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November 17, 2016
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July 19, 2000
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May 21, 1964
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Approved For Relwe 2000/0 iii-A1764R004400090018-2 21 May 1964 MEMORANDUU FOR: Chief, Historical tuff SUBJECT ": History Of the Clandestine Services, . Preliminary Appraisal of the Prob1e0 (Part Two) REFERENCE Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated 14 May" 3.964 1. In the first of these related memoranda, I made two proposals which I consider a minimum response to Task 1-b of UN 1-46. This memorandui will discuss ways in which a useful historical structure might be erected upon this groundwork. It is based upon the assumption that there is a valid require- ment for a Clandestine Services history adequate to fulfill the purpose described in your note of 15 October 1963: "To consolidate K record of problems and solutions, failures and acconplisaonts wUch will put the past into historical perseetive as bec!aerouad for the cur- rant direction ce centaal intelligence and provide a reservoir from wicLj particular requirements for his- torical material ean be satisfied." That purpose, with which I aa'ree, will necessitate a good deal of thoughtful, time-consUming work. 2. Within that freMeavork, however, there is still need for somewhat more precise requireacnts in order to arrive at oven a rough judgment of how much time and how much work. Relieble gauges are hard to find. Most ordinary histories are pretty- much beside the point. Mascive institutional histories such as the coat records of the armed services would provide a model far beyond the capability of any past 25X1A or present concept of a CIA Historical Staff. The 25X1A effort for 1946-49 and that of for iO- 25X1A 53 deal with quite a different quality of problem because they are concerned almost entirely with the domestic and non-action components of the agency: additionally each of them, in its own way, has inadequacies for the purpose you have set forth. The OSS War Report and the present South Vietnam study are not directly comparable, either to each other or to the pres- ent problem, but they are more to the point. CONFIDENTIAL GROUP Excluded frol etiomatic darautdin nnd dccIK?,1111.:allul ,IIIMM?01.0.1.M.W.I.--a..?????1014111?11.011?111 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000300090018-2 .? Approved For Relea,se 2000/08/ iii4L4ROOW0090018-2 3. The OSS Report povered a period of somewhat more than four years. It was begun in July, 1946 and submitted in fin- ished form 5 September 1947. During that time it engaged the services of seven officers, six researchers, six consultants and part-time writers, and two clerk-stenogrephers, coneuning a total of roughly 20 personeyears. When printed in 1949 it occupied 718 double-column pages, plus illustrations, exhibits and appendices. Yet it was admittedly incomplete and partly etchy. It suffered from the problem of coping with source material which. in some respects we nearly overwhelming in volume and in other respects inadequate or lacking. There was no sense of continuity on the task force; it was a job to do end be gotten over with. It benefited from the fact that memories were fresh and the time span to be covered was relatively short. 4. The Vietnam study illumines from quite a different angle. Initially one experienced and more than usually artic- ulate officer, with part time clerical assistance, was given eight months to complete an account of the agency's activities in Vietnam. 1950 was taken as the year of commencement, that 25X1A being the time when the first Clandestine Eery- ices) representatives were eeu w The deadline was set to match that of a comparable State-Defense study. The job required poring throUgh thousands of documents, intere viewing several hundreds Of persons, many of them abroad, sorting and balancing masees of often conflicting material and ultimately will require, of courses the writing of the finished product. The ieeessibility of the task, with its limitations as set, euiclAy became a7p11.yent; alter two months one CS researcher was detailed alsezt fulletime to assist the officer originally assigned. Later at the reeuest of this officer the DDI eesigned en rssintrnt to assemble the con- tributive material from his ()Mere, and another CS reseacher began working part time. :As of thie writing, the original deadline is 45 days away anl the rxobable actual completion date at least four months mere. Fortunately the State- Defense historians appear to be no better off. 3. It is clear that neither the OS nor the Vietnam exonple, although pertinent, offers a solution to the over- all CS history problem. The task force aperoach would be organizationally disruptive and probably would not produce a satisfactory product. Tho Vietnem approach, applied to the rest of the world, would reach astronomical proportions. It seems to me equally clear that there is no rationality in expecting that a single person, whatever his experience and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000300090018-2 Approved For Release 2000/0 hitlitAllit9104.4-9t764R000,411p090018-2 -3- talents, could produce anything thet might honestly be des- cribed as a "history" of the CS in your definition. What then might be done short of reining oneself to responsibility for a foreseeably inadequate job? Perhaps something, given a will in the right places. O. I propose that reach of the original drafting be done by selected officers of the ceveral CS comoonents, under the general guidance but not the direct jurisdiction of the Histori- cal Staffe-topics* to be chosen and draftsmen to be suggested by a small CS historical board which would have to meet no oftener than perhaps four times a year. 7. This proposal hap a. number of advantages, the most important of which is that it stands some chance of getting the job done. In addition: a. It is flexible; it would provide both for the compilation over time of an accurate general history of the CS and for more Otailed eeeendicese it also would accommodate and ma?eee'ee of elle-A special studies as right be required iron time to time by DDP and DCIvits scone and pace could be adjueted as circumstances re- quired. b. It would ineure that ench topic or area was treated by a person ell qualified to deal with it; at tha same time it should not unduly overburden any one draftsman. c. It would not be oiTanizationnlly disruptive and would not expand the Historical Staff beyond the modest proposal of reference. d. It should provide no important eleeonts of continuity and a senee of participation on tho part of the CS components. n addition to country histories, any number of subject his- tories suggest themselves, including (in no order of import- ance): proprietary orgenezations, cover generally, relations with other agencies, ceeeeielly military, State, FBI; defec- tors, emigrees generally, tses end problems of aircraft, foreign liaison, the records problem, labor activities, etc., etc. CONMENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000300090018-2 ? Approved For Releup 2000/08/COOW-REPHil ?4- 4R00041.0090018-2 S. Finally, it would leave the responsible officer of the Historical Staff with a job which would be neither a sinecure nor a ludicrous impossibility. Among his taske: a. Preparation of an over-all historical outline and of proposals for consideration by the historical board; b. Editing, rpwriting.and rechecking first drafts as necessary and generally preparing them for a place in a finished work;: c. Writing intereediate chapters and other connec- tive or prefatory Leatorial to provide coherence to the finished work; perSeenelly preparing such other contri- butions as might net be better assigned elsewhere; U. Interviewing eueh historical personages as Allen Dulles and Frank Wiener, e.g., for intimate insights unobtainable elsewhere; ee Sunorvising the wor of the research group recon- vened in referoecO and asreering that it supports, as well as possible, other woefe curreatly in progreee pursuing its longer goal of organizing true historical archives; f. Undertaking such evaluative functions as may considered suitable for hiseerical purposes; (there /TOMS to have been considereble conflict and confusion as -to wleother this is an historicel staff function and, if eo, how to go about it). 0. It must be emphasiexel that this proposal will work cely if it has the clear in uneeeivocal endorsement of DDP. 25X1A CO IFIEITIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000300090018-2