HISTORY OF THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES, PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL OF THE PROBLEM (PART TWO)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000300090018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 21, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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21 May 1964
MEMORANDUU FOR: Chief, Historical tuff
SUBJECT ": History Of the Clandestine Services,
. Preliminary Appraisal of the
Prob1e0 (Part Two)
REFERENCE Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated
14 May" 3.964
1. In the first of these related memoranda, I made two
proposals which I consider a minimum response to Task 1-b of
UN 1-46. This memorandui will discuss ways in which a useful
historical structure might be erected upon this groundwork.
It is based upon the assumption that there is a valid require-
ment for a Clandestine Services history adequate to fulfill
the purpose described in your note of 15 October 1963:
"To consolidate K record of problems and solutions,
failures and acconplisaonts wUch will put the past
into historical perseetive as bec!aerouad for the cur-
rant direction ce centaal intelligence and provide a
reservoir from wicLj particular requirements for his-
torical material ean be satisfied."
That purpose, with which I aa'ree, will necessitate a good deal
of thoughtful, time-consUming work.
2. Within that freMeavork, however, there is still need
for somewhat more precise requireacnts in order to arrive at
oven a rough judgment of how much time and how much work.
Relieble gauges are hard to find. Most ordinary histories
are pretty- much beside the point. Mascive institutional
histories such as the coat records of the armed services
would provide a model far beyond the capability of any past 25X1A
or present concept of a CIA Historical Staff. The
25X1A effort for 1946-49 and that of for iO- 25X1A
53 deal with quite a different quality of problem because they
are concerned almost entirely with the domestic and non-action
components of the agency: additionally each of them, in its
own way, has inadequacies for the purpose you have set forth.
The OSS War Report and the present South Vietnam study are
not directly comparable, either to each other or to the pres-
ent problem, but they are more to the point.
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3. The OSS Report povered a period of somewhat more than
four years. It was begun in July, 1946 and submitted in fin-
ished form 5 September 1947. During that time it engaged the
services of seven officers, six researchers, six consultants
and part-time writers, and two clerk-stenogrephers, coneuning
a total of roughly 20 personeyears. When printed in 1949 it
occupied 718 double-column pages, plus illustrations, exhibits
and appendices. Yet it was admittedly incomplete and partly
etchy. It suffered from the problem of coping with source
material which. in some respects we nearly overwhelming in
volume and in other respects inadequate or lacking. There was
no sense of continuity on the task force; it was a job to do
end be gotten over with. It benefited from the fact that
memories were fresh and the time span to be covered was
relatively short.
4. The Vietnam study illumines from quite a different
angle. Initially one experienced and more than usually artic-
ulate officer, with part time clerical assistance, was given
eight months to complete an account of the agency's activities
in Vietnam. 1950 was taken as the year of commencement, that
25X1A being the time when the first Clandestine Eery-
ices) representatives were eeu w The deadline was
set to match that of a comparable State-Defense study. The
job required poring throUgh thousands of documents, intere
viewing several hundreds Of persons, many of them abroad,
sorting and balancing masees of often conflicting material
and ultimately will require, of courses the writing of the
finished product. The ieeessibility of the task, with its
limitations as set, euiclAy became a7p11.yent; alter two months
one CS researcher was detailed alsezt fulletime to assist the
officer originally assigned. Later at the reeuest of this
officer the DDI eesigned en rssintrnt to assemble the con-
tributive material from his ()Mere, and another CS reseacher
began working part time. :As of thie writing, the original
deadline is 45 days away anl the rxobable actual completion
date at least four months mere. Fortunately the State-
Defense historians appear to be no better off.
3. It is clear that neither the OS nor the Vietnam
exonple, although pertinent, offers a solution to the over-
all CS history problem. The task force aperoach would be
organizationally disruptive and probably would not produce a
satisfactory product. Tho Vietnem approach, applied to the
rest of the world, would reach astronomical proportions.
It seems to me equally clear that there is no rationality in
expecting that a single person, whatever his experience and
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talents, could produce anything thet might honestly be des-
cribed as a "history" of the CS in your definition. What then
might be done short of reining oneself to responsibility for
a foreseeably inadequate job? Perhaps something, given a will
in the right places.
O. I propose that reach of the original drafting be done
by selected officers of the ceveral CS comoonents, under the
general guidance but not the direct jurisdiction of the Histori-
cal Staffe-topics* to be chosen and draftsmen to be suggested
by a small CS historical board which would have to meet no
oftener than perhaps four times a year.
7. This proposal hap a. number of advantages, the most
important of which is that it stands some chance of getting
the job done. In addition:
a. It is flexible; it would provide both for the
compilation over time of an accurate general history of
the CS and for more Otailed eeeendicese it also would
accommodate and ma?eee'ee of elle-A special studies as
right be required iron time to time by DDP and DCIvits
scone and pace could be adjueted as circumstances re-
quired.
b. It would ineure that ench topic or area was
treated by a person ell qualified to deal with it; at
tha same time it should not unduly overburden any one
draftsman.
c. It would not be oiTanizationnlly disruptive
and would not expand the Historical Staff beyond the
modest proposal of reference.
d. It should provide no important eleeonts of
continuity and a senee of participation on tho part of
the CS components.
n addition to country histories, any number of subject his-
tories suggest themselves, including (in no order of import-
ance): proprietary orgenezations, cover generally, relations
with other agencies, ceeeeielly military, State, FBI; defec-
tors, emigrees generally, tses end problems of aircraft,
foreign liaison, the records problem, labor activities, etc.,
etc.
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S. Finally, it would leave the responsible officer of the
Historical Staff with a job which would be neither a sinecure
nor a ludicrous impossibility. Among his taske:
a. Preparation of an over-all historical outline and
of proposals for consideration by the historical board;
b. Editing, rpwriting.and rechecking first drafts
as necessary and generally preparing them for a place
in a finished work;:
c. Writing intereediate chapters and other connec-
tive or prefatory Leatorial to provide coherence to the
finished work; perSeenelly preparing such other contri-
butions as might net be better assigned elsewhere;
U. Interviewing eueh historical personages as Allen
Dulles and Frank Wiener, e.g., for intimate insights
unobtainable elsewhere;
ee Sunorvising the wor of the research group recon-
vened in referoecO and asreering that it supports, as
well as possible, other woefe curreatly in progreee
pursuing its longer goal of organizing true historical
archives;
f. Undertaking such evaluative functions as may
considered suitable for hiseerical purposes; (there /TOMS
to have been considereble conflict and confusion as -to
wleother this is an historicel staff function and, if eo,
how to go about it).
0. It must be emphasiexel that this proposal will work
cely if it has the clear in uneeeivocal endorsement of DDP.
25X1A
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