I.ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1946
• Content Type: CHART

A. TYPE OF
OPERATION
I. 4CTIVITP:; CHF'FIY OUT;IV
Ap?mami For-Keleammr20
C. MISSION ANO EXTFNT
CAk-LIED OUT
B. ,v1"NCY EN-,ACED
THERE IN
THE UNITED STATES.
-11'; I I ,'III II 11
01-3 .
. TYPE OF COORDINATION
E. KNOA4 FUTURE FLANS
Clandestine
operations
X-2 / OSS
Responsible for completeC.E
information under JCS
Directive concerning
efforts of other powers
in Eastern Henisphere
directed clandestinely
against U.j. (and against
one anothel. in areas where
U.S. has an interest) by
means of espionage, pro-
paganda and subversion.
To accomplish the mission,
operations were carried on
In ormat on secure fro
all usual source S includ-
ing secret agents, double
agents, penetrations,Ultra
material, an from liaison
.ith o,her American secur-
ity arencies and with our
Allies. Agency not exec-
utive. Information assem-
3.ed, analyzed & eveluPted
turned over to Stale '
p ..rmy
NaVy,F9I,Treasury,etc. for
action. Operated in East-
ern Hendsphere solely.
Because of lack of repre-
sentation, due to Mac
Arthur's prohibition
against OSS, severely
handicapped in Far East
operations.
Maintained close liaison
with 6tate:.FRI: Army; Navy;
all Treasury security agen-
cies-(i777ureau of Nar-
cotics, Secret Service, For-
eign Funds control, bureau
of Customs, zureau of inter-
nal Revenue); Justice (in-
cluding FBI, ET-s-777Tien
Control Division & the
Alien Registration branch);
FEh for smujing of etra-
tegic commodities (e.g.
industrial diakionds); Pro-
vost Marsnal General; TiVil
Affairs: jar Shipping Ta=--
iiiEntaition; Office of
-censorship. Maintained
'close liaison with Allied
counterparts and certain
Security branches of neu-
tral governments. Coordinat-
ed all C.L. activities with
the Armies in ETO through
the SHAEF Arar AOOM (made up
of X-2 personnel, La-5 &
Sec. 5. of and French
C.E. representatives; di-
rect lines of communications
with Armies and Amy Groups
were maintained).
In the Office of t e Under
tary of Aar
main-
taining 501 persdhnel in
various Army Zones; main-
taining 4ashington Staff
for analysis of C.13. trends.
and activities; maintain-
ing liaison officers with
the occupation Armies;
maintaining central files
of enemy subversive per-
sonalities.
This document has been
approved for release through
e HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ol
fs Central Intelligence Agency.
Date
CONAN par- a
F.B.I.(Justice)
App
Executive law enforce -
?ovedif CIA.
similar to X-2 but limit-
ed to operations in West-
Maintained close liaison
RIY0-61S-0Y093411'06
liaison with all other-3
Security agencies. Main-
Nill maintain liaison re-
presentatives in various
European countries, one
representative in each
A. TYPE C B. AGENCY ENGAGE#PP
OPERATION THEREIN
II. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY 41THIA ThN UNITLU iii
ovifi FitosjesspOcgritas :
CARRIED OUT
E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
STATE DEPART-
MENT OPERATIONS
Office of Controls
(formerly operation-
al controls). During
the war Adolf Berle
T;as Chief. At pre-
sent Fredk.B. Lyon
is Acting Chief.
Mr. Lyon was Chief
of Foreign Activi-
ties Branch during
the War. (See Sec-
tion C) and during
General Holmes'
tenure as Asst.
Secy. was Assist.
to General Holmes
in addition to his
other jbbs.
The following branches
are in the Office of Con-
trols which during the
'Aar had, among other
things, overall secur-
ity responsibility in
the State Department;
Security problems of all types
from the originating agencies
(X-2, FBI, Army, Navy, Censor-
ship, etc.) were steered thru
the Department and,upon occas-
ion to Embassies and Consul-
ates for action.
1. Passport Division - responsible for issuance of pass-
ports in the broadest meaning of the phrase.
2. Visa Division - responsible for assembly and correla..
tion of information necessary to determine the admissibil-
ity of aliens into the U.S. in the interest of public
safety, and national security.
3. Special War Piroblems Division - special problems con-
cerning citizens abroad - is,, whereabouts, welfare and
transmission of funds to citizens abroad, evacuation and
repatriation of citizens abroad, etc.
4. Foreign Activities Correlation - presumably for
curity reasons, operated under the following loose
directive: "Responsible for inittion and coordination of
policy and action in all matters relating to foreign
activities and operations". Among its .responsibilities
were the handling of Security matEu.as they related to
foreign service personnel and to rs6nnel employed in
lace in t e world by t e De rtment.
ranch, because it was in the Same
division, an ecause its chief also was Assistant to
the Chief of the Office of Controls, was able by con-
trolling the use of passports, visas and exits, to ef-
fectively control movements of many individuals in
certain counter-espionage cases. However, many aspects
0;401.1. work were incohpletely handled. Almost never
advised other agencies (or at least the working eche-
lons) of policies and instructions to missions in ad-
vance. With more trained personnel and clearer oper-
ating directives, a better job would have been done.
Plans to continue to
handle the State Depart-
merit Security job, within
Office of Controls, NOT
within the new intelligenc
set-up.
Fro y"..
ARMY
OPERATIONS
C. I .0 .
Approveild?0eRalease]M5142431: CIA-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3
investigative functions
transferred to A.S.F.
Continues operations in
certain service commands.
A. TYPE OF
OPERATION
Ap
B. ,v1ENCY E.NE,ACED
THEREIN
I. ACTIVITIE:3 CHIEF1Y OUT1IDE THE UNITED STATS.
roveciFo
I ? ? via IBM 111.4.1.
? 11 . 11 WA ?
C. MIS3ION AND EXTFNT
CAR-IIED OUT
01-3,
. TYPE OF CO0i-tDINATION
E. KNON FUTURE 'FLANS
Clandestine
operations
X-2 / 03S
Responsible for completeC.E
information under JCS
Directive concerning
efforts of other powers
in Eastern Heffisphere
directed clandestinely
against U.. (and against
one anothev in areas where
U.S. has an interest) by
means of espionage, pro-
paganda and subversion.
To accomplish the mission,
_operations were carried on
under State Dept. cover in
'ural areas and with the
Armies under name of
(Special counter-intelli-
gence) in the various the-
aters(except MacArthur's
Information secured fro
all usual sources includ-
ing secret agents, double
agents, penetrations,Ultra,
material, an,; from liaison
.ith oher American secur-
ity agencies and with our
Allies. Agency not exec-
utive. Information assent-
led, analyzed & eveluFted
turned over to State, Army
NaVy,F9I,Treasury,etc. for
action. Operated in East-
ern Hemisphere. solely.
Because of lack of repre-
sentation, due to Mac
Arthur's prohibition
against OSS, severely
handicapped in Far East
operations.
Maintained close liaison
with state:. FBI: Army; NavY;
all Treasury security agen-
cies (i.e. :sureau of Nar-
co:Acs, Secret Service, For-
eign Funds Control, bureau
of Customs, bureau of inter-
nal Revenue); Justice (in-
cluding FBI, ;,;nemy Alien
Control Division & the
Alien Registration branch);
FEA for smuLling of Stra-
tegic commodities (e.g.
industrial diamonds); Iro-
vost Marshal General; 71711
Affairs: ',Air :Shipping Ad-
ministration; Office of
- Censorship. Maintained'
close liaison with Allied
counterparts and certain
Security branches of neu-
tral governments. Coordinat-
ed all C.E. activities with
the Armies in EIO through
the SHAEF Afar Room (made up
of X-2 personnel, la-5 &
Sec. 5 of 11-6, and French
C.E. representatives; di-
rect lines of communications
with Armies and Any Groups
were maintained).
In the Office of the Under
Seeretary of irar,tmain-
taining X-2 representatives
under State covers;Imain-
taining SCI persdnhel in
various Army Zones; main-
taining ',4ashington Staff
for analysis of C.I. trends
and activities; maintain-
ing liaison oCficers with
the occupation Armies;
maintaihing central files
of enemy subversive per-
sonalities,
rrowt i)ekoe j
F.B.I.(Justice)
Executive law enforce -
ApprovedtFargRelgasfi2flOSA.12128n CI
similar to X-2 but limit-
ed to operations in Nest-
Maintained close liaison
RDIR8B-04.03421R0U020111246061 -3
liaison with all other
Security agencies. Main-
Nill maintain liaison re-
presentatives in various
European countries, one
representative in each
Approvih*Folliagbadtaidabilig20001-3
A. TYPE OF B. AGENCY ENGAGED
OPERATION THEREIN
STATE DEPART-
MENT OPERATIONS
Office of Controls
(formerly operation-
a). controls). During
the war Adolf Berle
Chief. At pre-
sent Fredk.B. Lyon
is Acting Chief.
Mr. Lyon was Chief
of Foreign Activi-
ties Branch during
the War. (See Sec-
tion C) and during
General Holmes'
tenure as Asst.
Secy. was Assist.
to General Holmes
in addition to his
other jobs.
C. MISSION AND EXTENT D. TYPE OF COORDINATION
CARRIED OUT
The following branches
are in the Office of Con-
trols which during the
'Aar had, among other
things, overall secur-
ity responsibility in
the State Department:
Security problems of all types
from the originating agencies
(X-2, FBI, Army, Navy, Censor-
ship, etc.) were steered thru
the Department and ..upon occas-
ion to Embassies and Consul-
ates for action.
1. Passport Division - responsible for issuance of pass-
ports in the broadest meaning of the phrase.
2. Visa Division - responsible for assembly and correla-
tion of information necessary to determine the admissibil-
ity of aliens into the U.S. in the interest of public
safety, and national security.
3. Special War Problems Division - special problems con-
cerning citizens abroad - i.e?, whereabouts, welfare and
transmission of funds to citizens abroad, evacuation and
repatriation of citizens abroad, etc.
4. Foreign Activities Correlation - presumably for se-
curity reasons, operated under the following loose
directive: "Responsible for iniation and coordination of
policy and action in all matters relating to foreign
activities and operations". Among its responsibilities
were the handling of security mat as they related to
foreign service personnel and torPersBnnel employed in
any place in the world by the Department. is divi-
sion was also responsible for State cover granted to
033, FBI, etc[ This branch, because it was in the same
division, an ecause its chief also was Assistant to
the Chief of the Office of Controls, was able by con-
trolling the use of passports, visas and exits, to ef-
fectively control movements of many individuals in
certain counter-espionage cases. However, many aspects
of C.I. work were incohpletely handled. Almost never
advised other agencies (or at least the working eche-
lons) of policies and instructions to missions in ad-
vance. With more trained personnel and clearer oper-
ating directives, a better job would have been done.
E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
Plana to continue to
handle the State Depart-
ment Security job, within
Office of Controls, NOT
within the new intelligenci
set-up.
rvvyyL ekiae_
ARMY
OPERATIONS
C.I.C.
After Jail, 1 1944 all
ApprovercPW4ip6rMS11.1A-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3
, rans erre o . . .
Continues operations in
certain service commands.
sEctrT coNF PEST
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cEsm4 TaTtLLIaNcE GPOTIP
czNTpl?g, PLAN Tga STAFF
Date
taciosure:
att. 1-
? ?y:
To For:
PlaPninZ Note and Return
inf)rmetion
Deputy ' File
Pev. & Policy Recommend routing
Securl,ty
Support
or reference
Neceosary Action
Comment
Recommendntion
Steno . Prepare CIG Action
Secy, NIA Review
Reports Staff Suspenoe File
44J,,Off,Qe.r
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A ove lease 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01 34 00200240001-3
SZCRW CONF BE. -
F'or : Alfre(i VcCormack Approved ForRelease 2005/M 1034R000200240001-3
From: Lt. Thomas 4. Dunn, USNR
OUTLINE OF AMERICAN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-ESPIONAGE & SECURITY ACTIVITIES
710RID NAR II
The following outline indicates briefly in a general eay the activities of the various American Counter-
intelligence, Counter-Espionage and Security Agencies which operated during the war.
The outline is divided into two sections:
I. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.
II. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.
For the purposes of speedy assimilation of the types of C.I.,* C.E.,* and Security* activities and the agencies engaged
therein, the following categories have been adopted: A. Type of Operation; B. Agency or Agencies engaged therein; C. brief
Description of Agency's Mission and Extent carried out; 0. Type of Coordination of Agency's Activities with other Agencies
enraged in C.I., C.E. or Security Work; E. Known plans of Agency for Future Operations.
That American C.I., C.E. and Security efforts were anything but centrally directed or controlled will be obvious from the
following outline. Neither were officers, experienced and trained in counter-intelligence work engaged in planning at the
top or policy levels of the various agencies, with the possible exception of the FLI. Finally, a confusion concerning the
objectives and techniques of counter-intelligence as opposed to Positive Intelligence existed in the minis of many in the
intelligence field not intimately familiar with the details of C.I. work. Objectives, methods, training and personnel
selection are very different from those used in the field of positive intelligence.
The lack of central direction is particularly acute today since the various agencies engaged in C.I. work no longer have the
obvious German and Japanese targets.
It is not the purpose of this paper to suggest a pan for American Counter-Intelligence and Security effort, but rather to
set down briefly the wealth of experience already gained and to indicate where this experience can be found, in order that it
may not be overlooked when such planninp is undertaken. Obviously, in addition to the experiences of the agencies and per-
sonell in the agencies outlined below, consideration should be given to the experiences of other nations, particularly the
British, concerning whose systems and methods we have full and detailed information.
A. TYPE OF B. AGENCY ENGAGED
OPERATION THEREIN
I. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATS.
C. MISSION AND EXTENT
CARRIED OUT
. TYPE OF COORDINATION
E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
Clandestine
operations
X-2 / OSS
Responsible for completeC.S.
information under JCS
Directive concerning
efforts of other powers
in Eastern Heaisphere
directed clandestinely
against U.j. (and against
one another in areas where
U.S. has an interest) by
means of espionage, pro-
paganda and subversion.
'lb accomplish the mission,
operations were carried on
uneer State Dept. cover in
neuural areas and with the
armies under name of a.C.I,
(Special counter-intelli-
gence) in the various the-
aters(except MacArthur's).
Information secured from
all usual sources includ-
ing secret agents, double
avente, penetrations, Ultra
material, ani from liaison
ith oher American secur-
ity avencies and with our
Allies. Agency not exec-
utive. Information assem-
-led, analyzed & evaLueted
turned over to State, Army
Navy,FBI,Tteasury,etc. for
action. Operated in East-
ern Hemisphere solely.
Because of lack of repre-
sentation, due to Use
Arthur's prohibition
against OSS, severely
handicapped in Far East
operations.
Maintained close liaison
with State: FBI: Army; Navy;
all Treasury secuTnaT agen-
cies-(177-73ureau of Nar-
coAcs, Secret Service, For-
eign Funds Control, Bureau
of Customs, eureau of Inter-
nal Revenue); Justice (in-
cluding FBI, .127iTY-71ien
Control Division & the
Alien Registration eranch);
FEA for -smuggling of etre-
tic commodities (e.g.
industrial diamonds); Pro-
vost Marsnal General; Mil
Affairs: Ar Shipping i7=--
MIETTETation; Office of
Censorship. Maintained'
close liaison with Allied
counterparts and certain
Security branches of neu-
tral governments. Coordinat-
ed all C.E. activities with
the Armies in ETO through
the SHAKE War Room (made up
of X-2 personnel, T.',1-5 &
Sec. 5 of id-6, and French
C.E. representatives; di-
rect lines of communication
with Armies and Amy Groups
were maintained).
In the Office of the Under
Seeretary of War, main-
taining X-2 representatives
under State covers; main-
taining SCI personnel in
various Army Zones; main-
taining Washington jtaff
for analysis of C.I. trends
and activities; maintain-
ing liaison officers with
the occupation Armies;
maintaining central files
of enemy subversive per-
sonalities.
tk..
J .
F.B.I.(Justice)
Executive law enforce-
ment agency with mission
similar to X-2 but limit-
ed to operations in West-
ern Hemisphere. Mission
in Central & South Amer-
ica operated under tri-
partite agreement with
American Intelligence Ser-
vice (for description see
paragraph under U.S.Army)
and Navy. FBI jurisdic-
tion included enemy ag-
ents, couriers and enemy
transmitters and was di-
rected at repression
rather than at the long-
er recipe objectives of
counter-intelligence.
Generally considered to
have done first-class
repressive job particu-
larly in the U.S.
Mission in North America
shared with other agen-
cies (Army, Navy, etc.)
Maintained close liaison
with State. Maintained
liaison with all other
Security agencies. Main--
tained liaison officers
with the various theaters
of military operation dur-
ing latter period of war
to gather information
particularly on renegade
Americans for prosecution
in U.S. by Justice. Lia-
ison relations generally
considered poor by most
other agencies dealing
with FBI. Reason: No gen-
eral exchange of C.I. or
C.E. information by FBI;
too much publicity on
security matters brought
to FBI attention by other
agencies; FBI prone to en-
gape in jurisdictional
disputes at all levels.
Liaison with British bet-
ter in most respecLs than
with American Agencies.
Nil maintain liaison re-
presentatives in various
European countries, one
representative in each
Embassy in Central and South
America at least until
June 30, 1946. Will continue
internal security activities
in U. S.
* Footnote: Because of the tendency in Intelligence circles to confuse the terms "Counter-Intelligence", "Counter- Espionage"
and "Security", the following definitions explain their use in this memorandum: (It is realized that these definitions are some-
what arbitrary -- that C.I. encompasses C.E. and both, in the larger sense, are practised to obtain National Security. However,
in ordinary "intelligence" parlance, the word "Security" while ueed in its broadest sense to mean National Security, is commonly
used in the narrowest sense outlined below).
1. Counter-Interneence: all efforts to neutralize, repress or eliminate the activity of enemy, inimical, or other persons,
groups or governments or their representatives to secure intelligence, the obtaining of which would adversely affect the na-
tional security.
(continued as Footnote - page 2)
Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-011011012 ET
ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUT3IDE Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3
THE UNITE) STA2ES, continued:
A. TYPE OF
OPERATION
B. AGENCY ENGAGED I C. MISSION AND EXTENT
THERM I CARRIED OUT
D. TYPE OF COORDINATION
PAGE 2
E. KNO6N FUTURE PLANS
Radio 1. Naval Communica-
Intelligence tions (delegated
to Coast Guard)
2. FBI - certain
categories
3. Army Signal
Corps (through
G-2)
4. British
Procurement of clandes-
tine material under agree-
ment of June 30, 1942, was
the responsibility of
Naval Communications (del-
egated to the Coast Guard)
and the FBI with general
agreements as to area of
origination. Further gen-
eral agreements were made
with certain of our
Allies as to area respon-
sibility. Handling con-
sidered HIGHLY UNSATIS-
FACTORY by counter-espion-
age agencies. Both Army &
Navy communications were
dictateirial in establish-
ing priorities and in al-
locating material. For
further information see
separate memorandum of
different classification.
Liaison on clandestine mater-
ial virtually non-existent on
American aide. Close liaison
with all interested agencies
on this material by British.
Awaiting settlement of
jurisdictional intell-
igence questions.
U. S. ARWY
Operations
In Military Thea-
ters: C.I.* under
G-2. (i.e. Counter-
intelligence)
Organization as follows:
G-2
C.I.
S.C.I. C.I.C.
A. C.I.C. under the C.I.
is an operational rather
than a staff intelligence
activity. Its mission is
Excellent liaison on S.C.I.
level through G-2, C.I.
with all other agencies be-
cause of link with Air Room
in London. Virtually no co-
ordination (due probably to
theater responsibility) lia-
ison between C.I.C. groups
from one theater to another.
Much excellent field work on
part of C.I.C. was thus lost.
to provide effective C.E.,
counter-sabotage and counter-subversive security for units
to which it was assigned WITHIN a theater. The C.I.C. is
the executive security arm and responsible for all general
security work in the theater. However, lacking central
coordination, name files and research facilities, it was
found necessary to set up S.C.I. units (Special counter-
intelligence) staffed by X-2 representatives.
B. S.C.I., is responsible for handling of all controlled
enemy agents (A/T) in theater, and for carrying out much
penetration and all double agent activity. Advised and
assisted C.I. authorities in apprehension and interroga-
tion of enemy intelligence personnel, on the basis of
S.C.I.'s exclusive access to Ultra material.
As compared to C.I.C. operations in Europe and the
Middle East, results were poor in Far East. No S.C.I.
activity in Far East.
S.C.I. work has been com-
bined with the work of
the C.I.'s office. No
central control or files
above miliLary zone level.
In Neutral Areas:
MILITARY ATTACHE
Military Attache did lim-
ited counter-espionage
work. This work ordinar-
ily delegated to X-2 re-
presentative in Eastern
Hemisphere and Legal At-
tache in Western Hemis-
phere.
Generally good liaison with
X-2, FBI, Naval Attaches &
with other Allied repre-
sentatives.
Awaiting coordinated
intelligence plans.
In South America:
AMERICAN INTELLI-
GENCE SERVICE
Responsible for all enemy
subversive efforts directed
at War Department plans, pol
icies, physical installations
et. In tri-partite agree-
ment with FBI - did not con-
sider its primary mission
to be directed against agents
but inevitably had to work
against enemy agents to
carry out its mission, hence
overlapping of operations
with FBI. Operation di-
rected from kiwi, Florida.
Maintained large central
files of subversive persona
or those suspected of sub-
version.
Good liaison with FBI and
Navy.
Service ceased in January
1944. Operation turned
over to M.A.
Files returned to Who's
Who Branch, G-2 War De-
partment, Washington.
* Footnote: continued from page 1.
2. Counter-Espionage: All efforts to neutralize, repress or eliminate the practice of spying or employment of secret
agents by enemy, inimical, or other persons, groups or governments affecting the interests of the United States.
3. Security: In its narrow sense, used to mean all efforta to shield or guard aeainst the disloyalty or active es-
pionage of, or sabotage or subversive efforts on the part of, any persons in or connected with U. S. establishments,
installations, plants, factories, etc. and to insure the physical protection of such persons, plants or factories from
espionage, sabotage or subversive activity.
Approved For Release IA4DP8t411
ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE 04:11MigtkPIFP,elftStfilgiaWi8/f12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3
A. TYPE OF B. AGENCY ENGAGED
OPERATION THEREIN
U. S. Navy
Operations
C.I.
Combined Al-
lied Effort
Fleet Commands:
STAFF INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICER.
C. MISSION AND EXTENT
CARRIED OUT
In many instances had
Security Officer handl-
ing C.I. work, particu-
larly in Amphibious
operations. Navy policy,
however, is to turn over
all Security and C.I. work
to an Army G-2 wherever
possible. This in turn
usually is aFsigned to
local C.I.E.
Rear Echelons and Base
operations ordinarily have
Security Officer.
D. TYPE OF COORDINATION
Decentralized operation.
Studies, manuals, name
information provided and
coordinated by Domestic
Branch (D) through ONI
channels. Good liaison
usually with local C.I.C..
Intelligence officers in
the Fleet Command working
on securityltrained and
administered by ONI but
not directly responsible
to ONI.
PAGE 3,
E. KNOPIN FUTURE PLANS.
Awaiting new coordinated
intelligence plans.
Neutral Areas:
NAVAL ATTACHE
Some C.I. work done at
the request of Domestic
Branch (D) ONI (formerly
Op-16-B). Sometimes
shared work and responsi-
bility with Intelligence
Unit of Staff of nearest
fleet. N.A.'s & N.O.B.'s
early in Ole war initiat-
ed C.I. work in South
America before FBI was in
the field.
Channeled C.I. informa-
tion through F.Branch
ONI to D. Branch. Rela-
tions with N.A.'s gener-
ally considered unsatis-
factory by C.I. Branch (D)
because of N.A.'s respon-
sibility to F. Branch. ,
Maintained where necess-
ary liaison with other
American, Allied and neu-
tral C.I. and security
organisations.
Awaiting new coordinated
intelligence plans.
Domestic Branch
(D) ONI
(Formerly Op-16-B)
SHAEF 1AR ROOM
dhile located in dashing-
ton, this Branch provided
the research facilities
for Naval C.I. work. Many
of the studies prepared by
this Branch eventually
turned over to CIC since
CIC often served as exec-
utive arm. Agency well
staffed and did excellent
0.1. job though severely
limited by indirect con-
tact with sources and ac-
tion agencies in field.
Maintained liaison with
all security agencies, but
provided for no adequate
exchange of counter-
intelligence.
The Counter-Intelligence War Room, London, was an into.
grated Anglo-American organization with united French
participation; it operated under general authority of
SHUT from its inception (1 March 1945) until dissolu-
tion of .;HAEF (July 1945) and since later date is di-
rectly controlled by the three contributing agencies:
MI-5, MI-6 and 033/X-2. C.I. RJom has been cen-
tral information and advisory agency directly servic-
ing British, U.S. and French counter-intelligence au-
thorities in Germany and Austria with ihformation,
reports nnd recommendations on personnel and operations
of German Intelligence Services. In Summer 1945 had
maximum staff of 200 people.
&lila awaiting new intel-
ligence plans, contract-
ing operations. Event-
ually during peace period
D will probably be siLply
a staff operation.
Now reduced to lieuidation
basis of about 25 people.
Deception
Corbined Al-
lied Effort
Department
of State
Operations
212 Committee
Nothing known of
similar activities
under idacArthur.
Chief of i4ssion
212 Committee - Mission and Accomplishment. 212 Com-
mittee was organized August 1944 by deception author-
ities of 21 AG and 12 AG in order to: (1) Approve
all materials ent out by CEA's (controlled enemy ag-
ents) in the theater (except the UK where this func-
tion was handled by the XX Committee or Committee of
Twenty as it was 6eneral1y known). (2) Jirect de-
ception policy for the traffic of CEA's. (3) Author-
ize the use of CEA's for particular operations.
Meeting weekly or fortnightly until end of war, the
Committee eventually became little more than a clear-
ing house for discussions of CEA problems. It rare-
ly offered deception directives, and its function as
approving authority for deception material gradually
disappeared.
212 Committee - Coordination with other Agencies.
212 Committee, originally composed only of deception
authorities of the Army Groups and the chief CEA of-
ficers of British and American SCI, was eventually
enlarged to embrace all British and American agen-
cies interested in CEA matters in the ETO (including
ANCXF (with links to thc Admiralty); AEAF (with
links to the Air ..inistry); G-2 and G-3 of SHAEF
(with links to the XX Committee); G-2 and G-3 of
12 AG; I(b) and G(R) of 21 AG; and G-3 of 6 AC as
well as SHAEF CE War Room) and from all three Amy
Groups. The French, however, were never allowed to
participate in the deliberations of the Committee.
Coordinated all intelli-
gence anu security in
neutral countries. In
the Eastern Hemisphere
ordinarily delegated the
C.E. work to the X-2 re-
presentative; in Central
and South America dele-
eated C.E. work to Legal
Attache.
In most instances (with
few outstanding excep-
tions) liaison was pas-
sive and would scarcely
be called thorough.
Operations closed down
when SHAEF dissolved.
Policy continues as out-
lined in Column "C".
, '-i.44;:- 4-!" -`14' ? 411. if-ogg. '4
;.?1.23...
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Approved for Release
ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, continued:
A. TYPE OF
OPERATION
B. AGENCY ENGAGED
THEREIN
C. MISSION AND EXTENT
CARRIED OUT
:IA-,83-01034R000200240001-3
C. TYPE OF COuRDINATION
PAGE 4
KNONN FUTURE PLANS
Economic Secur-
ity Operations
. BLOCKADE CON-
TROL DIVISION,
FEA.
A. Charged with coordin-
ating all information on
the smuggling and illicit
movement of strategic ma-
terials outside the U.G.
Charged withsupplying co-
ordinated information to
action arency (e.g. -
Navy, Army) to stop said
smurpling.
A. Did good job of coordin-
ation and liaison both in ob-
taining information from agen-
cies in the clandestine field
and with the action agencies
using the finished product.
A. Now in Stat.e Department.
. WORLD TRADE
INTELLTIENCE
DIVISION -
STATE (Now Ec-
onomic Secur-
ity Control
in the
Office of Ec-
onomic Secur-
ity Policy.)
B. ArTID charged with
handling proclaimed list
of blocked Nationals.
Both agencies (A & B) re-
lied on OSS and FBI,
Army, Navy, for clandes-
tine information; both
ootained overt informa-
tion from own sources,
:State, from other sources,
etc.
B. Did good job of coordin-
ation and liaison both in ob-
taining information from agen-
cies in the clandestine field
and with the action aiencies
using the finished product.
B. Awaiting new coordin-
ated intelligence agency
plans.
SAFEHAVEN
PROJECT -
STATE DEPT.
Project to utilize the concerted efforts of the Allied
towers to investigate enemy plans, investments and indi-
vidual activities which could be employed to preserve
their economic, political and military potential abroad
following the cessation of nostilities. Materal gather-
ed from all intelligence and security agencies handled
by Division of Economic Security Policy for economic
security matters;by eoreign Activities Correlations
Office of Controls, for political security matters.
Project very ambitious. Needed closer coordination .o
aims and operation within State Department.
Project continues to be
handled by two different
divisions within state,
although recommendations
have been made to con-
solidate.
End of "Activities Chiefly Outside the United States"
Part II begins on next page.
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II. ACTIVITIES CHIET WITHIN TIE UNITalITATES
A. TYPE OF B. AGENCY ENGAGED
OPERATION THEREIN
C. MISSION AND EXTENT
CARRIED OUT
D. TYPE OF COORDINATION
!AGES
E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
STATE DEPART-
MENT OPERATIONS
Office of Controls
(formerly operation-
al controls). During
the war Adolf Berle
was Chief. At pre-
sent Fredk.B. Lyon
is Acting Chief.
Mk. Lyon was Chief
of Foreign Activi-
ties Branch during
the War. (See Sec-
tion C) and during
General Holmes'
tenure as Asst.
Secy. was Assist.
to General Holmes
in addition to his
other jobs.
The following branches
are in the Office of Con-
trols which during the
War had, among other
things, overall secur-
ity responsibility in
the State Department:
Security problems of all types
from the originating agencies
(X-2, FBI, Army, Navy, Censor-
ship, etc.) were steered thru
the Department and upon occas-
ion to Embassies and Consul-
ates for action.
1. Passport Division - responsible for issuance of pees-
ports in the broadest meaning of the phrase.
2. Visa Division - responsible for assembly and carrel*.
tion of information necessary to determine the admissibil-
ity of aliens into the U.S. in the interest of public
safety, and national security.
3. Special War Problems Division - special problems con-
cerning citizens abroad - i.e,, whereabouts, welfare and
transmission of funds to citizens abroad, evacuation and
repatriation of citizens abroad, etc.
4. Foreign Activities Correlation - presumably for se-
curity reasons, operated under the following loose
directive: "Responsible for iniation and coordination of
policy and action in all matters relating to foreign
activities and operations". Among its responsibilities
were the handling of Security mat4eit.as they related to
foreign service personnel and to/Nrsannel employed in
any place in the world by the Department. This divi-
sion was also responsible for State cover granted to
OSS, FBI, etc. This branch, because it was in the same
division, and because its chief also was Assistant to
the Chief of the Office of Controls, was able by con-
trolling the use of passports, visas and exits, to ef-
fectively control movements of many individuals in
certain counter-espionage cases. However, many aspects
of C.I. work were incobpletely handled. Almost never
advised other agencies (or at least the working eche-
lons) of policies and instructions to missions in ad-
vance. With more trained personnel and clearer oper-
ating directives, a better job would have been done.
Plana to continue to
handle the State Depart-
ment Security job, within
Office of Controls, NOT
within the new intelligence
set-up.
ARMY
OPERATIONS
After Jan. 1 1.944 all
investigative functions
transferred to A.S.?.
except for limited ac-
tivity in certain ser-
vice commands. While
in G-2,tile pattern of
confusion between Secur-
ity, C.E. & C.I. very
marked. 0v2 War De-
partment continues to
exercise general staff
supervision over all
C.I.C. policies and ac-
tivities in the mili-
tary establishments.
Continues operations in
certain service commands.
A.S.F.
Internal Security &
Intelligence activi-
ties in the zone of
the interior consol-
idated under A.S.F.
PUG responsible for
supervision of all in-
vestigative functions
and activities.
Good coordination with
Army, Navy and FBI.
Awaiting future Army
plans.
0-2 War Department
WHO'S WHO BRANCH
None
None
Setting up under recent
.0-2 directive, organi-
zation whose mission is
very similar to that of
X-2, FBI and D-4 Navy.
G-2 War Department
CPM BRANCH
Responsible for inter-
rogation (among other
things) of all mili-
tary POW's in the U.S.
Refused to use ser-
vices (in many instan-
ces the advice) of
trained counter-espion-
age personnel in all
interrogations.
This Branch probably
the worst perpetrator
(in Washington) of bot-
tlenecking and with-
holding devices in the
name of security. Aa
a result of this at-
titude, a number of im-
portant C.I. Cases held
up and sidetracked.
Close coordination in joint
effort with Naval counterpart,
but because of lack of C.I.
interest poor liaison with
X-2, D-4, et al.
Awaiting future intelli-
gence plans.
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4411tIt
: CIA-R
1034R000200240001-3
ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY WITHIN THE UNIT) dIATW, continueu:
D. TYPE OF COORDINATION
rwur. o
A. TYPE OF
OPERATION
B. AGENCY ENGAGED
THEREIN
C. MISSION AND EXTENT
CARRIED OUT
E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
_
O.N.I.
DOMESTIC
BRANCH
Counter-Intelligence work
done in the Domestic
Branch (formerly Counter-
Intelligence Branch), in
the following sections:
(The titles are self-
explanatory):
D-1 - Investigations
Section
D-2 - Security of
Naval Information
D-4 - S.E.C. Section
(3aootage, espion-
a,e and counter-
subversion)
D-22 - Naval Censorship
Section (inactive)
D-23 - Commerce & Travel
Section (inactive)
All D.I.O. information of
a C.I. & Security nature
from the field was pro-
cessed through this
Branch.
Remarks under Navy-Domestic
Branch in Section I apply
here.
.
Remarks under Navy - Domes
Branch in Section I apply
here.
NAVAL
OPERATIONS
JUSTICE DEPART-
MENT OPERATIONS
(other than FBI)
1
Immigration and
Naturalization
Service
See Security -- Port of
Entry Section, Page 7.
Responsible for admis-
sion, exclusion, registra-
tion, fingerprinting and
deportation of aliens and
investigation of alleged
violations and administra-
tion of laws pertaining to
the above functions.
Operates the Immigration
Border Patrol to detect
smuggling and surrepti-
tious entry of aliens into
U.S. One Important phase
of this responsibility
during the war period cov-
ered the control of alien
seamen arriving in Amer-
ican Ports,
Good coordination with
other agencies.
.
Planning to expand its
activities.
The War Division
Supervises the Alien Re-
gistration Division and
Enemy Alien Control Div-
ision which had charge of
supervising and controll-
ing all agents of foreign
governments and registered
under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.
Good coordination with
other agencies.
Activities contracting.
U.S .CENSORSHIP
OPERATIONS
Office of
Censorship
Maintained staff which
censored all mail and
cables terminal to the
U.S. Maintained Secret
Watch List on persons
suspected of espionage,
sabotage or subversion
(names provided by Army,
Navy, X-2/OSS, FBI) for
special treatment,
Maintained Laboratory
for special treatment
of suspected communi-
cations. Made all in-
formation available
from Censorship.
Maintained excellent
liaison with all agencies.
Effectively coordinated
censorship operations for
the benefit of all user
agencies.
Upon cessation of acti-
vities recommended that
a special committee be
appointed to maintain lie-
ison with 03RD and to obse
censorship techniques as
they were carried on with
other countries and to be
prepared to implement the
plan prepared by the Of-
fice of Censorship in the
event of future hostil-
ities.
Security Oper-
ations concern-
ing ATOM BOMB
Manhattan
District
Engineering
Project
Responsible for Security
of project processes,
personnel and plant.
Maintained large security
staff in the U.S. FBI
assisted in security pro-
tection upon request of
District.
Liaison with our Allies.
Maintained offices in
London.
Some planning - probably
informal - of a Security
Agency to cover the world
on all forms of atom
security from location and
control of ores to fin-
ished project.
WAR SHIPPING
ADMINISTRATION
Ship Movement
Section, Division
of Security &
Communications.
Responsible for the lo-
cation and date of arriv-
al of all merchant ships.
Supplied all security
agencies with information
of great use in the con-
trolling of couriers.
Good coordination with
Security agencies.
Security of
Joint Opera-
tional Plans
Joint Security
Control
1. Security
2. Deception
_
Fair coordination with Secur-
ity agencies which were one
major outlet for such decep-
tion as was engaged in from
this country.
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Pippr ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY WITIN u vjuPWIlL123 1A-RDP83-01034R000200240001 -3
A. TYPE CF B. AGENCY ENGAGED C. MISSICV AND EXTENT D. TYPE OF COORDINATION
OPERATION THEREIN CARRIED OUT
PAGE 7
E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
A. SECURITY INVEST-
IGATIONS & Police
Type Security
A. IncluiingPerson
ell Security invest-
igations; war
plant security;
security of all
Army and Navy
installations, etc.
B. SECURITY INVEST-
IGATIONS of
people at the
various PORTS OF
DITRY.
IG-2
ONI
FBI
ASF (OPMG)
CIC (ASF)
OSS (Security
Branch)
Coast Guard
A-2
State
Civil Service
Navy, Base main-
tenance
Treasury
Made policy and directed
investigations of a se-
curity nature.
Little coordination between
the various agencies doing
Security investigations.
C.I.C., F.B.I. and Navy did
certain amount of coordin-
ation on plant security work.
OP MG not coordinated too
well %ith others early in
war. Later it took over
many of CIC investigative
functions.
Only God knows.
(On second thought,
mebbe Schwarswalder)
4?11111?
Handled by a
Panel originally
as follows:
Panel
I Second
Screening
State
Third
Screening
Immigration
Fourth
Screening
Customs
Directed all interroga-
tions at the Ports of
Entry. There seems to
be general agreement
that the panels did not
accomplish much since
screening already had
been done abroad by Army,
Navy, State, X-2 and by
F.B.I. in South America.
Previous screening in
many instances done by
Allies. The Navy drop-
ped out first, was fol-
lowed by the Army and
eventually the F.B.I.
Routine State queries
of Gripsholm passengers
and the usual Immigra-
tion and Customs exam-
ination continue at the
various Ports of Entry.
Immigration and Customs
to carry on.
Security Oper-
ations of
TREASURY DEPART-
WENT
Bureau of
Customs
Among its functions im-
portant in War were en-
forcement of customs and
other laws by patrolling
international borders of
U.S. Inspection of all i
ternational traffic ente
ing continental U. S.
Prevention of smuggling of
contraband merchandise
into U.S. Sxamination of
all tangible communica-
tions entering and leaving
the U.S. other than thru
regular mail channels.
These controls exercised
through 46 Cuatoms Col-
lections districts and
three border patrol dis-
tricts.
Maintained good liaison with
other Security agencies dur-
ing the war. All Treasury
law enforcement agencies co-
ordinated under Chief Coord-
inator, Elmer Irey.
Planning to expand op-
erations. Recently one
Treasury agent was at-
tached to Embassy in
London. Will build up
organisation abroad
gradually. These Treas-
ury representatives will
use covers of Special
Treasury Agents examin-
ing weights and grades
of merchandise, etc.
Their actual targets will
be obtaining information
concerning the smuggling
of contraband into the
United States.
. Division of
Narcotics
1. Responsible for leg-
al importation of narco-
tics.
2. Responsible for pre-
vention of illicit traf-
fic and production of
narcotics in the U.S.
During War maintained no
agents abroad but relied
on X-2/OSS for informa-
tion and coordinated ef-
forts with F.B.I. and
other enforcement agen-
cies on all matters of a
security nature.
Foreign Funds
Control
Good coordination, but because
narcotic imports were reduced
drastically, did not partici-
pate to any great extent .Works
closely with the Bureau of
Customs which is the action
agency at all Ports of Entry
and on all borders of the U.S.
Controlled flow of Amer- Good liaison with FEA, State,
ican currency and secur- etc.
ities abroad; controlled
property and funds of
enemy aliens or enemy dom0-
inated and neutral coun-
tries. Relied on overt
sources and on OSS,State
FBI, Army, Navyp etc. for
clandestine information.
Planning to expand op-
erations. Will have a
few representatives
abroad to spot large
stocks of narcotics
which may be sent to
the U.S.
The Branch is concerned
with liquidation of all
tunds seised during War.
Secret Service
Charged with Security of
the President and Staff;
and with the prevention
of counterfeiting.
Close coordination with
Justice. Only fair coordin-
ation with other C.I. agencies.
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Planning to continue
operations on about
same basis.
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