TURKEY: FORGING A NEW ORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100120002-0
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks :
In the event you may not have seen this
assessment [albeit somewhat dated], it does
represent one useful contribution to the
problem of where we go vis-a-vis Turkey
It might be useful$ once you are back and
have caught your breathl to see what additional
papers might be apprtbpriate for our next pro-
duction on Turkey I suspect that anotl>tr
NIE is premature, given the most recent one,
but we certainly should consider either a
"Memorandum to Holders?" ors if we want to go
into a broader strategic arena, perhaps an
IIM, but in any case, it is worth our discussion
at your convenience
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Turkey:
Forging a New Order
Secret
coPY 2 0 0
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Turkey:
Forging a New Order
Research for this report was completed
on 15 January 1981.
This assessment was prepared b
Western Europe Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, Western Europe
Division, OPA,
This paper was coordinated with the Offices of
Strategic Research and Economic Research, the
Intelligence Officer for Western Europe.
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Secret
PA 81-10077
March 1981
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Turkey:
Forging a New Orde
Summary The generals' takeover in Turkey on 12 September 1980 brought to at least a
temporary end an experiment in liberal parliamentary democracy launched
by reformist-minded younger military officers in 1961. Rapid economic
growth and social change during the 1960s and 1970s had led to unfulfilled
expectations, ideological polarization, excessive partisan zeal, endemic vio-
lence, and a breakdown of political order. The near collapse of the structure
set up by the constitution of 1961 highlighted Turkey's unreadiness for the
stresses of an exceptionally freewheeling democracy
The generals then intervened, suspending the constitution, banning all
political activity, and extending martial law to the entire country. They
quickly contained violence and began to lay plans for tackling the causes of
terrorism and promulgating new political rules to ensure stability in a
democratic framework. The commanders had little choice but to continue
Demirel's much lauded economic austerity program, partly because it
seemed to be bearing some fruit, and partly because Western creditors-on
whom Turkey is heavily dependent-have made its continuation a condition
for further assistance. Nevertheless, if the sporadic oil supplies coming from
Iran and Iraq prove insufficient for Turkey's long-term needs, acute short-
ages of energy and other necessities and the lack of foreign exchange to a
for oil imports could create serious problems for the new regime
The new political order that the military leaders envision is ambitious and
comprehensive. The generals have promised to establish a constituent
assembly next fall composed of nonpartisan individuals. The fundamental
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law that emerges, which must be approved by the military, probably will
include:
? Provisions for a less freewheeling governmental system with a strength-
ened presidency, a revamped parliament, and a more responsible judiciary.
? An electoral law that will reduce the influence of small parties and
measures that depoliticize the bureaucracy, labor unions, and the educa-
tional establishment.
? Measures that streamline the public sector and redefine the statist struc-
ture of the Turkish economy.
? Reinforcement for the secular system and provisions that will minimize
religious and sectarian influence in politics.
In foreign policy, the generals face the same fundamental dilemma as
previous governments: they depend on the West for economic aid and global
defense, but they cannot function without the oil supplied by Middle Eastern
countries. Nevertheless, by pulling Turkey sternly back onto the secularist
path sketched by Ataturk and containing the violence that was tearing the
fabric of Turkish society, the military has in effect made Turkey a more
accommodating NATO ally. The new regime has shown a willingness to
work toward a settlement of the Cyprus dispute and longstanding dif-
ferences with Greece over territorial rights in the Aegean. Not having to
worry about securing a parliamentary majority or political backing, the
generals are better able than their predecessors to implement an agreement.
On the other hand, Ankara is striving to cement closer ties with its oil rich
neighbors in an effort to make up for the severe disruptions in energy
supplies caused by the war between Iran and Iraq-which together account
for some 75 percent of Turkey's oil supplies. This has led to a tilt away from
Israel and is likely to induce the military regime to interpret Turkey's
NATO commitment more strictly-probably ensuring that Ankara will be
extremely reluctant to allow US facilities on Turkish soil to be used for any
operations in the Middle East that fall outside the purview of the Alliance.
I I
Ultimately, the success of the military program to reform Turkish institu-
tions depends on the unity of the ruling National Security Council and the
level of public support for it. Although there are signs that the generals
disagree on methods, unanimity appears to exist over long-range goals. The
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public has thus far supported the military government, but the longer the
restoration of civilian rule is delayed, the more likely it is that the public will
become restive and potentially troublesome. Large antiregime demonstra-
tions, unlikely at this time, would undermine the generals' attempts to
reassure Western creditors that democracy will be restored as soon as
possible.
Western pressure is not likely to deter the generals from staying in power
until they have achieved their stated goals. They could conceivably decide,
once the new democratic framework is in place, to turn over formal author-
ity to the civilians-perhaps as early as the spring of 1982. It is much more
likely, however, that they will retain at least a behind-the-scenes political
role until they are confident that their entire plan is completed and accepted
by key groups-a process that will probably take several years. On balance,
the commanders seem to have the will and the resources to succeed in
restructuring the political system. If they do, the result will be a less
freewheeling democracy in Turkey, but greater political stability. Whether
such restructuring will address the fundamental causes that gave rise to the
current situation is an open question, however, and if it does not, the steps
the generals are now taking may not be sufficient to preclude future military
interventions. F7 I
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The National Security Council: (left to right) Admiral Lumer
Generals Ersin, Evren, Sahinkaya, Celasun, and Saltik
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Turkey:
Forging a New Orde
The Turkish General Staff assumed direct control of
the government on 12 September 1980 after a pro-
tracted period of anarchy, economic uncertainty, and
political turmoil. Although the generals were
prompted to act by a series of events earlier in the year,
the root causes for the military takeover lie much
deeper
The Roots of Turmoil
Many of the strains on Turkish society can be traced to
the 1920s when Ataturk wrenched the country into the
20th century and superimposed a Western system of
government on Turkey's historically authoritarian cul-
ture. But the dramatic transformation of Turkey's
essentially stable and stoic society to one overwhelmed
by instability and turmoil dates more clearly from the
aftermath of the military takeover in 1960
Ironically, the political structure created after the
1960 coup to turn Turkey into a modern democracy led
instead to polarization, extremism, and instability. The
liberal constitution of 1961, which granted extensive
rights of association and almost complete freedom of
expression, allowed political beliefs long suppressed by
Kemalist philosophical dogmas to emerge. The growth
of associations widened the ideological split between
leftists and rightists and cut across ethnic, sectarian,
and urban-rural cleavages
Turkish society simultaneously entered a period of
dramatic change-industrial production rose, new
plants were built, the labor force grew, illiteracy de-
clined, intellectual life prospered, and every segment of
society came to demand more for itself. Growing eco-
nomic inequities and the sharpening of class distinc-
tions further exacerbated social tensions. Old values
that had traditionally cemented social relationships
were replaced by new "truths," and this competition
between old and new produced conflicts in every
sphere
Although Turks obtained greater democratic freedoms
and more material benefits during the 1960s, political
and social institutions failed to adapt to the new de-
mands. An important reason for this failure was Tur-
key's Ottoman legacy of revolution from above-a
process that creates the framework to represent and
speak for the masses, but fails to provide sufficient
avenues for participation or for access to power. Al-
though a large number of Turks became emancipated,
political institutions seemed ever more restricted.
Frustration and alienation led to the creation of ideo-
logically diverse, and at times extreme, political or-
ganizations
Another reason for the failure was the relative immo-
bility and ineffectiveness of Turkey's elected govern-
ments after the restoration of civilian rule in 1961. No
single party was able to win consistent public support.
The 1961 coalition came about only as a result of
strong military pressure on the center-right Justice
Party to join forces with its leftist rival, the Republican
People's Party. Moreover, the political struggle that
had been waged in the 1950s between two right-of-
center parties had evolved by the 1970s into a con-
frontation between the shar 1 of rized left and right.
F__ I
Economic and Social Factors
Demographic, economic, and social factors have fur-
ther alienated many Turks. The population of Turkey
has soared from 19 million in 1945 to 47 million in
1980, and in recent years the working age population
(15 to 64) has grown by about 700,000 annually.
Because of the lack of job opportunities, only about
250,000 people have actually entered the labor force
annually, and less than half of these have found work.
Total unemployment probably is close to 25 percent if
one includes the "disguised unemployed"-those who
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want jobs but are too discouraged to actively seek
them. Aided by $4 billion in Western economic aid,
Turkish economic growth averaged over 6 percent
annually during 1948-75, but this did not keep up with
the rising expectations fueled by increased educational
opportunities and the experiences of Turkish workers
in Europe. Moreover, Ankara placed too much em-
phasis on import substitution instead of develo in
competitive export industries
The current economic crisis was triggered by the 1973
oil price hikes, but it is even more the result of bungled
economic policy. Ankara tried to shield Turks from
higher oil prices through subsidies, price controls, ex-
port restrictions, an overvalued exchange rate, and
huge budget deficits. These measures disrupted
production, curtailed exports, and caused imports to
soar. Turkish governments did not, or could not, face
up to these problems until January 1980 when Prime
Minister Demirel introduced his stabilization pro-
gram. These austerity measures probably were a major
step in the right direction: they began to slow inflation,
reduced the balance-of-payments deficit, and largely
eliminated shortages of critical items. But given the
severity of the crisis it will re uire several years for
them to be effective
Turkey's troubled economy-where the rate of infla-
tion soared to over 100 percent before Demirel's
austerity program took hold-contributed to the rise
and spread of radical ideologies. When young people
left the traditional self-sufficient life in the villages to
seek employment and education in urban areas, they
sought ideological "families"-rightwing and leftwing
groups-that would provide warmth and shelter in
return for their loyalty. Greater democratic freedoms
allowed conflicts to come into the open by politiciz-
ing-indeed by polarizing-the civil service, educa-
tional institutions, and all public programs. Restraints
fell away from groups that were once under firm
discipline-youth (almost a class by itself in Turkey),
the Alevis, the Kurds, the labor force-and left them
caught up in a free-for-all.
Immediate Causes
The minority Demirel government that came to power
in October 1979 was confronted with myriad economic
and internal security problems, compounded by a
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political stalemate between the major parties. The
failure of the political leaders to reach agreement on
how to address the issues led to public frustration,
political immobilism, and military impatience.
Violence. Political and social polarization continued to
increase during Demirel's tenure and led to rising
violence. Terrorism took the lives of more than 1,500
people during the first six months of 1980. The trend
was clearly ominous: the average number of deaths per
day in 1978 was two or three, in 1979 it was four, and
by September 1980 it had soared to more than 20.
Although the statistics inevitably included some vic-
tims of nonpolitical crimes, the rise in violence primar-
ily reflected clashes between the left and right fueled
by tensions that had become endemic to Turkish soci-
ety.
The level of violence had been rising gradually for
several years, but the first major shock came in
December 1978 when over 100 people were killed in
Kahramanmaras in fighting between extremists. Mar-
tial law was quickly imposed in 13 of Turkey's 67
provinces, and by September 1980, seven more prov-
inces were added in response to what some-especially
in the military-perceived to be Kurdish separatist
activity in eastern Turkey and increasing sectarian
conflict in central Anatolia. Martial law had little
impact on the level of violence, however, and it in-
volved the military in what is essentially police activity.
Moreover, terrorists, hoping to provoke harsh military
repression that would turn the people against the gov-
ernment, sought to deepen that involvement by killing
prominent people-such as rightist political leader
Gun Sazak (May 1980), former Prime Minister Nihat
Erim (July 1980), and leftist leader Kemal Turkler
(July 1980)-and attacking military targets.
The Political Impasse. Rampant terrorism contrib-
uted to the political stalemate that developed immedi-
ately after Demirel's accession and continued through-
out 1980. Lacking an effective parliamentary
majority, Demirel created a minority coalition govern-
ment with reluctant support from the Islamic fun-
damentalist National Salvation Party of Necmettin
Erbakan and the more flexible rightist Nationalist
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leader Bulent Ecevitl
Action Party led by Alpaslan Turkes. Demirel's
precarious majority, however, was frequently tested by
the opposition Republican People's Party and by
Erbakan, who repeatedly threatened to withdraw his
support
As the commanders became increasingly concerned by
the deteriorating economic and security conditions,
they began to issue warnings to civilian leaders to
cooperate for the sake of the national interest. Their
demarches in January and February 1980-appar-
ently the result of pressure by the commanders on
General Evren-emboldened the Demirel government
to enact sweeping economic reforms and to propose
new internal security legislation recommended by the
military. The warnings also temporarily intimidated
the opposition RPP into muting its criticisms and being
more cooperative. This truce was soon broken, how-
ever, and the parties were unable to reach agreement
on electing a new president even after the passage of
six months and more than 120 ballots. Nor were the
parties able to work together on additional military-
backed internal security legislation that was proposed
in late July.
?
The last straw for the military came toward the end of
the summer. It became increasingly obvious that the
parties could not come to terms on holding early elec-
tions-the only hope of breaking the political stale-
mate-and at the same time the NSP joined forces
with the RPP in an apparent attempt to bring down the
government through censure motions against the gov-
ernment and its ministers. In other words, it became
clear to the military that the politicians were incapable
of putting aside their partisan interests for the good of
Turkey. The commanders concluded that the politics-
as-usual approach by civilian leaders would continue
indefinitely as the country, crippled by the absence of a
permanent president, headed toward civil war.
The Erbakan Factor. One of the most galling aspects of
the political situation for the military was the dis- 25X1
proportionate amount of power NSP leader Erbakan
acquired and used in Demirel's coalition government.
To the generals, Erbakan seemed to threaten all that
Ataturk had stood for-a strong, independent secular,
and Westernized state-and that they were pledged to
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defend. Trading on the key position of his party,
Erbakan sought to strengthen the hand of religion in
Turkish politics, a clear violation of Kemalist secular
principles. He also demanded that Turkey put more
distance between itself and the West and draw closer
to its Islamic neighbors. It was the government's fail-
ure to break relations with Israel following that coun-
try's annexation of East Jerusalem that gave Erbakan
the pretext to withdraw his su port and begin work to
oust the government.
A religious rally sponsored by the NSP in Konya on
7 September, where Ataturk and the Turkish state
were derided, further enraged the military. By itself,
this incident was not the determining factor that made
the military decide to intervene; F_ I
I Nevertheless, it was a dramatic re-
minder to the generals that the Turkish state was in
danger of departing from its underlying precepts. It
also touched nerves in the military, and coming as it
did after a series of volatile episodes-most notably
bitter fighting in Corum Province and the ouster of the
pro-West Foreign Minister Erkmen-it may have been
the final nudge that made the generals act when they
did. In hindsight, however, it seems clear that the .
takeover would not have been delayed long in any case.
The Turkish Way of Taking Over. The military take-
over of 12 September offers some useful insights into
Turkish political dynamics. Although the commanders
dismissed the.Demirel government for its inability to
cope with mounting problems, their action was
prompted more by the disruptive tactics of the opposi-
tion than by the government's programs. Available
information indicates that the commanders strongly
favored some of Demirel's proposals, such as constitu-
tional amendments to strengthen the presidency and
holding early elections in the fall. It was the repeated
efforts of the RPP and the NSP to prevent passage of
military-backed legislation and their attempts to bring
down the government that caused the military re-
action. The Turkish press put the matter succinctly
after the takeover when it characterized the coup as
one of the few that "overthrew the opposition" instead
of the regime in power.
The other distinguishing characteristic of the Turkish
military is its strict adherence to Ataturkist principles.
The commanders were manifestly reluctant to assume
power-preferring instead to let the democratic proc-
ess take its course-but were forced by mounting crises
to conclude that if they did not, they could expect a
steady worsening of the political situation and a grow-
ing challenge to Kemalist traditions.
The Turkish military assumed power for similar rea-
sons twice before, in 1960 and 1971, and each time it
stepped down when it considered its task complete. The
generals probably will act likewise this time, stabiliz-
ing the political situation, revamping the system
according to Kemalist ideals, and planning the phasing
out of military involvement in politics
Their job is more difficult this time, however, because
the causes of the takeover spring from the roots of the
Turkish political and social system. The house needs
more than spring cleaning, it needs rebuilding. The
task will almost certainly take longer than the 18
months that were sufficient for previous takeovers
Military Perceptions of Civilian Government Failure
By 1980, the generals had formed a low opinion of
politicians as a class: they were divisive people who
sought personal political gain at the expense of the
national well-being. Political bickering-common in
Western parliamentary systems-seemed to constitute
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Justice Party chief'Suleyman Demirel and Islamic fundamentalist
NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan.
a threat in the context of Turkey's more traditional and
authoritarian political culture in which the concept of a
"loyal opposition" has not taken root
Military Aspirations
The regime's first priority is to restore order in a
country that has been wracked by violence over the
past few years. Harsher security measures-curfews,
house-to-house searches, mass arrests, extended peri-
ods of detention without trial, and occasional execu-
tions-have drastically reduced extremist activities. In
a determined effort to avoid the polarization of society
that followed the earlier military takeovers in 1960 and
1971, the government has been scrupulously
evenhanded, cracking down with equal vigor on leftist
and rightist organizations. Although harsher measures
have led to some human rights abuses, these appear to
be isolated cases. There is no indication that the gov-
ernment has sanctioned brutality, and it has begun
The military government's program of action following
the takeover amounted to an indictment of the 1961
constitution and the civilian leadership the constitution
had given rise to. According to the new regime, politi-
cal leaders were unwilling or unable to cope with:
? A weak and ineffective executive.
? An overly powerful judiciary.
? Extensive university autonomy.
? The incongruity of the liberal law on associations and
groups and Turkey's traditional norms.
? The rapid growth of small ideological and religious
factions that. could, and did, enter the political arena.
? A politicized and polarized labor force, civil service,
national police, and educational establishment.
? An ineffective and divided legislature.
? A stagnating economy.
The generals hope to tackle these issues systematically
by carefully drafting new laws that will ensure fun-
damental changes in the Turkish political system.
When violence has been rooted out and the economy
brought back on a sounder course, the commanders
will restore civilian rule.
investigations into all reported abuses.
Remarkable progress has been achieved, but no one,
least of all the military, believes that terrorism has
been eradicated. Although it is dormant, its roots are
deep in Turkish society, and violence will blossom once
again as soon as the freeze is over-unless those roots
can be dug up.
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The second priority item on the generals' agenda is
economic stabilization. Lacking definite answers to the
problem, the commanders have continued Demirel's
austerity program and have persuaded the highly re-
spected economic czar, Turgut Ozal, to stay on to
implement it. Although the Turkish press has recently
stepped up its attack on Ozal and his policies for failing
to achieve dramatic results, the generals are not likely
to make any changes, both because the package seems
to be working-inflation appears to be down, exports
and workers' remittances are up, and shortages of
consumer items have largely been eliminated-and
because Western creditors are making future loans
conditional on the continuation of Ozal's measures or
others like them.
In the short term, however, the military regime may
find that parts of Ozal's stabilization program work at
cross-purposes to their goals of eradicating the social
and economic inequities that breed extremism. The
commanders might then be torn between short- and
long-term goals- ossibl exacerbating strains in the
ruling hierarchy
the military in the aftermath of a takeover, has not
worked, and a whole new structure must be erected.
The new constitution will officially be written by a
constituent assembly, which apparently will be formed
between next August and next October. The ruling
council probably will limit the size of the assembly as
much as possible-unlike the unwieldy group that
wrote the 1961 constitution-and might exclude politi-
cal leaders that were in office or were engaged in
politics at the time of the takeover. In any event, the
assembly probably will rubberstamp many of the con-
stitutional provisions that the NSC will submit to it. Its
job is not expected to last for more than a year,
although its tenure will depend on the ease with which
it reaches agreement and its receptivity to the NSC's
prescriptions
A Stronger Presidency
The commanders would like to see a strengthened
presidency that would provide for quick and firm
decisionmaking. Turkish presidents under the 1961
constitution owed their meager, and largely ceremo-
nial, powers to the prestige of the office as the symbol
of the state and to their status as the link between the
military and the politicians. The generals would like to
give the chief executive real muscle and reduce the
influence of political factors in national
decisionmaking. The new constitution is likely to:
Beyond controlling violence and pursuing economic
recovery, the generals hope to make constitutional
changes that would prevent those conditions that gave
rise to the takeover in 1980. They envisage a series of
reforms that include a new constitution and laws on
political parties, elections, secularism, and the like that
would critically alter the balance of wer in favor of
stability
A New Charter
The military regime's plan for the restoration of civil-
ian rule is predicated on the assumption that many of
the reforms can be achieved in three to five years. The
basic objective is to create a more stable political
system that would make future military interventions
unnecessary. The military's reform effort is ambitious;
it includes writing a new constitution, drafting new
laws on political parties and elections, and restructur-
ing many of Turkey's political institutions. The system
created by the 1961 constitution, which was written by
? Give the president wide discretionary powers to dis-
solve parliament in times of crisis and regulate the
functions of government.
? Grant the president greater authority to address
national problems and to initiate legislation in
parliament.
? Streamline the election of the president either by
popular vote or by the legislature; if the system of
election by parliament is retained, failure to elect
after a specified number of parliamentary rounds
would result in the dissolution of parliament or early
elections
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There has been some speculation that the NSC might
carry on as the nominal executive even after civilian
rule is restored-at least until the dust has settled and
a permanent president can be elected. Although it is
too early to be talking about candidates, Evren is in the
best position to make the transition from "head of
state" to president-effectively extendin the mili-
tary's involvement by several more years.
A Weaker Legislature
The most likely outcome of parliamentary restructur-
ing would be a unicameral legislature with the Senate
replaced by an advisory body, or simply absorbed by
the lower house, the National Assembly. The new
charter would presumably seek to amend those pro-
visions of the 1961 constitution that have by general
agreement promoted divisive political crosscurrents.
Drafters will take a hard look at laws that allowed:
? The prime minister to co-opt ministers from outside
parliament.
? The Constitutional Court to oversee and overrule
legislative acts.
They will also look into reforming the proportional
representation system that encouraged a plethora of
parties and produced coalition or minority govern
ments.
Stricter Electoral and Political Party Laws
Electoral laws are of particular interest to the military
rulers. With the example of Erbakan fresh in their
minds, they would like to create a system where small
parties would be denied access to disproportionate
power. Under the electoral laws that were enacted
during the 1960s and early 1970s small splinter parties
were encouraged by the promise of seats in parliament,
thereby siphoning off strength from the major political
parties. The resulting profusion of parties almost al-
of the electoral contest would represent the district.
This winner-take-all approach would perforce lead to a
two-party system-also envisaged by the generals. An-
other option is to hold elections under a two-ballot
system that would eliminate small parties, or at least
reduce their power to wield significant influence. Or
the generals might decide to adopt the West German
model, which requires a minimum percentage of votes
to qualify for a seat in parliament. Even proponents of
proportional representation concede that majority rule
might be salutory for a while-at least until greater
stability is achieved. In any case, once electoral law
reforms are on the books, the generals might permit
political activity to begin, perhaps as early as the
spring of 1982.
Before they do that, however, the commanders would
try to reform the parties. They believe that the 1965
Political Parties Act prevented internal party democ-
racy, restricted alternative leadership, and promoted
the perpetuation of an oligarchy almost impossible to
unseat. They envisage drafting a new law that would
liberalize the internal dynamics of parties and allow
greater opportunities for leadership changes, thereby
avoiding the personal politics exercised by such part
leaders as Demirel and EcevitF__ f
Judicial Reforms and Law Enforcement
The judiciary has posed special problems in Turkey's
centralist political system. The most independent
branch of government, it bears the onus of having been
in the best position to turn back the tide of extremism
and violence and having failed to do so. In addition, the
Turkish judiciary under the 1961 constitution acted to
nullify or modify executive and parliamentary acts,
thereby contributing to the politically charged at-
mosphere and to divisiveness.
ways compelled the largest party to join forces with The generals, first of all, want to reduce the authority
and accede to the demands of factions that had nothing of both the Constitutional Court, which reviews legis-
in common with the major political forces. Coalition lative acts, and the Council of State, which oversees
partners frequently became critics and at times joined executive and administrative decisions. Military lead-
the opposition to oust the government, thereby leadin ers apparently fault both for blocking measures re-
to virtually continuous impasses in parliament inforcing the state's authority, such as essential se-
The commanders envisage a tighter and more stringent
form of proportional representation. One option is to
create single-member constituencies where the winner
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i
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The commanders are likely to streamline the country's
judicial organs without tinkering with their independ-
ence. They foresee the creation of State Security
Courts that would deal-as they did in 1971-73-with
crimes against the state. They hope such a measure
would relieve the military of martial law duties in
times of crisis and allpw for swifter and more efficient
meting out of justice.
been violated. Although the new law stacks the deck
against the defendant and could be seen as a threat to
civil liberties, it might have the beneficial effect of
reducing the backlog of cases that has developed as a
result of the military crackdown and roundup of terror-
ists.
Reemphasizing Kemalism in Education
The Turkish generals ascribe some of the blame for the
growth of anarchy to the country's educational estab-
lishment which, according to the military, has aban-
doned Kemalist principles in favor of extremist philos-
ophies. They point directly to the 1961 constitution
that allowed unprecedented autonomy for universities
and associations, thereby permitting the dissemination
of Marxist, "foreign," and religious ideologies consid-
ered contrary to the Kemalist foundations of the Turk-
ish state
The commanders are also studying the possibilities of
revising the penal and criminal codes with the objective
of making them more stringent and more specific. The
military criminal code will likewise be scrapped and
replaced with penalties for violations of the penal code.
In the meantime, the commanders have amended the
law governing martial law duties. On 10 November,
the number of days that suspects could be detained
before bringing them to court was tripled to 90. If the
investigation is not completed after 90 days, however,
the detainee must be released.
An additional amendment on 14 November was de-
signed to speed up the trials of terrorists by removing
the possibility of defense-inspired delays through
procedural challenges. Not only did the amendment
limit the defendant's rights to delay the case beyond 15
days, but it made martial law authorities immune from
civil actions alleging that the rights of suspects have
The commanders aspire to rebuild the educational
system so that youth-considered a class by itself in
Turkey-can once again be reared in the Ataturkist
tradition. The takeover on 12 September appears to
have had a salutory effect on education by driving
underground many extremists who had used the
schools as headquarters for their activities. The re-
gime's program in the short term is to depoliticize
education, and the military rulers have begun to purge
the Ministry of Education of extremists. They are also
bringing radical teachers' union leaders to trial. The
commanders have been reluctant, however, to intrude
into the universities and have instead let them police
themselves. The military retains influence through
administrative appointments and will probably become
more forceful in its demands as its reform effort un-
folds.
Strong opposition to military policies has not appeared,
and most academics are taking a wait-and-see attitude.
Resistance to educational restructuring might grow if
the military begins to impose its presence more
forefully in educational institutions or if the intellec-
tuals are not consulted on the drafting of a new con-
stitution. Criticism of educational reform would also
intensify if the new rules are excessively restrictive.
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Greater Control of Provincial Administrations
The generals-in an effort to purge extremists from
government positions-also abolished provincial coun-
cils, dismissed the mayors, and replaced them either
with military officers or nonpolitical individuals
Provincial administrations are under the direct juris-
diction of the NSC, and this centralization is likely to
continue until the military pulls out from politics
The administrative reforms in Turkey's local govern-
ments illustrate a darker side of the military's rule.
Because the generals are convinced that politicians are
corrupt, they are replacing some competent, respon-
sible officials with unqualified people who frequently
thwart public projects supported by the people. The
commanders also have the notion that once a nonparti-
san administration is appointed, matters will automati-
cally get better. That this has not been the case is
demonstrated by the recent reshuffling of governors
and security personnel in many of the provinces
The new constitution, however, probably will decen-
tralize provincial administrations after civilian rule is
restored. The practical result of such a move would be
to free local governments from Ankara's influence.
Along with a political parties law that decentralizes
party machinery, it would also break the hold of
central party administrative boards over local party
councils.
Reinforcing Secularism
The generals attach particular importance to main-
taining the Kemalist tradition of secularism. Kemal
Ataturk implemented a strict policy of excluding re-
ligion from politics in the 1930s that has distinguished
Muslim Turkey from many of its Islamic neighbors.
The commanders-guardians of the Kemalist tra-
dition-have historically been wary of religious pene-
tration into the political arena and have watched
events in Iran with alarm. Attempts to bring Islam into
government contributed to the takeovers in 1960 and
1971. Blatant disregard of Kemalist principles by
Islamic fundamentalists and their verbal barrages
against the Turkish state in 1980 contributed to the
takeover on 12 September.)
S
The Turkish military probably will attempt to mini-
mize the influence of religious political parties by
carefully manipulating the new political parties law
once civilian rule is restored. There are also likely to be
provisions in the new constitution and the penal code
that would control religious activity. Some resistance
might be expected in rural areas-especially in the
NSP strongholds of west-central Turkey-but for the
most part Turks, who have lived with secularism for
half a century, are likely to go along with the pro-
hibitions
Civil Service Reforms
The Turkish civil service has become one of the most
political sectors of Turkish society under recent civil-
ian administrations. A change in government almost
always meant stacking the bureaucracy with political
appointees without regard to qualifications and com-
petence. The requirements of coalition building also
led to trade-offs where certain crucial ministries-
such as Youth and Sports, Interior, or Labor-were
staffed by supporters of small political parties who took
the occasion to bring in their own people, thereby
contributing to the polarization of the civil service. Not
only has the Turkish bureaucracy been a hotbed of
extremism, but it has also grown to such an extent that
the civil service employs 10 percent of the labor force.
Since the takeover military leaders have assumed vir-
tual carte blanche to overhaul the civil service. Never-
theless, the commanders apparently are moving cau-
tiously. They are making a conscious effort to
depoliticize the system, eliminate inconsistencies, and
gradually reduce overstaffing. The generals have
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changed governors in 27 of Turkey's 67 provinces and
are seeking to remove ideologues from state economic
enterprises, the Ministry of Education, the state plan-
ning organization, and the Ministry of Youth and
Sports. They have also begun to reshuffle security
officials in various provinces. Their aim is to create a
civil service that is less divisive and bulky, more com-
petent and professional, and more independent of
political forces.
Radical labor confederations-like the Confederation
of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK), Confed-
eration of Nationalist Labor Unions (MISK), and
Hak-Is-have contributed to the polarization of soci-
ety and to violence. Their political activities, moreover,
have led to a decline in productivity, thereby exac-
erbating Turkey's economic problems. With the excep-
tion of the moderate Confederation of Turkish Labor
Unions (TURK-IS), the military government has
banned all labor union activity and recently appointed
trustees to administer the dormant unions. The gen-
erals want to write a new labor and associations law
that would keep labor confederations out of politics.
The military is moving cautiously but firmly on labor
reform. The National Security Council ordered all
strikers back to work shortly after the takeover, but
gave them a 70-percent pay raise. The NSC also
pushed through a severance pay law that makes it
easier for businesses to fire people without putting
much financial strain on the employer
Some progress has been made toward restoring limited
collective bargaining; a draft bill now being considered
will mandate contracts for those ordered back to work
in September, recommending that existing contracts
be used as benchmarks. The law would also probably
impose a ceiling on wage and fringe benefits. Ju-
diciously applied, these new labor rules could have the
desired effect of prodding workers into greater pro-
ductivity and labor unions into more responsible
behavior
The government is also working on tax reforms to
alleviate the inequities and disincentives that have
crept into the system partly as a result of inflation.
Measures so far include a reduction in most income tax
rates and an extension of coverage to the largely un-
taxed agricultural sector. The remaining laws are ex-
pected to alter the tax structure both to alleviate the
burden on lower and middle income groups and to meet
requirements of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Tax reform should boost
revenue, thus reducing the budget deficit-a possible
key to further progress in slowing inflation, which is
still running at 40 to 60 percent
In addition to measures aimed at boosting productiv-
ity, the military hopes to attack inflation through
budgetary measures. Although Turkey's 1981 budget
is 105 percent higher than that approved for 1980, it
was written in the context of the January 1980 auster-
ity program and attempts to be anti-inflationary.
Among other things, it commits the government to
fiscal conservatism in supporting public enterprises. A
novel change is that the entire cabinet-instead of the
Minister of Finance-will have authority to increase
appropriations. The Finance Minister previously was
independent in fiscal matters and frequently increased
appropriations beyond set limits. Now deficit spending
will be more difficult to justify.)
The economic plan-drafted simultaneously with the
budget-calls for $3.5 billion in exports and $9 billion
in imports, reflecting Turkey's dependence on foreign
goods; crude oil requirements account for a large share
of the import bill. To reduce the trade deficit the
government program includes provisions for stimulat-
ing exports through incentives and an export insurance
structure. Ankara has for a long time recognized that
the public sector is less productive than the private
sector and is now attempting to alleviate the import-
export discrepancy by making Turkish industry more
competitive in world markets, particularly in such
areas as food processing and agriculture-related indus-
tries. Exports have picked up sharply in recent months
and were almost two-thirds higher than the cor-
responding period a year ago. Workers' remittances
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from Europe-a key item in Turkey's balance of pay-
ments-also are at a record high, and Ozal attributes
this to Turkey's "flexible exchange rate policy,"
whereby the Turkish lira is devalued frequently in
small increments to keep it competitive.
The military will also try to restrain government
spending, in particular by continuing the effort begun
in January 1980 to make the state economic enter-
prises, among other sectors of the Turkish economy,
subject to market forces and therefore more competi-
tive. State subsidies were to be reduced and in some
cases eliminated. The generals have continued this
policy and are expected to pursue the revamping of
public enterprises. They may also seek to turn over to
private enterprise those state-run businesses that
continually operate at a deficit and might examine the
entire statist structure to see which public services
might be run more efficiently through market mech-
anisms. This would be done carefully and perhaps
reluctantly, however, because statism was one of Ata-
turk's guiding principles.
By and large, Turkey's foreign policy under the mili-
tary regime will not differ significantly from that of the
Demirel government. The generals face the same fun-
damental dilemma: they depend on the West for eco-
nomic aid and global defense, but they cannot function
without the oil supplied by the Arab countries
Nevertheless, in the process of pulling Turkey back
onto the secularist and pro-Western path marked by
Ataturk, the military has in effect made Turkey a
generally more accommodating NATO ally. More-
over, the new regime has shown a willingness to negoti-
ate the Cyprus issue and longstanding differences with
Greece over territorial rights in the Aegean. Not hav-
ing to worry about securing a parliamentary majority
or political backing, the generals have been more flexi-
ble than Demirel could be on such issues as Greek
reintegration into NATO-which was accomplished in
October largely because of Turkish concessions-and
the lifting of airspace controls over the Aegean. The
military leaders would like to eliminate the economic
and military burden of maintaining troops on Cyprus,
and they are pressing the Turkish Cypriots to work for
an agreement with the Greek Cypriots.
The extent to which the commanders will pursue rap-
prochement with Greece (and the Greek Cypriots) will
depend in large measure on their success in carrying
out domestic programs. Their flexibility on foreign
policy issues will be determined by the nature of the
political system that emerges in Turkey, what Turkish
leaders perceive the national interest to be, and the
level of political resistance they encounter along the
way
Although the military's strong commitment to the
West was prescribed by Ataturk, their sensitivity to
Western views is also dictated by economic necessity.
OECD members pledged a substantial amount of aid
in 1980, and another pledging round may be held this
spring. Western banks have advanced enormous loans
and large amounts of credit to Turkey, and a re-
scheduling of commercial loans-amounting to some
$3 billion-could also take place in the spring. This
assistance is crucial to Turkey's stabilization program,
and the commanders are loath to strain ties with their
creditors.)
On the other hand, Turkey is no less dependent on
foreign oil. Hard hit by the disruptions in oil flows
caused by the war between Iraq and Iran-which
together account for some 75 percent of Turkey's oil
supplies-Ankara is striving to cement closer ties with
its Arab neighbors. This has led Turkey to tilt away
from Israel, and relations between Ankara and Tel
Aviv have been reduced to the second secretary level.
The generals will continue to seek economic aid from
the West while angling for more oil from the Arabs.
These conflicting interests will induce the military
regime in Ankara to interpret Turkey's NATO
commitments more strictly-probably ensuring that it
will not allow US facilities on Turkish soil to be used
for any operations outside the purview of the Alliance.
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The success of the military program will depend on:
? The level and degree of unity among the command-
ers on fundamental issues.
? The nature and strength of resistance from poli-
ticians and intellectuals.
? The degree to which the public perceives the pro-
gram to be in its interest and supports ii
Because the commanders are not hindered by require-
ments for parliamentary approval or public mandates
to carry out their program, they are likely to write and
implement those laws that they have promised. There
are contradictory reports on the unity of the ruling
NSC, however, and any internal strife among the
rulers, of which there is little evidence, would torpedo
the speedy return of civilian rule.
to bear down on leftists-particularly radical union
leaders-and are likely to continue to do so; these
actions might undercut accusations of favortism if the
NSC continues its deliberate evenhandedness
The monolithic facade of the government also has
begun to show cracks over the government's program.
Some o the disagreements stem from the inevi-
tably divergent views of technocrats on social and
political issues. The generals, however, have thrust
themselves into the political arena-however reluc-
tantly-and now must act as politicians as well as
soldiers. Disharmony, therefore, is likely to focus on
the personalities within the nonpartisan governments
Although the comman ers
have been particularly careful to be impartial, the
prosecutions of far rightist Turkes and Islamic fun-
damentalist Erbakan have left the NSC open to
charges of favoring the left. The generals have begun
The level of public support for military operations and
the government program is also important for the 25X1
success of the reform effort. Thus far, public support
for the ruling council and its decisions has been impres-
sive, and it is likely to continue at least for the near
25
25
2
2
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future. There was a general sense of relief when the
military took over in September, and despite reserva-
tions about the loss of democracy, the dominant public
reaction was satisfaction over the return of public
order
Public perceptions of the government's program have
been mixed because the action plan is vague; people do
not know what to expect. This wait-and-see attitude
could turn to open support if:
? Political stability is achieved and maintained.
? Polarization of society is reduced and extremism
rooted out.
? The economy shows visible improvement over the
short term.
? The groundwork for restorin democracy is laid in
the near future.
The public's mood is volatile, however, and resistance
could increase if the commanders take too long in
implementing their reforms and restoring civilian rule,
or if the economy begins to deteriorate once again. The
latter is critical because Turks are currently preoccu-
pied with bread-and-butter issues. Any serious disrup-
tion-such as the Iranian-Iraqi war-could stall eco-
nomic recovery. The resulting pinch, even if perceived
to have been caused by external factors, would prob-
ably translate into dissatisfaction with the military
government. Large-scale public discontent would
undermine the regime's attempt to reassure Western
creditors that democracy will be reinstated as soon as
possible and jeopardizp the nolitical stability -
lished by the generals.
presidential elections before withdrawing.
The level and nature of resistance from politicians and
intellectuals will depend on how radical the generals'
surgery on the political system turns out to be. There is
little doubt that the commanders will not tolerate
polarization and extremism in the political and educa-
tional spheres. They are bound to take strong restric-
tive measures that will become focal points for
resistance.
If the ruling council decides merely to establish the
framework for political reform and leave the details to
the civilians to complete, political resistance probably
will be relatively subdued. Political leaders would
count on being able to tinker with the implementation
of reforms not to their liking
The more probable outcome, however, is for the mili-
tary government to pursue its complex program to the
end, whatever delays this may entail for the resump-
tion of democratic government. As the length of mili-
tary rule stretches out, discontent and the chance of
organized resistance will increase. The government's
response will be the key factor, but given the clear
determination of the generals to go ahead with their
program, it seems likely that they will succeed in
restoring stability in the short term.
General Evren announced in mid-December that the
NSC will provide a timetable this year for the return of
civilian rule. So far, the regime has only promised to
create a constituent assembly by the end of October-
barring major setbacks. The process of drafting a new
charter could take a year or more, and after that the
generals would have to oversee a host of fundamental
changes as well as setting up legislative and, finally,
On balance, the commanders seem to have the will and
the resources to succeed in restructuring the political
system. If they do, the result will be a less freewheeling
democracy, but greater political stability. Whether
such restructuring will address the fundamental causes
that gave rise to the current situation is an open
question, however, and if it does not, the steps the
generals are now taking may not be sufficient to pre-
clude future military interventions
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is
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Secret