MEMORANDUM REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 6, 2005
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 28, 1948
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1.pdf | 614.85 KB |
Body:
Transcribed by FH for ABD
8 May 19 53
Aooroved For Release 2005/12/
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034R000200080001-1
8r .u ity Infosrr?.tinn
28 May 1948
MEMORANDUM REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Central Intelligence Agency has obtained only meager information
on current "biological warfare activities and intentions of our
potential enemies." We infer that the Soviets are engaged in research
and development on biological warfare for such reasons as the following:
1. Unclassified publications in the USA and Britain show that we
are engaged in research and development on biological warfare. For
example., an article by Jerome Feiner in the current issue of Harper's
Magazine discloses some of the biological agents on which we are working
and the place where the work is being done. One would expect the Soviets
to be developing defensive measures against these agents and to be
engaged in offensive search and development on agents against which
vie would be most vulnerable.
rv Cap'ired'erman "anA a anese dacurn titsindicat that the Soviets
tiere en ;aged in preparations for biological warfare during and before the
ar. It is probable that such work was continued after the war.
c?tI 3? There are several hundred scientists in the USSR whose published
bork in bacteriology, immunology, etc., indicates that they are capable
If developing agents for biological warfare.
I 4. Various scraps of information point in the same direction:
umors of biological warfare installations on islands in certain
oviet lakes; desire of the Soviets to purchase in the USA equipment
or the manufacture of penicillin - equipment which could be adapted
or the large-scale production of biological warfare agents; failure
-bf the Soviets to send delegates to the recent Congresses of Tropical
,`'Medicine and Malaria here in Washington.
We want to know, of course., whether the USSR has installations
devoted exclusively to research and development on biological warfare.
If they have a central military installation similar to our Camp Detrick,
it could be identified through esuionage by a combination of character-
istics given in our intelligence requirements. However, biological
warfare research can be conducted within laboratories normally devoted
to medical research. Such work would be almost impossible to distinguish
from legitimate biological and medical research. Pilot plant or large-
scale oroduction of biological warfare agents might be done in plants
that could not be distinguished., except by unusual security provisions.,
from plants in the legitimate pharmaceutical or fermentation industries.
Testing facilities for biological warfare munitions could not be so
easily concealed.
APPROVED F'~ ny
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Security : ;:,ati'o',
Apr-Release 200511 /23. IA-RDF?$3 " F d0 gGG8O001-
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It is of the greatest importance for us to know what agents
the Soviets are producing or are prepared to produce on a large scale.
Possible agents are so numerous that we cannot prepare specific defenses
against all of them. We should know whether the Soviets plan attack
against our crops and livestock as well as man and whether by sabotage
or open warfare. It seems to us that reliable answers to these questions
are ime ossible to obtain in peacetime unless we should have the good
fortune to find a disaffected Soviet scientist, intimately concerned
with the program, who is willing to disclose it. We do not count on
such a break, for scientists everywhere have shown that they can and
do abide by security regulations. The best we can do, therefore, is
to be sure that our intelligence renuirenents are understandable to
ceeratives not specially trained in biology and that they are properly
disseminated among those who might be in a position to get some of the
desired'information.
Dr. Wallace R. Brode, chief of our Scientific Branch, and, Professor
I. L. Baldwin, (airman of the Committee on Biological :Warfare, Research
and Development Board, recently flew to London to consult with British
authorities on biological warfare intelligence. We are assured of full
British cooperation in exchange of intelligence. The paucity of bi_c-
logical warfare intelligence from Russia was felt by the British and a
considerable portion of the discussion at this meeting dealt with this
subject. The British concur in the feeling that our best hope of specific
de'-ails is t'nru disclosure by Soviet personnel rather than infiltration
of our agents.
Of our own sources of intelligence we find that reports of military
attaches and evaluations from the Scientific Branch, Intelligence Division
of the Array give us the host useful information on biological warfare
developments abroad. Reports of interrogations by agents of the Central
Intelligence Agency both at home and abroad are becoming more numerous
and helpful.
If we get little information on the activities and intentions of
the Soviets in biological warfare, we can at least estimate their poten-
tialities by a study of Russian publications from which we can determine
the scientists capable of such research and their changing activities,
the institutions in which they are working and the trends of their work.
From such information, which will be assembled by this Agency, with the
help of its Foreign Documents Branch, useful inferences can be dram.
For example, it is believed that the Soviets might hesitate to initiate
open biological warfare because of present deficiencies in their medical
and public health services; that is, in their potentialities for defense
against our retaliation. We may expect Soviet sabotage, however, and,
lacking reliable intelligence, we should prepare now to defend our most
vulnerable crops and livestock and key personnel against agents to which
our specialists believe they are particularly susceptible.
ecurtity
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- 3 - Security Information
The Ocold war" preparation of Russia might be slowed down in Rusnia,
with regard to biological warfare, if we should supply Russia, at
prices sufficiently low so that internal production was impractical,
such biological preparations as serums, vaccines, penicillin, etc.
This might deter them from the construction of productive plants for
such materials. Such plants would be easily converted to biological
warfare purposes and there has been recent inquiry by Russia concerning
plant material for production of penicillin.
Signed by hand
28 Mayl9L
R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Hear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
+r B: ILC/Ict
1 - Secretary of National Defense
1 - Director of CIA
1 - Asst. Dir., 0I
1 - Chief, Scientific Branch, ORE
1 - Central Records
1 - Admiral Souers per phone call from Jean Gray - A.B.
1 - Secretary of State)
! l.",.
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Chronology of Events in Whittaker Chambers Alger Hiss Case
%! (,O
v a-
00
>-o.'w
F5
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cS2
I-- Q,
1948
August Records of House Committee on Un-American Activities made
public.
1949
January 8 Mr. Acheson said he had known the family - two Hiss boys -
from childhood and he could vouch for them absolutely.
May 6 Nixon questioned two hours re subversive activities. 2b1d
,
lst on denial he gave State Department documents to Chambers
after January 1937; 2nd on denial he saw Chambers after
January 1, 1937.
July 9 Jury's final ballot - 8 for conviction and 4 for acquittal.
July 10 Truman says he has never changed opinion that Un-American
Activities Committee handling of case was "Red Herring" to
distract public attention from 80th Congress blunders and
crimes.
Nixon criticized Judge Kaufman for barring testimony
by Mrs. Massing and William Rosen.
July
his colleagues on House Committee on Un-American Activities
that they "stay out of" any current espionage case being
considered by a grand jury. After interview, Nixon said
he thought his committee had done a great service through
its public hearings on the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss
controversy.
Hiss was under indictment by a Federal grand jury in New
York on perjury counts in connection with secret documents
removed from State Department files in 1937 and 1938.
Prosecutor Asst. U. S. Attorney Murphy calls witness on
typewriter's possession by Catletts late in March 1938.
C. M. Eiehelberger testified for Hiss as character witness.
Thief in Far Eastern Division, State Dept, gave documents
to Chambers.-
r
O Jury gets case - found guilitiy on two counts of perjury:
CL,
Cr
1950
January 21 Hiss brought to trial on account of perjury for denying
m
1'd
that he gave secret documents to Mr. Chambers, and charged
perjury for denying that he had seen the ex-Communist after
January 1, 1937. Second perjury trial - jury out 24 hours -
reported verdict at 2:50 P.M. 5 years imprisonment and $2,000
fine on each account, or 10 years imprisonment and $Li,000.
The government contended that the documents were passed in
February and March 1938.
;,, 0CG'L-1
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1950
January 22 Acheson' friendship with Hiss - his friendship "was not
easily given and is not easily withdrawn." A friend
had the right to be considered innocent until he was
proved guilty. Acheson never condoned crime for which
Hiss was convicted.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
'lam cnac
approved for r e LLE^` t ti7 ;C:':
the, HiSTOR1 GZ L P1;VIE V PRO Gii.',AK .
the Central In ell i c en.ce ena .
Her S" - 2
Date__6 2
This is a TEMPORARY DOCI;Eo ~w ti
only, for the use of DCi/HS.
The record copy has been
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
Date 6 ~'/ HRP g .- Z
On 7 October 1950 I will relinquish the position of Director of
Central Intelligence to Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, United States
Army .
I cannot depart without expressing to each individual member of
this Agency my heartfelt appreciation and gratitude for the fine and loy-
al support which I have received during the more than three years I have
held my present office.
We have experienced together the hard knocks, the real difficul-
ties, and the successes involved in our mutual responsibilities, and I
can say honestly that we have made very considerable progress together in
a field beset by complexities and problems always inherent in pioneering
a new field.
I am sure that each of you will give to your new Director, General
Smith, theesame loyal and vigorous support which I have received, and
that the Central Intelligence Agency will continue to grow in capability
and stature under his leadership.
I wish continued success and happiness for each of you, and you
may`bo sure that I will miss our association when I have gone.
R. H. HILLENKOETTEB
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
reM / pp ~~
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rte- ~!
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'II-IE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
April 30, 19~t7
r1y dear General Vandenberg:
The Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army has requested
your return to assume important and necessary duties 1,,ri.th
the Army Air Forces. I regret losing you as the Director
of Central Intelligence, but the reasons presentec~{n e are
so cogent that l have acceded to his request. Your task
has been exceptionally well performed, and all my good
wishes go with you to your new post.
I have directed Rear .Admiral Roscoe H. Hil].enkoetter
This is 3 TEA4PORARY tC'~~I~ you as of Tlay 1, 19~t7 ?
only, for the use of DCI/HS.
The record copy has peen Very sincerely yours,
released to Nattonai Archives
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
pate 6 ~ 6 ~ i HRP g~ ~ Z-.
/s/ Harry Truman
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Director z~f Centro"1 Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
( signed) John ri. White, Jr.
JOHN Nl. WHITE, JR.
Plajor, G5C
y,~~~.r.~SY';tti :4:CY~' a:;:7.~~?i{S'~`9 '`.Cs:~ . "'.i7
~i+.1~..~ 111 A7~t.JdS.d.le6f~ "-r?Y iL"!i Ci`ages .
DATEt
28 May 1948
ND.t
22630/A
LDCATIONe
HS/HC-30
Item 5
BSTRACT
In this report the DCI points out considerable concern re the USSR
capaxlility in the field of biological warfare and the paucity of exist-
ing information. He noted need to rely onjcaptured foreign documents
a:nd an attache reports. 1
Suggested was a plan t o sell biological preparations to Russia at a
p:rice~ so low. as to preclude their own manufacture which could actually
' bra preparation of agents for BW.
[Darling History Transcript] ,
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ei Z5~2$ iuiiiotTi~ re~vtovt
HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET
AREA AR COUMTRYIS)
prov IC elea e~OQ~/r2/23: CIA-RDP83-01034R000.4>809BDOB1-1
~+~.-
Alger Hiss
IDENTiFICATIOM OF OOCUNE
"Ch,ronology?
hittal~ ham
of Events in Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss Case,"
ey; 2 pages.
by Mrs. Hawl
PATE:
Aug 1948 -
22 .Tan 1950
IOCAT10Ni
HS /HC-30
Z'his is a chronology of incidents in the trial of
al~rll Alger Hiss for the charge of subversive activities. Hiss was
charged with taking secret documents from State Department files in
193? and 1938 which he supposedly passed on to Chambers.
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FORM 252
~? f~
?tt~~ttt ?rt~l~~t ~
t~ITt~llt
HISTORICAL~STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET
~ oa eounT~rtal
Appointmen
Personnel
Hillenkoette~h 7 Oct 1950
Lt. Genl. Wal er
B. Smith c~A~s.~
no class
' NO. r
DENTIFICATiON OF DOCUMENT (~uther, torw, ~ddr~s~e~, title i 1~n/th)
Letter from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of
Central Intelligence to employees of CIA; 1 page.
LOCATtON+
HS/HC-30 /}
_item 1 -~"
`~It~ this letter Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter announces that he is
re~~.i.nquiehing hie position as DCI to Lieutenant General 1lalter B. Smith
effective ? October 1950. '
Darling History Transcript].
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'ORM 2523 iis+T~e~~ -Rtr+OU?
I. 69
HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET
SECRET (llhsn Flllad In
AREA OR COUNTRYIS)
--_Hqs--
' el
I
Whi e o e
Arm a'
tl T 00
s a
ruman
Lt Genl Ho t
a n
___ __ R.Adm Roscoe
OATEs
30 April '47
30 April '47
IH. Hillenkoettl~;
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (anther, lorw, addraaaea, ttt/a ? !en/!h)
Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Lieutenant General
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence; 1 page.
Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Rear Admiral Roscoe
TI. Hillenkoetter; 1 page ,
LOCATIONt
HS/HC-30 ~--
Item 3 ~.~
In these letters President Truman tells Lieutenant General Hoyt S.
Vandenberg that the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army had asked for him
to return to the service, and that Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
had been appointed the new Director of Central Intelligence, effective
1 M~y 1947:
e same message is relayed to Adm. Hillenkoetter in a separate letter.
[Darling History Transcripts]
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?~~ 2523 ~;; ~;;~; '"""?' ? ? H I STOR I CAL STAFF SOURCE i NDEI( SECRET ~ "' "'
AREA 0~1 COUNtRTlS) ORBANIiATIOMf
s rove Ham- Relea e -
Manhattan Atomic Ener
District Records
OAt[+
l8 Feb 1947
c~ASS.+
no class
NO.+
IDENTIF;,f'CIlT10N OF ODCUMENT (+++thor, forty, addrooaoo, tlt/o ? 1on/!A)
Utter from~Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, to the
Honorable David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission; 1 page.-
LOCATION:
HS/HC-30.03
Item 2 = .
In this letter Mr. Robert P. Patterson reveals the plans for trans-
fer~ing the Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS) of the Manhattan District
to'the Central Intelligence Group.
[Darling History Transcript]
A roved F
FORM e~~e~eri -Re+r+~rs ? HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET lls?lil
2523 ?
,_.. e.+T1~11?