MEMORANDUM REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 6, 2005
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 28, 1948
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1.pdf614.85 KB
Body: 
Transcribed by FH for ABD 8 May 19 53 Aooroved For Release 2005/12/ 22630/A 034R000200080001-1 8r .u ity Infosrr?.tinn 28 May 1948 MEMORANDUM REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE Central Intelligence Agency has obtained only meager information on current "biological warfare activities and intentions of our potential enemies." We infer that the Soviets are engaged in research and development on biological warfare for such reasons as the following: 1. Unclassified publications in the USA and Britain show that we are engaged in research and development on biological warfare. For example., an article by Jerome Feiner in the current issue of Harper's Magazine discloses some of the biological agents on which we are working and the place where the work is being done. One would expect the Soviets to be developing defensive measures against these agents and to be engaged in offensive search and development on agents against which vie would be most vulnerable. rv Cap'ired'erman "anA a anese dacurn titsindicat that the Soviets tiere en ;aged in preparations for biological warfare during and before the ar. It is probable that such work was continued after the war. c?tI 3? There are several hundred scientists in the USSR whose published bork in bacteriology, immunology, etc., indicates that they are capable If developing agents for biological warfare. I 4. Various scraps of information point in the same direction: umors of biological warfare installations on islands in certain oviet lakes; desire of the Soviets to purchase in the USA equipment or the manufacture of penicillin - equipment which could be adapted or the large-scale production of biological warfare agents; failure -bf the Soviets to send delegates to the recent Congresses of Tropical ,`'Medicine and Malaria here in Washington. We want to know, of course., whether the USSR has installations devoted exclusively to research and development on biological warfare. If they have a central military installation similar to our Camp Detrick, it could be identified through esuionage by a combination of character- istics given in our intelligence requirements. However, biological warfare research can be conducted within laboratories normally devoted to medical research. Such work would be almost impossible to distinguish from legitimate biological and medical research. Pilot plant or large- scale oroduction of biological warfare agents might be done in plants that could not be distinguished., except by unusual security provisions., from plants in the legitimate pharmaceutical or fermentation industries. Testing facilities for biological warfare munitions could not be so easily concealed. APPROVED F'~ ny Tr I1,11 l'"Aft' s ~aLxl Security : ;:,ati'o', Apr-Release 200511 /23. IA-RDF?$3 " F d0 gGG8O001- Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : EIA-RDP83-01002'0001-1 It is of the greatest importance for us to know what agents the Soviets are producing or are prepared to produce on a large scale. Possible agents are so numerous that we cannot prepare specific defenses against all of them. We should know whether the Soviets plan attack against our crops and livestock as well as man and whether by sabotage or open warfare. It seems to us that reliable answers to these questions are ime ossible to obtain in peacetime unless we should have the good fortune to find a disaffected Soviet scientist, intimately concerned with the program, who is willing to disclose it. We do not count on such a break, for scientists everywhere have shown that they can and do abide by security regulations. The best we can do, therefore, is to be sure that our intelligence renuirenents are understandable to ceeratives not specially trained in biology and that they are properly disseminated among those who might be in a position to get some of the desired'information. Dr. Wallace R. Brode, chief of our Scientific Branch, and, Professor I. L. Baldwin, (airman of the Committee on Biological :Warfare, Research and Development Board, recently flew to London to consult with British authorities on biological warfare intelligence. We are assured of full British cooperation in exchange of intelligence. The paucity of bi_c- logical warfare intelligence from Russia was felt by the British and a considerable portion of the discussion at this meeting dealt with this subject. The British concur in the feeling that our best hope of specific de'-ails is t'nru disclosure by Soviet personnel rather than infiltration of our agents. Of our own sources of intelligence we find that reports of military attaches and evaluations from the Scientific Branch, Intelligence Division of the Array give us the host useful information on biological warfare developments abroad. Reports of interrogations by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency both at home and abroad are becoming more numerous and helpful. If we get little information on the activities and intentions of the Soviets in biological warfare, we can at least estimate their poten- tialities by a study of Russian publications from which we can determine the scientists capable of such research and their changing activities, the institutions in which they are working and the trends of their work. From such information, which will be assembled by this Agency, with the help of its Foreign Documents Branch, useful inferences can be dram. For example, it is believed that the Soviets might hesitate to initiate open biological warfare because of present deficiencies in their medical and public health services; that is, in their potentialities for defense against our retaliation. We may expect Soviet sabotage, however, and, lacking reliable intelligence, we should prepare now to defend our most vulnerable crops and livestock and key personnel against agents to which our specialists believe they are particularly susceptible. ecurtity Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034026[=6 11 - 3 - Security Information The Ocold war" preparation of Russia might be slowed down in Rusnia, with regard to biological warfare, if we should supply Russia, at prices sufficiently low so that internal production was impractical, such biological preparations as serums, vaccines, penicillin, etc. This might deter them from the construction of productive plants for such materials. Such plants would be easily converted to biological warfare purposes and there has been recent inquiry by Russia concerning plant material for production of penicillin. Signed by hand 28 Mayl9L R. H. HILLENKOETTER Hear Admiral, USN Director of Central Intelligence +r B: ILC/Ict 1 - Secretary of National Defense 1 - Director of CIA 1 - Asst. Dir., 0I 1 - Chief, Scientific Branch, ORE 1 - Central Records 1 - Admiral Souers per phone call from Jean Gray - A.B. 1 - Secretary of State) ! l.",. Approved For RRlepse 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034RP'0d200080001-1 Chronology of Events in Whittaker Chambers Alger Hiss Case %! (,O v a- 00 >-o.'w F5 uiom~Q cS2 I-- Q, 1948 August Records of House Committee on Un-American Activities made public. 1949 January 8 Mr. Acheson said he had known the family - two Hiss boys - from childhood and he could vouch for them absolutely. May 6 Nixon questioned two hours re subversive activities. 2b1d , lst on denial he gave State Department documents to Chambers after January 1937; 2nd on denial he saw Chambers after January 1, 1937. July 9 Jury's final ballot - 8 for conviction and 4 for acquittal. July 10 Truman says he has never changed opinion that Un-American Activities Committee handling of case was "Red Herring" to distract public attention from 80th Congress blunders and crimes. Nixon criticized Judge Kaufman for barring testimony by Mrs. Massing and William Rosen. July his colleagues on House Committee on Un-American Activities that they "stay out of" any current espionage case being considered by a grand jury. After interview, Nixon said he thought his committee had done a great service through its public hearings on the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss controversy. Hiss was under indictment by a Federal grand jury in New York on perjury counts in connection with secret documents removed from State Department files in 1937 and 1938. Prosecutor Asst. U. S. Attorney Murphy calls witness on typewriter's possession by Catletts late in March 1938. C. M. Eiehelberger testified for Hiss as character witness. Thief in Far Eastern Division, State Dept, gave documents to Chambers.- r O Jury gets case - found guilitiy on two counts of perjury: CL, Cr 1950 January 21 Hiss brought to trial on account of perjury for denying m 1'd that he gave secret documents to Mr. Chambers, and charged perjury for denying that he had seen the ex-Communist after January 1, 1937. Second perjury trial - jury out 24 hours - reported verdict at 2:50 P.M. 5 years imprisonment and $2,000 fine on each account, or 10 years imprisonment and $Li,000. The government contended that the documents were passed in February and March 1938. ;,, 0CG'L-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1 Approved For lease 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034RpO400080001-1 2 1950 January 22 Acheson' friendship with Hiss - his friendship "was not easily given and is not easily withdrawn." A friend had the right to be considered innocent until he was proved guilty. Acheson never condoned crime for which Hiss was convicted. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1 Approved For Rd1eaae 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R0 2`00080001-1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 'lam cnac approved for r e LLE^` t ti7 ;C:': the, HiSTOR1 GZ L P1;VIE V PRO Gii.',AK . the Central In ell i c en.ce ena . Her S" - 2 Date__6 2 This is a TEMPORARY DOCI;Eo ~w ti only, for the use of DCi/HS. The record copy has been under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM. Date 6 ~'/ HRP g .- Z On 7 October 1950 I will relinquish the position of Director of Central Intelligence to Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, United States Army . I cannot depart without expressing to each individual member of this Agency my heartfelt appreciation and gratitude for the fine and loy- al support which I have received during the more than three years I have held my present office. We have experienced together the hard knocks, the real difficul- ties, and the successes involved in our mutual responsibilities, and I can say honestly that we have made very considerable progress together in a field beset by complexities and problems always inherent in pioneering a new field. I am sure that each of you will give to your new Director, General Smith, theesame loyal and vigorous support which I have received, and that the Central Intelligence Agency will continue to grow in capability and stature under his leadership. I wish continued success and happiness for each of you, and you may`bo sure that I will miss our association when I have gone. R. H. HILLENKOETTEB Rear Admiral, USN Director of Central Intelligence reM / pp ~~ A roved For Release 2005L12/23.; $3`=0i'O'34?406266WOOO1-1 rte- ~! App~B~d For R~le~se 2005/12/23 :CIA-RDP83-01034R~0~200080001-1 'II-IE WHITE HOUSE Washington April 30, 19~t7 r1y dear General Vandenberg: The Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army has requested your return to assume important and necessary duties 1,,ri.th the Army Air Forces. I regret losing you as the Director of Central Intelligence, but the reasons presentec~{n e are so cogent that l have acceded to his request. Your task has been exceptionally well performed, and all my good wishes go with you to your new post. I have directed Rear .Admiral Roscoe H. Hil].enkoetter This is 3 TEA4PORARY tC'~~I~ you as of Tlay 1, 19~t7 ? only, for the use of DCI/HS. The record copy has peen Very sincerely yours, released to Nattonai Archives under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM. pate 6 ~ 6 ~ i HRP g~ ~ Z-. /s/ Harry Truman Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg Director z~f Centro"1 Intelligence Washington 25, D. C. ( signed) John ri. White, Jr. JOHN Nl. WHITE, JR. Plajor, G5C y,~~~.r.~SY';tti :4:CY~' a:;:7.~~?i{S'~`9 '`.Cs:~ . "'.i7 ~i+.1~..~ 111 A7~t.JdS.d.le6f~ "-r?Y iL"!i Ci`ages . DATEt 28 May 1948 ND.t 22630/A LDCATIONe HS/HC-30 Item 5 BSTRACT In this report the DCI points out considerable concern re the USSR capaxlility in the field of biological warfare and the paucity of exist- ing information. He noted need to rely onjcaptured foreign documents a:nd an attache reports. 1 Suggested was a plan t o sell biological preparations to Russia at a p:rice~ so low. as to preclude their own manufacture which could actually ' bra preparation of agents for BW. [Darling History Transcript] , Approved For Release 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP83-010348000200080001-1 ei Z5~2$ iuiiiotTi~ re~vtovt HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET AREA AR COUMTRYIS) prov IC elea e~OQ~/r2/23: CIA-RDP83-01034R000.4>809BDOB1-1 ~+~.- Alger Hiss IDENTiFICATIOM OF OOCUNE "Ch,ronology? hittal~ ham of Events in Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss Case," ey; 2 pages. by Mrs. Hawl PATE: Aug 1948 - 22 .Tan 1950 IOCAT10Ni HS /HC-30 Z'his is a chronology of incidents in the trial of al~rll Alger Hiss for the charge of subversive activities. Hiss was charged with taking secret documents from State Department files in 193? and 1938 which he supposedly passed on to Chambers. Approved For R lease 2005/19/9 ? c:ln_RnPR~_n1n~dlannn~nnnQnnn~_~ FORM 252 ~? f~ ?tt~~ttt ?rt~l~~t ~ t~ITt~llt HISTORICAL~STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET ~ oa eounT~rtal Appointmen Personnel Hillenkoette~h 7 Oct 1950 Lt. Genl. Wal er B. Smith c~A~s.~ no class ' NO. r DENTIFICATiON OF DOCUMENT (~uther, torw, ~ddr~s~e~, title i 1~n/th) Letter from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence to employees of CIA; 1 page. LOCATtON+ HS/HC-30 /} _item 1 -~" `~It~ this letter Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter announces that he is re~~.i.nquiehing hie position as DCI to Lieutenant General 1lalter B. Smith effective ? October 1950. ' Darling History Transcript]. Approved For Release 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP83-010348000200080001-1 'ORM 2523 iis+T~e~~ -Rtr+OU? I. 69 HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET SECRET (llhsn Flllad In AREA OR COUNTRYIS) --_Hqs-- ' el I Whi e o e Arm a' tl T 00 s a ruman Lt Genl Ho t a n ___ __ R.Adm Roscoe OATEs 30 April '47 30 April '47 IH. Hillenkoettl~; IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (anther, lorw, addraaaea, ttt/a ? !en/!h) Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence; 1 page. Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Rear Admiral Roscoe TI. Hillenkoetter; 1 page , LOCATIONt HS/HC-30 ~-- Item 3 ~.~ In these letters President Truman tells Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg that the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army had asked for him to return to the service, and that Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter had been appointed the new Director of Central Intelligence, effective 1 M~y 1947: e same message is relayed to Adm. Hillenkoetter in a separate letter. [Darling History Transcripts] Approved For. Release 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP83-010348000200080001-1 ?~~ 2523 ~;; ~;;~; '"""?' ? ? H I STOR I CAL STAFF SOURCE i NDEI( SECRET ~ "' "' AREA 0~1 COUNtRTlS) ORBANIiATIOMf s rove Ham- Relea e - Manhattan Atomic Ener District Records OAt[+ l8 Feb 1947 c~ASS.+ no class NO.+ IDENTIF;,f'CIlT10N OF ODCUMENT (+++thor, forty, addrooaoo, tlt/o ? 1on/!A) Utter from~Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, to the Honorable David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; 1 page.- LOCATION: HS/HC-30.03 Item 2 = . In this letter Mr. Robert P. Patterson reveals the plans for trans- fer~ing the Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS) of the Manhattan District to'the Central Intelligence Group. [Darling History Transcript] A roved F FORM e~~e~eri -Re+r+~rs ? HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET lls?lil 2523 ? ,_.. e.+T1~11?