoCAsTR9 SJINOCA ;IRO 4,125 i 59.695 30 .7 (10,136) --BERATI PERATI 3,666 169,431 48,2 (10,403) KORCI A KOWA ? 3,750 169,234 ? 45,1 . (22,80)') KOSSoVO KUKESI 2,038 48,666 22,9 12001 DIBRA PESHKOP1JA 2,151 83,491 38,9 (1,00u) OUR AZ7.0 [JURA:20 1,550 90,243 59,2 - ? (9,739) EL- BASAN ELBASAN 3,549 ? 110,447 31,1 (13,796) -SCuTARI SCUTARI 5,SGO 180,929 28,9 - (29,909) I ? TIRANA TIRANA 911 59,190 64,9 (30,80Q I- I VA LONA (9,106) 1,448 1 VALONA 88,807 39,0 1- f28,143" 1.105,903 38,6 i TNIS FIGURE EXCLUDE3 ME ISLAND OF GAUCHO 13,6 WNW WINCH 96111 RETURNED TO ALBANIA THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH 1T?L`A THE ISLAND NI UNINHABITED BY CIYILIAN3. 214.8 qradecI ? ? .1899 Peon ^n,n,Ct ERAf 248060 , ..... .1: TIC Zarnon. roowasio ? ...1950 wo,.,?.ICURITZA 1405 Oafish \ .1/4., Gio % .2584 0 908, ? ? 81113h ;''' l4erovocli i 0 t?anena . .-)t 11 ..: 40.?????? 1,G. ...... , ........ ... e .. ,,, 1.. ....... 2 . 4 . 20 --Pr me II ASTRO L ? 0 `42 1671 Les 91,31 3.14 3 NOTE ? UNDER "DENSITY", SUBSTITUTE DECIMAL POINTS FOR THE COMMAS.- [EXHIBIT " A SURVEY OF ALBANIA Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 SECRET Distributiom G.:2/GSI TS0 Holabird CIO Austria CIO Germfuly CIC Greece 35 a 3 2 3 1 3 Approved For Release 200?1IAPA-alT3-00415R006100200002-9 613RM NC. 51.61 MAY 1949 444 Adiob Mill le Approved 'r or Release 2004/02%19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY Brazil CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT SUBJECT Communist Propaganda Material Distributed in Sao Paulo PLACE ACQUIRED DATE ACQUIRED REPORT NO. CD NO. DATE DISTR. 26 Sept. 1950 NO. OF PAGES 1 25X1 NO. OF ENCLS. 6 (to ORE only) (LISTED BELOW) 25X1 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT SO U. S. C.. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO. HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. ? 25X1 25X1 ESTATE ARMY 25X1 THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION *Documentary ITS ru,',114ENT fS ENCI '1131i ATIAGNE04 pn r.:rif Attached for your information and retention are copies of propaganda distributed by the Communists in Sao Paulo during the month of August 1950. The first four attachments originated with the Cruzada Humanitaria pela Proibi9ao das Armas Atomicas,* rua WenceKauRraz, 146, Sao Paulo. Enclosures: Porque e Urgente Assinar 0 Apelo de Estocolmo (pamphlet, 4 pages) Cruzada Humanitaria (pamphlet, 32 pages) Sheet for signatures against the atom bomb Poster against the atom bomb Appeal of the Uniao Geral dos Trabaihadores of Sao Paulo, with place for signatures in support of the Stockholm Appeal (I page) Leaflet entitled Brado de Alerta do Camarada Prestes (I page) 25X1 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 NAVY AIR NSRB DISTRIBUTION ORE OPC Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 DO-CAMARAD& PRtSTES! tes lacca eorajosarlente up_gaii e t,r) cto part1LLookmAYIWYANWPIA-W41W ipor vattatte uo pot.) e derrot'ar os orresoi'es ex-tornaa,c internos. Ne ata ,t,cr cm que paire sobre o floss() pov0,0 2c118 tTrave porigo,A Guerra L Prestos, '. coal firmeva o caminhc 4a lut6 l'evoluoioneriassPela liberttgao Sc n guerrn 'nos bnte 4 porta ameaga a iiaa.de nossos filhos e uturo da naoao. Que nos sirva de exempla? heroism? do pow) Ooreandou, }-rpfile 0 invasor de sua_potrlajos Impt? )011stes ner1nos So 03 patroes de itra que no querem,attrur no guerra 1:,(D2,tra as 1305s9s irmaos:flNem um solaado: a Core;.a,e o gue devemos afirriar' :N,7a luta e umt so,noSzo inirnigo e 40mo. Responaeremos a Liutra e a todo4 ,t,ralaorse que Jamais raremos gUerra u.potro que luta pox* sua ,libertavao, 3im cootinuaremos lutando pe/a nossa.- DE res n r.nrt1117)-Jr1r,:111,-7, 109449(44.7% ).mper p ypte:r opreores estro. 1r. 171.o.,ra em que GLA, 11443.8 grave Per 4;0,a ft-porta cQM firme9p, 0 lutas relioluciynario Vaoironalo Se a guerrn nos ameaca,P '.?!i de rK)5-0.-ti,fi f,buturo 4a ne4R.o. Que nos sirv ommplo,p 216%oismo do 1)0r9 rcr repele'e 14ivasor de r1r1,1Stas amerionnos. que 400 quereal_A4td.--v4, 00/1trft 08 gOoja IrMW.J2 para a CerPP1,0 9 ve IqU$sa,111-ta e uma EflaPonare4100 P Ltr 0. oa 0.7V,a0r8 oe 4,5, farem( A limsOVO 11.10 Lan por e dCcIltinUrremoo iutanapp. ibertPga0Jeolltra 03 opressoreedenos" lip& nqa0-.?oOntra a3 recr o po1:70,ue so Dutra sua d rcvolqUO sao Dutra e ;)L2F, CPna: iP 0 M241 ifp s? de Pre s t eso programa de- 1,S;J mvit4 's '6) de ([1, liibertaqa? que traduz os_angetios /40 P ber? que trpdt4 Os P%ac k! , p r ,PaZ,rra e Z.,1,ber vqfpo Prz,Tor;r1( e ffli$fareins guerrn P UniPn trami;.is farem(y2uer :trin dos traballiPdores. VIVA 0 94/potrir dos P'71171't e PRESTESt 7Rrste3 ?27,, .., , DO CAIURADA PRESTES2 - BRAJO DE AL1-7,,tr.)-k DO ' 'JA'74Te7g?liTE9P.corajTio ui-manifes ,t1Titen-laniV67.5r7Toiritc.---17z-z d -1 , . _.. .._. _ to o Partido Oomunista do Braall,para o co 1:Ifirti b 06munictn de 7(:)1 ,I? impor a vontaae do povo e debrotar or '...0p4ir P. vontnge LOP?V? :preSs4rOa ext:pinos...s $ em que.palia.aohre oilot??-i, mais grave:peT1.0,A -T_O-;--"'- _ poni,-a oc-)Li 4s ,12ta8 revolu-074,- 46 Naec)n71. ,,c: E-,. ikier.r- , ' - ' ortp,e e.:4.,4,c,r1 a,vida de nor,s--7,7/ -P fYttirflY (IP_ nao, Q,,,..;c xemp,J..? 0 11.0r6iSL:C c-.1,(,, pr.,,,,q,= (.17--;.". ?epeio 0 ,InVaaor de sua Ilstro px1ri.oPrlos..a0 os Pa trn que nos quorE',9_il'Ar!'T ontrn Oa no 8303 ir,:),:i;=HTifi rra Oore;_a o ve of:aa 414a e.uta..so,noso i- MV.500.espronderemos a 91.40,1'ea que .11-11A1rj.faxcQ-- opressores eXtern106-0 int0r4015. NeetA paira sabre o,nllaso palm: o-mt7is grave perlgotA d.l.lerrgt ?rests xpponts oom fl.riesa oopaminho 4a ,PaZ . . ?-4 uta e revoluoloariasjpela Iibc? -?OhiOrrl. f4p 4Uerria_nos bate a 0 ilnetnp A 1:.4t. de flosses 0 as ilf.".9.zlorv ;14o.'1108 131r1rt 434 - herc4sm? .do,pon ocreanoique ptiC'6, vrsPr dP 9ua,petria',os ;rape rialiS140 144404,q-artg,41.,$40...,na, patrte Dutra 4'ut noS querem,atirar na gue ra pntra os es59a irmaos:FINem um sC 11:17' a CC,),e;g1 C?0 9.11t.deVe1710_3 PfA 17?iax".1 Nokea 17-rta0),LI14 aP44044O-,1,414410 0 smo- 104120n49t417,a4 4.,PUtPa k tc7.400 s trai4orOs QUO jamaAlt 4'ar0po Qzra. um IN.N6 qu(.itita por SUa Ilber a-ao a ),ira povo que luta po y i- almie04tin4BOAos 141.441 pela nozaa .p stmlcoatinuaremos ',1utande ,p-.1- 1ibert4q",?P4;11 ne Rpreo_liWTs 41) floe?, ibertevo,onatra agi opressoo4a so potto,que sap tiutti1',0 134.p c rItartEt. . lig povo , quo . aro Dutra e FrO lelp 0 menifesto de Prestezjrcgrma teir o 1114,Inifeto ae Prost,-3 , libert%lao clue treduz oe rr..eios do 4,11bertn.Vo gun trndx-7 , ) p9yrs-rr Pvt7J,iTerrp C,.- .,)ovo,por 7,,F-,o,Paz Terra e LibeEarlde. 4 t P,fpem guerrn tniao Sov1.6? - l n pmrl frx,ns guOrr ptri (los trrbf1hnaorQ,91 vivA doc, ,P.TIFSTtS. c o C*13 OAMKR:ADA P11S3TE5 e ./ o ovo ND S?.PAULO LUTA R4 doNTRA 0 N1r0 DE Ziar1.45 BRASILLIEA..1 PARA A - 004k--A =BHA E A BOMBA AT 1:i0A.,AtiSIZTANDO.1P.,ELO .E$TOGOi...20 ,,CON$.11.)EliAN:1)0 CRIMINC=_DE G'J RRA 0 romatio App o -ed 004102113 - POVO DE SAO PAULO LU IO vE TROPAS B 's . ? QRNIA,OONTRA A*GUSaRA E A71:30112;! ' MICA;A33INalD6 U kPILOZ CONQLCZN.u0 OhIIAINOSO /' CON' 25X1 APELO DE ESTOCOLMO XIGIMOS a proihicao obsoluta da ARMA ,TOMICA, arma de error e de exterminio massa de poputa- coes. EXIGIMOS o estabe- lecunento de um rigo- .4- DSC) controle internaci- para assegurar a o9iiicac.ao clessa meclida dc interdivio. C!JNSIDERAMOS que croverno que prirneiro Aolizar a arma atomica,, flao importa contra que iSi cometera urn cri- e contra a liumanida- Ae e sera tratacio icomo .iminoso de querria. PEDIMOS a tocios os aomens e mulheres de baa vontade (10 mundo inteiro que assinem este pelo. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : Cii-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 assine contra a CRUZADA HUMANITARIA PHA PROIBIQA0 OAS ARMAS ATOMICAS JA W ENCESL A NJ BRA2:, 146 - ANDAR - 5AL.A5 312-313 - SAO PAUL(..) Assine e colha o maior ii rordeasassivataraiRli.8ficoncarrao emio de viagern a Europa Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 APproVed For Release 2004/02/19' : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Cruzada Humanitaria APtL0 DE ESTOCOLMO EXIGIMOS a proibigiio absoluta da ar- ma'atomire, arma de terror e de exterminio em massa de populagOes. EXIGIMOS o estabelecimento de um controle internacional para assegurar a / 2 splicagdo desta medida de interdicao. CONSIDERAMOS que o goy- erno que primeiro utilizar, a arma atomica, no un- porta contra que pais cometerci um crime contra ?khumanidade e serci tratado corn? criminoso de guerra. PEDIMOS a todos os homens e mu/he- res de boa vontade do maid? inteiro que assinem este Apelo. AU/kikAs TM11Af 25X1 MILHAO DE ASSINATURAS CONTRA AS CRUZADA RUMANITAR1A CONTRA AS ARMAS ATOMICAS *UA WENCt61.11.11 BRAZ, 146 ? 9.o ANDFIR ? 6191.949, 912 - *13 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 , Approved For Release 2004/02/19": CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Assinaturas Que Salvam Milhoes de Vidas Ja no fina da grande guerra de 1939-1945, o rnundo inteiro foi aba- lad? corn o bombardeio de duas cidades. japonezas : Hiroshima e Nagasaki (Japao), Depois de tantos bombardeios, os povos viram surgir uma .nova e terrivel arma de guerra ? a bornba atomica ? corn a capacidade infernal de reduzir a cinzas, em poucos minutos, rnilhares de criaturas e construcOes. Mae, pouco foi dito sObre os incriveis sofrimentos de rnilhares de pessoas que nlorreram. Jentamente e dos que ficararn vivos para ver o que nunca imaginaram ser possivel: o inferno na terra. Urn sabio ingles ? P.M.S. Blackett que recebeu em 1948 o Fre- ya? Nobel de Fisica como recornpensa pelos seus inventos e descobertas, escieveu urn liVEO (*) que produziu grande lmpressao em todo o rnundo, contando 6 que as bombas atennicas fizeram aos homens, mulher(!s, crian- gas, edificios e instanCes daquelas duas cidades japonezas. Nesse livro, o sabio ingles reproduziu trechos inteiros de relatOrios oficiais dos governOs dos Estados Unidos e da Inglaterra, nao deixando diwidas sobre o que aconteceu em consequencia da explosao das duas bornbas langadas sobre o japao. Depois e antes desse li-vro, apareceram diversas histOrias sobre a bomba, Inas, 0 povo nunca ficou sabendo bem o que acontece nos bombar- deios atomicos. No ano de 1949, surgiu mais urn document? iniportante ? o relatorio da COM issao de Energia AtOmica dos Estados Unidos. A publi- . ' oagao,deste liVrinho, entre nos, tem por fim esclarecer o povo sobre o que 1?galmente urna guerra atornica, mostrando que ela pOde ser evitada. ?.14S,CONSDC1JENCDIS MILItARES E POLITICAS DA 214ERGIA AT6MICA" - LONDRES, 1946 ,k, I ? 3 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19*: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ISTO E A GUERRA1 .11ties Foi f"?ste o destino que sonhastes para vossos Mhos? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDID83-00415R006100200002-9 Nests dias que correm, quando ?ada yes major o perigo de UM& Stova guerra, a arneaga de urn diliivio de logo este', sobre a cabega de rtados Os seres humanos, sem excecOes. Mais de urn pais no mundo possui bombas atOrolcas. ., TQ4QS sentem,que ?rgente evitar que a guerra comece, mas, pou- . . 9, QS que realmente sabem o que sera uma nova guerra, corn o uso 'rrnas atOmicas. , Depois de ler.este,livrin.ho, sera facil compreender que ?recise, DI13 qUE A PRIAMBA 130MBA ATOMICA SEJA ATIRADA, por- epois c1esse inicio tragic?, os bombardeios atOrnicos entre os wises erre, trans ormarao o mundo awns enorrne fogu.eira. ' ' ' As oriangas as mogos os homens e as mulheres de texlas as idades, , ....es e n cional . raps? rehgroidades, do nosso pais, por desgraga nossa, est-do ; sob essa tertherl. aa eaga. 0 Brasil ?rodutor e exportador de materias .pihns ,para a fabricagao de armas atomicas, e isso, alem do mais, nos co- am dentro do campo de uma guerra que venha a se desencadear. I , Assim com.o foi proibido o uso dos gazes venenosos na guerra, assim mho, sao fiscaaclos em todo o muncloja produgdo, o comercio e o uso de , oertos venenos (Opio, cocaina, etc.), tambem ?ossivel urn acOrdo entre as 1,:iaiom prothindo a fabricagao de armas atomicas e fiscalizando a apli- valao da energia atOmica, a fim de que ela seja empregada sOmente pare o bern da humanidade. , No passado, milhares e milhoes de pessoas, envolvidas no logo e natleptrui0e da guerra, repetiram muitas vezes esta prgunta : Porque nao ?ertritarFnos41sto ? , , 7 Agora poremt ?reciso responder COM rapides, porque depois de i corn4ada a guerra. sera dificil saber quantas pessoas poderao, ainda, fazer es" *eNunta. 1 , Todos os 'lawns e mulheres de boa vontade, sem nenhuma ex- ? (*gaol tem em suas maos 0 mei? de evitar a guerra atOmica, condenando desde j? govern? que seja o PRIMEIRO A UTILIZAR A ARMA ATO- MICA contra qualquer povo. oVniao priblica do Brasil e do mundo inteiro, unidas pelo sa- ireit? a viola sem cogitar de politica, de religiao ou de quaisquer oUXa diterFpgas, estao realizando,urna grapde eleicao, em que dirao 0 go ensam cia guerra atOmica, em que exigirao a garantia de que ela ?nuirica seja comegada, mas, desde A afirmando que amaldigoam o govern? que iniciar tal guerra. . , , ,,, , t ,,i'si3O cpumo veSt,e aro de 1950, em Estocolmo, essa grande eleigao id inielada pelos Partidarios da Paz. MilhOes de pessoas, em todos as pai- - 6 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ' ,Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ses do mundo, estao votando pela proibigao e contrOle das armas a o cas, pondo A sua assinatura nate document? que se chama .APtL0 DE ESTOCOLMO rxiarmos a proibigdo absoluta da arrna atOnvica, arma de terror e de exterminio en massa de popula- goes. EXIGIIVIOS p estabeleeintento de urn contrale in- ternacional para assegurar a aplicacO0 destci medida de interdigdo. CONSIDERAMOS que o goveAo que primeiro utilizar, a artier atornica, no irnporta contra que pals cometerd /on, crime contra a huntanidade e sera tra- tado corno 'criminoso de guerra. OEDIMOS a todos os lumens e rnulheres de boa vontade do niundo inteiro qve asstne'rn este Apelo. ,Caela pessoa que nao vota nesta grande eleicao, tambem contribui para tornar possivel a guerra atOmica. Nao e justo pensar, apenas na prOpria vida. As crrancinhas, os nnocosL todos os que nasceram para viver e ter tun future, nu heard? sabendo, talves, quern assinou ou no 'assinou pela praibicAo. Mas, cada urn, no seu initimo, respondera a si mesrno sobre o que fez pela vida de milheies de inocentes. E" apenas uma assinatura, rnas, milhcies delas faro saber que a humarndade exp a poibicao das armas atOmicas e que esta disposta a Punir os carniceirs que cornecem e'isa barbaridade. ttlos responsAveis pela sorte da paz e da guerra. E' essa a =kr forca que tern cada ser human? ? a sua vontade e a sua acao rras que Precisa ser levada ao conhecirnento dos responsa- veis pela sorte da paz e da gruerra. ASSINE E 'JUDE A COLHER MILHARES DE ASSINATURAS NO A121,L0 DE isrrocoLmo -7 ORGANIZE 0 SEU GRIUPO DE COLE- TORES DE ASSINATURAS Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Minha mcie? minha querida mdezinha... Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19.: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 A gurnas das Milhares de Manifestagoes para Proi- bigio e Controle das Armas At6micas .00 ?EMBAIXADOR OSWALDO ARANHA, ex-presidente da Assembleia das Nacoes Unidas : "A interdicao da bomba atomica' sera o pri- meiro passo no sentido do desarmannento geral, sem o quai a paz *era ameacada pela fOrca e pela brutalidade". CIENTISTA CESAR LATTES, Fisico de Energia Nuclear: "Quanta ener,gla atornica, acho, da mesma forma que a esmaga.c:tora mato- ria dos cientistas ern todo o mundo, que ela deve ser utilizada unicamente para fins pacificos". IPROF DR. HA..lyS BETHE e mais doze fisicos norte-americanos : "Julga- , -mos que nenhurna nacao, tem o direito de empregar tal bomba, rnesmo por uma causa justa. Esta bomba nao ?ais uma arma ,de guerra, mas um meio de exterminar populacfies inteiras". 'DR HERBERT MOSES, Presidente da Assoclaceto Brasileira de Imprensa: ,-"Quanto a bomba atomica, arma terrivel de destruicdo em mas- sa, entendo que deve ser proibida". IDEPUTADO PLINIO BARRET?, do Con gresso Federal : "Julgaria o pri- ]rrieire ;govern? que utilizasse a bomba attimica contra qualquer ? 9 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 outro pais como indigno de pertencer a comunhao clas nac,Oes civilizadas. 0 minim? que Ihe devia acontecer era o fuzilamento de todos as seus membros". PROF. LUCAS NOGUEIRA GARCEZ, Seoretcirio da Viacdo de Sao Paulo: "Neste particular, quero declarar que, desde 1948, quando Sua Santidade o Papa Pio XII se pronunciou contrario ao empriigo da energia atomica como arma de destruicao, me convenei, ain- da mais de que a proibicao e controle das armas atOrnicas e urn desejo profundo que esth no coracao de todos os homens de boa vontade". PADRE JOAO BATISTA DE CARVALHO, Deputado Estadual de Silo Pau- Io: "Sao arrnas desumanas, anti-cristas, cujo emprego e lesivo aos rnais sagrados interesses da humanidade". PROF. DR. THEMISTOCLES CAVALCANTI, ex-Procurador Geral da Rey. p : "Proibir o emprego da bomba atemica ?arantir a paz". FREI ISAIAS RAYUSI, do Convento dos Capuchinhos do Rio de Janeiro: "Nos somos homens pacificos. Amamos a paz elldesejamos a fell-. cidade dos povos. Rogamos cliariamente a Deus que nos livre de uma nova guerra. Mas, ?reciso que se peca tambern aos ho mensde governo para que entrem irnediatamente em entendi- mentos pacificos e nos livrem de uma nova hecatombe". IRMA DULCE, Diretora do Circu/o Operdrio da Baia e do Co/egio Santa Bernadette: "A bomba atomica ?ma arma de destruic,ao e Cu penso que devemos tratar de construir e nao de destruie". DR. FRANCISCO PATTI, presidente da Cruz Vertnelha de Sao Paulo: "So facet votos para que o proprio Direito Internacional acabe corn as guerras, Sd posso aplaudir, evidentemente, qualquer me- dida de controle efetivo da energia nuclear e a proibicao da bomba atemica-. PROF. SAMUEL PESSOA, Catedratico da Faculdade de Medieina de Scio Paulo e presidente da "Organizacao Brasilera de Defesa da Paz ? 10 -- Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 .? Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 da Cultura" (Sao Paulo) : "A bomba atOrnica espalha a des- truicao cega, o sofrimento atroz, estendendo o seus efeitos ate sobre geracoes vindouras, por afetar, nas suas irradiaceies, os orgaos geradores do homem". FLAITIO COSTA, Tecnico futebolista responseivel pela seleccio brasileira nu disputa da Copa do Mundo, a celebre taca "Jules Rimer : "As- sinarei o Apelo Estocolmo corn muito prazer. Acho que a guev- ra e o esikrte sao duas coisas antagonicas. A guerra so serve para dividir os povos. 0 esporte, ao contrario serve para uni-los". GENERAL: RAYMUND? SAMPAIO, do Exercito Nacional: "A major energia descoberta pelo homem nao devera servir para a sua prOpria destruicao, mas, para a construed? de urn novo mundo de paz e de progresso constantes". DR. ALVARO MOUTINHO RIBEIRO DA COSTA, Ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal: "Totalmente contra o emprego da bomba atOmica em qualquer circunstancia. Totalmente a favor da paz e da solucao pacifica dos problemas fundamentals de todos os povos, sem distincao de raca, de religiao e de credos politicos". Outras manifestacoes favoraveis a prOibicao das armas atOmicas e aa Apelo de Estocarno: Gabinete do Govern? Finlandes, Associagao dos Cientistas da Inglater- ra, Conselho Nacional da Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes, Movimento Repu- blicano Popular (da Franca), Comite Internacional da Cruz Vermelha (Genebra, Suica) , Joliot-Curie (Franca), III Congresso Brasileiro de Es- critores (realizaclos na Baia), A.ssociacao da Juventude de Hiroshima e Nagasaki (Japao), Selecionado Italiano a Copa do Mundo, Soviet Supre- mo da Uniao das Repalicas Socialistas Sovieticas, Frades do Convent? dos Franciscanos (S. Paulo), fl Congresso dos Estudantes Secundarios do Bra- sil, Rev. Goncalves Pacheco, presidente das Igrejas: Evangelicas de S. Paulo, Assembleia Legislativa de Pernapbuco, Camaras Municipais de ? Monte Alegre do Sul, Campos do Joraao, Guarulhos, Rio Claro, Salto de It?, Tanabi, Mogi das Cruzes, Piquete; Sao Vicente, Nhandeara, lift, Sao Caetano do Sul, Botucatii, Lins, Jaboticabal, Poa, Santa Adelia e $anto Andre (Sao Paulo), -?- Ladainha, Car= do Cajurii, Nova Lima, Sabath, lciberlandia e Cataguazes (Minas) ? Rcife, Olinda, Pau D'Alho e Jaboatao (11rnarnbuco), -- Curitiba, Ponta Grossa e Londrina (Parana) ? 11 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? Nova Iguassii e Sao Goncalo (Est. do Rio) -- Joao Pessi)a. (Paraiba. -- Salvador e Bonfim (Baia) ? Goiania (Goias) ? VitOria (Espirito Santo) ? Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) ? Fortaleza (Ceara) - - Cuiaba (Mato-Grosso), Liga de .Defesa da Constituieao, Uniao Estacimli dos Estudantes, Centro Aeademico XI de Agosto, Grernio da Faculdado de Arquitetura e Urbanism') de Sao Paulo, Cornissao de Assuntos Exte- riores da Camara de Deputados da Republica Argentina, Episcopado Ca- toile? da Polonia, Dr. Torres Bodet, presiderite da UNESCO; alern dc centenas de vereadores, deputados, escritores, jornalistas, professores, itn- versitarios, eiemislas, artist as, rrilitares, diplomatas; estuciantes, operariaos, etc. etc. ? POVO DE SAO PAULO DARA' 1.500.000 ASSINAURAS PELA PROT-- B.100 E CONTROLE INTERNACIONAL DA ARMAS ATOMICAS NO APPLO DE ESTOCOLMO -- 12 - - Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? Os Horrores dos Bombardeios Atomicos em Hiroshima e Nagasaki que aconteceu em Hiroshima e Nagasaki (Japao), quando explo- clif arn as duas bombas atOmicas lancadas ern, agosto de 1945, ?xplicado corn muitos detalhes em dois relatOrios oficiais, urn dos norte-americanos e outro dos ingleses. 0 relatorio dos ampricanos chama-se: "Efeitos das Bombas AtOmicas, Pesquiza dos Bombardeios Estrategicos, Estados Uni- dos, U.S.S.B.S., 4 e 5". 0 ingles, tern o nome de "Os efeitos das bombas atomicas sobre Hiroshima e Nagasaki", public:ado em Londres no ano de 1946. Os ataques contra essas duas cidades japonesas, nao encontram outro igual em toda a historia militar do mundo. Os aviOes B.29, carregados corn bombas atOrnicas, partiram da ilha de Tinian, escoltados por urn ou dois avines de observagao. Num desses avioes de bornbarcleio ia, o capita() Ro- bert Lewis: esse aviao tinha o nome de "Enola Gay". A meia noite do dia,5 de agosto de 1945, o capita? Lewis e sua tripu- lava() receberarn, sem maiores explicacoes, a seguinte ordem: "Prepa- re-se para voar". 0 coronel Tibbets, chefe da expedi,gao de bombardeio foi inforrnado, apenas, do seguinte: "0 "Enola Gay" devera voar dentro em breve. Que a tripulacao esteja a postos." As duas,horas e cincoenta minutos da madrugada do dia 6 de agosto, o "Enola Gay" levantava vooc corn uma tripulagao de 7 homens, sem saber outra coisa alern de que a missao era arriscadissima. No coniando 13 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 105E' DA SILVA ITU 0 QUE ACONTF.E.EU NOVA =ADE ATACADA POR PTIMAS AVSMICAS C DISSE COM OS. sEus SOTOES: "DENS ME L;VREE CRIAR IMUS 510405 PARR MEM TOREAro.3 !IESE,A IsAMIA,IDADE!. NUNCA!. VON Ill PROCURAR ESTE TM. DE "APETO DE EsTocoLmo" DEPoIS DE TER C01,3111D0 ALGUMAS CENTENAS DE Al- SiNATURAS NO SERVICO fPEGANDO DEODE 0 PAWL? ATE 0 POREEIRO), MSS DA SILVA IA DE CASA DK CA. SA, 30511410, VENDO QUANTA GENTS QUE QUIPPIA ASSINAR 0 APELO ITS ESIOCOLMO. ICU DA SILVA IA ESTAVA ISESoLVIDD A CO-..HER, PI:. LO DEVOE, I.0O3 ASSINATURAS aVAND1) MOD SABEND,) OVE A "CRLITADA HUMANITARIA PELA PROISIZ:A0 DAS RAMA!: ATRAMICAS" OFERECU1. OS GRAGA. VW( VIA. GEM A ITALIA SARA QUEM MAIS A3SINATUEAS CON 55010555, ENTAO PERSON: IVOR ASSiNATURAI. CArt PEQUENO! SOSINHO NAO VON VENCER ESSA. PARADA" REUNIDOS OS AMIGOS E PARENTE, I. S. EXPLIC,CRE SST EXPLECADO. 0 QUE PODCRA ACONTECER St A ROMA A16MICA RAO FOR PROISMA, DEN ENTAO, A IDEIA DE RORMAREM UM GRUPO DE COLETORE3 ASSINATUNIS Z PROPoS QUE A MARIA RIBEIRO. MUITO ESTIMADA ROR TONGS NA REPONDEZR, FOSSE A CANDIDATA DO GRUPO PARA A VIRGEM A ITALIA. "TODOS JUNTOS - DIESE 0 TOSE ? VODEMOS MA1JDAR A MARIA NESSA VIAGEM, EU Min ONE QUERIA IS. MRS, TEMOS QUE TRABALIIRR EM CONIUNTO PARR RODER MRN7)AR 0 NOSSO CANDI- DATO". TODOS GRITARAM: "VA/ R MARIA': Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 . Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 0 JOS i DA ,SILVA ror ESCOLHEDO PARA PRESIDENTE DO .111/310-0, PEDRO MANZINI FICOU rscapriv9Ano LE -BRODER, CONTAR E ENTREGAR AS ASSINATI/RAS NA C107ZADA:A MULHEA too rinmago DEU A IDEIA 1)5 INETMAYi UM posTo piespr.Doa NA OUITANDA DO. MA- ?RIDO. TODOS MARA/4 ENCAIIREGADOS Dr ARRAN. ? TAR MATS COLETORES DE ASsIDATURAs E ELOUNI nr, rlatito PARA AIUDAR A CRUZADA. NO T, DIA DE TRABALHO, 0 051/50 COLHEU 2.005 AS SMATURA. NO POSTO DA QUITANDA DO FIRDIUno MATS LOOS AsSINATURAs. o TM/BAUM EM GRUPO PROVOU QUE ERA MU/10 MELHOR. 2401 NIXAMO DIA o ontrpo no Jost DA sILVA ENTROU sw *so ITO TRABALHO, coTHErtno AssurAmpits EM 'TOD? 0 BRIRRO, 0 PESSOAL SE DIST/URI/1U POR RUAS RABA EnTAR DUPL1CATAS HAS .AISTRATURAS E. NAC) 41.0dEROR AS MESH AS pESsOAS. ALOUMAS MAO sa itasf tip our SE IRATAVA MAR, 0 PESSOAL DO 1;81111.0, EXPLIC,OU BEM 0 ASSUNTO. TODD MUNDo ASSI. NAVA AGORA. DE 3 EM 3 DIAS 0 PEDRO MANZIN1 VA/ EN. TREGAR AS ASSIDATURAS COLHIDAS, DEM CONTADAs SEPARADAS: AS DA FABRICA, AS DO BAIREO, AS CON. 56001055 NO 10GO DE FUTEBOL, LEvA AINDA, pOn Es CRITO, 0 OUE rizEnnm PARA MELLIORAn 0 TRABALHO, 0 QUA DIESER/2M As DESSOAs PROcURADAs E oUTRAS EXPERIENC/As. COM AS PRIMEIRAS 1.000 ASSAIATURAS 0 GRUPO GANHOV DMA COLECAO DE /0 LIVROS. 0 OUE OUEREM r A VIACEM HMS A mAPIA. HAS, pitiN CIPALMENTE. EsTA0 DECIDIDos A vtr Ft BOMBA AT'o MICA 511011311)5. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ia o coronel Tibbets. J?o ar, receberam pelo radio o rumo que deve- riam seguir. Ao entrarem em territOrio japones, receberam a seguinte ordern: "Vde sempre a 5.000 metros de altura. Evite combates corn cacas ini- migos. N?aterrize em terra japoneza. Seu aparelho deve voltar a base intacto ou desaparcer por completo." Depois de nove horas de voo, ouviram nova ordem: "Dentro de nove minutos estara em cima de uma cidade; lance a bomba nUmero 1." A primeira bomba, de acordo corn os relatOrios oficiais, foi lancada a 6 de agosto de 1945, as 8 In)ras e 15 minutos da manh?sobre Hiroshima. 0 relatorio americano "I.T.S.S.B.S., 5" diz: "A major parte dos trabalhadores j?e encontrava em servico, mas. um grande nitmero deles ainda se achava a caminho do servico; quasi to- das as criancas das cscalas e urn certo ntimero de operdrios, trabaihavam ao ar livre, ocupados ria demotic& de predios bombardeados, para protecdo contra o foga e enviamin o tinaterica aproveitavet para fora da cidade. 0 ataque realizou-se 45 minutos depois de tocado a sinal de perigo pas- sado. Por cause da falta de aviso e da indiferenga da poptaageto em face da presenca de pequeno3 grupoS de avioes? a exploscio ocorreu em condicoes de surpresa quasi total, quando ninguem se encontrava nos abri,gos su- bterraneos. Mai& gente se encontrava de fOra dos abrigos subterraneos; out ras pessoas? na major parte, achavam-se no interior de liabitacoes tra- gels ou em edificios comerciais." Mais ou menos 11 quilornetros quadrados da cidade de Hiroshima fo- ram com.pletamente destruidos pelo fogo. "A surpresa, o desabantento de intimeros edificios, o incendio, fize- ram urn nimero de, vitimas ,ate hoje nunca vista; 70 a 80 mil pessoas fo- ram mortas, desapareceram ou foram consideradas mortas e quasi outro tanto de feridos. 0 grande nim era de vitimas ?anto niais impressionan- te si se corn para corn as resultados do raide sobre Taquio, realizado entre 9 e 10 de marco de 1945, na gual a neimero de mortos nab foi tdo elevado, conquanto tivessem sido destruidos 42 quilometros quactrados da cidade... Tres dias inais tarde, em Nagasaki, a cidade quasi nada sabia a res- peito do que ocorrera cm Hiroshima, a nc-to ser umas vagas noticias do desastre de Hiroshima que apareceram nos jornais de 8 de agosto." ? 16 --- Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Nenhum aviso, portant?, tinha sido dado quando, a segunda bomba ;atornica, foi langada sobre Nagasaki. Somente 400 pessoas se encontrst- yam nos abrigos subterraneos da cidade, construidos para conter, mais ou menos urn tergo da populagao. As testemunhas de vista de Hiroshima stio unanimes em dizer que ,v1ram urn c/arcio brilhante e bronco no ceu, sentiram urn sopro violento do ar ouviram um, trovdo seguindo-se o barulho da quebra e desaba- mento de casas. Faiam tambem de uma eScuridclo crescente e de uma nuvem de poeira densa que envolvia a todos. Pouco depois viram os 'ineendio.s que destruiam os diversos quarteiroes da cidade". (Relatorio ingle" s, pdgina 2.) Os nUmeros referentes aos resultados dos bombardeios atOmicos das duas cidades japonesas, comparados corn os do raide incendiario realizado sobre Toquio (Japao), em margo de 1945, mostrarri o poder de destruigao das bombas atOrnicas. O raide sobre Toquio foi realizado por 279 aviOes, que despejaxarn 1.669 toneladas de explosivos comuns e bornbas incendiarias. Essa capital tinha, ern media, poi* quilometro quadrado, cerca de 50.000 habitantes. Os ' resultados foram ds seguintes: 83.600 niortos e desaparecidos; 102.0000 fe- ridos; 2.000 mortos por quilometro quadrado destruidos; e 4.500 vitimas por quilometro quadrado. O bombardeio de Hiroshima foi realizado por 1 aviao, que langou 1 bomba atomica. A cidade era menos populosa do que Toquio e so tinha 14.000 habitantes por quilometro quadrado. Os efeitos produzidos foram os seguintes: 80.000 mortos e desaparecidos; 70.000 feridos; 5.800 mortos por quilometro quadrado; e 12.000 vitimas por quilometro quadrado (en- tre mortos e feridos) Os efeitos da explosao da bomba atemica sebre Nagasaki e Hiroshi- ma foram muftp elevados, sem dilvida. Isso se deve,,em grande parte ao fato de que os bombardeios atinnicos sao feitos de surpresa . corn ailment? atual na rapides dos aviOes e outros meios de transportes aereo, o aviso de ajerta ?uasi impossivel. o que aconteceu em Nagasaki ?escrito plo governo arnericano, na seguinte maneira: "No moment? da explosdo deu-se uma libertacdo de energia sob a forma de luz, de calor, A irradiagoes e de presseco. Todos as tipos de rectos esgathararn-se cam a velocidade da luz, comprendendo os raios e Garna,.os ultra-vioietas, os raios visiveis e os infra-vermethos, estes corn ? ? 17 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9, seu calor irradiante. Uma gmda de pressiio, criada pelo enorme desloca- mento do ar, formou-se quasi instantaneamente em torno do ponto de exPlosdo mas espalhou-se mais lentamente, mais ou menos coin a velocida- de do som. Os gazes super-aquecidos que constituem a bob a de logo iniciar espalharam-se e subiram mais lentamente ainda... 0 clardo ntio durou litaiS do que uma fractio de segundo, mas, fol tdo grande a sua intensida- de que chegou a produzir queimaduras de terceiro grciu sobre a pelv hu- mana n?protegida dentro do raio de um quilometro e melo... Nas proximidades do panto zero (ponto do solo exatamente ern baixo do ex- plosdo), o calor torrou os cadciveres e tornou-os irreconheeiveis". ("VS. S.B.S., 4 ? pcigina 22). 0 desabamento dos predios, causado pelo deslocamento do ar, produ- ziu uma serie enorrne de incendios, que se espalharam em tedas as dues cidades e as destruiram quasi que totalmente. Asses ince/Idles, Clue foram produzidos pelas radiacoes atomicas, por curto-circuitos e pelo proprio fo- ga das cozinhas, produziram urn grande mimero de vitimas. "A fOrca do solar? causado pelo deslocamento do or, que se seguiw ao clarclo,,fol tab grande que afundou os telhados dos edificios de cimento ormado e achatou totalmente as predios menos resistentes. A pressacy maxima do sOpro, no panto zero, ncio foi muito elevada par causa da al- iura.em que se deu a explosclo, Tido tendo sido maior que a de uma bomba comum de alto poder explosivo; essa pressdo diminuia a medida que a sua- propagagdo se distanciava do ponto inicial. Nelo obstante, a pressoo atm- ? uma distetneia maior e teve major durageo que a de ulna bomba comum de alto poder explosivo; a major parte das construcoes de cimento ar- mada foram danificados ou destruidas ate a uma distOncia de 200 metros em Hiroshima e de 600 metros em Nagasaki. Os predios feitos corn tijo- los foram derrubados, nuract distancia de 2.200 metros, em Hiroshima, 2.500 em Nagasaki." ("Ii.S.S.B.S.,4 ? pdgina 23). Para se ter urns ideia dos efeitos das duas bombas atomicas sobre a vida e o movimento das duas cidade, basta dizer que Tanta em Hiroshima cbmo em Nagasaki, as proporcoes do desastre- atingiram a um tab nivel quo reduziram a completa paralizagdo a vida urbana e industrial. Os ataques classicos mais destruidores, coma as rai- des de Hamburg?, no vertu) de 1943 e a de Toqitio, na primavera de 1945. silo conseguiram produzIr efeitos compardveis, paralizando tada a toga- /4=0o do comunittade." (Relatorio ingl? pcigina 3). -- 18 -- Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R00610020,6002-9 Quanto a destruigao em Hiroshima, os efeitos da expiosao atomics mostram o que podera acontecer cora cidades rnaiores e mais pequenas. "Das 90.000 casas que existiam na cidade, cerca de 65.000 foram total- mente destruidas e quasi todas as restantes foram danificadas, pa) me- nos superficialmentc. As canalizagoes subterraneas ncio foram arreben- ? tadas, a nclo ser nos pontos em 4ue passavam sabre pontoque transpoem as cursos dagua que cart am a cidade. Todas as pequenas fitbricas situadas no centro da cidade foram destruidas. As grandes empresas, localizatlas nos arrabaldes cia cidade quasi nada sofreram e, mais ou menos, 94% dos seus operarios sairam ilesos. Quasi 74% da productio industrial local re- sultava dessas grandes empresas. Calcula-se que trinta dias depois do bombardeio, alas podericr.m recuperar o seu nivel de produgdo, si a guerra tivesse continuado. As vias ferreas que atravessam a cidade foram COW- sertadas e, dois dias depois do ataque, a 8 de agosto, estavam em =ads-. gdes de funcionar novarnente". ("S.S.B.S., 4 ? pciginas 23). Esses resultados mostram que a major destruigao causada pela born- ba atornica 6, realmente a de vidas humanas, sendo que os estragos mate- riais nao tem a mesma gravidade. Em Nagasaki, das 57.000 casas da cidade, foram destruidas 20.000 Quanto aos efeitos Wore a industria, nessa cidade, eles foram os seguintes: "Calcula-se que se a guerra tivesse continuado e si o abastecimento de matey/as primas fosse favoravel a reconstrucao, os estaleiros de cons.- truce" es navais poderiam ter recuperado pelos menos 80% da suck prodw- . cap maxima em 3 ou 4 meses; as siderurgicas teriam sido consideravel- mente recuperadas no prazo de um ano; as usinas de eletricidade atingl- e riam novamente, em dois mesas, uma ba parte de stta producao e, em sets mesas, vottariam a sue, capacidade normal; as fcibricas de material belie? voitariam funcionar cora 60 a 70% da sua producao anterior, em quinze mazes." ("U.S.5.B.S.,4 ? pcigina 23). Tanto em Hioshima corno em Nagasaki, foram os edificios de cimenloo ?arrnado que melhor resistiram a explosao, aguentando-se, semi-destrni- dos, no meio das cinzas da cidade. Mas, em contraste corn a sua apa.- rencia exterior, esses predios estavam completamente queimados por dentro e os respectivos incendios havia.m matado os seus moradores. Oa predios destinaclos a suportar a explosao atomica, devem ser construidos segunclo os modelos de seguranga contra terrey6tos. t Os dados e informagoes reunidos e estudados pelos tecnicos e cien- tistas, mostram que as bombas atOmicas de Plutonio causam grande des- truigao e outros efeitos numa area de 20 quilometros quadrados, isto ? 19 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 quasi urn alqueire de terraria Alem disso, o deslocamento de ar ocso- pro produzido pela sua explosao e igual ao que produz a explosac, de 20.000 toneladas de rlinamite. , A mortandade causada em Hiroshima e Nagasaki (120.000 pessoas mortas) n?foi maior porque o mamero de pessoas por quilometro qua- drado era relativarriente pequeno. Os relatOrios oficiais caleulam que uma explosao igual, numacidade como TOquio, teria matado 300.000 pes- soas e urn numero igual de feridos. 1st? quer dizer que, unra explosicy atornica em cgidades como Rio e Sao Paulo podera mator de 150.000 a 200.000 pessoas de uina so ves. Os estudos dos dois bombardeios realizados sobre as cidades japane- sits, confirmaram clue os danos eausados a edificios, maquinas, instala- coes industriais, etc. .foram relativamente insignificantes quando comparae dos corn a destruicao e inutilizacao de vidas hurnanas. Alem disse, .os efitos retardados da explosao atomica, sobre o organismo humano,, ainda na,o sac) totalmente o..nhecidos e vao sendo registra.dos a medida que Sc revelam. Isso demonstrou cue as armas atomicas sao principalmente, AR. MAS DE TERROR CONTRA POPULACOES CIVIS, armas de dettrui- clio indiscrirninada de populac5es nao participantes das uperacoes mi., litares. Uma outra concLusao -irada dos bornbardeios da duas cidades jape- nesas ?ue a destruicao causada pela bomba atornica ?ajor nas zonas do terreno piano (Hiroshima), mas essa "vantagera" desapareecria corn o langamento de diversasn bombas. Quanclo 0 capita() Robert Lewis', de volta a sua base, desceu do aviao que lancara a bornba atomica sobre Hiroshima, seus chefes foram abra- Co-lo, dizendo: "Ca-pitao Lewis, vac& lancou a primeira bornba atornica!" A celebridade esperava-o. Jornais e radio passaram a ocupar-se do a- contecimento ern todo o mundo. Lewis referinclo-se ao que acontecera em Hiroshima, dizia: no coronel Tilabets e pareceu-rne que tinha os olhos de ngue, conic ss,,. todos os horrores da guerra e do rnundo o queimassem." 0 capita() Lewis, que era catOlico, pensando na catastrole de que fora o instrumento, remoia: "Cern Mil mortos... Vinte mil. catolices..." Hoje, depois de ter estado as portas do desespero, o capita? Robert Lewis ja nap ?ais militar. Num convento dos Estados Unidos, ele eaconde a sua desgracada sorte, a sorte do homem que apertando urn bo- tic) de comando, abateu de uma s6 yes 100 mil vidas inocentes. - 20 - Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 1STO E A GUERRA! Pao p Who. So eles Testa ram ... Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9. 'Os efeitos dos bombardeios atOmicos ainda estao presentes em Hiro&- liima Nagasaki. Os queirnados, os aleijados, o grande minter? de pes- soas que vao se tornando cegas, o monument? aos milhares de mortos, as sepulturas que se abrem para os que ainda estao morrendo, o campo de einzas e eseombros que ficou no lugar onde antes estavam duas cidades, ,ainda estao presentes no espanto de tOda a humanidade. Mas, ja se anurt- cia tima nova guerra, ja se faz alarde de poder destruir novas cidades vela bomba atomica, calcula-se friamente quantas pessoas sera possivel dirninar corn uma so explosao. Hiroshima e Nagasaki cram duas cidades como outras quo existera pelo mundo, apenas diferentes nos seus aspectos exteriores, na popu1a- 00 e nos seus problmas, Mas, eram habitadas por seres humanos, corn as suas criangas, sua juventude, suas escolas, seus hospitais, suas fabri- sua vida prOpfia. ? Hoje, novamente, ergue-se sebre tOclas as cidades e criaturas do mtm- do, a ameaga atomrea. E' urgente meclitar sObre esses fatos e compreender que a luta pela sobrevivencia est, acima dc tocias as difrengas. 0 que importa saber 6 quern esta disposto a impedir um novo massacre, sem indagar de onde possa partir a iniciativa de novos ataques atOmicos, sem procurar thvi- dir diferengas que necessariamente existem entre os seres huma- nes, a grande crtizada pela sobrevivencia dos povos. OS homens de bOa vontade do mundo inteiro, aos milhoes, declarant, peick ALO DE ESTOCOLMO: ? Consideramos que o govern? que prinzeiro utilizar a bomba attimica, nao importa contra que pais, tera co- netido urn crime contra a humanidade e devera ser tratado como llninOSO de guerra. ASSINE HOJE 0 APELO DE ESTOCOLM0 ? 22 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 "Eu vi os Sobreviventes de Hiroshima" Narrativa 4 Senitora Tasiko Yuasa Na margem do boletim que reclama a proibicao absoluta da arma ato.. mica, a senhora escreveu: "Espero de todo o meu corac5o que a bombak, atomica nAo caia jamais s.:)bre nenhuma parte do mundo." E assinou; Tosiko Yuasa. Esta senhora 6 japonesa. Estava no Japdo em agosto de 1945, quando a bornba atomica foi lancada sObre a cidade de Hiroshima. E' tuna das raras pessOas, na Franca, que viu os sobreviventes daquela catastrofe e que sabe, por experiencia propria, o que significa a "atomizacao" de uma cidade. Esclarecet que a stta qualidade de estrangeira ihe impede qual- quer julgamento politico, mas conta o que viu e ouViu. "Antes disse ela you contar uma historia horripilante." 4`Na momento ern que a bomba caiu sabre Hiroshima, urn hornet(' es- tava sentado num dos marcos de marmore da rua, diante de urn banco. 0 homem foi completamente volatilizado. Eneontrou-se, depois, sobre rnarrnore, uma mamba Inuit? nitida, indelevel: a sombra da desgraca? a imica coisa que restou sOpro da explosao produziu estragos terriveis. Num grande ntimero de 4rtimas, os olhos foram projetados para fora das orbitas. Encontra- ram-se cadaveres cujos olhos pendiam das pontas dos nervos. ? 23 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Pode-se dizer que, praticamente, a vida cessou num raio de urn quit- Iometro; entre uns dois quilometros, a morte nao ?rnediata, mas as Vi- firms sofrern queimaduras atrozes. Geralaterite, nas pessoas atingidas, aparecem tumores na pek; esses tumores se alastram cada yes mais pelo vorpo, escurecem, tornam-se duros. Os membros, bracos e prnas, come- cam a parecer corn pincas de carangueijos. As criaturas perdem os cabelos. Mas, si chegarn a sobreviver, os cabelos nao nascem rnais. Outro detalhe ainda rnais horrivel: a pale cal aos pedacos e muitas 'yews totaimente 0 ser humano se transforrna ern urn n-dseravel Iran- ?gaiho esfolado, torcendo-se de dares. Assim, pois, era iinpossivel socorrer a todas as vitimas. Os servicos 'sanitarios dividiram as vitimas em duas categorias. De urn lado, os que pensavam poder salvar ainda; era para estes que se reservavam os -cuida- chas .medicos; de outro lado, as que tinham sido por demaia atingidos. tstes ,cram atirados a urn canto, onde ficavam a morrer itentamente. NUM raio de tres quilometros, a maior parte das pessoas nao liquida- das pela explosao safreram hemorragias: o sangue corria de tOdas as partes -- do nariz, dos ouvidos. Para esas pessoas era quasi impossivel !comer, engulir. Podia-se introduzir urn pouco dagua na beta de urn doen- te: ele nos olhava corn ar aparvalhado, a agua lhe escorria de urn 'ado e de outro da bocia misturada corn sangue. Os medicos verificaram qua mesmo nas vitimas menos diretamente atingidas, o numero de globulbs brancos do sangue diminuia. 0 carpi* comecava a se decompor interiormente e era assim que, em Hiroshima. seres vivas comecavam j? sentir-se cadaveres. A tudo isso se juntaram as vitimas do logo: o calor produzido pela explosao da bomba pro vocou um incendio monstro em Hiroshima, que .nao fez sena? agravar o :panic() geral. Uma ehuva negra corno tinta come- vau a cair, mas o iacenctio continuou a se espalhar, enquanto os que as- caparam tentavarn fugir, descalgos, sobre o asfalto em brasa. Vi pessoas que se achavam tres quilometros do ponto onde a bomba caiu. Tinham tido muito rnedo, mas estavam aparentemente ilesas: nao tinharn queimaduras, nem feridas, apenas de tempos em tempos sentiam uma impressao de ligeira vertigern, que atribuiam i ernocao. No fun de um mes ou dais, 'estas pessoas estavam mortas. Os efeitos radio-ativos da bomba agiram, lenta mas irnplacavelmente. Nilo se pode afirmar que alguern tenha saido ileso do bombardeio atomico, mesmo quancto, aparen- temente, nada tivesse sofrido. 24 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ?Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Em Hiroshima, os membros de uma mesrna familia, nao tiveram todos a xnesma sorte. Conheci o caso do prefeito da cidade: achava-se all corn sua muiher e tres de seus filhos, no dia do bombardeio. le e dois fi- Thos foram mortos pela explosao. Sua muffler e un filho nao sofreram mats do que queimaduras; acreditava-se poder salva-las. Urn outro caso, de uma menina que nao estava na cidade. Entrou em casa para socorrer sua mde e seu irrnao. Dols meses depois, os dois reviyentes sucumbirarn, vitimas dos ferimentos sofridos; a men ma, tote naci estava presente no momento do bombardeio, tambem esta mor- la. 0 f? ontato corn as pessoas atingidas matou-a... a nao ser que tenha pereeidO ?orne; nao se sabe ainda an certo. 'Pala-se. as vezes, nos livros de aventuras, ern- raids invisiveis, rajas, de morte. A bomba at5mica ?rn pouco assim; nao provcrca des- frufgoes incriveis aperia's pela explosao: semanas e semanas depois de sua qtfeda, ela age ainda, misteriosamente, pela radioatividade e faz ativas i ? da agora, pertoILle Hiroshima, os camponeses contarn que quando 4:t1tivarn, a terra, tem tima impressao de vertigem e sono." enhora Tosiko ..ltrasa, agora residente na Franca, mostrou an re- _ ter do jornal urna pedra trazida de Hiroshima. Cinco anos depois, essa pedra ?adip-ativa. Foi feita a verificacao: a pedra foi colocada sob urn coitsdOr de Geiger, aparelho a que os tecnicos da quimica nuclear chamam l'ascala"*e que parece uma especie de mesa de bordo. Quando o apare- o foi Rost? a funcionar, feixes luminosos se acendiam, uns vas outros. 0 carater radio-ativo da pedra estava demonstrado. Eis o que declarou essa muffler japonesa que viu os soterevivPntes de Hiroshima. Co Preende-se que nao tenha vacila.do um minuto em assinar o LO D STOCOLMO. 41-11,1pTAS pAo 1.00.006 ASSINVIIMAS AO BSTOCOLMO ? 24 --- Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ISTO A GUERRA! Urn interval? do bonthardeio... Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 * 'Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Havera Defesa Contra a Bomba Atomica ,Em julho de 1949 foi publicado o relaterio da Comisse-e de Energia At puea dos Estados Unidos, corn rnuitas ,outras informa.cties sobre os efe0os dos bombardeios atiimicos. Ou.tras publicagoes, da Inglaterra e da rranga, trataram tamloem da questa.? de saber si existe defesa contra os bombardeios atomicos. ?meu provado que, em caso de guerra, qualquer cidade, urn pouce importante, podera ser o alvo dos bombardeios atomicos, porque essa arnia de destruicao e destinada sempre as grandes concentraOes de po- pulagao. Os portos, como Santos, por exemplo, entroncamentos ferro- viarios como Bauru, centros industriais como SAO Paulo, Sorocaba ou Santo Andre, as localidades importantes pela sua producao agricola, come ? case de muitas cidades do interior, incluem-se automaticamente na lista dos alvos Provaveis no case de uma guerra. 0 que ,acontecei quando uma bomba ateanica explode sObre uma cidade? Durante uma fragao de segundo, urn sol artificial, mais brilhante de que o nosso, brilha a algumas centenas de metros de altura e uma nu- vein em forma de cogumelo se eleva a 13.000 metros de altura. Ern redor do ponto da explosdo, numa distancia de 800 metros, t8-. da qs construceies que nao se am feitas de cimento arrnado ou de ago, *Ito craz4das pelo sopro da explosde e 70% do restante e destruido. As pesSoas que'n?estiverern muito bem abrigadas, sera() mortas pelo so- pre da explosao ou perecerao sob os desabamentos e pelos escombros que ? 27 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 sac atirados a grandes distancias. Quern nao ficar sot errado sob uma parede ou nao tiver o cranio fraturado, recebera queimaduras tao pro- rfunclas por todas as partes nao protegidas do corpo, que nao poderit viver mais do que alguns momentos. A temperatura se eleva de tal manenra. ,que os objetos inflamaveis pegam fogo; os incendios se alastratn. earn .gorande violencia, principalmente no sentido do vento. Alem disso, as IradiacoeSN fazem numerosas vitimas, Milhoes de projeteis invisiveis e do .ondas ultra-penetrantes destroem as celulas do corn?, mas a rnorte .procedida de uma agonia horrivel, que pode durar de quatro a citice dies. Algurnas pessoas durara mais tempo: sao as vitirnas dos hemorra- gias genexalizadas. A eiestruicao das defesas do sangue*(glebuios bran- vos) faz corn clue as pessoas menos atingidas morrarn pot causa de roc,- lestias como gripe ou simples resfriados, doencas que as organist-nos nor- mars gerahnente suportam e vencern. As experiencias e os bombardeios de Hiroshima e Nagasaki demons- traram que quando a bom.ba explode prOxima do chao., a radio-atividade :lama perigosa, pot muito tempo, a zona afetada. A bomba atomica sub-marina explodida nas experiencia.s de Bihar evantou Urila coluna de agua de quasi urn quilotnetro de lateura e coin ,a altura de dois quilometro. Essa coluna de agua produziu uma chtiVa de oelemento& radio-ativos que chegou a atingir pontes clistantes a quasj 4 quilornretros do lugar da explosiio. Esses raios quando atingem num pes- soa. ela tern poucos minutos de vida. Tres anos depois da explosao? aincia havia na ilha de Bikini uma zona perigosa por causa da radioatividatie Mesmo marls tarde, os peixes ou plantas cIesa zona podia milduzir cancer ,a quem os comesse. Qual a defesa contra a .bomba atemica? Ern primeiro lugar d preciso nao esquecer quo os bornbarcieres - micas cornceam sem aviso, de surpreza, e os sects efertos imediatos, tern a :velocidade de poucos segundos. Nessas condieoes, a prote?eao do povo ,em abrigos subterraneos teria que ser permanente Isso naturalmente, exigira: da parte dos governos.enormes despesas, quo se tornam ainda maittres por causa da necessidade de proteger ta moont as incilltatrois, roeios de transportes e as instalacoes militares. Quanta aos socorros as vitimas, ?recis() considerar quo, no caso tie um hombareleio aternico, as linhas telefonicas, telegraficas e os cab's vondutores de eletricidade sat) destruidos peIos desabamentos, incendios, etc. Dossa forma, as ligaeoes entre varios pontos da cidade teriam que ser feitas por urn servigu especial de radio-transmissao, corn gerador do ..AeOergia eletrica independente. Por outro lado, considerando-se o ocatoie -- 28 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ' Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :CIA-RDP83/-00415R006100200002-9 laititragro de vitimas que os bombardeios fazern, elas teriam que ser tra- ? taa no proprio local do desastre, exigindo-se para isso urn treino especial de pessoal rcsponsavel pelos socerros. ,Uma cornissao de peritos ingleses considera que no caso de serem atingidos 100.000 habitantes de tuna cidade, somente 50.000 teriam possi- bilidade de sobreviver, e desses, 20.000 ski casos graves. A experiencia , da ultima guerra demonstrou que num caso dosses, seria exigido o tra- balho de 200.000 pessoas clurante 5 horas pelo menos, para que os socorros zi&O fossem quasi inuteis para a maioria das vitimas. Os carros de socorro teriam que contar, tambern, corn o bloqueio das ruas:entulhadas de escombros. Isso tornaria preciso, antes de mais nada, urn reconhecimento aereo para deterrninar as zonas de menor destruicie, por onde poderiam penetrar mais rapidamente na zona a ser socorrida. Por outro lado, as zonas afetadas pela radio-atividade teriam que ser muito hem localizadas, pois, elas sac) extremamente perigosas. Em tais partes da cidade os socOrros seriam praticamente impossiveis, porque as turmas de salvarnento rporreriam corn as vtimas, ern major ou menor pra- zo. Alem disso, urn medico ou enfermeira que penetrasse numa zona ridio-ativa ficaria perigoso para as demais pessoas por causa das radia- Ibes one Passariam a espalhar dos seus preprios corpos e roupas. Nos subterrineos, aqueles que conseguem abrigar-se, devem verificar eonstantemente, corn aparelhos especiais, si o ar que respiram nao esti sendo portador da morte pela rklio-atividade. Gs incendios que se iniciam em grandc nUmero de predios ao /TIES- mo tehipo, se alastram como nas florestas. Em_tal caso, e inUtil utilizar igua. Torna-se precis() dinamitar quarteiroes inteiros para evitar que o foga se espalha, salvando, assim, o que ?ossivel do resto da cidade. ? No caso de serem langadas vitrias bombas aternicas selbre uma mes- rna cidade, torna-se dificit prever as proporcoes da catistrofe e as possi- bilidades de algum salvarnento ou de defesa. ? i' A utilidade dos abrigos subterrineos ?uito duvidosa como meio de defesa civil no caso dos bombardeios atornicos. Seria necessario, antes de tudo, dar o alarme ern tempo, cada yes que se aproximasse urn aviio sus- ?eft?, enquanto que no caso dos bombardeios comuns, procura-se pri- nt '7 o barrar o avano do inimigos corn esquadrilhas de defesa, Isso tor- iThr a L'necessaria que a pop ulacao permanecesse quasi que todo o tempo ribs' abrigos, o que desorganizaria completamente a produc5.o, j?ue as pessOaL- teriam que 'hear inativas. A hipotese de se,instalar Coda a indUs- I , ? 29 -- ApProved For Release 2004/02/19,: CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9. tria debaixo da terra nao parece realizavel em pouco tempo, c por outro lado, as problemas de defesa nil? se resumem em cuidar soraente das fabricas. 0 sistema de alarme contra a aproximacdo de avibes inimigos deve ser rnuito cerrado e atingido grandes distancias, por causa da grande ve- lacidade que hoje tern os aparelhos a jacto. Mas, por outro lado, quanta maior fOr essa rede de a tarme, maior 6 a zona em que a papillae:a? tera que se recolher aos abrigos para proteger-se. No caso de redes de radar que cubram milhares de quilometros, os alarmes teriam que ser dados para regRies inteiras de urn pais, porque o curs? do aviao inimigo que se aproxirna pode mudar constantemente. A noite, a maior parte da populacao das grandes cidades teria que dornair nos abrigos, mas, no caso de um bombardeio noturno, grande parte do povo ficaria impedida de sair para a superficie: por causa da enorme destruicao, dos incenclios e da formagao de zones de radio-ativi- dade. Em face dessas circunstancias, urn grupo de fisicos ingieses declara: "E' tal a extencao dos problemas provocados por um bombardeio atorni- co, que as medidas de defesa sao praticamente inUteis, si ndo incluirern preparativos em tal escala quo, todosais detalhes da situagdo possain ser previstos e meditadoa corn grande antecedencia." Tudo o que se disse a respeito das medidas da defesa civil contra os bombardeios atOmicos de:monstra que seria-preciso rnodificar, radicalmen- te, a mod? de vida do homera. 0 pavor dos bornbardeios atornicos nao dove ser encaminhado no sentido de fazer o homem voltar a situacdo em que vivia no corneeo do mun(io: em cavernas on debaixo da terra, cora? bicho. A soloed? esta, evietentemente, na proibicao e contrOle das armas atomicas, pois, elas constituem urn perigo para todos os povos do men- do, sem excecao. Mas, alem disso, ?reciso nao esquecer que, nestes das que passarn, a paz mondial se acha seriamente ameacada e que nao ha, portant?, tempo suf [ciente para modificar totalrnente o modo de vida da humanidade, coma solucito para a sua sobrevivencia. ? 30 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 'Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 E' urgente, portant?, que todos os povos, sem distingOes exijann a proibicao e o controle imediatos das armas atOmicas. Essas exigencias j?st44 send? realizada atrav?de mi1h5es de assinaturas no APZLO DE EgTOCOLMO. ASSYNE COM SLTA FAMILIA E SEUS AMIGOS 9, AFrp. DE STO- (OLMO 4 'AJUDE A COLHER,MILHARES DE DUMAS ? 31 -- Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 fr Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 EIS 0 FUTURO ! 0 que estainos fazendo por eles`.! Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006100200002-9 PELA PROIBIcA0 DA BOMBA ATOMICA APELO DA UNIAO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES DE SAC) PAULO A BOMBA ATOMICA ?rna arma criminosa de exterminio em massa de po- pulac5es. Assirn, se vier a sr utilisada em uma guerra, atingira principairnente os tra- balhadores, que constituern a maioria da populacio das grandes cidades. Por isso mesmo, e atendendo as recentes resolucoes da FEDERAcA0 SINDICAL MUN- DIAL e da Conferencia Sindical do Sul do Continente, a UNIAO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES DE SAO PAULO apela para todas as suas organisacoes aderentes, bem como para todas as comissOes de reivindicac6es, pan todos os traba- lhadores sindicalisados e para o proletariado ern geral afim de que assinem e facam as- sinar por seus companheiros de trabalho e por suas familias o APELO DE ESTO- COLMO pela proibicao da 130M ba atom ica. Deixando de lado todas as divergencias c diferencas de pontos de vista sobre ou tros assuntos, TODOS OS TRABALHADORES devem assinar o apelo pela proi- bicao da boinba atomica. Le tnbremo-nos de que se UMA UNICA bomba atomica cair sobre Sio Paulo matara naais de zoo.000 pessoas. TRABALHADORES! Assinernos o APELO DE ES TOCOLMO I Organi- semos em todas as fabricas e locals de trabalho COMISSOES amplas c unitarias CONTRA A BOMBA ATOMICA, abrangendotodos os trabalhadores ! Unamo- nos contra a arma criminosa ! Una rno-,nos aca defesa da vida de nossas familias ! Una- mo-nos em defesa da humanidade ! APELO DE ESTOCOLMO EXIGIMOS a proibicio da arma atotnica, arma execravel e de exterrninio em massa de populacoes. EXIGIMOS o estabelecirnento de urn commie internacional para assegurar a a- plicacio desta medida de proibicao. CONSIDERA MOS que o gover no due prirneiro utilizar, contra qualquer outro paiz, a arma atomica, cornetera urn crime contra a humanidade e sera tratado como crirninoso de guerra. Nome Bairro Nome Bairro Nome Bairro Nome Bairro Nitrrfroved-For-Release 2004/02/1.9 :.CIA-RDP83-0.04150041-002.09002,9 TO TAMB]eill ropg ACONTgCER, NA STJA CIDADE T.Jk4A PO ,130,1415A AIC MICA ATIRADA SO13134 kIMOSI-Illvtik. jALQ CAUSOU: .003 mortos desaparer.41o's .000 foridos gravemente 60.000 casas clo5truidos Luto eau milhares de families do todo o Pais 25X1 "CRUZADA HIJkAirTiTARIA PELA PROZBIG.A.O_DAS AIMS An:MICAS". _ T . RUA WENCESLAU BRAZ, 146 SALAS .1.2'e 313 ----- SAO PAULO, 02-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 :.CIA-RS3P83-00415R006100200002,-9 Aos Que Afirrnam : i"Essa campanha pertence a urn partido politico" DIZEMOS: "0 Ap6lo de Estocolmo fol kingado par diversas personalidades de re, name mundial e pertencentes a correntes politicos as mats diferentes. A pri- metra assinatura fat a do ginnide rdbIo frances Joliot-Curie. Corn ele assinarant mats de cern pessoas de fc:ma internacional, tis coma Madame Cotton, pre isidente da Federacao Internacional dos Mulheres, General Lazar? Cardona., ex-presicionte do Meitico, a ex-procurador coral dos Estados Unidos, John Bagger, amigo e colaborador de Roosevelt, o escritor sovietico Illya Ehren- burg, a abade catalio) Jean Botitior, a lider stridical mexicano Lombardo To ledcrno, Pictro Nenni, presidente do Partido Soctalista itcOictno o o Deao de Canterbury, alem de outros. Sac essas algumas dos personalidctdes quo com- poem o Comite Permanente eleito no Primeiro Congress? dos Particlarios da Paz realizado ern Paris e ern Pragci em abril de 1949, cujos delegados repro- sentcrvani 600 milhaes de sores humcmos. No Brasil, esse mesmo Apelo jd foi assinado pelo Ministro do :'ilupren,o Tribunal Federal Dr. Alvaro Moutinho Ribeiro da Costa, General Leitao de Cur- volho, bom como thip itados e senadores de diversos partidos, como c senador Mathias Olirnpio ((MN), os depuiadcs Plinio Barreto (UDN), Gurgel do Amaral CTB), sacerdotes como o Padre Joao Batista de Carvalho (deputado do PSD), Frei Ludovico, provincial dos Franciscanos de sao Paulo, professores univet- sitarios como o Dr. Euripedes Slinoes de Paula e Dr. ros6 Quirino Ribeiro, da Faculdacie de Filosofia, a cientista Cesar Lattes, artistas como Mara Rubia, Gregorio Barrios e YhO Totico, radio-atoms coma Leonor Navarro, Gassy Fonseca, Mario Lugo e Lia de Aguiar. Alem disso, for aprovado em magi:5es de 20 Cgmaras Municipals de Sao Paulo." AOS CUE AFIRMAM: "Nao adianta proibir s6 a arma atOmica; ?recis() prolbir tOdas as arracts de destruiccio coletiva." RESPONDEMOS: "Proibir a anno atarnica significara livrar a humanidade da ameaca mars grave e sera a mob o de acabar corn a "guerra fria:" e crier um clime ft:worm-el a negoo acaes entre as gr(mdes pot6ncias, dando-se, o primeico pass? para o desarmament) geral. Contra a bornba atOrnicia, que ameaca sem dis- tinceies milhaes de liomens e mulheres, pode-se realizar uma campanha do uniao do todos on sores humanos e, pot isso, essa campanha 6 main eficiente. A it:Irma atOntica, quo extermincr cidades inteiras, nao se presto pare a defesa de uma linha militar perque afinge as exercitos de ambos as lados. Essa anna foi criacio para aterrorizar populag(3es de cidades inteiras e o ecu ernprOgo produzida 1 gue:ra total. Proibir a crrma iatamica 6 a maneira de iniciar a interdiVio de out:as camas." AOS CUE AFIRMAM: "Ninguem ousat a utilizar a bomba afamica" RESPONDEMOS: 'A Comba atilltin'ita lob utilizacia em de agosto de 1945 contra Hiroshima APPrPWODEAToRtiegtsPisan 41,024490: calleci-RDPV34104415R606c9132011615t49 roved For ' 2064/ 2019 :,CIA-fiD983.00415R006100200002 9 fiptarl rescotitclas exOatheitte por c&xsa de dua densidade de populagab. Em ctio 'deste `am o Presidents Truman disse em Pocatello o seguinte, referindo-se cto primeiro bombardeio atOmico por 1e ordenado e possibiliclade de repe- , cao: "Eu o fiz enteio e yes digo que outra vez si for necessario." ? "1.16 crirninosos que nclo respeitarao a proibicao da arma atOmica" tESPONDE7vIOS: "St centenas de milhaes de crictura humanas so rnanifestarem pela con- enac8ro antecipada do govern? quu venha a utilizer a arma atOmica ern pri- tneiro lugar, contra qualquer pais, isso dard a tal govern? o aos responsavels Por" sse crime motistruoso a certeza do um castigo seven, do qual nao po- derao escapar. Essa ad-vertencia, fe;ta por todos os 'Davos do mundo, ? mats seguro argument? perra fctzer recuar os quo esteictm pensando em cometer o inonStruoso crime do bombardeio atomic?. A histOria do mundo mostra que iquando os`povos se op8em decididamente a urn agressor deshumcmo, a punt- 'gra? ?errivel." AOS QUE DIZEM: lamais se impedirao as guerras" 1FIESPONDEMOS: "Nei? ?erclade que sempre haven't guerras. As guerras so feitas corn as povos ?o podem ser feitas sem o seu consentimerito, si eles se ?poem resolutamente a participar de tais cainificinas. Cada assinatura no Apelo de Estocolmo uma voz que diz NA?i gruerra. Si, corn esse gesto to simples, so uniclas as vontades de contends de milh5es de hornens e mulheres de todos os praises, es str gigantesca uni8o, jamais alcangada, toma possivel fazer recum a guerrct e salvor 4a Paz Si outras guerras de agressao ocorreram no pas- sado 6 porque os povos nao estham unidos e decididos a punir os respon- saveis per elas. M' as, na guerra 'contra o nazism? Ia vimos como o Odio dos povos do mundo inteiro pode derrotar urn gov'erno agressor. No caso da gv.erra atomica, rnilhoes de assinaturas no Ap8lo de Estocolmo 16 t,ginifica urna condenagao pr6v1a do govern' o criminoso." AOS QUE "Para que pode servir urea simples assinatura?" RESPONDEMOS: "AB assinaturcts reunidas, de todos os pauses do mundo, traduzirac, a von- lade irresistivel de Paz dos povos. Os mandatarios eleitos polo povo deverao em conta. Os parlamentares deveralo preocupar-se corn ems. Os go- vernantes Dies clever& prestar a major atenocio. Os fautores de g-uerra re- clictrao diante desta reprovac_2810 de milh5es de sores humanos, pots cad? assinatura 6 a 'arrieaga de urn cdstigo irnplacivel para aqueles que tontarern contra a vida e o patrimeinio da humcmidade." AOS QUE DIZEM: AOS QUE DIZEM: 'i ? "Essa campanha? serve coo interesses de urn pais ou governo" :I FIESPONDEREMOS: "(;) Apelp de Estocolmo limito-so a colocar fres questoes muito simples: .., . . , , #013115441tfalla,MiLgaW2t615490'2?1451:edit-145 _ 5-5tUfgaigidoiocd602-9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA4RDP433-00415R006100200602-9 dena9a0 mato crirninoSo de Ouerra do govern? Clue PEIMEIRO arrnct xi& imparto contra que pais. A aceitaceio dosses printiptos corresponds antes di tudo aos anteresses da Paz, isle 6, aos tateressOs comuns de todos os povos. 0 Apelo nao Impale menhurrio escolha u favor deste ou daquele govern?, dOste ou dacuele sis- terna palate?. 0 Ape lo corresponde iso asseio de tidos as povos de afastar a terrivel