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ORM O. 1I .AY 1949 5.6 A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200010002-7 CLASSIFICATION SECia,T "4"111.1"11111.1.11.6"r". CENTRAL- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NU, Alp FOR M6,TION VitE0ORT CD NO. 25X1 UNTRY BJECT. , IACE- QUIRED 11E OF INFO. :QUIRED I. / norm y / Ilisce4aneous 1945 Seventh Army 32portJ on Germany ! i \ , 25X1 25X1 25X1 DATE DISTR. 22 Sept. 1950 NO. OF PAGES NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO, 1.11$ DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE _r THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT SO R. S. C.. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION IF ITS CONTENTS IN ANT MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS IMO. 25XBITE0 BY LAW, REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM 15 PROHIBITED. The attached miscellaneous U.S. Seventh Army reports on the interrogation of various praninent Nazis are sent to you for retention. 'CLASSIFICATION S-.:117,T. 25X1 V RETURN TO ARCMS & OEMS CENTER IMMAILY AFTER USE JOI37,4,1c-J-Ret. a 3 7e,c, froso STATE NAVY NSRB ARMY MR DIT*RlB4jIQL, 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 (21 ? Approved or Release 20014/02/12 : CIA-RDP83=004-11R008200030002=7? a.cf 6-4-1 Approved For Release 2004 /02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030 0-11-? 0-44,44.4 002-725X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/0!n:lpk-RDP8 n' NC?' 11.V Firt710S Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 3-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET 25X1 : SEC :Auth: CG SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 25 RET , 7th Army : I May 1945 ? OBSERVATIONS ON ARMORED TACTICS 25X1 (Cf also Report Ref No SAIC/17, 24 May 45) i) GUDERIAN, Hans, GENOBST (Col Gen), FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool), former-Chief of Staff, German G. and Forces, and Inspector General of Armored 'Units, is a 57-year old officer who apparently wants to appear anil-Nazi. He talked freely and answered all questions willingly, but stated emphatically that he did so only because HITLER's death freed him from his oath of allegiance. 1141as: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: R.W. ii) VON GEYR, Leo, GEN DTZTRUPPE (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored Units. Proud of his profession, of the old Prussian general type, source gave information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous. Having been Military Attache in LONDON for several years, source claims to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs. Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: R.W. 1. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN GUDERIAN 17 Jun 1888 1894-1901 01-03 03-07 Main Off Candidate Institution (HAUPTKADETTENANSTALT) LICHT- ERFELDE. .07 Assigned as 0 C (FAEHNRICH) to HANNOVERSCHES JAEGER BN 10 at BITCHE. 27 Jan 08 Promoted to 2d Lt. , 09 Transferred to GOS:AR with Bn. 12-13 13-14 ? AU I4Niovdt. 8 Nov 14 Spring 15 18 Dec 15 Spring?-fallt17 Born at CULM/VISTULA. School at-COLMAR. 0ffiCer8 candidate institute -(KADETTENANSTALT) at KARLSRUHE. Feb-Nov 18 Dec 18-Sep 19 On DS with TELEGRAFEN BN 3 (3 Telegraph Bn). War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN. . . CO of Radio Posts with various hqs. Promoted to 1st Lt.' Intelligence officer with various hqs. Promoted to Capt. On DS on Staff of various hqs. (up to that time, his basic organization was still 10 JAEGER Bn) With a hq staff in Italy. FREIKORPS (GRENZSCHUTZ) -(Frontier Guards) for the EAST. Source helped to organize these units. 1 S E C. fl E T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 Oct 19-Jan 20 Jan 20-Apr 22 Apr 22-fa11 24' Oct 24-Sep 1 Feb Oct 27-Jan Feb 30-Sep 1 Feb Oct 31-Jun 1 Oct Jul 34-Oct Oct 35-Feb 1 Aug 1 Feb Mar 38-Nov Nov 38-Aug Nov Sep 39-May Jun 40-Jun Jul Jun 41-Dec Dec Feb 41-Feb 43-Mar 21 Jul 27 27 30 31 31 34 33 35 38 36 38 38 39 38 40 41 40 41 43 45 44 28 Mar 45 SECRET REICHSWEHR BRIGADE 10, HANNOVER. Company commander with 10 JAEG.ER Bn of 17 Inf Regt, GOSLAR. REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry) INSPEKTEUR DER KRAFT- FAHRTRUPPEN (Inspector of M/T Units). On 2d Div Staff, STETTIN: - Promoted to Maj. REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry), TRUPPENALTS. CO, KRAFTFAHRABT j (j M/T Bn), BERLIN LANKI'VITZ: Promoted to Lt Col* C of S, Inspector of M/T units. Promoted to Col TRANSPORT ABT DES 14 C of S, KomuaDo DER PANZERTRUPPEN (command of armored troops). Commanding 2 Armored Div. Promoted to Brig Gen. Promoted to Maj Gen. CG XVI Corpsi BERLIN, OKH, CHEF DER SCHNELLEN TRUPPEN (Chief of Mobile Units). Promoted to Lt Gen (GENERL DER PANZERTRUPPE). CG, XIX Pz Corps (Poland and France). CG PANZERGRUPPE GUDERIAN Promoted to GENOBST (Col Gen). CG of PANZERGRUPPE 2 (Pz Group 2 later changed to 2 Pz Army). Placed in FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool). Inspector General of Armored Troops. In addition to other duties, Chief ofStaff, German Forces. FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool). 2. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN VON GEYR 2 Mar 1886 1892-1904 04-11 05 11-14 13 Aug 14-Nov 14 Nov 14-summer 16 Jan 15 Born at POTSDAM.. Gymnasium at 'STUTTGART. 26 WUERITEMBERGISCHES KOENIGSDRAGONER REGIMENT. Promoted to 2d Lt. War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN. Promoted to 1st Lt. Regt Adj, 7 Cav Div. With 9 Cay Div Hq, as Russian interpreter. Promoted to Capt. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ground 2 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 summer,46.7Jan 17 .,Jan.17,4Apr 1.7 Apr,17fall 17 fall,17,Apr 18 Apr,18.41ay 18 May' 18-Jun 18 Jul. Aug 18Sep 18- S'elo. 18 19-Oct 19 Mar Jun 20-Sep 22 Sep 2?-Jan 25 Jan 2.5-Oct28 Oat 28-Jan 31 Jan 31-Apr 33 30 Oct 32 Apr 33-Oct 37 Sep 35 Oct 37 Oct 37-Feb 40 Feb 40-Dec 41 ' Apr, 40 Det 41-Jun 42 Jun 42-Sep 42 :Oct +2-Jan 45 Feb 43-summer 43, SEC R ET On DS with XXII Res Corps Staff. Liaison Officer, First Bulgarian Army. ASsigned to XXII Res Corps Staff. G-2, Army Group (HERhOG) ALBRECHT. C of S, 30 Inf C of S, 26 LANDWEHR Inf Div. G-2, Army Group SCHOLZ. On Staff of Bulgarian ORCHRIDA Div. Ill with malaria until end of war. GROSSER GENERALSTAB (Higher General Stai0'; and Russian questions). Instructor of tactics at at MUNICH. Squadron Commande of 18 Cay Reg , LUDWIGSBURG. Premoted,to Maj, 1-A (First Staff Officer) 5 Cay Div. 1-A (First Staff officer) WEHRKREIS IV DRESDEN, CO, 14 Cay Regt LUDWIGSLUST/MEC=NBURG. Promoted to Lt Col. Promoted to Col. Military and Air Attache, the legations at BRUSSELS Promoted to Brig Gen. Promoted to Maj Gen. CG, 3 Armored Div, BaLIN. CG XXIV Corps (later changed to XL ArMored Corps). Promoted to Lt Gen. Ill. , CG, XL Armored Corps,. Deputy CG, LXXXVI Corps. BERLIN (Polish OCS WUENSDORP near BERLIN and German EmbassyLONDON, and in and The HAGUE. , summer '+3-Jul 44, GENERAL DER PANZERTRUPPE WEST (Gen of Armored Forces, West), which was nucleus for the PANZER4RMEE DER PANZERGRUPPE- WEST (Panzor Arm:: of Panzer Group, West), later renamed 5 Pz Army. Aug 44-Kay 45 Inspector of Armored Units! In July 44., source was relieved from his command in the WEST because of differences in opinions regarding armored tactics. 3 NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS GEN GUDERIAN _ . Gen'GUDERIAN considers air superiority an essential factor in a good coordinated tank attack. .Another important point is that tanks should 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved Fol. Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 always be employed in masses. On ideal terrain and with all necessary tanks avaiable, a good attack can employ three armored divs, each with 300-400 tanks. If the attacking force has more than one corps available, all diva can be employed on a broad front without any reserves, while the other corps takes up positions to the rear as reserve unit. In the Case of tank units in reserve, the General points out, it is difficult to bring them up to the critical points in time to be of decisive value._ As an illustration, source recalls that when he attacked the'MAGINOT Line-in 1940, he employed three armored diva on a broad front, leaving the question of reserves to another corps. The leader of tank units should always be far up to the front, since quick decisions and forceful leadership are by far tore important in armored tactics than in engagements of any other arm. It is of paramount importance to recogniae the exact moment when the unit should advance into battle to its best advantage. ' Armored tactics, source points out, were substantially known even before the war. Source's "ACHTUNG PANZER", Gen de GAULLE's "L'ARMEE DE CHOC", and British tactics were essentially the same. However, these tactics were employed neither by the British nor by the Frenchthus, despite inferiority in heavy tanks, the Germans achieved victory in 40, mainly due to superior communications equipment, and through correct employment of armored tactics. As regards tank production, it is better, in Gen GUDERIAN's opinion, to have quantities of an older-type tank available than toexperimentwitlatoomany models and lack the necessary amount of armor. ,Through series production the many changes of the experitental stages (KINDEMaNKHEITEN - "children diseases") are avoided. 4. NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS - GEN VON GUR Source stresses the importance of speed of decision as applied to armored tactics. A leader of tank units must be able to make decisions on a min- ute's notice, work constantly under the pressure of time; he must have a "stop-watch mind" (GEDANKEN DER STOPPUHR). American regtl, bn, and co commanders still require too much time for making decisions, source believes, and are thereby losing the surprise element. Leadership of armored units of div and greater strength should be characterized by its dynamic qualities, and should "deliver punches at the right time and at the weak spot". ' Armored tactics must vary according to the oponents, source.points out. He himself developed different tactics for the Eastern and Western fronts. The amount and execution of air-tank coordination are decisive in tank battles. In this connection, the failure of ....the GAF is mainly responsible for the Allied break-out in Normandy. The ability of the individual tank gunner to aim a good shot at long ranges is also a most important factor in the outcome of tank engagements. Generally, proper organization and leadership of fire fights has to be stressed. (NOTE: All information below has been obtained from Gen GUDERIAN) 5. FUTURE. DEVELOPMENTS . Land warfare will be dominated by the use of the tank as long as no more efficient A/T weapons are developed. Three types of tanks will con- tinue to be essential: a heavy penetration tank (SCHWERER DURCHBRUCHPANZER) for the main thrusts; a light reconnaissance tank (LEICHTER AUFKLAERER); and a tank destroyer, which should be heavily armed and speedy. Source points out that during this war there has been A German tendency to replace the light tank with a heavy one, and that only on account of his specific 1+ SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R066200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 requests the production of light tanks was taken up again. For close combat developments of the flamethrower tank are to be ex- pected. The German flamethrowers suffered from the bad quality of the oil; also, the inflammable liquid was placed within the tank, The American solution of placing the inflammable liquid on a trailer was much more effic- ient and comfortable for the tank crew, and American oil is excellent. As a weapon, the flame throwing tank is limited to .street fighting and fight- ing against an enemy that cannot be reached by the straight flight of the machine gun bullet. It should be used as support weapon only. Source, how- ever, expects further developments of its fire techniqUe which, he believes, will be carried along artillery lines. The morale effect of the flame throw- ing tanks upon the enemy is conaiderable. Rockets, having the obvious advantages as to weight, -etc, canneetyet en- gage point targets and are therefore unsuitable for mounting On tanks. Once? this disadvantage of the rocket projectors is overcome', however, tank-moun- ted rocket projectors will be commonly ueed.. , a Source does net believe that tank-mounted arty weapons will undergo con siderable changes. He points out that tank crews had already enough trouble with a long barrelled 88 mm gun, especially in the case of _a gain with muzzle brake, when passing a.ditch, for instance. A longer barrel would seriously limit the tanks' mobility. A.limited number of tanks used for penetration only might be. the exception. Howitzers mounted on $P chassis did net prove very successful, except for specifically assigned special mieSions. .The best suited weapons for,mount- ing on tanks at present are guns of calibers between 75 and 90 mm. German technicians had quite some trouble in finding a good tank engine; dust in Russia had a destructive effect Oh German engines t Source thinks that similar difficulties might be encountered b Y the Americans when em- ploying tanks in China. He believes Mass employment of tanks against the: : Japanese in China possible, but difficulties might be encountered trying to employ armor on a large scale on the Japanese islands. Due to the numerous., rivers in China, further developments of amphibious tanks Would beof value. Source believes that extensive adaptations of infra-red rays to tank warfare are.. to be expected. He is of the opinion that years to come, might bring in the field developments comparable to these in the field of radio equipment between 1918 and the outbreak of 'the present war. 6. COMPARISON OF EXISTING TANKS Source rates the German Royal Tiger as the best tank employed ,at present. Next is the Russian T-34, especially the model mounting a 85 mm gun. Next is the American SHERMAN the main shortcoming of which are its too narrow tracks. The Russian T-34 has excellent tracks as well as a light Metal DIESEL engine. The quality Of the steel in Russian tanks was slowly de- clining, however, and the lack of easily turnable turrets as well as good radio communication equipment were obvious disadvantages. Source credits the German Army with having the best tank units. 7. GERMAN JAPANESE COOPERATION Source doee.not be were coordinated. To given to the Japanese matic representatives During nine months of anese Ambassador, Mr Attache, Mr KOMATSU, On the Japanese diplo American questions, hove that any attacks by the Germans and the Japeneee his knowledge, information on German tactics was only once, in 1940. Afterwards the Japanese diplo- were seen by source with HITLER on rare occasions. working close to the FUEHRER, source saw the Jap- OSHIMA, only twice with HITLER. The Japanese Military was seen five times with HITLER during the same period, matic staff was also a Mr NISHI (?), specialist in SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved Fizir Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 Source does not know whether Japanese aggressive measures which led to the declaration of'war were coordinated with German efforts, but he be- lieves that they were. 8. DETAILS CONCERNING HITTRR Source saw HITLER last 28 Mar 45, before being placed in FUEHRERRESERVE. At that time the FUEHRER was suffering from nervous attacks, and his left arM, and leg were shaking strongly. HITLER was also still suffering from bruises on his right arm and from the injured right ear drum, results of the 20 July attempt on his life. HITTER talked clearly and in a precise manner, and was well informed about the last details of the military situation at that time. Source thinks that after his rial to power in 33, HITLER worked in the interests and to the good of the Gean people.' The following events source thirks passable, if not entirely Pcorrect". This refers to the increase of the German Army, the occupation of the Rhineland, the Saar plebiscite and the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland. German annexation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia and of Poland.did not find source's approval. HITLER, source states, was able to convince everybody that his decisions were right through his personal charm, throughout the war. Field Marshal KEITEL, whom source does not consider very clever, was particularly succept- ible to HITLER's arguments. The German General Staff raised objections as to various Contemplated operations, but HITLER had his successes to back him up, and repeatedly accused his generals of a lack of imagination. Source states that the General Staff did not like the idea of attacking Poland in 39, but that the generals finally agreed to attack knowing that they could not resist HITLER's wishes, 9, THE-EVACUATIONAT DUNKIRK Source claims he was not allowed to enter the Port of DUNKTM with his tanks. The British forces there were to be destroyed by the GAF. alone. The Air Force, however, failed in this task, and the British evacuation at DUNKIRK was thus made possible. Source believes that, given permission to enter DUNKIRK, he could have annihilated all troops assembled there. 10. NORMANDY INVASION While a number of mistakes were made in the German preparations for an Allied invasion of France, the factor mainly responsible for Allied success- es was the failure of the GAF! At ?ie time of the invasion the GAF was still at the level of 1940, with no new-type planes., The lack of air-super- iority led to the complete breakdown of the German net of communications. Other failures were the neglect to modernize the SIEGFRIED Line, the neglect to fortify cities like PARIS, LIEGE, ANTWERP, and the wrong distribution of armor. Source claims that the sole responsibility for all these errors lies with HITLER alone who neglected to follow advice given by the General Staff. It was HITLER who decided that the Atlantic Wall was strong enough to with- stand all attacks. Commanders of tank units opposing Gen PATTON were unable to use their, initiative,, but had to follow HITLER's own plans. Source thinks he could have stopped Gen PATTON in France, had he been left free to employ his own strategy. . 11. NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ATTACK OF FALL 44. . After source had been appointed Chief of Staff, German Ground Forces, he tried to work out a plan to stop the Russian advances. He found condi- tions similar to those prevailing in the WEST, namely that important places had not been fortified, 6 Approved For Release 20/.213 dl1RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 The GAF, unable to cope with Allied air superiority in the WEST, was completely absent from the Eastern front. Source believed that because of Inferior technical developments of -(he Russian Air. Force as compared to the Allied, the GAF could achieve more in the EAST. He asked for air support, but it was denied. When the situation became more critical, HIMMLER, for- merly commanding ArmTGroupaUpper RHINE, whose primary function was, at ' first, to catch deserters, appeared at the Eastern front entrusted with the task of stopping the Russians. Source told HIMMLER that he considered his function as leader of the German Police more important, and asked him, to tistop playing troop leader". HIMMLER reported this conversation to HITLER, and eventually brought about source's ousting as Chief of Staff. Source also had a conversation with RIBBENTROPP, in which he pointed out that a two-front war was too much to cope with, end asked him to make peace either in the WEST or in the EAST. This conversation was also reported to the FUEHREP, and helped in bringing about GUDERIAN's dismissal. Source claims that as early as 43 he had conversations with SPEER and GOEBBELS in regard to the seriousness of the situation., Both agreed with source's point of view, but were unable to influence HITLER to stop his "intuition warfare". .The contemplated date and location of the Russian thrust were well known to the top Eastern front leaders, source claims. HITLER, however, did not believe that the situation was dangous, believing Russia too weak after the summer campaign to start a new offensive. All materiel prepared by source for the Eastern front was shipped to the WEST in Sept 44. HITLER also erroneously overestimated the value of the RUHR, in source's opinion. The RUHRwap,at that time-already'crippled by Allied air attacks, while the Upper Silesian coal mines were still working full blast. Still, it was de- cided to concentrate on the defense of the RUHR. Source points out that stronger resistance in the EAST would have helped German food problems, since East Prussia was an essential :actor in assuring the necessary crops. 12. ARDENNES OFFENSIVE Although source was not involved in this offensive in any Official capacity, he was watching it closely, since all his reinforcements for the Eastern front were used up during this campaign. Source thinks that in the beginning the front, limited to valleys, was too narrow. According to his estimate, the offensive should have been broken off on 20 Dec, after Amer- ican resistance on a larger scale appeared. RUNSTEDT, however, was ordered to hold his gains at all costs. 13. PERSONALITIES Source considers VON RUNDSTEDT ap the best of all German generals at the present time. He is serious and still commands the confidence of the German people. Sauce suggests him as a candidate for a role similar to that of HINDENBURG in 25. HIMMLER, source believes, is responsible for the deeds of the SS. He is a man with bad illusions. Source expected HIMMLER to change the policy of Germany by putting HITLER in his proper place. KESSELRING, source says, is very intelligent, clever, but an opportunist. 14. PERSONAL NOTE When Gen PATTON broke out of Normandy, HITLER told his generals that they would be unable to employ such daring tactics. Gen GUDERIAN objected, re- calling his historic breakthrough in the ARDENNES, in 1940. 7 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/23 25 May 45 15. MISCELLANY a) On 16 Jan 45 a German corps had to reture toward WARSAW. The WARSAW garrison was weak, but the FUEHRER ordered the city held at all costs. Source gave this order to his C of Sy Col VON BONIN. In th,e afternoon Col VON BONIN reported that the troops as well as the WARSAW garrison were withdrawing and source, after checking this information as best he could, designated the next stand of the' withdrawing troops. At the FUEHRER's conference, source was asked by HITLER whether he had known of the seriousness of the situation. Source said he had; while they were conferring, a radiogram arrived stating that the WARSAW garrison was still holding Out. HITLER again gave orders to hold to the last. At that time GUDERIAN'S orders as to a next stand had not yet arrive d at WARSAW and when they finally came, the WARSAW.commander preferred to follow those orders than those of HITLER. When the FUEHRER received th, news, he-decided to hold VON BONIN responsible and put him, together wit two ,junior officers into the S-AFGEFAENGNIS (Prison) BERLIN-MOABIT, despite source's prOtesta that he was the only responsible person. The , two junior officers were finally released and given front assignments, ,*hile VON SONINJs case was transferred to the RSHA (Central Security Office), The RSHA investigation cleared VON BONIN of all charges, but HITLER stated he did not trust the investigating officers. VON BONIN stayed in prison for two months and was then transferred to the DACHAU .concentration. camp. b) Col GRAF VC11 RITTBERG, an intelligent German officer,. realized in Apr 45 that the war was lost for Germany. He said so, and was shot for his careless remark cY"Russia wants to eliminate Poland. The American and British policy in regard to the Russian question is not understandable". d) Source believes that Germany cannot supply her own food as long as Russia keeps her Eastern provinces. e) "Negro troops either from French colonies or from the United States used as occupatior,1 forces will damage all signs of good will". ? 25 May 1945 SEVENTH ARLY INTERROGATION CENTER 12(.7?,(1 PAUL KUALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 8 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CI 1-S1 1 Ref No SA/0/22 25 May, 1945. 415R006200030002-7 25X1 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 ? US ARMY gAuth: CG, 7th Army anit: :Date: 24 May, 1945 : REICH MINISTRY .OF THE I1TERIOR (This Report is being published i answer to Special Questionnaire provided by US Group CC, G-g, T-Section, 6th Army Group, 14 May 45). I. PREAMBLE The following information was obtained from Otto EHRENSBERGER, Dr KUrt HEINRICHS, Dr LAUBE, Dr Walther OTT, and Ernst PA3ST, all of whom are officials in the Ministry of the Interior. Most of the records and personnel of the Ministry are located in the followitv places: i) QUERFURTF, near HALLE ii) SCHLOSS LEUOHTENBURG, near JENA (KL A RR Station) iii) SCHLOSS SONNENSTEI7 in PIEM, near DRESDEN iv) BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46 v) GARMISCH- PARTENKIRCHEN It is possible that the personnel and records which were in BERLIN in March 1945 Were recently evacuated elsewhere or the papers were destroyed. Date of Information: See Text Interrvator: G.P.M. ORGANIZATION CF TFE MINISTRY OF THE TTITERTOR The chart as found in the Organization Charts of the German Ministries and Cen- tral Agencies is out or Date, due to the fact that certain changes were made in 1944 when H/MMLER became Minister. Por revised chart showing the )rincipal changss see Appendix. Personalities and their probable locations are listed under the reSpective Departments, below: A. CENTRAL DEPARTMENT 1. Personnel Ministerialdirektor 10ELLKE - possibly in BAD SACHSA, in the Southern Harz. Ministerialdirigent BURKART - AUGSBURG. Ministerialrat Dr GRAU vicinity ofSTUTTGART. Ministerialrat Dr OTT - AUGSBURG (SAIC). Reichsrichter HAHN - Southern Germany. A number of intermediate officials are in GARMIS07-PA17T7KIROFEN. 2. Records The records of the Central Denartment are partially in QUERFURT and partially in SCHLOSS LTUONTS"BURG, near JENA. A few are in GAT:ISCH. The records in KRLIN are believed to have been totally destroyed. B. DEPARTMENT I 1. Personnel Ministerialrat Dr GLOBK7 KOCHEL, HI1nE113URGSTRASSE 292. Ministerialdirigent Dr KESSLER - AUGSBURG. Reichsrichter SOFEIDT-BRUEOKT - AUGSBURG. Regierungsrat STIETIALDT - AUGSBURG. Yinistorialdirektor Dr FAUST - presumably in Northern Germany. Ministerialrat Dr VONT q0LFF - QUERFURT. Oberrogierungsrat Dr HOFFMA'T - in Southern Germany. 2. Records The records are in QUERFURT, LEUIFTENBURG, and BERLIN. 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref,yo SAIO/22 23. May LO.DinARTMENT-II 1. Personnel SECRT Ministerialdirektor EFRENSBERGER, AUGSBURG Reichsrichter Dr ?AST, AUGSBM.1- (SAIO). Johannes KAIBEL,. AUGSBURG) (SAN). . Oberregierungsrat VOLLPREOHT, AUGSBURG. Ministerialrat MUTTRAY, TRAUNSTEIY. Regierungsrat VO7 110577SURG, TRAUNSTETY. Oberregierungsrat Dr FISCHER, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN. Reicherichter Dr DANKELMANN, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN. Oberriegerungsrat MAYER-jESTPHALEN, qUETPURT. Oberregierungsrat RITTER 'ION LEX, tZUERFURT. Ministerialrat BUOKOV, EUTIN. . Ministerialdirigent JACOBI, Presumably in Minieterialrat KLAS, Ministerialrat GUELOT7PFENNIG Oberverwaltungsrichter lEISE Oberregierungsrat Dr PETZ 2. Accords, Most of the records were leatroyed in air raids, at BERLIN and KussTim. Some records may be found in lUERFURT, and possibly a few at GARMISCH-PARTEN- KIRCHEN. - H H . fI It Northern 0 Germany. ft It D. DEPARTMENT III Most of this Department, both personnel .and records, is located at SCHLOSS SCNYENSTEIN, in PIR7A. A smaller part remained in BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46. /II-4 Dr JOACHIM GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN Ministarialrat BOETTCHER PITA Ministerialrat BO!( E BERLIN JIB Direktor Dr FOFFMEISTER Ministerialrat 1r TITTEL Oberregierungsrat KNAUT Ministerialrat SIBETH /II-0 Ministerialrat Dr LOBE Ministerialrat KAEMPER Ministerialrat ULRICH Praesident KNE/P Ministerialrat GOEDECKE Ministerialrat moLsEN Oberregierungsrat KOBE E. DEPARTMENT IV 1. Personnel Ministerialrat Or HEINRICTS Ministerialrat Dr HOMM.N.T Ministerialdirigent Dr FUCHS Regierungs-Kassenrat TESCHNER Gauhauptmann Dr KREISSL Reichsrichter BERNER Ministerialrat VO7 LUCAS BERLIN PIRNA AUGSBURG (SAII) PIRNA n- It BAD HEILBRUNN, near BAD TOELZ BERLIN I) AUGSBURG (SAIC) 0 It AUGSBURG LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA REICHENBURG PIRNA BERLIN Ministerialdirigent Dr LOSOHELDER " In addition, there are seven minor officials and PARTENKIRCHEY, seven employees in GARMISCH- 2 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S ECRET Ref No SAIC/22 25 May 45 2. Records Most of the records of this Department were destroyed in an air attack on BERLIN in Nov 1943. Of the new records, part are in PIRMA, part in QUERFURT, and part in LEUCHTENBUIG, near JENA. A few records were left in BERLIN, DOR01.- THEENSTRASSE 49, and a few were it. GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, in the RATHAUS. F. PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS 1. Personnel Dr KAUFMANN (MD) GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN Ministerialrat NGEL 25 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER r7.7 PAUL K LA. Maj, MI, Commanding. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 CENTRAL DEPT Budget Dis- bursing,Accoun* ting,Distribu. tion of work, Internal rou- tine, etc. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR HIMMLER i HEAD STATE SECRETARY STUCKART DEPARTMENT I Constitution, Legislation, Administration. IO Constitution IV Legislation & Admin Law I "Sued Ost" I "BM" new order in Bohemia I "Ost" I "West" DEPARTMENT II Civil Defense of REICH I-RW Civ Defense I.-RW Mil Law and Policy I- RS War Damage 'STATE SECRETARY AND tREICH HEALTH LEADER CONTI 1 :VP TWAT TIT DEPARTMENT IV A;Pol appointments Civil servants B. Higher Services C.Civ Servants Law, Policy, training, salaries ,expenses welfare ,pensions, salaried employees and workers. 'Control of Local Govt fro-1,$ if DEPARTMENT A DEPARTMENT B C N Public Health Public Welfare iDEPARTMENT Veterinary Matters Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 - elifis:ttellsase 2004/02/1 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S. Z C HIE T "rm AN ENCL1 ? - I ? . Z,`,.1 '01111', SEVENTH ARMY INTtRAGATION CtNTER APO 756 US ARMY HERMANN GOERING - INANCIAL NOPS : SECRET :Auth: CG7th Arm :Init: :Date: 29 May 19'+5 "Thefollowin g notes candrning Hermann e GOERINGs ' . , , , income, covering the erio'd 1937 - 42, were found in his ledger: 4 Date of Deposit , Check troth HAMBURG 12 Jul 1937 10 Oct 1937 31 Jan 196 19 Ve111938' 7 Jul 1138 8 Dec 1938 Feb 1139 13 Apr 1939 1 jun 1939 ' 26 Oct 1939, :12 Jul 1939 - Dee 1139 24 Jan 19O 141)r 1940 - 11 Jul 1940 25 Oct 1940 Feb 1941' r 1941' ft it ,11 J11,1 1541 &fill. 194-2: Jun 1942 ,5 Sp 1942 3..? Oct 1943 It ti It It ft It it ' ti It 2 checks from RAMBt (Special account HOFER) check from HAMBURG Bank DEUTSCHE BANK THYSSEN BANK THYSSEN BANK btUTSCHE BANK THYSSEN BANK btUTSCHE BANK THYSSEN BANK DEUTSCHE BANK THYSSEN BANK DEVTSCHE BANK 'DEUTSCHE BANK' cTitY8ftN BANK THYSSEN BANK 'THYSStN BANK' DEUTSCHE BANK- THYSSIN BANK THY8StN BANK TH(SSEN BANK 'THYSSEN BANK 'DEUTSCHE BANK THYSStN BANK THYSSEN BANK 'THYSSEN BANK 'TOM. RM It It II ft It It Sum 250,000.-- 250;000.-- 125,000.-- 300,000.-- 125,000.-- 250,000.-- 250;000.-- 125;000. -- 125;000.-- 125,000.-- 125,000.-- 125,000.-- fl 250,600.-- 250,000.-- 250,d00.-- 236,000.-- 25d,d00.-- 250,000.-= 230,000.-= 256,600.-- 1,226,000.- 256.000.-= to It 0 st RM 5,901,000.-- i According o statements'by Minister Dr FUNK' these are checks of theCig- Ote Factoq REMTSLA, with the owners of which GOERING had very good hee.tiOns: A tax trial agaihit this firm involving about 12 million marks 7sSaii?preSI1ablY with GOERING's help. The president of the finance dept in HAMBURG would probably know out this matter. ' 1 ?WingI noteS in the ledger: Attattii 6S.Am" sTiAttgAt'arnINN THtSUN'HOK, THYSStN BAItt THYi8EN't- THYSSEN BANK THY8Zhil'atl\l' 150,000.-- 160;060.-- 10000.- 100 ,b00, ?ft 11000 1_000. RM 1,450t000.-- 25X1 TOTAL For Release 26 ApOrOved For Re ease 200410 Ref No 8AIC/31 29 May 45 1.14Rld wils A Publiailar of 161Ped him a great deal: The ur#F 1540/41 there are Check . - ? insurance periodicals. GOING reportedly connections With the other firms are unknown. _ I following transfers of larger 30 Oct 1440 'pihthMtTAix 06iPtivii) 30 oe. j;54b JUN Nov 1940 BANK 15-trz` tUFTPAHnT 'Nov WITTKOWITEt B2RGI3A11 19 Nov 1940 REICHSWERKE HERM.G0211ING ,,,Tan 1941 FtEICHSWERKE HERVI:GOET{ING , 3 Jan 1241 (RHEiNlyiETALL) 7 or 1,941 JUN- t8 Apr 1941 BANK DtR IMFAHRT 30 4i)r. 1541 RHtiNMETALL (ROHNERT 1,6'. Aug dliNkgq I'Mnd , 17 Sep jLjiHEI1M.00211/ga WRKE 1941 HERM:GOthaNG WERKE Bank BANK DER DEUT:m. P.1,17,41 01. It -77 tt 11 " 11 11 It 850,000.-- 1,4,? qQtreING received nearly 2 million marks within two year's through his control of these _:?,,laxits under' the tour?Year Plan, GOERrNG admitted that he Ba "ask:0'1 all these Plants to tralsfer Some funds occasionally to his 'Ter's anal account, since Under Party 're ons members in public offibis we riot 'liowed. to accept renumerei.ations for services as board members. 1945 8EVENTH' ARMY INTilltio.GATrib cEvinok ed For Release 2004/02/14 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 30002-7 SECREI: auth: OG 7th Armyt IR Ant ZIITERROGAndig 'gl\rt411 An 7,8 US ARMY sDate: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 11 W R $ R IC $v 0 4at OTAINt! g4ftNalf6OZRIM. Of Questionnaire A 0 of S, G-5, Seventh Army, 10 May 1945) Date of Information: See Text Interregater: " 1 Although he has been depicted in many news reports as being half mad, GOERTNG gives the impression or being a highly intelligent and cunning man, with charming mannera and a certain knowledge of art. He is very talkative, and once he has started to develop a favorite theme he can hardly be stopped. _ Re ,insist, that he has no desire to: conceal anything about the works of art which he hae obtained in foreign countries. He explains his tremendous accumula- tion of treaeures by claiming to be a Feat lover of artistic works, and by stat- ing that it was his intention to transform CARINHALL into a National Museum. He says, ?ICH BIN NUN MAL EIN RENAISSANCETYP" ("After all, I'm a Renaissance type"). , GOERING also states that the low prices of jewelry and works of art in the occu- Pied countries provided an incentive to buy them wholesale. He adds that he was, astoundpd by the cheapness of diamonds at CARTIER's in PARIS in 1940. From 1942 onwards, the prices of antiques and artistic works rose enormously, and he had to exercise all,hie cleverness and every 'Fuse in order to avoid being "ptung" by the dealerP. ,S0Vree ote,.tes thP-t in addition to 4.1e treasures which he bought, others were sent to hil;L,as gifts by Party members and units of the GAF, and that he also ex- changed articles with dealers and other collectors, as a stamp collector Wwapi stamPs- Olaims that oily about one percent of his collection comes from France. GOWNS COLLS0TIOTT A . . GONG states that no works of art were taken away from the French National , , . 1 , . , Museums.. Re ,Claims to have been very helpful to the directors of the French MuseuM iin ProVidfng,sate repositories for their treasures in specially constructed air', r4i4 shelters. He otatee that he exohanged two statues and a couple ot paintings ., , for one, WOOdfan etatUette and ono Tainting which he Was very fond of at the 10t.J.7E. , The negotiations, he states? were lona and difficult, but there was no exercise of , . . , , , t ? pressure on his part. ' The Jewieh properties were exhibited in the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME under the _, supervision 'of trench and German officlales The most valuable of thee() wee sent, on HITIRO's orders, to the Royal Castles of NEU-SCHWANSTEIN and HOHENSOHWANGAUI , , . , Bavaria, to, the shelters of the FUEHR4BAUT3N in MUNICH and of :the RICHsCH4Nq.14- Lay in ga441, and to O3ERSALZBL!2G. Their ultimate destination was the new Na- tional:XUseum at ,LINZ. Altheugh ho admits that some of those treasures wore sent 41eewhere, GOERING pretends to have no-knowledge of their whereabouts. , . , The remaining works of, art exhibited at the SALLE DES J2UX DE PAUME were sold at public auction, ?W bought some paintings, statues, antique furniture, and GOBE- aN tapestries. In those deals GOERIA. was advised by a French expert, a Museum ' -, ' f , ,grriow., and his bids never exceeded :the evaluation sot by this advisor. The on- ly jewelry which he bought was antique. French and German antique dealerswore also. authotiiod to take part in those auctions. PW claims that the FUEHRER ao- man4041)110,tos:raphe of all works of art bought by other amateurs, and that the 1st- ' t,Or-Otoli ISto turn 0,110 Oloir purchases to 14iTunie representative, for Oventual '' Litz' . - shipment to the Museum. _Woe that he, 'braught contain atoms direct from dealers in Paris; liko. . e _ Vate collector. Also, ho occasionally Mado purchases from chateaux and Pri- eatipne through an intermediary. Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SEQRET Ref No SAM/14 19 May 45 3. CONDITION 2E TEr COLLECTION Source states that two specialists were responsible for the care of the works of art in his collection, and that all items werq in an excellent state of pre- servation at the time of their evacuation to Southern Germany (Zee next section)6 4. pEPosiTonss OF THE FRErCH WORKS OF An - There was not sufficient time to evacuate GOERING's entire collection when the Russian advance menaced CARINHALk. A number of GOBELIN tapestries (no French ones) and a certain amount of furniture (Louis XV and Louis XVI) which came from the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME had to be left behind. The most precious collections were pent to 3ERCHTE3GADEN, by RR. At the time of PW's arrest there by the SS, 2, April 45, these treasures were loaded on freight cars which were inside the unfinished. tunnel of the BERCHTEZGADEN RR station, and en some other oars which stood on the tracks of the RR line from BEROBTBSGADEN to KOENIGSEE. (Note: This information has since been confirmed.) Before his arrest GOERING had time to give orders for the security of these freight Cars. Neverthe- less he wap informed that some of the guards attached to him (GESTAPO and SD map) had started to plunder the cars, as well as his villa at OBERSALZBERG, under pre- text of putting them in greater safety. Source believes, however, that all the valuable works of art which he obtained from the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME can be located and returned! Following the interrogation source made a written statement pledging his cooper- ation in the recovery of these art treasures (See Appendix). He also gave the fol- lowing additional locations where some other works or art acquired at the JEUX DE PAUME might be found; a) A certain number of GOBELINS at the BURG. VELDENSTEIN near, NEUHAUS on the PEG- KITZ(RR limtrom'BUREMBERG to BAYREUTH). b) A certain number of GOBELINS in the air raid shelters of the LUFTWAFFE War ' Academy at WILDPARK-WERDER, near POTSDAM. 0) One painting called the "Madonna of MEMLING at ZELL an GEE. (This painting was returned by this unit.) GotnING ..0104m0 to have had nothing to do with ables other than those mentioned in this report. ]..9 144Y 1945. at PWs wife's present dwelling PW to G-5, Seventh Army, through any French works of art' orvalu- SEVENTH ARMY-INTERROGATION-OUTER ? PAUL KUBALA, Ma, MI, Commanding, AEORET or. 'or or. orro Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Npie 2 Approved FOrRellgeott 2004102/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R04/20-0030002-7 8 e_c T tRer No $A10/14 19 May 4, -I hereby declares 1) That / am ready to return art treasures (exhibited in JEUX DE PAUME) which I 40qtlired and bought at auctions of requisitioned property. ? .2) That I will do my utmost to find out about the location of these articles and that I will give all the pertinent information possible. That the,greater part of these al-icles and of my total property of art trea- sures are packed in several freight care in BERCHTESGADEN. The storing of these articles in air raid shelters did not occur because of my imprisonment by HITLER -the day after my arrival there. That T informed the French liaison officer in charge about several other places where there could be some boa important worka.of art. ) That I am convinced that a conference with my former art custodian HOFER in ?the:presenee of Allled officers will lead to a speedy and extensive clarifica- tion of all questions. AUGSNRG 18 May 194,. ./s/ HERMANN GOERING REIOH$MARSOHA11 CIA.RDP88-00418?R40,?qP,993002 4 g2.R 11 T g tiRof NO SAX0/29 sAuth$ Ca, 7th Army; 46 liel 45ApprovedtRrRelease 2004/02/19? : CIA-RDP83-00415ROGGIOdopri 9, $ 'pat : 2 Ma 194 SlImxTH Am 4JITOGATIaN QENTER APO 7,8 IJS ARMY P;P 221 TRAIAL JAPAPII Ar.on49,. Atace , - very geOd Russian he was able to makefriendawith Gen ONODERA, who Speaks no Other European language well and who therefore had few friends in STOCKHOLM. 8ol4rce.tal:ked freely and appears to .be entirely sincere and truthful. 8-2 , Date of Information: See text Interrogator: 25X1 a 49-year-Old Hungarian diplomat who was Asst Milit ry om Dec 4, to Nev 44. Owing to the fact that he speaks 2 Tqc,0N4 HISTORY OF dF,N ONODERA , Gen ONODERA, who is 45 years old, comes from a family of the Japanese nobility. Hiswife belengs to a Japanese family Of the highest nobility and is said to be - relgted to the Emperor, a fact of which the Gen is very proud. They have three sons; the eldest, who is 15 years old., is at a cadet school in Japan. They ap- parently live a Modest, harmonious family life, go out rarely, and receive few guests. Gen ONODEHA is a moderate man, iirinks very little and does not smoke. He sufferS from low blood pressure. Once Or twice a month he communicates by tele- phone with his sons and relatives in Japan. .11ifs Gen is a. diligent and tireless Worker. He speaks and writes good Russian, Speaks and writes Gorman poorly, and understands some English. He deliberates for SOMe time before making a statement. 'Ho has frequently told source that the Japan- es0 General qwf, as well as the Emperor, was highly satisfied with his work in STOMOW, and on several occasions he has has given source to understand that he was a future O.S.n4iaate for the post of Chief of the Japanese General Staff. He has )r140Or'sPeken to source in detail about, his career, but during the course of fro- 1.uent conversations between Feb and Nov 44 source was able to obtain the following :Information about the General's history: 23 GradUated.frora War College, where he had learned to speak Russian. 24-27 Various assignments with higher commands. 28.*50 Served as Capt (Intelligence Officer) on General Staff with troops op- posing the Aussians in Manchuria. There ho perfected his knowledge of the Russian language, and is said to have done excellent work. 50-56 Assigned to various higher commands. Also served as instructor of tac- ties at War College. 36-37 Organized the pro-Japanese "National Chinese Movaaent" in China. Ac- cording to his own statements, he did a "perfect? job and received groat PrOit for this work., 40 ? Qoqmanded an inf div fighting in China for an entire year. Source be- ,,,lieVosIt was in 40., . 40- ? Rellwnod to War College as instructor, ? Assigned to ST00E:HOLM as Military Attache. 3. OFFICE OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM a) Lodation , This office is located on the fifth floor at LINN:4-GATAN 38, adjoining the Gener41's private apartment. In Nov 44 Con ONODERA iold source that he intended to rent another small apartment so that he would not have to receive visitors in hieeffico. Source believes that this MOVO was contoviated in order to Safeguard the security of the work at the office. .0 Mission The Punetion penal Japanese precedence over of this office is tO furnish military intelligence to the Im- Government. It importance VMS 00/1SidOrOd SO great that it took the Japanese Legation at STOCKHOLM. Gon ONODERAls reports R .4 pproved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAI0/29 28 May 45 went via Oteri?lan Military transmitters in BERLIN directly to the Emperor, where- as 'tlIP reports of the Minister atentto the Prime Minister, who submitted to the Etperor only such portions of the reports as he considered of particular im- portange, Furthermore, Gen ONODERA claimed that he had-orders to check the Legation's seourity measures, and that he could request the recall of the Minis- ter if he d4 net consider him euitable for the post. Atter_the,agedessful Allied invasion of France, Gen ONODERA told souroe that he had recoived Orders to remain at his post after Germany's collapse ia Order to take oharge of the Japanese intelligence system for all Europe. In source's ,opinion he already has a very considerable network of espionage agents at his disposal. 0) Offioo Dutios and Poreonnol Gen ONODE4 and his wife do all the code work themselves in a special room of their privflte apartment. No one else has access to this room. NO engineer specialists, whom sour describes as co-workers, work at this ?Moe. Ono of them, SATO, is supposed to be an authority on aircraft con- struction. JHo is about 32 years old, and speaks vory poor English. During 44 he mado frosuont trips to Gormany. The othor,name unknown to source, is said tO be nava. construction engineer. Ho speaks Gorman fluently. Gon ONODERA rerwked that,this man was very familiar with tho compoetion of the Rumanian Vtd. RusSian inaOlz ,Soa floots, T" MgthenlAn women, one of them the wifo of a Swedish cavalry Capt, work in an antbeToom. They translate Swodish newspapor articlos and do general of- fioo work. # During 44 source frequently saw three or four othor young Japanese in tho ?Moo. ONOARA atatod,that thy had boon studying in Europe and wore unable to return hemq; so ho had given thom employmont in his offico. In early Nov .44, C4ODER4 mOntiOnod that ho was expecting throe additional Japanoso for his of- aid that five moro would be added to tho Logation Staff. At that time ho Wasoalso trying to got evJapanoso radio toohnician, as well as oquipmont,'in Order to have offootivo communications ,with Japan after tho anticipatod eel- lapse ef_GerillanY? 4. AP.4.99.14X12Pi In 041,704):4 .0.111s many meotings with source, Gon ONODERA froquontly assOciatod with tho fellOwinos o , , Tho yln44,11 Military Attache and his ptaff Tho Gorman 4ilitary Attache and his Staff Tho Gorman Air Attacho and his Staff Lots frequont4' ho associated with!, The Rumanian Military Attache Tho,Swisp-Militar-AttaOho Gen K4LGRESM, Diroctor of the Swodiall. Attapho Group Maj PETERSON, Dirootor of tho Swedish,Oommqnioation Group Ho novor mado any montion of his rolations with tho Russian Military Attache. Gon OMODMA visited his own Logation sovoral times wookly. Ho sometimes made derogatory remarks about their work, such as, ?Thoso p000lo don't do anything. They only road tho nowspapors, translate them, and that is what thoY send to Japan.? Ho montionod that ho had ofton argued with tho Ministor about thisetypo of work and also that ho had found negligence in tho code work. Approved ,For Releas.? CIIDLICO2/119 TCIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 1. Approved For Release 20O4102119: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S TORET ????? awn* ????? Ref No SAI/29 284Ay 45 5. SORT AFFILIATIONS a) Intelligence Oonoerning Russia An ?Athenian, who according to repeated statements did excellent work, was . a chief source of Gen'ONODERXts intelligence on Russia. After the capitulation of Finland, Gen ONODEAL established connections with Finnish intelligence of- ficers who had escaped and who were anxious to work against the Russians. b) Intelligence Ooncerning the Allies OMURA boasted of having an agent .in the British Passport Dept in the B/R- . GEL-JARS-GATAN, STOCKHOLM. He claimed that he regularly read the reports of the Secretary of the British Legation, OHESHIRE, who is said to be a Capt and chief Of tlae British Intelligence Corps. This was a source of considerable amusement to ONODERA, which is illustrated by the following story: One day a SWediSh journalist, Oipt Goosta AELIN, invited VOECZKOENDY (source) to 14neheon at the RC HE Restaurant. The journalist asked VOMOMENDY several Political questions; among. others 'Jib asked him what would be the reaction of the Hungarian Army to an Allied landing in the Balkans. Source replied that Hun- gary would be very pleased about it, but stated that such an operation would reqUire at loast 20 divs, as tho Germans were very strong in the Balkans. On - the following day source visitod:the genoralts office and noticed immediately that ONODERA was suspicious of him. Just as source was leaving ONODERA sudden- ly askod him how ho happened to know Capt MELIN. In reply source asked, "How do you. know that / know him? Did you perhaps see me with him at tho RIOH2?" ?NOMA ropliod that ho had road the report which CHESHIRE had received fram. MELIN.. Source then told the Gon what he had told Oapt ONODMIA then etated; "The roport which CHESHIRE sot to LONDON was not the same; apparently .ho had work6d.it over." Gen =DEM always waited for tlio British courier piano, and froquontly he ,statO4 that ho had r000ivod "something intoroitine from England. He also sent ,.Money to England, as he inadvertently revealed to souroo. on Moro than one oc-. :easion by such romarka'ae, "People say I am stingy, but I believe my mon in '.England are satisfied; /always send money." Source boliovas that ONODERAts - informants wore British lournalista, because ho once montionod knowing nows- : papor reportors formorly stationed In STOCKHOLM who had boon recalled to Eng- land. o) Intolligonco Concorning Germany As ago674RA frequently remarked, 'ho know practically everything about tho disposition of Gorman military forCoa.:, He and his assistants ofton travelled to Denmark, Norway and Gormany to Meet German officers. ,8. GIN =DEWS OPINIONS ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS ? a) Ra/iability of ONODERAts Doductions Gon ONODERA io.a fine oxamplo'of the Intelligence Officer. Ho is industrious, disoroot, suspicious, and intelligent. Ho spares no effort in building up his not of agents. His deductions concerning tho military situation in Europo wore corroot, and his predictions havo boon borne out by events. Prom infor- mation roopivbel from %%gland rogarding tho buildup of supplios, ho was ablo to oetimato tho dato of the invasion of tho Continont to within a month of the actual landing. After tho-landings-in Normandy, ho prodictod that tho Germans would not be able to ropol Alliod forces. Based upon his oxporioncos in the Far Mast, ho declared that to bridgohoad would be destroyed within tho first 24 hours, or not at.all. He anticipatod tilt) destruction of Germany soon after the bridgehead was succossfully established, and by early 1945 he was making every effort to rovamp his espionage network accordingly. Approved For Release 2004/41 :n4lIF'83-00415R006200030002-7 B OR E T Approved For Release 2004/0/T8 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SA10/29 23 May 45 b) The European Situation after Allied Victory At the end of lug 44, ONODERA declared that all Europe would be exposed to the dangers of Bolshevism after Allied victory. Russia is slowly but surely gaining control of the Continent. /n Scandinavia she is already at the At- lantic, and from there and from the Baltic Sea she already surrounds Sweden and threatens Denmark. After conquering Northern Germany, she will be able to work her way to the English Channel. Russia already dominates the Balkans, and from there she threatens the Middle East. The smoothly functioning Soviet propaganda machine will do everything possible to provoke revolutions in the Iberian Peninsula, in France, and in Italy, and then to tackle Europe from the Southwest. Soviet activitiocin North Africa are becoming more and more dan- gerous. Ultimately England will contiont Russia alone, because the US will have no time to attend to Europe once she is fully committed in the East. Japan will confront tho US. with eVeincroasing difficulties, and will tie down US forcos completoly; The R4sSians, ot the, other hand, will receive military reinforcements from the 40 millions Germans in tho occupied areas, and will also engage in strong propaganda activities among the impoverishod Gorman masses.. Once Soviet Rus- sia has had time to reorganize her disrupted agriculture and to bring her fac- tories into Pull operation again, sho will be so strong that she will tolerate no counter power in Europe. o) Russo-Japanoso Relations ONODERA sp01 frequently of Japanese hatred of tho Russians, but he pointod out that Japanis primary enemy was the USA. In 44 he was firmly convinced that RusSiayould not attack Japan. Ho asod his reasoning on Russiats need to re- habilitate her industrial and agricultural systoms. Russia, ho stated; must reorganize her KOLHOS and SOWHOS (collective farms), build more and more trac- torst'and gonorally rovamp her agriCultural sot-up, which had proved a failure during the War. Tho Russian farmer -would have to take to scythe and shovel to odeaPe'dtarVation. If tho US had not shipped vast quantitios of food to Russia in 43, a major disaster in the food 'situation would have occurred. a d) Tho USA ONODERA ,statod in Oct 44 that ho expected the European War to end in Fob 145. Ho doclared_that the US had already won tho "American War" by binding to hoz..., solf Canada, Contral'Amorica, and South Amorica. With the acquisition ofinu- morous air and naval bases, the US had gained unquestionable superiority over iMPOvoriahod Britain. However, Soviet propaganda in South America will greatly increase) and aside from tho probleMs created for tho US by Japan, the US will have to face others provided by. Russia in Scandinavia, tho Balkans, and the oil regions of tho liddlo East:. With tho discharge of many AmeriCan'aoldiors after tho European War, the US will bo faced with severe labor troubles. All those factors, ONODTRA hoped, would prevent the US from deploying all her forces in tho Op4tinu4tion of the war against Japan. o) Gorman Policies At tho end. of May 44, source had ,a lengthy oonforonce with ONODERA, during which the latter severely condemnod German policies. ONODERA stated that EOCH, Gorman Pldnipotontiary for Eastern Torritorios, had so coaductod affairs in the occupation of tho Ukraino that ho might as well have boon working for the So- viets and deserved the "Ordor of STALIN". Tho Ukrainians, who had greeted tho Gorman Army as liberators in 41, had already turnod their backs on the German civilian ocoupational authoritios as far back as 42, simply because of maltreat- ment and the transgreasions of a few subbrdinatos. Tho Gorman civilian author- ities, through their iduoasurablo lack of understanding of tho pooplo and throui their ignoranoo concorning tho Ukrainian question, had made onomios of tho Ukrainians, whoroas with understanding and cooporation they could have gained an army of throe million mon. Gori ONODERA wont on to say that tho troatmont of Japazaby the German High Approved For Release 2004/02A9 FAADRBFA33-00415R006200030002-7 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No sAIV29 28 May 45 Command had been equally stupid. No conferences were held concerning coordi- nated conduct of the war. The last thing that the Japanese wanted was the Germaneattackupon:Russia. The Japanese High Command had a quite different plan. They wanted Germany to drive through the Balkans, Turkey., Iran, and Iran to the Persian Gulf, and finally to link up with a coordinated Japanese drive in India. ONtltRA said that it was high time, in these last hours, to try to work together. He had received word fromeTOKYO that conferences between the two high commands would shortly take place at the FUEHRER's Hq. Immediately -afterwards, the German newspapers announced that extremely important confer- ences were pending concerning the common conduct of the war ia future operatione. Ten days later the subject was dropped completely, and no further word was published or spoken regarding the conferences. When source questioned =URA on the matter, the latter answered evasively, merely stating that Japan would continue the war to the end, regardless of the outcome in Europe. Source be- lieves, that the Japanese offer: of Common action in the conduct of the war was - intended. to mielead the German High Command and to influence Russia to Conclude a "special agreement" with Japan, a different form of agreement from the "Five Year Nen-Aggression Pact". Gen ONODERA appeared very pleased when he mentioned this pact. ' 7. CONCLUSION From thattime on,yroxd,ONODERA mentioned again and again that he would have to stay in STOOpOLM for a long time. Prior to Nov 44 he had been receiving additional sums of money from various sources, including 150,000 Swiss francs from the Japan- ese Attache in Finland. Source believes that, owing to the present European situ- ation and to the disruption of Communications, there may be loopholes in ONODERA's organization; but he declares that a man of ONODERA's perseverance and ability would be able,to repair them without great lose of time. He is cenvinced that Gen oNopaRA has built an espionage and intelligence service which from henceforth will bothe center of such Japanese activity in Europe. 28 May 1945. SEVENTH ARMY_ENTERROGATION CENTER riot :Xt-tft- rd, PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MT, Commanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 8 E`CI R Lt. T 14 Apr 45 Copy No r"qqS Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415 If the information tion, it should be so or of the methods by The following are this report% SECRET Or. RnnA7nnnfinnn7-7 SEVENTH ARMY CENTER APO 758 US ARMY - SECRET tAuth:OG th Arm :Inits ,A .Date: 1 A r contained in this report is required for further distribu- paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names which the information has been obtained. the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in ' Name Rank Secret No Unit Place and Date of Capture PAUTR, Friedrich GENLT 'a.D.(Maj GeA) 45/998 Retired WUERZBURG, 9 Apr 45 (retired) GAME, Heinrich GENMAJ i.G.(BrigGen; 45/950 001719. BERGZABERN050 Mar 45. GS0) Inf.Div. STEINBACH, Paul GENMAJ (Brig Gen) 45/969 FUEHRER- KLEINRINDERFELD 2 RESERVI,OKH . 2 Apr. 45 RODENWALD, Ernst GENARZT (Surgeon 45/975 Mil Med HEIDELBERG,1 Apr 45. Prof Gen) . Academy, BERLIN WITKINHAUS,Hubert GENMAJ a.D. (Brig 45/978 Retired MOSBACH, 4 Apr 45. Gen)(retired) MILTZOW,Hermann .OBSTLT i..G.(Lt Col, G8C)' 45/951 Ia,719 Inf Div BERGZABERN,50 Mar 45. HACKEMANN, Ernst OBSTLT (Lt Col 45/992 Battle Group GERS- GERSFELD, 6 Apr 4, FELD SCHREIBER, Kurt LT 204 Lt) 45/976 LUFTWAFFE HEIDELBERG,51 Mar 45.. BA z.b.V.6 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECaEZ bommisissell I. SOURCES: a) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Heinrich GAEDE, CG 719 Inf Div, a 47-year old General Staff Officer, intelligent, arrogant, very Prussian, and violently anti- American. From 1942-1944 he was in Bulgaria as Chief of the Getman Train- ing Staff attached to the Royal Bulgarian Army Staff. b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Paul STEINBACH, FUEHRERRESERVE OKH (German Army Officers' Replacement Pool), a 58-year old professional soldier with a non- Nazi attitude. c) OBSTLT (Lt Col) Hermann MILTZOW, Ia, 719 Div, a 5..year old General Staff Officer of typical Prussian caliber.. 1. Personalities M: They seem to have respect for KEITEL. KEITEL is only a messenger boy; when the FUEHRER calls, he runs. * * * * * * G: I wrote to Gen SEIFFERT in HAMBURG to do something about my wife, and I (also wrote to) the General of III Corps in BERLIN. GI I was with the Arty Inspectorate in BERLIN before the war. S: With EASE ? G: Yes. S: I made HASE's acquaintance in NUERNBERG when he was CG of a dig, the 3rd. Then he became Arty Inspector. S: ROMMEL and RUNESTEDT are supposed to have told the FUSHRER on 25 July, i.o. after the invasion, that the war could no longer be won. M: HIMMLER's train was always marked SZH. G: What does that moan ? M: SONDERZUG HIMMLER (Special Train HIMMLER). It was always well guarded. * * * * * * * M: Did you know LATTMANN (?) at the War College in DRESDEN ? G: Recently he was a colonel with MODEL; an efficient fellow. * * * * * * * Are you the same ago as SEIDOWSKI (?), ho was also ./a under.me, and so was ROTHA (?). 2 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET M: SEIDOWSKI (?) was fat and blond ? No, tall and thin; he is engaged to be married now. M: VON ROTBA (?) was in my olass; we were together in STUTTGART with the MT troops. G: They were all with me in SOFIA. * * * * * * * M: SEYDLITZ was always a blabbermouth, and so was his wife. G: PFELSCH (?) was first Ib with Army Group, then he was Id (?), then he was transferred, M: And Gen MERK (?) ? G: Gen MERK oy, was first with (Army) Group BLACK SEA, then he was together with us. 2. Miscellany The General Staff is the only good thing still left in Germany, and it will certainly still have a great influence on the civilian population. G: As soon as the Party joined in the conduct of tha war, the course of the war could be foreseen. G: If this thing oollapsee, and we lose the war, we will have to work for the people with all our strength. The German people just cannot be destroyed. Many things that Were done are difficult to defend, for example the mass murder of the Jews. As an officer it was sometimes difficult to participate in these ac- tions. They should have solved the problem in another way, Sometimes it was horrible the way they shot women and children. G: They want to sound out our attitude now; they expect us at any rate to sup- port the military government. G: We were sold out by Dutch and Russian workers. S:? That was bound to end badly, what with 25-50 nations running around in Ger- many. * * * * * * * S: Why do you dislike the Navy so much ? G: Because they gorged themselves with hundreds of thousands of youths (int).. $ And the Luftwaffe, too. Young fellows, classified 1A, who never heard a shot fired; they were on duty with searchlight units. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 _da SE CHET G: All the men in the Navy are young kids, while we had only 47 and 48-year olds. G: They are all in flight at the approach of the Russians. The fields are not taken care of anymore, and we have to feed ourselves again. The SEYDLITZ gov- ernment is supposed to be alread3r-on German soil. The Russians are rebuilding German industry for them, and after that the war against England will follow. 3: S G: S : 0: 3: 0: The war in the EAST has taken a shameful course. Women have been raped. The Germans are no better than the others. In the beginning the Germans shot all commfssars who were taken prisoner. Plenty of Russian prisoners have sim- ply been beaten to death. How long does it take until a request for a decoration goes through? 24 hours by telephone, three weeks by mail. I had an UFFZ in charge of a pillbox; he received the Knight's Cross and a lieutenancy immediately by order of the FUEHRER. He never went to OCS. I was always horrified about concentration camps, Well now, that depends on how you look at it, one could also consider them as penitentiaries. Wore the Bulgarians only committed to combat partisans? They Were not committed at all. They were used as guards along the rail- road lines. They wore only provisional dive, and not regular ones. 0: I was Chief of the Training Staff in Bulgaria. I had 20,000 mon under me. had a combat school. All the shipping on the Danube, security of mines, all that was under my control, the entire ABWEHR (Intelligence Service). II. SOURCES: a) GENLT (Maj Gen), GENERALSTABSINTENDANT (4uarterm'aster Gen), a.D. ( Friodrioh ?AUER, a 70-year old Bavarian who is too old to worry about and too senile to do anything else. b) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gon) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year old BERG Professor, ono-time head of the Institute for Tropical Diseases who is well acquainted with scientists all over the world. (Soo Roper SAIC/7, 13 Apr 45). c) LT (2nd Lt) Hans SCHREIBER, ASSISTENTARZT (Junior Medical Officer) BEWAEHRUNGSBTL (Punishment Bn), a 28-year old medical officer who did research in connection with criminal investigations in civilian life. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 retired) politics HEIDELe.. in BERLIN, t Ref No Luftwaffe medical Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 qBET 1, BacterioloAdcal Warfare R: My personal opinion is that bacteriological warfare is impossible'. I do not know anything about it, and do not think that a German scientist will permit himself to be used for that, especially for ethical reasons. P: If there had been any preparations made for bacteriological warfare, then we people from the Housing Administration would also have known about it, since we would have, to make preparations for the protection of the population. R: The following motto is valid in this case: what you yourself are working on, you do not talk about, and what others are working on, you do not ask about. I have received no indications of bacteriological warfare. What I worked on my- self - malaria control - I will gladly tell them about. P: I knew the man in charge of the Hygiene Dept in the OKH, Prof SOHREIBER. R: Yes, hetes now head of Training Group 0, at present in POTSDAM. I myself from the Institute for Tropical Hygiene, and also consultant of the SANI- TAETSINSPEKTOR (Medical Inspector) for tropical hygiene. Besides that I had my work at the University of HEIDELBERG. S: Wasntt there a bacteriological institute in LEMBERG? R: No, I think you are mistaken. It is in KRAKOW. S: I knew a GENERALSTABSARZT (Surgeon Gen) who had worked as a bacteriologist, but I can't remember his name. Ft: There is nobody outside of Prof ZEISS and myself. Altogether there are only 10 GENERALSTABSAERZTE (Surgeon Generals) in. the Germany Army. R: I bred 80,000 mosquitoes (anopheles) in a mosquito breeding station near' BERLIN for experiments with sprays. III. SOURCES' a) GENMAJ-(Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKENHAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier, ex-WEHRMAOHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Oommandant)MANNHEIM-LUDW1GSHAFEN, who was put on the retired list on 31 Mar 45. b) OBSTLT (Lt 001) Ernst HAOKEMANN, Battle Group GERSFELD, a reserve officer, who was employed at I.G. FARBEN before the war. 1. Dr ILGNER, Director of I.G. FARBEN (Note: Dr ILGNER was a detainee at the Seventh Army Interrogation Oeinter dur- ing'the samo.poriod as.sourcos above.) H: Dr ILGNER, the plant manager of I.G. shoUld not remain unpunished either. A Democrat until 1930, he then changed horses, a real profiteering Nazi. When I saw him again in 1940, 10 years later, he greeted me with "HEIL HITLER", ? es 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Nazi from top to bottom. These swine!, People like us have to sit here, and they run around free. (See note above). H: You know, of course, that I.G. is a great concern with many branches in for- eign countries. During the war these branches are not in direct contact with FRANKFURT. If, for instance, the branch in.Argentina,has a lot of foreign cur- rency, and the branch in Chile does not have any, but needs money to build a branch office, then Argentina can send the money to Chile, and ILGNER super- vises and approves these transmissions. For that purpose he travelled all over the world. He was the central financier. This ILGNER is a miserable character, completely uninteresting as a person. He lets everybody down if it is to his own advantage. 2. Plannitts for the Future It would be funny if I were to work for the military government now. Ht It would be a neat trick to be sent to BERLIN by the Americans. Then you would have something to eat, and you could still do what you wanted. But we still have to feed ourselves. H: We'll get something out of them yet. And imagine what freedom of movement you would, have. You could travel again through all the countries. H: Did you hear anything about the partition of Germany? As far as I know, Southern Germany, Baden, etc, will be occupied by the Americans. Thatle a good thing; we will be safe that way. All Northern Germany will supposedly be occu- pied by the British, and the rest will be given to the Russiane. Well, that's terrible, and quite unthinkable. L: Yos, the so-called ELBE Line for the Russians. There will be a mixed occu- pation for BERLIN. H: What will happen to Austria and the Tyrol ? L: We shall soon see. L: (Re Nazis) The responsible persons must be hanged, and the others must be put in labor battalions whore they will have to pay for their guilt. 3. Miscellany H: Shortly before Christmas / was a member of an Honour Court. A paymaster Made some typical remarks. HtMMLER did not sanction tho verdict. We acquitted the man shertly.hefore Christmas, which had a resounding effect (KNALLEFFEKT)..A miserable Party wench excused herself. She was one of the worst kind. Thank. heaven the prosecutor and the foreman of the jury wore decent people.. Then there was another case whore a medical capt in the Army, a Party member, was supposed to have said, "the FUEHRER should stick to architecture inotoad of the conduct of the war". That follow was also acquitted; but HIMMLER revers40 the verdict,' with the demand that ho bo condemned to death.' 6 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .SEORET L: (Talking about his days as WEHRMAOHTSKOMMANDANT, MANNHEIM). A few months ago I officially invited a bishop for dinner. The bishop appeared, and so did the Party big shots (PARTEIRONZEN) - the bishop came in Tull regalia. Every- thing wont off smoothly, but after a few weeks I received a notico saying that it was forbidden to invite bishops to official receptions. Well, I am a Cath- olic, but I let it go anyway. H: (Re the hopeless situation near FULDA) There were no maps of the sector in which we wore fighting; we made our retreat by moans of an old atlas. 14 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER ? ) / PAUL KUHAL Commanding. 21( Maj,MI 7 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 21 Apr 45 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0 A ENCla Copir No 30 SEC E T SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 US ARMY 06200030002-7 ; SECRET: :utri CG :Init: a :Date l 21 Apr 5 If the information contained in this report is required for further distribu- tion, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained. The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report: Name .010.1.1?1110.? Rank Secret No Unit Place and Date of Capture RODENWALD, Ernst GENARZT (Medical 45/975 Mil Med HEIDELBERG, 1 Apr 45 Prof Or Corps Gen) Academy, BERLIN LUETKINHAUS, Hubert GENMAJ a.D. (Brig 45/978 Retired ? MOSSACH, 4 Apr 45 Gen, Retired) WESCH, Ludwig, Prof Dr Prof of Physics 45/987 HEIDELBERG Univ Beg Apr 45 ET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1-10RET SOURCES: a) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gen) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year old HEIDEL- BERG professor, one-time head of the Institute for Tropical Diseases in BER- LIN who is well acquainted With scientists all over the world. (Of Reports Ref Nos SALO/7, 13 Apr 45 and SAIC/X/1, 14 Apr 45) b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKEZVAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier, ex-WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Commandant) MANNHEIM-LUDWIGSHAFEN, who was put on the retired list on 31 Mar 45. (Of Reports Ref Nos SAIO/X/1, 14 Apr 45, and PW Intelligence Bulletin MFIU 5/751, 16 Apr 45) c) Prof Dr Ludwig WESCH, a physics professor from the University of HEIDELBERG, who was engaged in research work on secret weapons. * * * * * * * I. Medical and Other Scientific Experiments R; /t.is a pity that all the work ol,s has done will be wasted. I have tade . a specific Series- of.experiments,'which were, so to say, concluded. They dealt with physical fitness tests of officials destined to work in the tropics. They were supposed to be put into practice with the acquisition of the Came-, reonsby the .Germans. Everything wae prepared to the last detail: The mili- tary organization and the medical installations for the troops were such that each company had special equipment, organic transportation for six people, a doctor specialized in tropical diseases and chemicals. In thoee days we could still get everything, _ R: Three years ago I took a three-week course for colonial doOtors.(KOLONIAL- AERZTE) on the subject of sleeping siokness at the Prince LEOPOLD Institute at ANTTIERP. The course was expellent. R: In 1940 when I was in a Negro prison camp in the neighborhood of where we were making our studies, and I wanted to go to STARGARD, I had to get the sig- ,nature of Gen OLBRIGHT (since executed). This always took 2 days. W: What was the T/0 in your organization? R: It was about as follows: . . 16 technical assistants 10 Army doctors (Fib SULLEN) 4 positions for scientific sterlIes 2 officers' positions - technical officers 2 - personnel ( " ?) At one time I had 25 professors under me. Most recently the following Were still with me: Prof MARTINI; Prof ?LIEGE (?), zoologist, University of MARBURG; Prof MATTES (?), zoologist, University of MARBURG; Prof LENZ (LINZ?), entomolo- gist; Prof-Dr PIKORWSKI (?), staff member (DOZW); REGIERUNGSRAT (Government Oeunsellor) Dr prox BAURAT (construction engineer); AM Dr INMEOKER (?), TIEFBAUER (excavation engineer). S ORTT Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDF'83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 R: A few weeks ago I received an order stating that research work was to be carried on only in connection with vital war-decisive weapons. This rescinded an order I had received a few months before. Nothing but contradictions. - - The sathe confusion reigned in the question of SONDERFUEHRERB. There, too, they never found a proper solution. In the EAST in the occupied territories all kinds of people were ,tat into SONDERFUEHRER uniforms. R: The entomological station MALOHOW, BERLIN, where I was, and where 40,000 mosquitoes were beingbredwas directed by a Dr MEIER (?). He was an exter- minator (SOHAEJLINGSBEKLIIPFER) and the station was the information office for the Army. He was shipped to the front as a lieutenant. W: (Re KREBS Institute) At that time it was vary interesting (at the Insti- tute); I worked with ultraviolet and inorganic light-rays. I cured 85-90% of the tumour cases with ultraviolet rays... The bacilli were stimulated through X-rays. The knowledge gained (by these experiments) came in very handy when in 1939 parachute flares (1,ZU0HTOHIRAE) (?) and accessories were to be predUced. R: When I was at the Negro hospital at BORDEAUX, I had the opportunity of train- Img young doctors in the subject of tropical diseases. ? -, W; It is'a pity that we cannot continuo with our work. You undoubtedly know that we have produced insulin from the pancreas. A now method which I have just completedprovided fot the manufacture of a now antidote for . . (?). . from mould and other plants. First it was supposed to have boon manufactured in PRAGUE, and SIEBERT (?) had it ready in HEIDELBERG. * * * .* * * * W: Until the end, I had a Dutchman as my colleague. He was very intelligent, industrious and thorough. R: What kind of work did you do? W: I worked in the U-boat. . .The work i8 more concerned with defensive wea- pons which can do Germany no harm (if thoy fall into Allied hands). Therefore my institute W0.8 allowed to remain. W: I have made very groat experiments. For the past year I worked on a par- ticularly important now experiment. Everything was worked out and ready. And now everything is over, and we have to start afresh. Itls awful to have to go through all that. 0 0 :1/4 0 7.1 W: As GEHEIMRAT WHMITZ (?) told me, five-ton nitrogen (bombs?) were supposed to have been manufactured, but that is a ridiculous idea. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 3 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 II. Porsqnalitios E T W: I would like to know the whereabouts of my father-in-law, Dr PLASCHER (?). Ho was direotor of milk distribution. R Is that your father-in-law? I know bit too. Wt tots, he always had ber of the Party, Dr REICIERT (?) is there. Consequently, (HTIDELBERG?) to be very careful about informants. He was not a mom- deputy KREISLEITER (VS District Leader) and ho is still there is hope that my father-in-law stayed thoro too. Ho makes such a youthful appearance, about 45. No, ho is about 55. R: Mr FERRL E (?) is the only one who left 1-121.03LBERG days before (the arrival of the Americans). He is a vice-director (?ROR=R) and also a nomber of the SS, but that's really no r?ason (to run away). Th, people were very angry about it. It's different idth SCHAIDHENN:R (?) - after all he is a minister. W:I also gave myself up as an SS man - there is really nothiAg wrong with that. We really haven't done anything. * * ,!? * ? *- *- you know that HAGGT1\- fled just in time? R: r could have escaped with the last Red Crosa ambulance, as S EFZ (9).fro14,-- mArtrITIm did, but I did not want to do that. R: I also have worries obout my Institute. Perhaps ILX (?) is still there, but he is an SA STNCARTEYFURER (Col), although only as a doctor. He could be denounced very easily. Dr STETTEBIL(?), an understanding man, is in charge of the (buainoss) affairs in HEIDELBERG I believe. Rs- .Prime Minister (MINDiTERPR:IDENT) XOEHLER (?) is a nice man, straightfor- ward and unassuming. But GAUL.LITER SPRENG:R (?) is a pig. * * * R: Do you know'XIMSCHT (?) of the REICH Biological Institute (BIOLCGICHE MICHSANSTALT)? aEORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .SEORET W: I have given all my employees permission to talk about their work. I wonder if they know (the Americans) that I was at the KREBS Institute from 1929-1934. At that time I was together with IERNER (?), whom I helped con- siderably in 1933. He came from the hULTSJHINER LAEL\TOr_EN and had a Jewish grandmother. After tha.t heleft for BRUEN'. He was a very decent man; he work_)d on chemical and physical therapy. W: I have be- n active in the HEIDELBERGER TEUTONEN, a LANDSMANNSCHAFT (student fraternity). W: The Party r HEIDELBERG was quite moderate, not like in Saxony and Thuringia. In our town (HEIDELBERG) they never shot anybody. Do you remember AMBERGER, a foreer Social-Democrat, and STAFFERT (?)? The latter was a clear and under- standing person, who recently was the mediator between the Americans and the civilian population. R: I had some Dutch stocks which were very low. I wanted to sell them immedi- ately. The government received next to nothing from it, or only a ridiculous amount. You could not get along with the RM 10.00 which were permitted for private foreign travels. Had I not visited so many conferences in CAIRO, LON- DON and PARIS I could not have escaped the mouse trap In this manner I al- ways had a little more money. W: I married into a somewhat questionable democratic family, on account of which I had difficulties with the Nazis. My wifels uncle, for instance, was a Com- munist and interned in the concentration camp at ORANIENBURG. My marriage was very much resented in Party circles_. L: Have you been across (the ocean)? W:No, but I hold many American patents. I also worked for TELEFUrIEN. Near . . .(?) I maintained an experimental station for I- G. FARBEN. My work,had very little connection with military things; it was mainly research work. * * * * R:? I am glad, after all, to have declined the invitation of the University. It is better for the present, and besides, a proposed salary of 50,000 marks would be insecure and without a firm basis. * * * R: I had a conference with the Dean of the University, SOFi,IIDT (?) (of STRAS- IYURG?) this last January, together with STEIN and ? ? . At the time the tak- ing over of the'BUERGERHOSPITAL (STRASBCURG) by the University clinic was un- der way. STEIN was involved in this affair, for which he is being reproached severely in Alsace. The faculty became very rich through the acquisition. Besides, STIUNT is rumored to be receiving salaries amounting to 300,000 REIOHS- MARK. He Is a somewhat mtantically inclined person". S EORE Isommionli ?????? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 5 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1111101111mild SECRET W: I remained faithful to Scierce even as a-Party member, and besides, I did not kill anybody, L: Have you taken an active phrt in Army or Party life? W: No, I had a serious operation, and was unable to do so- * * * * * * III. Covering the Retreat R: It was acTime that all the bridges in H.:EIDTIBMG were blown up, but you couldn't talk the general out of it. Since theG217 affair the military are soared to death. You couldn't get over the NECKAR; all:the traffic was - bottled up. Not even boat transportation uas prepared. The people asked the general at least not to blow up the old bridge, .butile said that he had re- ceived orders from higher up, to blow up all tha bridges. W: I received orders from the armament inspectorate (RnSTITGSINSPEKTION) to save the equipment, since it was the only equipment of its kind in Germany. G73HTIMRAT LOGT,RSTAL (?) was also still with me. I had an argument with the regimental commander that ho shoul' not erect a roadbloaok in the vicinity. . I-finally succeeded. W: Shortly before the Americans arrived, an officer from the armament inspec- torate came to see me. I turned over the establisment to him, because my instruments are irreplaceable and must not be destroyed. W: MITTLHAUSZY was defended for four days by Navy petty officers, equipped only with PANZMFATUSTEN, without any heavy weapons - about 100 men, including two holders of the Knights' Cross. Finally only two men wore left. Tho potty officers came from a school in MITTELHAUSEN. W: Thad to leave my wife in MITTTIDORF with our three children. The young- est is 20 days old. The peasants are hostile to us, because they think that we wore tha cause of the battle for the village. * * * :*4 * * * IV. Chemical Warfare W: It has been learned that the Russians manufactured gases to cause anaes- thesia, and that they experimented with them in factories. They have never actually used them, however. R: We Germans are very much afraid of it (gas) and would never make use of it ourselves. None of my colleagues would make himself available foz such a thing - primarily on ethical grounds and also because it might boomerang (02GEN ZWZISCHNI:IOIMIT). My friend Z-ZISS has never mentioned anything about it to me, and that is proof that it does not exist. 6 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 W: The WHRER is Voted as saying,. "When the:Fr arrive they will only find a sloeping Germany." What do you suppose he means? , I am glad I do not know; it is ale * * 7?$ * * * * it4Ty govormont much simpler that way. The AMorioans conduotod themselves quite differently from the way HITLER predicted that they would. They arrived in our little town, they did not ' destroy anything, did not steal or repo, but behaved like real gentlemen. Amorioana ar-31 of oeurso, to a large extent of Gorman origin. Ration cards in MOS8A0Whave boon issued and everything is going on as before. * * * * * * * ..loinOr,(SOHRUCHWEISTER) BRAUN in MOSBAOH, a :Comer democrat, is in chargo -Of the gasworks. They (the Americans) kept him, because he is a particularly 'able fellow. * * * * * * W: The future leeks dark to pc. The Allies Will take away the small amount of gold we have loft - and all the treasures we robbed in Franco as well. The country will be occupied and since it is impo9sible to hide in the w,:oda, it is bettor to give up. ilhat,?dA you think the poop do? from the SS STANDART3N (Regts) are going to I= If the peasants keep their mouthe shut, many people may be able to hide in the ,bAXRISPH2N WALD or in the valloYs of the Alps. That's a good idoa and it being carried out in practice. * * * : Then.) fig a price ot four million:dollars on HTMivILR's head. would turn hIM over tp the Allies, if 1 knew whore he was. * * * * * * * 1 R: We must not think about future.devolopments. I saili in the last faculty Mooting (AIDSIBERG University) that we would have to appeal to the sentiments of the BritiSh and Americans. Perhass we can got the University going again f' in this way. W; Porhaps?the stone plaque with th o names of the Jewish founders such as AR- BURG is still there. That might also help to samo extent. *!* * * W: Now the question arises, how can l'help the cmth 6:tallegiancel 1 believe ihat th . , wl.th the, AMeriCans.- T? can help derri!any th any harm. * the Fatherland without breaking o best thing to do is to collaborate at way very much without doing myself Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 EO RET L: W3 have to forget the p'7,et and we have to work with tho new masters. . W: Yes, that's right, that is the only way to preserve the German people, and we have to do it as good Germans. * * * .R: I believe that our chemical industry will be the only one to remain in existence; also possibly the optical industry since we are, so far ahead in that field. Whether the heavy industry will remain is very doubtful. R: No, other nation has accomplished what. Germany has done. We stood from the Northern tip of Norway (ITCRIDCAP) to the SUEZ Canal, from the Atlantic to MOSCOW. We introduced German art, culture, and way of living. That cannot be forgotten. And surely we shall became and shall bo a groat nation. The Gorman idea will live, ,31731] if it takes twenty-five or fifty years. - Germany will be victorious. What can America do against it? They 'willbuild a few factories and get industry into high gear. But they are still backward, with- out culture and barbaric. They can still learn from us. Imagine what We have accomplish:ed in the war against malaria. Prof MARTINI and two of my as- sistants have achieved great things during the war. And on the Italian front, people such as medical Capt -STIEBEL (?) worked splendidly. W;I mn a confirmed National Sooialiet and a Gorman. It is wonderful to live at ft time like this. YSJAP, NS, NSV, are all marvelous institutionS! Prof BUTTEN .(?) in PRAGUE is the only colleague in my field who comes up to my standards. * * * * * * * Wt The lost war has shown Germany that she is a nation of: leaders that she will become a nation of leaders again, and that she will always remain one. Of course when the white flags hang out in HEILELBERG, and when people run around -with Red Cross armbands, it looks ridiculous to the Americans, and it is degrading for us. R: The British want to take revenge, but they'll have to forget about that. We'll surely have it ?nuch easier under American occupation in Southern Ger- many. VEM. German Occupational and Foreign Pelicy R: In Belgium the Flemish expected great things from us when we came, but we were outsmarted by the Walloons; we wanted to unify the Belgian people. In the medical faculty in BRUSSELS we wanted to work together with Walloons and Flemish alike but it never got beyond the experimental stage. whom did we Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 : SECRET , send as our representative? A German district physician (KREISARZT) to re- present the German medical profession. Yes, the Department of Education (KULTUSMITISTERIUM) and. the foreign policy (AUSSENROLITIK) have been beyond all description (UNTER ALL.R KANONE). in Ger- many lately. 21. April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER AAJ PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 9 CRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 '19 May 45 Copy Approved For Release 2004/02/1q : CIA-RDP83-00415R ENCLOP! R E T No ????7;,..t....?!??, re, r trdi !Tr7f7,77' 06200030002-7 - ,..... ......... . r........... SECRET FTITEId7-7.1-7-7th Am,y: ., . ' , 4 Dae; 1 may 4 1 ; 1 mit; if,t_6., .g. -.4._ : ? 'SEVENTH RvtY INT RROGATIO11 ontR. ' AO 756 . US ARMY , If the information containeid in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information'has been obtained. The fol.lowing are the namr,s and secret numbers of the prison- ers mentioned in this report: ? Eat dank, Position Secret No 1 , GORING, Hermann REICHSMARSCHALI 45/1409 , LAMMERS, Hans Heinrich MIMI Minister and ' 45/1495 Chie of Chancellery t' ? ; gaRET 6?????=11110 4'? -0 ; //.. . Approved For Release 2004/02/1q : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 , , -7 - 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/1 CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 E (i :1. 7 T NOTE: The following is a literal tra-Islaion of a conversation bet- ween GO?RING, LAMEERS, and several interrogating officers. I. HITIER's Successor 4,?? GORING: T must tell you something. You are the head of the Chancel- lery, you signed all documents, You became aware of a change in the situation only by accident, not through any official papers. You knew about it only after Do11.11TV radio address, Anybody could appear tomorrow and declare, "T received a radio nesSage after PONIT,Z received his; I am the head of the state now..." I, for one, have written proof (about the nomination of a successor)...., and when DONITZ appears now, he must ha-e some sort of written or- ders. LAMMERS: Yes, that's clear; he will have to produce documentary proof. G: If he has any, he has to make it known to the German people in the REICHSANZEIGER (Official Legal Record). Here we have a case of a he7,.i of a state who really is not a head of a state, since no proof can be found. On the other 114.4, I am the only one who, as legal head of the state, could possibly be recognized by the American Government at the present time, and who could negotiate. This is the greatest deception ever foisted.. The Law of 13 Sept 34, the original of which we have here, is the basis for the .ease. According to this decree, HITLER can name only one successor. There is also a decree issued after HESS' ? flight (reads HITLER's Decree of 29 Jan 41): "In the ;eventuality that I would be hindered in the execution of 'duties, even if only temporarily, and should I be un- able to give special directives during the time of my in- diSposition.l. appoint as my successor in all my offices REICHSMARSCHAIL of the Greater German REICH, Hermann .04ING. Signed HITLER; This Decree voids the Decret of 23 Aptil 38 eoneerning the FUHRER's successor." This is the Son why the REICHSMARSCHALL (GORING himself) sent an 1,114.14iting telegram (in April) It wasn't really necessary that I inquire (whether HITLER had died) it was only out of loyalty that I did The coup d'etat was made only because I wanted to avoid further bloodshed, on 23 Ap-i' 45.... You can well say that BORMANN is crazy! L.; had received the order concerning the FtHRER's successor from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the WEHRMACHTSFIYHRUNGS- SAB (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the followin manner. Gen WINTER Wrote, "Inclosed I am sending you the cOntents of'an order whch was received by Grand Admiral DONITZ: 'In the place Of REICHSMARSCHALL GORING, the PUHRER appoints you, HERR GROSSADMIRAI, as his successor. Official documents follow. As of now, you will take all measUres which are necessary according to the present situ- ation' - from this it can be concluded that HITLER was dead - 'signed: REICHSLEITER BORMANN". G: Is there anything more fantastic than this fraud committed by nORMANX?...You know, the decisive point in my inquiry VM8 (the request for) freedom of action in foreign matters. ECR ET 2 earmiargii Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/1i : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 O. : Could he broimmiat , have don.cl-ww-egall:y? I. No, in that case he would have ha 6 to put it on paper. G. Now I ask you, HERR L.AinS, do you really believe that alter the PtJHRER had publicly declared my appointment as his successor, and since he further announced my illness or poky withdrawal from office, he would not have been able to aandunce over the radio such an important change as that ,of his successor? 1.0.: Now, I'd like to know, aid you withdraw from all your duties because of ill health, or was this step ordered from else- where? ? G: It was ordered from elseWhere. Ee (HITLER) threatened to shoot me Or to throw me Out of all jobs, except My appoint- m4t as his Successor. I.O.: NOT to relieve you as his successor? G: No, That has he connection with any office. I.O.: Youadmit.that you did not actually resign? G: No. I was forced to do so. Otherwise I would have been execu- ted.iMmediately. 1: I would like to point out another thing which is of import- ance. After this action (GORING's demotion) a press notice appeared which stated that the REICHSNARSCHAIL resigned as Oompander of the Air Porce, because of a heart ailment... he still retained his title as REICHSMARSCHAIL... and the decree (about HITLER'S successor) was therefore still effect- , ' ???? G ieU, 1 must say, these ?mn crooks have put over a coup that is outstanding.... I have always known that, ih the event of something hapnening to the IITERER, my life would : be in the greatest danger for the following 48 hours. After ?that time I would have performed the swearing in, and it would have been a legal fact. At any rate, I would have ar- e 12WN within 48 hours. , ?o. I wou? ave carr ci ou wo personal ac ions imflediately: the arrest of BORMANN and the firing of RIBBENTROP.... They Were the two thorns in my ,side. sor 4* * G: I told some GAMITERs w o were close to me, about a year and a half ago, when everything became clear to me, that if tate ever designated me as (HITDER's) ;successor, I would place a High Court over Mei I told myself that no man should assame,the responsibility of not having anybody over him... A dictatorship must never come again, it does not work. We see it now. As long as d' man is good, as HITLER was in the beginning, everything is wonderful... but (then) it came to "-PremeS. Approved For Release 2004/02/1 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 II. Chemical Warfare 1.0.: I believed that HITLER would use gas t the last minute. G: No, Once, toward the end, he cOnsidered CW, but we told him that gas was out of the question. I was told that all your gas' masks would have offered no protection. The gas Was so dangerous that I wouldn't permit another demonstration. I knew:that the gas would have had to be transported to the tear when the Americans came, and the effect of an air attabk on the train might have been catastrophic. Just imagine; a train of 75 loaded freight cars attacked from the airi.a bomb frees the gas, and the -fragments which fly 6,7,8, or even 10 km spread it! 1.0.: But experts are of the opItlioA that one needs many.more gas bombs than HE Or incendiaries' to destroy a city. G: Let mei tell yeu this asa specialist; the most dangerous are the incendiaries. The Ametcans have really given us the - works with HE bombs... A 'small incendiary falls into a house and the whole side of the street burrs If incendiaries are . . tArown against railroad yards, then, of course, it doesn't Make sense at Some of the factories (which had been aitapkeC) - if you stood in front of them you could never believe thatthey"d be rebuilt. CITROEN, in PARIS, for instance. ". After six weeks tbeystarted working again. The whole roof was down. But where there was a fire, all machines were ? ruined. Fire is the worst of all... We knew that we were more advanced in chemical warfare and that we had more dangerOUS gases. When 'one has such gases, one must expect to use them some day. G: Well, we thought America 'would start chemical warfare. It was pointed out that America did not have to fear for her cities. 4Aa the troops who attack with gas can protect themselves better than the population. We also planned to attack England Ith, gas in case the Americans resorted to chemical warfare. Tha question of possible consequences of a bombing attack against a gas-manufacturing factory was raised on numerous OecaSions:. Was the population to be evacuated? (But) the ITHRER never wanted to get the population excited about gas. That, of course, is understandable; I would have acted the same way. During the last few years the air superiority was .so one-sided, so pronounced. We told ourselves that every- thing would be spoiled by bringing up the topic of chemical warfare. as? IX,: What did HITLER moan by his well-known saying: "God forgive me the last three days of the war"? G: Ho NEVER said that. III. HITLER's Death L '00.: Do you actually believe ihat HITLER is dead? G: Well he WAS sick. A cerebral liemorthage was doubtlessly with- 4 linommiummi )11minmeimmirOi 1E.211.E.T. Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/1a : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 in the realm of possibility, in that condition. Whether this led to his end, or IhheIher the man committed suicide. I.O.: Are you definitely sure that he is dead? 0: I have no doubts about pm. so. hr. 40 mar owe G: The PW.IRER collapsed on the evening of the 22nd (April), as a result of the war situation. The whole thing was set off by my telegram in which I alroct for freedom of action in matters of foreign policy. Since I had talked about negotiations (with the Allies) for weeks and months, they knew exactly that I would attempt to negotiate immediately, the very same , day. Several generals we-ted to surrender. -IV. Epreign Illtunpz Account LI There is an aceount with the RE-ICI-MBANK which originates from donations made in various,currencjea, even in gold coins. We opened the account for him (HITLER) under my name, but it be- longs to the POHRER. IX.: You say the 76,000 dollars are with the RBICHSBANK? L: Yes, they are there. The kEICHSBANK holds a gift from a man from Transvaal who donat4 69,000 dollars; German- Americans donated 2,400 dollars, anonymous gifts amount to 478 dollars. I want to emphasize that it is not my account that I .m turn- in over here - it is proved by the documents, too. Egua - SPEER Conference G: The talk he (RITLER) had with SPEER was very interesting. Ten days before the collapse, on the 17th (April), HITLER called SPEER and accused him of pabotaging the "scorched earth" poli- cy. SPEER replied, that the people did not want this policy and that there wasn't enovgh time. The PtHRER then said, oThat's the end, then! Why don't you toll me you know that thf. war Will be won?. ." "No," said SPEER, "I can't saY7--"Ehat:" Said the POIMER: ;"Can't you .say that ysa believe that this war will be won?" "No", replied SPEER, "I can't say that". The rUHRER then asked, "Can't you say at least that you hope that' the_ war eAri. 0141.,b),w94?',QuOth SEER, "I can't say that, it is perfectly clear to me that everything is over." HITLER then said, "SPEER, it HAS to be done, everything de- . ponds on it". "We are short of everything", was SPEER's reply. "Can't you say y.21.1 wish that the war will be won?" asked: gITIJER, "Yes, can-"gE7 that", said SPEER. The FUHRER then ApPrOached him and said, "I thank you for saying, at least, the' b'pst you could. But lean see only this"- perspiration stood on his forehead -"wc must realize that we must hold out until the last hour, no matter how much lightning and thunder. know we will come through!" VI. 414.9Nly 100.: as resistance in tho'mou4tains not anticipated? 4 G: 011.4 .yes, it was anticipated. The SS was working on it bUt } Approved For Release 2004/02/1 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/1q : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Vistammargi 3 ..[OR._C I they made a Mess of it, that's quite clear tome. It was also too late, Like in ther instances, nobody ever listened to the officers. 400 .00' 0?0 . 0, ?111.1. ??11111 L: We want to offer our services to the Allies. We are not war criiinals. G: We want to see to it that there is order and peace, especial- ly until matters regarding the rblationship to the Allied forces have been cleared up; to avoid uprisings in connection to CommuniSm, etc, which would be very embarrassing to the Americans and English. This is the only aim we can possibly have after the collapse, and I am the one who can not only helps but who also knows all the episodes of the past. mar kw. Ira L: The last time I was with the FIIHRFP oa 27 March. A lot of papers awaited his signature. Some were weeks old. He said, HIYou sign them!" I declined. His main opic was that Frede- rick the Great did not know when the war would end, either. ...HITLER was greatly excited about the REICHSMARSCHALL at- tempting to start negotiations with the Allies. And then they mentioned in the last leaflet that the REICHSHARSCHAIL was going to flee... 19 May 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER Yt.t.?6,1 PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 6 ,SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062 - 24 May 45 Copy No 30 00030002-7 Dictoscullt SECRET lio : S,ECRET: :Auth: CGL, 7th Army : iInit: :Date: 24 May l95 : SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 us ARMY If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained. The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners men- tioned in this report: Name GOERING, Hermann Rank, Position REICHSMARSCHALL ? VON BRAUCHITSCH, Bernd Walter Col, GAF, GOERING's Adjutant Secret No 45/1409 45/1410 This report should be read in conjunction with Reports Ref No SAIC/X/3, /9 May 45 and Ref No SAIC/X/4, 21 May 45. 1 S E Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 fI. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .00.10001- SECRET wommillimmoommommon 24 May 45 lomm. I. PERSONALITIES INTERROGATING OFFICER: When was the last time that you personally saw HITLER alive? GOERING: In the evening of the 20 Apr, around half past eight. We raced away. IO: To get away that same evening? G: Yes, yes. Afterwards he retracted his order that I was to go South--, in his usual manner, and ordered me to be at his cave on the follow? ff ing day. The room was very small. He (HITLER) sat at a large table, and we all stood around it--about twenty of us. ? IO: Was that in the cellar of the chancellory? G: Yes, deep down in the shelter. I can't believe that he let himself be shot. You should have seen him--his whole body shook violently. And he grew more vicious with every moment. + + + IO i By the way, this Professor HOFFLANN, the photographer, should be able to tell quite A bit about the FUEHRER. G: More than anyone else. + + + G: You ought to know how he (HITLER) lived in the last two or three years. As long as nothing unusual was going on, he would get up at half past eleven, after being awakened at nine o'clock. He would read the newspapers and then sleep some more. Then he'd get up and the daily routine would start. Then came the discussion of the (military) situation. Ordinarily this discussion lasted from three to four hours--during which he would- get terribly excited. We had to remain throughout the conference. Then he would eat dinner and during the evening he used to talk to some officer from headquarters After discussing the evening situation he would go to bed at nine o'clock, and at twelve o'clock he would get up again. IO: Wasn't there a discussion of the evening situation in the morning? G: Yes, the second one was at half past twelve or one o'clocki and - lasted two'houra After that we had the 'conference. It waS attended by GUDERIAN, BORMANN, FEGELEIN (HIMMLER's liaison 111.an to HITLER) and BURCKHARDT(?).Everything was brought up there to the least little detail. All sorts of things were rushed through at this conference. G: BORMANN was not only head of the party offices, but one day--about a year and a half ago--we were surprised by the following interest? ing letter: "The FUEHRER has repeatedly given me assignments and orders which do not come under the jurisdiction of the party, but 2 s E cf-7/mmowna Approved For Release 2604/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 24 May 45 MIMIOMINIIII.0".1.111111111111MMINiii are of a military nature. He did this In' oder to give .me the' authority to pass his orders along in this line as' well, and to', supervise .their execution. As of today,,the FUEHREH has made me his Secretary." So now he was secretary to' the FUEHRER! And then there Was Another thing. The Minister of justice had to submit to him the sentences pertaining to disloyalty trials in the Army. HOHMANN returned them with the remark, that they were a disgrace, that such an antagonism of the court was impossible--he would see to it that the attorneys would be dismissed from office. He had the minister of justice completely under his thumb. By rights; SEYSS-INQUART in Holland should have made his roPorts to the State inspector, SOYMEHSU But no, he had td give his reports directly to HOHMANN. The only one who put up a struggle was 2OVEN in Norway, but he was taken ' care of. + + + 1 G: ?RIMER said that Count HERNADOTTE had come to see him. He told me4 "You know, he must have been the man EISENHOWER sent as a negotiator. I replied: "I can't believe that. Don't take offense, but I doubt whether they will accept You as a negotiator." Than he retorted: , "Sorry to contradict you, but I have undeniable proof that I am considered abroad to be the only person who can maintain peace and order," And after :that, he didn't care what happened. And I thought he might have more proof than I, and restrained myself. So I said,: "I just can't picture that." And he always came back tty the? samething: "If anything should happen to the FUEHRER, and you art unable to take over--after that might happen-'-can I say such and such?" That occurred at least 10 times during those 2 or 3 hours I kept wondering: "Why should I be unable to take ov,er?-- Why. should I be cut off?a....Theil it suddenly dawned upon me....POPITI, (?) al- ready had mentioned something like that...And when I mentioned that to him (HIMMLER), he said: "Well, maYbe POPIN (?y may have said something like that. He might claim to know something. But as far as I am concerned it is an unheard-of 'impertinence." I wanted to ? talk with POPITZ (?) again, and they said: "Of course, of course!" And when I asked, when our talk could be arranged, they told me:It may not be possible to arrange it today, but,on the day after to- morrow," That day passed without .the talk. Then I heard one day that the FUEHRER had ordered POPITZ (?) sentenced to death. The ,eXecution was postponed until later... Well, I couldn't help that either.... G: This HIMMLER--he really startled me during this last conversation Of ours. He made the ridiculous suggestion, that I nominate him as Chancellor upon becoming HITLANH's successor. I replied to him: "I cannot do that, because according to our constitution the offices of Chancellor and President are combined." Then he said: "Sir, if anything should prevent you from becoming the successor, can I have the job then?" There I replied: "My dear HIMMLER', we'll have to wait and see. That will depend upon the circumstances. I can't see what should prevent me from taking the office. What could stop me?".... And that happened in our last conversation at least ten . times. As I sat there, I pleaded with him. All he would have to do, 3 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-T' 1.1101111111.10101.nimpimilimimilimmil 24 May 45 would be to say just one word to his SS men, and I would be free. (G was arrested by SS end of Apr 45) But he dodged the question, and said that unfortunately my detention had been ordered by the FUEHRER, He knew for sure that it was a mistake. Everything would be cleared up shortly. So he just let me sit there. Lt Col FRANKE of the SS can testify to that II, ART TREASURES AND FUNDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES G: I'd like to get the whole thing straightened out. I can tell you confidentially, that certain objects were destroyed completely. And I will confide a secret to you: there are some things buried at KARIN HALL. There are large objects--four beautiful sculptures. I'll tell you what's there-- including these-sculptures. Then you'l: have the whole story. Where I have traded things, I'll give you others. Those things which belong to me, can be stored for the time being.. ..But I am not responsible for the FUEHRER's stuff. All I can do for you is to tell you where my own things are. It will do good to be able to say: 'These items are taken care of--I can forget about them." + + + G: One day I was approached by a man who owned an insignificant house in a suburb. He had his own glass workshop. He owned a tremendous collection, and sold me a few valuable pieces. From him I bought two church windows, 8 m high. IO: You must have built some sort of a chapel. G: No, I did not. However, I bought an entire chapel in France, an old one. I took only its windows. I was given a Gothic house in ABBEVILLE with all the trimmings. All I could use were the inside panelling, the winding stair-case and the big gate. Then a woman wanted to sell me a Spanish Harem, So I looked at it. There were wonderful things in it. But I couldn't use anything with the ex- ception of a beautiful davenport, which I purchased. Hardly six months later FRANCO asked me what had happened. He said he had heard that I purchased a castle in Spain. Thank goodness that wasn't so. + + + G: I don't have a cent abroad. A number of the most crooked deals were made in the name of the FUEHRER or the REICHSMARSCHALL (himself, And everything passed through the German customs sanctioned with our names. von BRAUCHITSCH: And some of the most notorious orders, of which no one knew whether they were genuine, were given in the name of the FUEHRER or REICHSLIARSCHALL G: I made a present to my sistex-in-law in Sweden, so that she. could buy a small house for herself. That was a famous Swedish castle... The last time I was in Sweden, was in 1935.... Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 24 may 45 III. AIR FORCE Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 imaimmtbismstrosmarormassatili G: I have looked through, all these 'casualty, reports,. And I found more losses than we had announced.. It was important for us, of course, to prove that We had. shot down always one or two more planes than the Others. You shoUld have seen what ridiculous statements we made--you co'Tldn't help laughing when you read them. Take for example ti .. time when we wrote that we were to get a plane with a 12 cm cannon + + + IO: Did you know anything about remote-controlled bombs? G: They had one disadvantage. They (the planes) had to reach an altitude of 6000 meters and had to fly in an absolutely straight line toward their targets for two minutes, without being able to dodge. IO: Did you know where EISENHOWER's headquarters were in Africa? G: No. But we knew that there was et 'fleeting in CASABLANCA. We ' did not like to attack'hedquarters anyway. We thought that might be a mutual understanding. G: The heaviest Casualties Were in HAL=G, UUPPERTAL, and DRESDEN. It was terrible. The people of DRESDEN couldn't believe that You would bomb the city, because they thought MESDEN was too well known as a cultural center. The city was overcrowded. + + + (G on planned air attack on Russia's power plants) ' G: In spite of the existing fuel shortage, enough gasoline was re- served for this attack, Everything was ready. And then the FUEHRER would have to order the demolition of these ridiculous bridges across the ODER river, which the Russians could repair overnight anyway! Ridiculous to use this magnificent machinery just to destroy these bridges.--It was maddening. All these large- scale plans had to fall through. I just couldn't stand it anymore. I finally worked myself into a nervous condition. It); And what did you do for relaxation? G: I took vitamin tablets, read detective stories, and smoked my cigars very slowly. You know, I Can read the, sane detective story three times without tiring of it. IO: Did the FUEHRER read stories like that too? G: No, that Was only I. He got them. for me. The FUEHRER read only very serious literature ' And so, little by.iittle, I was Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 r11.11.1111.1.11114.1111.1k 24 May 45 disgraced. But what was I to do? I'd give an order, only to find out on the next day that it was all nonsense He attacked my friends, but he meant me. And then, toward the end, just because he heard the word "negotiations" he wanted to cut me off from everything--and that after 23 years + + + + + + + , IV. CONCENTRATION CAMPS Gs These pictures (of DACHAU) which you showed me yesterday must depict theactivities of the last few days. It is beyond me, just - what was behind all that. ELLER must have suddenly gotten .a fiendish pleasure out of such things. I have heard such stories before, for example that a large. load of Jews left for Poland during the winter, where some of the pEeple froze to death in their vehicles.. I heard of these things mostly from the ranks of my employees and from the people. When I made inquiries, I was told, that such things would not happen again--it was claimed that the trains had been sent on the wrong route. Then there was some -talk about what you call "VERNICHTUNGSTRUPPEN" (Extermination troops). It was claimed that there were many diseased people in these camps and that many died of pestilence. These troops had the job of bringing- the corpses to a crematorium where they would be burned. +++ G: All cruelty was repulsive co me. I can name many people whom I have helped,- even Communists and Jews. My wife was so kind--I really have to be grateful for that. I often thought, if only the FUEHREll would have had a sensible wife who would have said to him: "Here is a case where you can do some good, and here another, and this one " that would have been better for everyone It was very depressing for me. In some cases I had to write to HIMMLER, that he shouldrelease this one and that one. And he would reply, that he was very sorry, but that he could not do it, or perhaps that he didn't want to do it. But there were quite a few cases, where he did it anyhow.... But now it is pretty clear to me that all my efforts were wasted. Whoever attacked HIL,, was eliminated. On top of. that, he lied to me. Not a single report was read to the FUEHRER G: I wanted the foreign workers to be rounded up so that they could be turned over to the advancing enemy troops at some central point .instead of being allowed to run around loose. And then I told him (HITLER) that the concentration camps should be guarded if at all possible, until the British or the Americans arrived, because we were detaining quite a number of criminals there whiCh neither we nor they would want to release. They should have been guarded, and the enemy should have taken the responsibility of segregating those whom he did not wish to release. You surely can't be interested in freeing a lot of criminals. And the same thing goes for workerk from foreign territories--that was my biggest worry. I told him that something would have to be done about them, as well as about prisoners of war. We also mentioned Russian prisoners of war--but 1111111111410111111111111011141.01111011.111114.1111% ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 6 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 24 May 45 ? there we knew what would happen if-they broke loose. The French were very decent.,, they were mainly employed as farmhands. T + + + + 4 4 + V. JEW BAITING AND RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES G: These NUREMBERG laws came as a great surprise to Me. I am still wondering today, where they could haVe originated. I knew only too well that they would cause bad feelings 'abroad. ,.. I was in charge of the Four-Year Plan. At that time SCHACHT came to see me and said: "Sir, these incidents will cause us serious economic difficulties abroad." So I went there, and they showed me the laws, saying that they had not beell approved yet. Some of the clauses were being changed, but there were no major changes. And from then on the Jew-baiting really started. The United States ? respended with a most disr7reeable boycott. And I was given a ' lecture, that from now on it would-be very difficult to maintain any kind of commercial relation with America. But all this was temporarily forgotten in the excitement over the Sudeten incident in Sep 38, Then the war started in '39. For the time being, all was well. Then, early in '40 they went to it again--paying par- ticular attention to the Jews in the occupied countries. I have to admit that things kept'getting worse, and that they were sanctioned by various groups. All.sorts of impossible excesses ? occurred. I didn't approve of thea, but unfortunately I couldn't do' anythingagainst them. I didn't have too good a name with the party myself. The first time when'theY really attacked me was in '3,8. They didn't say anything about the wedding, but when I had my child christened Ln the first year of my marriage, I was attack- ed vehemently. It was claimed by the party, that the christening bf my child would put the FUEHRET1 into a terrible diletma if it ever'became known. They wanted me to name my child, without a :religious ceremony. That may all be well arid good, except that the ? FUEHRER had been put up to this--particularly by the Minister of the Interior and GOEBBELS. Then IPTZE, chief of the SA, started to reproach' me, saying that such a step against the Nazi party was intolerable. And from then Oil there wasno end .of trouble--someone would always point out this incident. Later on we had some serious arguments. It was intended to merge the two religions.. ..Next we had these terrible days in Tirol?there were some uprisings when these silly Hitler youth boys started trouble in a church. KERRL, who is a smart man? said: "I am a,eatholic myself, I do not want to haVe,anytking to do tiththat." WAGNER ofMUNICH had. the same attitude. The whole thing was jst plain madness. VI, MISCELLANY G: It was only since very recently--say for the last 4 weeks--that he (HITLER) said: "We can't help it anymore." + + + G: I had ihe feeling that it would take nothing short of a miracle to save our cause. But I believed we might be able to fight to a Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 sommemeasmommmmismils 24 May 45 draw by taking more radical measures. Unfortunately I wasn't boss. There were a lot of ether things too. The Army was so unwieldy--it should have been reorganized. The leadership of the Army was broken up through SS interference--there was a serious split. The maddest scheme hadn't even been introduced yet, that was to cooe soon. There was to be a merger of the party leader- ship with the Army command. BORLANN was to draw up the necessary legal measures. He would have had to pass judgement on every little general. ++. G: If you'd ask me now, when .I first gave up the war for lost, I'll have to admit that I had some doubts and worries for quite a while-- but I only realized our illaY.j,t4hle defeat since.the very last few days. You see, I made every effort to find a way out, because I believed we had a good chance to hold out much longer. , I think I can tell you frankly that things would have gone differently, if I had been supreme commander. We would have used jet-propelled planes much earlier--and that would have been most unpleasant for you. + + (Re: Counterattack in Hungary) G: DIETRICH then went down there with the Sixth Panzer Army. The order to attack was given,. The offensive was made by two divisions after a km forced march, and repelled. When HITLER received the news he went raving mad. He said: "If we lose, the war it will be his (SEPP.DIETRICH's) fault." And he immediately issued these two orders: First of all, the four divisions, "HITLER,JUGEND", l'ADOLF HITLER", "DAS REICH," and another one, were to take off their brassard& immediately, and were not to wear any decorations for throe days. And HINVILER was to go to VIENNA right away in order tc. tell SPP DIETRICH, he should by rights be sentenced to death. Also that he (HIMMLER) was to' set an example of this man who had been a traitor to his country. Then all was quiet ,for a few days. Bul, later it started all over again. We were really done far. G; But BORMANN charged Frau SCHOLTZ-KLINK with the formation of a women battalions. Many already had participated in anti-aircraft work, such as operation of searchlights; that is true. But just pyiton!,, such women's battalions were to be committed against the PuWans in the second line. Their training was supposed to in- clude the use of machine guns. + + + IO: T9 what extent did Germany use liquid air? G; Liquid air, how do you mean that? B: Liquid air was an addition to explosives, since they became scarce. IO: We440 that it had been used in Russia. The Russians demanded t1a it be discontinued immediately, otherwise, they would use gas. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 8 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 24 May 45 Gs No, that is a lot of Aonsense. + + + G: THE PEUPLE NEVER CALLED ME ANYTHING ELSE BUT dHERINANN"! ONLY HERMANN! NEVER ANYTHING ELSE BUT HERMANN! TO BE CALLED BY ONE'S FIRST NAME - THAT IS THE HEIGHT OF POPULARITY. 24 May 1+5 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER ,5(4,j _PAUL KnALA, Maj, MI i! Commanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For wir......reiserempot,..grammemrszAkimmi.,2 5 1 A 14io2I19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ECUISt RE iMflt , ***** ....... L _ :Autiv CG, 7-Th Army ; ,:init: ' .',...4'z 04_,...ret, ? ? :pate: 28 May 1947"?: SEVENTH ARMY INTEERWATION CENTER APO 758 US ARMY Copy .No ? #4,4,4 *** If ,the inforationcontaj.ned in this report is, required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased _that no mention is made of the prisoners' .names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained. , ? The _following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners men- tioned in. this rpTcrt4 110,11. GUDERIAN Heinz Rank Position GEN01.38T (Co]. Ge) FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool). Formerly Chief Of Staff German, Ground Forces and Inspector General of Armored Units. GEN D_PHRUPPX, (Lt Gen), Inspector of Arripred units, formerly German Attach'e in i.Olv'DQN,. ? OBSTGRUF (Col Gpn of WAN ss ) , ex-CG, Army Group "G".. VON GYRI, Leo HAUSS Secret No 45/1559 ? `, 45/3561 Pit43-0 ,13 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 28 May 45 I. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN GUDERIAN: Everything went well at the Start. After the fall of SMOLENSK our high command was faced with the Bathe choice of decisions as NAPOLEON in 1812; Should I first go to MOSCOW, or should I first con- quer the UKRAINE and Occupy Russia's national granary,: .... or should. I go to conquer LENINGRAD in order to get the Baltic Sea under my control. This problem hid been considered earlier, because everyone knew that such a decision would have to be made sometime. Even before this campaign the FUERRER had decided to take LENINGRAD first, in order to have the entire Baltic Sea under his control, and ,thus establish a naval base supporting the German left flank. At the time when our troops stood at the gates of LENINGRAD, and when the drive was held up at KIEV, on our right flank, he suddenly chang- ed his mind, He abandoned the idea to take LENINGRAD first-74n attempt which could have succeeded. Nor did he attempt to take MOSCOW as NAPOLEON had done--in spite of our firm conviction that MOSCOW could be taken. In fact, I had already given orders for an attack on MOSCOW for 15 Aug with my PANZER Army. Instead he decided, after weeks of thought, to conquer the UKRAINE first. Thus, on 25 Aug, I had to head back in a southwesterly direction toward KIEV, instead of being allowed to ?Aartmy drive toward MOSCOW. Well, at least the capture of KIEV resulted in the isolation and surrenaer of an; army group. But it set us back 4 weeks in our advance toward MOSCOW. It got us into the muddy season, where the mud made traffic on ordinary roads impossible, and retarded it very much even on hard- surfaced roads. It was Winter be4ore it got too cold: You mustn't underestimate NOSCOW's importance., MOSCOW is not only the capital of Russia, but considering the conditions of 1941, it was the hub of Russia's communication system. .All the connections between North and .South whien were still usable, all double-track railroad line, all the main telegraph and telephone fines, all canals and navigable rivers,.. everything passed throuah MOSCOW. Whoever controlled MOSCOW also controlled the political affairs, a powerful armament industry, and a traffic and comMuriications center of that nation, and could split Russia into two parts. I personally presented this case to the FUERRER on the night of 23 Aug 1941. Then he was still un- decided. Later the order was given to take the UKRAINE. I was called to him to present my plan for the attack on MOSCOW once again. And once again I tried to change his Mind. At that time he still could control himself sufficiently to listen to me and let me finish my Story. Once more I pictured the vital importance of MOSCOW to us and eXplained to him, that if we could capture MOSCOW in the early Vaal toward the end of September, we could cut Russia in two parts. And ..then we could still decide whether to occupy the Southern or the Northern half first. That was the purely military angle of the affair. Now let us consider the political angle, which was equally important. It was believed that the STALIN regime would break down politically. But in order to bring this regime to a collapse it was necessary to occupy MOSCOW. We should have pursued a policy of con- vincing the Russian people that they would get a better deal if they cooperated with us. We should not have said, as we did: "We shall cut Russia. into small pieces. We shall divide it and make a German colony out of it." Thus the Russians, even those who were against - STALIN, the White Russians, said: "No, we won't have that." This Was our great political error. The decision to take the UKRAINE first, which resulted in the unsuccessful winter campaign against MOSCOW, and the misguided policy toward the Russian people--these two were the reasons why we did not find the nec,P,-- _support among ii.._.-mormsorarsaisinswegaganai Approved For Rel se arm : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Releas LTh2 May 45 *41""'"' 9: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .the population, nor the military*strength to finish this campaign as quickly as possible. And 'this was so essential, because there Still was an undefeated enemy in the West. On top of everything, , . Japan and America came to grips., and we thought we might have to enter that conflict too. So we -issued a new declaration of war, Which'aaaed America to the 'side of Our enemies. I don't know the reasons for this last decision. But I was at the front, commanding Ly'army1 -and thus couldn't fariliarize myself with every detail. (Re: Why' X/EV was taken first and t"iMsaa) A GUD; I onferr'ed with the FUEHPER tWice about this question, once on 3 Aug (5Once.on 23 Aug. At that tithe the general staff, too, was in 'laver Of attacking IWSCOW first: G: When the PANZER Army GuntnIAN finally did attack, we had a temper- ature or aeg ll0;) below and an icy 'wind , , At that time the Only way to employ armored diviSions, was to gather the tanks of a ?nUMber different' divisions. That shows how few tanks we had left. There was no time for rebairs, nor did we have the necessary lquipmenl and spare parts. My Own division, which I had led up to that campaign, was reduced to 12 tanks at 10SC0Vq. ?\INTERROGATING OFFICER: How high do you estimate the casualties at that time? GD: During,the winter damPhigh Of 1141 they were not too'high. Our ? Vrincipal losses were causedthrough the cold. But to be honest, . , _ OasUalties weren't abnormally high until we came to STALINGRAD. JI*c were our,firSt Catastrophic lasses. Then we had these terrific enve1opMent6 Ire had -some 300,000 casualties there. From thn n, with these COntinued ehvelopMents of large units, we suff- ered our first irrepIacable losses. That was also where the German OtiUier!s morale started.its-dOWAWard slide. There he lost his Sense of invincibility. :Our meh took, part in practically every attack, without complaint.' But' in this final campaign'we no longer could attack. None of our attacks succeeded; And before that, not -? - even our most diffidalt attacki failed, .J Re; Count VON SC1IULENBU16) 4 GUD; He was a native of M08COW, went to school there, and Was said to be exCeedingly well acquainted with the country. From a military point , . cif view, he was one Of the besf authorities on Russian tactics, and 'in addition to that he had vergood connections in -Russian military circles,' T knew that for a Cerltainty.' Be operated just like a Russian,. The RuSsians were mote open and more friendly ,toward him than they were toward'moat foreigners. Thus we always were well informed, Nobody can say that his reports were incorrect, but no one would believe t4e;ii. 4 GUD; IT fewer of our outstanding strategists had been dismissed in 1943 ' and at the end of 1941, we would have fought an entirely different I myself, was relie'Ved of mY Commaid on the basis of a false report whiCh a senior general had made'about me. In Jan 1942, after returning from Russia, -I demanded-an investigation by a military clQurt. It was my intention to'have the facts straightened out. My ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 request was net granted. In the case of another general, an in- veStigaiion was also refused, One general filed a suit, Which, how- ever,' *0 hot carried through, In the following spring a law was passed which suspended the regular courts. Thus the dictatorship wasj#mly entrenched in the ariy. ' From then on it was imposs- ible to file a suit, or to demand a trial. Later, when the law was intensified, it even became T'Aripossible to resign, my predecessor as Chief of the General Staff handed in his resignation five times, but it_was_never)accepted. ,When I was assigned to the General Staff Without peing consulted about tie assignment, I was received with these_words'; "I do not want you Start out by tendering Your res- ignation. It wouldn't be granted anyway. It is up to me (HITLER) whether yeu stay in your Office or not?your wishes are of no con- , sequence:. I alone am responsible for what happens--not you!" + + + + + II, THE INVASION" IO: There is, a sharp difference between the tank battles on the Eastern .front, and those of the Western front. Those in the EAST were al- ways on a larger scale. ? MR: That is just what we wanted. wanted to spare our tanks, in , , qrApr to be abletto engage the Americans and the English in a real fight where we could put our experiences of the Eastern front to good use'. .1 was of .a different opinion than ROMEt. I.expected your landing to:be:successful. The Angio-Saxon world had prepared itself fer,alanding-and we could not stop the guns Of the Anglo-American lleet and its aircover with merely a few mineS. The troops would :pimply walk ashore, There was our one chance ,to engage the Allies in a real tank battle while PATTOt was still assembling his units. It would. have .been. a boon to my,old had another chance to fight with the divisions I had trained myself. But fate wouldn't have it po ROMMEL,'s armored,divisionS were largely dispersed, and Under constant AT lire. IO: But it was almost 2 months aftei. the invasion before PATTON broke through at AVR.SCHES. dEYR: That made our mistake a worse one yet, TO: He forced yo U into a Very Smallpocket. GaR: That is the reason why I was relieved. After CHERBOURG was taken, '?.elloile realized, including' NAPSCHALL RUNDSTEDT that the CAEN bridge head v4604 have to be vacated I proposed that in order to savethe armorSd divisiOns, so that I could let them get Some rest and then cominit them on the left ,flank, ,Every would-be officer realized that the Americans would come down from CHERBOURG to break, through our 7th Army positions. I had the divisions (to stop them) but was not permitted to employ them in this manner. was too late, even then, We already had CHEROURG. ; GEM There wap slim chance of succesq., t our chances would have been e0h-better'at AVRAIIONES. At 4at time you could have been defeated. 0: I still remember that tilere weri arr:ored divisiOns opposing u. And we always wondered when t be committed. If ihommommimmumlum...mmd Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 -oirimmolprwripprewilmow-,-,----- Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 GEYR: I can, te)-1,You exactly, which divisions I had in store for you. The 17 SS Division and the aivision ubAS'REICH,? a first rate outfit were reSerVed for the Americans 'Then we had saved for you the 114444404114TE" and "HITLERJUGEND6' divisions and large components the 2iArmored and tho 5 Armord. , That was ouite a far cry from / , , . T. the overstrained 17 Divisioh. They were a brave new unit, more or. le,ss the only ones in the 7 Army sector who fought brilliantly. . . . , iqes that there were a few medium-sized armored units which did .. , , t bolong to the 7 Army sector. - , HAUSSER; There was also the LEHR division. It was further back on the ht flank. ant According to the original plan, t e (PANZER) tEHR division was not to be comMittecl, Butl could nat'withdraw it from the vicinity of BAYEUX except by vacating the CAEt bridgehead. That bridgehead was no ',onger of any use to us c yway : The time for throwing the Brit- ish from t.he bridgehead back into the sea had long passed. It was only a matter of holding a few pliin fields..:. Unfortunately 1 Wap_ not :to have the pleaSure of crossing swords with General PATTON. X really Would have enjoyed that. It was beyond me, why we could 115A, have committed a PANZER army in this decisive battle against Y'our forces. Then at least we would have fought on an even basis. 4 GEO: The Situation at CAEll was as follows: On the morning after the attack there were but OO men left with the surviving commander of the aivision which had teen hit on the coast! That is What I found , When I took over two,:daya later, having missed the beginning. The rexliihder.of the divis4-011,had heell destroyed by the allied warships hich,you know more than I do.. But I know how effective they arel nd then no one wantedyto believe us when we told them how far in- an. the guns of these warships could fire. They just Wouldn't be- 'eve our ,reports. There f had but one reply: "Gentlemen, just tand there for a while and you'll find out how far they can fire." GU: In our reports to headquarters these and many other descriptions were Simply not believed. That was our hard luck. Our misfortune in ,this war, one of many, was that the Majority of our leading person- alities never had any front line *commands during the war. When it y,tas reported, for example, that the British fleet was outside CAEN, that they could fire as far as-307km inland, and that therefore it WOUld be senseless to leave our 4-mored divisons within therange of ther artillery--someone would simply maintain that they couldn't are that far. And they viol .d claim next, that :just these last 3 or 5 km would make all the difference The people who made these etatementq never took an active part in the war themselves. They got all their ,experience at `sessions around ,conference tables. 10: 1,44 could not understand why the invasion in the South of France ,SuOeeede.d.se easily. You must have been prepared. 'After all, you had daiXy'reconnaissance-miSsiens'oVer Corsica, North 'Africa, and It-aly You must have suspected something And jou must nave seen our boats whi.Ch were Oi_r000nnaiaPce.ipatrol'alOng the coasi. SEM 1111011011101?11?10011. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2,8 May 4, SOO QUD: The,reason for this lies in our :peculiar evaluation of defensive strength, which is indicative of Our strategy during the last year of this war, It was purely a strategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE). Our system of fortifications was arranged along a number of lines. First the WE8TWALL, which was only one line for all practicall pur- poses. The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIE, , WALL was built, again nothing but one line. And this was the line in which all available divisions were committed. When it was suggested to assemble Qur armored divisions behind it, as a mobile reserve which could be used to oppose an attack, regardless of .where it may come frpm,we were told: "No, they 'would be too late, everything will have to be thrown into the front line." ROMMEL was the main propon- f ent of this strategy. IO: How is it, that ROMMEL favored such a theory? He should have learned his lesson in North Africa. CUD: IMAWEL was the principal proponent of this theory in France. -Later on KLUGE followed suit. And it was impossible for me to do anything against it, A fortress such as AtTWERP, for example, was not util- ic,ed. It had neither ammunition Or armament worth mentioning. That was the worst blunder we could poSsibly have made. And we did not fortify PARIS! Nor did we repair the fortresses VERDUN, EPINAL, alsonT, METZ, or STRASSBURG so that they could be used. Vie simply had two lines: the ATLANgIKWALL--Which was expected to fail like any other installation of its kind wherever the enemy would attack; and then the WESTVALL--another line wich was expected to succumb wher- ever the enemy would concentrate all his efforts. H. POMMEL and I were at odds about ttlis for rany months. Then General GUDERIAN himself came to France in order to bask me up. But un- fortunately it was impossible to achieve anything. GUD: fwas sent to ROEL for that particular purpose. But HITLER told me: "I can't tell the Fieldmarshai in command how to run his bus- iness. H: We knew exactly, even before the Invasion started, that the ratio of allied an ored recn cars (PANI',ERSPAEHaGEN) to Ours was 15 to 1; tanks, 10 to 1; and planes, 30 or'50 to 1. And in view of this sit- uation oUr only hope for victory lay with mobile warfare. GEYR: ROMMEL was a fairly'good tactician, but he didn't have the faintest idea about strategy. GUD: ROMMEL was excellent as high up as a corps commander. He was a'first rate divisional commander, because. he was courageous, Went to the front, and participated in Oerything. But later, when he commanded an army., Using the same technique; he lacked the vision which is essential for such a task. You knoW,. it takes time to learn to lead Urge and fast armored units. .Ana ROMMEL was not a tank expert. After all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition. IMMEL loet-Some of his nerve in Africa. IO: What do you think of our General PATTON? GUD: General'PATTON did what we would Lye 'liked to have done and what we veed to do. He was very ast which could already be seen in NOR- , MANDY. I was with the FU Rihen PATION's drive started. He said: Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 6 .-44Approved For Release 2 4/02/1 tIAAROP83-00415R00,0. 200.030002=77 , y145 .3., -,-,- .[AtT's amete'sS jdEn-Ing Of -a I`eW"lankS. Our 'Gen- rirr-er-1-... .O.?-:.i- c1-' 11-P' -7'. 6-: 4:..6.4'6. -.11:17?.:-.1:1,.., ,1'...611.=.1:hilin...9:1/.... au.--- .11-1.....-eaki-hnd Prendh'kaginOr line 'toward fhe At !antic coait ine a .ifed 'in. the-. ea-me-ina-nn.-er-,; ' -0-ul;-brez...ilythrOugh to the Swiss border, pr ordi_ .;i ern, iii.' Or flie:4PUS,Si;aii.,`,.piaket.; - both were based On the am 'tiiiiii - O'Oitiaiia-pi-i- iiho7 ab, e-s:i.ilt re' a.a. --- re b recklessly can never e Tio...-' rat'e. g' i-ie-s-liii-uSt: a', feiLininutes or I.:, few ,hours ;...,,n_ .4,. to do.i h. 1ss..v,:fiiLi:-..'f.:(...., ,..-.,..?,_ ..T'',4 .-- i ...., ,_ i . , , . ,. ? .,....- -'..... ..i.' .,-!-...!.,'...:?,.,; .::',-;'..i.s.''''-'-' , . . - - -'-' ? ' ' , :. , ' ''' \ .-,,,-.;--.? -- ; ''''' . e'd' i"c5r-ce In fl he inatiO61'4Y.Oa'ir"" tar!,ce' 'with your armor Mpaigri Wei 's.O t taria irig , that :I immediately included Amerifeefic-s- Into he -curriculum of our armored:forces' ioo a?' - Ten ;earlier thnht, n *h 01;1511, coudirtinctly' recognize ri pan spearheaffs by Ete in order to clr Erie way--n& 'whlcli gave u no'- en of '4 idrou noTThc he-.71.:,.E8-*( London Pines) gave us the ag?.'tO ?theien3h o? flme for 79.-iiii6Fia"- Cilia On nOtbe able:lo?a;t3:acit.jir '6aw. article myself' Where the sd it, 1.71- aiso isiiowe"ct it to tikiztnAIL ..ntriqrsirtrtiv. ,ewte Tnivit- yeti-welt, and therefore-read it very tioroughy If 3&w t1 bri.shWe1l! ?ou"ll know that -n-of one of hi'r?Tds , fi's o econju of a parpe'r--iriC.rnairit censors. They egican veit.-Y-LaCh 'irife're-s`f 6a-iir :3-11 .5, te, , discovered '` the ?ge'C'Oilic 4ces or niiii.=a-*sharrf -re"fai7t of etir e e n rereseu. a Ives of AmeriCan 'War f lanAhqd.iis7,:d7e.a7.1..ing, with -neiol`fa-frOn'e-fOr-iiarieuv-ef aad,pt wariing- e anaowirs Save to expect -qUite a 1O't; a?' g - the man en v r Pali-Lain/ *ril. thise rintd in as wen as. the -feet that the `ctiiiisr6iis 49t rore let, IT remeniter fhe dale correc ly. aO4.Uldt-de'duCe'lfrarV4af- iang it woula tale you to qet ready or 4:X1 , - Fl 7: = ht after the invasion started, and when the complaine e as'- We ad heAr7erins. .ir116-the- -e-x-plaline7d' to aralibiel"C-ofaigentS a7lOne 'Tar- the 'luxe Of the ftav and lir force. . - , .4, mrOtLtArry COO- _ wa deeply grleve w en lieard that ASA was definitely to be- - , -1--te)niTAITILr Yt/g- A renchs , -- ? ; A4iiirig that there of ? romise using , ctecieiOrght- be yos pone or'the tiirlie German can ever forget. __ Germany trO7ite.Sthe, ? . The first ti nie after - 0 and aga.in this tim- e. The point at present: is not to incorpor.- F1t 1440E ,?.n-to G,Fi^:-kin.;y:1: via:IA-a-be a tett if ?tile- '4tiaris wolk):d have ?,,-a iquatr,al: that of the United ' T s few je-ars , and were "VI'', 1'v the 016:irde 'ID " Tfi "x". t t 'd- ^t , e 2.SC 1 e. ere,, ore vva,, c onsl ere goo news, h- the I It ? - " t-. t, , Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 28 May 45 SAAR territory was to be under American jurisdiction. No European can be unbiased about these questions, not even the British. The idea of a "Balance of Power" is of prime importance to the English- man. There was a bitter struggle between EDEN's and SAUEL HOARE's schools of thought concerning this point. England under her present leadership is not in the position to be as impartial toward European problems as the United States would be. One must look at this realistically. A farreaching and fair solution of Europe's economic problems is possible only under the leadership of the United States. + + + (Re: DACHAU) GUD: We can't understand that. Even our own circle was affected. The chief of my operational department was in DACHAU. I never got any news from him. my wife coulLn't utter a word, or she, too, would have been sent to DACHAU. We knew of a few of these dirty affairs in the concentration camps. IO: Couldn't you go there youself? GUD: No, that was impossible.'....HIkELER was responsible for all the atrocities. +++ GEM: I was with RIBBENTROP for one year as a military attache. I only stayed with him out of a sense of duty. He was no professional diplomat who knew his business. He had lived in Canada for a while, and thought that the British were just like the Canadians. But they are quite different--you can't compare the two nations. And guided by his ignorance he believed that he understood the English people. GUD: In the Summer of '43 and the Fall of '44 eur generals explained to our Foreign Minister that a two-front war would be impossible. The front in the East. could be held only if the 4-est could be pacified. We would have to be free on one side. I presented these ideas not only to the Foreign Minister, but also to the FUEHRER. It was im- possible to get themi to consider these questions seriously. - GUD: During the Polish campaign, the FUEHRER was with me, only 50 meters behind the front line--he was still with me in France--but never in Russia. IO: He would stay around as long as everything went well, but no longer. GUD: That was not the reason--he left because he had to fly South. Only, a few weeks ago he was still with some divisional headquarters near the ODER, He was not to be blamed himself; the FUEHRER was no coward. But the fault lay with his friends, who kept him more and more in the dark, without themselves knowing anylhing about warfare. Too bad he didn't follow my advice to join his men. However, his health wasn't up to standard a ere actually were some men in his 8 - L'oquilms, Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 28 May 45 ALM .444 wit circle, men of Supreme Headquarters such as JODL, ZEITZLER or DOR- MANN, who never came anywhere near the front. GEYR: At _least ZEITZLER commanded a Corps at one time. R: But he never left his he.ldquarters to go forward. He never came closer to the front than his corps headquarters. I remember him ttaal the French campaign with the PANZERGRUPPE KLEIST, where he was was my superior. Not once during the entire campaign did he come to my headquarters. + + + GM I never heard anyone present a viewpoint at the FUEHRER HQ which dirfered from that of the FUEHRER. . . . IO; That is not what GOERING told'us. He claimed that he had numerous quarrels with HITLER about the employment of the air force. , . . . Gp: That is unquestionably true. They argued at every meeting. but those were onesided arguments. 28 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER AUL KUBALA, Maj; MI, ' Commanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 26 May 4-5 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-0041pfg \s? 8 E G 11 E `00-1 DE't 00030002-7 S D-v-Tr-r"T"---1-11 :Auth: CG, 7th Army : SEVENTH ARMY INTrRROGATION CENTER :Init: Xp APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 26 May 1945 : RISE OF NAZISM IN VIENNA 1. SOURCE FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard, Major, GAF, former GAULEITER of VIENNA. Subject was born 18 May 1898 in VIENNA, of a family of artists and archi- tects* After finishing REALSCHULE (High School), he entered a TECHNISCHE HOCUSCHULE (Technical College) but was obliged to leave because of financial difficulties. He served, in World War I from 1916 to 1919 as Lieutenant in the Austrian Air Corps. In 1923 he became a bank clerk. From about 1920, he became interested in literature and started to write. Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 45 Interrogator: E.H. 2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN VIENNA Subject claims-he entered the Nazi Patty in 1929 because the financially desparate situation of the State made existence for the individual almost impossible. Young people met strong obstacles trying to obtain jobs (sub- ject claims he tried through the Christian Social Party and Citizens Nation- al Party, but in vain) and were therefore forced into one of the two radical parties, Communist or Nazi. Subject believes that National Socialism is a direct Product of the Versailles Treaty. FRAUENFELD advanced quickly in the NSDAP and became GAUIEITER of VIENNA in the beginning of 1930 ("or rather. made myself GAULEITER"). He held this post until the party was officially banned in June 1933. Subject passes over the political period lightly by saying, "The climax consisted of brawls in pubs and fights among the students at the University. I myself was beaten Up three times. In these four years our opponents had no dead, while we suffered three dead as casualties of the struggle with the Communists." FRAUENFELD became member .of the LANDESREGIERUNG (VIENNA Government)! STADTRAT (City Counsellor), LANDTAGSABGEORDNETER (Member of Parliament), and member of the GEMEINDERAT (City Administration). He founded Nazi pub- lications. According to him the entire political fight was typical for the usual political differences in VIENNA and did not tranSgress the usual level. FRAUENFELD was only GAULEITER of VIENNA; the command of Austria was in LINZ, entrusted to PROKSCH and THEO,HABICHT, who had been sent from Germany. In 1932 the Austrian leaders of the NSDAP started party action against FRAUEN- FELD because of Jewish connections. This petered out after strong admon- ition. Things gradually became tougher. SS leaders arrived from Germany, and "sinister" characters came to him as collaborators. ,In June 1933, after , HITLER's advent in Germany, acts of violence started, and as a result, the party was outlawed. FRAUENFELD claims he opposed this violence, refused to obey the order to flee to Germany like all ether Nazi leaders, and offered to resign his party position. Except for being "shadowed" by detectives, he was allowed to move freely in VIENNA from the time of the ban until Dec 33. Arrested on suspicion of having authored a leaflet, and released a month later, he was arrested again and was bent to prison in WOELLERSDORFibecause of negotiations with Prince STARHEMBERG. He was released at the end of May 34 and this time DOLLFUSS, thru his representative STEPAN, started negoti- ations of his own and offered him a position in his cabinet. Meanwhile the LANDESLEITUNG of the NSDAP, whose seat was in MUNICH, had repeatedly ordered him to flee Austria and threatened him with reprisals. At the same time he found out that Prince STARHEM3ERG had discovered his negotiations with DOLLFUSS and wanted to have him arrested. This concurrence of events was decisive for FRAUENFELD - he fled to MUNICH. At the LANDESLEITUNG in MUNICH he was rather ungraciously received, and was subsequently assigned to minor propaganda activities. In July of that SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/143 rCIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 3. 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET 26 May 45 year he was involved- in 4 severe plane accident and suffered critical in- juries plus nervous shock. It took several weeks until he recovered, and immediately afterwards had an automobile accident. Offers this as proof that he couldn't possibly have had any connection with the abortive uprising in Austria and the assasination of Chancellor DOLLFUSS. All Austrian Nazi offices in GerL,any were dissolved. FRAUENFELD himself, who claims to have been profoundly shocked by the events of those last few months, asked for permission to return to Austria. This was refused, and he was told that if he wanted something to do, he would have to find a job in Germany. He contacted Secretary of the Statee FUNK and accepted the post of GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Financial Secretary). of the REICHSTHEATERKAMMER DER REICH& KULTURKAMMER (Theatrical Wing of the National Dept of Culture). According to FRAUENFELD this marked the 'end of his active political career in Austria and Germany. He claimed that within a year he already had differences and troubles at his job, and that one of his close collaborators was removed from office, and moreover, that his job was made impotent by the aivointment of a Chief KAMMERPRAESIDENT. FRAUENFELD sought refuge in writing and in speaking tours. This gave him opportunity to travel extensively and bemore independent than it would have been possible under normal circumstances. His speeches and lectures during the first years were at times contrary...to official policy, and he was forbidden to lecture on several occasions. He also taught in the School of the German Theater in BERLIN, at the Theater School in BOCHUM, and at SCHOENBRUNN in VIENNA. FRAUENFELD expected to return'to:VIENNA after the ANSCHLUSS,.but discov- ered that the city was forbidden to him by Reich Commissar BUERCKEL, However, under the pretense of scheduled lectures at SCHOENBRUNA And various other art institutions, he managed to visit the city occasionally.. 3. VIENNA DISILLUSIONED In time, the "sobering up process", as he calls it, followed: "We Austrian dreamers who fought for the old idea of the Reich now found ourselves sold out. All that happened was the creation of a Greater Prussia (GROSSPREUSSIZ): VIENNA, on the other hand, was robbed of her cultural importance and was. degraded to a subordinate provincial town."...According to him the population of VIENNA, tired of the machinations of GLOBOTSCHNIGG and BUERCKEL, demanded a Viennese. FRAUENFELD denies having campaigned in any way, and claims that the movement was entirely spontaneous. This brought about the second party investigation of FRAUENFELD. The principal'cause for this action was the. impression created by previous events in VIENNA. However, the accusations against him included having used his official position to give aid and com- fort to MISCHLINGE (half-Aryans) formerly active in theatrical circles. The case arrived at a negative conclusion and was dropped. He asked to be allowed to resign from public office in favor of a seat on the Board of a VIENNA bank. This was flatly refused. After that episode FRAUENFELD decided it would be safer for him in the Army, and in 1940 entered the GAF as a Captain. He was detailed to the Foreign Office as Liaison Officer for various Army headquarters in occupied countries. His duties terminated with a spinal injury received in an auto- mobile accident during the latter part of 1940. Thereafter his job consisted of writing articles and giving lectures on the. political and economic situ- ation of the world. 4. ACTIVITIES AS COMMISSAR IN THE UKRAINE ? In 1942 he was suddenly pulled out of the Army, sent to the OST MINISTER- IUM (Ministry for Eastern Affairs), and assigned as GENERALKOMMISSAR (General Commissar) for the Crimea. He claims that he and GAULEITER ERICH KOCH, who was Reich Commissar of the UKRAINEIclashed immediately. FRAUENFELD claims 2 SECRET imomemememmormommimpi, Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 - Approved For Release 20044/14 :Ptik-liDP83-00415R006200030002-7 26 May 45 that KOCH's administrative policies, and not his, were directly responsible for the "breeding of partisans". Source states that under his own methods he obtained the best harvest in the Crimea, and never had a case of terror- jam or partisan violence. He administered the northern half of the Crimea from Sep 42 to Sep 43. As a result of his differences with KOCH, two of his assistants were arrested and removed from office. How he always managed to slip though the fingers of the Gestapo has not as yet been clearly determined. Later, disciplinary action was again started against him, but the Russian advance interrupted proceedings. FRAUENFE'D returned to Germany and dissolved the financial and personnel sections of his Crimean administration and, upon his own request, re-entered the Army. He was assigned to the CKW WEST PRUSSIA and travelled to various sectors of the front dispensing political propaganda to the troops. In the course of his dutie8 he arrived in VIENNA in the fall of 44, Here he was prohibited from lecturing by Baldur VON SCHIRACH. 5, ANOTHER INNOCENT Subject repeatedly claimed that since 1933 he has not been politically active, and that all his friends were either artists, or businessmen who were lukewarm toward the regime. He also claims that during his term as GAULEITER, the police and other authorities never had occasion to arrest him for any criminal acts, and that his two arrests wereof a purely polit- ical nature. Of course FRAUENFELD did not explain what the authorities recognized as criminal acts. He never belonged to the SA or SS, and did not hold any rank (except GAULEITER) in any of the party organizations. His party membership, in addition, was discontinued after his entry into the army. The latter, it must be remembered, was not voluntary, since all members of the Nazi Party had to relinquish their membership upon entry into the SerVice. 26 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER 1!;67*-,4,-,c X44., AUL KUBALA, 9 Maj, MI, Commanding. 3 S ECP.1.1T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R00620003 SECRET ,1S AN antnSMIE ,d NOT LE 0002-7 27 May 1945 : SECRET :Auth: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: APO 758 US ARMY HANS FRANK'CLAIMS INNOCENCE :Date: 27 May l95 1. SOURCE FRANK, Hans, GOVERNOR GENERAL of POLAND. After reporting.for duty as a lieutenant to the 9 In/ Regt upon the opening of German hostilities against Poland, source received orders from HITLER to take over the administration of Poland. ' He proceeded to Silesia, where the FUEHRER welcomed him in his special train and gave him his final order, by which source claims to have guided himself throughout the period of his regime in Poland: "(You will) so administer the coUntry.that.we may draW from it the greatest possible use for.the.war." , Source took office 7 Nov 39 in CRACOW. In 44 he returned to Germany, with his staff and documents, having fled before the 'Russian Advance. He was captured at his estate at NEUHAUS/SCHLIERSIE by American troops. FRANK has attempted suicide twice since his captured.. Weakened through less of blood, he talks only with effort. Source is Clever and, knowing the danger of his present situation in the light of his past record, is dramatic and persuasive in trying to vindicate himself. He now condemns the Nazi ideals, although; as president of the Academy of German Law (AKADEMIE DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTES).he had a strong voice in the formulation of the Nazi conceptions of right., RatinK: 0-3 Date of Information: See text ,Interrogator: W.K. 2. ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY RECORD Source isfamiliar, through the press, with the accusations made. against him as!lbvernoraGeneral of Poland. He insists that he wanted only to further Polish interests, but that he always encountered difficulties, and had actually very little to say in the Administration of the country. He says that the Poles, a Slavic people and not Asiatic, should be con- sidered absolutely Western and European. Their upper Strata are enemies of Bolshevism, and of Russia. But at the same,time unfortunately, they are enemies of Germany. Source made the following explanations, which he is very anxious to have considered in the examination of his record: a) ,"Beside Me in Poland stood the 'REICHS Commissioner for' the Strength- eining of German Nationalism Abroad t (REICHSKOMMISSAR FUER DIE FESTIGUNG DEUTSCHEN VOLKSTUMS IM AUSLAND), HILMLER, who commanded the Police, and upon whom I had no influence." b) "Economically the country was under GOERING, who, as chief of the Four-Year-plan, could exploit the country as he pleased. GOERING's motto was, "Let the Poles starve; I need grain for Germany." c) ."GAULEITER SAUCKEL had the Polish manpower at his disposal, and could deport Polish men and women for labor without consulting me." (NOTE: The above statements, confirmed by REICHSMINISTER Dr LAMMERS, do NOT remove FRANK's responsibility, but help to establish the, guilt, of HIMMLER, GOERING and SAUCKEL.) Source also tries to place respcasibility on the German military comm- anders in Poland; particularly GENOBST. (Col Gen) VON BLASKOWITZ. He claims that atrocities - murder and looting-+. had been committed by German troops in Poland prior to his taking office there in Nov 39; and that it was at that time that the Polish resistance movement originated. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET 27 May 45 3. GOVERNOR GENERAL'S STAFF IN POLAND Source gave the following as the SEYSS-INQUART, Dr BUEHLER, Dr SIEBER, Dr VON KRAUSHAAR (Later) EMMERICH, Dr SPINDLER SENKOVSKY (Later) FRAUNDORFER WILLE NAUMANN GERDEIS LAUXMANN personnel Deputy of his staff in Poland: to FRANK. Chief of Government; Secretary State. Dept of Interior. Dept of Economics. President of the Dept of Labor. Dept of Justice. Nutrition Railways Postal Dept KRUEGER, HOEHERER. SS u. POLIZEIFUEHRER: (Superior SS and Police Leader) KOPPE, HOEHERER SS 11 POLIZEIFUEHRER: (Superior SS,and Police Leader). Treasury. of Liaison men to HIMMLER; carried out his orders in police matters without PW's :knowledge. 4. CONCENTRATION CAMPS Source declares that he had nothing to do with the establishment of concentration camps, nor with sending persons to them. He claims he be- came familiar with the atrocities committed in MAJDANEK only through the foreign press after the entry of the Russians, and immediately addresSed a letter to KOPPE demanding an explanation. Previously he had laloWn of the camp only as the "Central Collecting Point for the Security Service" (ZENTRALES SAMMELLAGER FUER DAS SICHERHEITS. WESEN). His only other previous knowledge about concentration camps was that early in the war the police 11.c1 been taking prisoners to the da14 at' AUSCHWITZ, Silesia. When the interrogator observed that the German governors in LUBLIN (uncles FRANK) must have known Of the awful conditions in MAJTANEK, source became involved in self-Contradictions, and finally-had to. admit that the question had been brought up before the chief training leader (HaUPTSCHULUNGSLEITER) of the Party, SCHMIDT. The responsible LUBLIN governors were: Former OBERBUERGERMEISTER, DRESDEN. Former BUERGERMEISTLR, HOF ZOERNER, Dr WENDLER, Dr The man responsible for the MAJDANEK camp was GRUF (SS Maj Gen).GLOBOT- SCHNIG, a native of KAERNTEN, and of Slovenian descent. Source says he was a rather brutal man, and a one-time GAULEITER in VIENNA. 5, ANTI-SEMITIC ATROCITIES Regarding the systematic murder of the Jews in Poland, source spoke as follows: "As a lawyer lam opposed to lawless disregard and killing ofhumar beings. I believe a secret law exists providing for the extermination of SECR.E T 2 MONOWINNOMINIONNINIMINft Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S. S ECRET 77777-4-5--g the Jews, and agreed upon only by HITLER, HIMMLER, and HEYDRICH." Source further stated that HITLER must have known of these murders and approved of them, Since he himself had once notified HITLER of the un- lawful activities of the SS in Poland. Source claims that besides HITLER, guilt is on the heads of HIMMLER, HEYDRICH, GLOBOTSCHNIG, and the smaller SS leaders who carried out mass murders without orders from. above. 27 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER / t PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/197 CTA:R15013-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-R30 D Pf 27 May 7" 1St RE_ II 06200 25X1 A 30002-7 : SECRET :Auth: CG :Init: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Date: 27 May 19 APO 758 US ARIq Arm : REICHSKULTURXAMMEZ (NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE) 5 1. SOURCES a) FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard, MAJ., OAF, GAULEITER of VIENNA until 1933; GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Business Manager) THEATERKAMMER (Theatre Dept) of the REICHSKULTURKAMMER (National Dep-tof Culture). (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/ 25) b) HINKEL, Hans, REICHSFIL1'IINT7NDANT Film Department, Propaganda Mi_istry. Report Ref No SAIC/28) Rating.: B-2 Date of Information: (National Film Director) under Source for Appendix only (Cf See Text Interrogator: E.E. e. ORIGIN AN]) FUNCTIONS OF THE REICHSXULTURKAMMER The REICHSKULTURKAMMER (Neaonal Dept of Culture) was an attempt to com- bine the entire cultural life of the nation under one organization. Its existence was provided for in law,- and the orders of its seven department heads (KALMERPRAESIDENTEN) in turn had the powers of. law. During the life- time' of the RKK (REICHSKULTURKANLER), other agencies were constantly de- manding its manpower for their own uses, but it managed to maintain its exiStence nevertheless. The functions which the RKK was supposed to fulfill include the follow- ing i Oireation and supervision of art and music schools, representation of the interests of it members, social security, examination and class- ification of talent, pensions, relief, and legal aid for members. 3. ORGANIZATION (See Appendix) Heading the RICK were the following personalities: President: REICHSLINISTER FUER VOLXS- AUFKLAERUNG U. PROPAGANDA (Minister of Public Enlightenuent and Propaganda) Vice President: State Secretary of Propaganda Ministry' GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Business Manager) - the actual head Legal Expert Dr PaulJoseph GOEBBELS. Dr FUNK, GAULEITER HAHNKE, State 'Secretary NAUMANN, chronologically in the order named. Hans HINKEL, Dr SCHADE. Dr SCHMIDT-LEONHARD Source is of the epinien,that greater power was 77ested in the office of the GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER,not for reasons of necessity or efficiency, but ?simply. as the result' pt the personal ambitions of HINKEL who, in additon to hie post as GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER, held the title of General Secretary of the organization. The RKK was-further dixided into departments (KAMMER), each being de- Voted to some. field such as the theater, music, radio, etc. The Propaganda Ministry itself, however, had similar departments (music, film, literature, There was no clear boundary between the province of these depart- ments and those of the RICK. The result was an unnecessary duplication of functions, and, frequently, Confusion and ,friction. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SE,RET 27 May 45 , During HINKEL's regime the power in the RKK was shifted at times to the departments, then to departments in the Propaganda Ministry itself; yet HINKEL would always manage to regain his place at the helm. The central-. isation of authority in the RKK was accomplished through frequent changes of the presidents and business managers of the different departments, thtis undermining their influence and importance. Source. says that HINKEL lacked technical background, and considers his work to have been of small value, ,He says further that under HINKEL there was a ruthless turnover of personnel, withreasons for dismissals Seldom ' given. In addition to the titular head of the Pia, there was a REICHSKULTURSENAT (Culture Senate) of 130 members,,at first divided equally between "culture administrators" (KULTURVERWALTUNGSFUEHRER) and creative artists. After a few years the administrative personnel were removed from this body. The Senate convened once a year to hear a speech by the President of the RKK. - 4, 4. DEPARTMENTS OF THE RKK Seven departments (KAMMER) functioned under the RKK: theater, music, film, press, literature, creative arts, and radio. The last named depart- ment was dissolved in 1939 or 1940. Each department had a president, vice- president, and business manager, who as in the case of the RKK itself, was ? . the actual head. There . There was, however, a Certain amount of fluctuation in the division of power among these various offices within the departments. For example, Richard.STRAUSS, as president, was the leading figure in the music depart- ment, followed by Prof Peter RAABE. Similarly, Richard BLUNK, as president, led the literature department, followed later by Hans JOHST, while Prof Richard SUCHENWIRTH was business manager. The president a of the theater department were Otto LAUBINGER until 1935, and Dr .Rainer SCHLOEMER until 1937 (both also in charge of the theater department of the Propaganda Ministry); later the. actor Ludwig KQERNER Until ? 194a and finally Paul HARTMANN, with Eugen KLOEPPER as\vice-president. The departments had from 100-400 employees each. The departments of the Propaganda Ministry maintained branch offices in the districts (GAUE),.but - the departments ct-the Er41( maintained only their central Officee. Each department of the RIM was divided into-pections'(FACHSCHAFTEN),, which were further divided: into special groups (FACHGRUPPEN). The theater department, for example, was divided into thoJcllowing, sections: Stage (MIME), light entertainment (ARTISTIK) (circus, vaudeville, etc), dance (TAW, actors (SCHAUSPIELER),.publishers.for the stage (BUEHNZNV,ERLEGER). Membership in the sections varied widely.' -Thestage section, for instance, had about 40,000 members,, the dance section about 6,000, light entertainment, about 13,000. The stage section of the theater department was. divided into the follow- ing special groups: a) Producers: State, district, city, KRAFT DURCH FREUDE (Strength Through Joy); private enterprises. b) Directors: GENINTENDANTEN (General managers), INTENDANTEN (Managers), ? DIREKTOPEN (directors). 0 Stage managers: play and opera managers; artistic, technical, comm- ercial managers; conductors, ballet:masters, etc. d) Actors. e) 4ngers. f) Dancers. g) Choir singers. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/1a :-C14-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 20042111:&IA-a)P83-00415R006200030002-7 27 PW.1.? h) TechniCal .personnel, secretaries, etc, 5.. FUNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENTS The primary function of the departments was the representation Of their members in the securing of positions. Political directives were supposed to emanate from the corresponding departments in the Propaganda Ministry. The primary function was carried out individually by the various sec- tions. Membership in the sections was subject to racial restrictions under the NUREMBERG laws. Thus, membership was possible only for "pure" Aryans, for "mixed Aryans Second Class" (MISCHLINGE 2. KL), and Aryans married to "mixed Aryans First Class': (MISCHLINGE 1. KL). Special permits were necessary for mixed Aryans First Class and Aryans married to non-Aryans. As far as source knows, nobody who was eligible under the above rules was denied membership in the theatre department, though it became necessary at times to negotiate for members with local authorities who, through caution or prejudice, were opposed to their employment. In 1937 the granting of special permits was taken over from the departments by the central office of the RKK since, in the opinion of that body, the departments had been too liberal in their interpretation of the law. Source states that in the cases of certain well-known artists the ques- tion of their eligibility for membership was sometimes referred to higher authority, and eventually decided upon by GOEBBEIS himself, The result of this system was that prominent artists had the opportunity to receive "favorable consideration", while those of lesser reknown were certain to suffer. 6. FINAIJCING OF CULTURAL LIFE Cultural life under the Propaganda Ministry was subsidized by the State. Funds were allocated to the theatre ("T") departmeht of the Propaganda Min- istry, and distributed to districts and cities through their local finance facilities (the DEUTSCHER LANDTAG in the case of the cities). Thus the PKK had no direct connection with the State subsidizationa Public funds in the amount of RM 90-100,000,000 were allotted yearly to the theatre. In addition, HITLER and GOEBBELS Made contributions running into the millions. 7. THEATRE FACILITIES UNDER THE NAZIS Germany had about 220 permanent theatres Two-thirds of these divided their efforts among opera, light opera, plays and the dance, while the re- mainder devoted themselves to one Or another of these fields. In addition to the permanent theaters, there were about 100 traveling theaters, mostly' presenting performances of plays. Many of these performed in small towns during the summer mcnths, their tours being arranged under the supervision of the RKK, 27 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER te."?.ta( "12r:44,4a PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ? t1190041404914)0091MW, Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET ' t,h.,WAriElki-J8.510)030401111P9OVIIPPrimiPermivvernell 27 May 45 APPENDIX (Names shown are of those men who last held the positions.) Source: H. H. HINKEL ?smi?????....e...... I MINISTER FOR PUBLIC ENLIGHTENMENT AND PROPAGANDA% Dr GOEBBELS - NATIONAL DEPART:MITT] OF CULTURE BUSINESS MGR: Dr SCHADE LE4AL AFFAIRS: Hats MEISTER 1 ADMINISTRATION: Hans MEISTER PERSONNEL% Hans MEISTER AID FOR ARTISTS: Walter OWENS SOLDIER SHOWS: KOCHANOWSKI -1 STATE SECRETARY: Dr NAUMANNI A".........?imw........wii THEATER DEPT: Pres: Paul HARTMANN Vice-Pres: Eugen KLOEPFER .Business: Dr SCHADE , Stage Dept: Theo0or LOOS Directors' Dept: SCHEFFELS Circus, Vaudeville, etc: SEIGER FILM DEPT: Press Prof Carl FROEHLICH 'Vice-Pres: Carl MELZER Business: Carl MELZER Films: Prof W. LIEBENEINER MUSIC DEPT: Pros: Prof Peter RAABE 'Vice-Pres: Prof Paul GRAENER Business: Dr MORGENROTH CREATIVE ARTS DEPT: _Pres: Prof Wilhelm KREIS Vice-Pres: BREKER0 GIESSLER Business: Hans MEISTER 4.....------- LITERATURE DEPT% Pres: Hans JOHST "Vice,-Pres: BAUR (from EHER firm) Business; GENTZ PRESS DEPT: -Pres: Max AMANN Vice-Pres: Dr DIETRICH ADMINISTRATION: Dr OTT LAW AFFAIRS: SChMIDT-LEONHARD PERSONNEL SEC: VON DRATEIG PROPAGANDA: Wolfgang DIVERGE G7RaANN PRESS: FISCHER 1.0.???????k FOREIGN PRESS: BRAUWEILER MUSIC: Dr DREWES- ?.?????????-? FILM: PARBEL- THEATER: Dr SCHLOESSER LITMATURE ??????????? SCULPTURE Approved For Release 2004/0/4 -.9-aeliSP83-00415R006200030002-7 anle CULTURE 4;?';',4'uelove,;;;,;.-e46114,wr .. 44444;JL-44 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R00200030002-7 1 Ref No SAIC/28 28 May. 45 ,44.2144W SECPET ? APO 758 1- O ARMYY SEVENTH ARMY INTERR;Gi':-'T?I1VON:::'1T:k"R7-I::::-: CG 7th A'my - . R T HANSHHEINRICH HINKEL (Cf also Report Ref No 5A1C/27, 27 Mal 45) 25416 L. SOURCE HINKEL, Hans Heinrich, Civ, Former Business Manager, REICHSKULTURKAMMER (National Department-of:Culture). Source is a 44-year-old native of WORMS, whose father Owned a butcher shop and vineyard. Because of organic heart trouble Source was never drafted into the army. He studied philosophy at the University of IpNN, and attended the University of MUNICH in 1920-21. There he became a member of the student organization OBERLAND, which was incorporated into the VATER- LAENDISCHE:VERBAENDE (Fatherland Organizations) in spring 23. During the same year he was forced for financial reasons to leave school and earn his living, which he did by working first in a bank andlater on a canal con- struction project. In Oct 23 he was overtaken by physical exhaustion and retired to the farm of a friend in Lower Bavaria. On 8 Nov 23 he was called to MUNICH by the OBERLAND organization and participated in the. HITLER Beer Hall Putsch at that time. He received the BLUTORDEN (Order of Blood) in 1934 undoubtedly in recognition Of this participation; .From MUNICH he returned to the farm, where he remained until Mar 24. In 27, through is, COnneetien with the STRASSER publishing firm, source resumed his activity in German sala Nazi politics. Hiscareer,.which reached its high point in his appointment as businessmanager,Pf.the REICHSKULTURKAMMER, is described in the following sections Of this report. , Though,a.generilly reliable type? source.tried,durin?nterrogation to play down his own importance in Nazi cultural and political'life. He tries to color the fats in his own favor; ? Rating: C-3 . 2 Date of Informa ion:Idar 45 g? ASSOCIATION WITH GREGOR STRASSER Interrogator: E.H. ; . _ DUring his stay on:the forMfollOwingthe-HITLER Putsch of 23,, source . made the acquaintance of t4eTharmaOist Gregor STRASSER and hie two brothers, Dr Otto. and Franz STRASSER,'the:latter a member of the Order of Benedictines. In 1927, when source had been editor of the newspaper INN u. SALLACU WACHT -..(NEUOETTING/-INN) for three years, Gregor STRASSER invited him to invest in the publishing firm. VERLAG,GREGOR STRASSER GmbH, BERLIN. Source invested RM 40,000 (which he had acquired through his marriage) in the venture. He .thus *came into control of 49 per c'enipf the stock of the firm,-the.other, 51 per cent being divided among,the three STRASSER brothers.- Source 'was nde administrative and bnsiness,directOr ef the firm, while the policies Vert in 'the hands of Gregor and Otte,STRASSER, ' Gradually the firm was enlarged,. and after about three years.itowned all -:SiX-weekly'papers of the Nazi Party .in Northern Germany. -Its position NORTH of theMAIN was comparable tO that of the,Party publishing firm of Franz r-EHER,1AUNICH? for Southern Germany., , The political:itrend of the brotherSSTRASSER differed in many respects from:Tthe official Party line as expressed in the papers of. the NSDAP EHER firm and in its chief paper, VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, published by Adolf HITLER with Alfred ROSENBERG as chief editor. The differences centered arstmd .questions of religion, the Jewish question, foreign policy and social policy. The STRASSER papers considered themselves aligned against the "heathenistic- Fascistic tone of anti-Semitism" of ROSENBERG, who, because of his "intellec- tual superiortylLover HITLER, had free rein in the running of the VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER. 1 60. ?A?proved For Release 2004a:12:II*: EILADP83-00415R0062000300.02-7 ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/28 28 May 45 Through the growing importance of STRASSER in Northern Germany -'especiaLly among the workers in the industrial regions of the Ruhr, Saxony, HAMBURG, etc - his papers continued to gain in circulation, and the expansion of the firm demanded new funds. Source bent home for More money and contributed sums of RM 40,000 and later RM 300)00 - the entire family .fortune - to the firm. The growth continued, despite the fact that Dr. GOEBBELS, Who had been called to BERLIN by HITTER, did not make use of their weekly to propound his views, but founded a new paper, sharply anti-Semitic in tone, DER ANGRIFF. DER ANGRIFF was the official Party organ of the BERLIN district and was made possible through the cOntributions of thousands of the first Nazis, mostly poor people, ii the national capital, Later when the EHER publishing firm took over DER ANGRIFF, this fact was not taken into consideration, and G0EBBEL4 received a large sum of money or it, 3. HINKEL'S REVOLT (?) AGAINST THE pARTY In 1930 the first rebellion of Gregor STRASSER and his friends against the Party took place. This was mainly against the more and more one-sided interpretation of the program by ROSENBERG, GOEBBELS, STREICHER, ESSER, Gbtt- fried FEDER, and others. Gregor STRASSER was considered an "outsider". After a terrific struggle between the STRASSER publishing firm on one side and HITLER's EHER publishing combine on the other; STRASSER consented to liquidate his firm as rapidly as possible and to demand that his brother Otto leave the NSDAP. HITLER promised STRASSER and HINKEL that the money invested in the firm, which would be lost through the liquidation, would be considered an "honor debt of the Party" and would be repaid as soon as possible Thus through A legal bankruptcy process the STRASSER firm was liquidated. HITLER, however, never'kept his promise. When source later mentioned the debt to HITLER's private secretary, Rudolf HESS, he was told that he would be given a seat in the REICHSTAG as compensation. This Would give him a Monthly Salary of RM 600. Gregor STRiSSER advised him to accept, and in Sept 30, when the number of Patty seats in the REICHSTAG increased from 12 to 107-, HINKEL was elected a Member. He claims that he never received any of the RM 110,000 invested. with STRASSER, and that he refused to collaborate in GOEBBEL's paper DER ANGRIFF, as he was in favor of the political views represented by STRASSER and his brother. 4-, "BATTLE UNION FOR GERMAN CULTURE" Wishing to do some work outside his regular political job, source founded a branch of the "Battle Union for German Culture" (KAMPFBUND FUER DEUTSCHE KULTUR) in Berlin in 1930. This organization had been started a few months before in MUNICH by the well-known art publisher BRUCKMANN, with the aid of a few prominent artists. There was a danger, pointed out to him by BRUCKMANN and STRASSER, that ROSENBERG might attempt to dominate this non-Party Organ- ization, since HITLER had made ROSENBERG his "Pope of Culture". Source called on all. artists in the national parties (DEUTSCHNATIONALE PARTEI, DEUTSCHE VOLKSPARTEI, etc) to become members of his organization. The principal attraction for most of these artists was the fact that member- ship in the NSDAP was not necessary, while at the same time they were enabled to participate in the reconstruction of the financially ruined theatrical and musical professions. Members of "Marxist" parties were not accepted, as the danger of "complete domination by the Communist Party" became more and more threatening. In BERLIN the KPD (Communists) had polled over 1,000,000 Votes. In the theatre all the classics and classical composers were slowly dis- appearing from the programs. In attempting to restore them, the organization became a success in certain circles, despite the fact that the Party through DER ANGRIFF called it a "colorlessi.bourgeois union". 2 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 iltrPeigyvirrolmV?rewinftrekooriworwomorrimergireProirrlitiverMs..! jeitIVU:gidiallrVt'jZ-Zirrlirrirrikfit:44:St.:I.P.:=711`7;;;Iffe,f.. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/28 28 May 45 5. PRUSSIAN THEATER COMMISSION , . In ,193l the revolt of the BERLINISA leader STENNES occurred. As in the previous year during the STRASSER rebellion, source claims that an expulsion process from. the Party was started against hip. As active participation in the revolt could not be proved, he was let off, but was never to get an office in the Party. During the spring of 1933 source was put in charge of the Prussian Theatre Commission (AUSSCHUSS) by Hermann GOERING. Members of this commission were almost exclusively artists, among them Ludwig KOERNER, later president of the National Department of the Theatre (REICHSTHEATERKAMMER) This comm- ission WAS to submit plans concerning personnel and programs for all the official theatres in Prussia to GOERING, after the Jewish Managers of the theatres had been removed through national laws. 6. JEWISH CULTURAI,, ORGANI4ATION (KULTURBUND) In July' 1933 various Jewish personalities, whom HINKEL knew from theatri- cal and Musical circles, asked him if there was any possibility of their finding employment in Germany, as they could not Or would not emigrate. According to source, it was he who suggested to the Minister for Culture for Prussia, Bernhard RUST, and to GOERING, the creation of a Jewish cultural organization (KULTURBUND). This organization was to provide performances by Jewish artists for exclusively Jewish audiences. This was very much desired by many Jews, since, because of existing laws in many districts and cities', it was forbidden for them to attend public artistic performances. The plan was to Create the organization first in Prussia, and then on a national scale, with the collaboration of the Jewish communiti:es. Despite the great fanaticism in many circles, permission for this undertaking was granted after a few days, first by RUST and then by GOERING. -(RUST is supposed to , have told source that "he had picked up an extremely hot iron" and that he was curious to see how long the ROSENBERG-STREICHER-GOEBBELS clique would ? remain silent). In Aug 33 the BERLIN executive council of the Jewish KULTURBAND had its first session. The chairman was the former conductor of the State Opera (STAAISOPER) of BERLIN, Dr SINGER. The theatre,' formerly the HERRNFELD., THEATER,- was called the THEATER DES JUEDISCHEN KULTURBUNDES and was located in the KOMMANDANTENSTRASSE. From among the artists of opera, stage and music who had been dismissed after 30 Jan 33, groups for opera and stage performances were formed. This .was carried out later on throughout Germany, and resulted in a fairly well organized Jewish cultural life. In Feb 34,after a conference with RUST, FRICK and GOERING, source was made "Commissioner for non-Aryans Artistically Employed within REICHS Terr- itory." He held this office Until 1941. Source claims that through this activity he made himself many enemies and only the position of GOERING, which Was untouchable until 2-3 years ago, made it possible for him to continue, (He was considered GOERTNG's special agent.) Source claims that he was supported in his endeavours by Dr Hjalmar SCHACHT and Dr Walter FUNK. 7. POSITION IN REICHSKULTURKAMMER (NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE) , During the autumn of 1933 the legal foundations were laid for a REICHS- KULTURKAMMER (RICK) (National Dept of Cultnre). During the summer of. 35 source, allegedly much to his surprise, was made third business manager (GESCHAEFTSFVEHRER) of this agency by Dr GOEBBELS. The other two business managers were GRUF (SA Maj Gen) Franz MORALLER and Prof Dr SCHMIDT-LEONHARD. The latter was the originator of all laws and executive regulations pertain. ing to the REICHSKULTURKAMMER. For this legal work, done at the request of Dr GOEBBELS, he was made Professor of Culture Law (KULTURRECHT) at the 3 SE.F.,RET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIAIRDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 $ECRET Ref No SAIC/28 28 May 45 University of BERLIN. SCHMIDT-LEONHARD was notorious as a fanatical Party member. Source claims that he was gradually reduced in importance within the RKK, despite great success in organizing a sort of USO organization for the troops on the front. Finally he was left only two purely artistic jobs: since I May 44 that of REICHSFILMINTENDANT (director in charge of the movie industry), and since Apr 42, that of director of the artistic programs on the radio. His successor in his job of general business manager (HATJPTGESCHAEFTSFUEBPER) of the RKK, as well as thatof General Secretary, was Dr Hans SCHRADE, who at the same time was business manager of the Department for Theatre (REICHS- THEATREKAMMER). a) Regulation of German Film Industry When source took over the film industry in 1944, he says movies in Germany were faced with cultural ruin. 'Dr Fritz HIPPLER, who had held the position from 36 to 431, had completely failed.. He was followed in rapid succession by three other Men within one year. Almost simultan- eously with source's taking over his new position, the Film section in the Propaganda Ministry received a new boss, GAU Propaganda Chief of ? HANOVER Kurt PARBEL, PAR34 a-former HITLER YoUth leader, was the "Party mali"for the movie industry + and had been appointed td this job through BORMANN, As Pre/Agenda Chief ot HANOVER he had coMe to the attention of the GAULEITER for HANOVER, LAUTERBACHER, and later was brought to the Party office of BORMANN.. Here he received a certain amount of schooling and was known as a "coming man". Source concentrated on making movies for entertainment+ While the special office under PARBEL's direction made newsreels and special productions. As,REICHSVILMINTENDANT (Director of the German film industry), source was placed over the production chiefs of the various film studios, in- cluding: UFA, TOE'S, TERRA, BAVARIA, WIENFILM, BERLINFILM and PRAGFILM, Dr WINKLER, as Deputy for the film industry (REICHSBEAUFTRAGTER FUER DIE FILMWIRTSCHAFT) was the governmental representative in control of the financial heads of the same film companies It was also his respon- ? sibility to bring all movie firms under state control by buying them up through the CAUTIO GmbH, of which he was the director. Also through CAUTIO, which was financed by the REICHS Finance Min- istry, Dr WINKLER bought the SCHERL magazine from HUGENBERG. b) Regulation of German Radio The agency in over-all control of the German radio was the Radio sec.- tion of the Propaganda Ministry, whose function was exactly analogous to that of the Film section. Subordinate to this section was the REICHS- RUNDFUNK,(National Radio) GmbH, which actually presented the programs to the .radio public. Hans FRITSCHE, besides heading the Radio section of the Propaganda Ministry, was responsible for newsbroadcasts, speeches, lectures, commentaries, and all "spoken words" emanating from the'REICHS- RUNDFUNK. In charge of administration of the REICHSRUNDFUNK was Dr GIASMEIER, while source was head of music, Source claims to have had only two ' programs under his control, one at the REICHSSENDER, the other at the, DEVTSCHLANPSENDEP. These were purely artistic, he claims, and received the applause of soldiers, who were tired of the dry political program served them by FRITSCHL 8. RESIGNATION AND CAPTURE ???????,.. On 15 Dec 44 source was dismissed at his own request, with his salary as MINISTERIALDIREKTOR (title for high government official) continuing. It was his intention to embark on a commercial undertaking in the film If ECP ET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/28 28 May 45 industry, which would not have been allowed while he held a government position. On 10 Apr 45 source received an order from GOEBBELS to go to Southern Germany to supervise music at the radio stations, and if possible to assemble officials of the Propaganda Ministry. This source did gladly, as it gave him a chance to leave BERLIN and to visit his wife, who had been ill ever since she was dismissed from the concentration camp in RAVENSBRUECK. He Visitied the Bavaria Film Company in Munich for:a short time and ordered a continuation of production, against the orders of the,GAULEITER GIESSLER. From there he went to MITTENWALD, where other members of the Music department of the REICHSRUNDAINK were assembled. He turned over all his equipment to American authorities when they arrived at MITTENWALD, and was arrested there by US soldiers. Subject claims that the singer Anita SPADA, who later became his second wife, was thrown into the RAVENSBRUECK Concentration Camp for five months for "defeatism and pacifism". His subsequent marriage to her was considered unfavorably by Dr GOEBBELS, whom source describes as his arch-enemy. 28 May 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER P..01.? PA L K1 BALA, 4' Maj, MI, ? Commanding. 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062 SECRE 'Ti-MS IS MI EtiCUSORE 00 ha LEI AO Ref No SAIC/30 29 May 45 00030002-7 : SECRET: :Auth: 00L 7th -Army : anit: /1:2(.0 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Date: 29 May _19.45 APO 758 US ARMY DR.RWIERT LEY 1. SOURCE LEY, Robert,REIHSORGANISATIONSLEITER, Leader of the DAF (German Labor Front) and REICHSWOHNUNGSKOMISSAR (Commissioner of Housing). His thick, stocky, sullen composition makes him appear brutal and unpleas- ant. Even after his world:collapsed, he remains the fanatical Nazi. Com pared with other Nazi bigwigs, his attitude to share the blame is snrprising. He says: ''Now they all want to picutre HITLER as a sick man who was lead by BORMANN; HITLER is sick and BORMANN dead - a clever maneuver! No, all of us who had a leading position are responsible for everything, so are the "red pants" (generals) who claim to have "Wanted only the best," now that the war is lest. He makes a theatrical impression, he Might even be slightly demented. He willingly gives information regarding his own self, however, his statements regarding other Nazi officials must be accepted with reser- vation. LEY claims that he did not become a follower ef HITLER out of ulterior motives. He drew RM 1000 monthly as chemist for the IG FARBEN Works, be- came enthused by a speech of HITLER, resigned his position, 'and worked ex- clusively for HITLER. This action he based on his fighting nature, calling attention to his having fought as a pilot until the last,minute of the first World War. About the accusations made against him by the press abroad that he was a heavy drinker and a woran chaser, he said, heave been a teetotaler for the last ten years (FUNK claimed this to be a lie, statin that he was drunk repeatedly). . He admits that he appreciated women, Claiming that he needed diversion since the death of his wife in,1942, which:affected him greatly. He did not become rich in the party. He drew only RM k000 per month and his property consisted only of a three hundred hectaro estate. The many houses which were claimed to have belonged to him were property of the Workers' organization and used for official business. Rating: 0-3 Date of Information: May 1945 IaLeizawla: W.K. 2. LAST MEETING WITH HITLER HITLER appreciated LEY to the last, LEY met HITLER for the last time during the night 19 Apr in the shelter of the Chancellory. Although HITLER had been. holding conferences since four o'clock that afternoon, he received LEY at midnight appearing alert and fresh. it,wasarell known however that HITLER had undergone an operation on hie vocal cords'and suffered from trembling of his arms and legs. HITLER gave LEY the order to go south, add- ing that he would fellow. 3, MEETING OF GOEBBEIS ANDSEPP DIETRICH LET .talked with GOEBBEIS on 20 Apr and had asked him to take at least his (GOEBBELS family td Safety. GOELBELS replied, "These generals are incapable of defending BERLIN. I will have to do it myself. If necessary I shall die here and Magdat(my wife) has decided to do likewise:" -.LEY proceeded to the ALPS where he was joined by SEPP DIETRICH who assured him that he would fight to his death with his SS men. LEY said,: if he (DIETRICH) did not do it, his wife is to blame who later came to visit him. DIETRICH is no army soldier - - only a political Soldier of HITLER." E.& Apsroved For Release 2gOil0z/ . c -RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 z 1 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/30 29 May 45 a 4,. LAST COMBAT MEASURES OF LEY LEY denied having had a conference with HIMMLER on 12 Apr regarding the continuation of underground activities after the collapse. LEY however organized the "FREIKORPS HITLER" in mid-May, He consulted with HITLER and begged him to form a "FREIKORPS" consisting of men, women and children from the "German Labor Front", who were to fight to their death. To this HITLER agreed. However, this Corps was formed only in the Hoi,th, it was organized by the staff of the DA. It was put into action in the neigh- borhood of BERLIN, where the people all died in action, according to LEY. (LAMMERS and FUNK confirmed the formation of the "FREIKORPS HITLER"; LEY had told them that the generals were wOrthless and the ministers had to lead the army). 5. TRY'S ACTIVITIES As chief of organization, LEY supervised the education of the replacements for Party leaders, because HITLER considered him an especially fanatical party member. Subordinated to him were the three ORDENSBURGEN (Schools for Nazi Leaders) in Germany. As leader of the DAF he administered the funds of the Workers' Association, which he described as being the largest organization in the world. His capital was 10 billion marks. This capital Originated from property of for- mer trade guilds, and at the ,time of collapse consisted of the largest in- surance company in the world, the VOLKSWAGEN automobile factory, the VULKAN shipyards in STETTIN, large factories in the food industries, thousands of homes and stores, hotels and convalescent homes,the"BANK DER DEUTSCHEN ARBEIT" (Bank of German Labor) and a cash reserve of three-quarter billion marks. The association was administered by experts in their fields and belonged to the German workers. All documents are in BERLIN, from which LEY claims, it can be seen that he did not acquire any property from these funds. According to LEY, the workers believed in him, and his most loyal followers are in the RUHR district. "During the war", said LEY," my workers naturally worked for victory, and I strengthened their will to victory with speeches. I would have liked to fight with weapons alongside my workers. I treated the foreign workers well. They will see when they return to their homelands . how little is being done for them and will insist that the truth come to light; that the workers in Germany are better off than workers in .any other country. No foreigners were put in concentration camps by me. However, take responsibility with others for the cruelties which happened there. "It is known that lam anti-Semitic, even if I could,. start over. again I would not do otherwise; however, I would make changes in the racial laws. Because .ofthem, primitive people are easily lead to acts of violence." 6. OPINIONS ABOUT OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES In this respect LEY is very careful, he considers such expressions treason to the party. Nevertheless he Made the following criticisms: ,a) GOERING: "GOERING was never able to win the heart of the workers. He was con- sidered a comical figure. I can best describe him as the "pus-bag" - (EITERBEVLE) not only of the party but of Germany as well." LEY also called him a conceited, egotistical windbag, who by his measures damaged the party considerably, and now does not stand by the party. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ? 4VOStffi'afAotcVaW'CtkVolaIWZZIY;:"AiltZ4174'44T,fjrggMtrfgWigWPIMTTC;15,tvi:ltfrhllffirgr;DliVIMVn Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-0041514006200030002-7 SECRET 1 Ref No SAIC/30 29 May 45 b) BORMANN' BORMANN never controlled HITLER. LEY was present many times when HITLER yelled at BORMANN, "BORMANN had many faults but was a loyal party member, who may have died with HITLER." c) FEGELEIN: Herman PEGETPIN is not a politician like BORMANN. He was the liaison officer between HIMMLER and HITLER because he was handsome and dashing. He met Eva BRAUN, who was HITLER's mistress, at the Chancellory where he met her sister Whom he married about two years ago, LEY believes that FEGELEIN did not die in the shelter together with HITLER but that he received. an assignment at the front. 29 May? 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER ie!:24j A.:LAgikfm PAUL KU BALA , Maj, MI Commanding. 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R00620 0\ Ref No SAIC/32 29 May 45 ? SECRET ENCLOS lETACH 25X1A 030002-7 SECRET iAuth: CG th Arm SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 29, May 19 HEINRICH LAMMZRS, CHIEF. OF REICH CHANCELLORY 1. SOURCE. oa Heinrich LAMMERS represents the typical,Ger'man official and jurist. He tries to emphasize the point that since the farty took over control of all Matters of German policy, foreign and interior alike, he was not more than a figurehead in the Reich Chancellory, but he apparently realizes that these claims are subject to strong argument. He joined the Party in 32 and, as expert in state and administrative law procedures, was indispensable in the legal transfer of the state function 6 toParty authorities, especially in the first period, when HINDENBURG was still alive. Due to his position he is a highly important witness for unlawful,actions of the Nazi regime. ? Source, like almost every REICH Minister and high-ranking military leader, received a considerable monetary gift for hi S services, which apparently - weighs heavily upon his conscience, . Rating: C,-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K. 2, ACTIVITIES AS CHIEF OF REICH CHANCELLORY According to his position as Chief of the Chancellory, source was to in-. strudt the ReiehaChancellorconerning the current political situation. .This task'was.performed by LAMMERS in the' first years of the regime; before HINDEN- BURGIs death. .After the governing of Germany was taken ever by the Party alone; source claims.matters of interior' policy were no longer the concern of the Chief of the Chancellory, and after NEURATH was fired aS Foreign Minister and RIBBENTROP took over his functions, this field was also eliminated as one of LAMMERrs affairs. The nominal functions of the Chief of the Chancellory were as follows: a) State Legislation Matters . Until 37, laws were either decreed by the Reich, cabinet or submitted 'in. writihg: -Th@y1Wera then submitted-to'ail'ministerS concerned'and-fi,- 441* signed by HITLER... Since 37, all laws were Counter-signed by LAMMERSa who MAS responsible for the legal aspects of the drafts and was therefore called,"Notary of the ROich". . LAMMERS claims the NUREMBERG Laws "were prepared and made legal by the National Socialist REICHSTAG. They had probably been prepared by Reich Minister of the Interior Dr FRICK. I received.notice of them only after they had been, made legal". b) Matters Concerning FUEHRER Decrees Such decrees were issued directly by the FUEHRERt for the most part' upon suggestion by one of the Ministers. LAMMERS checked the drafts con- cerning their form, and afterwards theywere published. . c) Administration of Chancellory Fnnds As Chief of Chacellory, Source administered special funds at the.dis- poeal of the Head of State. These funds consisted of the following: 1) General Purpose Funds (FONDS FUER ALLGEMEINE ZWECKE), amounting to 30-40 million marks annually. HITLER used these funds for making monetary gifts to his high-ranking collaborators, beth civil and mil- itary. LAMMERS defends this procedure by recalling that Frederick the Great granted his collaborators so called "dotations", and that Napo- lean likewise gave large monetary rewards to his marshals. ..A.poved For Release 201:44=11k: ZIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/32 29. May 45 The order for the payment of a larger sum was given either by HITLER, by HITLER's Chief Adjutant, or by BORMANN. LAMMERS recalls that Field Marshal RUNDSTEDT received RM 250,000 on 11 Dec 41; GENOBST (Col Gen) Heinz GUDERIAN received nearly PM 1,000,000 to purchase an estate in WARTHEGAU (Pomerania); Field Marshal LEEB received about RM 500,000 for the acquisition of a forest estate in Bavaria; Field Marshal BRAUCHITSC- aS far as source remembers,- also received a larger donation; as to Field Marshals LISZT and WEICHS, source assumes that they were also favired with monetary gifts, but he does not recall the exact figures; but Field Marshal POMMEL received nothing and neither did Field Marshal WITZLEBEN, The GAF Field Marshals received similar "allotments" di- rect4rfrem GOERING. ,LAMMERS recalls that Field MarshaLMILCH received. a large amount of money to purchase as estate somewhere near BRESLAU.' "Representation Expenses" (AUFWANDSENTSCHAEDIGUNGEN) for the Ministerr were also paid from thetoeneral Purpose Fund. GOERING, for example, received as REICHSNARSCHALL at first RM 43,000, then RE 96,000, and finally RE 240;000 a year,,in addition to his salaries through the various other official posts he held (of Report Ref No SAIC/16, 23 May 45). LAMMERS admits that the simultaneous receipt of several salaries was unlawful. ii) Aid Fund (HILFSFOND), amounting to 90-100 million marks a year. This fund was further subdivided into a Housing Fund (L) (BAUFOND), fro; which HITLER financed special building projects, e.g. in LINZ, where he had attended school; a Charity Fund (W) (WOHLTAETIGKEITSFOND), from which subsidies were paid to hospitals and similar institutions; and a Reserve Fund (R), which contained a reserve capital to replenish the other funds. The assets for all these funds came from the Reich Min- ? istry of Finance. d) Coordination ofethe Reich Ministries The task of Coordinating the activities of the various ministries also was the concern of the Chle4 of the Chancellory. - Laws proposed by a min- ister had to be submitted to all other ministers who were interested in the matter LALLIERS alSo had to confer continuoualy with ,the Director of the Party Chancellory, at first HESS, afterwards BORMANM, since all laws had to be submitted to the Party authorities prior to their publication. e) Decisions Concerning Petitions and Complaints were also part of the functions of the Chief of the Chancellory. 3. REICH CHANCELLORY STAFF GRITZINGER was Secretary of State and LAMMERS' deputy; In addition there were four Cabinet Counsellors (KABINETTSRAETE): Dr MEERWALD, *MINISTERIAL- DIREKTOR (rank equiv to Maj Gen); STUDTERHEIM, whose special field was occupied territories; WILLUHN, commerce and communication; problems; Dr FICKER administration, organization and state law matters; Dr KILLY, whose special field was civil service law, social security, and finances, was finally re- moved, because of his non-Aryan origins, under pressure by BORMANN. All these officials were specialists. 4. DEALINGS WITH HITLM In the beginning e when HITLER did not yet govern exclusively through the Party, LAMMERS was an indispensable link between the Reich President and' the Reich Chancellor. HINDENBURG at first disliked HITLER because of the latter' loud manner and because HITLER did nOt fit into HINDENBURG's environment-. LAMMERS coached HITLER into controling himself when reporting to HINDENBURG, and finally the Field Marshal came under HITLER's spell. In this connection LAMMERS recalls that when he came to the NEUDECK estate a few days prior to HINDENBURG's death in order to have some papers signed, HINDENBURG, extremely weak, told LAMMERS: "Give my regards to my dear HITLER". Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET 2 ...1_,VazadiiIi,,,a-saiVzia.-ai-,a7444-44141WW/ifi. .14.- ..amatti*.eataaaeeketseneeeestiedaaexamireeteemer,faaletaaaa*Hiaaageateitya Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/32 29 May 45 Until 37 LAMMERS reported to HITLER four times a week on the current affairs of state. After 37 the Council of Ministers did no longer assemble, and HITLER began to transmit his political will through orders addressed directly to the respective ministers and generals. LAMMERS had no say in matters regarding foreign policy since RISBENTROP's appointment, he claims. .He learned about the attack on Poland only after the beginning of hostil- ities, ummEns claims, and then he had to issue the necessary decrees. GOEING according to source, was not very much in favor of the war against Poland. LAMMERS made his last official report to HITLER on 24 Sep 44. He does not recall the subject matter of the report, but states that details are noted in his diaries which are packed in wooden eases and are stored in his official residence in SERCHTESGADEN. LAMMERS last saw HITLER on 27 Mar 45, when HITLER signed some papers without any comments. LAMMERS subsequently fell into complete disfavor and was even sentenced to death upon BORUANN's urging, he claims. 5. NOTES ON HITLER, ,BORMANN, -RIBBENTROP a) HITLER During his first few years in office HITLER repeatedly demonstrated his desire to. govern according to laid down laws. ,This tendency was caused by the fact that HINDENBURG was still alive, and by the somewhat insecure feeling of HITLER as executive. Already after the ROEHM Putsch, however, HITLER started to pay less and less attention to his ministers and goVerned.more. and moreas a dictator,. In matters elf foreign policy he relied more on his intuition than on actual facts. He did not tolerat, any Objeciioas or news of unpleasant happendings. Whoever talked back fell into disgrace and was removed. After the outbreak Of the war with Russia, the Party was the sole. ruler in the inner administration of the country. HITLER was particular3a annoyed that according to law he could not just fire generals and high officials, but had to pension them. As a result, the REICHSTAG was ass- embled in fall 45 arid a law stating that any man. in Germany could be re- moved from office by HITLER without trial, HITLER being the.highest judge in eitilar matters, was passed. On this occasion HITLER made his speech in which, aside from the generals, he attacked the judges as parasites of the state. - HITLER always tried to avoid harsh measures against deserving Party members who, in eource's opinion "did not deserve any decent treatment". b) BORMANN Source associated with BORMANN almost daily in line:of.duty, BORMANN, already Chief. of Staff of the Party Chancellory (STABSLEITER DER PAR- TEIKANZLEI) under Rudolf HESS, came into particularly close contact withBIT4ER because he also looked after the OBERSALZBERG affairs. HESS paid. lit1.4 attention to current Party matters and BORMANN, who was very industrious, gained more and more irlimportance. .After HESS' flight, HITLER nominated BORMANN as Chief of the Party Chancellory (LEITER DER PARTEIkAN4EI), since he did not want to nominate a successor to HESS; thus BORMANN was given the most important pest in the Party administra- tion, and since 42 it could be stated that the Party governed the State, BORMANN wasathe leading man. In spring 45 BORMANN. was appointed secretaa to the,FUEHRER, which meant that no statesman or Party member could. approach HITLER without seeing BORMANN first. Only the generals still retained free access. Whoever objected to BORMANN was removed. At:firat'BORMANN got along with HIMMLER, but later, when BORMANN tried to interfere with HIMMLER's "Police State", their relationship deter:. iorated. The unlawful treatment of concentration camp victims was un- doubtedly known to BORMANN, but source claims that it had not been ordered Approved For Release 200/02/1911 CIA4RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 3 Approved For Release 4004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECR -E T Ref No SAIQ/32 29: May 45 by him. Most likely HIMMLER is the responsible person, source believes. BORMANN, however, succeeded in removing even the last "non-Aryans" from their positions. BORMANN was by profession a farmer. He was a small, tough man, intelligent, ambitious, double-faced. He learned quickly. He like alcohol and was frequently criticized by HITLER, who had a dislike for drunks. BORMANN was married to the daughter of Party Judge BUCH; he ill- treated his wife and had difficulties with his father-in-law, whose dis- charge he finally brought about,. BORMANN at first tried to maintain good relations with LAMMERS, since he could learn a great deal from him. Later, when LAMS did not want to submit to him, BORMANN became source's personal enemy. . In source's opinion BORMANN did not dominate HITLER, but he had a strong influence upon him. 0). RIBBENTROP After HITLER's rise to pOwer, NEURATH's position became difficult, since the Party Office for Matters of Foreign Policy strongly influenced the foreign policy of Germany. HITLER finally dismissed NEURATH, whose ideas he considered too old-fashioned. HITLER's foreign policy was not stable, because of the multitude of Party agencies interested in the subject. In addition to RIBBENTROP, there was also ROSENBERG and even the Hitler Youth who maintained their own foreign-political offices. RIBBENTROP is described by source as a cool, realistic person, vain and succeptible to flattery. HITLER thought highly of him, because he encountered little opposition from his part. Source frequently had occasion to report .to HITLER minor wishes of foreign diplomats, only to receive the standard answer: "Tell it to RIBBENTROP". Source claims that all important conferences concerning the war against Poland were held by HITLER with AIBBENTROP and other statesmen under four eyes only. 29 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER 4 tA titialit eet-Si /I PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. SECRET Approved For Release 2014/02/19:?CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ValfarAiMataarktiiikiNAIMINIcANYitiALA6M;e4WitakiNkiri'Ai 4pproved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415 S E C E ttk" Ref No SAIC/24 26 May 45 06200030002-7 : SECRET :Auth: CG, 7th Arcw SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:Init: /-,010 APO 758 US ARMY:Date: 26 May 1245 AMANN 'S CONTROL OF GERMAN PRESS SOURCE MAX AMANN, Director of REICHSPRESSEKAMMER (State Press Commission). Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 45 ' Interrogator: W.K. . . AMANN made few appearances in the public life of the. party, but thrbugh brutal seizure or suppression of German publications, he built up an . enormous Nazi newspaper Concern. Through the books and newspapers he pub- lished, he had a strong influence n the minds of the German people. AMANN himself, despite mediocre business ability, became a multi-millionaire. In appearance AMANN is homely and has only one arm; the other he lost in a hunting accident. He is coarse by nature and speaks in a Bavarian dia- lect. His relationship to the party stems from the fact that as FeldWebel (Sgt) he was HITIRR's immediate superior in World War I. II. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TO HITLER During World War I when HITLER joined the staff of the 16th Bavarian Reserve Inf Rest as messenger, AMANN was regimental Sgt Major. AMANN scribes HITLER as having been a homely, pale Soldier., whose civilian dee- upation was listed as "Kunstmaler" (artist painter).. HITLER was Courageous and stood up well under strain; even then he showed a passion for war. He was not promoted because there was no opening-. After the War AMANN was a clerk-accountant and rade good money. HITLER met him on the street-and asked him to join his party and organize the press AMANN joined only after his wife encouraged him. AMANN describes HITLER as a sexually normal, man, HITLER'S only woman friend, with whom he had occasional intimate relations, was EVA BRAUN, a former employee of the photographer HOFFMAN. She had a little house in MUNICH/BOGENHAUSEN. During the last months she was constantly around HITLER. Otherwise AMANN seldom met HITLER. HITLER had very little understanding of economic matters; so.AMNN had less occasion than other party leaders to visit HITLER in person. However, he alone had the right to address HITLER with "Good morning, Herr HITLER". Since the beginning of 1943, according to a decree by BORMANN, no party leader could come near HITLER without BORMANN's permission. AMANN met HITLER for the last time on 24 Feb when HITLER Spoke to the leaders in the REICHSKANZLEI.. Even then HITLEI appeared physically failing, and he was very much under the influence of BORMANN. III. OTHER POLITICAL PERSONALITIES a) BORMANN Chief of the REICHKAN3LEI. After HESS' flight, BORMANN an uneducated, brutal individual, gained more and more influence over . HITLER. Together with HIMMLER he maintained a spy system against every- body, including party leaders. During the last months he had made HITLER a tool for himself and had the nickname, "HITLER'S RASPUTIN". BORMANN's friend, GAUTRITER GIESSIER; of MUNICH, was also unscrupulouS. The often met and conspired together. b) HIMMLER. P.MANN's neighbor on the TEGERNSEE, HIMMLER seems to be of a homely nature, and his outward appearance belies his tyrannical rule. AMANN regards HIMMLER as a kind of Robespierre, or as a witch-burning Jesuit. HIMMLER considered it his duty to eliminate all enemies of the As: 1/P SECRET proved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062000300020-7 SECRET 4 Ref No SAIC/24 26 May 45 . Nazi ideolOgy, and he did so calmly and impersonally, without hate and wiihoUt'sYmPathST.* DUring the last months HIMMLER's importance went to his head and he played the great commander with a special train and great surroundings. In.theenORMANN pushed even,gIMMLER aside. c) GOERING. GOERING was no National Socialist, but always the big gentleman. He never had contact with little party people like AMANN. He alone led HITLER into the war, by giving him wrong impressions Of the powerof the LUFTWAFFE, on which HITLER based hi 8 great hopes., (As AMANN was saying this, GOERING, by coincidence, was being led past as a pris- oner'. ANANN jumped-up excitedly, 'pointed oUt the ?window at GOERING, and said, "This fat slob here, you should hang him. ? He is responsible for the war and the death of my'son. Itis him, and not we small peopleM- AMANN has no proof of GOERING's war responsibility. He states merely that "the people say it". d) GOEBBELS. AMANN Considers GOEBBELS his enemy because he always wanted to interfere in the nianagement* the press, which AMANN says was solely his responsibility.' AMANN believes BORMANN, HIMNLER, and GOEBBELS were the three bad spirits of HITLER. IV. THE EHER PUBLISHING CO. a) Establishment. AMANN, upon HITLERs wish, took over a Small MUNICH publishing house. for the :party in 1?20,- This concern was owned by a widow named EHER.. It is characteristic that NANN allowed the moneyless widow a monthly rental of only 50 RN until her death. The paper, at that time the nrOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER", was not solvent, and was kept going only through the sale of books. HITLER never re- ceived a,fee from the concern for his articles. For his book, "MEIN KAMPF", which the EHER firm published, HITLER asked only 10 per cent of the sales price. A large sum was still owed to HITLER by the publish- ing firm, was never claimed. b) Organization. . AMANN admits that he could l_ot have succeeded in the 'organization of such a big concern without help of men experienced in the publishing field. Especially helpful were Dr '67INCKLER and' Dr RIENHARDT, both of BERLIN. After RIENHARDT went to HIMMLER, Wilhelm BAUER was AMANN's right hand man. The system controlled about 700 daily newspapers. The "VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER" with its three editions (BERLIN, MUNICH, VIENNA) had a total circulation Of 1,500,000. AMANN admits that the small number of subscriptions was.a result of poor contents. The "STUERMER", STREICHER's organ; was independent; AMANN did not want it in his system because it was too filthy. On the other hand, HIMMLER's paper, "DAS SCHWARZE KORPS" was part of the chain, but was directed only by the editor, D'ALQUEiN. For organization of the system see appendix.' AMANN himself was in charge of .the main officein MUNICH (bombed out several months ago). Individual districts of the party received one- third of the income of the district publishing)houses. The GAULEITERS appointed district editors but AMANN,held.the'final jurisdiction. To implications that AMANN had ruthleSsly destroyed other publica- tions, AMANN replied that he'had compensated the owners. The ULLSTEIN Publishers got 12 million RM, HUGENBERG got 65 million; and likewise SCHERL Publishing Co., KNORR & HIRTH Publishing Co. in MUNICH, and the Stock Exchange paper were paid. ,AMANN admits that some of these "made trouble", but he sees-no injustice in his acquisition of these concerns. a SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECR.ET Ref No SAIC/24 26 May 45 The suppression of the "kRANKFURTER ZEITUNG" was accomplished by HITLER himself. When asked which foreign newspapers were subsidized, AMANN replied he did not know. That information is known to either the press department of the Foreign Office or to Dr WINCKLER. c) Financial Statement. AMANN does not know the exact balances of the concern. These state- ments could be made by his financial director BICKEL in MUNICH; Dr RICHTER, also of the EHER concern.; or Dr RIENHARDT. At any rate, the concern was one of the greatest, undertakings in Germany, and equaled IG FARBEN in sales and profits. Net yearly income averaged 100 millions. Net profits of about 500 millions have been de- posited in the REICHSBANK. Asked why he did not use profits to acquire paper factories, forests, etc., AMANN replies, "I don't want to let my- self in for such things.'" AMANN's.personal economic status is according to his own statements as follows: As head of the EHER concern he received a yearly income of 120,000 RM, and 5 per cent of the net profit. He does not know the exact sum of his capital; it is, however, several millions. Of real estate he possesses the following: one apartment house in MUNICH/BOGEN- HAUSEN, WASSEREURGERSTRASSE 6, and one villa in ST QUIRIN on the TEGERN- SEE. Upon HITLERis request he furnished it luxuriously for display purposes. In addition he had large hunting grounds. He did not invest any money for himself or his concern in foreign lands. 26 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 11 3 S E C R .E T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN PRESS REICHSKULTURKAMMER (State Culture Commission) DR GOEBBEIS REICHSVRRBAND D. DEUTSCHEN PRESSE (German Press Association) CAPT WEISS II REICHSPRESSEKAMMER (State Press Commission) AMANN Eli 01 DEUTSCHES NACHTRICHTENBUERO RUNDFUM 7-7EICHSVERBAND D:.:DEUTSCHEN ZEITUNGSVERLEGER --I EA( c=11 Of tol TUR PUBLISHING CO (German News Bureau) (Radio) ) (Association of German Newspaper Publishers) REICHSVERBAND D. DEUTSCHEN ZEITSCHRIFTENVERLEGER AMANN (Association of German Magazine Publishers) DR RIENHARDT, later WILHELL BAUER APPENDIX GAUVERLAGE (District Publishers) STAMMVERLAG MUENC HEN (Main Publishing House - Munich) "Voelkischer Beobachter; Book Publishing Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Control of Other Purchased Interests New Establishments in Occupied Territories. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200 Ref No SAIC/21 Lf May 45 5 E G E IS AN ENCIAISIME 11E.10 : SECRET :Auth: CG th Arm : : SEVENTH ARMY iNTERRO :Int. APO CENTER APO 758 :Date: 2 May 95 : US ARMY t ? INFORMATION ON THE GERMAN'MINISTRY OF POSTS ??????10.*".1. 25X1A SOURCE OHNESORGE, Wilhelm, Minister of Posts, joined the Nazi Party in 1920, left it in 23, rejoined it again in 33. He held no position in the Party, but was OGRUF (Lt Gen) in the NSKX since 37. Source was president of the REIMPOST ZENTRALAMT (Central Of from 2.9 to 33; he then became Assis-' tant Postmaster General' and finally, in '37, PostMaster General (Minister of Posts). Source is the inventor of the "four way switch" for cables. He was very cooperative during interrogation and stated that he was able and will- ing to help in the reconstruction of the Post Ministry. Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: B.M. GENERAL NOTE: This report is 'submitted in accordance with the questions pre- sented by Sig 0, US Group CC, G-21 T-Section, 6th Army Group, ,APO 23. Many documents and records which were.notabsolutely essential were destroyed because of transport difficulties, source stated. 1. What responsibility did the REICESPOST (PRP) have it supplying facilities for use'bf thoI)ropaganda Ministry? REICHSPOST had responsibility for all mechanical matters such as trans,. mitters, cables, frequencies, etc. Responsibility for network inside radio., stations was with Propaganda Ministry. Postal employees did not enter stations.- ? . 2. What were the various units of the Central Division (MIN-Z or ZENTRAL ABTEILUNG).? Very briefly, what was the function of each of the units? i) REFERAT Party Chancellory?Political supervision of personnel matters. ii) REFERAT Postage Stamps?New issues, etc. iiiLREFERAT Fieldpost. iv) REFERAT Social Benefits of Employees--Vacation and VERSORGUNGSANSTALT (Welfare' Institutions).. Latter was a kind of additional insUrance,for postal emploYees'whith was paid to them in addition to sOcial SecUrity. v) REFERAT Instruction in Postal Matters. 'vi) REFERAT Press': vii) REFERAT Postal Advertisements. viii) REFERAT Statistics?Records of numbers Of letters, parcels, etc. 3. What private companies are partly owned by the DPP? i) DEUTSCH ATLANTISCHE TELEGRAPHEN GESELLSCRAFT ii) RADIO AUSTRIA, VIENNA..: iii)-TERNKABEL GESELLSCHAFT,' iv) POSTREKLiME GESELLSCHAFT (all shares were owned by RP but it was chartered as a private company). 1 SECR1T* /5-d Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 4. Which grades of civil workers were placed strictly on merit? From Postal Assistant up, all grades were strictly on merit. Lower services had age and merit promotions. 5. Who was the Secretary of State working under you? Jakob NAGEL 6. Do you and your chiefs of Telecommunications have a record of all the permanent telecommunications installations in Germany, even of part of the facilities used by the military? Who by name would have this infor- mation? These records should be in UNTER HACHLING, near MUNICH. MINISTERIALDIREK- TOR FLEISCHMANN should have this information. 7. What is the function of the "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE" in the DRP? Source claims there was no "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE in the DRP. 8. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civilian mail recently been carried out? By the EHRMACHT and GESTAPO. The WEHRMACHT censored all mail going to foreign countries. The GESTAPO gave certain addresses to post offices and received letters addressed to them t Address lists were with the individual post offices. 9. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civil telecommun- ications recently been carried out? GESTAPO gave certain numbers to mail employees. These numbers were auto- matically connected with a secret room in the telephone office. Arrangements were made so that postal employees had no chance to listen in. 10. To what extent is the .6ILDTELEGRAMMDIENST ("Facsimile Telephotography Service") used? The DRP had a large network which was not used very often during the war. Source thinks that television will be much more efficient. Facsimile Tele- photography was not profitable. 11. Give the locations of the storage depots for telecommunications equip- ment and spare parts. REICHSPOST ZENTRALAMT. Storage depots of the RP ZENTRALAMT were moved and MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANLE should know where they are now. 12. What is the basic system used in the Railway Post Office? For example, who or what department ow t the RR.thail tars* (itc? The DRP once owned approximately 5,500 Postal RR cars. Division VI (MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH) Was in charge. One official of this depart- ment, who is supposed to be an expert, is in KEHLHEIM/DANU3E. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 13. What general devices; such as a scrambling device, were used in the DRP: telecommunications? What type, of messages, were sent on suchsystems? , , The "Inverter" system. It was for military and Party use. Source invented a new system which vis in use on the BERLIN-OSLO line. 14. In the DRP, how did the various division heads keep informed in a general way of the work of the other divisions? There was a monthly conference Where all :urgent questions were brought up. The was also a weekly session within each section. 15. How does the GAF teletypewriter Aetwork fit into the teletypewriter net- work of the DRP'? Part of the network was rented to the Air Force. Special machinery was Air Force operated and procured. 16. To what Ministries .(e.g. Propaganda Ministry) and in what proportion are the Wireless license fees allotted? Propaganda Ministry got half of first 8 million participants. For-all participants over 8 million, theyroPagando. Ministry received 3/4 and the DRP received 1/4. Each registered radio listener paid 2 RM monthly. 17. Approximately what proportion of the income of the DRP comes from each of the income producing services'? Approximately as follows: Letters and Telephone Automobile Telegrams parcels 62% 35% 2% 1% 18. Does the DRP collect taxes? If so, what type? The DPP does not collect taxes. 19. Where are the policy-making recerds (basic records) of the REICHSPOST? Might be in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and/or UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH. 20. How many, and which ones, are left in BERLIN? Exact location? Old, historically valuable records were left in BERLIN. between LEIPZIGERSTRASSE and ZIL;MERSTRASSE. 21. When did OHNESORGE leave BERLIN? On approximately 10 Apr 45. 22. Get data,pn his movements. First he went to ALTMUENSTER/TRAUNSEE where he stayed for 3 or 4 days. Then to THANNKIRCHEN, near. DITRAMS4ELL, days with the ESSER family. Thence to the BAD TOELZ Post WILHEILISTRASSE at HAUS TRAUNBLICK where he stayed 8 Office for 4 or 5 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 days. Thence to KITZBUEHL Grand Hotel for 5 days; LOFER POSTHEIM for 3 days; and BAD GASTEIN Post Office and Hotel Mozart for 4 or 5 days. 23. Does the Advisory Board (BEIRAT) exist now? If The Advisory Board still exists. Source cannot the Advisory Board has not functioned for 6 years. members. A list of names could be obtained through limited advisory function. 24. Who makes up the National Defense Group (GRUPE What were the basic functions of this group? so, who are its members? remember names because The Board had up to 12 source. UBEIRAT" had only REICHSVERTEIDIGUNG?) MINISTERIALDIRIGENT HORNOTT) was head of the Group. All army orders as to cable connections and networks were sent to him. In case the Army gave up certain districts, the cables were returned to the Defense Group. 25. Why was the Postal Police (POS.?CHUTZ) taken over by the SS? What were the functions of this group? How were its members obtained? What per- centage of RP personnel were full time members? What percentage were part-time members? Source claims that there was no connection with the SS whatever, except that uniforms were obtained through SS gm offices. Postal Police Officers and men were not members oi the SS, but postal employees. Groups of em- ployees were used mainly ap air raid protection squads. Later members were put into the VOLKSSTURM. The members of the Postal Police were obtained on a voluntary basis from among the employees. Only instructors were full time members. A total of only about 80 people, in all directorates, were full time members. Approximately 5% of personnel were members before the war. 26. REICHSPOSTFILLSTELLE in DAHLEM. a. Who was in charge? Postrat MACK b. What were the functions of this organization? To produce pictures concerning internal organization of postal affairs and to procure instructive pictures for employees. c. Number of employees? About 15. 27, Where is the board for allotting frequencies within Germany, according to the allottments of the World Frequency Board? Who is the head of this Board? RP ZENTRALAMT: National frequencies; Division VII: International fre- quencies. MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE is head of the board. 28. Is there a long term development group for cables, other technical installations, etc? If.-so, where is it in the RPM organization? Also where is it located? RP ZENTRALAMT for cables and machinery, Research Institute of the RPM for television, infra-red, and relay stations; The RP ZiENTRALAMT was in LI- SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 S E-C R E T Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 BERLIN-TEMPELHOF. The FORSCHUNGSANSTALT (Research Institute:)of the RPM was first in BERLIN-KLEIN MACHOW, later in STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. 29. In the last five years, has the RP operated with a profit or loss? Do you remember the approximate figures? The RP operated at a profit. The gross income was about four thousand million marks. In 1944 this figure 'decreased to three thousand million. 6% of the gross income was given to the Ministry of finance, which was in control of spending. 30. Explain liaison and coordination with other ministries, such as Navy and Transport, for communications with ships. Did RP personnel or RP approved personnel do the work? Who installed, maintained and developed the equipment? Liaison with other ministries was done by writing alone. MINISTERIAL? DIRIGENT HORNOLD kept up coordination with the Army. Part of the postal network was taken over by the Army. Exchanges of the Army network wererun by Army personnel. Postal employees were used to repair cables. Army in stalled and developed equipment. 31, . Give a detailed description of the branches and sub-branches of the Central Office (RP ZENTRALAMT). i) Telephone Transmission Technique. ii) Telephone Exchange Construction, iii) Operation of Long Distance Network. iv) Acoustics, Microphones, Telephones, Calibration of Instruments. v) Telegraphy, AC Telegraphy, Multiplex Telegraphy, Telegraphic device4 vi) Mechanized Operation (parcel transport, pneumatic post). vii) Furniture Standardization. viii) Testing of Materials. ix) Workshops. x) Checking of costs of all DRP installations. 32. Explain organization of RPF (Reich Research Institute). Who was head of it? Where is it .located? W'iat subjects were being recently pursued? To what organization was the research information supplied and how was it gotteninto practical use by the Armed Forces? President_ GERWICH of the RPF was in charge. He is believed to be in AACH, Baden. The former president was a Mr ?GLADENBECK who is with the ALL- GEMEINE ELEKTRIZITAETS GESELLSCHAFT. The RPF was located for a time in STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. Subjects recently pursued were television and development of infra-red research. In peace time yearly publications were issued. During the war the HEEESWAFFENAMT (Army Procurement Office) re- ceived the information. - Source states that the Army made too little use of postal research results. 33. Give evacuation addresses of all services, offices, archives, etc, not already supplied. Division' I: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUEHN. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 5 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ' E C-2 E Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 Division II: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN. Believed HACHING, together with some documents. Division III: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN. Division IV: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR KOERNER. Believed to be in NEHLHEIM/ DANUBE, with documents. Division V: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR RACKOW. Believed to have been last in BAMBERG. Division VI: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany. Division VII: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany. Foreign Division: Dr RISCH was last in BERLIN. "OST" (EAST) Division: General Consul KOEHN is believed to be near STADT STEINACH, Thuringia, possibly with some records. STAATS SEKRETAER NAGEL left BERLIN in order to join Admiral DOENITZ! RP Pre6idint. FRAHM and a Dr KLEINSTICK were last in BAD TOELZ. Source states that both men have extensive knowledge of postal affairs. There are approximately 100 postal employees in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE. Among them are experts belonging to all divisions. Some records might also be there. There are 20 telephone and radio officials in UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH. A Dr SCHNITTGER, expert on radio tubes, is in GEHLBERG, about 50 km from STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. The last office of the Post Ministry was in BAD GASTEIN. Certain records should still be there. STAAM _ SEKRETAER NAGEL was supposed to open an office in BARGTE HEIDE, near HAMBURG. The Central Telegraph and Telephone Office was in UNTER HACHING, near MUN- ICH. Situation plans for cables and lines might be found there. RP ZENTRALAMT: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE. Postal Savings Institute VIENNA (5000 employees): MINISTERIALDIREKTOR NIRSCHEL is believed to be in a home for postal em- ployees near the MONDSEE in Austria. Central Administration of charities: OBERPOSTRAT GIERKE. REICHS Printing Works: DIREKTOR MOELLER, BERLIN. STAATSDRUCKEREI (Govt Printing Office) VIENNA: HOFRAT FISCHER, VIENNA. REICH Television Corporation does not exist anymore. 34. In addition to regular civilian telecommunications, what other tele- communication services did the RP supply? Were the Other serVices men- tioned operated by the same operators who performed the civilian tele- communications service? Were the same facilities used for more than one type of service -- if so, a general description of how this was controlled. to be in UNTER Networks of the Army, Navy and Air Force belonged tal was paid for them. The networks were operated by had its own network and had to pay rent to the Posts. operated by the Party. Industrial firms like SIEMENS own nets which were privately operated. The European Society) was in VIENNA. to the Posts and ren- the Army. The Party This network was , AEG, etc, had their 1DOSTVEREIN (Post 6 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 35. Was the SCHULUNGSLAGER of the DRP abolished? Yes. 36. When was it operated last? One year ago. When the Ministry in BERLIN was bombed, the camp became the seat of the RP Ministry.. 37. Where is OHNESORGE's wife? In ELLBACH, near BAD TOELZ. 38. How long was she connected with the DRP? Six years. 39. What was her official position.? Source states that she had no official position. Since her marriage to the Minister she was only interested in the postal employees' vacation homes. 40. When you last heard of it, was the Field Post Office still in FRANKFURT/ ODER? The Field Post Office was last in ST JOHANN, in the Tyrol. 41. Where is MINISTERIALDIRIGENT Dr FRITZ SCHUSTER of the Field Post? He went to Admiral DOENITZ together with STAATSSEKRETAER NAGEL. 42. How were the Postal Funds administered? Short term loans were given to Govt Banks (REICHSBANK, SEEHANDLUNG) which took over the administration. 43. Who was the final policy authority for paying out the funds? Minister OHNESORGE. 44. Is the POSTSCHUTZ still under a MINISTERIALRAT in the Min. Z.? The POSTSCHUTZ was last in "OST" Division. 45. Who was the last known MINISTERTALDIREKTOR of the POSTSCHUTZ? General Consul KOEHN. 46. Where is he now? Believed to be in LOBENSTEIN, Thuringia. 47. Did HIMMLER have complete authority over the DRP personnel? Source states that HIMMLER had no authority whatever over DPP personnel. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S E C RE T Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 48. Where is the main POSTSCHUTZ Camp? In ZEESEN next to "SCHULUNGSLAGER". 49. What was the total number of POSTSCHUT4 employees? Formerly the "TRANSPORT ABTEILUNG" had 4,000 men with 1,600 vehicles. In the last few months only a few hundred men were left. 50. Did the POSTSCHUTZ personnel receive training in sabotage functions? No. 51. Who was responsible for the forarding of Red Cross PW packages to Allied PW's in Germany? Source believes it was Division I. Possibly POSTDIREKTION STETTIN (from Sweden) and POSTDIREKTIONEN KARLSRUHE and STUTTGART (both from Switzerland). 52. Why were so many packages undelivered? Because of the breakdown in communications lines. 53. Who was responsibile for this breach of faith? The President of the REICHSPOSTAM STETTIN. 54. Where is the largest cache of these packages at this time? Possibly in STETTIN. 55. What was your policy in disposing of undelivered packages? Source states that he ordered them sent back to the Red Cross. It be- came known that great quantities of parcels were given to bombed out per- sons in STETTIN. Persons responsible for this were imprisoned. 56. How many vehicles were owned and operated by the IMP? Six thousand busses. Source did not know how many -trucks or cars. 57, Does Division I deal with the administrative as well as the operational matters such as the DRP Bus service? Administrative matters only. Operational matters were in the hands of REICHSPOSTDIREKTIONEN. 58. Does Division I control the operational and administrative side of the DRP Savings Bank? Yes. 59: Did Division I keep records of all stocks of stamps? The different "DIREKTIONEN" kept these records. 8 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/21 24 May 45 60. Are stocks of stamps still intact or have they been destroyed? Some stamps may have been destroyed by air attacks, etc, but not in- tentionally by postal employees. 61. Where are the stocks located principally at this time? There should be stocks of stamps in every Post Office. 62. Describe how the R.P.O. functioned in handling the WEHMACHT postal system. Field Post officials were members of the Army. Postal officials were in charge of transportation until mail reached a certain secret point where the field post employees took over. The Army paid 20 pfennigs per man per day in order to take care of the free mailing privilege for soldiers. . 63. If regular postal rates are required of all discharged WEHRLACHT per- sonnel, will the revenues be sufficient to hire the personnel required in the DRP? Yes. 64. How long would it take for the State Printing Plant to replace all printed stocks of stamps necessary for six months of operations? Replacement would be very fast as long as auxiliary printing plants could be put back in operation. 65. Assuming that war damage has already destroyed all postage stamps and the time to provide temporary new issues is 30 days hence, what is your recommendation or plan to re-establish first class postal service in Germany? Find printing plants that are still operative. Auxiliary printing plants have the necessary material. Try to find President ROST (formerly in BRESLAU) now in the American occupation sector. Contact Presidents of REICHSPOSTDIREKTIONEN in the American sector as to personnel questions. Contact all personnel in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH. Great numbers of trucks of all kinds would be necessary. Former German Army vehicles could be used. Long stretches in rural districts could be serviced by female mail carriers. Wooden barracks could be used as post offices. Former postal employees who are now PW should be selected for help in order to re-establish mail service. German signal troops and com- munication troops should not be dismissed, but should be used for repairs. 24 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER TaAL ea*, PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062 SECRE T , ElltV3"11? .1\ V_AA SECRE.T Ref No SAIC/20 24 May 45 1030002-7 tAttch: 0G 7th Arm SEVENTH ARMY-INTERROGATIOW.OENTER :Initi APO 78US ARMY :Date: 2 REICH MINISTRY OF FINANCE:I:LOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND DOOUMENTS (This Report is being published in answer to-SpecIal Questionnaire . provided by US Group 000 G42, T-Seciicht 6th Army Group., 14 May 1945) II PREAMBLE The following information was obtained from Permanent:Under Secretary REINHARDT and Under Secretaries WOOTHKE and KALLENBACH. They are very'cooperative and state that they are willing and able to help in the reorganization of the Ministry and its departments. In connection with the records and documents, it was pointed out that many had been destroyed in air attacks. Furthermore,- all nonessential documents were destroyed because of the difficulty of transporting-them arid because Of their constituting a fire hazard during air raids. Many of the records of all departments were evacuated to WUERZBURG and left there with two employees as custodians. Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: G.P.V? IX. MINISTRY OP FINANOE A. DEPARTMENT I Most of the personnel and records were last located in BERLIN/OHARLOTTENBURG, B/SMAROKSTRASSE 48-52. The records of ./B were in BEELITZ.near BERLIN. About twelve officials, under'Ministerialdirigent AUGUSTINE, together with some records, were last in BAD-TOELZ. Some officials, notably Ministeralrats KALLENBAOH, GERTH,.and SCHMIDT-SCHWARZENBERG, were in GARMISCH.,PARTENICIROHEN, but were taken into custody by OTO around May 4. The chief officials still looated in BERLIN are Directere KLUGE and MEYER. S. DEPARTMENTIII - This department came directly under the control of,REINHARDT. Most of. the records and personnel are in MENAI!, Thuringia. A few: under Director Dr SIEGERT and Ministerialrat SCHERER, are still in BERLIN. ' C. DEPARTMENT III This department was also under the, Control of RE/NHARDT.' Most of the records arid personnel are in /LMENAV, Thuringia. In addition to these, there' is a Regis- rungsrat SCHADT and one other official in WEILHEIMi Oberregierungarat'TeLENSK/ in BAD-TOELZ, and Steueramtmann PAUL/din BERLIN. D. DEPARTMENT /V- MinisteiialAirigent WOOTHKE (AUCSBURG) was one of the men in charge of this 'department. Most of the-personnel and,doCuments remained in BERLIN and POTSDAM, . under Ministerialdirektor WEVER. Ministerialrat VOGELS was last in OBERLA/NDERN, hear MUNICH. In addition, there were three officiale in BADTOELZI,MOLTER, and HORN. '? E. -DEPARTMENT V ? Most of the personnel and, documents remained in BERLIN, under Ministerial- direktor Dr BERGER, although this man may now be in HAMBURG. It is believed that one official, Dr BREYNAN, went to BAD-TOELZ. Some officials and documents were in QUERPDRTH, in the Harz, under Ministerialrat DAMPER. Ministerialrat SCHMIDT was in GARMISCH, but was taken into custody by CIO on 4 may, 45. P, DEPARTMENT VI This department is divided into four sections as follows: VI-A Documents and personnel were last in BODENBACH, in the Sudetengau, under Ministerialdirigent Dr BROHTZ, who is either in BODENBACH or in WALDSASSEN, in the Oberpfalz'. VI-B Last located in ILMENAU, Thuringia, under Ministerialrat ROSENBAUER. Some personnel and records were in MALLERSDORF, Lower Bavaria, under Minis- terialdirigent VON DIETZ. ' 1 S'EORgT Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006290030002-7 5X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S E 0 It T Ref No SAIC/20 24 May 45 V1-0 /n ILMENAD, under Ministerialrat ENGELBRECHT. VI-D Partly in /LMENAU, under Ministerialrat.ENGELBRECHT, and partly in MALLERSDORF, under Regierungsdirektor WUNSCHEL. G. DEPARTMENT VII This department remained in BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr RECK. Address: BERLIN/CHARLOTTENBURG, BISMARCKSTRASSE 48-52. H. DEPARTMENT VIII This department was formerly the Prussian Finance Ministry. It remained in BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr SCHECHE. Some of the personnel and records were sent to NEU-RUPIN, Brandenburg. I. CHIEF REGIONAL FINANCE OFFICES These departments were directly under the control of Under Secretary REINHARDT, who states that there are eractically no records left, most of them having been destroyed in the last few years, and that it will be necessary to start from scratch. He states that he would be able to reorganize and reestablish these departments. DEPARTMENT FOR TRAINING AND EXAMINING This function was carried out by Under Secretary REINHARDT, who states that there will be no difficulty in reestablishing it. K. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS POLICE This function was transferred to the Ss Police under HIMMLER. L. MAIN OFFICE FOR GENERAL FINAN:)E AND CREDIT QUESTIONS This office remained in BERLIN in the REICHSBANK, under Ministerialdirigent BAYERHOFFER. His office was in the OBERFINANZPRAESIDIUM on the KURFURSTENDAMM. SOME) of the officials and documents were sent to BAD-TOELZ, under Ministerialrat BUSSMAN. M. STATISTICAL OFFICE Records were last in ARNSTADT, Thuringia. The head of the office, Ministerial- dirigent FIEDLER, was last in GARMISOH. N. OFFICE OF MAIN TRUSTEE FOR CONFISCATED PROPERTY - EAST This office no longer exists as such. Its functions were taken over by Depart- ment VII/ (Par F; above). O. OFFICES IN THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF THE MINISTRY These offices were, for the most part, still in BERLIN, with the exception of the Direction of the Austrian Salt Mines, which was last in VIENNA, and the Sup- reme Financial Court, which was last in MUN/CH/BOGENHAUSEN, MONTGELASSTRASSE. The Directorate of REICH Building was last located in BERLIN, at KURFURSTENDAMM 193. The REICH Debt Administration,. under Dr FISCHBACH was completely burned out. Dr FISCHBACH's home is in BERLIN/DAHLEM. P. RE/CHSHAUPTKASSE (TREASURY) The Treasury was still located in BERLIN on 13 April 45, in the REIM-MBANK Building on the JAEGERSTRASSE. Plans had been made to.evacuate'a portion of it to Southern Germany, but they had not yet been carried out. 24 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER ,2 PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. SE C R.ET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/19 24 May 45 SECRET 'SM ENNA kfA 0 0 : SECRET :Auth: :25X1A SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGLTION CENTER :Init: APO 758 US AMY :Date: 24 May 1945 HOFER, THE EXPONENT OF PEACE ? 1. SOURCE' HOPER,Fran, OGRUF (Lt Gen) NSKK, GAULEITER and REICHSSTATTHALTER of Tyrol - liortnEsibets. HOFER's career is a typical example of Success under the Nazi,Regime He rose from modest beginnings to heights of power attain.. able only in .a totalitarian state. Clearly seeing where his advantages lay he joined the Austrian branch of the Nazi Party in 1931, and when the organ. izitIOn waS-ouflaWed, sought refuge in Germany, where he joined in plotting- the future ANSCHLUSS Having been placed in charge of elections for Aus- trians residing in Germany, his Wor': may be considered one of the contribu- ting factors of the Nazi "success" in 1938. He Was rewarded with the appointment as GAULEITER of Tyrol. Rating: C-3 Date of Information; See Text Interrogator: E.H. 2. ADMINISTRATION OF ITALIAN TYROL HOFER held the office of REICHSSTATTHALTER (Gbvernor) of Tyrol - Vorarl.!, berg (Italian Tyrol) since Sep 41. After MUSSOLINI's fall he was the head, of a stringent military government and had absolute authority in this area. The only duties left to the DUCE were to collect taxes, pay his officials, and contribute 10,000,000,000 LIRE to the German war effort monthly. ApproX- imately 40,000,000 LIRE of this sum was appropriated by HOFER, suPposedly for the purpose of road improvement, billetting of troops, construction of air raid shelter, payments of bomb damages, etc. Source claims that Se suppressed both the Nazi and Fascist parties in BOZEN and TRIENT under the pretext that this was foreign territory. He installed DE BERTOLINI, an 80-year-old anti-fascist lawyer, who had pre- viously arrested MUSSOLINI, as prefect of TRIENT 3, HOFER'S EFFORTS FOR EARLY SURRENDER HOFER got in touch with SS OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) WOLF, Chief of the SS and Police in Italy, who had had talks in early March with a certain Mr.. DULLES who claimed to be a representative of President Roosevelt, in Switzerland. The purpose of these talks was to arrange for the withdrawal of German troops to a predetermined line in front of the Alps, and cessation of hos-- tilities until the defeat of the Nazis in BERLIN. In March and April HOFER visited the FUEHRERHAUPTQUARTIER (Supreme Head- quarters of the FUEHRER) where, according to his claims, he advocated the retreat in Northern Italy during an interview with Genls JODL, BORMANN, and WINTERDEER (?). Upon his return from HITLER's Headquarters, HOFER con- tacted GENOBSTMSan)WITTINGHOF, Commander of Army Group "C", the German ambassador to Italy RAHN, and JOLF, and told them Of the curt rebuff and harsh treatment he received from HITLER. The General was noncommittal. Later he contacted OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) KALTENBRUNNER, Chief of the SICHER- HEITSPOLIZEI (Security Police) for the SOUTH German area, a direct repre- sentative of HITLER and successor to HEYDRICH, for the purpose of reaching a definite line of action to avoid further bloodshed and destruction in. his (HOFER's) area. No impression was made in this quarter. On 24 Apr the STEIRMARK, OBERDONAU, KAERNTEN,and SALZBURG regions were: added to HOFER's jurisdiction. On 26 Apr he had a conference with Field: Marshall KESSELRING and GENOBST (Col Gen) WITTINGHOF, and claimed that he SECRET /LS // I/Ai&oved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/19 24 Mriy. implored them to and ,a hopeless fight. KESSELRING declined to accept his appeal and a few days later sent him a message ordering him to keep his nose out of military affairs. As'a result Of talks with an American officer who Came to discuss surr- ender terms, HOFER ordered the removal of the numerous AA guns surrounding INNSBRUCK, and that all the bridges, in INNSBRUCK and vic be left intact. I. THE FUEHRER MISINFORMED According to HOFER, HITLER was completely misinformed on production fig- ures. HITLER received his miSinformation frOm a Certain HERR SAUER; pro- duction expert from Dr SPEER's office. ,Although all figures were prac- tically bare-faced lies, HITLER claimed SAUER to be his best source of in- formation and trusted him completely. HOFER cited the following examples: HITLER was convinced' that he received 2500 cars monthly from Italian factoriaP, while actually only 500 were produced. In one of SAUERs reports for a certain period ending 1 Dec 44, he stated thata certain, factory in FOICCHI, Italy was producing 4,000,000 rounds of. machine,pis- tol ammunition. However, this factory had not been completed by that. date, and did not begin production until 20 Feb 45. Another instance cited by HOFER was a report issued by SAUER in which production. of 81 mm mortars in a factory in VIPITENO, Italy was claimed to be 8000 per 'month. During a conversation with HITLER, HOFER was told that this plant prp- duced at least 1000 mortars per month. The truth, however, was that the factory had just been completed, and production had not started. The Monthly quota was set at 200 mortars. 5. WEHRWOLF 'HObIlt claims that he refused to organize a aHRWOEF in his district, but despite his opposition that it was organized through other Channel's. .Hw- ever, in order'to keep "order" and to "avoid unnecessary trouble which could only lead to disaster for the people" he appointed a certain TOEFPER, man- ager of a factory in INNSBRUCK as liaison man between him and the WEHRWOLF organization. Source claims he does not know.the name of the leader but that TOEPPER has all the needed information to disrupt this organization. He claims, however, that he knows the No 2 man (but not by name) and offers his services to assist the Allies in rounding up the gang and locating their stores of weapons. 6. ART TREASURES a) Czech or Hungarian State Property: Source claims that these objects were stored in a railway car neat LANDECK, and were supposed to move in the direction of Switzerland. b) Italian Gold Treasure: Cached in a bunker in the castle FESTE FRAN.MS- .FESTEI.vic VIPITENO and BRESSANONE c) Property of Florentine Art Galleries: Stored with. the knowledge of the Italian government in the ST LEONHARD courthouSe. Source claims that persons who may have more information on the subject are Dr RINGLER, who can be reached through the LANDESMUSEUM, INNSBRUCK and GRAF (Count) TRAPP INNSBRUCK. 2 SECRE.T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/719 69ekeDLP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/19 24 May 45 7. FACTORIES BOZEN: SINNICH: VIPITENO: KIRCHBICHL (vic WOERGL-KUPSTEIN): 8. PERSONALITIES GAULEITER HABICHT: WEISSENBORN Dr BILGERI SS OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) GREIFELD Underground munitions factory, was to have started production 10 May with a monthly capacity of 20,000, 000 rounds. Underground ball-bearing factory. Steal and Aluminum factory. Truck factory With monthly capacity of 250 trucks per month. Saltpeter and nitrogen plants. A completed factory for mortars; had neVer started production timated capacity, 200 per month. A 40,000 sq m light machine gun factory, located in a lignite mine. It is also equipped to build aircraft engines. SS OGRUF PRUETZMANN: SS OGRUF GLUECKS sa OGRUF POHL 24 May 1945 First leader of Austrian Nazis in exile in Germany; ? killed on Russian front. Chief of weapons section in production office headed by SAUER. Last seen in Tyrol, supposed to be hiding in a tunnel in vie REITH. Former president of INNSBRUCK Chamber of Commerce; later GAUWIRTSCHAFTSBERATER (District Economic Ad? visor). Expert on food, public utilities. Lives in BRIXLEGG, Austria. Chief of REICHSKOMMISSARIAT (REICH Commission) for the security of the German people (DEUTCHES VOLK- STUM); in charge of repatriation and relocation. WEHRWOLF leader for Germany, second to HIMMLER. Inspector General of Concentration Camps. In charge of finances and business exploitation of Concentration Camps. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER PAUL K DALAI Maj, MI, Commanding. / 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062 ? Ref No SAIC/18 24 May 45 ?_ECRET ? ErnI.OSOIE. ? ok? 25XIA SECRET :Auth: CG, 7th Army: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:Init: APO 758 US ARM!: Date: 24 May 1945 : ? ? HITLER'S LAST SESSION IN THE REICHSOHANCELLORY, 24 FEL 112 Note: No authentic reports of this session have been published in the Press or announced over the Radio. Reports Which-have been released did not contain the true facts. SOURCES i) WAHL, Karl, GAULEITER oflAUGSBURG ) Both these men were present at ii) AMANN, Mix,,Nazi Party member No 3.) the, meeting described below. Rating: c,3 ,Date of. Information: 24 Feb 45 Interrogator; W.K. The meeting was called on very short notice. It was to take place at 1300 hrst. and the leaders were told to come by Oar and to return the Same day.' There were some 60 or 70 people, all told, REICHSLEITERS, GAULEITERSt-SA and SS leaders, but no generals or leaders of the, WAFFEN SS. The members were lined up on three sides of A large and still un- damaged room of the REICHS'Chancellbry. In a few:Minutes HITLER entered, followed by BORMANN. Both Men shook hands with all present, and there- after HITLER Spoke briefly to REICHS Labor Leader HIERL. He spoke in a low voice, and only. parts of the conversation could be understood, but at the,end HITLER presented HIERL with a case containing the 'highest German 'decoration The reception was followed by a simple luncheen, consisting of stew and real coffee. HITLER left the room at 1530, and an hour and one-half later the leaders reassembled to hear his speech. When he returned to make his speech, HITLER sat at a small table, on which were his notes and a glass of water. Everyone noticed his stooped position and the fact that his left hand - not the, right one which was wounded on 20 July was shaking so badly that at times his entire body was trembling. It seemed to be causing the FUHRER great discomfort. At first his voite was low, but it gained strength and later reached its customary climax. No change in his voice was noticeable. HITLER'S speech lasted approximately one hour and one-half. For the first time the impression upon -is-listeners was not convincing. HITLER seemed to be struggling to convey a feeling of inner hope to the assem-., bled Party leaders, but the sensational news which all anticipated was not fortheoming. The substance of his address follows: He stated that the RusSian onslaught was of paramount concern to the people, because it was accompanied by serious misdeeds against them. . However, it was expected that the attack could be stopped. A large-scale counter-attack was planned, but hod been delayed chiefly because of great losses of heavy weapons. HITLER praised the brave deeds of certain generals, and expressed the wish that others were also "carved of the same wood". Many lacked the abil ity to improvise, which was a necessity. He singled out as es- pecially brave Gen HUE, who had been killed. In the.main message of his speech, however, he called upon them not to become faint-hearted but to develop supreme strength, and then the war could still be won. The leaders would have to guide the people personally, and bring out a "Teutonic Fury" in them. He declared that this was the time to find out the true quality of the German people, Should the German people give up, then it would be demonstrated that they had no moral worth, and in that case they would deserVe destruction. That would be the rightful judgement of history and Providence. 1 SECRET Aip/XVO FVRelease 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/18 24 May 45 Concerning military affairs he brought out four points: i) Germany must remain on the defensive in the WEST. (HITLER had great faith in the Westwall and the RHINE). ii) In the EA8T a powerful counter-offensive would be prepared. (He did not indicate the sector). iii) The new U-boats were outstanding; they represented a rev.4 olution in the technical field. DOENITZ was a phenomenally outstanding leader. iv) The new MESSERSCHMITT fighter plane, LE-262, was without equal anywhere in the world. It could not be damaged in combat, the only losses occurred as a result of accidents in take-offs or landings, and these were insignificant. Production was on a tre- mendous scale, and the results would soon be noticeable in the air. HITLER then spoke ( = the mistakes of the German Air Force, declaring that the greatest fault had been the choosing of the wrong models. Towards the end of his address HITLER spoke of politicalevents. He stated that England would hold out to the end; she was firmly allied to Russia and would not give in. On the other hand, he predicted that, if Germany held firm during the crisis, a day would come when serious conflicts would arise between Russia and the US. Concluding his speech, HITLER thanked the assembled leaders for thet cooperation and loyalty, and then spoke a few words concerning his health. This he had never done before, so it was especially note- worthy and had a depressing effect upon his listeners. He said that Frederick the Great had returned from the wars an ill and broken man. Now he, himself, felt the burdens of War, which had become evident in symptoms of ill health. Previously, owing to great worry he had suffered from a trembling leg. Now, however, the infirmity was in his lett arm. He hoped it would not move to his head, for a shaky head would be unpleasant. But even if that occurred he could only say, "MY heart will never quake; that remains ice-cold". He went on to say that after the attempt of 20 July the doctor read his pulse and found that it had remained at its customary 72 beats. He also mentioned trouble with his vocal chords and admitted that he had undergone an operation not long before. In closing he stated that he would in the future be forced to take some harsh measures. The leaders should not misjudge him if he should take steps which they did not understand, When HITLER had finished, BORLANN spoke a few words about loyalty and courage and readiness to follow HITTER unto death. Before leaving, HITLER conversed briefly with a Zew people - Dr GOEJBELS, Dr LEY, GAUm LEITER HIRTZ, and BACKE. Then he said he must leave, as others were already awaiting him in another room. 24 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER K(Atitic,/ PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 2 SECRET _ _ _ Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ?OP itilS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO DO NOT UlACH Approved For Release 200410219E9PITITI?,83-00415R006200.0 00027 A : SECRET: APO 758 US RAY SEVENTH ARMY LTERROGATION CENTER :Auth:05IL7tE Ara: :Date:23 may 4 Ref No SAIC/.16 23 May 4, GOERING DISCUSSES HITLER, ROMMEL, SCIENCE, AND - GOERING 2511A 1. PREAMBLE The cause for which GOERING stood is lost - but the canny Hermann, even now, thinks only of what he can do to salvage some of his personal fortune, and to create an advantageous position for himself. He condemns the once beloved' FUEHRER without hesitation. Up to now he has not made a plea .1'1 favor of any of his former henchmen, alive or dead. Yet, behind his spirited and often witty conversation, is a constant watchfulness for the opportunity to place himself in a favorable light. Rating: 0-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K. 2. THE FUEHRER a) HITLER AS STRATEGIST According to source, HITLER concerned himself almost exclusively with military operations from the beginning of the war up to the end. At times he made decisions down to division operations. The FUEHRER believed that fate had selected himto be the military leader of Germany - a belief which was strengthened by the success of his operations in France. Here HITLER decided to break through at SEDAN and drive for ABBEVILLE. against the advice of the OKH, where it was believed that the attack was possible only from the right flank. When operations atarted the OKH openly expressed doubt of the suecess of the plan. Then, When the attack went off better than expected, and resulted in a complete victory, HITLER. became very proud of his military abilities?as did the generals themselves. - PW went on to describe the situation meetings at the FUEBREWs hq. HITLER was always present at these meetings, which took up 6 to 7 hours of his day. The following officers usually attended these meetings: KEITEL, GEFFELDMARSCHALL (Fld Marshal) WINTER, GENLT (Maj Gen) OKW BUHLE, GEN d? INF (Lt Gon) OKH . ZANDER, STAF (SS Col) Party Chancellory BURGDORF, GEN d. INF (Lt Gen) ) VON PUTTKAMMER, Admiral VON BELOW, OBST (Col) FUElgtER's Adjutants . HAENSCHE, STUBAF (SS Maj) KERSTEN, HPTSTUF (SS Capt) FEGELEIN, GRUF (Maj Gen) Liaison Off to HIMMLER VOSS, Admiral II " " DOENITZ SCHERFF, GENMAJ (Brig Gen) War diary writer' JODL, GENOBST (Col Gen), or his Reported on the representative situation in tha WEST ? GUDERIAN, GENOBST (Col Gen) Chief-of'Staff of the Army; reported on the situation in the EAST? JUNGE, KAP z. SEE' (Navy Capt) Reported on the naval situatiot . BUMS, MAJ Reported on the air -situation GOERING himself and GROSSADMIRAL (Crand Admiral)DOENITZ were frequently present at these meetings.. At the meetings, maps wore spread out.on a huge table.- The officers waited near the entrance for the -appearance of HITLER. When the FUEHRER,arrived he shook handswith all present and then lead the group into the room. The officers then gave their talks on the situation. During these speeches HITLER frequently interrupted and gave his views in energetic tones. Opinions in opposition to his own wore- soft-pedaled and never reached -a point of serious discussion. egEORET 1 d For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Rof No sac/16 a, may 4, During poriods when the ?situation was unfavorable, HITLER took it out on tho different branches of tho armed forcos and blamed their heads for all mistakes. Source was singled out quito often, and had to take robukos in front of all tho officers present. This load to the point whore the officers bog= to lose thoir respect for GOERING'a military ability. At tho mootings HITLER always presented tho latest dispatohos of the foreign press, which ho than discussed in his well-known mannor. During tho last few months tho situation meetings wore hold in the Winter Garden of the Chancellory and then to the very last in HITLER's bunker undornoath tho Chancellory. This bunker had a dimonsion of on1y5x3 in. Alltho officers had to Crowd into this all spaco and many of them faintod daring the meetings. Tho night meeting which usually started between 2400 and 0100 hours was not attondod by?all the officors, but HITLER was always present. After thO mooting HITLER's famous tea would take place. Horo a nall circle of trusted frionds would?makedecisions of primo political importanco. Hero, too, BORMANN used his strong influonco to overrule HITLER, who was usually tired after tho previous mooting. GOERING maintains that all things not directly connected with tho conduct of tho war bocmno tho responsibility of BORMANN. The FUEHRER's tea guests Usually included the following persons: BORMANN, FEGELEIN, GRUF (SS Maj Gon), BURGDORF, GEN d. INF (Lt Gon), All or some of tho adjutants, arid Mrs JUNGE Mrs SCHROEDER Mrs CHRISTIAN b) HITLER'S PLANS FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONV2ZTI0N i) Prisoners of War PW claims that it was HITLER'S intention to donounco tho GENEVA Convontion if the war would have lasted another throe months. All Allied PW except the so valuable to tho Gorman war economy wore to be oxterminatod. According to source, this plan bocamo known to tho generals and tho Nazi Party loadors, all of wham took a stand squarely against it, with the oxcoption of GOEBBELS. It was pointed out to HITLER that German PU in Allied hands would havo to expect the samo fate. To this tho FUEHRER replied that those millions of Germans wore of no more use to tho war effort aayway, but that after his proposed action there would be no more deserters from tho Gorman Army. Tho Gorman people, said ho, would then fight to tho last man. ii) Chomical Warfaro _c PW states that HITLER was restrained from the USO of CU during tho last period of tho war only by his fear of Allied retaliation. He often admitted that he had missed the chanco to use OW at the right time (i.e., during the oarlior stages of tho war). .At that time ho had believed Gorman victory certain with tho uso of normal weapons. c) HITLER'S DEATH Whon tho situation in BERLIN had dotorioratod beyond hope, HITLER allowed his personal physician, Dr MORELL, to escape to tho SOUTH of Germany. MORELL had boon administoring c. very largo daily doso of hormones to tho FUEHRER- Source boliovos that it was the sudden absence of thoso hormones which caused HITLER's general breakdown and subsequent death. Following 20 July 44 tho FUEHRER's health had boon declining. His right log and arm trembled spasmodioally, and the enallost contradiction irritatod him to a high degree. Only BORI/UX GOEBBELS and FEGELEIN still had any influonoe op him. PW says tho atmosphere of HITLER's shelter was horrible. His socrotary and his mistress could stand it only by being drunk all day long. Approved For Release 2004144 frtdiADP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S 30 R E T Ref No SAIC/15 23 May 45 3. ROMMEL'S DEATH PW claims that ROMMEL had plotted against HITLER in the 20 July Putsch. On tho following day tho FUEHRER sent a high 85 officer to ROMMEL with the order either to accept arrost and trial or, as a special privilogo bocauso of his meritorious service, to shoot himself with tho pistol which was handed to him at the sano time. Ho was allowod five minutos in which to make up his mind. ROMMEL choso the second alternative. 4. GOERING ON SCIENCE JND INDUSTRY - a) ATOM SMASHING PW claims that Gorman sciontists have made tromondoUs prOgress in gnashing tho atom. Ho boliovcs that this will bo the rovolutionary Sourco of onergy-in the future. Although ho was chairman of the Gorman Sciontists' Loaguo, source does not havo an approciablo amount of knowlodgo of the field. Basing his statement on a booklet ho onco saw dealing with the subjoct, PW claims that Amorican research in tho field of tho atom is far below that of other nations. b) NEW GERMAN U-BOAT Source is very proud of tho success which he claims for a now Gorman turbino- driven sUbmarino which "doos not need to surfaco for air". Only a few of thoso subs wore ready in spring 45; In largo numbers they would bavo inflicted serious damage on Allied shipPing. Their undof-wator speed is claimed to be almost as high as the speed of tho fastest surface vassals. 5. GOTRINGS ECONOMIC STATUS h) REGULAR INCOME In tho light of one of tho Party's foremost early aims - namely, that no one earn more than RM 1,000 per month - GOERING's economic status is grotosquo. In answer to questions concerning the source of his income, PW replied that ho received "very docent" wages as President of tho Prussian Ministry, and that "largo checks" woro pincod at his "disposal" (ZUR VERFUEGUNG) by the mombor firms of tho Supervisory Council of Manufacturers (AUFSICHTSRAT VON FABRIKUNTERNEHMUNGEN), although ho did not rocoivo a regular salary as head of this agency.. Ho would not make any prociso statements as to the total of his income; which would bo difficult to establish, his resources being in the hands of a number of different .banking- institutions. Examination of a bankbook, however, revealed tho following information: Income as Minister of Aviation approx RM 3500 per mo ft P member of "REICHSTAG" 1700 " " Special oxponso account .from REICHS Ohanoollory 20000 " Adding to this his estimated salary of RM 25,000 per month as President of tho Prussian Ministry, his total monthly income from tho above sources was over RM 600,000 per yoar. In addition, there wore regular chocks from tho EH ER Party Publishing House amounting to RM 120,000 por year, for his writings on tho Four-Year-Plan. Allowing for salaries accruing from othor public positions, a yearly income of RM 1,000,000 may be considered a fair estimate. b) ADDITIONAL INCOME Tho abovommontionod bankbook also shows occasional chocks and 'credits from large firms - for example, semi-yearly amounts of RM 300,000, RM 250,000, etc. from tho RETS MA Firm (Cigarettes), HAMBURG.. (Note: Minister of Finance FUNK SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/T: CIXRDP83-00415R006200030002-7 3 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Ref No SAIC/16 23 May 45 oxnlaina thee? amounts, stating that REENTEMA, was involved in a trial for ovasion of taxes amounting to several millions, from which it was able to extricate it solf with, GOERING' s aid.) As chief of the Four-Year-Plan, sourco was able to have any Oinount of money put at his disposal, more or loss "voluntarily" Thus it may be said that for all practical purposes, money waa not a matter of concern in PW' s life. Questioned about a possible fortune in foreign countrios, source replied, "T can await any revelations of your agents concerning my 'foroign fortunosl with an untroubled mind." (Note: It was possiblo, however, to learn from REICHSHINISTat FUNK that GOERI.11-6 had probably smuggled money abroad through MEDEL, a partner in the WITZIG banking concern. MEDEL, a native of Germany and rt naturalizod Dutchman, married to a Swiss woman, worked for GOING in some sort of illogitimato doald in foroigr currency. About three to four months ago ho flow to Spain, probably with a large share of GOERING' s fortune, which was in all likelihood to be deposited in , Portugal or South America? It may be noted that GOING asked the interrogating officer ropoatodly whether living conditions wore bettor in Argontina, or in Ohilo? Dr FUNK explained that GOERING, ^s director, of tho Four-Year Plan, could disppeo of foreign currencies indopontly, and that ho usod thom,unhositatingly for his own purposes, such as the purchaso of art treasures.) c) PRIVATE FORTUNE PW' 8 fortune consists mainly in objects of.!,,rt, which ho robbed from foreign countries, bought, or accepted as "voluntary" gifts. ,Sordo Of this fortune cams, from towns such as NUREMBMG, which prosontod 'him with objocts of art - jeweled daggers, swords, boxos wrought of gold, and the like - at ovary possible occasion ? Other works of art cemo from foreign nations, statosmon, industrialist; craftemon, musoumo, and from the FUEHRM . They combined to form a collection worth many millions, which, judging by his motion in discussing it, ho wanted to build up into the largest treasure in the world, somothing like the two fabulous hoards of German folklore, the NIEBELUNGENSCHATZ or the WELFENSOHATZ ? 6. VANITY OUTRAGED,. P11 complained about his troatmont as a prisoner, saying that it is usual for a marshal to have a tiouso of his own to live in. Considering his position as a Nazi, however, ho thought ho would have to be satisfiod to live in the some manner as the other officer PW. He says ho asked the 4^poribans for safe conduct when ho gavo.himsolf up, and now bo finds himself a prisoner of war. He is worried about his private possessions. Judging by the way the Allies have boon dealing with thorn, ho says, ho foars that one day "they will take tho pants off me" ? 23 May 45 PAUL KUBALA, Commanding SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/17 24 May 45 SECRET 01 .......... : SECRET :Auth: CGL 7th Army: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:Init: : APO 758 US ARMY:Date: 24 May 1945 ........ ...... OBSERVATIONS ON ARMOR EMPLOYMENT (This Report is in answer to Questionnaire, Hq Seventh Army, Office of the Armored Officer-, dated 18 May 1945) SOURCES i) GUDERIAN, Heinz, GENOBST (Col Gen), Officers Repl Pool, OKH, former- ly C of S, German Ground Forces, and Inspector Of Am-bred Units. Apparently wantingtO appear anti-Nazi, the General answered all ques- tions freely; .he stated emphatically, however, that he did so only because HITTRR's death freed him from his oath of allegiance. Rating: B-2 Interrogator: RW. -ii) VON GEYR, Leo, GEN D PZTR (IA Gen), Inspector of Armored Units. Proud of his profession, of the old Prussian general type, source gave information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous. Having been Military Attach 'e in LONDON for several years, source claims to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs, , Rating: B-2 Interrogator: R.W. iii) DIETRICH, "SEPP", OBSTGRUF o2,61 Gen of..WAFFEN SS), CG 6 SS Pz,Army. Impressed by his own position and deeds, blaming everybody for lack of courage, the notorious SS General appeared to criticize Allied equipment and tactics because he thought it was "expected of him" rather than as a result of actual experiences. He emphasized his 35-year-long Army affiliations. Rating: 0-3 ' Interrogator: R.W. iv) HAUSSER, Paul, OSSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFFEN SS), ex-CG, Army Group "G". Source is a ?Tim believer in HITLER's theories, and attempted to justify most of the FUEHRER's deeds, but.he talked freely on military matters. Formerly a Prussian general in the Army, source stressed the fact that he was primarily a military leader and not a politician. Rating: B-2 Interrogator: R.W. ANSWERS TO SPECIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 1, What do you think of the offensive fire power of the American tank and tank destroyers? While,Gen GUDERIAN and Gen Von GEYR felt that they were not sufficiently experienced to answer the question, the former because he did not command troops opposing American armor, the latter. due to the limited employment of armor during the part of the Normandy campaign when he was in command, the two SS generals praised American tanks and tank employment. "SEPP" DIETRICH stated that in his opinion,the SHERMAN engine was ver good, but that a larger cal gun could be mouated on the SHERMAN tank. The new American heavy tank, he said, was even more satisfactory and could be favorably compared with the best German tank, the Royal Tiger. Gen HAUSSER called the fire-power of American tanks "immensely strong". 11) SECRET vird For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S ECRET Ref No SAIC/17 241WaY 45 . 2. In general, what is our greatest weakness in armor and armored tac- tics? , Gen GUDERIAN is of the opinion that the tracks on our tanks are too narrow, causing them to get stuck when operating in snow or mud. Thus the American tanks are "Good We.. Tanka" (SCHoNWETTERTANK). Gen von GYP thinks American armored tactics 'were good, given American air superiority; when difficulties were encountered, air support was called for and the matter taken care of. If called to fight an enemy with equal or stronger air power, however., American tank tactics would have tp be more daring to be successful. Attacks were not carried through to the last. Flexibility of leadership (WENDIGKEIT DER F,OHRUNG) was some- times lacking when large tank concentrations were employed. Gen DIETRICH' points out errors in armor employment, -notably the fact that armor was not always employed in sufficient Masses. This, he says, is a tactical error which results in lack of offensive power. In the case of large armor concentrations, the Germans were always. aware of them due to lack of proper security. Gen HAUSSER thought that a lower-echelon commander' would be better acquainted with these problems. He stated, however, that the idea of tank concentrations ihstead of individual tank employment was correctly recognized by the. Americans and carried out in the best POssible way. The tendency to avoid frontal attacks has proven successful. 3. What are your views on effectively combatting infantry A/T measures in the, use of the PANZERFAUST? Gen GUDERIAN.thinks the PANZERFAUST an excellent weapon, easy to transport-, cheap and easy to manufacture on a mass production basis, and easy to handle in a fpxhole. Its disadvantages, as seen by Gen GUDERIAN, are Its short range and the jet flame.. Both DIETRICH and HAUSSER think that although invented as a result of the. A/T gun shortage, the PANZERFAUST has proven itself to a.point where it can no longer be regar..Thd as a pure "emergency weapon". As Gen DIETRICH puts it, even if he could 'obtain as many A/T 'guns as he wanted, he would not like to omit the PANZERFAUST'in organizing A/T defenses. Gen von GEYR regards the PANZERFAUST as an emergency weapon par excellence. His answer, in full:'"Faute de mieux, on se coucha avec sg femme..." ? 4, Have you found that the bridging problems for Pz Kw V and Pz Kw 'VI greatly limit their tactical mobility? All sources answer this question in the affirmative, but all point out at the same time that, in general, the root of the problem lies in the specific types of German bridging equipment, and in supply difficult- ies. In this connection Gen von GEYR states flatly that, with the technical quality of American equipment, no difficulties whatsoever should be encountered, Gen GUDERIAN and Gen HAUSER point to supply problems as the main difficulty. Gen-DIETRICH thinks the K-type bridginE equipment insufficient, but the I-bridges very good, except in the case of large rivers, like the RHINEi 5, To what do you attribute German tank losses, by percentages? Air, A/T, Arty and mechanical? Which was most feared by. tank crews? 2 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET- Ref No SAIC/17 24 May 45 Gen GUDERIAN: 60-.70% through ,mechanical failures (Eastern front); 15% A/T; 5% Arty; 5% mines; 5% othera. (Note: figures are only a very rough approximation; source was very hes- itant about answering thi6 question) Gen von GEYR: Source could not give kny approximate figures. He thinks air-tank cooperation the most deadly combination. Air attacks are very effective and most feared by tank crews. Gen DIETRICH: 30% methanical failures;' 10% air; 15% A/T; 45% tanks and" PDs. Losses due to arty are negligible. Most feared by crews: Allied tanks and TDe. ,Gen HAUSSER: During long movements to the zone of action, 20-30% of, all tanks en route fall out due to mechanical failures. Considering the remainder as 100%, 15% are lost.through ? mechanical failures; 20% through air attacks-; 50% ' through A/T defense; and 15% are knocked out by arty. Tanks and IDs are feared most by German tank crews. 6. What'developments have been made in the use of Infra-Ray or similar ray devices for night operations by tanks? Where can technical data be found on the subject? Who were the manufacturers? What men de- veloped this device? ? All sources agree that these uevelopments have not yet passed the early experimental stages. Gen DIETRICH knows about experiments carried out at the TRUPPENUBUNGSPLATZ (Training Area) PADERBORN; Gen GGDERIAN thinks the GAF was developing similar devices, and heard about tests with PKWs (passenger cars). Gen GUDERIAN thinks the ENTtaCKLUNGSSTELLE DES LUFTFAHRTMINISTERIUMS (Research Center of the Air Ministry) shotld know details; Gen DIETRICH refers to the HEERESWAFFENALIT (Army Weapons Dept), BERLIN, as the place where details might be found. 'Gen von GEYR is of the opinion that the British lead in the field of Infra-Ray research, and mentions specific- ally Prof LINDELANN, of OXFORD. He does not know any details'as to German Infra-Ray developments, and also refers to the GAF for details. . 7. What de you think of American reconnaissande tactics? Gen GUDERIAN thinks that AMerican tactics are generally the same as those employed by German units. Advanced (VORGESCHOBENE) motorized ton with air support is very effective, he statese Gen von GEYR thinks that the organization of American ten units is superior to the German, particularly in the number of vehioles, where the proportion is 15:1. The most dangerous moment fortheopponent is mass rdn after a pene- tration; he,pointe.oqt. Gen DIETRICH praises American air ten ("excell- ent"); but'ithinks but ground tactics lack aggressiveness. Movements have to be executed in shorter time, he thinks. Gen HPIISSER particularly likes American cav groups; he thinks they are "very effective" because they are used to close dangerous gaps in addition to their ten missions. The German Army Leeks a similar unit; he points mit; and in units which Could perform similarly to oUr cav groups, equipment is inferior. 8, What do you think of American r n equipment? What are its weaknesses? With the exceptien of von GEYR, who claims no knowledge of the subject; 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S E.c.R 5 T Ref No SAIC/1:7 24 May 45 all other sources describe the light roil-tank as "excellent". Gen HAISSEP also'thinks the radio communication system and equipment is efficient; Gen DIETRICH thinks the rcn car is not heavy enough. Gen GUDERIAN enviously adMitsathat'Germari equipment is inferior. 9. Has much German technical data on armor been given to the Japanese? All sources except Geri GUDERIAN had no knowledge of the subject. Gen GUDERIAN thought that according to a statement by the FUEHRER, the.Jap- anese automatically received information on all German new developments. He could, however, furnish no details, 10. Do you know of any important developments in Japanese armor? All sources claimed no knowledge of any such developments. 11. Approximately Western front how many tanks did Germany have operative on the on I Mar 45? Gen GUDERIAN: Rough estimate: 400-500. At the time of the beginning of the invasion a total of,1,200 tanks were operative, and losses could usually be .replaced in time, After Jan 45, the transportation breakdown caused failure of delivery to units. The most acute shortage was in assault guns, and other SP guns. Gen von GEYR: Rough estimate: 200-300, Gen DIETRICH: 300 was the maximum,: aCcording to his estimate. Gen HAUSSER : Army Group "G" had approx 100 tanks and assault guns available. Estimate of the total, which he believes probably incorrect:- 1,000. 12. What is the total number of each of the following types, Mk V, Mk VI and JAGDTIGER w/128 mm? Gen GUDERIAN was the only one He did not know any total figures he stated to be not more than 100 approx 300, On the average; Mk VI 100-120 per month; JAGDPANTHER, C 24 May 1945. who could answer the question at all, except in the case of JAGDTIGER, which . The monthly production of Mk V was were produced at the average rate of mm: 50-70 on the average, SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER (2 X.?4A.A.LA.. PAUL KUBALA, Maj, LI, Commanding. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062( 3 2 toosut 'Tr toi Ref No SAI0/15 22 Ahy 45 STV7,7TH :RMY IOTTEOGTION Olrz1f]R APO 758 VS 0030002-7 4 s .6E0113 I :Auth: OG, th IrmN: :Dates 22 Aay 1945 : HVIG POTTHAST, MIO7BrY3HAn MISTS3 SOUROt Hedwig POTTHL:;T is an attractive woman in her early thirties, who might be termed the prototype of the Nazi "DrISOM ?RAUH'. She gave the improssion of being an unaseu:Ang woman rather than a forceful or palovlating type. Ratings 0-) Date of Informations See Text Interroqator. IZ. HISTCRY Source was born '6 Feb 15124 iA OCI07,3,'the daughter of a Llerchant of middle class family. She att3nded school in I 1, and later studied at the Zconomic Inetitue for Interpreters in 1/077HTI.g, earnin7, her degreo in 1953. ?rom, 55-34 she worked as. a clerk in a govt office in 003117Z. , In the autumn of )5 she applied for transfer to a post'whoro she could utilizo her knowlodso of taglishi and she was subsocivaltly 4von a position in the.nwepapor net of the --2STAPC Office in B3RLIF. Howev:ir, she still had no -opportunity to ;:tate, use of her lng/ish, she as'.oae for a transfer or for permission to. resign. She was not permitted to loavo the G1STAPO 6orvico, but was givon a. now position as private soorotary to Hoinrioh a post which sho::ocoUpiod from 'Jan 36 until tho'boginning of 41. Source statos that sho supervised 922,1111's "PRIVA2 (Private Chancellory) -aAd that. her work was in no way concerned with his 56 activities. III. AFFAlaHITR F;L:ILI.TR 1n to OOV1'90 of so,.i.rooln work with. HLII,DA an attacl:mont developed which ovontually 13d to a serious love affair. Sourco loft her job in 1941 to load the lifo.of a loyal, dovoted mistress, and she bore two ohildron to HL.IILIR. iri the years which followod. The alliance was not legalized by marriago only boCauso HI:yZalIa felt that a divoroo miht result in his wife's death, as the latter had boon very ill ever sinco the birth of hor on17 child. In the autumn of 42 source moved to 8ZROH.Tr.A.ZZ:,?whoro she ro.lained until just before the Allied occupation... - Iv. 2TaIg7k )CUTT8 ? .1-M MILL 32 4 ? Source states that the last time she saw Hii.:2.311 was during the week onding 22 Aaroh 45. At that time Mii.11,12 was confined to bed in a hospital at HOH3F- LUTOHO near sufforiig from an attaok of srippo. :Inc visiting him there souroo onoountorod Dr Folix rilli$TEX of LIIMS04,Ttio 6, 6TOOKHOL14, a zaaSage spocialist who had b364 troating HILL 3:?, for yoars. Dr :2;a$TtN told her to call upOn him if over she noodod any help. (A wire from source to Dr :::TRST.IN was intorcopted by Allied authoritios, disclosing source's loetion and loading to this interrogation). Thiloelo lived in WIROHTZSGADIT, she used to receive daily tolophono calls from unsaab., bi:?L presumes that the calls oamo from 3IY, but she is not oortain. ,The last call from him MAIO on 19 April 45. 114 usual ha, discussed only personal mattors over the phono, although ho montioned the fact that tho situation was gotting moro difficult ever y day* Boforo oaying-goodbyo ho promised to call again the following day, but source states that she never spoke to him amain. A letter from him arrived the same day, howovor, dolivorod by SORT 2 13 Approved For Release 2004/02/16 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref go- SAIO/15 22 Nay 45 SvOR ? ? .-- ono or. HrytzTals staff officers. It containod the usual personal messages, but ended with another phrase about difficulties and tho hope that God would protect her, the children, and Germany. The letter gave no hint as to 1-IL:MIA's plans, and no directions for source. Source states positively that this was the last word, direct or indirect, which she has received from hin. Pravious to the interrogator's arrival, source had been shown a copy of "Stars and Stripos?0 announcing 7.71L.LILM's capture. She apparently believed this to be true, bepauso she Was obviously deeply concerned and shocked when it was suggested that the story mi.2:ht not be true. She could offer no opinion at to his whereabouts, but by a question revealed that sho thought he might be in hiding samewhere, "trying to save somothing for Germany?. She does not believe that ho has floe, to another country, and she clatas that he never gave any indication of havin7 any plans in case of a Gorman collapse. V ? HLIML!-3-.R S TA7 F Source nontioned the followirm personalities on s privato staff: STAF (SS Col) 3AUATZT ,:s.cted as private courier b etwo on HIlLiL and source ?'3T5.F (SS Col) Dr 31-0:7DT Lt Ool of Police SUCHAITTJC .0S,2TJF (1st Lt) GT.TIGTaMq VI,AFTT3ECIAT When the Allied advance threatened 3IICHT.:35GADT.T, source a7:-.-;i3. with .her children first to .A.OH-37S117,3, Tyrol, and su.bsequently to another address whore this interrogation toolk. place -After repeatedly. protesting that she had burned all her letters from HII?iML?L - source finally admitted th-t "she had burned only a s-eall -portion of them, as , she couldn't boar to destroy anythinz so precious her. A.ppropriate author- ities have been notified regarding the disposition of thee e letters. VII. HIi Source Ste:loot that HI1--11131i nevr discussed politics or SS activities with her, . and that she has boon completely uninformed on these matters . since leaving her job. She considers an idealist with troMendous faith in Germany and in, the She believes that everything ho did was for the sake of e..,-many. Ho never enriched himself ? -nd never kept valuable presents but gave them to the -SS. His only property is his house in M.Y/TD/T.-.3GENSEE. which he bought on- a mortgago and paid off over a period of years. HI1111;7311 was-privately opposed to -a continuation of the war against the .';Teste.rn Allies. Ho attributes the fact thatland and the US fought a :_'..ratny to my a 7.37.3727.110131s ineptitude, and believes that ano - Foreign 1.:inister might have avoided such a disaster. 22 May 1945 -IT TTH 17.75.2..;'C:3:.TION 0Ii'72.71.3a PAU L , Maj , MI ? Oommanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ? 25X1A Approved For Fitgease 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDPQ3-004.1ReittE000030 02-7 THIS Is AN Rol' NO $A/C/1 19 may 1945 F SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 ? ?US Army HERMANN QOPING,TALKING SECRET : :Auth: CG th Arm : anit: aato: 19 May 1 5: /. SOURCE GOERING, Hermann, REICHSMARSOHALL. Sourco is by no moans the oomical figuro ho has boon depicted so many times in newspaper reports. Ho is neither stupid or a fool in the Shakospoarean sense, but gonorally cool and calculating. Ho is able to grasp the fundamontel issues under discussion immodiotoly. Ho is certainly not amen to be underrated. Although ho tried to soft-podal many of the most outrageous crimes Com- mitted by Germany, ho said enough to show that ho is as much responsible for the policios within Gormony and for tho war itaolf, as anyone in Germany. GOERING took groat pride in claiming that it was ho who was responsible or tho planning and suc- cossful execution of tho paratroop landing in Grote, that it was ho who had drawn up tho plans for a capture of Gibraltar, a plan which was never carriod out bocauso HITLER was opposed to it at tho last minute, that it was ho who was rosponsiblo for tho development of the Luftwaffe. On tho other hand ho denied having had anything to do with the racial laws and with tho coocontration camps, with the $S- and tho atrocitios committod both in Germany and outsido. GO2RI:G is at all times an actor who doos not disappoint his audionco. His vanity extends into the field of tho path- ologiCal, as ip oxemplifiod by tho poarl-groy uniform, the heavy, solid gold opaulw ottos and an enormous diamond ring on his right hand, oven though his medals wore limited to two, including the Grand Croas of the Knight's Cross with Swords and Diamonds. Just as muoh a pert of GOERING aro two of his aides, OBIT (Col) VON BRAUCHITSOR, son of tho Fiold Marshal, end HPTM (Coot) KLAAS. GOERING was only too ploanod to be able to discuss tho history of the past 12 years, and ho gavo all information more than willingly to a group of interrogators. II. !THE WA Outbroak And The Polish Campaign COMING claims that ho tried to prevent HITLER from launching the Polish campaign, and when ho did, and Franco and Britain did not declare war immediately, ho attamptod onco more to bring about a peaceful solution to the problom. From 1- 3 Sept 1939 tho Germ= forces wore advancing into Poland without a declaration of war. GOERING ropoivod a massage through his personal courier in SWEDEN at noon on 3 Sept from Viscount HALIFAX, in whioh the latter aakod him once more, end for the last time, to halt the operations before it was too late. GOERING bogged HITLER to stop the Gor- man forces and to make an offer to Britain and Franco to the offoot that they would be willing to solve the problem peacefully, if they would be allowed to keep tho territory already oocupiod in the first throe cloys of Soot. This would have meant the elimination of tho Polish corridor--all this territory had been overrun in tho first throo days?and would have given Germany an area, which for a long timo was being jealously watched and vary much covotod by Gormany. GOERING fools that tho offer might have boon acceptable to Britain and Franco, on the grounds that it would have loft Poland a buffer state botwoon Germany and Russia. Howovor, before thoso propoaals oould be aubmittod to Britain and France, the declaration of war arrived from both those countrioa. Tho Invasion Of Franco AO. Tho Lowlands GOERING crodits HITLER for tho plan of the invasion of France and tho Lowlands. Originally it was intended to invade France at a much oarlior date, somotimo during the winter of 1939-40. HITLER askod GOERING to inform him as soon as a period of fine weather Was in sight, so that tho Luftwaffe could be committed for at loast five days in a row, a period which was considered suMciont to disorganizo the French linos and to launch a powerful offensive, tho main effort of which was to come around NAMUR. GOERING claimed that at that time ho was very much opposed to tho in- vasion of France, and suggostod repeatedly that it be postponod until Spring. Ho SECRET 1 4.5L/00/ a feAigoved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET was in constant fear all through the wintor that a poriod. of fino weather might pro- cinitate the offonsivo against Francon It was during tho winter of 1939-40 thata certain mishan occurred which almost -resulted in GOERING-Is end, at least as a political figure, and might. have moant Gormanyis end, if tho accident. would have boon exploited properly by the Alli. A Gorman courier was given tho complete plans for tho invasion of France and tho Low- Lands, which wore to be dolivorod at a Gonoral Staff ConfOronco at Cologno. .Tho pilot, Recording to GOERING, got lost and landed in BELGIUM by mistako. The papers wore promptly capturod, but everybody refused to believe that they wore anything but a fake. When the courier discovonocL tho mistake and found that the piano had landed, pot on the destined airfield ell the right bank of the RHINE, but in BELGIUM, ho made an attempt to burn the papors, but ho succeeded only partially, and most of thorn wore capturod either intact, or at loast, in such largo fragmonts, that tho main gist of tho documents could not be mistaken When tho 'news broke of what had happened, HITLER raVod at GOERING and told him that the Luftwaffe was rosponaiblo for this faux pap. GOERING told his audionno how ho sat at home byhtho fireside with :papers trying to. rononstruct what had happonod, and ho oven burnt his fingers trying to, find out whether or not the courier had had time to burn most of the papers. At the -instigation of his wife, ho called in several diviners and fortuno tollors who finally roachod tho conclusion that tho detailed part of the plan for the invasion must have boon destroyed. The result of all this was that a new plan wasndranno up, which was bettor than tho first, and which was finally oxocutod, i.e. the breakthrough at SEDAN. GOERING was very onthubiastic.about tho way in which HOLLAND was conouerod, prid- ing himself again and again for his own ingenuity in this connection. Ho tolls the story of a: Dutch first lieutenant who told about this incidont Gon WINKELMANN, Commander of the Dutoh Armed Forcos,was Galled up on the telephone by this Lt who was holding a certain bridge near tho Albert Canal. The latter asked him for por- mission to blow up tho bridge bocauso there wore paraohutists dropping down in tho immodiato Vicinity. Gon WINICELYIANN rofusod to bolievo tho story, and told him to refrain from blowing up tho bridge. A few minutes later the Lt called again, and again Gon WINKILMANN refused to believe it, and adding that ho rofused to have two divisions cut off from retroat,--thoso divisions wore being hounded by tho Germans from the front--and that it nas absolutely impossible that any paratroopers would daro to drop behind tho linos. A few minutes later tho Lt called for the last timo, saying "General, I an about to be arrested", and at that moment tho German para- troopers captured the Lt and tho bridge intact. Tho BombinA-Of.F2a1M1 GOERINGto story of tho bombing of ROTTERDAM was vory much in divergence with tho publishod stories and the known facts. GOERING claims that only ono wavo of 36 nlanos carrying incendiary bombs, none of. which oxcooded 50 kg, dropped its bombs. GOER/NG bocamO very- oxoitod when he was asked for his oxplanation for the largo num- bar of dead and woundod. "What largo numbers of woundod?" ho cried. nI toil you what happened, the fire brigade was so soared to death (HAT SO EINEN SOHISS GEHABT) that it refused to move out and do anything about tho fire. That's-why such a largo part of the city burntndown Tho destruction could have been restricted to a very mall area, if the firo brigade would have taken any action on it. You can ask the BUERGERMEISTER of ROTTERDAM about that, and ho will toll you. the soma thing. All thoso stones of hundrods or thousands of dead and wounded are just inventions and fairy tabs (ERFINDUNGEN UND MAERCHEN), At the most some twenty or thirty people could havcodiod from fames, whilo they wore hiding in the collar. When the s000nd wave camp over, Gon STUDENT ordored'a rod flareto. bo fired to prevent the dropping of moro bob, and this was dono, and no further bombs wore dropood.n GOERING'os an For-OZU Moditorranoan In 1941 GOERING had made plans for a massive offensive in tho Moditorrancat. Tho plan was about as follows;- Throo Army Groups wore to take part in what wr?s intended. to SECRET 2 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Noe' Approved Fora Release 2004/02/16 : CIA-RDP83-00415Gig06200030002-7 S E OR. 3 T be a vast onvolopmont operation. One Amy Group was to go through Spain, capture Gibraltar, move into Morocco, and roll up tbo front aa far as TUNIS, a ocord Army Group was to go through Italy and move into Tripolitania, and a third Army Group was to go through tho Balkans and Grooso and capture the Dardanellos, ANKARApand out through to the SUEZ Oanal. Upon the completion of thin move, it was planned to offer the following proposal to Groat Britain: to present them with the fait aocompli that the Mediterranean is no longer theirs, but that they could use it again, if they would ally thomsolvos with Gormany and fight against Russia. GOERING fort that this offor would havo had to be accepted by Groat Britain, since they could ill afford to lose the Moditorranonn as a passage to the Far East. Actually tho original plan for the move through Spain was GOERING8s brainchild. Ho claims that ovorythiug was proparod for this move, which was substantially as follows: fifteen divisions, including two parachute dive and three flak corps, wore linod up for this purpose. Approx 600-88mm (sic) AA guns, and a numbor of specially constructed 80om pi000s, plus a number of "smallorn 60cm arty piocos wore to bombard GIBRALTAlluntil it was pulverized. It was colt that no living soul could have ramainod in tho galleries undo- such a bombardment. The now 80cm guns wore alroady mounted on rniloars and yore ready to roll through Spain. The guns, when in firing position, occupiod four railroad tracks. The two parachute dive, which wore part of to fifteen diva, wore hold in roadiners to jump on the plateaus which surround the rook of GIBRALTAR. GOERING bolievos that theso two dive would never have boon necessary, sine? tho bombardomont by all the gunny which was to be an in- cossant pr000duro, would have brought the garrison to its kneos, , At the last minute HITLER rofused to carry out the plan, which ultimatcly included the entry into Portugal for the purposo of scouring the ports and establishing now U-boat bases to substitute or supplcmont thoso on the French Atlantic Coast. GOERING fat that HITLFRIs refusal to carry out the piano was a big, mistako. Tho ya, With Rl.1010, GOERING says that ono of his groatost ?hocks was experienced when HITLER decided to wage war against Russia. GOERING told him that what ho was doing 110.0 agatnst his oisfn bollofs and contrary to what ho had written nnd promised the people in "MEIN KAMPF". HITLZR told him that it was unavoidable, that the Russians wore becoming a groator monaoo ovary day, and that ho would smash the Russian Army before winter. GOERING pointed out to him that oven if he mashed the Russian Army, Gormany would still not be able to make peace with the Russians, but HITLER refused to listen. , /t was in the vintor 1941 that GOERING had his first disappointment in HITLER. Forced to rotroat SOW distanoo in Russia, HITLER boon= incronsingly more ill-taw- (xi and unroasonablo. ,GOERING then roalizod that HITLEH was not able to with- stand setbacks. This was in ovidonco oven more during the days (:): the battro of STALINGR:X. ? HITLER refused-to lot the Army of 200,000 mon undar VON PAULUS cut its way out, despite the fact that ho was implorOd to do 9D by GOERING and a groat majo- rity of the military, HITLER callod GOERING one day and asked him for a statanont on the total numbor of transport pianos available and their total loading capacity. GOERING told him but mddod that thonumbor of olsnos would bo inadequate for the task ahead. HITLER thou askod GOERING whothor it was possible to carry in supplies by bomber, and GOERING told him that it could be dono, but that it Was not advisable, sine? many bomb os woro being usod in the battle against Britain. HITLER oalculatod that by the uso of all availablo transport pianos and bombers, including the use of a brand now wing of Ho 1771s, which was just in the pro coos of training for a spring offensive, and for which GOERING had a particularly soft spot in hia heart and which ho was desperately trying to keep intact during tho training period--ho (HITLZR) could supply the Army of 200,000 with o,J-o. GOERING protested bittorlyi stressing the impossibility of the job duo to a number of factors, including the weather; GOERING told HITLER that ho could not expect to have constant flying woathor, and that some days it would be impossible to fly at all, and in that case, the quantity of supplies roquirod the following day would bo doubled. HITLER porsistod and GOER- ING tried to oomplyWiththoordors? The attempts to aupply the surrounded Army soon AEORET 3 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET broke doun for just tho roasons indioated by GOERING. Tho woathor was atrocious and most of tho pianos wore either wrecked on tho ground or lost in tho air through aooidonts. Tho result of this venture was that after a short time, most of tho transport pianos, many bombers and tho entire Ho 177 wing weroimmobilizod, and that tho battlo of STALINGRAD was lost anyway. GOERING stator; that from that time on, the rolationehip botwoen himself and HITLER steadily deteriorated. HITLER would give and countermand orders so often, that GOERING was complotoly unable to keep abreast of tho situation. Ho would have a conforonco with him in tho afternoon, and return to his quartors in tho evening to find 'a oortain order waiting there for him which the FUEHRER had not mentioned to. him during the conference. Many of thoso orders wore quite iMpos- siblo to carry out. Ac an oxamplo of one of thoso controvorsios, GOERING citos an order from HITLER which ordered the ontiro Luftwaffe to make an all-out attack on LENINGRAD in an attempt to knock Out the city. non GOERING told him that ho could not possibly transfer the entire airpowor against one objootive, and loavo all' other objoctivos, ospocially LONDON, untouched, HITLER accused tho Luftwaffe of cowardice, claiming that it was afraid of tho AA guns in LENINGRAD. It was usoloso to toll him that the AA protoction of LONDON was considerably stronger than that of LENINGRAD, and that the Gorman Mora had not 6hibd away from the task of bombing LONDON. GOERINGte attitude with rogardo to tho Ruosinn war was as follows during wintor 1941: It would be tho boot thing to hold ori to what we havo got--tho Ukraine-- and not attompt to ponotrato any further. Lot us build an East Wall with all tho millions of workers which wo havo at our disposal, and no Russian /XIV will over break through, booauno we have a superior Luftwaffe, and they can never break through tho dofonoos without an effective Air Foroo". However, the following spring the offonsivo was renewed with tho well known results. GOERING claimed that during tho first few days of tho Russian campaign, tho Luftwaffo had terrific sucoomsos. On one day they knocked out 2,700 Russian pianos, almost all of them on tho ground. The Russians, ho claims, did not have any idoa of what was happening in the first few hours of this devastating attack. GOERING, supported by VON BRADCHITSCH, then wont on to say that they thomselvoo did not be - hove the phenomenal success at first, and only announced tho loss of 1,900 Russian piano. 20 Lay. Putooh GOERING said that ho was supposed to have boon prosont at the mooting which was scheduled to tako place botwoon HITLER and MUSSOLINI at the FUEHRERHAUFTWARTIER, in East Prussia, but that duo to his dislike of MUSSOLINI, ho docidod not to attond tho mooting. It was only duo to this fact, that ho avoidod either being killed or woundod. GOERING says that it was impoosiblo to organigo an effective anti-HITLER movo- mont at the timo. To do away with HITLER would have probobly meant coming to an agreement with tho SS on that matter, and the SS oould not be trustod, GOERING felt. When askod why ho did not protoo':, to HITLER, and why ho did not give up his position as Chief of tho Luftwaffe, GOERING replied that ho was afraid that ho would consequontly lose his plaoo as ouc000nor to HITLER, and that he would be ro- placod by ROMANY, for whom ho claimod to havo a special dislike. Tho Racial Polioios Of pommy GOERINGto explanation for tho racial pelidy in Germany waa as follows: Tho per- secution was not intended to take on the aspects which it did later on. It was originally intended to squeeze only those Jews who were in leading positions, since they "represented a serious danger for the German nation". "After all, those Jews who fought in the World War and received the Iron Cross 1st class, were allowed to AECRET 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 lerowl *we Approved FoN&elease 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415/A006200030002-7 8 E 0 T,E T remain. We even encouraged their emigration to Palestine, and helped them to leave Germany." GOERING made no attempt to hide the fact that he was very much in favor the "arysnization" of Germany, it was just the "methods" with which he was not quite in accord. "Anyway, during the first few years of National Socialism we did not per- secute the Jews." He admitted that the rogroms of 1938 Were "pretty bad" (RECHT SOHL/MM), but claimed that this was the first instance of persecution of the Jews in Germany. "It was never intended that the "Aryanization" of Germany should take on such forme" (ES WAR NI E VORGESEHEN DASS DIE SACHE SOLCHE FORMEN ANNEHMEN SOLLTE). Although GOERING openly admitted that he knew of the "existence" of concentration bamps, he claimed that he never realized that they were particulary bad institutions. "I always thought that they were places where people were, employed for some useful woric." After seeing some of the pictures taken at DACHAU Concentration Comp, GOERING said "all this must have happened in the last few weeks". He said that he could not "Understand" that there are some people in Germany' who could Commit such atrocities. Atrocities In FrapAp .101. ?????????????? GOERING said that he did not believe in the atrocities which the Allies claim the Germans had mtmitted in FrInce. "You should have soon some of the bodies of German soldiers who were killed in Frando. It Was simp/y ghastly, indescribable the way these people looked." He Aismissod the Mutilation of French patriots as "propaganda" and compared the stories with those of the last war where people were supposed to have been fund with some limbs cut off. With this answer, he dismissed the matter. GENOBST(Ool Gen), BECK Gon GAMELIN aosmo considered Gone BECK and GAMELIN, both one-time Chiefs of Staff of the Gorman And French Armies respectively, to be in the category of "drawing-room!' gen- erals (SALONGENERALE). GOERING felt that both generals knew only the theory and not the practice. Both of them would spend most of their time weighing the different possibilities, all of which sounded ver nice on paper. 1,:t417 k.c1. MUSSOLINI, GOERING did not have one good word for Italy and MUSSOLINI. He felt that Italy was a millstone around Gormanyte neck, and that Germany would have been much bettor off if they had never bothered about Italy. GOERING seams to have a personal dis- like for MUSSOLINI. He imitated MUSSOLINI during his meeting at the BRENNER Pass, when HITLER had hurriodly arrived from Germany after hearing that Italy planned to march into Gr000e, HITLER apparontly tried to persuade MUSSOLINI to refrain from such a venture. GOER/NG said that he had full "sympathy" for the French if they despise Italy. Ho felt that Italyts entry into the war one week bofore the ond of the French COPV" paign was a "treacherous" move. "If I wore a Frenchman, I would spit on the ground every time I saw an Italian". The most ridiculous thing of all, according to GOERING) was MUSSOLINIts speech at the conclusion of tho French campaign, when he said that Italyts soldiers had accomplished the very difficult task of overcoming "tremendous fortified positions", and worst of all had triumphantly announced the capture of a certain mountain peak, which had always boon Italian. 19 May 1945 SVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER fex,k PAUL KUBALA4 s. Maj, MI, Commanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-EV,P9-ektM1/902 DO MIT DE MtlVi SEuRET_ Ref No SAIO/12 111 17 May 45 SEVENTH AR2JIY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 US AR:1Y 2 2 2 25X1A 02-7 SEC RT - Auth: 0G,7th Army ; Init: , Date; 17 MAy 45 , NOTES ON PERSONALITIES AND-ESTABLISHI:iENTS ASSOCIATED WITH DIVELOPI,IENT OF V-WEAPONS I. SOURCE LARSSON, Nils, a Swedish engineer who has worked for two years in Germany on, rocket research. Ho appears to have a well-rounded picture of German rocket prodUC- tion and plans, and although ho admits that he is only a "small man" in this field, he knows the more important, men and where they can be found. Ho volunteered tho information published below, which is given in souroets own words* Ratings Date of Information: 101&y. 45 Interrogators E.T.H.L. II. OHIEF FOR DEVELOPivENT OF V-WEAPONS "Tho Chief for Dovelopment of V-woapone, Gen DORMERGER, is staying in HINDELANG, near OBERSTDORP, Allgaou, according to soUrco's latest information. The Gonoral has a complete sot of documents on the V-2 in his possession, To avoid destruction of these documents, tho General should bo approached with the utmost caution. He is believed to be carrying false identification papors. Thoroforo it would be advisable to have someone who knows him personally mako the first contact 1114 ROCKET BOMB MATHEMATIOIAN "Dr Franz KALSCBEUER, who is one of the outstanding mathematicians in the field of ballistics for rocket bombs (AUBSENBALLISTIK DER R WAFF21, is reported to be . At prosont in TRAUNSTEIN, Upper Bavaria. Ho has with him all tho supporting 14i4t for a nowly developed slide rule for rocket bombs, and also tho Handbook of :Rocke Science of the VA (Exporimontal Station ? ). Furthermore, he guards all secret designations (code dosignations) for -oekot scioncop-as well as the key for thormo- - dynamic computations'. For the further deVolopmont of the rocket bomb by the US Army the apprehension of this man is absOlutely essential, and itshould be undortakon with extra= ea,- tion, as noted in II above. Dr KALSCHEUERis residing with a family named WW1., ? evacuated from DANZIG, and is engaged to be married to a daughter of tho fami4". IV* VIVAPAS l'Tho firm WAOKERCHEMIE, MUNICH, has a stock of VINAPAS in the storeroom of i,tk factory building at BURGHAPEN On the SALZAOH River, Upper Bavaria* This is a rpm_ material: of groat importance in the deVelopMent of tho rockot bomb, and tho entire Stock should bo ocured W. MEASURING INSTRUMENT FOR ROOKEV.M4LOPMENT "One of tho most important instrumonts connectod With rocket development ie a measuring devico designated GM 0 E. This instrUmont is loCated in the GASTkAUS BAECKERALM, in EAYRISOH ZELL, Upper .Varia, and is in tho care of Engr Waldemar TROAS1 who is the only min in Germany Who is fully quallifiod to service tha it-let/lament. tio has orders to bloW it up if ho can no.longor safeguard it VI. ORIGINAL DATA FOR ROCKET BOMBS , "Engr Karl Heinz SCHLESIGER4 from tho oxpertmental laboratory of tho WAFFEN4' . UNION (loapons Union) in PIANS, Czechoslovakia, is in possession of the original exact data, for to rocket botbs. SCHLESIGER was in VEILNBAOH, noar ROSENHEni on 10 May 45, in a hotel now,rovipitionod by the Rod Cross.' This mountain resort (BERGHOTEL) was used until recently as a transit camp for Slovonose FEILNBACH is situated approx 5 km SOUTH Of the detour to BAD AIBLING on the SALZBURG-MUNICH AUTOBAHN." SCRET #40 Aprbitga For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 VII. AMMONIUM PER0HLORAT3 "The DEUTSOHE SPRENGSTOFFOREMIE MK, at KRAIBURG on the INN, Bavaria, lac.s, ia stook 600 kE of ammonium porchlorato, a substance which forms the basis for now dovolopmonts in oxplosivosi It is stored approx 500 m NV of thO main entrance, in oxplosivos bunker No 3.58, which is partly dostroyod." VII/. RAY.7ANSMITTER AND INTEGRAL OAL0tUS MACHINE 'Tho original and only existing ray transmitter for the remote control Of rocket trombe is located at PRIBRANS, OzochoslOvakia, 60 km SV of PRAGUE, and 3 km WEST of the ,main PRAGUE-6IRANONITZ highway. The instrument is in the former physics 'building of the oxporimontal laboratory of the WPFEN UNION, SF:ODA, BRUENN. This building is known as DREIECKGZBATUDE and is situated on the slope of HEILIGEN BERG (Holy Mtn)." "In the assembly dept of the se-called work shop building, adjoining the DREI-. EGKOMBADIUDE is the only oxistingmodol of an integral calculus machine." ? Sourco boliovos that both instruments described above are of groat impOrtanoe. ,17 May 1.94, SEUNTH ARIE INTLIROGATION =MR ("WC 16/akot4 PAUL MALL, Haj; MI, Oommanding. 4 39.113/ Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 --- Approved For Release 200410211Q: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/9 20 Apr 45 THIS IS AN ENCIrvilF o!}' SECRET :Auth: OG, 7th Army:? SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: r2(4. APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 20 Apr115 PROPOSED PLAN FOR OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN GERMANY _ SOURCE GRAF VON ORIOLA, GMT (Maj Gen), comes from an old Silesian aristocratic fmm- ily. He is cooperative, expressed a pronounced non-Nazi attitude, and has an intense interest in the reconstruction of Germany. (Of Pd Int Buls Nos 5/750 and 5/751) Ratinc: B-2 Interrua.tor: W.M.B. Note: The following is presented substantially in source's own words. . OCCUPATION OF 73CUTHERN GERMANY (See Appendix) Source considers three corps fully sufficient for the occupation of Southern Germany EAST of the RHINE and bounded in the NORTH by the approximate line: Mouth of the LAHN - BAD NAUHEIR NEUSTADT/SAALE - COBURG -ABOH. The distribution of the occupationforces would thus correspond to the distribution of the German military forces in the pre-war years. Source believes that it would be of ad- vantage to have the oectors occupied by the three occupation corps correspond to the German WEHRXREISE sectors, as. this would facilitate cooperation with. the existing military and civilian offices. For the sane reason, and also to make the best use of the local tranoportation and communication facilities, source suggests that the corps CPIs be located either in the cities where the wEHRKREISE Hq were formerly located, or in their immediate neighborhood. The proposed areas allocated for the occupation forces, within the boundaries considered above, and excluding all tel -itory WEST of the RHINE as well as the SUDETENLAND, are as follows: Army Staff ? First Corps Second 'Corps Third Corps The DCNAUWOERTH area, because of its central location, OF: MUNICH; comprises WITHRXREIS VII. OF: NUERNBERG; Comprises WEERKEIS XIII and Southern cor- ner of WEERKREIS IX. OF: STUTTGART; comprises WEHRKREIS V and Eastern part of WEHRKRSIS XII. The following locations are suggested by source for div h : First Corps: First Div - ROSENHEIM Second Div - AUGSBURG Third Div - GARMISCH Second Corps: Fourth Div - WUERZBURG Fifth Div - REGENSBURG Sixth Div - BAYREUTH S 3 ',II-1ST Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET Third Corps! Seventh Div - DONAUESCIIINGEN Eighth Div KARLSRUHE Ninth Div - WIESBADEN The div boundaries proposed by the General correspond to the probable occupa- tional capacity of each. district. The boundaries are lines that may be easily plotted, viz, AUTOBAHNEF (super-highways), highways, rivers, etc. Source thinks it neither practical nor necessary to quarter the occupation troops in dispersed and broken-up groups; he believes central grouping more ad- visable, This would facilitate the operation and maintenance of the unite. Such an arrangement Would,. furthermore, permit the use of existing and, for the most Part, recently constructed barracks. The dense net of good roads would permit quick shifting of troops, should the, need arise. The following training grounds are in the army sector: i) GRAFENIMEHR - Second Corps, but also within easy access of First Corps; ii) HAKAEL3URG MUENSINUN iv) WILDFLECKEN v) SONTHOFEN - Second Corps; Third Corps; Second Corps; - First Corpe; primarily for mountain training. If the use of arnored dive for occupation troops is intended, source thinks it advisable to locate them in the immediate proximity of these training: areas, in order to decrease the damage to the crops caused by the maneuvering tanks. 20 April 1945. SEVENTH AMY INTERROGATION JENTER PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, "- Commanding. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 Appendix Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER SECRET Ref No SAI0/9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R00p I.- THIS IS AN ENC1.PSI: - : :TT SEORE.T- ,Ref No SAIO/10 22 April 45 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 US ARMY EVENTS LEADING UP TO 20 JULY PUTSOH (df Report Ref No SAId/2, l0 !pr 45) "A. EARLY UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS 7 25X1A 030002-7 : sgoRsT s, cp,uths 0 :Init: :Date: 22 Apr 5 61,410?611 *********** .W11 I. SOURCE HEM, Emil,'HEIDELBERG, KAISERSTRASSE 33, a 51-year-old Socialist, who appears to have considerable knowledge of anti-Nazi movements. He paid for his political- convictions by being imprisoned for almost two years (between 1934 and 1936), after trying to. create an underground organitation in SV Germany. RatinA: 0-3' Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: II. ANTINAZI GROUPS It should be understood that only the so-called intelligentsia were engaged in the Underground movements mentioned ia this report, and that the various groups so engaged were to hays formed a smal1 cadre for organizations to be created after a sucoesiful Putsch. LEUSOFLNER, former Minister of the Interior .of Hessen, who io mentioned several times in this report, had by 1941 become the loader of a group of anti-Nazi intel- lectuals and former trade union chief. GOERDELER, former Mayor of LEIPZIG, : seems to have first taken an active part in those ventures.in 1941. He became the principal liaison man between the generals and the other factions, but he had no underground. movement to give him a perSonal backing. LEUSOHNER and GDERDELERcoI laborated withthp generals, who had been plotting. HITLER!s doWnfaIl since1939. In addition to the clique led by LEUSCHNER, GOERDELER4 and .the generals, other small:greup,had been formed which met at Count MOLTKE's castle at KREISA,. Silesia. Acoording to source, the leading personalities werei. Count,MOLTEZ' ?bunt York VON URTENBURG Dr.:MTVITNDORFP Dr-HAUB40a, Prof REIOMINI HALLS LE,133P, Father D3LL, S.J., MUNICH OBEANONSISTORIALRAT (iquiv Archbishop) Dr plAmmmExER %mil HINK (Former Social Democratic Party.Aopreeontative) ft ft Pt SP PP. PP lO lf PP " P$ (Representing the German: Catholics) (Spiritual loader of the German. Protestants since' NIT02113111$ iMprisonmont) (Source) III. WV ATTWTP The firpt preparations for an insurrection against HITLER were made during the winter of 1939, when.GENERALFELDAARSCHALL VON BRAUCHITSOH'had concentrated a number of armored divisions in the SERLIN area. However, Gen GUIDER/AN lost his nerveat the last momentvand,the whole:Undertaking had-to be called off. (This ,story lp,tas- told to source by LEUSCHNER). . Tho next try.Lso fax as is known to source, Was made in Deo 41. Then again VON BIAUCHITSOH.was ready to liquidate HITLER, and the preparations had reached such an advanced stage that the Field Marshal asked LEUSOHNER to name those SEOE,3 T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET prominent Nazis whom it was essential to kill at all costa..The coup Was planned for Christmas 41, but VON BRAUCHITSCH was relieved of his Command 12 Dee, and the scheme collapsed. In 42, LEUSCHNER, MASS, another Socialist union loader, and KAISER, the former chief of the Catholic unions, reached complete agreement as to the action to be taken. With GOERDELER acting as intermediary, LEUSCHNER established contact with the generals, who were represented by Gon VON BECK. Other generals known to have takon part in the talks woo Gen FALKENHAUSEN and Gon KUECHLER. Gen MANSTEIN refused to take part, stating that ho was a soldier, not a politician. The third attempt was planned for April 43, but during a meeting between source and ars MITRENDORFF and HAUBACH, at source's house in OBERSTDORF, Allgaou, it was docidod that aTutsch in 1943 would be untimely. Tho Russians wore still far away, and their political intentions wore unknown, while tho Americans and tho British had not yet had any important military or eolitital succoss. 4 now govornmont would havo had to face tremondous problems. The iirrection was therofore postponed, after Gen VOX BECK had been notified through CoUnt MOLTKE. In the same year, GOERDELER, LEUSCHN2R, and tho former Ambassador to MOSCOV,Ovunt VON DER SCHULENBURG, drew up a plan to ostablish contatt, first with STALIN, and later with tho British and American govornmonts. Count SCHULENBURG was to have crossed the jRussian ?linos in Gon KUECHLER's Army sector, but in tho end pontiOsion was refused by the Gents Ia, bocauso the fact could not have boon kept secret. ,(This was told to source by LEUSCHNER and MIERENDORIFF, who had also Shown him a memorandum from SCHULINBURG to HITLER, written in May 41, in which the Count pleadod with tho FUEHRER not to go to war against Russia since tho vast spaces and tho severe climate prosentod insurmountable difficultiosY. In the. summer of 43, the gonorals declared that a revolt on their part waS impos- sible, but that they would wolcomo a rovolution and would give it their immediate: support. The Jesuits, who had encouraged the underground movomont from the start, wore assigned the task of conducting a poll of popular sontimont. When this poll disclosed a negative reaction everywhere except in MUNICH and VIENNA, it was:con cludod that a popular rebellion was out of tho question, and that HITLER would have to bo ovortbrown by mon with political and military power. Spurt? statoe that H1MO attempted to establish an ontento with LEUSOHNER during the course of the sumo. mor, and it is sourcore opinion that ho was succossful in this and that he maintainved contact with LEUSCHNER ftain4 that time onward. Count MOLTKE's clique and the group formed by GOERDELER, LEUSCHNER, and the gen- orals had oortain political difforencos, but by early summer 44 they had reached an understanding coneerning the proposed personnel of a now government. GOTRDELER was to have boon Primo Minister at first, but LEUSCHNER was to succeed him after a short time - at least so LEUSCHNER was led to believe. Source, who was a mombor of Count MOLTKEls circlo4 claims to have boon offered tho governorship of Southern Germany, which ho refused because ho did not want to hold publit office. To this refusal ho attributes the fact that ho is still alive. Austria was to remain a province of Germany, but a soparato government was planned, Whickincluded SOBUSCHNIGG, SEITZ, :the former Mayor of VIENNA, and Dr GLEISS- NER, .a, SOcial Democrat. SEITZ had reluctantly agreed to participate in tho spring of 43. IT. THE 20? JULY PUTSCH Early in July 44, LEBER got in touch with the throe-man Contra]. Committde of the Communist Party. Source believes that ono of those mon was a Nazi agent. kt any rate LEBER and REICHWEIN, together with tho members of the Central Committee, wore arres- ted shortly thereafter. At one of those meetings tho namo of Col VON STAUFFENBIRG was mentionod, and source thinks that tho possibility that ho had become known to the GESTAPO may have influonced VON STAUFFENBERG to advanco the date for the putsch. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 ;it ? Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SE 0 RET: PERSONALITIES Source believes that the following pOrsonalities connected with the underground activities describcd above may still bo alive: Dr GLEISSNER Mrs SOMANB 'CONSUL MOVVRNT FALTER1EG 11, BERLIN. (Mentioned abovo): BURGFELD-24,, or c/o WEBER, MITRASSTRASSE.9, FRANKFURT/ MAIN. Her husband was one of LEUSCHNER's collaborators, and source bolioyes that she may know a nutabor of per- sonalities who Might be useful: I. SOURCE . LINDEMANN, Reinhold Moritz, 0/GFR (0111), 659 SCHW FLAK ABT (Hy A/A BO, a 44- year-old native of RODACE, nor COBURG. His records show that h9 joined the Nazi Party in 1952, and that he hold the rank of TRUPPITUEHRER (S/Sgt) in the BA He was cooperative during intorrogation, but it is apparent that ho is an opportunist 11110 is anxious to ingratiate himself with the winning side* Although his cousin, GENLT (MajGon) Fritz LINDEMANN, was implicatod in the 20 July putsch; source donipb having had any connection with the affair himself. Rating 0-75 - Data of Information: See Text Interrogator61R4E.T. and E.Wi II. THE 'MOVEMENT - Source believes that the attempt on HITLER of 20 JUly 44 had its incoption in the CONSUL Mevomont, which was founded during 1940-41; and which was named aftor an ant-Communist organization of the oarly 20's. Tho group was madeup_of lawyers, economists, and high-Tanking Army officers, and its ideals; according to source, wore demOcratic: Its purpose was to overthrow HITLER, and to end the war, by bring- ing about an insurrection. P1 received his information from his brother, Dr Kurt LLATM/1/27N,who Was killod bye. bomb .a few weeks ago; and from Maj Dr REUSSE, an old family friend. Source states that neither of those on wore involved in tho movement, but both had iii- direct connections with it. Maj RIUSSE was at tho LUFT1AFFENFACHSCHULE (GAF Trado School), WUERZBURG; where ho directed tho training program. III.. PROMINENT PERSONALITIES ? ? ? ? GRAF HELLDORF GENMAJ (Brig son) HASSE Dr GOERDELER GENLT (Maj Gori) Dr Fritz LINDEMANN GENOBST (Col Gon) HIPPER (?) OBSTLT (Lt Col) BENARDIS OBST (Col) GRAF VON STAuFFENBERG Former STADTKOMMANDANT, -BERLIN. OBERBUERGERMEISTER (MAyor), LEIPZIG. , Sourco's cousin. General Staff Officer. ? GENOBST Fritz FROM His murder Of a Gonoral Staff Officer fol- lowing 20 Julyvand his subsequent disap- poarancotwere reportod in the press, Fiold Marshal VON 1ITZLEBEN Tried by a people's court after 20 July:The Judge in the case was killed, and further news- was suppressed, source states. The leading members after tho founding of the Movement wore Field Marshal VON S EORE T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S Z 0- R E T 4 , WITtlAttrytt and 0,1iliF VON ST141.7FENBERG.. The ?X-iLinilor of memllor,s, in the movement is gen- erally estimated at 500, according to source, of whom :approx,400 are 'thought to have boon executed following the 20 July putsch, including all thejLbove-namod person- iitte eXc'Opting'poSSibly Gen FROM, whose connection with the,p1pt was never provon. , -? ? 22 4pril 1945' SEVENTH- /ARM' INTE'RROGATION.CENTOR re/.4.0t. 11(4.4.-12J-et-e-et. PAUL KUBAL.A., Maj I MI, Oemmanding? !-: ??? ? ? SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 4 25X1A Approved For, Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R00620 / 2 IS AR ENCITSPR N PO PM Ref No SAI0/11 5 Aay. 45 030002-7 25X1A TTh AR, A I'srT1:1101AIION 011-1T7.?. APO 758 US T.r1D-TRC+.,Icu:m i40V1:17,7T ?TD saLigATA8 SOUR0,7 ACM, Siegfried, civilian, pharmacist, 51/11, 11. YLT:rMr;,45.11, ilIPT.O.H; anti- Nazi and cooperative during interrogation. Rating: 0-3 Date of Information: Beg lay 45 Interrogator: W.F.V. A"TI-NAZI U7D7RGROUND ACTIVITI75 Source claims to be a member of an underground organization which, he claims, was at least partly responsible for the limited. resistance. offered to the Allies in AUIICH. Source joined the uovoment about four Woes ago, after having desert- ed from the Army. The organization, was very secret, and source came to know only one of its sector leaders (A3SCH4ITTS47,IT]..i), Hans ?17371.1, ln HIliSOK3TRG3TJA6S1. AUTIL7R, source suuests,- would be able to supply a long list of .'azi and anti- flazi in =I0H. In SCYLIT1577, 57 of .1U-I07, a Dr lustav ZTITIJI-t was the leader of the anti- vazi underground org?mization. He told source about a week ago that a coup was planned for the time when the Americans would be on their way toSCHLIIIIRS77. It was delided to do away with, the layor, the ir, and an unidentified high .95 leader (F07fin'in SS PU'IHRTR). The underground movement was camouflaged as the local W1HRW0LF, because that was the only way of obtaining arms. or this purpose Josef "SUP' 'I.A.LDH7111 served as liaison man with the $S. The 6OHLT7571.: organiza- tion was 30 men strong; another estimatA 40 man were scattered about the country- side and in the surrovAding uountains. Source ws sant by Dr ZTITL1R to etablish contact with the Allies in order to help the underground organization i.. their attempts to prevent organized resistance on the part of the b and to capture the loading SS personalities in the area. Dr rI1,1-11 could be reached at either of the following places: K7AYABI1E07, SCHIJIIi57]; or at his brother's house, iA JOS]F.,THAL. Josef '0i.ALDH-TAR could be found in J0S2,7ST1-11,. A number of unidentified 7azi Party and leaders passed through 6OHLI7RS.77 about two weeks ago on 'their way to 3A1fliS-2H ?AIL and the mountains beyond, source States. 5 't:lay 1945. $777JTH AR.2. tn '7 1'1 'PH / PAUL E1T3ALA., Commanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 2 13. Ref No SAIO/8 18 Apr 45 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RniIPS$SO4IORG10690 E OR R 030002-7 SECRET: :Auth; 00, 7th Army: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: APO 758 ? US ARMY :Date: 18 Apr 45 : ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE (This report should be read in conjunction with Report Ref No sAIV6). SOURCE WAGNER, Karl, Prof Dr, a 43-year old scientist, prof at. the DARMSTADT Technical Institute. Source is a close-mouthed, lonely individual who is interested solely in his research work. He talked rather reluctantly at first, but once on the subject of his scientific developments he did not hesitate anymore. Source claims to be at. the Allies' disposal, but his sincerity is open to some doubt. Source was assigned the task of compiling evaluation tables of rocket fuels by the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center. Eight days before the Allied occupation of DARMSTADT, howover, he was ordered to destroy them. OtinA: B-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 InterrogEle921: A.Z. ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE . Source dovolopod the electrolytic condenser for Prof Dr BUCHOLDIs V-2 automatic range-control device (of Report Ref "Zo 8AIC/6). Ho used a sodium chloride solution (see below) as oloctrolyto, and silver for ono electrode; the other oloctrodo, also of silver, was covered by a thin layer of silver chloride. . While loading the condenser, the current is sent through it in such a way that tho silver chloride layor is moved from one silver electrode to the othorl Ail' 017.4. e- A6-0 1- The amount of silver chloride used for tho layer is predetermined by tho chargo with which the condenser is to be loaded. By rovorsing tho polarity of tho condo/seer (during the flight of tho V-2 missilo), tho silver chloride layer is moved bank to the first electrode. As soon as the silver chloride has boon completely moved to the other electrode, a sudden incroaso of voltage from .1 v to 1.0 v is produced, duo to tho hydrogen layer formed around the silver. This voltage is impressed upon the grid of an amplifier tube which activates a relay (Rolay J, Report Ref No SAIC/6); the relay, in turn, operates tho mechanical device which stops tho fuel combustion in the projoctilo. The exact composition of tho solution is imol of sodium chloride, 1 mol of ? acotic acid, and 1 mol of sodium acetate. Source emphasized that most of tho diffi- culties were encountered in obtaining a pure solution. The actual condenser was built in a container 2 cm in diameter and 6 cm high. The accuracy of the final signal was .0015 undor laboratory conditions, but loss in actual oporation. 18 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 25X1A Approved For Relea e 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200 Ref No SAIC/7 13 Apr 45 THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE T DO NOT DE.B1 SECRET SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 - US ARMY X1A SECRET :Auth:CG,7th Army :25X1A :Init: PK: :Date: 13 Apr 45 : ofeesaverneyeeaveee ? - GENERALARZT (GEN OF MEDICAL CORPS) PROF DR ERNST RODENWALD I. SOURCE Dr RODENWALD is a 66-year old HEIDELBERG University professor who is acquainted with leading medical scientists throughout the world. He appears to have an open, honest character, and to abhor falsehood. Although ho admires HITLER's social pol- icy, he dieagreos with most of the National Socialist principles becaUse of his religious beliefs (Roman Catholic) and his humanitarian sentiments, and ho cannot understand why the Gorman leaders do not stop the war, since it is obviously lost for Germany. Nevertheless he still considers himself bound to the present govern- ment by his military oath of allegiance to HITLER. The Professor boom() a Party member in 1932, while living in BATAVIA, Java, but when he discovered that the Party was trying to force a political policy on the "BUND DER AUSLANDSDEUTSCHEN", he quit the Party, never to enter it again. This attitude was held against him, and-he encountered difficulties when he returnorl to Germany, although ho was permitted to continuo his scientific research without molestation, Dr RODENIIALD is prepared to contribute his services as a hygiene scientist to assist the Allied authorities, and is also willing to place his laboratory and research center completely at their disposal. It is possible that ho has boon in- fluenced in making this decision by his anxiety to reinstate himself:in the good -graces-of thoNotherlands'Gevt, which was paying him a pension before the war. Rating: B-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrokator: A.Z. II. HISTORY AND MOVEMENTS 1897 Student at the Military Medical Academy, BERLIN. 1907 Student at the Institue for Marine and Tropical Diseases, HAMBURG. 10 Official govt doctor in Togoland, Africa. 15 Medical advisor on hygiene to the Fifth Turkish Army, with Turkish rank Of Major. 19 Left the Army to finish his doctorate at HEIDELBERG University. 21 Medical advisor on hygiene in Netherlands East Indies. 26 Medical Inspector, East Java. 34 Returned to Germany as Prof of Hygiene at HEIDELBERG. 39 Called to XII Army Corps. 40- CO of the Institute for Tropical Medicine,, BERLIN, 45 but continued as.professor at HEIDELBERG. 41 With an anti-malaria mobile laboratory train in Italy and the Balkans. 43 Promoted to GENERALARZT. III. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE Source claims that he never hoard of any experiments in this field. He empha- sizes that he was strictly a specialist in hygiene and tropical diseases. He statee that when the question of 8W was raised at an official dinner for Army doctors in 1943, all present agreed that this type of warfare Was impracticable owing to the danger of contaminating friendly troops. In this connection he cites the case of Australian troops who brought dysentery to the Allied units attacking the DAR- DANELLES in 1917.,, The resulting epidemic forced the Allies to withdraw, but the German troops were also contaminated, and they lost half their numerical strength. Source states that none of his fellow university professor with whom he is ac- quainted would be willing to lend assistance in the field of BW. 1. SECRET p Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET IV. POSSIBLE BW EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS In BERLIN/MALCHOW souree directed a station where anopheles mosquitoes were bred at the rate of 8,000 per month. In 1944 a girl was sent there from an SS zoological research institute in Bavaria, in order to study the breeding opera- tions. Source states that there are several institutes of this nature, known as "SS ARNENERBE INSTITUT", but he does not know where they are located. He sug- gests that these SS research institutes would be the most likely centers for any experimental work in BW. V. PARA TYPHUS "0" Source states that the bacillus of para typhua "0" can be carried by human beings for months without harm to the carrier. But should the carrier contract malaria, the bacillus becomes virulent and is then fatal. VI. ATOM SMASHING At HEIDELBERG. University source knew a Chinese girl who had been making suc- cessful experiments in this field. After the commencement of the Allied offen- sive, most of her laboratory equipment was moved to TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM (now in friendly hands). Source cannot recall the girl's name, except that she belongs to the GO family. ) VII. ORGANIZATION OF WEHRMACHT SANITAETSINSP (GERMAN ARMY MEDIOAL INSPECTORATE) CO of the Inspectorate is GENERAL 0/STABSARZT Dr HANDLOSER. There are four sub-inspectoratee: A. Ground Forces Inspectorate, CO Dr WALTER. 1. Personnel Department. 2. Science Department (Statistics and dissemination of sanitary regulations). 3. Organization Department (Tb b and T/E for medical and sanitary units). - 4. Administration and Finance Department. B. Air Forces Inspectorate CO Dr SCHROEDER. O. Navy Inspectorate, CO Dr GREUL. D. WAFFEN SS Inspectorate, 00 not known to source. vrm GERMAN MILITARY MEDICAL ACADEMY 00 of the Academy is GENERALARZT Dr ASALT a Nazi. The Academy is composed as follows: A. Teaching-Section, also called "PEPINIERE", where military doctors receive instruction. B. Research Section (00 GENERALARZT Prof Dr SCHREIBER) made up of the following LEHRGRUPPEN (Institutes): 1. Hygiene, OP Prof Dr ZEISS. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 S E OR E T 2. Tropical Diseases, CO Prof Dr RODENWALD (Sept 43 part of this Institute was moved to the WILLIAM KERKHOFF INSTITUT in BAD YAUHEIM). 3. Toxicology, CO Prof Dr WIRTH, who is also a OW specialist. 4. Pharmacology, CO .Col GEMEINHARD. 5. Physiology: . a) Bio-climatic Section: Prof RANKE. b) Alimentation Section: Prof LANG. 6. Pathology and Anatomy: Prof A7DERNATH. 7. Photography and Training Films: (?) 8. Air Technics: Prof STRUCHHOLD. (This is no longer a part of the Research Section.) IX. GERMAN GENERALARZTE The only German medical officers of general rank (all university professors) are: Prof Dr SAUERBRUCH II " HABERER. ? H LAEVEN H KREUZ ROSTOCK ZEISS Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDe83-00415R0062000 THIS IS AN ENCIPSITTIF DO NOT DE fir,r! P), Ref No SAIC/6 13 Apr,45 SOURCE SECRET : SECRET: :Auth: 00,7th Army: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER In it: APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 13 Apr 45 : V-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PENEMUENDE T-2 AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE 6 ???e?eueve?s o????? BUOHOLD, Prof Dr, Technical Institute of DARMSTADT, a 45-year old DARMSTADT scientist employed by the BROWN-BOVERI Works, MANNHEIM, from 1923 to 1934, when he accepted a professorship at the TEOHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, DARMSTADT. Reluctant to give any information when first interrogated (not at this Center), source now claims to have been authorized by the rector of the school to disclose the details of his research work to the Allies. He was cooperative during interrogation and is ready to collaborate with the Allies. . Rating: 5-2 Date of Information: Spring 45 Interrogator: A.Z. I. INTRODUCTION In Sept 39 the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center ordered several scientists of the' Technical Institute of DARMSTADT to meet at PEENEMUENDE. During the meet- ing these scientists were informed of the intended large-scale experiments with rocket-propelled missiles. Each was given specific assignments for developing various parts of the experimental projectiles. Source was assigned the following: a). A device maintaining a constant frequency of 500. cycles of secondary importance to the V-2, according to source. b) The automatic V-2 range-control unit (See III, below), c) Later, source had the task of developing measuring instruments for the HEIDEL- BERG cyclotrons: II. V-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PEENEMUEDEZ The father of V-2, source states, was Prof VON BRAUN, an engineer of little importance before the war who had carried out some rocket experiments in the post World War years together with OPEL Jr. When he proposed his V-2 ideas to the German General Staff in 1939, he was put in charge of the PEENEMUENDE laboratories Dr STEINHOFF, only recently given the title of professor, and described by source- as being exceptionally able, was assigned to work on the experiments :as a' special- ist in electrical matters. . The research on V-2 proceeded very slowly at first. In spring 43, however, orders. to speed up the experiments arrived. Most of the component parts of V-2 were built and tried at PEENEMUENDE; only .a few devices were given to scientists for development outside the Experimental Center. These wore given to the DARM- STADT Technical School professors for the most part, because Prof Dr STEINHOF was a former student at that School. Source successfully completed the automatic range-control devices for the V-2 by the end of 43," but ho was still trying to improve it, as well as finding er- satz materials for some of its parts. Gen DORNBERGER, Knights' Cross holder, was OG of the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center. in a 27-volt current 11. AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE FOR V-2 Since the explosions giving the V-2 missile its forward thrust are irregular, SECRET (Is Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 E itis impossible to predetermine the time at which the combustion should, be stop- ped.forany given.range. The only way to increase the range accuracy of the mis- sile is, therefore, to out off the fuel combustion NOT at a time set in advance, but only after the missile attains a definite velocity, calculatedin advance. This, in turn, can be deduced through the well-known integration formula by con- sidering the acceleration at the moment of each explosion, i.e., at the instant of each forward thrust of the missile. a) Itiagiples'Involved In Source's device, the thruat of the missile at the instant of the explosion is transformed into a direct current which is 'proportional to this forward thrust This current is directed through an electrolytic condenser previously charged with a capacity calculated to correspond to the velocity of the missile at which the fuel combustion is to be stopped. During the flight of the missile, the gen- orated current builds up a charge equalizing that of the condenser. As soon as the charge thus built up reaches the proportion of the condenser charge the re- sulting rupture of voltage operate a mechanical device Which stops the fuel cot- bustion.' b) Operation (See Schematic Diagram, Appendix) A rotating coil B is placed in the magnetic field A. In front of the coil, and placed eccentrically with it, is a copper plate 0, which, in turn, is placed in the center of the field originated by two coils, DI and D'', through which passes an induction current of 500 cycles. ' When the missile is given a forward thrust at the instant of each explosion, the mass of the copper plate 0 tends to move. By doing so, the plato disturbs the constant magnetic field created by the coils DI and Du. The current created in the coils 'b' and D11 originates in'the secondary of the transformer E an al- ternating current which is applied to the grid of tube R'. This current flows through the transformer F into the copper oxide rectifier G, and from here, as (pulsating) D.0, it charges special electrolytic condenser H and flows back to tho rotating coil B. Hero it creates a rupture of voltage which nullifies the original effect of the forward thrust of the missile on the copper plate O. ' As soon ae the currant flowing through the valve H becomes equal to the pre- determined charge stored there, a discharge of voltage occurs, which is impressed on the grid of tube R. A relay J, placed in the plate circuit of tube R", is operated by this grid reaction and, in turn, operates the mochanioal device which stops the fuel com- bustion. . PW states that an accuracy of .001 is obtained by this device. In order to charge the electrolytic condenser H, source developed an instrw- ment (KONTAXTUHR) which operated on a 50-cycle currant. This apocial current was created by a buzzer working on 50 cycles, also developed by source. 15 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION OENTER /.4 PAUL PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Oommanding. 2 SEORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Appendix Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET V-2 AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE (SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM) Direction of 1 Acceleration' ....... 40 v;500 c erryln._ D I Legend 'wry rby. H .0141....????????????1110.11....,Im) A - Magnet 3 - Rotating Coil (DREHSPULE) C - Copper Plate Di )- Coils 1 - Transformer (GITTERUEBERTRAGER) P Transformer - G - Copper Oxide Rectifier (TROCKENGLEICHRICHTER) H Special Electrolytic Condenser (ELEKTROLYTISCHT ZELLE) - Relay - R1 ) - Tubes R") Report Ref No SAI0/6, SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER 8ECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 4' Approved For Release 2004/04M9 UpAA-ROPE31- ? Ref No SAIO/1 6 April 45_ DO NET 5F1i SECRET 415R006200030002-7 SEVENTH ARAY INTERROGATION CENTER APO _758 US ARMY , INFORMATION ON GESTAPO IN BENSHEIM SECRET 25X1A Auth: CO? SAIO ! mit: izAtt Date; SOURCES i) METER, Francisca, 40 years old. Claiming that she now sees, the treachery of the Nazis,she is vary cooperative and volunteered all information. Rating: 0-2 Date of Laformetion: Mar 45 Interregator: R.I. ii) METZGER, Eleanore, 21 years old, cooperative but unobservant; she still ap- pears to have. some pro"Nazi sentiments. Rating: 0-3 tate of Information: Mar 45 Inte_rrogator: R.I. iii) GANTNER, Annelieee, 21 years old, not very observan6, but fully cooperative. Rating: 3-2 Date of Information: Mar 45 interrcigator: iv) LSONHaRD, Erna, a 22.-year old stenographer and typist who was very cooperative and helpful. Rating: 3-2 Date of Information:. Mar 45 Interrogator: W.M.B. -v) BOE, Marie Therese. A 26-year old girl who claims to be a French citizen and who was forced to work for the GESTAPO. Refusing to obey Orders to be transferred to the interior of Germany upon the approach of the Americans, she went into hid- ing and remained behind until the arrival of American troops. Rating: B--, Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: d.M.B. ,Notel Sources, all employees in GESTAPO Hq, BEFSHETA, were -brought to the Center for the purpose of interrogation on the shooting of American soldiers at 3ENSHEIM (See I, below), Some general information, howevee, was also obtained during in- terrogation. . I. SHOOTING OF Al-IERICAN SOLDIERS All sources with the exception of Source METZGER agree on the following story: On 24 Mar 45, at about 2300 hours, when the arrival of advancing American troops was imminent, two American soldiers were shot by the KRIM SEK (Criminal Secretaries). . STADTMANN and RAAF, at GESTAPO Hq, BE7SHEIM. A Polish subject KAMINSKI, the jani- tor .(address not known) was present at the execution. None of the sources were .present, but all heard the story from KAAINSKI the following day. A Mrs SEITZ, who lives in the building ofthe former GESTAPO Hq, was also present at. the shoot- ing. The two Americans were buried in the GESAPO Hq courtyard. The order for the execution was given by a major of the BEhSHEIM garrison. One day after the air attack on NORAS on 15 or 20 Feb 45, an American soldier was brought into the BENSHEIM,GESTAPO. Hq and put into a room, face to the wall. He was interrogated, loft the building after two hours, and wae not heard of since. Source LEONHARD heard from her landlady that this man had been shot. Source GANT- YER, who kept the register of all men coming into and leaving Hq, was not given , the name of this soldier, and made out ao papers for his ehipmegt to another camp. - As this was a most unusual procedure, she assumes that the man was shot. II. GESTAPO FILES 3-2 (Source: LEONHARD) (See SHAEF,. CI Brief, 1 Mar 1945) i) General SUCH-UND SPEZIALKARTET. This .department was known aleo as the FAHNDUINTGSKARTEI (Searching File). Pink colored cards (FAEND7NGSKARTEN) wore designated for foreign nationals, while S E ORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 k SECRE T yellow colored cards were for German nationals, The. information contained in these cards is at the same time to be found in beek form in-the FAHNDUNGSB(JOH. This is a monthly. publication of the RSHA in. whieh all :wanted parsons are listed with their personal descriptions. The in- formation is transferred from the book to the cards. ii) HAUTTYARTEI (Main Index File) . The cards of ABT II -wera blue, while the files were yellow, indicating that they contain a list of political crimes and suspects. Thed'ardsofkBTTIiwere(9rapp, and the files were green, indicating that they contain a list of espionage crimes 07- uspects. The above color system pertaining to both the SUCH UND SPEZIALKARTEI and the HAUPTKARTEI is prescribed by the RSHA in BERLIN and applies to the whole of Ger- many. iii) A-KARTEI (Riders) This index file contained a list of political criminals or of those people who hsd not adopted. the National-Socialist point of view. Mbst of the people indexed wore in concentration camps.. On these cards grben blue, and rod riders were used. Source believos that green referred to "Marxism " and rod to ncomMun- ism", but ignores the moaning of the blue rider.? The index was always kept locked and stored away in a safe. Only one person was handling the index and nobody was supposed to see .11.0 contents of these cards The files for the green, blue and rod -cards were only in two colors, green and yellow. All entries on the index cards wore Made in plain langua7,0 and not in dodo. iv) GESTAPO Files in DARMSTADT All records of the GESTAPO in DARMSTADT were CO. uplotely destroyed by fire dur- ing a bombing attack on 11 Sept 44. When this Hq Was moved to BENSHEIM, now re- cords and files had to bo compiled. Thoy were forced to start again from scratch. III. GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Branch), DARMSTADT B-2 (Source: aNTNER) A number of people who wore arrestod by the GESTAPO wore transferred from BENS- HEIM to DARMSTADT for a so-callod special treatment (SONDTRBEHANDLUNG). KOMMISAR WANGEMANN was in charge of this doparl, -It. Source was responsible for filling out the travel papers. At one time she noticed on one ofthe rapers that the per- son involved was rapidly dying of a disease, which, source claimed, could not havo boon the case. Iv. FORGED SOLDBUECHER FOR THE VAFFEN SS B-2 (Source: GANTNER) . oscnAF MUSCH was observed by SOUTQO one evening in the process of forging SOLD- BUTCHER for the WAFF EN SS for REG RAT GIRKE, KRIM RAT HELLTYBROICH, BAUMEISTER, and a driver. V. CONCENTRATION CAMPS 5-2 (Source: GANTNER) ? Persons arrested by the BENSHEIM GESTAPO Hq woro shipped to the following in- stitutions: i) Male political convicts and foreign workers who had sexual relations with Ger- man women were sent to DACUMJ (major offonses),BUCHWWALD (minor offenses), and FLOSSENBUERG (minor offenses). 2 STORE T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 / Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ii) Female political convicts and women who had soxuai. relationb with foreign workers _wore shipped to RAVENSBRUEOK and, FLOSSENBUERG. iii) Persons convicted of sabotage, of failing to cuppoar for work, of prohibited sexual relations which aid not result'in pregnancy, ot al, wore sont to DARMSTADT Reformatory (for the Saarpfalz Region); MAINZ Reformatory (RHINE Region); HEDDEN- HEIg; and HIRZEMHTIM. The maximum punishment was 56 days, 6 April 1945, SEVCYTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER PAUL KUSALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. 3 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Appendix Name GIRICE Fritz Civilian Title Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET GESTAPO PERSONALITIES ALDGEREINE SS Title T:ELLEN3T1OICT-T L,partment Section Age(+) T. GESTAPO HQ BENSHEIM, ADOL F HITTER SPL 52 (Responsible for District HESSEN) REG RAT STUBAF Ohief of Hq ERTL-. RAT STUBAF ? SCHWINN Peter POI RAT STEIN, Ernst POE OB INS HSTUF BENKWITZ, Ger- ?POE 'ENS OSTUF hard BATZ, Joachim POL SEX EIDEANY, Julius (+) Estimated Report Ref No SAIC/1 Deputy Parser-lel Finance Transp to ..onc camps, visas, pas- ses Preventive detention filing SECRET Height(+) 32 1.70 m LEI= IV 39 1.75 m LEITER I 1.75 m "ITITER II 55 1.72.m ? IV 6 aab 32 1.75 m 32? 1.73 in IV 6 an ? 37? 1.74 m Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Description Stocky build, broad shoulders, dark hair, scar behind right ear (3 cm) Speaks English, good- looking, brown eyes, black hair, good teeth. Very ETdnder, blue eyes, dark blond hair, nervous eye twitch. ? Broad shouldcrs, grey eyes, grey hair. Medium blond re- ceding hair, blue oyes, wears glasses, thick lips. Dark hair, brown eyes, very nervous. Bald, grey eyes, right log stiff, healthy complexion,. 111.2pcndix (Cont'd) Civilian Name Title Approved For Release 2004/02/19,: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET ALDGEMEINE SS Ra-lk Departi_e_t MUSCH Isolde VPPED, 7ilholmine AI.:BRECHT, Hans POD SEX r;UDI131713ERGETZ, Fritz AMS TUZ GIESS, Fritz WEISS, Gertrud POI SEK (+) Estlmated Report Ref No SAIC/1 OS CHAP Interpreter Personnel Typist Mail Finance Section 3AST?IV lc 2 Administration ' Admin; food Admin Mess Hall SECRET A e(+ Height( 65? 30? 1.70 m 24 1.68 in 24 1.58 m 42? 1.75 m 30? 1.69 in Description 1.72 m Grey hair, stocky, wears civ clothes, Latvian dialect. 29? 1.80 in 32 1.78 in 1.65 in Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Blond, blue eyes, stocky,. broad face. Dark blonde,bluo- grey eyes, protru4- ing teeth. Dark hair, blue eyes, quiet disposition. Blond hair, grey eyes, slender, bony face. Dark blond, dark complexion, unstable disposition, indis tinct pronunciation. Dark blond,. zrey _ eyes, slender, wears glasses.- Light blond hair, light blue eyes; strong, energetic disposition. Black hair, blue eyes, stout, ener- getic manners. 9 Appendix (Contld) Name METZGER, Miss GELBRICH; Magda SCHM=, Maria GI:NINE-Pt Hiss IZITGBER STATT=N F;JDIXGER, Helmi WARLICH; use (+) Esat'ed aolDclqRf fo SATC/1 Civilian Title Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET ALLGEEEINE SS Rank Department Section Typist, Admin _KRIM ST:X US..T2UF 7R.ILI SEX Secretary to .C.I'IRXE Agc(+) Height( ) Description 28 Secretary to HEBLZNBROICH 31 Tvansp to Jews Jews 1.65 in 1.65m. Black hair, dark eyes,. beautiful teeth,deli,. oat? cemplexion,chann, ing manners. . Black hair, remarka- bly..blue eyes, long eyelashes, very slim. IV 5 37 1.73 in Black black CO, loot. IV 5 Jews (typist) IV 5 32 22. ri 6a b 23 SECRET' 1.75 in 1.69 in 1.70m Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 hair(greying), eyes, pointed Swabian dia- Greying hair, black eyes, fine face, Viennese_ dialect, cordial manners. Brunette, blue eyes, noticeable large mole on left forehead, stout. Black,hair, blue eyes,fine appear- ance,very intelli- gent, GME's girlfriend. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET _,endix (Cent d) Civilian AIDGEMEINE Title SS Rank Department Section Age C -1-) Height(+) Description DLHEER,Andreas. iclam.03 SEK STUSCHAF WESTAUSDADER IV lc 1 53 1.68 m Almost bald, _black eyes,oue of upper ?teeth missing,thick pronunction. Gc71"Z,Karl Kaim LSST HSCHAF rEST=SVANDER IV lc 1 29 1.76 in Blond hair,blue cyes,fresh complexion, artificial right leg. 2RI3CHBIER,Karl KRIM SEK STUSCHAF VESTAUSIANDER IV lc 1 41 1.70 m Dark hair,dark eyes, scar on back of head, exceptionally broad his. 7)1?IEGEIA,Laver STUSCHF WES=SLAYDER IV lc 1 42 1.69m Bald, exceptionally black eyes, sick appearance,Bavarian dialed-1 Miss Interpreter IV lc 1 =OLD Erika Interpreter IV lc 1 21 1.70m Dark blond hair, blue-eyes, slendor,bad complexion,two gold teeth. -TLLTHES,Georg KRIM SEX STUSCHLF ORTSLUSDANDER IV 10 2 46- 1.75 m. Black hair, grey eyes, thick eyebrows, healthy complexion, strongly built. ELLP,Kiche1 KRIM SEK ?0RTSLUSLANDER IV lc 2 .34 1.69m Dark blond hair, grey eyes slim appearance,pale com- plexion. WAGNER,' Xsrl 40 1.69 in Dark hair,blue eyestred com- plexion,scar on face,stout. RETZza,Seppel - IV 1c 2 38 ? 1.75 m Wavy black hair,grey eyes, slim,Bavarian dialect. (+)?Estimated Report Ref No SAIO 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1037)ondix Cont'd) Name GnT EBERT GLOOM:TER, Hans HEUSEL?Goorg Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Civilian _ILIGEXEINE Title SS Rank KRIM OB SEK BCRTHOID,Heinich LLCKS, Heinrich LEONIERD, Miss BROBLCH", Martin WEBER, Ludwig OB SEX (+) Estimated Report Ref No SLIO 1 oc, t(Lrmy) Capt(Lrmy) Tr S T Do artmant Section A o Height( DescriTstion IV lc 2 Russian Inter- preter 44 1.68 in 42? 1.70 m ? Counter- IV 3a & b 56 ? 1.70 in espionage IV 3a & b .51 ? 1.75m IV _;.a b 48? 1.68n IV3p &b 26? Typist IV 3a & b Counterespi- IV 3c onaga.War in- duStries Guard a as- IV la & b cape; Communism, Marxism 1.7C in 49.? 1.72 in 53? 1.70 m T 72 T.' " Approved For Release 2004/02/19.: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Graying black hair,grey.eyO's, strong,wears an exceptionally beautiful diamond ring on small finger of loft hand. Black hair., dark eyes,scar on right corner of mouth. Grey hair,gre oyas,mustache,- scar on back of,right,hand, friendly disposition. Groy hair, grey eyos,Dro-,- flounced bollystrongly built, plump appearance. Dark hair, grey eyes,wears glasses,slila,quiet disposi- tion. Straw-colored hair,dark oyes, slonder,stomach ailment,hol- low cheoks,ESSLN dialect. Dark blond,somcwhat bald,blue eycs,round face. Black hair,grey eyes,heart ail- mant,strongly built,quiet dis- position. 5- Appendix (Cont'd) Civilian Title rano Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ALLGEMEINE SS Rank Do. rtnen SECRET Section TETERS', Karl BLUEEISTER,Josef GLESS DENGER,Elfricde RECHEL,Eariechen Typist Telephone Operator Age(+) Height(4-) Description 36? 1.70 m 32? 1.70m 50 1.70 in 23 1.68 in Wavy black- hairldark eyes,high check bones, quiet disposition. Blond hair,blue eyes,Bavarian dia- lect. Dark blond,grey eyes,long face. Black hair,black eyes,light com- plexion, slim. 22 1.67 in Blond hair,blue eyes,hcalthy complexion. In G-ESTLPO ,AOSSENDIENSTELLE (Poreign Sarvic Post); DARMSTADT W.LNGEMINN, Julius KRIM TOM 081U7 KoRELL, Karl KRIM 0 SEK STENDLIJ GERELN, Rina naTL, Miss RIRSCHNhit, Christi- KRIM SEE no FREDIENBI.AtGER, Erika (4) Estimated Report Ref No S.IIC/1 Registration SECRET 52 1.80 in 52 1.68 in Grey hair, grey eyes, thick grey eye- brows, strong appearance. Grey hair, grey eyes, stocky, tip of right hand middle finger missing. 46? 1.70 in Dark blond hair, slender. 25 1.67 in Dark blond hair, slender, blue eyes. 37 1.67 in Dark blond hair, protruding teeth., 36 1.70 in Brunette, grey eyes, strong appearan- ce, energetic manners. 20 1.55 in Black hair, dark eyes pale, slendkar. Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Lppendix (Cont'd) Civilian Name Title. 6r.DER, Karl POI 0 SEK Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 E C R .E I LLIGEMEINE SS Rank Department Section Lge(+) Height(+) Description 46 1. 68 in . Black hair, black eyes, small face, high cheek bones. III. GESTLPO LUSSENKOMILNDO.(Foreign Service EA) , GROSS UMSTLDT UNILICHT, Karl STUSCHLF 40 _ 1.65 in Dark hair, flat nose, stout. DISSELBECK, OSCHLF ? ri.T 1 c 1 29 1.66 in ? Bald, black eyes, slim. Karl-Heinz SCHRCDER, Hedwig 21 1.63 in Brunette, dark eyes, high cheek bones, slander. IV. GEST.LPO ,IUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), GIESSEN 7&TPDEL- HSTUF 45 -_ 7TXZER mum WM 1as relieved by-SEP,- 56 1.67 in Greying heir, fat, 7cars PEL glasses. ICESCH KRIM SEK 1.75 m 45 Dark hair, slender. V. GEST.LPO ;.USSENKOMIC,..NDO (Foreign Service Ha), 70RITS 7Y-x-HV7CdHLER HSTUF 45 1.58 in Dark hair, grey eyes, fat, stocky. VI. GEST.LPO L,USSENDIEN3T3TELT7S (Foreign Service Post), H,IYLU =GER }IM EOM Not SS 331.68 in Dark blond hair, stocky. fTifTTTIE, Heinrich KIM SEK 43? 1.70 in Dark blond hair, slender. SCHMITZ, KRIM SEK 1.75 m Black hair, sl=dcr. VII. GESTL.P0 .LUSSENDIENSTSTEILE Foreign Service Post), MLINZ 7_GEYDR KRIM KOU OSTUF 38? 1.70 in Dark blond, slender. (+) Estimated Report Ref No SLIC/1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Lppendix (Cent' a) Civilian ? Name Title Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET LLLGEMEINE SS Rank De artment Section o(+) Heizht( .Descri tion BP-LNER SOMMER ZORN, Lulu VIII. KRIM SEX KRIM SEK 33? 1.80m 45? 1.70 m Typist 23 1.60 m Black hair, dark brown eyos., slender, self-assured. Black hair, brown eyes, stout, fresh complexion, good appear- ance. Red hair, blue eyes, stout, wears glasses. REFERLT N GEGNER IL_CHRICHIENDIENST (Enemy Signals), BENSHEIM, LM-M=ETTILTZ (1.gents recruited by Ref N worked in M:.INZ, BINGEN, WORMS, DLRLISLIDT, and GROSS UMSTEDT) BOHM, Bruno amd SEK 36 1.68 m KNORZER, Erna lately in F=EFURT .KEtISCH SNYLIK KEUM SEX HEERWLGEN KRIM SEK PETRI KRIM L.SST 31 IX. REFS= N, Sub-Sec BINGEN 43 33 X. REFE= N, Sub-Sec WORMS 1.71 m 1.73 in 1.70 in Light blond hair, light blue eyes, nervous, flat nose, Saxon dialect. Black hair, black eyes, long pale face, arrogn.nt manners. Dark blond hair, strong build. Black hair, dark eyes, Polish citizen, speaks some German. 45 1.65 m -Tey hair, slender, very intel- iigbnt, speaks French; furni- ture store K=STR 1, DLRMSTLDT. 29 1.76 in Dark blond hair, grey eyes, slim. XI. INSPECTOR FOR RS, BERLIN, PRINZ -LBRECHT STR 8-9 LOHMER-PIEYR2,DER, Dr (formerly Chief of GESTAPO Hq DLRMSTLDT and INSPECTEUR WIESRLDEN) (+) Estimated Report Ref No 5LI0/1 48 1.80 m Dark blond hair, very good appearance. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 8 LDpendix (Contid) Civilian Name Title Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 LLLGEEEINE SS ',lank S E C De artmont Section (+) Hoi ht( Descri tion STRLUCH FRIEDRICHS ISSELHORST, Erich Dr EHIMINGER,Erich SCHILLING, Dr. DLHLHEILL2,Karl ICILLE2,1.1fred M'ILIER,Gorhard GEHB,Yarl , REG 0 INSP WILRE,Lrtur DIRIEWLNGER. c+y Estimated llei3ort Rof No 1,77(7/1 OSTUB712 STUBLF OSTUBLF XII. GESTLE0 Lig MINSK (Russia Jan 43-Jan 44 42 33 58 1.75 m 1.78 m 1.75 m STLF Now in BERLIN asIL 32 1.80 m LiITSCHEF STUBLF Lator chief investigate at GESTLPO Hq, WIESBLDEN 37 1.70 m OSTUBI.F 35 1.65 in USTUF 46 1.60 in -TrSTUF 35 1.65 in HSTUF 45 1.70 m HSTUF SONDERXCLEJLNDO loader against partisans 34 1.70 in OS TUE SD 38 1.73 in 7SECRET Approved For ReleaSes2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Dark blond,dark brawn ayes,scar an left part of face,hcalthy toeth,good appearance,very Dark blond,slender,quiat person. Greying hair,light blue eyos,stout, very intelligent,hard workor,good appearance. Black hair,dark eyes,slonder, goad appearnace,ambitious.. Dark blond,wears glasses,scar on left part of faae,vory intelligent. Light blond hair,light blue eyes, slender, energetic. Bald,dark complexion,wears glasses, fat,quiot disposition. Dark blond,stout,good looking. Black hair,dark eyes,slenderl quiet disposition.. Black hair ,dark eyes,tall,slendo, heavy drinker. * Dark hair, slendor;snappy appeszrance. 9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 kppendix (Cont'd) Civilian .LILGEMP,INE Name Title SS Rank DeLaytment Section Lgo(+) Height(+) Description IL.DECKER HSTUF SD 38 1.60 m Black hair,dark eyes,stout,gded-f' looking, cordial manners. OSWJILD OSTW SD? fomerl in KIEL 46 1.69 m Grey hair4ight blue eyes,strong appearance, was always looking for company. ( a (+) Lstimated Report Ref No sLIVI STUBLF SONDERKOR=DO IV; 36 1.70 m Light blond hair,6rey-blac 19 leader Rg-inst partisans. stout, easy-going. Later chief of :KIEL GESTLPO. XIII. SD LUSSEYSTELIE (orcin ServiCe Post) DL2MST.LDI HSTUF Chief of DLRMST.LDT Office .SECLEI _ Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ic Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200 THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE DO NOT DETACR SECRET Ref No SAIC/5 12 Apr 45 030002-7 ? : SECRET: :Auth:CG,7th Army: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: : :Date:12 Apr745 : APO 758 US ARMY ....... ..... e 00000 INDEX I. SOURCE ..... ................... ........ Page No 1 II. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW ......... . 1 III. KURIERSTELLE (Courier Hq) OKH ..... 1 IV. KRIEGSAKADEMIE V. THE GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE 2 VI, NATIONAL REDOUBT ....... 2 (See SHAEF, German Army Questionnaire No 24, 2 Apr 45.) I. SOURCE MESSEN, Hans, 0/LT, Courier Officer at Courier Hq, OKH, BERLIN. A 31-year old bank employee from KISSINGEN. He is of Dutch descent, but had to accept Ger- man citizenship in order to. keep his work. 'Anti-Nazi, source.gaVe hithself.up.to Allied troops on 7 Apt.45.. Source was cooperative during interrogation. Rating: B-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K. I. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW Source knows of the following Hq locations, as of 25 Mar 45: a) OKH (FELD) and OKW (FELD): ZOSSEN, approx 40 km SOUTH of BERLIN. All mail for front units, for armies and lower echelons, is delivered to OKH (FELD). b) OKH (ERSATZ) and OKW (ERSATZ), with most of its departments, moved to WEIMAR. Chief of the General Staff, OGRUF (Lt Gen) JUETTNER, is still in BERLIN, BEND- LER STRASSE. All preparations are made to move the entire OKH and OKW to an undisclosed location in Southern Germany. Upon receipt of to order "OLGA 1" the advanced party of these Hq will move to the new location When the order "OLGA 2" will be given, the entire staffs of OKH and OKW will move. HIMMLER and his Operations Section no longer have a permanent Hq. They oper- ate from an armored train named "PANZERZUG STEIERMARK". Part of the REICHSFUEHRUNG SS is still located in BERLIN, KAISERALLEE (ATRIUM), and in GRUNEWALD. The remainder haa moved to the METTEN Monastery, near DEGGEN- DORF/DANUBE. KURIERSTELLE OKH (Courier Hq 110) This Hq, at first under the ZENTRAL ABT (commanded by GENERALSTABSINTENDANT KUEHLE), was put under the ALLGEMEINES HEERESAMT (AHA) in Oct 44. In charge of the AHA is GENLT GREINER, a Nazi. OBERSTLT BRUCHMANN, who went through an SS training course, is in charge of the KURIERSTELLE. By hie command all non-Nazi officers, including source, were removed from the Post. In all, 30 officers be- long to the KURIERSTELLE. IV, KRIEGSAKADEMIE ? On 23 Mar 45 the KRIEGSAKADEMIE (GENERALSTABSLEHRGAENGE - General Staff Classes) was moved from BAD.KISSINGEN to the TRUPPENUEBUNGSPLATZ GRAFENWOEHR, GSM 4416/ U-6, First Edition/P-0031. Source spoke with the CG of the School, GEN DER'INF SPAETH, and with his adj MM VON LOCHWITZ, before the AKADEMIE had moved. He was told that it was planned to move the KRIEGSAKADEMIE to Southern Bavaria at a later date, and he was asked to suggest a nice, quiet place for its location. Source suggested BAD TOE:1,Z, approx 50 km SOUTH of MUNICH. ,Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET V. GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE A certain Lt ZIAMERWN, Weapons and Amn Officer at Seventh Army-Hq, told source on 2 Apr 45 that Seventh Army intended to move to defensive positions in the COBURG- LICHTENFELS-BAMBERG-FORCHHEIM area and that digging was already going on in this general area. Lt ZIMMRMANN's task was to blow up all amn dumps between the then- hold lines and the abovementioned positions. VI. NATIONAL REDOUBT Although unable to furnish definite information on the planned National Re- doubt, source recalls talks in the Officers' Casino at the OKH to the effect that HITLER and his elite SS troops intended to retreat into the mountains, and that fortifications are being built there. The moving of the OKH and the KRIEGSAKA- DEMIE into the neighborhood is also significant of these plan, source thinks. 12 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER A.41 "KOLL PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MIf Commanding. 2 S EORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 THIS IS tN ENum Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP8161411ROpwum A)\\ SE'CRET Ref No SAIC/4 11 Apr 45 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 US ARMY CHEMICAL PLANTS 0002-7 SECRTT tAuth: CO, SAN :Initt :Date: 11 Apr I. SOURCE HENDIIION, Fred, a civilian who lived in the US for almost sixteen years,run- ning a contracting business in 110OUTE 1, F.Y. He was very observant, and gave all information willingly. He has been giving voluntary assistance to CIO in BUCHTN. Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Feb 45 Interrogator: F.J.S. 25X1A 11. PLANT NEAR IMENIGS-WUSTERHAUSEN Source claims to have worked for three years as a maintenance man and "trouble sheoter"at a large chemical plant located seven km NORTH of NITDTRLAHT, GSGS 4072/ NE 52/10, Third Edition/V-05, a suburb of KOEPIGUSTTRHAUeEN. He states that this plant 'manufactured formaldehyde., hexa, hexalol; and a powerful high explosive (hex- ogen 0, from methanol brought from .a nearby plant at iliJDAU, The factory employs approx 300 French and German workers. The buildings are placed among tall pene tzees, in an area approx 1200 x 1,000m, (See Sketch). Each building is of brown breeL and has a sixteen-inch concrete roof built to hold earth, and planted with small teees. 4ire trellises are affixed to each building to support vines. However; all these efforts at camouflage are of no ? avail, because the plant's two "smokeless" chimneys emit poisonous fumes which turn all nearby vegetation brown. The location is also given away by a large pile of lime waste, white against the light brown of the blighted surrounding terrain. Chemical products are carried from building to building in overhead pipes, supported by conspicuous concrete piers. All buildings aro connected by paths 2 m wide, in addition to the service roads shown on sketch, which are approx 4 m wide. The water supply, which is essential to the operation of the plant, is carried in pipes laid approx 4 feet underground. III. ALTERNATE PLANTS According to source, two similar factories, intended for use as alternates in base the NIEDERLAH,..1E plant should be destroyed, have been built at SCHROBENHAUSEN, ga4aria, GSGS 4416/1.-5/6002, and at .P.ENFELDT/eCESER, asGs 4416/Q-4/2559. These plants are laid out in the same manner as the one at NIEDERLAHME, and the Same blighting of vegetation is caused by chemical fumes from the chimneys. Source states that these sites would also be easily detected from the air due to the large piles of lime waste. LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AT NIEDERLAHME PLANT (Note: Numbers refer to Sketch on following page). 1. Workmen's living quarters; not cam- ouflaged; looks like country house. 2. Garage. 3, Undo'rground chemical storage tanks. 4. Main electric switchboard shod. 5. Filling station for methanol. 6. Office building. 7.. Officials' living quarters. 8. Workers Mess and kitchen. 9. Washrooms. 10. Steam power plant. with 55-foot 1,1smokeless" chimney. 11. Electric power house. 12. Truck repair shop. 13. Formaldehyde plant. 14. Laboratories. 15. Hexa plant, with 16-foot tower. 16. Storage room for machinery. 17. Storage for finished. products. 18. Storage building. 19. Chemical processing building. 20. Repair shop. 21. Electric power building; quarters. 22. Tlasto disposal building. 23. Concrete air raid bunker. 24. Pipe lino tool shed. 25. Wooden tower for drying hoses. 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET : 26. Electric switchboard building. 27. Formaldehyde processing building. 28. Hexalol plant. 29. Concrete air raid bunker. V. SKETCHs CHEMICAL PLANT AT NIEDERLAHME cr, F.1 0 030 015 14 0 8 ar 11 April 45 2 27 191 ci 26 15 24 f 30. Chemical processing building for . high explosives. 31. Pump house for water system. 32. Small pond. NOT to scale. 19 23 -1 7- ---,- 11 )9 F3 (-1,(7---i-5--- ), 025 11 0 1 [1 19 16 0 . 22? d \-0 i7 18 ? } ; ?". r ; SA. -Lime waste pile SECRET 0 10 SEVENTH ARMY (7.A ( PAUL KUBALA, Commanding. INTERROGATION CENTER Maj, MI, c.vs"4 Approved For Release 2004/0i/19 : CIA-RDP83-00.415R006260030002-7 25X1 i Approved For Releasi72004/02/19 : CIA-FrillietF-Gti41115R00 200030002-7 In Nei VLACH - I Ref Ne SAIC/5 11 Apr 45 SE2RET SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 US ARMY HIGH-RANKING GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES ; SE RET ; :Auth: QQ SAN :mit: :Date: 11 Ap 6 SOURCE VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired). Involved in the 20 July incident and imprisoned by HIMMLER, source considers himself at last out of danger and talks freely on*any subject. He is anxious to cooperate with the Allies (See Report Ref No SAI0/2). Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Beg 45 Interrogator: LIST OF GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES a) Field Marshals and Generals i) Field Marshal KEITEL, GENOBST JODL, GENLT WARLIMONT - According to PW the three most important personalities in the WEHRMkOHT, are well known to source. They are unscrupulous men, cowardly, lazy, unwilling to sacrifice themselves. They worship HITLER to the last and have betrayed the Army to him. JODL -Very narrow-minded, a typical armchair general; he never realized that his orders were impossible to ocute; held his unit commanders respon- sible for all setbacks and denounced chem to HITLER; his main shortcoming was the inability to see the incompetence of HITLER as a military leader. WARLIMONT -A good society man, knows languages fluently, a "smooth oper- ator" (AALGLATT); if necessary he can work with people of every political be- lief; he has no fixed line and changes his mind very easily. ii) VON BRAUCHITSCH, Field Marshal - Opposed to HITLER but not outspokenly anti- HITLER: He was undoubtedly euspeoted of sympathizing with the generals of the 20 July plot. However, he emphatically denounced the 20 July affair in a news- paper article and hailed the appointment of HIMMLER as Chief of the Replacement Army, thus saVing his life. iii) VON MANNSTEIN, Field Marshal - Probably the most gifted military leader in Germany; has no clear-cut political beliefb. Afraid to take part in the 20 July events, he now pretends that he knew nothing about them. iv) FREIHERR VON WEICHS, Field Marshal - At heart an enemy of HITLER, he clearly recognizes the crimes which HITLER committed against the German people. Yet, against his principles and beliefs, he was the first to sign a written oath of loyalty to HITLER. v) BUSCH, Field Marshal - Of little importance as a military personality; a typical 100% Nazi general; worships HITLER completely. vi) VON BOOK, Field Marshal - At heart against HITLER, he is too ill with sto- mach trouble and too cautious to take an active part in the elimination of the FUEHRER. vii) MODEL, Field Marshal - An evil, ambitious and characterless person, whose actions are dictated solely by his personal ambitions. He has an incredible lack of consideration for his subordinates. Worships HITLER. viii) KESSELRING, Field Marshal - There is considerable doubt as to his military ability. ROMMEL and many other generals in Africa hated him or laughed at the military measures he took. His incredible optimism did not reflect the actual SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002,7 SECRET state of affairs. He sent optImistic reports regarding the situation in Africa to HITLER from ROME; the troops in Africa suffered considerably as a result of his leadership. ix) ZEITZLER, GEYOEST - Took over the post of C of S, Army High Command, full of idealism and confidence in HITLER, but within a fow weeks he learned to re- cognize HITLER's incompetence as a military leader and his moan character. ZEITZLER wap particularly shockod to find that HITLER was Complotely indiffer- ent to the death and misery of hundreds of thousands of Gorman .soldiers. He hated and despised the FUEHRER, but could not bring hiasolf to the decision to overthrow him. b) General Staff Officers (Of GERMAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS, MIRS(b)/RL/haS/18/44) Note: (*) indicates promotion known to source cince publioatioil of Seniority List of 1 May 44. -(#) indicates that the name does NOT appear in the above publication. i) ALDINGER, MM * ii) VON BENTIVEGYI, GENMAJ iii) VON BILA, OBSTLT * iv) BIROK, OBST v) VON BOEHMER, OBSTLT # vi) TREUSCH VON BUTTLAR- ERNNDENFELD, GENMAJ . (Believod NOT to be the one on the list) vii) BRENDEL, Zoadhita;, OBSTLT viii) BRUDERMUELLER, MAJ * ix) BUCHER, OBST x) SOHULZE-BUETTGER, OBST xi) GRAF ZU OASTELL- ? CASTELL, OBSTLT Son of Gon LADINGER who livos in FREUDENSTADT, Black ?Forest. Div commander. Previously he was active in the AB'1EHR. ? Probably Ia of a div. Related to BLOMBERG. Ho is in the QUARTIERMEISTER ABT of an army. Related to FIUGENBERG; he was seriously injurod on the Eastern Front and is probably no loner with a combat unit. - Since a few years in the Army Operations Sec, Joint Operations Staff, and an important collaborator with JODL. Very Clover and well-informed about the MI RMAOHTSFUEHRUITG, he seas all its weak points and those of HITLER, but is too clover and cautious to state clearly his opinions. Ia in-a p.n.offidor with ne fixod-political 5piniOns. In the Army:e0perations Sec, Joint Export on Balkan affairs. Born known to haVo democratic ideas; HITLER unknown. Operations Staff. in WUERZBURG,? is his opinion of Killed in 1944 on the Eastern Front whore ho was Rogtl 00. Hanged as a rodult of his participation in tho 20 July plot. Last assignment: Ia, Army Group SOUTH. Ia of a 3ICLITRUYGS Div in the EAST. Nickname: ?T0ENTIL aE2RET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 xii) COSSMAN, OBST VON GROLLMANN (Rank un- known) (NOT the one on , the list) VON HOBE, Heinz, OBSTLT xv) KEITEL, MM xvi) KLEIKAMP, OBST rvii) LAHOUSEN, GENMAJ viii) LASSEN, Ernst August, OBST xix) VON LINSTROM, OBST xx) BARON FREYTAG VON LORINGHOVEN, MM xxi) VON LOSSBERG, OBST xii) NIEPOLD, OBSTLT xii10 GRAF VON NOSTITZ, OBST xiv) OSTER, MM xxv) PALTZO, OBST xvi) RADKE, OBST ,SECRET For a. time 0 of S to GEN STUELPNAGEL; now 'Crof'S Of a corps. Ma,rried;has six children. Previously 0 of S, Se.cond Pz.Army in the Balkans; lately 0 of 3, _Army Group SOUTH, under VON WEICHS. Relative of GENOBST HiLDER; probably leads the rem- nants of a div pn the Western front. Sen of the Field Marshal; unimportant as a military figure; is on the General Staff Officers' list solely because of the position of his father. Important personality. he works in the HEERESPER- SONALAMT (Army Personnel Office) and in concerned with the General Staff Officers' files. Austrian, active officer of the Austrian Army who was.absorbed by the German Army after the occupation of Austria. Worked in ASUEHR both for the Austrian and German Armies. Lately sec chief in the ABWEHR, now OG of an inf div. Ia to GEN WEISS, CG Second Army; probably captured in East Prussia. Hanged because of his participation in the 20 July plot. Successor to COSSMANN, 0 of S to the 0 in C, France. His wife and two children are living in MUNIOH. Oomtitted suicide after the 20 July plot. Was AB- WEHR see chief. His wife and three'children are living in SALZBURG. Son of the well-known GENOBST VON LOSSBERG of the World War. C of S of a corps in Norway. He fell into disgrace because of some political remarks and his promotion was held back. Killed on the Eastern front in 1944. 0 of S of the Division Commanders' Scheel' in HIRSOH- BERG. Son of GENMAJ OSTER. He is Is. of a div on the Ital- ian front. Was ABWEHRSTELLE71EITER in DRESDEN until 1959. In the OKII Was HAUPTREFERENT (Chief Adviser) for Nazi indoetrination in the Army, directed the NSFO . School. A confirmed Nazi, he was nevertheless suspected of having been connected with the 20 July plot. lie was imprisoned for four weeks in the RSHA Prison, and then released, reportedly com- pletely 1.ohabilitated. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Xxvii) RAE, OBST ? S ECRET ? _ ? Supply expert in the QUARTIERMEISTERABT of an army group. REINRARDT, Hellmuth, Was 'C of S to Gen.OLBRICHT, Who had him relieved 'OBST- ,becauto he was not suitable for. taking part in the 20 July plot. GRAF STAUFFENBERG .took his place. xxix) SASS, OBSTLT xxx) SAUERBRUCH, OBSTLT Lately Ia of 58 Inf Div, he was seriously wounded in Russia. He lost a leg and is probably no lon- ger in the service. Son of the famous physician; holder of Knights' Cross. Was for some time Ic (G-2) of Second Pz ' Army. in the Balkans. Seen by source in the RSHA Prison, BERLIN, where he remained for a few days. Source beliew.)g, however, that SAUERBRUCH was at the Prison aE witness rather than suspect. xxxi) SCHOENE, OBST In General Staff position in PRAGUE. xxxii) SCHROETTER, OBSTLT For some time in the HEERESPERSONALAMT as adviser (REFERFNT) for the personnel files of the General Staff Officers list under OBST XLEIKAMP (See xvi; above). SCHWATLO-GESTERDING, Author of some inilitarr pamphlets. In 199 Chief ,OBST . of ABWEHRSTELLE HA.i:TOVER. xxxiv) SE-TER, MAJ In the QUARTIEREISTERABT, 0-KH Important collab- orator of GENMAJ STIED'. xXxv) SNEED, OBSTLT Personal -djutant to ZEITZLER Dead (Of Report Ref No SAL.:12). xxxvi) ULS, OBST G.of S of a corps on the Eastern Front in 1944. xXXvii) VON VOSS, OBSTLT Committed suicide after the 20 July plot (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/2). 11 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER A..) 1(;?: PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Commanding. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 a ApPiltie0 'For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R0062 Ref No SAIC/2 10 Apr 45 SECRET THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE DO HOT DETACH . SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER APO 758 US ARMY THE 20 JULY PUTSCH 130002-7 25X1A I. SOURCE-: VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired) has been a professional sol- dier since 1917, but he acts and talks like a buSinessman rather than a German general. He is related by birth and mixrridge to many a family of German high nobility. However, he is not a land owner, does not have independent sources of income, and has been living on his eoldiersl pay. He seems to be strongly un- der the influence of his wife. He has six children, all of whom are being brought up not to believe in the ideas of soldiering or of National Socialism. At the time of the interviews source was hi7;hly nervous and excited, due to the fact, he explained, that he had gone through a great deal Of suffering and that, at last, he ootsidered himself out of danger. He talked freely and without hesitation or doubt on any subject, and his etory is believed to be accurate and to the best of his knowledge. Gen VON PFUHLSTEIN is extremely an. 'ells to be employed by the Allies in any capacity. Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: d.M.B. II. PERSONAL HISTORY 17 Dec 1899 Born in Danzig. 19127 1917 KADOTTENANSTALT (Military. Academy) P02S0e.ei-LI0HTERFELDE. 19 Mar 1917 Entered Army as FAEHNRICH with 4 Guard Ragt. 14 Deo 1917 Commissioned LT. 1918 In 1000000-man Army. 1 Apr 1925 Promoted to 0/LT. 1 Apr 1933 Promoted to HPIM. 1933 Secondary General Staff position to the Arty FUEHRER III, BERLIN. 1935 CO, JAEGER Co in HIRSCHBERG/Silesia. 1936- 1937 Ic,XI Corps, HANOVER. 1937 Promoted to 03STLT. 1938 Ia, 19 Div. 1939 Ia, 58 Div 1941 C0,154 lief Regt, Eastern Front. 1 Feb 1942 Promoted to OBST. 1 Feb 1943 00,BRANDEN3URG Div. 1 Jul 1943 Promoted to GENMAJ. 1 Apr 1944 Re1ieved of command because of political unreliability. 1 Jul 1944 CG,50 Div, Eastern Front. .18 Jul 1944 Wounded. 1 Aug 1944 OG in charge of defensive fortifications, HOHENSTEIN-ORTELSBURGER- '1ALD, East Prussia, 1:7:- order of Gen GUDERIAN. 1 Sep 1944 Arrested by SD because of participation in plot against HITLER on 20 July 44. 14 Sep 1944 Officially dismissed from Army and imprisoned in BERLIN. 24 Nov 1944 Transferred. from BERLIN Prison to KUESTRIN Prison (Concentration Camp for officers politically unfavorable to HITLER). 30 Jan 1945 Dismissed free prison, where he was under HIM:LERIs custody as a political prisoner. 2 Apt 1945 Surrendered voluntarily to an American unit at WERTHEIM.- Present address: KREUZJERTHEIM, near WERTHEIM/Main. In the castle of his cousin 7UERST zu. LMENSTEIN-1ERTHEIM-FRE1DENBERG. S Tr, C R T Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7- 1 / Approved?For Release 2004/02/1 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006i00030002-7 TIT. BRANDENBURG DIV At the time source took over the 37k1DEN3URG Div, on 1 Feb 45, its personnel was comPosed exclusively of volunteers who knew of its special purpose. A number of SS men were, also in the Div at that time. During 1945 HIALER took out soma of the SS personnel and used them as political spies in foreign countries. In bummer 44 elements of the Div, viz, 2-300 men commanded by OBSTLT IJALTHER and his former adjutant, 0/LT CPERLACH, were transferred to the SS and placed under the command of SEORZENY. The force behind the move to return all reliable SS men un- der the Command of the SS was 0/LT VON FOELKIRSAM, a native from the Baltic states. IV. 20 JULY PLOT Not Tho following is an account of the happenings connected with the German generals' plot culminating in the attempt tomos.z1sinate HITLER on 20 July 44,1n source's own words. or the sake of continuity, and for the general interest it may present, the story of the actual assassination attempt has been included, -des- pite- source's absence from the scone or the event; ? 1. Preparations of the Plot "On 1 Feb 43 I was relieved as rogti CO on the Eastern front and given the command of he newly organized BRANDENBURG Div. GENAAJ OSTER, C of S, AVEHR ABTEILUNG, disclosed to me, in numerous official conversations, substantially the following: a) "In the opinion of a considerablo number of enlightened officers, including Field Marshals VON KLUGE and.VON MANIISTETV, GEN DER INF VON STUELPNAGEL, and many others who wore well informed, the war could no lonzor be won militarily. Every day that the war was prolonged leant unnecessary bloodshed and would oltimately load to the complete colle?)so of Germany. The newly appointed Chief of General Staff, GENOBST nITZLZR, was of the same opinion since the STALIN- GRAD debacle. b) "It was of primary importance to end tho war somehow, as quickly as possible. Tho prerequisite for this would have to be the elimination, or at least the exclusion of HTMER and the Party, since any negotiations between the Allies and HITLER wore impossible, - HITLER and his close supporters would never take such stops, in the first placo. MY opposition to HIPLTR and the Party had boon known to Gen OSTER for years. Field Marshals VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, GINOB9T BECK and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN have decided to remevo HITLER, at first from the military command only, at the earliest opportunity. Tho plan was approx as follows: On the appointod day the FUEHRER's Hq in East Prussia was to be seized by trustworthy anti-Nazi troops. VON KLUGE and VON AANNSTEIN, together with other officers, then wanted to seo HITLER and confront him with the following demands: i) Appointment of a REICEBGENERALSTABSOHEF (REICH Chief of General, Staff) with full powers of command for the entire -conduct of the war in all theaters; , ii) Subordination (UNTERSTELLUNG) of all throe qEHRAACHT branches to a single person; iii) lo-appointment for the vacant post of Army 0 in 0 (OBERBEFEHLSHABER DES HETRES)i 'iv) Establishment of a single General Staff for all throo JEHRMACHT branchos. Should HITLER not acccdo volunta:c_ly to this plan, suitable steps to apply' 2 11 fe, Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ApProved tor Release 2004/02/1g : CIA-RDP83-004151R006200030802-7 3 T ?P??? force were to be taken. Those measures would probably consist of placing HIT- LER under temporary arrest. Proparetions were made to out off all communicse? tions between tho FUEHRER's Hq and tho outside world at the designated time, until the desired decision would be reached one way or another. BERLIN was to bo seized by anti-Nazi troops at the same time. The intentions wore furthorto incorporate the qAFFEN SS into the Army, with the appointment of a REICH Chief of aoneral Staff. . Along with this plan there were other designs, of a political and economic nature, with tho dotails of which I EVA not familiar. It is fairly certain that it was hoped to ostablieh'contact with America and England through the Vatican, with the purpose of negotiating for an armistice. I think that the Vatican was chosen as the neutral mooting place for the diplomat a concerned; I do not know whether the cooperation of the Popo hkmself was sought. c)"It was further made clear to me that my appointment as Com:mender of the BRANDENBURG Div wae only a blind, that it would be my task to occupy a certain district of BERLIN with elements of the Div which wore located in the town of BRANDENBURG and, aboveeall, to eliminate Party officials, the SS, and tho SD. :d) "GEN DER INF OLBRICHT handled the technical preparations in the interior. But he was unable immediately to make any headway with his preparations., due to tho lack of capable and dependable officers. He finally succeeded in ob- taining OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG as chief, and only with the arrival of this officer did the proparationa begin to make progress. All preparations had to be handled with the greatest oar?. Only very few ofT'icers could at first . be let in on the secret. Spying by HIM.LER, the SD, and the Party indreased daily. The fact that the Chief of the Army Personnel Office (PERSONALAMT), - .GENLT SOHAUNDT, was a 100% Nazi and could not be told about the plot made the situation especially difficult, because officers who wore urgently desired for the accomplishment- of the prope..sd coup could not be secured. o) "The further arrangements of tho plan called for holding the Eastern front undor all circumstances, at least to protect the Gorman border from a Russian invasion. It was intended that a British-American invasion in the JEST should not be opposed; Gorman troops wore to be withdrawn to the interior of the REICH and to reinforce tho Eastern.front. The plan was to let in the ,Americans and British, without fighting and as fast as possible, far into Germany. The necessary preparations in the 4E8T wore in tho hands of GEN DER INF VON STUMP- NAGEL, Military Commander of Franco, and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN, Military Com- mander of Belgium. f) 'In the course of time it developed that Field Marshal VON KLUGE was some- what undecided and had postponed the dato of tho undertaking. In spite of all pressure he kept postponing the appointed time for tho coup. stooks and months passed, in summer 43, during which I and many others came to tho con- clusion that tho plan would never be carried out because of the indecision of VON KLUG,i% .VON KLUGE was advised, and even urged by his /a, GENTAAJ VON TRT'INOU, to go on with the plot. OBST SCHULTZE-BUETTGER, Ia to Field Marshal VON MANNSTEIN1 was also let in on the piers. g) "I received tho mission of determining, during a visit to tho OKH, the posi- tion and attitude of GENOBST ZEITZLER and the Operations Sec (OPERATIONS AB- TEILUNG).of the Army High Command. It was essential to know whether ZEITZLER - could be let in on the plot. Through several conversations with the officers of the Operations Sec, particularly with OBST GReF VON KIELMANNSEGG and 03STLT SAND, I received the impression that ZZITZLER, while he had taken over the position of Chief of the General Staff with great confidence in HITLER, real- ized after. a few weeks that HITLER -_73,totally imcompetent as far as military matters were concerned and was making one catastrophic decision after another. SEORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 5 ApOroved 'For Release 2004/02/1R : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ZTITZLER was especially shocked by the fact that losses in men which ran into ,hundreds of,thousende, as at STALINGRAD, did not make the slightest impression on, HITLER. ZEITZLER learned within ihose short weeks to recognize HITLER's military incompetenee and to hate and despise him because of his personal char- acteristies, But he was not yet thinking about the overthrowing of the FUEHRER. He rather considered it his duty, Cothe what may, to remain at his post. The inevitability of the Collapse wa4 painfully clear to him and to the offi- cers of the Operations Sec. They continued to work out of a sense of duty, and without, any hope. I communciated this impression t6 Admiral CANARIS; the decision was reached NOT to inform ZEITZLTA of the plans.' h) "In the course of the year 1943, Particularly in the fall and winter, the determination to overthrow HITLER riPened. There were various ideas as to the methods of realizing this aim. For a long time it was hoped that an opportunit5, would Present itself during one of HITLER's so-called "visits to the front" ,(FRONTREISEN). HITLER's visits usually carried him only as far as Army Group Hq. At Army Group Center as well as,at Army Group SOUTH preparations for an assassination were made. It did notcome to pass, because HITLER could no longer be persuaded to make a visit to the front, Thus the decision was gradu- ally reached to bring about the overthrow of HITLER, and if possible also HIM- LR, in the FUEHRER i) "In Jan 44 I was reported by a junior officer, 0/LT BOECKEL, as having a suspicious political outlook. I was-classified politically unreliable and, , therefore, relieved on 1 Apr 44 of the BRANTENBURG Div command and. placed at the disposal of the OKH. After I let BRLIN, I had no opportunity to witness the further: unfolding of the plan. I was sent to a div commanders' course at HIRSCHBERG. Having been appointed Od 50 Inf Div' on 1 July 44, I was on the Eastern front at the time of the attempted assassination on 20 July". ' V. THE EMI'S OF 20 JULY, 1944 "In KUTSTRIN, while under detention, I had occasion to speak to the following officers, HITLER's political prisoners like myself,: OBST VON CANNSTEIN, Comman- dant of the Cay School, BROMBERG; MAJ VON HASSTLT, son of the diplomat; and MM VON XLUGT, son of the Field Marshal. these three officers were apprehended just after me, and, were able to give a detailed account of the attempted execution of the plan. The greatest part of the story, as far as I can recall, was told by OBST VON CANNSTEIN. OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG, as C of'S to the Commander of the Replacement Army, had to report to the FUTHRER Hq to give an account on the state of the replacement forces. This report was to be deliverad as part of the so-called situation conference (LAGEBESPREOHUNG) in which HITLER, =TEL, JODL, ZEITZLER, WARLIMONT, and other officers took part daily. OftenTIMALER, and occasionally GORING were also present. STAUFFENBTRG had no control over the appointment of the date for his report. On the designated day STAUF7EFBERG flew in his pri-- vate plane to the FUTHRER Hq at LOETZEN, East Prussia. He had With him large maps and special large graphs for his report, and also a briefcase with a strong explosive charge. After arriving at the FUTHRER Hq,STAUFFENBERG declared that before the cOnferenco he would have togo into the conference room to lay out his maps and graphs. Thus STAUFFENBERG had the opportunity, immediately before . the conference, to go alone into the cOnference room. He spread his maps out on the table so that the view of the floor beneath the table was obstructed. Under the map table, protected from sight, he placed the briefcase with the explosive ' charge and probably a time fuze. Sinoe the situation conferences usually lasted several hours, and STAUFFEN- BERG was to be the last to report, it Was not noticeable that he loft the FU2HRER Hq at the bog of the conference. without waiting for the explosion he flew back to BERLIN and there reported to GIN OLBRICHT that the assassination was accom- 4 S ORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ApProved"ForRelease 2004/02/1 :CIA-RDP83-00415R006t00030002q 6 .... 31. plishod, Based upon this belief, the program proceeded further. All the prepared ordors were given. These concerned first of all the taking over of the most im- portentgovernnient offices in BERLIN and the arrest of the most important Party and SS mombors such as the higher-ranking GS police officials, GAULEITER, etc. GENOBST BECK tried at the same time to got in touch with the army groups by tolo.,- phone. As I understand it, the following conversation took place: MILT KINZEL, 0 of S, Army Group NORTH, received the telephone call from BERLIN. A voice, probably that of STAUFFENBERG, said, "I am turning over the call to GENOBST BECK". GEYOBST BECK then said, substantially, "I am not sufficiently informed regarding tho details of the situation in the Army Group NORTH. However, I am giving you the following directions for the further conduct of the struggle; Take care that Army. Group NORTH under no circumstances be cut off and lose con- tact with. the REICH. If necessary the Army Group front must bo withdrawn towards East Prussia". with those words the conversation ended. It can be assumed that MIMI BECK, GST nm INF OLBRICHT, and OST VON ST=FFENBERG.gave numerous or- ders and directives in the same vein. Thus it was (easy for the SD later to grab a high porcentago of all officers connected with the case, sinco through the un- happy outcomo of the attomptod assassination practically all the cards wero on the table. I know that many officers who woro not imeedirtoly apprehended, their nerves strained by mental uncertainty, bought and found death on the front or through suicide. This was the case of OST VON VOSS, 0 of S,? Army Group Oontorfand pro- bably of RPM- VON KOEHNEN and HPTM Holmut PINKERT of BRANDENBURG Div. Some of- ficers, such as NAJ VON HASSELT, aqeof the opinion that a high percentage of the officers involved in the plot weroRoizod by the SD and that perhaps only one- fifth were Olt. I personally know of only one, GENLT VON ROST, 0 of S, III Corps, in BERLIN, who was definitely involved in the preparations for the coup. .Until rocently ho was OG HOOH-UND DEUTSn -7 TER Div on the Eastern front, EAST of VIENNA. At first instrumental inthe.plans for the overthrow of HITLER, he later got "cold- foot" and stopped aside". VI. RS RA PRISON, BERLIN "On 1 Sept I was arrested by the SD, thrown into the RSH:). Prison, BERLIN, PRINZ ALBRECHT STRASSE, and. shackled. The prison coils wore located along two corri- dors in the collar. I was confined to Coll No 13 from 1 Sept to 24 Nov. 30 sin- gle coils were occupiod. In this SD prison I saw the following persons, some of whom I came to know personally, and others whom I knew only by sight. i) REICESMINISIER SOT.CHT, Coll 4. Probably roloasod Jan 45. ii) MINISTER POPITZ, Prussian Financo Minister. Probably hanged. iii) GENORST HALER, Cell 17. Probably now out of prison and in a concentration camp in MECKLENBURG. iv) GENOBST FROI. Pato unknown to mo, probably not hanged, but certainly still detained. v) The diplomat GRAF VON DER SCHULENBURG. Certainly sontoneod to death, and hanged. vi) The diplomat, VOX HASSELT, certainly hanged. vii) OBERBUERGERMEISTER GOERDELER (LEIP7IG). Sentenced to doath. Ho was bound hand and foot, then probably hanged. Call 7 or 8. ? ix) GENMAJ ?STEM of Sp ealEHR ABT, almost cortainly subsequently hanged. 5 SgORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ApProved`for Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R00620003002-7 SEORST x) OTrAILT GRAF VON KIELMANNSEGG, 0 of S in the Operations Soo, OKH. Confined near mo in Coll No 12 for six weeks, then released becauso of insufficient ovi? deace. Is supposed to have comiland of an armd rogt now. xi) (?rTILT SPEIDEL, 0 of S, OBERBEFEHLeHASER WEST, under RUNDSTEDT and KLUGE. Detained only for a very few days. I mot him again lator in the KUESTRIN For? tross. xii) My personal friond,PRINZ r releasod subsequently. Ho is _MST AUGUST VON HANNOVal. Is supposed to have, boon probably with his parents in BLItZ:ENBURG/HARZ. . xiii) The two personal adjutants whose name is unknown to me. of GENOBST ZEITZLER, OBSTLT SMIND and the other, SMEND was to be hanged or shot later. There wore 32 Small single coils in all,and'during my stay at the prison most of thorn wore continuously occupiod. s soon as one occupant was hanged another was brought in. About 200 to 300 persons were hold in the rison of the Criminal Court in MOA? 'BIT, BERLIN. All of those wore confined booms() of participation in the 20 July. incident. Among those 200 persons woro numerous other officers, members of tho Foreign Office, economists, merchants, intoliectuals. Mothor prison was located in FUERSTENBERG. In all the larger cities, the jails woro fillod with similar personalities. Those wore all somohow involved, or suspoctod of having boen in? volvod in the 20 July affair. GEFOBST Z-LITZLER was probably also approhendod. His whereabouts are unknown to mo, BERLIN lawyer, whose name has escaped me, was asked for advice by my wifo. This lawyer, who wg..A.s wall informed on those matters, told my wife that in his estimation about 25,000 persons had been ar? rested in connection with the 20 July incident". VIII. FORTRESS OF KUESTRIN "On 24 Nov I was transferred from ie RSFA Prison to the KUESTRIN Fortress. Here the SCHLOSSKASERNE wae designated as a concentration camp for politically unreliable officers. ?There were about 25 persons in KUESTRIN among wham I recall the following: 0 GEN DER KAV VON ESEBECK; last assignments Acting OG in VIENNA; ii) TINLT SINZIGER, Commandant of VIA; iii) GENMAJ VON STUELPNAGIL, Siegfried, discharged. Last aesignments Oommandant of STETTIN. GENLT smanu, 0 of St OB WEST; MAJ VON HASSELT; MAJ VON KLUGE, son of the Field Marshal; OBSTLT HOOPPNER; HPTM VON PAULUS, son of the Field Marshal; OBST OANNSTEIN, Commandant of the Cay School, BROMBERG. When the Russians stood before the fortress of KUESTRIN was evacuated in in utter rashness. I myself was able gates of. KUISTRIN on 30 Jan 45, the panic, and many of the prisoners released to go home. The fate of the other officers 6 S EORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ?,1 ? IP' 4 ? * Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 SECRET is not known to me. A new concentration camp for officers was to be set up in Central Germany, in the neighborhood of ERFURT, but I do not know whether .these plane have been realized". 7111. TREATMENT OF OFFICER PRISONERS "After the 20 July Putsch GOERING approached HITLER and asked him to treat the arrested generals humanely and in amanner befitting their position. This request was rejected by HITLER in the roughest manner possible., and GOERING was thrown out together with his request. SS OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER (Lt Gen ) Sepp DIETRICH (also ROMMEL?) reportedly supported this request. All three fell sub? sequently into disgrace." SEPP.DIETRICH "In CUESTRIN GENLT SPEIDEL told me the following SS OGRUF Sepp DIETRICH had realized a long, time ago that HITLER's poliey and his methods of waging war would lead to a catastrophe. SHIM told me that L'ITRICH saw these things as they really were. It must be remembered that Sepp WaTRICH, as a unit eomelander, got his impressions directly from the front and from his contacts with many Army of? ficers, ? impressions completely different from those of HITLER, able only to estimate the situation from behind a desk. There exists mutual mistrust between HIMMLER and DIETRICH; HIMALER felt that DIETRICH had grown too powerful and that he might become a dangerous rival in the future. SPEIDEL described DIETRICH as an uneducated country yokel, but having sound common sense. I saw a chit of paper on which DIETRICH had written to SPEIDEL in fall of 44: "With cordial greetings, Yours, Sepp DIETRICH (and not HEIL HITLER,' OMIT KAMERADSCHAFTLIOHEM GRUSS, IHR S"LT DIETRICH (UND NICHT HIL HITLER)). X. PERSONALITIES, ;90NDEREGGER, KRIMINALKOMISSAR, interrogator in RSHA Prison, BERLIN. Medium height, slim; narrow, wrinkled face. Brown hair, balding.. Slightly sloped shoulders. Southern dialect. Brown eyes. About 40 years old.? ii) HUPPENKOTHEN, SSSTUBAF(Coi), interrogator in RSHA Prison, BERLIN. 1.80 m tall, Westphalian origin. Broad shoulders, slender, strongly built. Remarka? bly round lac:mat, round smooth cheeks. Large, slightly protruding blue eyes. Dark blond, thick hair. Swaying walk About 30 years old. iii) KALTVBRU'INER, SS OGRUF (Lt Gen), 'Chief of the SD. Medium height, broad ' shoulders, stocky.. Large, fat hande. Daek blond, almost black hair.. Talks quietly. Slight Austrian dialect; 10 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER _0004 --1402 PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, Oommanding4 7 S ZORET Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7