THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

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Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Directorate of Confidential Intelligence The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future A Research Paper Confidential EUR 82-10020 March 1982 Copy Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 392 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Directorate of Confidential Intelligence The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future A Research Paper Information available as of 1 September 1981 has been used in the preparation of this report. The author of this paper is European Issues Division, Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, European Issues Division, This report was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. Confidential EUR 82-10020 March 1982 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Overview The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future In June 1981, the 35-year grip of the Christian Democrats (DC) on the Italian Prime Ministry ended when the office was assumed by the leader of a small coalition party, the Republicans. Although the DC remains strong, the loss of this key position was but the latest in a series of defeats and checks beginning in 1974 that have clouded the DC's future. Calls for party renewal have a hollow ring after eight years without evidence of effective action. Over the same period, the DC's main rival, the Commu- nist Party (PCI), has enjoyed a steady rise in electoral strength, but in 1979 it slumped for the first time in parliamentary elections. Conventional wisdom holds that Italy's Government is unstable, but detailed analysis shows three decades of stagnation and immobility while the DC became virtually inseparable from the Italian state. Also, since at least 1953, all major Italian parties?except the PCI? have retained an almost identical share of the electorate. The average lifespan of govern- ments since World War II is 11 months, but only one party, the DC, and a relatively small number of its leaders have managed the government. Except in politics, Italian life has undergone a metamorphosis since 1945, and profound change has occurred in the Catholic Church. The result is a governing "confessional" political party which has changed little while the nation has leapt into the postindustrial world. Now a major industrial power with a high standard of living, Italy is still ruled by a DC-dominated government Assessment of various facets of political activity permits identification of changes in progress. The crisis of DC party organization, leadership, and support groups, for example, shows an increasing divergence from the basic trends in national life. Study of regional, provincial, and communal levels of government and election results also suggests that traditional assess- ments of parties' strengths, particularly of the DC, based solely on national election results are inaccurate. The evidence is insufficient to indicate whether the DC will achieve true renewal or suffer imminent and dramatic decline. One thing is clear: the nature of the party's power and role in government is changing. Even though its traditional interclass appeal is disappearing and its ability to deliver spoils is declining, the DC may retain at least 28 to 30 percent of 111 Confidential EUR 82-10020 March 1982 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 the electorate for the near future and is assured of a major share of national life for some years to come. Fut the DC's longstanding inability to govern except in coalition will become progressively more subject to increased demands from potential partners. Coalitions of opposites in Italy are sanctioned by more than a century of practice. Hence a modus vivendi between the DC and PCI is not without precedent. Should that occur, however, the DC would suffer some shrink- age of its electorate, and conservative factional elements might bolt the party. Thus, should current trends continue, there will be a reduction of DC power in the next few years. Crisis is endemic in the DC's history, yet it has continued to survive against all predictions. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, continued juxtaposition of postindustrial society to a DC-dominated government described as a "35-year Watergate" is ultimately a volatile mixture. Confidential iv Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Contents 25X1 Page Overview 111 The Church versus State Antecedent 7 Party Structure 10 The Formal Organization 10 The Factions 13 Party Finances 17 Party Membership 18 Auxiliary Support Organizations 26 Church-Related Support Groups 26 Sottogoverno and Clientelismo 31 Other Support Elements 34 The DC's Electoral Record 36 National Legislative Elections 38 Administrative Elections: The Regions 72 Administrative Elections: Provinces and Communes 81 DC Policy, the Other Parties, and Prognosis 98 Has the DC Lost the Way? 98 Leadership Vacuum? 101 Implications for US Policy 105 Appendix National Referendums and Elections for the European Parliament 107 DC Parliamentary Delegations and the Party's Hold on Power 114 The DC and the Italian Electorate 125 Tables 1. Parliamentary Members of the Christian Democratic National 13 Council, by Faction, February 1980 2. Central Directorate of Christian Democracy (As of 5 March 14 1980 Election) 3. Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78 21 4. Party Membership, by Sector (DC Records) 23 5. Party Membership, by Sector (DOXA Poll Organization) 23 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential 6. Social Background of Electorate by Party 24 7. Union Membership, 1976-80 35 8. Election for the Constituent Assembly, 2 June 1946 39 9. National Institutional Referendum, 2 June 1946 39 10. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1948 and 1953 41 11. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1958 and 1963 42 12. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1968 and 1972 43 13. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1976 and 1979 44 14. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1948 and 1953 45 15. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1958 and 1963 46 16. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1968 and 1972 47 17. Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1976 and 1979 48 18. Population by Geographical Region, 1951 and 1979 52 19. Population and Voting by Sex, 1948 and 1979 52 20. Eligible Voters by District, 1948 and 1979 61 21. Population by Administrative Region, Voting for the Chamber of Deputies, 1951 and 1979 63 22. Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 66 23. Senate: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 67 24. Ranking of Chamber of Deputies Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979 70 25. Ranking of Senate Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979 Elections 71 26. Party Composition of Regular Statute Region Governments 75 27. Regional Council Election Results in 15 Regular Statute Regions, 1970-80 76 28. Regional Council Election Results by Geographical Region, 1970-80 78 29. Regional Election Results in Five Special Statute Regions, 1968-81 80 30. Regional Election Returns, 1968-81 82 31. Provincial Council Results by Party in 91 Provinces 84 32. Provincial Council Election Returns by Party in 86 Provinces, 1975 and 1980 86 Confidential vi Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 ( Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uommential 25X1 33. City Council Election Results Shown With and Without Eight Major Cities, 1975 and 1980 91 34. Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1975 and 1981: A Composite of 98 Communes With More Than 5,000 Inhabitants 96 35. Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1976 and 1981, in Five Provincial Capitals 97 A-1. Results of May 1974 Divorce Referendum in Provincial Capitals Ranked in Order of Vote Favoring Retention of Divorce Bill 109 A-2. Returns of Election in Italy for the European Parliament, June 1979 110 A-3. European Parliamentary Election Vote Restructured by Chamber of Deputies Districts 112 A-4. Returns of Elections for the European Parliament, June 1979 if Presented as a Senate Election 113 A-5. Seniority of Christian Democratic Deputies, VIII Legislature 115 A-6. Women in Parliament 116 A-7. Preference Votes for Leading Christian Democratic Deputies 118 A-8. DC Chamber of Deputies Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979 118 A-9. Preference Votes for Selected DC Deputies, 1968-79 119 A-10. Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote 120 A-11. Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Personal Preference Vote 121 A-12. DC Senate Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979 122 A-13. Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 124 A-14. Ranking of Chamber Districts, by Percentage of Valid Ballots in Eight Parliamentary Elections 125 A-15. Senate: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast by Eligible Voters in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 126 A-16. Ranking of Senate Districts by Average Valid Ballots, 1948-79 127 A-17. Regular Statute Group, Tables A-17 Through A-24 129 A-25. Special Statute Group, Tables A-25 Through A-31 137 A-32. Provincial Council Election Results by Party in Geographical Regions, 1975 and 1980 144 A-33. Chamber of Deputies, Tables A-33 Through A-64 149 A-65. Senate, Tables A-65 through A-84 181 Figures 1. Italy: Administrative Regions 2 2. Structure of Government, 1981 3 3. The Governments of the Republic of Italy 5 vii Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 4. Structure of the Christian Democratic Party 11 5. Comparatative Growth of DC and PCI Membership, 1946-77 19 6. Christian emocratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78 22 7. Major Parties' Share of Vote, 1946-79 40 8. Composition of Constituent Assembly, 1946 40 9. Composition of Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79 49 10. Composition of Senate, 1948-79 50 11. Labor Force by Economic Sector, 1951-80 51 12. Urbanization and Support for the Christian Democrats, 1953-79 51 13. Population Change (1951-79) in Relation to DC Representation Change (1948-79) in the Chamber of Deputies; Shown by Political Region 53 14. Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79 55 15. Distribution of Seats by Electoral District (Region) 59 16. Change in DC Delegation Size by Geographic Region, 1948-79 65 17. Provincial Council Election Results by Party in 91 Provinces, 1960-80 85 18. Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist Parties Showing in Provincial Elections of 1975 87 19. Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist Parties Showing in Provincial Elections of 1980 89 20. City Council Election Results by City and Geographical Region-1975 93 21. City Council Election Resutls by City and Geographical Region-1980 95 A-1. Results of Divorce Referendum by Province, 1974 108 A-2. Results of Abortion Referendum by Province, 1981 110 A-3. Election Results for the Italian National Delegation to the European Parliament by Political Region-1979 111 A-4. Relative Ages of Parliamentary Delegations: DC, PCI, PSI, 1948-79 117 A-5. Tenure of Office for Christian Democratic Ministers and Under Secretaries, 1945-81 Back Pocket A-6. Showing of DC, PCI, and PSI in Regional Council Elections 146 A-7. Chamber of Deputies Districts 147 A-8. Senate Districts 148 NOTE: Throughout the text of this paper, in cases where place names differ in Italian and English the English name is used. In the figures, the Italian name is used in most instances. Confidential viii Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future Christian Democracy's emergence as a major political force is one of the most significant events in Western Europe since World War II. Five of the 10 member nations of the European Community have large par- ties of this bent, the dominant one being in Italy. The rather dramatic rise of Christian Democracy after the war stems from its appeal as a moderate center movement at a time when the right was discredited by nazism and fascism and the left was associated with Stalinism and the Soviet Union. Also the Christian Democratic appeal was broadly based because of the movement's adherence to Christian principles on hu- man rights, particularly those of the individual, as well as to democracy, class reconciliation, and trans- national cooperation and integration. While Christian Democracy's strength is its nonideological, wide-rang- ing approach to politics, its weakness is the lack of any firm and articulated creed of specific goals. Still, its mild conservatism attracts many adherents because of its defense of private property, aversion to Marxism, and general rejection of excessive state intervention. In essence, Christian Democracy has drawn together pragmatists of all classes who desire the resolution of problems through conciliation and compromise. In the Italian case, it has had the added appeal of providing a broad opening to Catholics who were long excluded from national politics in the wake of Church-state hostilities during and after Italian unification. Christian Democracy has varied considerably in each of the countries where it has developed. The very vagueness of its programs plus the diversity of par- ticular country experience fostered the growth of somewhat divergent groups under the same label. This is particularly true of the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) because of the Holy See's presence in Italy. Much more so than elsewhere, century-old conflicts between Church and state in Italy still influence an Italian's perception of the role of the Vatican and of Catholics in public affairs. It is thus the prime example of the cliche that Italy has a long historic memory. 1 From 10 December 1945 to 28 June 1981, in unbro- ken sequence, governments headed by Christian Democratic premiers governed Italy (see figure 3). Either alone or in coalition with smaller parties, the DC's record of 39 consecutive governments is un- equaled in the West. Only in Asia with the Liberal Democrats of Japan can a comparably long tenure be found. Unlike Japan, though, Italy has become virtu- ally synonymous with instability. Whereas many observers believe that Italy's frequent changes of government are indicative of weakness or fragility, the DC's persistent and pervasive presence suggests something quite different. Indeed, continuity of political administration in democracies is normally regarded as evidence of a sound body politic. And when compared with some of the lurches and wrench- ings of postwar France, Italy appears rather stolid. Admittedly, however, the number of government cri- ses in Italy is the stuff of which instability is made. Also, a decade of recurrent Red Brigade terrorist activity has given Italy high international visibility with overtones implying governmental impotence, no- tably in the 1978 abduction and murder of former Premier Aldo Moro. There are also the electoral gains made by the Communist Party in the 1970s as well as the returns on various issues submitted to referendum since that on divorce in 1974, all connoting growing challenge to DC rule. Furthermore, an average life- span of 11 months for cabinets is hardly characteristic of stable government. Examined in detail, however, Italy's political condi- tion seems to suggest stagnation or atrophy rather than instability. Government crises rarely have result- ed from fundamental political differences. Instead they have been more an exercise in political ritual? jockeying by rival DC factions?wherein the game is perpetually influenced by the DC and its involvement in all segments of national life. Governments have changed, but men and policies have remained monoto- nously similar. When a major shift has occurred, such as the Socialists' entry into the government in 1963, the change was contemplated well in advance and was Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 1 Italy: Administrative Regions i Sondrie rentino- Bolzan .?2/ Alto Adige Trento ? Political region boundary Province boundary Political region capital Province capital ?.11Friult- j, Vehozia Giclia Udine Aosta Varase -Bono t Pordenon ? ...-,..--Gorizi. a. .. -4.,.--- - Como Perham i Treviso. losta /.----? Novara Lorribardia Brescia Vicenza. ifeneiG rTile, csie,-, . Milan . Vercelli ,,4.- . ice PiemOnte. ,, '''.(Milno) Veikrie? Padua. a Pavia' C,15011qa Mantua '1;u , .i(Venezia) (Trourriingor ? -----A-,-.? ? - Pia enza Parma' - -11,k.sti ;Alessa '. ,_ Re gio? ?Modena- -Ferrara .Cuneo (7,li---,',. BeinZ4 C Emg Bologn ilia ? 4rniiia- . . Ravenna iN-r.) ,-.h. a ' . J? -..."--?,` Savona Romago France Forli _ / ..---Imperia Carrara\ ' ucca ?Pistoia _ n Marino42, . ma --4Monaco 1.13 8r0 Pi Flares ? ' r.0 En-(Firenze) 0 100 Kilometers 100 Miles Names and boundary r presentat are not necessarily authoritative. Yugoslavia Q,Corsica ' -?--/.111uoro) Sardinia,' Oristanir Sardinia ( Algeria r Tunisia ) Leghorn oscana ? Arezzo (Livorno Siena? 'E *Tunis Marche acerata? Astoli o ncona 'Perugia -ymbria Terni. ? Viterbo? Rich 'Grosseto Latio *Rome tina iota c'' Usbeq, Fr ?,"Pescara '?Chiek,_ AbraP.zi Is rnia Molise Cam amino sso .Fogg'a \ Caserta .BeRev to eOglia qui Nries Avellino Cer:pahisa otenza (Matera Bastlicata 0 Isola I. fon VII1,134 Trapan. Palermo in a ?Enna , 'Callinissena ? - Agrihe C 1 ys- Catania Ta Cosenza Calabfia Cau,aio (.R,aligtri. di Calabria Syracuse Siracusa) Brindisi ? Le rdi 628851 3-82 Confidential 2 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 2 Structure of Government, 1981 Parliament Senate 315 7 Chamber of Deputies 630 President Prime Minister Council of Ministers Regional AssemblyRegional Commissioner Provincial Council Communal Council Electorate Executive Council President ?????......................... Prefect Executive Council President Communal Secretary Executive Council Mayor Election Appointment - Supervision Approval 585802 2-82 3 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 3 The Governments of the Republic of Italy Legend DC-Christian Democratic Party PSDI-Social Democratic Party PSLI-Workers' Socialist Party (later became PSDI) PSI-Socialist Party PLI-Liberal Party PRI-Republican Party PdA-Action Party PSU-Unified Socialist Party (temporary name of PSI and PSDI) PCI-Communist Party MSI-Italian Social Movement (Neo-Fascist party) DL-Democratic Labor Party Party Affiliation (Coalition) Months in Office= 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 Dates in Office Crisis Lengtha (days)! I Parentheses indicate party giving external support Alcide De Gasperi I-DC (DC, PCI, PSI, PRI, PLI, PdA, DL) --ri 10 Dec 1945- 1 Jul 1946 12 Constituent Assembly Alcide De Gasperi II-DC (DC, PCI, PSI, PRI) -I 13 Jul 1946-20 Jan 1947 13 Elected 2 June 1946 Alcide De Gasperi III-DC (DC, PCI, PSI) Ll 2 Feb 1947-13 May 1947 18 Alcide De Gasperi IV-DC (DC, PSLI, PRI, PLI) II 31 May 1947-12 May 1948 11 Legislature I Alcide De Gasperi V-DC (DC, PSLI, PLI, PRI) q 23 May 1948-12 Jan 1950 15 Elected 18 April 1948 Alcide De Gasperi VI-DC (DC, PSLI, PRI) L 27 Jan 1950-16 Jul 1951 10 Alcide De Gasperi VII-DC (DC and PRI) I 26 Jul 1951-29 Jun 1953 17 Legislature II Alcide De Gasperi VIII-DC (DC) _Li 16 Jul 1953-28 Jul 1953 20 Elected 7 June 1953 Giuseppe Pella-DC (DC) 11 17 Aug 1953- 5 Jan 1954 13 Amintore Fanfani 1-DC (DC) II 18 Jan 1954-30 Jan 1954 11 Mario Scelba-DC (DC, PSDI, PLI) 1 10 Feb 1954-22 Jun 1955 14 Antonio Segni I-DC (DC) II 6 Jul 1955- 6 May 1957 13 Adone Zoli-DC (DC) U 19 May 1957-19 Jun 1958 12 Legislature III Amintore Fanfani II-DC (DC) 1 Jul 1958-26 Jan 1959 20 Elected 25 May 1958 Antonio Segni II-DC (DC) LI 15 Feb 1959-24 Feb 1960 30 Fernando Tambroni-DC (DC) A 25 Mar 1960-19 Jul 1960 7 Amintore Fanfani III-DC (DC, PSDI, PLI, PRI (PSI)) 1 26 Jul 1960- 2 Feb 1962 19 Amintore Fanfani IV-DC (DC, PSDI, PRI, PLI (PSI)) 1 I 21 Feb 1962-15 May 21 Jun 1963- 5 Nov 1963 1963 37 29 I I Legislature IV Giovanni Leone I-DC (DC) Elected 28 April 1963 Aldo Moro I-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI) I 4 Dec 1963-26 Jun 1964 26 Aldo Moro II-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI) 22 Jul 1964-21 Jan 1966 33 Aldo Moro III-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI) ii 23 Feb 1966- 5 Jun. 1968 19 Legislature V Giovanni Leone II-DC (DC) I I 24 Jun 1968-19 Nov 1968 23 Elected 19 May 1968 Mariano Rumor I-DC (DC, PSU, PRI) I 12 Dec 1968- 5 Jul 1969 26 Mariano Rumor II-DC (DC (PSI and PSU)) 1 I 5 Aug 1969- 7 Feb 1970 48 Mariano Rumor III-DC (DC, PSU, PRI) 11 27 Mar 1970- 6 Jul 1970 31 Emilio Colombo-DC (DC, PSI, PSU, PRI) 1 6 Aug 1970-15 Jan 1972 33 Giulio Andreotti I-DC (DC(PL1)) I I 17 Feb 1972-26 Feb 1972 121 Legislature VI Giulio Andreotti II-DC (DC, PSDI, PLI(PRI)) I 26 Jun 1972-12 Jun 1973 25 Elected 7 May 1972 Mariano Rumor IV-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI) Il 7 Jul 1973- 2 Mar 1974 12 Mariano Rumor V-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI) I I 14 Mar 1974- 3 Oct 1974 51 Aldo Moro IV-DC (DC, PRI(PSI and PSDI) I 23 Nov 1974- 7 Jan 1976 36 Aldo Moro V-DC (DC) I I 12 Feb 1976-30 Apr 1976 90 Legislature VII Giulio Andreotti III-DC (DC(PSI and PCI)) I I 29 Jul 1976-16 Jan 1978 54 Elected 20 June 1976 Giulio Andreotti IV-DC (DC(PSI, PSDI, PI, PRI, PLI)) 1 11 Mar 1978-31 Jan 1979 48 Giulio Andreotti V-DC (DC, PSDI, PRI) I I 20 Mar 1979-31 Mar 1979 126 Legislature VIII Francesco Cossiga I-DC (DC, PSI, PRI) 4 Aug 1979-13 Mar 1980 22 Elected 3 June 1979 Francesco Cossiga II-DC (DC, PSI, PRI) I 4 Apr 1980-29 Sep 1980 19 Arnaldo Forlani-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI) I I 18 Oct 1980-26 May 1981 33 Giovanni Spadolini-PRI (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI) 28 Jun 1981- aGovernments are said to be "in crisis" from the time an incumbent cabinet resigns until its successor takes office. In the crisis period, the outgoing government serves in caretaker capacity. 585803 2-82 5 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential accepted virtually as a necessity even by those origi- nally opposed to it. Viewed in broad perspective, this and other shifts are examples of how Italian politics tend to move more in the context of geologic time than in conventional political frames. The characteristic torpor of Italian politics may, however, be coming to an end, albeit in slow motion. Analysis of regional and national elections as well as returns on referendums demonstrates that something is changing. In the midst of such protracted change, what might ultimately emerge is more difficult to ascertain than elements in the transition process. Terrorism and the Italian public's response to it, for example, are symptomatic of exasperated impatignce and frustration. The years of dramatic terrorist acts would seem to imply an eventual and unavoidable backlash or public outburst. Yet the passage of so many years of flamboyant incidents without decisive public outcry has become a particularly Italianate phenomenon. Terrorism in this instance must be regarded with caution, however, for it is a symptom of something more profoundly alarming in Italian life. Whether or not the Red Brigades and other terrorists, left or right, are aided from abroad is not the critical aspect of the situation. Instead, these assaults on the system are violent warnings of a profound dislocation which continues to feed lawlessness and which in turn can be exploited from outside. The Christian Democrats, and to varying extents their occasional coalition allies, carry great responsibility for the immobilism and unfulfilled promises that have frustrated the Italian people, driving some to the point of murder and mayhem. The roots of this violence and the seedbed in which it flourishes are widely viewed by Italians as deriving from years of failure by the government to resolve persistent problems and provide an effective response to national -expectations. Blam- ing the Christian Democrats alone for this state of affairs is simplistic, but as the only constant stewards of national affairs for 35 years they become a facile scapegoat. No objective analysis of contemporary , Italian affairs can thus avoid careful assessment of DC leadership and the party's role in guiding the nation, as well as a look at what can be expected of Italian Christian Democracy in the future. 7 The Church versus State Antecedent The image of the DC in Italian minds can be fully comprehended only through an awareness of the role of Catholics in the last century of national life. Unusual as the longevity of this phenomenon may seem to outsiders, Catholics and Catholicism?the question of Church and state?is the oldest continu- ing theme in Italian politics. Christian Democracy's rule is but the central manifestation of the phenom- enon since 1945. In addition, one must remember that if political conduct in Italy is Byzantine, it derives from centuries of foreign domination when duplicity, subterfuge, corruption, and myriad devious devices were justified as necessary for survival until they became a way of life. Italy's unification process was shot through with conflict between the papacy and the secular forces seeking to create a nation state. Church opposition to national unification hardened in 1870 when the King- dom of Italy seized the city of Rome, ending papal temporal authority. Pius IX then forbade Catholics under pain of excommunication to participate in the affairs of what he regarded as a usurper state. Only in 1904, and then in limited and oblique fashion, was that prohibition lifted to permit Catholics to throw their weight into any electoral district where leftist or anticlerical elements might otherwise win a seat in Parliament. Again in the national election of 1913 restrictions were further relaxed to allow Catholic candidates for the first time to run against leftists. Finally, with Benedict XV's grudging acquiscence in 1919, all constraints on Catholic involvement in Ital- ian politics were lifted. A Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo, then founded the Italian Popular Party (PPI), Italy's first confessional party and the forerunner of today's DC. As in previous Catholic political initia- tives the PPI was directed largely against Marxist elements in national politics. Until January 1921, when the Communist Party (PCI) was founded, the principal vehicle of Marxism in Italy was the Socialist Party (PSI). Whether in opposition initially to the Socialists or subsequently also to the Communists, anti-Marxism was as important in the founding of the PPI as it was in the establishment of the DC in the fi- nal years of World War II. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential If the hostility of the Vatican toward the Italian state is comprehensible, the Church's opposition to later Catholic initiatives in politics is harder to grasp. The first man to be elected to the Italian Parliament as a Catholic, the priest Romolo Murri in 1909, was defrocked and excommunicated. That incident and others illustrate ongoing tensions within the Catholic community itself. Catholic political activity in Italy developed and still continues to work either in spite of the Vatican or as a weapon used by the Church to oppose certain initiatives within the Italian political arena. Thus, one cannot assume that the DC is always and automatically subservient to the Vatican's wishes. On occasion each has done the other's bidding, but instances of divergence are not at all uncommon. Anti-Marxism remains the fundamental tenet not only of the Church but also for the DC, and it cannot be overemphasized as a central force in 20th century Italian Catholic political organizations. To a large segment of the Italian public, however, this appears as a negative initiative when directed against social and economic reform. Of equal significance in many Italian minds is the onus of Church accommodation with Mussolini in the Lateran Pacts of 1929. In short, a whole fabric of opposition to Italy or of complicity with the fascist dictatorship remains even today in the minds of many Italians when they think of Church involvement in national life?that of an occasional and unwelcome intruder whose interests are not fun- damentally Italian. This is the record which the DC, as a party of Catholics, has had to contend with since its founding. Not even the active and well-known participation in the resistance to fascism by some members of the DC sufficed to remove the wariness Italians feel for the Church in politics. If the DC has achieved a relatively favorable record in light of such obstacles, explanations are not hard to find. First, Italy is a nation of Catholics (as opposed to a Catholic nation) where reconciliation of State and Church opened the door to political activity for a massive group of previously alienated citizens, the largest single political bloc in the country. Second, in the aftermath of World War II and the simultaneous civil conflict which swept the country, the DC offered a healing alternative, an outlet for Catholic social Confidential aspirations favoring interclass cooperation, free enter- prise, and personal rights. While Stalin's Russia cast an ominous shadow over Europe, the DC stood for alliance with the West. In addition, with the removal of the monarchy by referendum in 1946, the DC, as representative of the Church, the other principal traditional institution in Italy, stood in an extremely favorable position to fill the resultant power vacuum. Still, as these factors recede in importance, the DC's lack of a well-defined political credo inevitably leaves it without the appeal of some of the other parties. Today's Christian Democratic Party was born in the summer of 1943 in semiclandestine circumstances after the fall of Mussolini but before the country was freed by Allied armies. The party dates its origins from several statements of principles and aspirations published by Alcide De Gasperi writing under the pseudonym of Demofilo. The first of these, Recon- structive Ideas of Christian Democracy, called for a party that was more a mutation than a continuation of the old PPI which Mussolini had suppressed. The two parties had in common the goal of promoting Chris- tian principles in the political world plus a direct political link to the Vatican. De Gasperi's program, however, was an odd blend of corporativism with a call for social reforms, individual freedom, the sancti- ty of private property, and the fostering of moral values, notably of the family. His first program merits mention primarily to underscore the degree to which the DC varies its aims, seemingly for advantages of the moment, a mode of conduct which opens the party to charges of opportunism. To call for any corporativ- ism in the aftermath of fascism and to speak of phasing out the proletariat?two major points in the early program?struck many at the time as odd. The first program has long since been abandoned and now seems even antithetical to programs the DC has fostered since. Nevertheless, the implied paternalism of the early program is in linear descent from the PPI and, before it, from the landmark encyclicals of Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (1891) and Graves de' corn- muni re (1901), which mark papal endorsement of Christian Democracy and the Catholic labor movement. 8 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uonlinential Despite the views it expressed, Christian Democracy attracted an unusually heterogeneous following in the wasteland of immediate postwar politics. Laymen and clerics, as well as progressives and conservatives, fell in behind De Gasperi. The disparate groups and individuals which joined at the outset were precursors of internal factions whose constant struggles are the hallmark of the party today. Individuals who stand out in the early DC represent a broad spectrum of political experience, some even tainted by association with the fascist regime, as in the case of Amintore Fanfani. The DC benefited from several organizations whose existence Mussolini tolerated even though he and the fascists did not wholly control them. Hence the early DC profited from having in place some Catholic groups made up of individuals who had not been in hiding or in exile. The Vatican itself, of course, provided a haven of sorts for future DC leaders to escape Mussolini and still remain physically in Italy, significant among them being De Gasperi himself. Catholic Action, the lay group promoting Church interests, as well as the Federation of Catholic Uni- versity Students,' out of which Guilio Andreotti and others came, provided the first organizational spring- boards for the DC. If such men and organizations proved useful for the party's launching, the legal and institutional carryovers from the fascist regime that they sanctioned are another matter. The DC not infrequently has been faulted for this, and it has proved a source of embarrassment as well as an obstacle to realization of various democratic reforms. Some aspects of the immediate postwar years have special relevance to the contemporary scene. Specifi- cally, the DC's occasional staunch stand against Marxist parties is not a phenomenon of the years immediately after 1945. The makeup of the Constitu- ent Assembly, as well as the constitution it produced, demonstrate the strength of both the PCI and the PSI (see figure 8). As a consequence, despite its opposition to Marxism, the DC was not initially strong enough to practice ideological purity. Its collaboration with both Socialists and Communists was a matter of necessity until in 1947 in his fourth ministry De Gasperi was able to exclude them from government. Also the DC 'See below, page 28 9 did not consolidate its power in 1948 merely because of its accomplishments or US backing. Heavyhanded actions of the Soviet Union, particularly in Czechoslo- vakia, were as great an assist to the DC as any tactical error or shortcoming on the part of the PCI or PSI. Thus, the habit of DC predominance dates from April 1948, with the first election for a Parliament under the new Constitution. The essence of the Italian Christian Democrats, to say the least, is not easily understood abroad. No other Italian or European party is analogous, and the nearest valid comparison?that of an American party?is misleading. Further complicating matters, the DC has become nearly indistinguishable from the Italian Government itself, an unusual situation in a parliamentary democracy. As a movement appealing to a vast number of interests, it is more an umbrella over a series of differing political viewpoints, a coali- tion of factions, some of which seem diametrically opposed. Its continued existence and dominance are as easily explained by historical circumstances as by its record of achievements. And its longevity of power is as easily explained by the unifying link of the Church as it is by any recognition of mutual self-interest and enjoyment of power shared by its component groups and leaders. Not the least of the vital elements in its survival is Italy's so-called imperfect two-party sys- tem, an allusion to the lack of a loyal opposition because of continuing doubts about the PCI's true allegiance. While Italy ranks in the top 10 of the world's powers by many criteria, the country still has one foot in the Third World in terms of political development, further clouding an already confusing impression. If Italian politics seem almost frozen in the past, the country's social and economic develop- ment have nevertheless progressed dramatically since World War II. As a result of these factors, an assessment of the Christian Democrats virtually approximates a review of contemporary Italy. This paper seeks to ascertain the status of Christian Democracy?its strengths, leadership, and relations with other parties and orga- nizations?as well as some indications of what the future may hold for the party and, unavoidably, for Italy. The central theme of this analysis is that a Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 fundamental change is slowly taking shape in Italy, a shift that appears to pivot on the returns of national consultations at the polls between 1974 and 1976 and which implies the erosion of Christian Democratic strength. Although nothing currently suggests that the party might disappear, many factors imply that its nature and success will be affected and doubtless altered in the relatively near future. The nature of the Italian electorate for some years is such that the DC, or a near likeness of it, will long remain among the nation's top three political parties. Party Structure For a party of such long-lived electoral success, the DC is surprisingly short on functioning organization and discipline in the conventional sense. Also, its membership fluctuates dramatically, with occasional temporary declines in some areas of as much as 50 percent (see following section on party membership). In all these aspects, the DC contrasts strikingly with its major rival, the PCI. Occasionally there have been serious attempts to correct this problem, the first and most effective being when Amintore Fanfani was party secretary in the 1950s. But today it remains only erratically well organized despite efforts in the mid- and late 1970s to achieve a rinnovamento (re- newal) following its electoral shocks of the middle of that decade. The DC's organization and daily functioning are best understood if viewed on two distinct levels: the formal structure and the actual working elements. In theory the party has a precise and elaborate organization ranging from thousands of local sections nationwide through the National Council, Central Directorate, Party Secretary, and President (see figure 4). How- ever, this system functions rather sporadically, usually in weeks prior to either a national party congress or elections. In practice, the DC is an amalgam of factions?something the Italians call correnti (cur- rents)?and a vast network of support organizations (on the latter, see the following section). The Formal Organization Today's DC organization is based on the new party statute drafted over a four-year period and published in 1979. The document purports to be the foundation of the party's renewal process. Despite the time spent on its preparation, careful reading shows that even Confidential when it took effect such important sectors as the youth and women's movements still remained to be completed. DC setbacks and losses from 1974 through 1976 forced many of the changes. For example, such innovations as direct election of the party secretary by the national congress rather than by the National Council sought to create "a wide open party." Al- though the changes attempted to make the party more genuinely democratic, the effort is a typically DC approach to problem solving: a reaction to conditions rather than a spontaneous initiative for revitalization. Many of the changes in party organization, it was said, were necessary because of fundamental innova- tions in the structure of the nation such as the enactment of the administrative regions. However, five regions had been in existence for years and the remaining 15 were put in place in 1970, nine years before the DC got around to adopting a statute reflecting this most important of Italian postwar administrative reforms. The 128 articles of the DC statute consider, in great detail, all aspects of party operation from individual membership requirements through the duties and functions of the top hierarchical organs and officials. Nevertheless the ongoing activity of the party sug- gests that the statute serves more as a statement of ideals or aspirations than as a binding constitution. As an example, it lays down specific requirements of moral and political conduct which in practice are made a mockery by the party's continuing production of scandals. What is new in party organization is the more precise outline for its structure as well as the election of functionaries in a manner parallel to the various levels of government where the party competes for office: communes, provinces, regions, and the nation as a whole. Provision is also made to favor those adminis- trative areas where DC election successes most fre- quently occur, presumably giving an incentive to the ambitious rank and file to work more actively for party candidates. On the other hand, although the regions are now second only to the nation in impor- tance, DC regional officials have yet to gain the influence still enjoyed by provincial leaders, notably the provincial political secretary who remains a lead- ing power broker for those seeking to launch political careers. 10 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 4 Structure of the Christian Democratic Party ?Line of election ?Line of appointment or coordination National Congress Regional Pre-Congress DC Parliamentary Delegations 585804 2-82 President Political Nat'onal Council Central Directorate (80 DC parliamentarians; 80 Executive Administrative noriparliamentarians; chairman Board Secretary Secretary Consultative Assembly of Body of Regions Regional Councillors of DC parliamentary delegations; DC regional secretaries; other members.) Regional Congress Regional Committee Regional Directorate Executive Board Regional Secretariat Provincial Congress --Provincial Committee..... Community Committee -x-N 3 ...--.....?............., 1 Provincial Directorate Community Directorate 3 3 Secretariat Executive Board Community Council 3 Secretary ...--"------ Sectional Directorate ?.-Secretary District Committee I 1 Sectional Assembly District Council 1 3 Secretary Local Section 11 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 National Congresses of the Christian Democratic Party 1. Rome, 24-28 April 1946 8. 2. Naples, 16-20 November 9. 1947 3. Venice, 2-5 June 1949 10. 4. Rome, 21-26 November 1952 11. 5. Naples, 26-29 June 1954 12. 6. Trento, 14-18 October 1956 13. 14. 15. 7. Florence, 23-28 October 1959 Naples, 27-30 June 1962 Rome, 12-16 September 1964 Milan, 23-28 November 1967 Rome, 27-30 June 1969 Rome, 6-10 June 1973 Rome, 18-24 March 1976 Rome, 15-21 February 1980 Tentatively scheduled for late April 1982 At the top of the party pyramid is the national congress, an assembly of delegates elected by local sections and regional congresses and including the DC members of Parliament. The Congress?in theory? meets every two years unless summoned into special session by the political secretary or a two-thirds majority of the National Council. It deliberates on general party policy and elects the national political secretary by secret ballot from a field of at least 30 candidates from 10 or more regions. The political secretary is, in effect, the party's chief executive officer with responsibility for coordinating and promoting the DC's activities according to the wishes of the National Council and Central Director- ate (see tables 1 and 2). As a matter of practical politics, the political secretary is normally a figure acceptable to the party's major factions. The party president is elected by the National Coun- cil, and the job tends to go to the head of the, most in- fluential faction. In practice the presidency has be- come as powerful as an incumbent can make it. While Aldo Moro was party president, he greatly oversha- dowed Benigno Zaccagnini, the political secretary. Today's incumbent, Arnaldo Forlani, creates the im- pression of being?at best and only on occasion?the equal of Flaminio Piccoli, the political secretary. Confidential Christian Democratic Party Political Secretaries 1. Alcide de Gasperi 2. Attilio Piccioni 3. Giuseppe Cappi 4. Paolo Emilio Taviani 5. Alcide De Gasperi 6. Amintore Fanfani 7. Aldo Moro 8. Mariano Rumor 9. Flaminio Piccoli 10. Arnaldo Forlani 11. Amintore Fanfani 12. Benigno Zaccagnini 13. Arnaldo Forlani 14. Flaminio Piccoli April 1946?September 1947 September 1947?May 1948 May 1948?April 1950 April 1950?September 1953 September 1953?July 1954 July 1954?February 1959 February 1959?September 1964 September 1964?January 1969 January-November 1969 November 1969?June 1973 June 1973?July 1975 July 1975?January 1980 January-November 1980 November 1980? The National Council is the party's deliberative body and theoretically must meet at least once every three months, although this rule is not carefully observed. Its membership is composed of 160 people elected by the national congress, 80 from Parliament and 80 nonparliamentary. In addition, seats are held by the prime minister, most current and past DC cabinet ministers, plus the chairmen of the DC parliamentary delegations, and regional secretaries. Ex officio mem- bers include under secretaries, editors of the party's national publications, and other party functionaries. The true inner sanctum of DC power is the Central Directorate. Using the proportional method, to reflect the strength and importance of party factions, the National Council elects the Central Directorate, largely from its own membership; the Directorate determines party political programs and even deliber- ates on the resolution of cabinet crises. In practice this is the forum where party factions work out their differences and make deals. The Directorate is sum- moned and chaired by the political secretary, who is usually the leader of the party's most powerful faction or is a figure acceptable to it and the other major factions. To carry out the daily business of the party, the secretary is assisted by deputy secretaries and the heads of various party offices who are frequently 12 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 1 Parliamentary Members of the Christian Democratic National Council, by Faction, February 1980 Dorotei Abis, Senator Lucio Bisaglia, Senator Antonio Campagnoli, Deputy Mario Castelli, Senator Angelo Danesi, Deputy Emo Degan, Deputy Costante Ferrari-Aggradi, Senator Mario Gaspari, Deputy Remo Gava, Deputy Antonio Lattanzio, Deputy Vito Mazzola, Deputy Franco Micheli, Deputy Filippo Petrucci, Deputy Amerigo Piccoli, Deputy Flaminio, Faction Leader Pucci, Deputy Ernesto Ruffini, Deputy Attilio Scarlato, Deputy Vincenzo Sedati, Deputy Giacomo Tesini, Deputy Giancarlo Area Zac ("Base") nselmi. Denutv Tina Bodrato, Deputy Guido Bonalumi, Deputy Gilberto Cabras, Deputy Paolo Cossiga, Deputy Francesco Dell' Andro, Deputy Renato De Mita, Deputy Ciriaco Fracanzani, Deputy Carlo Galloni, Deputy Giovanni Giglia, Deputy Luigi Granelli, Senator Luigi Grippo, Deputy Ugo Gui, Deputy Luigi Gullotti, Deputy Antonino Kessler, Deputy Bruno Ligato, Deputy Lodovico Marcora, Deputy Giovanni Martinazzoli, Senator Mino Martini, Deputy Maria Eletta Misasi, Deputy Riccardo Pisanu, Deputy Giuseppe Salvi,-Deputy Franco Zaccagnini, Deputy Beniamino, Faction Leader Andreottiani Andreotti, Deputy Giulio, Faction Leader Bisagno, Deputy Tommaso Carenini, Deputy Egidio Cristofori, Deputy Adolfo Nino Drago, Deputy Antonino Evangelisti, Deputy Franco Quattrone, Deputy Franco Scotti, Deputy Vincenzo Signorello, Senator Nicola Tantalo, Deputy Michele Fanfaniani Arnaud, Deputy Gian Aldo Bartolomei, Senator Giuseppe Bosco, Deputy Manfredi d'Arezzo, Senator Bernardo Darida, Deputy Clelio Fanfani, Senator Amintore, Faction Leader Forlani, Deputy Arnaldo Gioia, Deputy Giovanni Giuseppe Malfatti, Deputy Franco Maria Scalfaro, Deputy Oscar Luigi Forze Nuove Andreoni, Deputy Giovanni Colombo, Senator Vittorino Donat Cattin, Senator Carlo, Faction Leader Faraguti, Deputy Luciano Leccisi, Deputy Pino Mannino, Deputy Calogero Mazzarino, Deputy Mario Morazzoni, Deputy Gaetano Russo, Deputy Vincenzo Sinesio, Deputy Giuseppe Spitella, Senator Giorgio Tiriolo, Senator Elio Toros, Senator Mario Valiante, Senator Mario Proposta Bonferroni, Deputy Franco Mazzotta, Deputy Roberto Prandini, Deputy Gianni Segni, Deputy Mario members of parliament and representative of the factions. This staff in some ways resembles a shadow government, but it also mirrors the factional divisions and power relationships in the DC. Fundamental to the successful management of the party and its national office is a modicum of harmony among these elements, something which depends greatly on the skill of the political secretary. The Factions Difficult though they are to define, the factions of the DC are the essence of the party, the fundamental practical dimension which does not appear on any formal organization chart. 13 Factionalism has been a prominent feature of Italian political life since the country's unification, and to a degree not found in other countries. Most Italian parties have factions, but only those of the DC have become veritable miniparties. The phenomenon also is typical of the Catholic political movement in Italy and predates the founding of the DC; the factions are an unfortunate reflection of the experience of the old PPI. Because the DC is a large party appealing to all classes of society, some such divisions are inevitable. It is their degree of institutionalization, though, which is unique. Their relations with each other and to the party as a whole largely determine the DC's conduct. The number of factions at any time may vary, but the divergence of their views is wide enough to ensure that almost any act of one will contravene the interests of at least one other. Thus it is difficult to move the Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 2 Central Directorate of Christian Democracy (As of 5 March 1980 Election) President a Political Secretary Deputy Political Secretaries Arnaldo Forlani (Fanfaniano) Flaminio Piccoli (Doroteo) Ciriaco de Mita (Area Zac) Vittorino Colombo (Forze Nuove) Editor of II Popolo Franco Maria Malfatti (Fanfaniano) Editor of La Discussione Corrado Belci (Area Zac) Number of Percent of Number of Percent of Representatives Membership Representatives Membership Dorotei 7 22 Franco Evangelisti Emo Danesi Salvatore Lima Mario Ferrari Aggradi Nicola Quarta Remo Gaspari Antonio Gaya Vito Lattanzio Corrado Montemaggiori Vincenzo Scarlato Area Zac (Base) Corrado Belci Guido Bodrato Ciriaco De Mita Giovanni Galloni Luigi Gui 9 28 Nino Gullotti Riccardo Misasi Franco Salvi Andreottiani 4 12.5 Giulio Andreotti Fanfaniani 4 12.5 Gian Aldo Arnaud Angelo Becciu Manfredi Bosco Giovanni Gioia Forze Nuove 6 19 Emilio Colombo Carlo Donat Cattin Luciano Faraguti Sandro Fontana Mario Mazzarino Vincenzo Russo Proposta 2 6 Roberto Mazzotta Gianni Prandini Total 32 100 a Also included as members with right to vote: the Prime Minister, the heads of the DC delegations of the Chamber and the Senate, Gerardo Bianco and Giorgio Di Giuseppe; ex party secretaries Fanfani, GoneIla, Rumor, Taviani, and Zaccagnini, the delegate of the Women's Movement, Gabriella Ceccatelli, and the delegate of the Youth Movement, Marco Follini. Confidential 14 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential party because consensus is difficult to reach. The worst aspect of factionalization is the uncertainty it creates for the party, because defection by even one group can threaten the life of DC-led governments. No doubt a majority of the government crises since World War II has been caused by factional disputes within the DC. This phenomenon also underscores another unfortunate aspect of factionalization?the virtual merger of party and government under the DC's dominance. In effect, factional competition for control of the party has become practically synony- mous with control of the national government, and this in no small degree has heightened public cynicism about the DC and the governing process. Factionalism is not, however, wholly without virtue. Factions provide outlets for the party's diverse con- stituency because almost any interest group can find a "current" with which to identify. Also, endless com- petition among the groups fosters, willy-nilly, continu- ing policy debate as well as a system through which more than one set of leaders can rise to the top, thus providing leadership options at all times. Factions also provide an easy mechanism for semiofficial contact with other parties where similar views can be found, thus creating the bridges crucial to the formation of government coalitions. Conversely, this can and does dull the distinctions between government and opposi- tion. Because the Italian parliamentary system does not have politically "acceptable" or numerically via- ble alternative parties strong enough to form a gov- ernment, the interplay of factions seems to have been rationalized into filling the role of "loyal" opposition. As a constraint on the party in power, this arrange- ment is far from ideal. No statement about a faction remains valid for any significant length of time. Not only does factional composition often vary, but the faction itself may move back and forth across the political spectrum. Since the war some factional labels have remained constant, and a few individuals have not varied their ideological stands. Nevertheless, the ideological con- tent and orientation associated with a given faction can be quite fluid. If one were to trace this phenom- enon in the career of an individual, that of Amintore Fanfani probably would be the most illuminating. In the course of his 35 years in Parliament, Fanfani has 15 at one time or another been associated with several factions and been labeled as leftist, rightist, and occasionally in the center. Although the composition and ideology of factions change constantly, these features may be caught momentarily, like a snapshot, at national party con- gresses. The voting at the most recent congress in February 1980 shows six factions in the DC (tables 1 and 2 show factional alignments). At that time ideo- logical positions were somewhat more clear than normal because the congress voted on a "preamble," a broad statement of principle rejecting collaboration with the PCI (see text in box). In the summer of 1981 this preamble's principle was rejected by the National Council, indicating that factional alignments had once again shifted.' Even so, at more normal congress- es, it is the votes for the lists of candidates for election to the National Council presented by the various currents that show a faction's strength. The next such opportunity to catch a snapshot will be at the Nation- al Congress scheduled for April 1982. While Alcide De Gasperi lived, factionalism existed only on the edges of the party because he enjoyed such widespread support in the center as to mute the impulse to division. Despite his personal resistance to factionalism, De Gasperi and his Centristi (Centrists) group acquired a distinction within the DC commen- surate with their political position.' Although some other DC leaders of De Gasperi's time tried to promote their views and create a personal following, the welter of groups whose names are the key to internal party evolution began to appear in the early 1950s. The first significant attempt at forming a group was the left-leaning Politica Sociale (Social Policy) faction in the late 1940s led by Giovanni Gronchi, formerly a Catholic labor leader and later Factional changes at the Council meeting of 31 July to 2 August 1981 were too fluid to indicate a clear new alignment. All accounts agree, however, that the center-right "Preamblist" majority no longer exists and that the new orientation appears to be moving center left. It is currently referred to as the "management major- ity." See below page 17. ' In this instance the name of the current is self-explanatory, but often such is not the case. Normally, a faction's label is derived from its relative political position within the party, a place where it meets, a leader's name, or the title of the faction's paper or journal. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Preamble The fourteenth national congress of Christian Democracy: In the face of the country's grave problems, as well as those in the in- ternational sphere, burdened by tension which Soviet expansionism has accentuated with its passage to direct aggression and with the threat to the energy resources of the economy of the industrialized world; Expresses the conviction that a course out of these difficulties can be successfully followed so long as the Party is oriented, now and henceforth, by the principles and values of its popular and democratic tradition which have given it strength in the past to assemble a broad and lasting consensus and in the role of guide for the founding of the Republic, developing freedom, promoting civil, social, and economic progress, with the extraordinary transforma- tion of the country within the guaranteed framework of democratic institutions; It is aware that the Italian people today demand a more efficacious and intense struggle against the terrorist threat to the state and a firm and intelligent effort to coordinate the active will with which the great majority of its citizens are working to overcome economic difficulties; Confirms the unflagging pledge of Christian Democracy to uphold Western solidarity and that of the Atlantic Community as the fundamental instruments of defense and the essential means of discouraging the system of aggression and to hasten formation of balances which constitute the indispensable foundation for the resumption of detente; Confirms as well that Christian Democracy will develop a line of economic policy capable of promoting the maintenance of income levels which have already been achieved, their expansion and, in addition, a better territorial and social distribution of these benefits, notable in the South, by means of planning, reinforcing the system's free economy characteristics, both of market and enterprise, in a manner that will insert the nation more and more into the European Community as well as into the competition between free, industrial- ized economies. The fourteenth congress of Christian Democracy expresses confi- dence in and approval of the Cossiga government with loyal recognition to the parties which collaborate with it, support it, and permit it to work toward a more broadly based political equilibrium. The congress, while noting the evolution achieved to date by the Italian Communist Party, perceives that the contrasting positions still existing on clearly indicated problems do not permit Christian Democracy's assumption of any leadership coresponsibility with that party. The Congress entrusts the National Council of Christian Democracy with the task of promoting a political policy initiative which, with prior and open verification between the constitutional parties at the appropriate time and place, seeks to make the nation's government more safe and stable, in the spirit of national solidarity and of the recognition of equal dignity between the political forces which intend to collaborate. The fourteenth congress asks all organs of Christian Democracy, which?with their pledge?renew themselves, to work with diligent commitment to give the Party organizational force and a presence in society; directs to the voters an ardent and confident call to confirm and broaden their assent for the Party, also in the regional and administrative elections in the spring, in the assurance that Christian Democracy holds firmly in its hands and which will never permit the flag of liberty to be lowered for the Italian people. Rome, 21 February 1980 President of the Republic. Some would argue, how- ever, that Cronache Sociali (Social Chronicles), the leftist current founded by Giuseppe Dossetti in the same period, was the most important early faction because of the continuity of its rather intellectual viewpoint in subsequent groups. On the right, Vespa (The Wasp) developed in the mid-1950s, taking its name from a club where its membership gathered. This broad prototype of left, center, and right factions was present in the first legislature of 1948-53 and has remained more or less constant over the years, with an occasional proliferation to as many as nine or 10 simultaneously identifiable currents. The father of more recent DC factional organization is Amintore Fanfani who, following De Gasperi's death in 1954, organized Iniziativa Democratica Confidential (Democratic Initiative) from remnants of both Dosset- ti's and De Gasperi's followers; this was the majority faction through most of the 1950s. On the left two other groups formed: Forze Sociali (Social Forces), from the labor elements of the party, and La Base (The Base or Grass Roots), a more ideologically leftist force. To the right at that time was Primavera (Spring) headed by Giulio Andreotti. In 1959 Iniziativa Democratica split. Led by Mariano Rumor, its largest remnant formed the Dorotei, a center-right faction named for the Rome monastery where it gathered. This current remains the largest group in the party even if its leaders, membership, and political orientation have fluctuated. The Dorotei owe their long dominance in the party to a fairly consistent community of action with the followers of Aldo Moro, known as the Morotei, a current formed 16 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential during Moro's time as Prime Minister in the 1960s. While the latter tended to keep faith with the views of their leader after his death in 1978, members of this faction have slowly dispersed into other groups, pri- marily La Base. The Fanfaniani, those elements who went with Fanfani in the Iniziativa Democratica breakup, were also known by the name of their journal, Nuove Cronache (New Chronicles), and originally were cen- ter left. They, together with the more leftist labor union faction of Carlo Donat Cattin, Rinnovamento Democratico (Democratic Renewal), and a somewhat smaller Primavera on the right led by Andreotti, completed the major groupings of the first half of the 1960s. By 1980-81, the two strongest factions were the Dorotei and La Base. The latter is the largest compo- nent of the Area Zac (the Zaccagnini group); Dorotei holds 38 of the elective seats of the National Council (19 each from the parliamentary and nonparliamen- tary membership of the party) and Area Zac has 46. The Dorotei, whose followers possibly exceed those of Area Zac in number at the moment, is today's center current. The Zaccagnini group together with the Andreottiani (20 seats) are on their left. The group farthest to the right and the largest of that side of the spectrum is Donat Cattin's Forze Nuove (New Forces) (28 seats) which has been increasingly associated with the Fanfaniani (20 seats). The smallest group (8 seats), known as Proposta (Proposal), must be regarded as something of an unknown quantity whose most promi- nent members, Mario Segni and Roberto Mazzotta, are identified with conservative viewpoints. The occa- sional gravitation of Andrea Borruso and Massimo de Carolis toward Proposta also adds a certain quasi- clerical element. In any event, the so-called preambo- lista majority is a combination of Dorotei, Forze Nuove, and Fanfaniani, with support from parts of Proposta. Because governments have been controlled so long by the DC, it is hardly surprising to note that the choice of prime minister and the political orientation of his cabinet are reflections of factional relationships exist- ing when a government is formed. Not only does the most powerful current dominate the cabinet, but other factions share seats either as ministers or under 17 secretaries in rough relation to their influence. Thus the party's internal system of proportional power sharing appears in governments. Understanding this phenomenon is central to comprehending how internal DC conflict can bring down a government and to recognizing the degree to which party and govern- ment have merged. To attach any lasting or specific political ideology to any faction is ultimately risky. Until the summer of 1981 traditional party principles, often stronger among rightist factions, prevailed in the DC due to the strength of the Preamble majority. Pragmatic considerations?some would call it opportunism? have more commonly flourished on the left. The basic unifying element for all is maintenance of DC integri- ty (more factually accurate is mutual interest in holding on to power); even anti-Marxism is attenuated when leftist factions control the party. Except on issues involving religious principles?divorce and abortion, for example?Church interests and alle- giance to Catholic beliefs appear to follow all else. Reduced to bedrock, the pragmatic maintenance of power even more than the old belief that the party has a mandate to rule dominates DC conduct whoever the politician, whatever his faction. In practical terms, the DC is an oligarchy emanating from the various currents which in turn approximate miniparties under one umbrella that protects the power of all. Illustrative of the shared power motivation is the so- called management majority which replaced the Pre- amble group in August 1981. As the name implies, there is no dominant ideological current in the DC. This would indicate that Preamble principles are out and new factional jockeying is in progress which, according to who wins, will yield the new orientation and determine which DC figures enter the next governing combination. Party Finances The financing of political parties was long one of the better, kept secrets in Italy. To an extent this changed in 1974 with the passage of legislation providing public funding for parties and an annual publication of a financial report. Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed that major sources of income remain hidden and that published information is doctored. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential If expenses and expenditures for the DC cannot be determined with any precision, the nature of the party's income is reasonably well known. Essentially it derives from five sources: the state apparatus and the parastate industrial complex, contributions, party dues, subsidies under the 1974 law, and foreign subventions. In the first instance, the virtual merger of the DC and the Italian state provides numerous opportunities for the party to exploit its dominant position. The exam- ples are endless, but such practices as payment of extra commissions on public contracts, an additional sum on building licenses, acceptance of "gratuities" for the granting of special privileges or favors, or utilization of the so-called secret funds, a sort of slush fund that prime ministers have had at their disposal for almost a century, suggest a few of the available devices. The vast parastate industrial establishment (see section on Auxiliary Support Organizations) with its multibillion-dollar activities brought in enormous "contributions" until theoretically ended by the 1974 law. Contributions of a more conventional and less tainted nature come to the party from various inter- ests, but these are said to go almost exclusively to the individual factions, usually for support of a group whose political stance can promote the interests of wealthy backers. Doubtless the sums are occasionally quite large, but this is the least known of party income sources. There are also the dues paid by each DC member, but the fee is small enough (about $5 per head) to meet only a negligible part of the party's overall needs. The public law for party funding pro- vided that both election expenses and normal party operating expenses be subsidized in proportion to the party's demonstrated electoral strength. In 1978, for example, the DC thus received a total of almost 16 billion lire (approximately $18 million at the time), some 3 billion more than the PCI, the next largest recipient. Finally, as confirmed by the Pike and Church reports to the US Congress in the mid-1970s, various anti-Communist parties of Western Europe, including the DC, received considerable amounts of money from the United States after 1948. Confidential In some instances the handling of these matters has led to scandal. More than a few figures have had their careers terminated or put in eclipse by their involvement in such question- able activities. The public funding law's requirement that parties publish annual accounts of their income, public and private, has been obeyed; but few people take the reports at face value despite safeguards in the law for checking their accuracy. The DC's original obstruc- tionism to the legislation also caused various sectors to assume the party was reluctant to have its coffers inspected by the public, particularly since the new bill forbade parastate groups to pay any funds to political parties. When the law was submitted to a national referendum in 1978 and was approved by the public, the DC favored keeping it. Ethically, however, it could do no less. Beyond these general statements about party financ- ing, nothing more can be said with certainty. The DC appears to have adequate financing for its activities, but its efficiency in using funds is simply not known. DC financial scandals have been so numerous and frequent for so many years as to make them appear endemic to the Italian political scene. Even if some cases may have been exaggerated, the conventional wisdom has long assumed that corruption is a major element in the party's way of life. Ultimately, though, the party's political future may be determined more by its casual and ineffectual organization than by its finances. To give substance to the word "democratic" in its name and to be the mass interclass party of its claims, the DC would have to put real flesh on the complex organizational skeleton described in its stat- ute. Were it not flanked by so many support groups, its failure to be effectively dynamic and self-renewing in and of itself would have altered its role in govern- ment well before now. Party Membership The size of a political party's membership has long been regarded in Italy as an index of the group's organizing ability, particularly of its success in estab- lishing solid roots within its natural constituency as 18 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X6 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 5 Comparative Growth of DC and PCI Membership, 1946-77 Hundred Thousand Persons 3.0 Percent of Variation in Membership 40 30 20 10 ?10 DC .5 ?20 ?30 0 ?40 1946 50 55 60 65 70 75 1946 50 55 60 65 70 75 585805 2-82 well as for the creation of lasting links among its followers. From a modest numerical start in the 1940s, making an exception for the election year of 1948, the DC's period of greatest growth was in the decade of the 1950s. Until 1973 the party continued to gain members on a gradually rising curve. Surges and lapses exist in that timespan with upswings appearing in the years of elections or national party congresses. The consistent growth of the party was based on the organizational efforts and expertise of Amintore Fanfani in his years as party secretary in the 1950s. In the early 1960s DC membership reached and passed that of the PCI for the first time (see figure 5). There is, however, little correlation between the par- ties' formal membership and their records at the polls. Similarities in the two parties' organizations and membership are few, but a comparison highlights some aspects of the DC today. For a party of such long-lived electoral success, the DC, unlike the PCI, is significantly lacking in internal discipline and does not boast many visible and active local cadres. In fact, 19 much of the DC rank-and-file membership exists more on paper than in fact. Also there is relatively little contact between local sections and the party hierarchy, the reverse of which is true in the PCI. The DC membership in many ways is an amorphous and elusive mass. Unlike the PCI, DC members are not easily studied. Both parties publish annuals on their activities, but the DC publication lacks the extensive figures, tables, and charts of its counterpart. In short, the party has extensive records on its members and makes them available to researchers who ask for them; it does not give them the broad dissemination the PCI does. Learning about the DC membership is therefore not simple and conclusions cannot be wholly satisfactory. Another problem is that the DC's membership rolls are often said to be inflated, and DC leaders them- selves have questioned their accuracy. These statistics frequently have been the subject of charges and countercharges, as years of transcripts of national congress debates show. Inflation occurs because of Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential competition between the various factions, which rig the figures to exploit the party's system of internal proportional representation. In the past (the practice may or may not be continuing) the factions have been accused of registering the dead, fictitious persons, and relatives, as well as actual persons?but without their permission or knowledge. Use of this tactic suggests that the hard core of party membership is in fact smaller than indicated by "official" figures. The procedure for becoming a DC member has never been difficult, although it has changed over the years. In its first 15 years or so, the DC had many members who joined largely because they were in the personal following of local or regional leaders known as nota- bili (notables). By 1960, as a younger and different breed of party men began to develop factions geared to particular political points of view and organized for more efficient political action, a number of the old notabili were quickly shoved aside. In either case, however, membership in the party often was through sponsorship by one or the other of these groups, the result being a controlled membership. In the 1970s, particularly with the new statute of 1979 and the emphasis on rinnovamento, the goal now is an open party. Any citizen 16 years old or over may simply register as a DC member. The only requirements are that he/she be of irreproachable moral and political conduct and declare adherence to the party's values. While sponsorship has not been wholly eliminated (an applicant needs the signature of two members in good standing for two years), it has become perfunctory. Also, anyone age 14 to 16 is similarly eligible for the DC's youth organization. It is too soon to determine whether this new enroll- ment method is a success or a failure. However, its goal is the attraction of higher quality and more actively committed members. Still nothing has oc- curred to stop an ambitious provincial secretary from pushing for members to flesh out his own following or from refusing to conduct an enrollment campaign because it might bring in recruits whom he could not manipulate. The reform does show that the party Confidential recognizes a need to modernize and alter its image. With the scandals that have plagued its entire history, the DC can only benefit by getting members of "irreproachable" conduct. Even though the DC has long been the largest party in this open democratic system, it is difficult to get a clear social picture of its membership. Here one must underline the distinction between a party's electorate, which has been studied in detail in Italy, and its enrolled members. Data on the DC members are not lacking. The party has extensive records, but they have to be deflated and other information has to be weighed against other sources when possible. But some general observations can be made about DC growth and decline as well as the socioeconomic characteristics of its members. Data from 1978, the most recent available, indicate that membership was about 1.3 million. (The Prov- inces of Caserta and Catania did not report that year, however. See figure 6 and table 3). As with a number of other years, a national total may not cover the whole country because local groups appear to be rather casual, and not all get around to reporting every year. Still, this is a decline of approximately 35 percent from the 1.9 million reported only five years earlier. The drop suggests that the old pattern of increases at the time of elections and congresses, which kept the curve consistently high in the past, is no longer operative. Not only does that slump put the numbers back to something comparable to the late 1950s, but a look at the figures in a broader context reveals ironically that the timespan when the DC went from a small initial membership to a peak in 1973 is inversely proportional to the party's election record. During the same time, it moved from the enormous success of 1948 to the checks and defeats of the mid-1970s. Thus the evidence suggests that the DC passed some milestone or watershed in the 1970s. Various explanations or rationales have been offered for this shift, and the consensus does not center on political bad luck but on the profound changes that seem to be going on in the attitudes and composition of party membership as well as in Italian society generally. 20 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 3 Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78 1968 1973 1978 Piedmont 80,536 89,226 51,453 Valle d'Aosta 3,372 2,646 1,456 Liguria 37,819 42,816 26,416 Lombardy 193,654 201,750 139,887 Trentino-Alto Adige 29,749 30,666 14,307 Venetia 151,436 178,731 113,986 Friuli-Venezia Guilia 29,554 33,368 23,035 Emilia-Romagna 74,830 80,507 57,819 Subtotal North 600,950 659,710 428,359 Tuscany 61,076 68,727 54,245 Umbria 19,499 20,341 12,504 Marche 48,524 53,158 36,813 Lazio 152,884 (159,324) a 144,259 Subtotal Center 281,983 (301,550) a 247,821 Abruzzo 77,858 88,316 46,429 Molise 20,273 28,790 15,262 Campania 195,993 209,299 112,812 Puglia 134,681 162,829 134,932 Basilicata 29,432 38,258 23,711 Calabria 85,573 (89,152) b 66,174 Subtotal South 543,810 (616,644) b 399,320 Sicily 202,910 (212,644) c (199,977) Sardinia 66,758 82,744 42,823 Subtotal Islands 269,659 (295,388) c (242,800) d Total Italy 1,696,402 (1,873,292) c (1,327,300) c a Figures are lacking for the Roman Committee's membership in 1973. Based on figures for years before and after, the arbitrary sum of 75,000 is included here. b To fill the gap for figures missing from Catanzaro in 1973, a membership of 30,000 has been added on the basis of statistics for other years. c 21,000 has been added for Agrigento, missing in 1973. d 35,000 has been added for Catania, missing in 1978. e Final totals have been altered in keeping with figures added. See notes a to d. 21 Socioeconomic analysis of DC membership (as distin- guished from the DC electorate) presents special problems. Official party information is not only unre- liable but general and inconsistent. Fundamentally it seeks to demonstrate the party's claim to represent all classes in society. This is not borne out, however, by data collected by polling groups. And the contrast is greater still if the composition of membership and electorate are measured together. Tables 4 and 5 serve as an example of problems inherent in identifying the strata making up DC membership, although comparability of the data is hardly satisfactory due to the lack of poll information for the 1950s as well as changed categorization. If the party records are assumed to be self-fulfilling percep- tions based on inflated figures, the poll data are drawn not only from a smaller sampling but one which tends to be based on urban interviewing. Nev- ertheless, if utilized as broad guidelines together with other sources on the DC, a fairly reliable picture of the party emerges. To some extent stereotypes and conventional wisdom are substantiated, but in other instances unusual differences appear. When consid- ered alongside DC electoral returns (and known char- acteristics of the electorate), a reasonably accurate knowledge of the party's real socioeconomic backing can be reached. Following the administrative elections of 1980, when some 85 percent of the electorate went to the polls, the polling group Demoskopea conducted an analysis of the voters (see table 6) which, when coupled with the foregoing tables, provides the most accurate and up-to-date single-frame picture avail- able on the party. Of the stereotypes long attached to the party, none has survived so well or so long as the belief that the party is strongest in rural and traditionalist areas and that women-encouraged by parish priests-consti- tute an important part of its support. Both views have some basis in fact but with important refinements. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 6 Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78 Key 1968 1973 HEM 1978 North Lombardia Veneto Piemonte Liguria Trentino?Alto Adige Friuli?Venezia Giulia Valle D'Aosta Center Lazioa Emilia?Romagna Tuscany Marche Umbria South Campania Puglia Calabriab Abruzzo Basilicata Molise Islands Siciliac, d Sardegna Thousand Persons 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 66. a Figures are lacking for the Roman Committee's membership in 1973. Based on figures for years before and after, the arbitrary sum of 75,000 is included here. h To fill the gap for Figures missing from Catanzaro in 1973, a membership of 30,000 has been added on to the basis of statistics for other years. C21,000 has been added for Agrigerito, missing in 1973. d 35 000 has been added for Catania, missing in 1978. 585806 2-82 Confidential 22 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 4 Party Membership, by Sector (DC Records) Percent Table 5 Party Membership, by Sector (DOXA Poll Organization) Percent Economic Sector 1959 1977 Economic Sector 1977 Agriculture 24.9 12.4 Workers 14.3 Industry 17.7 18.4 Agriculture 4.9 Business and banking 6.0 7.7 Artisans, shopowners 10.3 Artisans 5.8 5.2 Professionals, teachers 8.6 Professions 2.1 2.8 White collar 23.2 Public employees 8.9 15.8 Students 1.1 Students 2.5 5.4 Housewives 18.6 Pensioners 3.8 5.7 Pensioners 15.9 Housewives 25.5 20.6 Unemployed and others 3.1 Unemployed and others 2.8 6.0 Total 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 Membership 1,602,742 1,077,388 The rural traditionalist areas of Italy are concen- trated in the center and south (including the two major islands), and the north-south distinction has been clear for many years. The meridionalizzazione (southernizing) of the party began in the 1950s and dovetails with the importance of the notables whose classic region of dominance is the south. In fact this is still true although signs are present implying that change-which means modernization in this case-is coming in the south at last. Party membership is dropping more there than in any other region. But if one looks at DC electoral returns in those areas, clearly the party still enjoys considerable strength (see figures 14 and 15). The signs of change are as yet confined more to certain provinces and cities than to regions, with the possible exception of Puglia which has long had some elements in common with the advanced north. The other region of great DC strength, the northeast, is very different in character. If the party still enjoys a hold on some southern regions like Molise, Calabria, or Sicily, it is due to the persistence of older social customs and hierarchies. The northeast, particularly Venetia, is strongly DC because of more conscious 23 religious conviction. Although the south may change through economic expansion, the northeast is more affected by new winds within Catholicism. The role of women in the DC as party members and/or electors is more significant than in other Italian parties, but they do not function simply as mothers and wives who support the party for its espousal of traditional moral values and the family. Indeed women are enrolled in the DC in greater numbers in the south, but their level of participation in party activities is quite limited. The region's Catho- lic subculture has few organizations to bring them out, and there is no women's liberation movement of any significance there. In much of the south party membership of women is passive and associational, supportive of a male family member active in DC politics. Overall national figures for women reveal that their enrollment is higher in urban areas than in rural. Quite possibly city life does not make the demands on an urban woman's time as those expe- rienced by farm women. Interestingly, in the PCI, which has long encouraged women into political activ- ism, female membership has run between 23 percent and 25 percent from 1960 to the mid-1970s. In the same period for the DC, the percentage of women in the membership went from a minimum of 34 percent in 1960 to a maximum of 38 percent in 1974. Since Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 6 Social Background of Electorate by Party a Sex Age Male Female 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 Over 65 Education High School/ High None College Junior Elementary/ DC 39.5 60.5 14.0 16.8 16.9 18.1 14.5 19.7 17.5 22.6 59.9 PCI 54.8 45.2 21.4 23.1 19.5 14.2 9.6 12.2 20.2 25.7 54.1 PSI 58.3 41.7 14.6 17.5 20.3 18.7 13.9 15.0 20.7 27.3 52.0 PRI 56.3 43.7 17.6 18.5 21.0 21.9 9.2 11.8 37.4 28.6 34.0 PSDI 53.9 46.1 11.8 12.9 23.9 19.8 10.7 20.9 20.4 30.1 49.5 PLI 50.0 50.0 17.7 14.9 14.9 14.9 15.6 22.0 51.6 21.9 26.5 MSI/DN 64.3 35.7 23.8 21.4 16.7 6.0 15.4 16.7 22.6 34.5 42.9 PDUP/DP 52.4 47.6 42.9 42.8 5.9 NEGL 5.9 2.5 45.2 40.5 14.3 a This analysis of the Italian electorate was compiled by the Demosko- pea polling organization on those who voted in the elections of 8 June 1980. It was published in Panorama, 23 June 1980. then the percentage has been declining. As table 6 shows, the ratio of women who vote for-the DC is far larger than those who become party members. Another assumption about the DC is that its member- ship tends to be among older groups but the last few years have seen an encouraging increase in the num- bers of youth, particularly those in the college years and immediately after. Recent indications are that more DC members and electors are in the older segments of the population, while the youth element is not so large as some believed and possibly hoped. There is in reality only a modest increase among youth from the small numbers of a few years ago. Notwithstanding the lack of comparability mentioned earlier in relation to official party records vis-a-vis polling information and the DC membership, the DOXA (another polling group) data may be nearer to current reality as Italy grows ever more urban. With such a caveat, what summary observations can be made about the DC's members? If the DC believes itself to be an interclass party, data on the member- ship do not now bear this out, but information on the DC electorate does show quite diverse class character. Confidential More and more party electors are middle class and mildly conservative, and their economic activity is particularly interesting. Although considerable differ- ences exist from one geographical region to another, basic trends are present in consolidated national figures. Here the DC's rural base potential is suffer- ing something more than erosion since those members whose income is from agriculture have declined more than 50 percent in the last 20 years (see also figure 11) showing shrinkage of the agricultural sector in gener- al. A slight rise has occurred in the industrial sector, notably among blue-collar workers. The only signifi- cant increase by economic activity is in the tertiary sector of service and public employees, and the gener- al group of impiegati (salaried white-collar employees) is the party's largest: 23.2 percent. Housewives and pensioners make up the next largest categories, fol- lowed by workers and artisans. In all the statistics and diagnostic dissections of the DC membership, the most important information concerns the verification of fundamental changes in party membership which relate to and derive from 24 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 6 (continued) Percent Profession Professional/ Manager Independent Business Clerical/ Secretarial/ Salaried Employees Businessmen/ Artisans Farmers Teachers/ Students Workers Housewives (Upper, Middle Class) Housewives (Lower Class) Pensioners/ Others 1.5 9.2 6.7 4.2 8.9 15.8 17.6 11.6 24.5 0.8 9.2 6.8 1.6 10.7 35.3 8.3 11.5 15.8 1.6 12.7 9.3 3.0 11.1 23.4 11.4 6.4 21.1 1.7 26.1 9.0 1.7 12.6 14.0 13.3 7.6 14.0 4.3 8.6 8.6 2.2 10.2 19.4 14.0 9.7 23.0 7.8 14.1 12.5 NEGL 12.5 4.7 18.8 1.6 28.0 1.2 9.5 10.7 2.4 16.7 19.0 6.0 7.1 27.4 2.4 7.1 4.8 NEGL 45.2 23.8 2.4 2.4 11.9 recent pontificates and ideas emanating from the Vatican Council of the 1960s. Simply stated, Church developments in the last two decades have had a profound effect on the Catholic subculture. On the one hand, large-scale secularization of national life has occurred, and on the other faithful practicing Catholics are less numerous but stand out as a more committed element. The DC in turn has also probably lost its faint-hearted members, and those who remain are more active in party or Catholic organizations just as they are more faithful in attendance at Mass. Theoretically the party ought to benefit from im- proved quality in membership if not in increased numbers; but faithful Catholics in Italy are not so numerous as foreigners assume, and the change has probably cut into party strength. The party is aware of this trend to an extent, and the rinnovamento and the new statute show the desire to be more open. Other tactics have been the Feste dell'Amicizia (Friendship Festivals), carnival-like celebrations with arcades, games, food, and political rallies designed to heighten the party's social pres- ence. The gatherings are an aping of PCI Feste deli 'Unita (Unity Festivals) which apparently are somewhat more successful. 25 Benigno Zaccagnini, while he was party secretary in the 1970s, also launched the GIP movement, the Gruppi di Impegno Politico (Political Commitment Groups). Their goal is to carry the party's presence into factories, offices, and schools. In 1978 there were 2,100 such groups, but again it is not clear what success they may be having. If indeed the smaller numbers mean a more commit- ted and more manageable party membership, the DC ought to benefit. Nevertheless, there are persistent indications that actual participation in party activity by members is extremely low. If renewal and revital- ization are to be achieved, the DC is making little progress when at least 50 percent of the members never participate in party activities and only 5 to 10 percent work for the party with any regularity. In contrast with the PCI's comparable publications, L'Unita and Rinascita, DC interest level is extremely low when only a tiny percentage admits to reading the DC daily newspaper, Il Popolo, and even fewer read the weekly journal, La Discussione. It is little wonder, however, that a committed DC member is not inclined to read the party press. Both major publications are characterized by stodgy and turgid prose. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential The DC is, then, more and more a party of Catholics; that is, of those people who practice their religion regularly, more and more the middle class and mid- dle-aged segment of the Italian population, the solidly conservative elements. And as the country becomes more secularized and demographically younger, the so-called diaspora dei cattolici a sinistra (the flight of the Catholics to the left) will continue. Indications are that the party is slipping away from the broad-based membership and wide appeal it once had and that its place is being increasingly filled by other parties, particularly the PCI, which is becoming less class oriented. If the assessment of DC membership suggests some- thing less than optimism for the future strength of the party, this is only part of the problem. The party's support has never come solely from within its own ranks. From the time of its founding it has relied heavily on the auxiliary support it receives from an enormous number of Catholic lay organizations. Be- cause of the existence of such groups, the DC will doubtless continue to practice a certain amount of benign neglect of its own party structure, no matter how much renewal may be trumpeted. In effect, the DC has been able to permit itself to have an erratic and creaky membership so long as these support groups existed. The party seems to take little or no note that recent pontificates and events in Italian life have altered and loosened ties to the Church and the nature of its organizations. Nevertheless, this support network seems likely to hold up well for a time and, ironically, is the closest link remaining between party and Church. Significant support also is offered by the sottogoverno (literally subgovernment, with the implied meaning of patronage), those who owe their livelihood to the DC's continued rule. The party has "colonized" a vast area of state-dependent organizations far out of proportion to its actual electoral strength, and this clientele will continue for some time to be another important source of party members, notably in the south. Therefore, as of 1981, the DC retains a sizable membership which is undergoing erosion, albeit in slow motion. Nothing implies its imminent collapse or even precipitate decline, but there is nothing to sug- gest that true renewal and growth can be expected. Confidential The issue becomes whether the confessional can com- pete effectively with the dynamism of late-20th- century consumer capitalism. Auxiliary Support Organizations As the DC's organization has long been weak and fragmented and its membership amorphous, the party has from its beginnings relied heavily on outside support groups. These organizations are closely relat- ed to the Church on the one hand and to the so-called parastate organizations on the other. In a sense the DC can be viewed as an uneasy, tenuous union of religious, industrial, agricultural, and worker interest groups. The cement of the components is in part religion, in part the enjoyment of the fruits of power. DC politicians have to balance among these not- always-harmonious interests and, without frequent success, attempt to formulate governmental policies. All elements combine to produce a situation charac- terized by one author as "the DC iceberg." Several observers say candidly that the DC simply "occupies power" and that party and state have now become indistinguishable. The DC has become the state and the state the DC, with the transgressions of one being identical with those of the other. Such a relationship is not unknown in other countries, but the degree to which the DC utilizes outside support groups is unusual in a democracy. The result and implications are best summarized in a statement of Gianni Agnelli, head of the FIAT corporation: "With 40 percent of the votes, the DC controls 80 percent of the power." Cynical Italians say of the DC that absolute power has corrupted absolutely. Church-Related Support Groups As a party of Catholics, the DC naturally has close links with the enormous network of Church-related organizations, recently estimated to be at least 8,000 in number. Since John XXIII's reign and the changes of Vatican Council II, when the Church began dis- tancing itself from Italian politics, the DC's most substantive and consistent association with Catholi- cism has been through the lay organizations. This relationship varies greatly, however, with issues and groups at any given moment. In the mid- and late 1940s, Church organizations and the DC were virtu- ally indistinguishable. Relatively undisturbed by the 26 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uonimential fascist government, they provided the structure and arena for political activity that gave the DC its initial thrust onto the national political scene. Although the roles are in some senses now reversed with a party that is theoretically able to stand alone, the DC can and does fall back on the Church's lay organizations to supplement its own insufficiencies. No study exists to substantiate the assertion, but it is doubtless safe to assume that in many instances membership in the Church organizations replicates the DC's lists. This is certainly the case in the "white" or Catholic northeast. And if relationships vary from good to bad, that, too, is a reflection of the general loosening of ties?or the secularization?which has occurred in Italian life since about 1960. Despite this, the Church's lay organizations remain the matrix from which DC leadership comes. None of today's party leaders has made it to the top of the hierarchy without some years of active apprenticeship in at least one of the following organizations. Azione Cattolica Italiana, ACI (Catholic Action). This is the oldest, largest, most prestigious, and most powerful Catholic lay organization in Italy. Most simply defined, it is an apostolate of the laity under the guidance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. ACI's responsibility is to coordinate in the secular world the work of priests and other religious leaders or, as specified by Vatican II, to evangelize and educate humanity to Christian values. ACI is more than a century old and grew out of a youth movement in the "white" area of Venetia. Its present name came into use around World War I. The connection it has had with the Catholic political movement in Italy is an intimate one as suggested by the fact that Don Luigi Sturzo, before he founded the PPI in 1919, had already been secretary general of ACI for four years. Pope Pius XI, who frowned upon direct Catholic political activity, favored ACI to the extent that he is known as the "Pope of Catholic Action." While he tolerated the supression of the PPI, he protected and favored ACI in various clashes with Mussolini's government. During his pontificate the movement was greatly expanded and largely given the organizational form it has today. ACI's conservative 27 character was firmly established under Pius XI and Pius XII, although subsequent reformers like John XXIII have altered it to some extent. ACI's membership has fluctuated, reaching a high of about 3 million in the decade after the war. Although down to 700,000 members today, it remains the most overtly political arm of the Church and can always provide a nationwide body of political workers at election time. No one has equaled the power of Luigi Gedda as president of ACI in the 1950s, but the Red Brigades regarded one of its former presidents, Vittorio Bachelet, as worthy of assassination in Feb- ruary 1980. Dr. Alberto Monticone, professor of Modern History in the University of Rome, became president of ACI in early 1981, succeeding Prof. Mario Agnes. Monticone was formerly president of the Movimento Laureati. He, like all other ACI officers, is flanked by a cleric with the title of Assistant. Often this assistant is from the top of the Church hierarchy, most recently the Patriarch of Venice, Marco Cardinal Ce. ACI is a federation of related organizations each of which has other groups within it and beneath it. When all are considered, no segment of life or professional activity is unrepresented. Size may have little to do with the influence of a particular group, but ACI is not generous in publishing its enrollment figures. The overall membership has slipped consider- ably in the last 10 to 20 years, but presumably those who remain can be considered as faithful and commit- ted followers. Technically ACI is a federation with the heads of the four major groups being vice presidents of the parent organization and president of their own division: Unione Uomini di AC, UUAC (Men's Union of Catholic Action). President Prof. Livio Crepaldi. UUAC is for all married men and single men 30 or over. Unione delle Donne di ACI, UDACI (Women's Union of Catholic Action). President Paola Bignardi. UDACI enrolls married women and unmarried wom- en over 30. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Gioventu Italiana di AC, GIAC (Italian Youth of Catholic Action). President Dr. Paolo Nepi. Single men 30 or under. Gioventu Femminile di AC, GF (Young Women of Catholic Action). President Maria Teresa Vacari. For single women under 30. Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana, FUCI (Federation of Italian Catholic University Students). FUCI enrolls only undergraduates in separate sec- tions for men and women. National presidents are Giuseppino Monni and Laura Rozza. Movimento ecclesiale di impegno culturale (Ecclesial Movement of Cultural Commitment). President, Franco Cavasola. This organization is still known better by its former name, Movimento Laureati di Azione Cattolica (University Graduates' Movement). The name change occurred in 1980 to coincide with a move for the organization's revitalization. Movimento Maestri di AC, (Teachers' Movement, known only by its name). For elementary school teachers, this group is presided over by Prof. Tomaso Seu. An outgrowth of the Teachers' Movement and closely related to it is the Associazione Italiana di Maestri Cattolici, AIMC (Association of Italian Catholic Teachers), which represents all public school teachers. Its founder and first president, Maria Badaloni, was Under Secretary for Public Instruction in eight con- secutive governments beginning in 1960 and was succeeded in that position for three more governments by the current president, Senator Carlo Buzzi. Both were elected to Parliament on the DC ticket. AIMC, in contrast to the Movimento Maestri, places empha- sis on professionalism but also expects religious commitment. Generally women's organizations have the larger numbers, and the men's groups are more visibly active. Of the more specially oriented groups for students, graduates, and teachers, records show that despite their influence, they have never enrolled more than 3 to 7 percent of eligible individuals in their sectors. The value of these organizations to the DC is immediately evident in the biographies of members of Confidential Parliament. Two of many leading examples of men whose careers began in FUCI are Giulio Andreotti and Aldo Moro. Once closely related to ACI and one of its most powerful arms is the Associazioni Cristiane Lavora- tori Italiani, ACLI (Christian Associations of Italian Workers). Formed by ACI immediately after World War II to bring the Church presence to the working classes and to compete with Marxist activities, ACLI soon became an important part of the labor scene. It began blazing its own independent course under the presidency of Livio Labor in the 1960s when it came into open opposition with ACI and the DC. In the elections of the early 1970s, it refused to support DC candidates and openly endorsed leftist candidates, including some Communists. Labor himself left the movement, joined the PSI, and was elected senator on their ticket in 1976. ACLI remains important today although its 380,000 members in some 5,000 clubs put it far below its peak enrollment in the past. Relations between the DC and ACLI have improved, but ACLI remains proudly independent. A candidate supported by it in an election is virtually assured of victory. Part of ACLI's strength derives from its strong parallel patrons' organization which handles pensions and reputedly has taken in as much as $150 million a year. Zaccagnini's founding of the GIP in the 1970s and the formation of the Movimento Cristiano Lavoratori, MCL (Christian Laborers' Movement) were intended, although not admittedly so, to offset the hostile influence of ACLI. The MCL's stated purpose is that of being a moderate alternative to ACLI, and it currently has some 180,000 members. Some measure of the pervasive Catholic influence is reflected in the following partial list of the ACLI's other related organizations: ? Hospital assistants (ACOS), 16,000 nurses and paramedics. ? Artisans (ACAI). ? Physicians (AMCI), 6,000 members in more than 100 sections. ? TV and radio station owners (AIART) and listeners who monitor TV and radiobroadcasts (ALIAS). ? Catholic parents of schoolchildren (AGESC), 50,000 members. 28 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 ?uunimenutal ? Boy and girl scouts (ASGI and AGI). e The press (USCI) (Flaminio Piccoli, currently DC secretary general, was once president of this organization). o Businessmen (UCIC). ^ Entrepreneurs and managers (UCID). o Publishers (UECI). The list could continue at some length and show prominent DC figures in key positions in virtually all of them. Each organization extends its influence and maintains cohesion through journals, newsletters, and newspapers. The potential for reaching the public and for supporting DC causes is obvious. However, in a nation where the Vatican is located and where cyni- cism is a national character trait, the public can be staunchly independent and deaf to blandishments on religious viewpoints with which it is all too familiar. Several other Catholic-related organizations merit mention either for their continuing strength or for their unusual nature. In the former group is the Confederazione Nazionale dei Coltivatori Diretti, Coldiretti (The National Small Farmers Confeder- ation), perhaps the most powerful single interest group in the country. Although Italy has become rapidly more urban and industrial since the war, this coalition of rural and traditionally Catholic landowners main- tains unduly large influence in parliament and within the DC. It is ardently in favor of private property and hence vehemently anti-Communist, and its members in parliament sometimes align themselves with right or center-right factions of the DC or, on occasion, with even more conservative parties. Because of its mode of organization in "families" or "associations" Coldiretti's size is difficult to ascertain. However, it is far smaller now than at its peak in the 1950s when claims to 6 to 7 million members were made. If its present claim to represent 90 percent of the farmers is accurate, its membership would be roughly between 2 million and 2.6 million. A somewhat smaller figure is, however, more credible. Reminiscent of ACI, the Coldiretti has in its ranks prelates with the title of "assistant," and it is general- ly regarded as a group of Catholic inspiration. But the organization has increasingly taken independent posi- tions and now assumes attitudes critical of the -DC, 29 which it has accused of being too "popular" and "insufficiently Christian." Beginning in February 1980 Coldiretti went through a period of virtually leaderless drifting when its longtime president, Dr. Paolo Bonomi, was hospitalized with Parkinson's disease. Although allowed to remain as honorary president, Bonomi was replaced in October 1980 by Arcangelo Lobianco. In his maiden address to the Coldiretti national assembly, Lobianco sternly threat- ened the DC that his organization would not necessar- ily continue its long relationship with the party. He frequently refers to Coldiretti as a union, and, in an unprecedented move in April 1981, the farmers' organization leadership met with officials of the three major trade unions as well as of Confcoltivatori, the small leftist association of small farmers, to map a concerted effort to improve farm conditions. An illustration of the depth of the DC-Coldiretti relationship and of the implications of possible loss of its support is found in the career of Paolo Bonomi. He founded the organization in 1944 and remained its president for 36 years, a period when he also served as deputy in the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and all legislatures to the present. He has never held a cabinet position, but he has long been a member of the influential Chamber Commission on Agriculture and Forests. The years of conservative legislation favoring farmers are evidence of his influence and that of Coldiretti. Until 1954 he was the "grey eminence" of the DC due to his role in extending its influence throughout rural areas via Coldiretti. Brief- ly Bonomi also headed the powerful Federconsorzi, Federation of Cooperatives. His enormous power was challenged when Fanfani became party secretary in 1954, but Bonomi was long considered as much a party leader as was possible for someone without high party office. Election posters for 15 years after the war often referred to him variously as "savior of the peasants' birthright" and "the anti-Bolshevik bulwark in the countryside." His replacement by Lobianco, a disciple who has now broken with the master's policy if not with the man himself, is of profound importance for the DC's main link to its biggest constituency, the rural electorate. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Beyond this degree of Coldiretti involvement in the DC, four of the DC's senators and 28 of its deputies are directors of various levels of the organization. A number of other members of Parliament mention Coldiretti membership in their biographical sketches. Nevertheless, despite the organization's preeminent role as a DC support group, increasing industrializa- tion and the concomitant decline of citizens in the agrarian sector (see figure 11) are making its influ- ence somewhat disproportionate to the element it represents. Even so, Coldiretti maintains an active program of organizations for women and youth as well as regional and provincial offices throughout the country. Under its new president it is also said to be showing signs of revitalization, but as yet one cannot determine if the DC will benefit or not from the change. Some conservative facets clearly remain in Coldiretti, but other evidence implies that it well may go an independent way in the future. A similar organization with Catholic influence is the Conicooperativi (Confederation of Cooperatives), which competes in an area?farm co-ops?first staked out by the PSI some years ago. The movement is notably important in the Catholic northeast. Still, as the agrarian sector continues to shrink, vote poten- tial for the DC in rural areas also declines. Although big industry and large business have never felt comfortable with the DC, a segment of that sector has long supported the DC. The Church-related orga- nization of this group is the Confederazione Italiana dei Dirigenti d'Azienda (Italian Managers' Confeder- ation), which embraces store managers up through factory and bank administrators. In some senses, this group is an urban parallel of Coldiretti. Its influence is not to be underestimated but unlike its rural counterpart, the body includes only a part of the business community. Nevertheless, several DC mem- bers of Parliament emphasize their membership in it. Still in the realm of Catholic-related organizations but with a newer and somewhat different character is the organization Comunione e Liberazione (Commun- ion and Liberation), founded in November 1969 at the Sacred Heart University in Milan as an outgrowth of student and labor upheavals of that time. CL stands as probably the leading symbol of younger elements in Confidential the Catholic political movement (as distinguished from precise connection with the DC itself) who seek to renew their religious commitment to a society based on Christian principles. The name of the move- ment is a case in point: communion as an instrument of the liberation of man from sin. CL borders on mysticism in its affinity to religious orders and semi- clandestinity that it equates with organizational mo- desty. The structure of CL is pyramidal with a small controlling body at the top that includes both clerics and laymen, all in their thirties and forties. Member- ship in directly related organizations and associated groups is said to run perhaps as high as 300,000 to 400,000. Viewed with some suspicion by parts of the Italian clerical hierarchy, CL is nevertheless closely associated with the former Archbishop of Milan, Giovanni Cardinal Colombo. The publishing house, Jaca Book of Milan, is the font of numerous CL publications. Beginning with the election of 1976, CL was influen- tial in promoting the successful candidacies of several DC deputies, notable among them Andrea Borruso, one of CL's founders. The organization's strength is greater in the north as its backing of others such as Costante Portatadino (Varese), Vittorino Colombo (Milan), Antonio Marzotto Caotorta (Milan), and Roberto Mazzotta (Milan) indicates. Their success in the elections of 1979 was somewhat more restricted, however. CL has organized branches in both universi- ty and working-class sectors and promoted the launching of Movimento Popolare, MP (Popular Movement), a more openly political body promoting conservative Catholic candidates for office. Borruso, the principle political figure in CL, believes the movement must be more than a simple obstacle blocking the road to the PCI; it must find a renewed commitment to carry Catholics a step ahead in offer- ing alternatives to the public. The MILLE (Movimento per l'Italia Libera nella Libera Europa, Movement for a Free Italy in a Free Europe), promoted by DC deputy Massimo de Caro- lis, is a movement of similar political inspiration and is also associated with young conservative Catholic leaders of Lombardy, but it has less clerical influence. MILLE is difficult to define beyond noting that it is a movement of small industrialists, merchants, and 30 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uonnaenttal professionals devoted to public renewal of conserva- tive and Christian principles. In fact, it appears to overlap considerably with CL and MP. Whether the allusion to the expedition of the Mille (The Thousand of Garibaldi of 1860) and the liberation of Sicily in the Risorgimento is deliberate or not is unclear, but the implication is not missed by the public. The MILLE has been important in backing candidates for the Chamber to the extent that the biographical manual published privately after the election of each new legislature lists in its most recent edition the names of those deputies whose candidacies the group supported. The list of 88 names significantly did not include the major DC leaders. What has been more significant in recent elections, particularly in those of 1976 and 1979, has been the progressive decline of official Catholic support for DC lists, particularly since the election of John Paul II. CL and MILLE, with their heavy religious overtones, are exceptions. This does not signify withdrawal of ACI and other specifically Church-related groups, nor does it mean they have denied the DC their support. Rather the tactic has been consistent with the "open party" and the goal of attracting new candidates and creating a new image which is some- what less obviously confessional. It appears that the result of these tactical changes and new organizations has, at best, allowed the DC only to hold its own for the time being. The nature of these organizations and the rapidly changing character of Italian society suggest that the trend is to divergence, not a promis- ing prospect for the party. "Catholic" in this instance seems less than universal. Sottogoverno and Clientelismo Church-related groups may maintain the DC's link to its philosophical roots, but Italy's parastate organiza- tions and other governmental agencies provide the party with its sweeping hold on power. The two terms clientelismo and sottogoverno (patronage, or literally, "undergovernment") are nearly interchangeable in street-corner parlance and summarize succinctly how the system works. The use of jobs, favors, and money by a ruling political party occurs worldwide and is a prerogative of power. However, the mode of using these privileges distinguishes practical politics from corruption and abuses. Time and again it has been 31 said that the DC in ruling uninterruptedly for 35 years has become indistinguishable from the state and that the party has promoted this identification. No one doubts that the DC has taken care of its support- ers by giving them government jobs and that as it moved away from the Church its strength came more and more from "colonizing" organs of the state with its own people. Some observers also argue that by making itself part and parcel of the system, the DC satisfies its anti-Communist mission. Whether true or not, the practice has made the DC vulnerable to criticism, and some Italians even say the situation has the feel of a "35-year Watergate." Any verification of the number of DC members and backers in government-controlled jobs is impossible. Popular wisdom holds that three of every four govern- ment jobs are filled by such people, and this propor- tion does not seem unreasonable. Compared with the party's consistent showing of an average of about 40- percent voter support, the ratio is excessive. Even in Molise, where the party consistently racks up its largest victory margins, the DC share rarely has exceeded 60 percent of the vote. By any standards, the DC's manner and degree of patronage use becomes gross occupation of power in a democratic state. However, since the mid-1970s the party has been forced more and more to share these spoils with other parties. Clientelism and patronage are more than mere pork- barrel tactics. Clientelism suggests people who are or can be obligated to the party rather than individuals whose livelihood depends directly on it. The distinc- tion is admittedly subtle and fuzzy, but the DC client is more likely to be someone like a builder who receives a government contract. Also, to utilize the Italian expression clientela/parentela (client/relative), clients are also the families of state employees who support the party on the assumption that failure to do so would cost a father, brother, or other relative his job. Ironically, as the DC completed this pervasive web of dependence, it displaced or made subservient many of the old notables, particularly in the south and the islands. The result was a sort of democratization of the access to power, but it was done more to assure the party's control than to promote values and goals. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Indeed, clientelism is more commonly associated with the south in the Italian mind. Its practice may or may not entail corruption, but many studies of the region concur in their negative judgment of the results. Without question the DC has aided the south and islands, but it has demanded their support in return. The area's underdevelopment has thus promoted its dependence on the party in power. One authority calls it "pragmatism without ideas." "Undergovernment" is the more important and also more insidious area where political strong-arm tactics can be used. The word cannot be fully comprehended unless one keeps in mind the breadth of its implica- tions. It refers to all those positions or power centers which in Italy are assigned by the central government executive. For example, this includes big banks, steel mills, and a host of enormous organizations, several of which have balance sheets of billions of dollars. In Italy, State participation in the so-called parastate organizations is one of the largest and oldest such practices in the world. The executives who head these organizations do so at the pleasure of the DC. Their power, prestige, and wealth are best understood as being fully comparable to those of a cabinet minister. A directory of the parastate corporations is as exten- sive as that of Church-related organizations. The great state holding companies are all under the control of the Ministry of Government Holdings (or State Participations), established in December 1956, long after the creation of the largest companies it controls. The position of minister has constantly re- mained in the hands of powerful DC men and, by the admission of one of them, Ciriaco de Mita, regularly provided patronage to party supporters (see pages 122-123 and foldout chart, figure A-5). Until the Cossiga government yielded this portfolio to PSI deputy Gianni de Michelis in 1979 it had been out of DC hands only for a six-month period in 1958; never has the ministry been without at least a DC under secretary; and never have the major corporations it controls been without a majority of DC faithful at their helms. The potential influence of the state- controlled corporations can be imagined just by noting Confidential the number of their employees: approximately 800,000 in 1979. The only larger employment area under the government is education with some 865,000 employees in the 1978-79 school year. The most powerful and famous of the Italian para- state entities is IRI, Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction), founded by Mussolini in the Depression as a tempo- rary device to save banks and industries threatened with failure. In 1937, when it was clear that these institutions could not return to the private sector and survive, IRI was made a permanent agency to manage the government's shares in joint-stock companies. At the end of World War II IRI was the mechanism for reconstructing Italian industry. Since that time it has grown steadily and has always been headed by a DC figure. Its current president, Pietro Sette, has spent his entire career in state-related organizations. The companies owned and operated by IRI include FINMARE, operator of Italy's worldwide fleet of passenger ships; FINSIDER, the largest complex of steel mills on the Mediterranean; FINMECCANICA, producer of industrial machinery and nuclear equip- ment; FINCANTIERI, the largest network of ship- yards in the Mediterranean; the Alfa Romeo auto works; the national airline, Alitalia; the biggest banks of the country, Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano, and Banco di Roma; and a host of other companies and industries. No better example of the link between IRI and the DC can be found than the career of Giuseppe PetriIli, who was president of the company from 1960 until he was succeeded by Sette in 1979. Not only was he a deputy in the Constituent Assembly and the First Legislature, but he was Under Secretary of the Treasury in several De Gasperi governments and for 10 years a member of the DC Central Directorate. Since leaving IRI in 1979 he has been a DC senator from Tuscany. 32 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uontidential The other well-known parastate organization is ENI, the National Hydrocarbons Agency (Ente Nazionale degli Idrocarburi), founded in 1953 to develop nation- al policy on energy as well as national resources for hydrocarbon products. As a public holding company with shares in more than 180 subsidiaries in Italy and abroad, it operates not only in the petroleum industry but also in chemicals, nuclear products, manufactur- ing and engineering services, restaurants, hotels, tour- ist facilities, and elsewhere. Its better known subsid- iaries include the petroleum distribution network of AGIP, (recognized by tourists for its logo of the six- legged dog) the textile mills of Lanerossi, and the industrial machinery plants of Nuovo Pignone. Recently ENI and its subsidiaries have been the arm of the Italian Government involved in bringing natu- ral gas to Italy from North Africa and in developing plans for the natural gas pipeline projected from the Soviet Union. Italy's poverty in energy resources places ENI in an extremely responsible and sensitive position for national security and international poli- tics. Its current director, another loyal DC backer, is Alberto Grandi. No one, however, is ever likely to rise to the power and fame of ENI's first director, Enrico Mattei, who was killed in a mysterious plane crash near Milan in 1962. Mattei broke the practice of American, British, and Dutch oil companies of divid- ing oil revenues 50-50 with the producing country by giving 75 percent to the home country and taking 25 percent for ENI, an arrangement rumored to have made him the victim of sabotage. Alongside these colossi are other major state-partici- pation organizations: EFIM (Ente Partecipazione e Finanziamento Industria Manufatturiera, Participa- tion and Financing Agency for the Manufacturing Industry); EGAM (Ente Autonomo di Gestione per le Aziende Minerarie Metallurgiche, Autonomous Agency for Management of Metallurgical and Min- ing Enterprises); and EAGC (Ente Autonomo per la Gestione Cinematografia, Autonomous Agency for Management of the Film Industry). 33 EFIM, founded in 1962, is in charge of intervening in and developing the industrial sector and is involved in industrial machinery, railroad rolling stock, helicop- ters, aluminum, paper, glass, tires, food processing, products, and distribution as well as promoting new initiatives in the south in both industry and tourism. Included in EFIM's holdings is Breda Ferroviaria which is under contract to provide subway cars for the Washington Metro. For some years before he went to IRI, Pietro Sette headed EFIM; currently the presi- dent is Dr. Corrado Fiaccavento. EGAM, established in 1958, did not really start operations until 1971 and is now the country's leader in mining as well as mineral exploration. EGAM is somewhat smaller than other state-participation agen- cies, but it is branching into new areas such as textiles and seems headed for continued growth. EAGC, which derived from institutions in the cinema sector left over from Mussolini's regime, was founded in 1958 with added impetus from the postwar movie- making boom in Italy. Of the companies within EAGC, the Istituto Luce (Light Institute) is the oldest, established in 1925 by the fascists to produce newsreels and documentaries for propaganda pur- poses. There is also the massive complex of film studios on the outskirts of Rome, Cinecitta, started in the Mussolini years. Finally, Italnoleggio (Italian Distribution) works in film management and distribu- tion. For a state-run operation, EAGC is a bit con- trived for a democratic country, but its justification lies in providing direction for an important sector of Italy's economy and in promoting cultural develop- ment. Least important of the organizations of state participation, EAGC nevertheless is an information forum of obvious potential influence and has consist- ently been headed by a loyal backer of the DC, such as present Director General, Dr. Pasquale Lancia. In the last year or so, two noteworthy cases of the state's withdrawing from participation in industry have occured: the giant chemical and electrical con- glomerate headquartered in Milan, Montedison, of Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 which the government owned about 10 percent, re- turned wholly to private hands, as did the EAGAT (Ente Autonomo per la Gestione delle Aziende Ter- mall, Autonomous Agency for the Management of Thermal Resorts) group of enterprises in thermal spas. Because of the magnitude of the parastate sector in Italy, only the parent holding companies are men- tioned here. Their hundreds of subsidiaries, however, cannot be forgotten as providers of jobs and/or favors for people who are willing to accept DC hegemony. These concerns, in turn, are not without influence in ancillary sectors of the economy when it comes to subcontracting and the like. Still, in the midst of this soft patronage atmosphere, it would be erroneous to assume that political litmus tests are more important than professional, technical, and administrative com- petency. The nature of the work of most of the parastate organizations is highly sophisticated and, given Italy's position in the world, must be competi- tive. Hence, most of the higher echelons of these companies are competent even if the fact remains that in a majority of cases, when party affiliation or preference is known, the men at the top are either DC-connected or apolitical. Useful as this sector has been for the DC, the public is increasingly resentful of and openly hostile to this relationship. As the younger generation of university-trained specialists grows, many of them both unemployed and anti-DC, political discrimination will be forced to yield?aided by other parties whose long exclusion from these fruits has intensified their criticism and public irritation. Other Support Elements The groups which can be considered as offering support potential for the DC also include direct government employment areas and the labor move- ment. As in most European countries, Italy has a series of state monopolies such as railroads, post and telegraph, tobacco, and other services, not to mention the civil service, which are wholly government-run. To say that these have been "colonized" like the para- state corporations is to impugn the integrity of the Confidential civil service. Nevertheless, as any resident of Italy would know from conversations with postal employ- ees, railroad conductors, and other state employees, the DC sympathizer usually gets the nod when there is more than one applicant for a civil service vacancy. Italy has only one nationalized industry, ENEL (Ente Nazionale per l'Elettrica, National Electric Energy Agency), and it has been utilized for placing party backers. ENEL's development projects also tend to be in areas chosen by companies known for their support of DC governments. The press on occasion has aired controversies about some projects, citing manipulation of rates and development of new electric service in areas to be industrialized, as well as questions of opportunities favoring one region over another. While some of the criticisms appear to have little validity, the ultimate effect is the addition of one more irritant to a public all too willing to believe that it is being treated unfairly. Rarely if ever has the DC, not ? merely ENEL, been effective in rebutting any of these accusations. Like virtually everything else in Italy, the labor movement is highly politicized (in terms of party relationships). The DC's arm amongst organized workers is the CISL (Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori, Italian Confederation of Work- ers' Unions). This organization was formed in 1950 by Catholic unionists who seceded from the CGIL (Con- federazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) because of its increasing domination by Communist elements. Initially CISL attempted to be politically nonpartisan and lay its primary emphasis on enrolling workers who were Catholics. Nevertheless the founding of CISL was symptomatic of the polarization of the labor movement within a society which was lining up in Catholic and Communist sectors. Promoting DC ideals, CISL tried to appeal beyond classes, thus rejecting class conflict and seeking to unionize various levels of Italian life. Members grew to regard this approach as potentially subordinating their interests to Catholic or DC goals, and the outlook soon became typically working class, primarily blue-collar oriented. 34 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 7 Union Membership, 1976-80 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 CISL Workers 2,536,787 2,489,613 2,490,967 2,510,230 2,610,072 Pensioners 286,948 320,289 377,770 396,000 447,648 Total 2,823,735 2,809,902 2,868,737 2,906,230 3,057,720 CGIL Workers 3,544,123 3,612,342 3,544,597 3,527,331 3,439,331 Pensioners 762,528 872,718 983,365 1,056,143 1,104,143 Total 4,306,651 4,485,060 4,527,962 4,583,474 4,543,474 UIL Workers 1,086,630 1,129,400 1,210,000 1,243,700 1,250,498 Pensioners 50,000 61,500 74,000 82,500 90,000 Total 1,136,630 1,190,900 1,284,000 1,326,200 1,340,498 Across the years, particularly since the 1960s, CISL members have gone from being Catholic workers allied with the DC to being workers who are anti- Marxist first and Catholic second. By 1969 or 1970, CISL, followed by CGIL,4 evolved into greater inde- pendence of the DC, and from 1974 until 1980 CISL sought common cause as much or more with CGIL than with the DC. Other unions in this same period increasingly became more independent in their align- ments with other parties. Even the CISL has on occasion favored general strikes and pursued a policy of confrontation with DC leaders despite continuing contact with and sympathy for the DC left wing. In any event Luigi Macario, the secretary general of CISL, was elected senator on the DC ticket in Piedmont in 1979, when he took shelter in the DC to escape CISL elements who favored more leftist or CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, General Confederation of Italian Labor) is the Communist Union and UIL (Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori, Italian Union of Workers) is aligned with the PSI, PSDI, and PRI. 35 worker-oriented policies. Macario's resignation to run for the Senate opened the way for election of Pierre Carniti as secretary general, a gruff and lifelong product of the labor movement whose sentiments are quite leftist. Even though the old bonds are much loosened, CISL is still regarded as linked to the DC. Realistically, however, the union has retained its strength not so much because of its connection with the party as its role as a non-Marxist alternative for workers and its recent promotion of worker share purchases in indus- trial management. Carniti, like Macario before him, has demonstrated a noteworthy independence charac- terized by primary interest in rank-and-file labor benefits. He is, however, much more forceful and respected as a leader, and CISL membership, unlike CGIL's, is growing under his guidance (see table 7). But two other significant developments will inevitably test Carniti and affect the future relationship between the DC and CISL. One is the aging of the work force, Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential which is leading to greater increase in union pension- ers than in active members. The other factor is the growth in the number of autonomous unions and ad hoc "struggle committees" (comitati di lotta). In short, numerous signs point to increasing grass-roots dissatisfaction with the conventional unions and their methods, and CISL is not immune. In retrospect, all the DC's support organizations have been undergoing a slow but perhaps decisive change for as much as 10 years and the process is gradually accelerating. Church-related groups, while altering their mode of backing the party, are slimmed down and more coherent, even though they are showing signs of less involvement in the mainstream of secular- ized national life. These groups remain, however, the area of greatest support and slowest erosion. The complex of state-related corporations is under increasing attack from the public, particularly as the Italian economy continues to face ever greater prob- lems without significant responses from the govern- ment. A complaint about DC monopolization of the parastate sector was formally inscribed in the Pro- grammatic Accord of 1977 (see pages 99-101), but the DC has only recently begun to yield its influence in any degree. Demands for the breakup of vast holdings such as IRI and ENI, particularly from the labor world, are increasing and cannot long be ignored. DC immobilism in this area results in backsliding which affects the national economy. Again, the era of DC monopoly cannot last much longer, but the implica- tions of changes are so sweeping for the economy that party considerations may soon have to be overridden for the general good. In the area of labor, the entire national work force appears to be finding its own distinct identity independent of party. For all intents and purposes, the DC, PCI, and PSI have already lost the degree of control and support they once took for granted from their respective union subsidiaries. Essentially the DC is left with the intrinsically anti-Marxist segments of Confidential labor, but the result is a metamorphosis of what was once a solid hold on a significant part of the work force. The Catholic link is now mainly ephemeral. Although it could once be included as at least a partial support element for the DC's interests and also for the party, the enormously important Confindus- tria (Confederazione dell' Industria Italiana, Confed- eration of Italian Industry), Italy's National Associ- ation of Manufacturers, is less and less in sympathy with the party. Confindustria cannot be considered an opponent of the DC, but its more active support is now with other parties, either with the PSI, led by Bettino Craxi or, more naturally, with the Republicans or Liberals. If the DC is a party of business, the support comes mainly from professionals, small industry, shopkeepers, and clerks, the segment of society with a less complex concept of private property. The main conclusion about the DC and its support groups may be that lacking effective renewal and refoundation within the party itself, the DC is already relying increasingly on the auxiliary support network, which itself is in the process of changing and shrink- ing. At the same time, the extent of secularization over the last 20 years has made the Catholic subcul- ture only a part, and a minority one at that, of national life. The DC has not kept pace with the change in the Church, a process the Church describes as aggiornamento (updating, with the connotation of modernizing). Unless the DC experiences a much fuller aggiornamento of its own, it will continue to lose support from many of these organizations. In the parastate sector the top-level positions already are falling rapidly to other more relevant criteria than political loyalties. The DC's Electoral Record Beginning with the referendum on the monarchy and the election for the Constituent Assembly in 1946, the new democratic Italy embarked on what has become a 36 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential myriad of consultations of the electorate. These elec- tions fall into five categories: national, regional, pro- vincial, communal, and referendums. For all of them the Italian Government has provided voluminous data. Before assessing the data, several cautionary observa- tions are essential: ? Italian elections over a relatively brief timespan are inconclusive for interpretative purposes. ? Conclusions drawn on the basis of the political regions or whole Chamber districts alone are incon- clusive and possibly misleading; the smaller divi- sions such as provinces are more reliable indicators. ? Urban and rural voting patterns do not necessarily conform to conventional patterns. ? No generalizations can be made for the nation as a whole without risk of creating erroneous assump- tions for large individual geographical areas. ? Failure to consider the enormous changes in occupa- tional sectors and population shifts can skew the meaning of voting patterns. ? Similarity of party numerical returns from one election to another does not reflect the often signifi- cant changes among elected representatives. ? The complexities of the operation of Italy's propor- tional representation system subtly alter the makeup of elected bodies. All of this relates directly to the Christian Democratic Party; hence, an assessment of its present and future status in the national body politic is a complex and inexact undertaking requiring constant consideration of the party's showing in many relative situations. Again this reflects the slow-motion factor in Italian politics where any assumptions must be drawn on a longer than usual perspective and predictions hazard- ed on the basis of relatively long-term possibilities rather than certainties. Also, before specific statements can be made about any one party, some recognition must be accorded the broad concepts that have developed about the Italian 37 party system in general. Beyond the simplistic asser- tion that Italy has a multiparty system, three more sophisticated viewpoints can be stated: ? Italy has a pluralistic party arrangement in which centrifugal tendencies pull the electorate to extreme ideological poles. ? Italian parties offer such a spectrum of choice that fragmentation is inevitable; the voter finds and stays within his niche, and election results tend at first sight to show little change. ? The system is an imperfect two-party arrangement in which the DC and PCI share the majority of the votes and the other parties can never hope for more than junior partner status. Each view appears in postelection journalistic commentary and often con- fuses observers not intimately acquainted with the Italian political scene. The characterization of Italian politics as an imper- fect two-party system comes closest to reality, al- though there are useful aspects to the other views. The system is imperfect because the opposition PCI is considered disloyal and hence has not had a chance for inclusion in the government. Alternation thus cannot occur and the small party partners become a crucial factor by holding the balance of power. These small groups provide the DC with internal support for coalitions or external tolerance necessary to permit one-party or monocolore governments. As the two major parties drew closer together in electoral strength, notably in 1976, the question became wheth- er the DC could remain the larger party and thus continue to claim the right to form the government, or whether it would slip behind and be forced to deal with the PCI. The junior partners, some of whom are not averse to collaborating with the PCI, may begin to weigh which of the two large partners is more advan- tageous for them to support. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential The basic question which has to be considered in analysis of the DC's record at the polls is whether evidence is appearing to substantiate the hypothesis that the party's organization is not being renewed and that its support groups are showing signs of profound change and altered loyalties?in short, that the DC is eroding as a force in Italian politics. Authorities on Italy take the elections of 1948 and 1974 as the high and low points of DC fortunes at the polls. The peak, achieved on 18 April 1948, occurred in the election for the first legislature, when the DC's candidates won more than 48 percent of the votes cast. On 12 May 1974, in a national referendum on the 1970 law permitting civil divorce, the DC commit- ted itself wholeheartedly to repeal of that legislation and lost by a landslide with 59 percent favoring its retention. As is often the case with conveniently simplistic reference points such as these, conclusions can be misleading. The election in 1948 was held under unusual circumstances, and the referendum of 1974 was a black-and-white choice with possibly less meaning than the outcome of 1975 regional elections and the 1976 renewal of Parliament. Today there are the increasingly important adminis- trative regions whose elections since 1970 are produc- ing another focal point of enhanced political power and changing voter patterns. Finally, lower level administrative elections at the provincial and commu- nal strata break returns into small enough segments to permit identification of trend areas. What results from any analytical view in 1981, of the composite of these various election statistics is a picture of DC erosion which increases inversely to the level of the populace consulted. If there is no evidence that DC support will disappear, there is still much to suggest that it is shrinking and will continue to do so unless the party alters its strategies or eventually succeeds in its timeworn renewal aspirations. Confidential National Legislative Elections Since World War II, Italy has had nine national legislative elections: one for the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and eight for the houses of Parliament from 1948 to 1979. Viewed as a whole, the returns of these elections, except for 1948, are unusually uniform, a political bas-relief of strikingly static character (see tables 8, 10 to 17, and figures 8-10). Only with an unconventionally long overview and careful compari- son of parliamentary election returns from various geographic regions do meaningful patterns begin to emerge. In fact, assessments do not acquire a true third dimension unless information from regional, provincial, and communal elections is considered as well (see pages 72-81 and tables A-17-A-32). Because Italian politics move with glacial speed the basic shifts are found primarily in subsurface movements. - The first national vote after the war, on 2 June 1946, produced a political spectrum that has tended to repeat itself in the 35 subsequent years. This first election appears now as a harbinger of a certain stagnation in Italian voting patterns that belies in part the conventional belief that Italy is unstable. The election of 1946 is most remembered today for its verdict to abolish the monarchy of the House of Savoy and to make Italy a republic. At the same time, however, Italians voted for their first postwar legisla- tive body, the unicameral Cost ituente (Constituent Assembly), a body of 556 members empowered to write a constitution for the new republic. In both 1946 votes, the election results demonstrate the close division of viewpoints in the nation (see tables 8 and 9). In the referendum on the monarchy? the so-called institutional question?the electorate supported founding a republic by a margin of only 2 million voters (8.54 percent of the participating electorate). In the simultaneous election of the assem- bly the margin was even narrower ideologically, par- ticularly if one recalls the affinity of the Communist 38 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 8 Election for the Constituent Assembly, 2 June 1946 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats 8,082,486 35.18 207 37.23 Socialists 4,765,665 20.74 115 20.68 Communists 4,358,243 18.97 104 18.70 National Democratic Union 1,560,037 6.79 41 7.37 Common Man Front 1,210,021 5.27 30 5.40 Republicans 1,003,086 4.37 23 4.14 National Freedom Bloc 636,330 2.77 16 2.88 Party of Action 334,877 1.46 7 1.26 Democratic Concentration of Labor 2 Italian Unionist Movement 220,196 0.96 1 0.72 Social Christian Party 1 Sicilian Independence Movement 4 Sardinian Action Party 2 Democratic Party of Labor 803,328 3.49 1 1.62 Peasants' Party 1 Front of Progressive Democratic Republicans 1 Total 22,974,269 100.00 556 100.00 Table 9 National Institutional Referendum, 2 June 1946 Number of Votes Percentage For the creation of an Italian Republic 12,719,641 54.27 For the retention of the monarchy of the House of Savoy 10,718,802 45.73 Total 23,437,269 100.00 39 and Socialist viewpoints at that time. The DC won 35.2 percent of the vote, and the two parties of the left 39.7 percent (PSI 20.7 percent; PCI 19.0 percent). This combined total for the three major parties, some 75 percent, is roughly the pattern which has prevailed ever since, save for 1948. Over the entire timespan, fluctuation has occurred among the DC, PSI, and PCI, but their combined total has remained much the same (see figure 7). Italy's new Constitution went into effect on 1 January 1948, and the general election for the first legislature of the Parliament was held on 18 April. Such a consultation would have been significant in any cir- cumstances as the first of a new regime, but circum- stances elsewhere in Europe rendered it more dramat- ic. The Communist coup in Czechoslvakia in late Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 7 Major Parties' Share of Vote, 1946-79 Percent 50 40 DC ? 36.5 Christian 30 Democrats PCI ?29.6 Communists 20 10 0 N0,11.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1946 48 53 58 63 68 72 76 79 PSI Socialists Percent of votes for Christian Democrats, Communists and Socialists in elections for the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and the Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79. Figure on right is party majority in election for European Parliament, June 1979. (With a law of 1975, voting age was lowered to 18 years, increasing the electorate by some 3,000,000, effective in 1975.) 585807 2-82 February made the election in Italy, with the largest Communist party outside the Russian sphere of influ- ence, all the more ominous. In an atmosphere of the beginning of the cold war, American interest in the Italian contest rose. Public statements by President Truman, urging Italo-Americans to write relatives in Italy to vote DC, and the pro-DC stance of the Catholic community in the United States rose to a crescendo by election day. As a result, the DC for some years had to cope with allegations that its victory was bought with US dollars and that it was an American puppet. Other elements of more lasting import from both 1946 and 1948 need to be noted for the bearing they have on today's Italian political scene and on the DC in particular. First, neither of these early elections took place in normal times, given contemporary condi- tions in Italy and Europe. Italy had not had a free Confidential Figure 8 Composition of Constituent Assembly, 1946 Percent (Seats won) Party Composition: Others (CUN) 0.72 (4) PRI-4.14 (23) DC-37.23 (207) Others (non-CUN)-1.62 (9) PdA-1.26 (7) BNL-2.88 PSIUP-20.68 (16) (115) PCI-18.70 (104) UDN-7.37 (41) UQ-5.40 (30) 585608 2-82 election since 1921, when the electorate was restricted to males. If a normal election is defined as a free consultation in peacetime, then the last such vote in Italy was probably that of 1909 when the country had not yet instituted even universal male suffrage. Hence, at best the 1946 and 1948 elections were the first normal ones after two world wars, 20 years of dictatorship, and a depression. In any event, these elections were the first with universal male and female suffrage for all citizens age 21 and over. Furthermore, the electorate was roughly triple that of 1921. Catholics participated in an Italian election for the first time with full Vatican approval, and genuine- ly mass parties with mass support participated for the first time. Thus the overwhelming majority of the electorate in 1946 had no experience of a freely exercised franchise and representative democratic government. 40 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 10 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1948 and 1953 1948 1953 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 12,741,299 48.50 305 53.14 10,864,282 40.10 263 44.58 Communists (PCI) a 8,137,047 30.98 183 31.88 6,121,922 22.60 .143 24.24 Socialists (PSI) 3,441,305 12.70 75 12.71 Social Democrats (PSDI) b 1,858,346 7.07 33 5.75 1,223,251 4.52 19 3.22 Liberals (PLI) e 1,004,889 3.83 19 3.31 816,267 3.00 13 2.20 Republicans (PRI) 652,477 2.48 9 1.57 437,988 1.62 5 0.85 Neo-Fascists (MSI) 526,670 2.00 6 1.04 1,582,567 5.84 29 4.91 PNM PMP (Monarchists) f PDIUM 729,174 2.78 14 2.44 1,855,842 6.85 40 6.78 Radicals (PRad) 0 0 Others 619,010 2.36 5 0.87 749,319 2.77 3 0.51 Total 26,268,912 100.00 574 100.00 27,092,743 100.00 590 100.00 Voter Turnout 26,854,203 92.23 28,410,326 93.82 a In 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberia, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). One hundred thirty-two deputies (23.00 percent of the Chamber) declared themselves PCI members; 51(8.88 percent) PSI. b Unita Socialista in 1948. e In 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque. d Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958. e From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movirnento Sociale Italiano and Destra Nazionale. f In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. Whatever faults may be laid to the DC now, it was the pivotal political grouping that brought Italy into a new order against a backdrop of war, destruction, economic hardship, and inexperience. And this leap into sophisticated government occurred without violence. In the election of 1948, the DC's margin of viotory overshadows all else. Seen more than 30 years later, the size of its vote is still remarkable. The margin of victory then has since proved to be a mixed blessing, a performance for which there has been no encore. For years the DC touted the 1948 results as proof of its massive support in the population and often asserted 41 that it had won an absolute majority. Opposition groups have frequently argued against this, though, pointing out that the popular vote was not absolute even if the Italian proportional representation system did give the DC an absolute majority of seats in both houses of Parliament (see tables 10 and 14). Worse for the DC, the party was long accused of insinuating its 1948 victory into a greater mandate than appeared warranted to other groups. More than a few innuen- dos from other quarters suggested that only US intervention-"votes bought with dollars"-account- ed for the DC's 48-percent share of the vote. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 11 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1958 and 1963 1958 1963 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 12,522,279 42.36 273 45.80 11,775,970 38.29 260 41.27 Communists (PCI) a 6,704,706 22.68 140 23.49 7,768,228 25.26 166 26.35 Socialists (PSI) a 4,208,111 14.23 84 14.09 4,257,300 13.84 87 13.81 Social Democrats (PSDI) b 1,345,750 4.55 22 3.69 1,876,409 6.10 33 5.24 Liberals (PLI) e 1,046,939 3.54 17 2.85 2,143,954 6.97 39 6.19 Republicans (PRD a 405,574 1.37 6 1.01 420,419 1.37 6 0.95 Neo-Fascists (MSI) e 1,407,913 4.76 24 4.03 1,571,187 5.10 27 4.28 PNM PMP (Monarchists) f PDIUM 659,865 f 776,942 2.23 2.63 11 14 1.85 2.35 536,991 f 1.75 8 1.27 Radicals (PRad) 0 0 Others 485,554 1.64 5 0.84 407,999 1.32 4 0.64 Total 29,563,633 100.00 596 100.00 30,758,031 100.00 630 100.00 Voter Turnout 30,437,770 93.81 31,766,058 92.91 a In 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberia, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). One hundred thirty-two deputies (23.00 percent of the Chamber) declared themselves PCI members; 51(8.88 percent) PSI. b Unita Socialista in 1948. e In 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque. d Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958. e From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra Nazionale. f In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. Confidential 42 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 12 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1968 and 1972 1968 1972 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 12,441,553 39.12 266 42.22 12,919,270 38.66 266 42.22 Communists (PCI) 8,557,404 26.91 177 28.10 9,072,454 27.14 179 28.41 Socialists (PSI) a Social Democrats (PSDI) 4,605,832 14.48 91 14.45 3,210,427 9.62 61 9.68 1,717,539 5.14 29 4.60 Liberals (PLI) 1,851,060 5.82 31 4.92 1,297,105 3.88 20 3.18 Republicans (PRI) 626,567 1.97 9 1.43 954,597 2.86 15 2.38 Neo- Fascists (MSI) 1,414,794 4.46 24 3.81 2,896,762 b 8.67 56 8.89 Monarchists (PNM) 414,423 c 1.30 6 0.95 0 Radicals (PRad) 0 0 Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) d 1,414,544 4.44 23 3.65 648,763 1.94 0 0.00 Others 477,076 1.50 3 0.47 697,862 2.09 4 0.64 Total 31,803,253 100.00 630 100.00 33,414,779 100.00 630 100.00 Voter Turnout 33,003,249 92.79 34,524,106 93.18 a Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Part ito Socialista Unificato. b From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Soci ale Italiano and Destra Nazionale. c In 1948 and 1953, PNM in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. d PSIUP in 1968 and 1972; Democrazia Proletaria in 1976. 43 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 13 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1976 and 1979 1976 1979 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 14,218,298 38.71 262 41.59 14,026,924 38.29 261 41.43 Communists (PCI) 12,622,728 34.37 227 36.03 11,129,298 30.38 201 31.91 Socialists (PSI) a 3,542,998 9.64 57 9.05 3,591,579 9.81 62 9.84 Social Democrats (PSDI) a 1,237,270 3.37 15 2.38 1,405,008 3.84 21 3.33 Liberals (PLI) 478,335 1.31 5 0.79 713,486 1.94 9 1.43 Republicans (PRI) 1,134,936 3.09 14 2.22 1,107,826 3.02 15 2.38 Neo-Fascists (MSI) 2,245,376 b 6.12 35 5.56 1,927,233 b 5.28 31 4.92 Monarchists (PNM) 0 0 Radicals (PRad) 394,212 1.07 4 0.64 1,264,082 3.44 18 2.86 Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) c 582,770 1.58 6 0.95 601,036 1.65 6 0.95 Others 270,350 0.74 5 0.79 863,271 2.35 6 0.95 Total 36,727,273 100.00 630 100.00 36,629,743 100.00 630 100.00 Voter Turnout 37,760,520 93.41 38,150,395 90.35 a Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Part ito Socialista Unificato. b From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra Nazionale. c Unita Proleteria per il Comunismo. Confidential 44 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 k,onimential Table 14 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1948 and 1953 1948 1953 Number Percentage Number Percent of Number Percentage Number Percent of of Votes of Seats Membership of Votes of Seats Membership Christian Democrats 10,899,640 48.11 131 55.26 9,692,584 39.87 . 113 47.68 (DC) Communists (PCI) a 6,969,122 30.76 72 30.38 4,912,093 20.21 51 21.52 Socialists (PSI) 2,893,148 11.91 26 10.97 Social Democrats (PSDI) b 943,219. 4.16 8 3.38 1,046,659 4.34 4 1.69 Liberals (PLI) c 1,216,934 5.37 7 2.95 695,985 2.86 3 1.27 Republicans (PRI) 594,178 2.62 4 1.69 262,484 1.08 0 0.00 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC 607,792 d 2.68 4 1.69 186,447 e 0.78 3 1.27 Neo-Fascists (MSI) f 164,092 0.73 0 0.00 1,473,596 6.07 9 3.78 PNM 393,510g 1.74 3 1.27 1,562,653g 6.44 14 5.91 PMP (Monarchists) g PDIUM Radicals (PRad) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Others 868,803 3.83 8 3.38 1,563,702 6.44 14 5.91 Total 22,657,290 100.00 237 100.00 24,309,351 100.00 237 100.00 Voter Turnout 23,842,919 92.15 25,483,201 93.78 a In 1948, Fronte Democratic? Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). b Unita Socialista in 1948. Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque. d In 1948, PRI-PSDI coalition in Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli- Venezia Giulia, and Liguria. e In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna. f From 1972, MSI was joined by Destra Nazionale (DN). g In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. 45 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 15 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1958 and 1963 1958 1963 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 10,782,262 41.23 123 50.00 10,032,458 36.52 129 40.95 Communists (PCI) a 5,701,019 21.80 59 23.98 6,933,842 25.24 84 26.67 Socialists (PSI) a 3,682,806 14.08 35 14.23 3,849,878 14.02 44 13.97 Social Democrats (PSDI) b 1,165,402 4.46 5 2.03 1,744,213 6.35 14 4.44 Liberals (PLI) c 1,008,830 3.86 4 1.63 2,028,379 7.38 18 5.72 Republicans (PRI) 363,461 1.39 0 0.00 223,107 0.81 0 0.00 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC 0 185,889 d 0.68 4 1.27 Neo-Fascists (MSI) e 1,149,873 4.40 3.25 1,459,046 5.31 14 4.44 PNM PMP (Monarchists) f PDIUM 510,823 f 1.94 0.81 429,339 f 1.56 2 0.64 Radicals (PRad) 0 0 Others - 1,787,523 6.84 10 4.07 584,935 2.13 6 1.90 Total 26,151,999 100.00 246 100,00 27,471,086 100.00 315 100.00 Voter Turnout 27,391,239 93.89 28,831,008 93.04 a In 1948, Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). b Unita Socialista in 1948. Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque. a In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna. e From 1972, MSI was joined by Destra Nazionale (DN). f In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. Confidential 46 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 contwenual Table 16 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1968 and 1972 1968 1972 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 10,965,790 38.34 135 42.86 11,466,701 38.08 135 42.86 Communists (PCI) 8,583,285 a 30.01 101 32.06 8,475,141 a 28.14 94 29.84 Socialists (PSI) b Social Democrats (PSDI) 4,355,506 15.23 46 14.59 3,225,804 10.71 33 10.48 1,613,603 5.36 11 3.49 Liberals (PLI) 1,936,943 6.77 16 5.08 1,316,058 4.36 8 2.54 Republicans (PRI) 620,658 2.17 2 0.64 917,989 3.04 5 1.59 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC 0 0 Neo-Fascists(MSI) 1,380,452 4.83 11 3.49 2,737,695 9.09 26 8.25 PNM PMP (Monarchists) PDIUM 308,916 c 1.08 2 0.64 0 Radicals (PRad) 0 0 Others 499,697 1.57 2 0.64 361,915 1.20 3 0.95 Total 28,601,247 100.00 315 100.00 30,114,906 100.00 315 100.00 Voter Turnout 30,212,701 92.88 31,454,873 92.72 a Coalition of PCI and PSIUP in 1968 and 1972. b Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Part ito Socialista Unificato. In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. 47 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 17 Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate), 1976 and 1979 1976 1979 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Percent of Membership Christian Democrats (DC) 12,226,768 38.88 135 42.86 12,010,716 38.34 138 43.81 Communists (PCI) 10,640,471 33.84 116 36.83 9,855,951 31.46 109 34.60 Socialists (PSI) 3,209,987 10.21 29 9.21 3,252,410 10.38 32 10.16 Social Democrats (PSDI) 966,771 3.07 6 1.90 1,320,729 4.21 9 2.86 Liberals (PLI) 436,751 1.39 2 0.64 691,718 2.21 2 0.64 Republicans (PRI) 846,505 2.69 6 1.90 1,053,251 3.36 6 1.90 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC 0 0 Neo-Fascists(MSI) 2,090,635 6.65 15 4.76 1,780,950 5.68 13 4.12 PNM PMP (Monarchists) PDIUM 0 0 Radicals (PRad) 265,397 0.84 0 0.00 413,444 1.32 2 0.64 Others 768,896 2.43 6 1.90 951,626 3.04 4 1.27 Total 31,448,181 100.00 315 100.00 31,330,795 100.00 315 100.00 Voter Turnout 32,557,373 93.27 32,968,054 90.73 Confidential 48 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 9 Composition of Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79 Percent of Votes (Seats won) 1948 PR1-2.48, (9) N. PSDI-7.07h (33) PSI/PCI-30.988 (183) DC-48.50 (305) 411*74 /PL1-3.83c (19) /MSI-2.00e / (6) PNM-2.781 Others-2.36 1968 PRI 1.97 DC-39.12 PL1-5.82 (9) (266) (3)) PSUPSDI-14.48/\ /NISI-4.46 (91) \ \ / (24) (5) 1953 PRI-1.62PLI-3.00 (5) /03) PSDI-4.52 / ,MSI-5.84 (19) / / (29) // PSI-12.70-- /PNM -6.85 (75) ,/,,,/ (40) PC1-22.60 _.--Others-2.77 (143) 590 _------- (3) DC-40.10 (263) PCI-26 91 (177) PSI UP-4.44 (23) 630 /PNM-1.30 / (6) _-Others- 1.50 (3) 1972 PS 1)1-5.14 (29) PRI- 2.86 (15) 1958 PRI-1.37d (6) PSDI -4 55 (22) PSI-14.23 (84) PCI- 22.68 (140) DC-42.36 (273) PL1- 3.54 (17)1 596 NISI -4 76 /(24) ,PN M -2.23 /(11) ,PDIUM -2.63 // (14) Others-1.64 (5) 1963 PRI-1.37 (6) N PSDI- 6.10 h (33) PSI-13.84h (87) PCI- 25.26 (166) 630 DC-38.29 (260) PLI-6.97 /(39) MSI-5.10 / (27) / / 'PNM-].751 //// /(s ..,-Others -1.32 PSI-9.62. N (61) (179) PSI PSIUP-1.94g At'N w (0) 630 ,DC-38.66 / (266) /1' LI -3.88 / (20) /MSI-8 67c / (57) thers-2.09 (4) 1976 PSI-9.64 (57) PCI-34.37 (227) PSIUP-1 PRad-1.07 58 4k. (6) (4) 630 PSDI -3.37 PRI-3.09 (15) (14) DC-38.71 (262) ,PLI- 1.31 / (5) MSI-6.12 e (35) _-01hers-0.74 (5) 1979 (P(62S20I):)9.81 PSDI-3.84 PCI-30.38 (21)1 s (6) PRacl -3 44 PS1UP-1.65 (18) 630 am n 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il Lavoro, coalition of PCI and PSI. h Unita Social ista in 1948. cln 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque. d Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958. c From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra Nazionale. fIn 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. g PSIUP in 1968 and 1972; Democrazia Proletaria in 1976; Proletarian Unity for Communism. hTemporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Partito Socialista Unificato. 585809 2-82 PRI-3.02 (15) DC-38.29 (261) PLI - 1.94 //(9) / MS1-5.28e (31) 49 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 (6) 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Figure 10 Composition of Senate, 1948-79 Percent of Votes (Seats won) 1948 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC - 2.68 r (4) PRI-2.62-- (4) PSDI -4.16? (8) PO/PSI-30.76a (72) DC-48.11 (13) PLI -5.37e (7) MSI-0.73h (0) z PNM-PMP- Z PDIUM -1.74' (3) Others-3.83 (8) 1968 1953 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC -0.788 (3) PRI -1.08 (0) PS DI -4.34 (4) PSI-11.91 (26) PC1-20.21 (51) DC-39.87 PLI - 2.86 (1)3) (3) .MS1-6.07 (9> ---PNM-PMP- PDIUM -6.44' (14) Others-6.44 (14) 1958 PRI-1.39 (0) PSDI -4.46 (5) PSI-14.08 (35) PCI- 21.80 (59) DC-41.23 (123) PLI-3.86 (4) PRI-2.17 (2) PSI- 15.23d (46) PC!-30.0l6 (101) DC-38.34 (135) 315 PLI- 6.77 (16) MSI -4.83 (11) /PNM-PM P- PDIUM -1 081 (2) Others-1.57 (2) 1972 PRI -3.04 (5) PSDI -5.36 (11) PSI- 10.71 (33) PCI -28. I 4 b (94) DC-38.08 (135) PLI-4.36 / (8) MS!-9.09 (26) ----Others-1.20 (3) 1976 MS1-4.40 (8) P- PDIUM -1.94' 246 (2) Others-6.84 (10) 1963 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC-0.68g 1963 PLI -7.38 (4) DC-36.52 (18) PRI-0.81 (129) MSI -5.31 (0) (14) PSDI- 6.35 PNM-PMP- (14) PDIUM -1.56 315 (2) PSI-14.02 PCI -25.24 Others-2.13 (44) (84) (6) PRI -2.69 (6) PSDI 3.()7 (6) PSI-10.21 (29) PCI -33 .84 (116) DC-38.88 (135) PLI- 1.39 (2) MSI -6.65 (15) Others-2.43 (6) PRad-0 84 (0) 1979 PRI-3.36 (6) PSDI -4.21 (9) PSI-10.38 (32) PCI-31.46 (109) aln 1948, Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). h Coalition of PCI and PSIUP in 1968 and 1972. c Unita Socialista in 1948. dTemporary merger in 1968 or PSI and PSDI as Partito Socialista Unificato. e Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque. fIn 1948, PRI-PSDI coalition in Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Julian Venetia and Liguria. g In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna. h From 1972, MSI was joined by DN, Destra Nazionale. 'In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM. DC-38.34 (138) PRad- 1.32 (2) PLI -2.21 (2) MSI -5.68 (13) Others-3.04 (4) 585810 2-82 Confidential 50 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 11 Labor Force by Economic Sector, 1951-80 Percent 50 30 20 10 Othera Industry Agriculture 0 1951 60 70 80 a Includes commerce, transportation, communications, hotels, banking, public administration, social services, and so forth. 585811 2-82 Two other sets of data for a comparable time period demonstrate, paradoxically, how much Italy has changed. The most striking are data on employment sectors (see figure 11). In 1951, 43.87 percent of Italians engaged in agricultural pursuits, the largest single sector. By 1980 that sector had dropped to the smallest, with only 14.14 percent still deriving their living from the land. The smallest sector in 1951? independent businessmen, professionals, and service occupations, with only 26.66 percent?grew to 48.27 percent by 1980. Industry, the other major area of work, rose in the same years from 29.47 percent to 37.59 percent. Recalling that the DC's most impor- tant support was said to come from the rural voter, the DC's share of the vote from these areas has declined, surprisingly, less steeply. The second area of comparison, population growth and change, also yields important information. From 1951 to 1979, Italy's overall population increased 20.35 percent (see table 18). During that time, the growth of both the northwest and center increased 51 Figure 12 Urbanization and Support for the Christian Democrats, 1953-79 Percent Change in DC Vote Share ?10 ?15 ?40 ?20 0 20 40 60 Rate of Urbanization Each point in this figure represents one of thirty electoral districts in the Chamber of Deputies. The rate of urbanization is measured as the percent- age change in total population in each district between 1953 and 1979. The change in the vote share of the Christian Democrats is measured also as a percentage change over the same period. Two districts (Valle d'Aosta and Trieste) were excluded from the analysis because they were not comparable to the other districts. 585812 2-82 much more rapidly. The northeast, south, and islands, traditionally DC strongholds, fell behind the nation as a whole in growth. Paradoxically the party base in these areas, measured in numbers of voters, has eroded only in certain areas?Sardinia, the city of Naples, and the Provinces of Taranto and Ragusa, for example. If election results are contrasted with the employment sectors and population, a curious phenomenon ap- pears: politics do not seem to reflect these other facets of national life. In a broader sense, keeping in mind the great changes in social and economic realities, the variance seems even greater. When applied to the DC specifically (and perhaps to some other parties), the implication is that the party is not coping well with economic, social, and demographic change. The situation described here is best summed up in the title of a book on the national election of 1979, Mobility Without Movement, a phrase highlighting the paradox of contemporary Italy. The country is by Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 18 Population by Geographical Region, 1951 and 1979 1951 1979 Change, 1951-79 Percentage Change Northwest a 11,745,432 15,435,163 3,689,731 +31.41 Northeast b 5,575,781 e 6,457,898 882,117 +15.82 Center e 7,507,069 9,772,932 2,265,863 +30.18 South d 16,627,480 18,598,959 1,971,479 +11.86 Islands e 5,762,772 6,563,559 800,787 +13.90 Italy 47,218,534 f 56,828,511 9,609,977 +20.35 a Northwest: Piedmont, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardy, and Liguria. b Northeast: Trentino?Alto Adige, Venetia, and Friuli?Venezia Giulia. e Center: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche. d South: Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria. e Islands: Sicily and Sardinia. f Trieste, which became part of Italy in October 1954, is not included. Its estimated population in 1954 was 297,003. most measures among the leading nations in the world in many spheres. In politics, however, it often appears more exemplary of the Third World. As the largest political party and a participant in every government from 1945 to 1981, the DC must bear a large portion of the blame for this, even if other parties also share responsibility. The word Italians use most in describ- ing the DC is immobilismo (immobilism) in reference -to the party's characteristic failure to act on many major issues and thus leave the country somewhat anachronistic politically. If exception is made for the anomaly of 1948, the stability of the DC's ranks in the Chamber is striking in terms of numbers. For the seven other legislatures beginning in 1953, the party's share of the vote ranged from 42.36 percent to 38.29 percent (1958 and 1963). But if 1958 is also excluded, the range narrows to a mere 1.81 percent (from 40.10 percent in 1953 to 38.29 percent) over a 25-year period (see tables 10 to 13). Nearly the same phenomenon appears with the Confidential Table 19 Population and Voting by Sex, 1948 and 1979 1948 1979 Males Females Males Females Total 22,868,008 23,953,962 27,767,759 29,060,752 Percentage of population 48.84 51.16 48.86 51.14 Eligible to vote Total 13,908,860 15,208,694 20,237,003 21,986,810 Percentage of population 47.77 52.23 47.93 52.07 Actual voters Total 12,855,102 13,999,101 18,400,272 19,750,123 Percentage of population 92.42 92.05 90.92 89.83 DC Senate delegation, despite the difference in its electorate caused by the age qualification for voting eligibility (see tables 14 to 17). With this evidence over a period of roughly 30 years, how can the erosion hypothesis be sustained? Here the significance of district-by-district analysis becomes clear. If on the surface the DC's vote percentages and the number of its deputies and senators remain so similar across the years, geo- graphic shifts in its strength and changes in delega- tion personnel are masked but quite real. For exam- ple, the election of 1979 was widely hailed? particularly in the press?as a great success for the party compared to 1976. True, the DC doubled its distance from the PCI, but this resulted primarily from Communist losses. The DC, on the other hand, lost 0.42 percent of the votes in 1979 relative to 1976. More telling Was its decline in 22 of the 32 districts for the Chamber (see figure 14) In the 20 Senate districts, the party fell below its 1976 level in 13 (see figure 15) Also among the 261 DC deputies elected in 1979, one less than in 1976, there were 59 new people, To be eligible to vote in Senate elections, a citizen must be at least. 25 years old. 52 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 13 Population Change (1951-79) in Relation to DC Representation Change (1948-79) in the Chamber of Deputies; shown by Political Region Percent Change Key Percent of Population Change 1951-79 11979 DC Representation Change Relative to 1948 I 1979 DC Representation Change Relative to 1953 Piemonte -100 -50 50 100 - Valle d'Aosta 7 Lombardia Trentino-Alto Adige (411.1 Venetoa Friuli-Venezia Giuliab Liguria Emilia-Romagna Toscana Er Sardegna -100 -50 50 100 Trentino- Alto Adige Aosta Lombardia Veneto Friuli- Venezia Giulia ? Piemonte Emilia-Romagna +s) Marche Sardegna A few deviations from traditional regional boundaries are nude in the formation or the thirty?two electoral districts of the Chamber. Population and representation Figures have been adjusted accordingly here. In the case of the Veneto, the province of Helium, is not included in the region's statistics. Figures include the province of Belluno (see note a). The province of Trieste was added to Italy in October 1954. Thus the population and representation statistics utilized here for years prior to that dale do not include Trieste. Addition of the 300,000 citizens Of that area thus alter statistics given for the region. If Trieste is excluded, the area had a slight decline in population as well as in its number of allocated seats. Toscana Umbria Lazio Umbria -100 -50 Marchec 1 50 100 Laz od Abruzzi Abruzzi Molise -1= Campania Molise Er Campania Puglia Puglia Basilicata Er Basilicata Calabria LI Calabria Sicilia O Figures to etude the province of Rieti (see note a). ,The province of Rieti is not included (see note a). Note: Italy's rust reliable postwar census was taken in September 1951. Figures from that report form the basis of comparison in this table together with population statistics reported for the compilation of electoral roles for the general elections of 1979. There is thus a slight variation implied in calculating the percentages of delegation representation in both 1948 and 1953. In addition, the ItalianGovernment's mode of reporting 1948 and 1953 election returns (to include those deputies elected through the Single National College) make a precise percentage calculation impossible. With each of these exceptions. no significant alteration of the results occurs. Sicilia -100 -50 cro 50 100 585813 2-82 53 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential 6 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 14 Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79 Chamber of Deputies Percent Key Percent of votes received by Christian Democrats .8 year average 18 year median 0 20 40 60 80 100 I. Torino 1948 1953 Novara 1958 Vercelli 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 ' I II. ?Cuneo Alessandria Asti , III. Genova Imperia La Spezia Savona , , , ' IV. Milano Pavia V. Como Sondrio Varese ' VI. Brescia Bergamo , , , , VII. Mantova Cremona , , , , , _ VIII. Trento Bolzano , , a No list of DC candidates presented in elections. b Trieste became a part of the Italian Republic in October 1954. ? cCalculations based on exceptions cited in notes a and b. 0 20 40 60 80 100 IX. Verona Padova Vicenza Rovigo X. Venezia Treviso XI. Udine Belluno Gorizia Pordenone 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 XVII. Ancona XXV. Pesaro Macerata Ascoli Piceno XVIII. Perugia Terni Rieti XIX. Roma Latina Viterbo Frosinone XII. Bologna Ferrara Ravenna Forli XIII Parma Modena Piacenza Reggio Emilia XX. L'Aquila Pescara Chieti Teramo XXI. Campobosso Isernia Lecce Brindisi Taranto XXVI. Potenza Matera XXVII. Catanzaro Cosenza Reggio Calabria XXVI I.Catania Messina Siracusa Ragusa Enna XXIX. Palermo Trapani Agrigento Caltanissetta XIV. Firenze Pistoia XV. Pisa Livorno Lucca Massa Carrara XVI. Siena Arezzo Grosseto XXII. Napoli Caserta XXIII. Benevento Avellino Salerno XXX Cagliari Sassari Nuoro Oristano XXXI Valle D'Aosta XXIV. Bari Foggia XXXI' . Trieste Italy IN ational Average Fe 585814 2-82 55 Confidential 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 14 Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79 Senate Percent Key o Percent of votes received by Christian Democrats = 8 year average um 8 year median I. 1948 Piemonte 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 ' . II. Valle d'Aosta ' , ya _= III. Lombardia , = IV. Trentino?Alto Adige , , , V. Veneto , , , , , ?, VI. Friuli-1, enezia Giulia b b , , ?b b VII. Liguria r --= VIII. Emilia?Romagna ' ,c ,c ........ allo DC list presented in the elections of this year. The average and median are thus for 5 elections. b The city and province of Trieste were not a part of this region until the elections of 1958. The 8 year average and median are also shown without Trieste. cThe DC and PRI presented a unified list in these elections. IX. Toscana , , X. Umbria --, XI. Marche , , , XII. Lazio ' , , , , XIII. Abruzzi , '. 1--d XIV. Molise .1?d XV. Campania , XVI. Puglia , , d n the elections of 1953, 1958, and 1963 Abruzzi and Molise constituted one region and hence one senatorial electoral district. Statistics shown here are official breakdowns for returns in those years for each of the two parts. e DC and PSDI presented a unified list. fUnified list of DC and PLI. XVII. Basilicata , 1, "... XVIII. Calabria , XIX. Sicilia , XX. Sardegna = Italy National Average , , , 25X1 585814 2-82 57 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 15 Distribution of Seats by Electoral District (Region) Key Number below years in light type shows number of seats won by Christian Democrats. Number below years in bold type shows total number of seats in a particular electoral dstrict. Cluunberofflepufies Electoral District 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Torino-Novara-Vercelli 13/26 11/26 11/26 11/33 11/32 12/34 13/38 12/39 Cuneo-Alessandria-Ami 9/16 8/16 8/14 7/14 7/15 7/14 7/16 7/15 Genovainapefia-La Spezia-Savona 9/19 8/17 9/21 8/23 8/22 8/22 8/22 7/23 Milano-Pavia 18/36 16/36 15/39 15/45 17/47 16/45 19/52 18/52 Como-Sondrki-Varese 9/14 9/15 8/14 9/17 9/17 9/17 9/19 9/20 Brescia-Bergamo 14/19 12/18 12/19 12/19 12/20 12/20 12/21 12/23 Mantova-Cremona 5/10 5/10 5/10 4/9 4/9 4/8 4/8 4/8 Trento-Bolzano 5/9 5/8 5/10 5/10 4/9 5/10 4/9 4/10 Verona-Padova-Vicenza-Rovigo 19/28 17/28 18/29 17/29 17/28 17/28 16/28 16/29 Venezia-Treviso 10/16 10/16 9/16 9/17 9/18 9/18 8/16 8/17 Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone 9/14 9/15 8/14 7/14 7/15 7/14 6/13 6/11 Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 7/24 7/22 7/27 6/27 6/25 7/27 7/27 7/27 Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia 7/19 7/19 7/19 6/19 6/20 6/20 6/19 6/19 Firenze-Pistoia 6/13 5/13 5/13 5/16 5/16 5/16 5/15 5/14 Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara 7/14 6/13 6/15 5/15 5/15 6/16 6/14 5/14 Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 3/9 3/10 3/9 3/10 3/9 3/9 3/9 3/9 Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno 9/17 8/15 8/19 7/19 7/17 7/17 7/16 7/17 Perugia-Terni-Rieti 5/11 4/11 5/13 4/12 4/13 4/11 4/12 4/10 Roma-Latina-Viterbo,Frosinone 20/34 15/38 16/39 16/48 17/47 17/48 19/55 20/54 L'Aquila-Pescara-Chiefi-Teramo 9/16 7/14 8/17 7/16 8/15 8/15 7/14 7/14 Campobasgrlsemia 3/4 3/5 4/6 3/4 3/5 3/4 3/4 3/4 Napoli-Caserta 17/31 12/31 14/34 15/38 15/38 14/38 15/39 16/38 Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 11/18 8/20 10/21 10/21 10/21 11/23 9/18 10/18 Bari-Foggia 12/22 9/22 10/22 10/23 11/23 10/24 10/23 10/23 Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 9/16 8/16 9/18 9/18 9/19 9/18 8/18 9/18 Potenza-Matera 4/6 4/7 4/8 4/8 5/8 5/8 4/8 4/7 Catanzaro-Cosenza-ReggiooCalabfia 13/24 11/25 13/26 12/26 11/26 10/24 10/23 10/23 Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna 15/26 11/25 13/29 12/29 13/29 12/30 12/29 12/27 Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta 13/25 11/25 13/29 12/29 12/29 13/30 12/25 12/26 Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano 9/14 7/14 8/15 8/18 8/19 8/17 7/16 7/17 Valled'Aosta 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 Treiste 2/4 2/3 2/3 2/4 2/3 1/3 Totals 305/574 263/590 273/596 260/630 266/630 266/630 262/630 261/630 585815 2-82 Senate Electoral District 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Piemonte 8/17 8/17 9/18 9/24 10/24 9/24 10/25 9/25 Valle d'Aosta 1/1 11/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 Lombardia 18/31 16/32 16/33 19/45 20/45 20/45 21/48 21/48 Trentino-Alto Adige 4/6 4/6 4/6 4/7 4/7 5/7 3/7 3/7 Veneto 14/19 6/19 13/20 14/23 13/23 14/23 14/23 14/23 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 4/6 4/6 4/6 4/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 Liguria 4/8 1/8 4/8 4/11 4/11 5/11 4/10 4/10 Emilia-Romagna 6/17 1/17 6/18 3/22 6/22 6/22 7/22 6/22 Toscana 7/15 6/15 7/16 6/20 7/20 7/20 7/20 7/20 Umbria 3/6 /6 2/6 3/7 2/7 3/7 2/7 2/7 Marche 4/7 /7 4/7 4/8 4/8 . 4/8 4/8 4/8 Lazio 10/16 /16 8/17 8/24 9/24 8/24 10/27 11/27 Abruzzi 4/6 /6 4/6 4/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 Molise 2/2 /2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 Campania 11/21 /21 10/22 11/29 11/29 11/29 12/29 13/29 Puglia 8/15 /15 8/16 10/21 9/21 9/21 9/20 9/20 Basilicata 3/6 /6 4/6 4/7 4/7 4/7 3/7 4/7 Calabria 5/10 /10 5/10 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/11 5/11 Sicilia 12/22 /22 10/22 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/26 12/26 Sardegna 3/6 4/6 4/6 5/9 5/9 4/9 4/8 4/8 Totals 131/237 13/237 123/246 129/315 135/315 135/315 135/315 138/315 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 59 Confidential 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 20 Eligible Voters by District, 1948 and 1979 Region and District Eligible Voters, Chamber Eligible Voters, Senate Population in 1951 Population in 1979 Percentage Change 1948 1979 Percentage Change 1948 1979 Percentage Change Piedmont 1 1,602,276 2,503,112 +56.22 2 952,798 979,024 +2.75 2,345,808 3,067,601 +30.77 Total 2,555,075 3,482,136 +36.28 3,518,177 4,538,020 +28.99 Liguria 3 1,108,119 1,477,501 +33.33 1,018,535 1,321,860 +29.78 1,566,961 1,852,903 +18.25 Lombardy 4 2,033,439 3,388,216 +66.62 5 783,004 1,271,566 +62.40 6 912,835 1,372,897 +50.40 7 533,328 548,522 +2.85 3,855,332 5,724,503 +48.48 Total 4,262,606 6,581,201 +54.39 6,566,154 8,929,703 +36.00 Trentino-Alto Adige 8 440,591 636,264 +44.41 390,539 541,766 +38.72 728,604 873,995 +19.95 Venetia a 9 1,420,031 1,883,682 +32.65 10 821,168 1,152,485 +40.35 2,099,256 2,751,182 +31.06 Total 2,241,199 3,036,167 +35.47 3,918,059 4,338,292 +10.73 Friuli-Venezia Giulia b 11 772,341 946,337 +22.53 32 239,456 543,693 c 871,346 +60.26 Total 772,341 1,185,793 +53.53 929,118 1,245,611 +34.06 Emilia-Romagna 12 1,285,313 1,777,675 +38.31 13 1,064,093 1,333,688 +25.32 2,094,830 2,751,273 +31.34 Total 2,349,406 3,111,363 +32.43 3,544,340 3,963,151 +11.82 Tuscany 14 785,447 1,133,129 +44.27 15 800,524 1,035,617 +29.37 16 542,487 627,602 +15.69 1,917,572 2,482,823 +29.48 Total 2,128,458 2,796,348 +31.38 3,158,811 3,594,607 +13.80 Note: Since March 1975, voting eligibility in Italy, except for the Senate, is 18 years of age. Prior to that it was 21. To vote for the Sen- ate, one must be 25. a For elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Province of Belluno is incorporated into District 11 with Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Figures given here for Chamber voters thus exclude Belluno. For elections to the Senate, Belluno Province is included in the Veneto. These figures therefore include Belluno for the Senate as well as for the 1951 and 1979 populations. b District 11 includes the Province of Belluno for Chamber elections (see preceding note). Senate elections in Friuli-Venezia Giulia do not include Belluno which instead returns to Veneto. c The city and Province of Trieste became a part of Italy in October 1954 and were then formed into Chamber District 32. Therefore, figures for 1951 population and 1948 Senate elections do not include Trieste. Estimated population of Trieste in 1954 was 297,003 and in 1979 was 294,062, or a decline of 0.99 percent. If figures for 1979 are adjusted to show growth in Friuli-Venezia Giulia excluding Trieste, the region gained only 2.41 percent in population over 1951. 61 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 20 (continued) Region and District Eligible Voters, Chamber Eligible Voters, Senate Population Population Percentage in 1951 in 1979 Change 1948 1979 Percentage 1948 Change 1979 Percentage Change Marche 17 Umbria d 860,897 1,102,747 +28.09 756,935 964,248 +27.39 1,364,030 1,409,845 +3.36 18 619,572 743,491 +20.00 Lazio e 444,743 559,154 +25.73 803,918 805,329 +0.18 19 Abruzzi 1,868,802 3,584,800 +91.82 1,758,543 3,178,384 +80.74 3,340,798 5,037,255 +50.78 20 765,621 996,896 +30.21 Molise 667,291 864,162 +29.50 1,277,207 1,233,397 -3.43 21 Campania 241,338 285,372 +18.25 210,085 247,295 +17.71 406,823 332,914 -18.17 22 23 Total Puglia 1,496,077 912,735 2,408,812 2,437,809 +62.95 1,288,593 +41.18 3,726,402 + 54.70 2,095,718 3,082,703 +47.10 4,346,264 5,420,390 + 24.71 24 25 Total Basilicata 984,816 731,391 1,716,207 1,474,834 +49.76 1,202,198 +64.37 2,677,032 +55.99 1,500,302 2,226,952 +48.43 3,220,485 3,889,422 + 20.77 26 Calabria 334,700 447,636 +33.74 289,824 374,762 +29.31 627,586 618,312 -1.48 27 1,093,613 1,508,930 +37.98 Sicily 946,577 1,257,160 +32.81 2,044,287 2,067,269 +1.12 28 29 Total Sardinia 1,340,804 1,249,969 2,590,773 1,870,890 +39.53 1,783,366 +42.67 3,654,256 +41.05 2,282,832 3,074,663 +34.69 4,486,749 4,970,595 +10.78 30 Valle d'Aosta 687,388 1,101,657 +60.27 603,771 917,284 +51.93 1,276,023 1,592,964 +24.84 31 61,130 87,821 +43.66 56,402 77,066 +36.64 94,140 114,537 +21.67 Italy 29,106,647 f 42,223,813 +45.07g 25,878,588 f 36,336,187 + 40.41 g 47,218,534 56,828,511 +20.35 d For Chamber elections, the Province of Rieti is detached from its region of Lazio and added to District 18. Chamber figures here thus include Rieti while Senate and population figures show Umbria and District 18 without Rieti. Chamber figures exclude Rieti Province; Senate and population include Rieti. See preceding note. Confidential f Trieste not included. The following changes occur if figures are adjusted to show growth without Trieste: Eligible voters for the Chamber, 1979: 41,984,357 (+44.24 percent); eligible voters for the Senate, 1979: 36,139,293 (+39.65 percent); population, 1979: 56,631,617 (+19.73 percent). 62 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 tontinential Table 21 Population by Administrative Region, Voting for the Chamber of Deputies, 1951 and 1979 a 1951 1979 Piedmont 3,518,177 4,538,020 Valle d'Aosta 94,140 114,537 Lombardy 6,566,154 8,929,703 Trentino?Alto Adige 728,604 873,995 Venetia b 3,679,790 4,137,327 Friuli?Venezia Giulia e 1,167,387 1,446,576 Liguria 1,566,961 1,852,903 Emilia-Romagna 3,544,340 3,963,151 Tuscany 3,158,811 3,594,607 Umbria d 983,075 949,252 Marche 1,364,030 1,409,845 Lazio e 3,161,641 4,893,332 Abruzzi 1,277,207 1,233,397 Molise 406,823 332,914 Campania 4,346,264 5,420,390 Puglia 3,220,485 3,889,422 Basilicata 627,586 618,312 Calabria 2,044,287 2,067,269 Sicily 4,486,749 4,970,595 Sardinia 1,276,023 1,592,964 Italy 47,218,534 56,828,511 a See more detailed chart in appendix, tables A-15 and A-16 for figures on the number of eligible voters, Chambers of Deputies and Senate. b Province of Belluno not included. e Belluno included in 1951 but not Trieste; 1979 includes Belluno and Trieste. The population of Trieste in 1979 was 294,062. d Figures include Province of Rieti. e Rieti not included. a 22.61-percent turnover in a group reduced numeri- cally by only 0.38 percent. In the Senate the situation was similar. The party's vote fell by only 0.54 percent, but it actually gained 3 seats. The increase was only 2.22 percent in the delegation size, but with 35 new faces (25.36 percent). 63 The irony of these statistics is compounded, in fact, if the same comparisons are made for the election of 1972. Although 1976 was considered a near disaster for the party, the DC's showing that year revealed a decline over 1972 in only 14 of the Chamber districts and seven for the Senate. Also, its share of the raw vote for both Chamber and Senate was actually slightly higher than in 1972. Indeed, had there not been the interim defeat on the divorce referendum (1974) and large setbacks in regional, provincial, and communal votes (1975), 1976 might not have ap- peared so gloomy, even considering the PCI's large share of the returns. If the DC had anything with which to flatter itself in 1979, it was in having a relatively smaller loss than the PCI. Otherwise the record of that year had elements of the same erosion occurring since 1974. Not only do these selected instances suggest that Italian political movement occurs below the surface, they also imply that election analysis risks becoming a numbers game. Reliance on statistics is unavoidable, but in Italy quantification has to be abandoned at some point to make way for elements which do not fit finite sytems. For example, the northeastern regions of Friuli?Venezia Giulia and Venetia are known as "white" Italy because of their fidelity to the Church. Yet other regions have large Catholic majorities, even if they do not carry their religion to the ballot box so obviously. Both the Valle d'Aosta and the Trentino? Alto Adige are known for their religiosity, but their French and German ethnicity tend to color their voting behavior more than does their faith. In the light of so many qualifications, what can be said of the DC's record in national legislative elec- 25X1 tions? First of all, using 1948 data for assessing subsequent DC electoral performance warps the rec- ord. A more realistic measure can be achieved by starting with 1953 because that and subsequent elec- tions took place in essentially normal times. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 In the Chamber of Deputies, one piece of conventional wisdom about the DC seems to be borne out: highly urbanized areas, particularly in the northwest, are not centers of party numerical strength (see figure 16). In districts including Turin, Milan, and Genoa (numbers 1, 3, and 4) where the party came close to achieving a 45- to 50-percent share of the votes in 1948, the decline has been steady in later years. The DC's delegation size there and in other urban areas such as Rome and Naples has remained stable, but simulta- neously population shifts and seat reallocation under proportional representation have increased the num- ber of deputies elected. The result is a drop in the DC's share of parliamentary seats. District 4 with Milan has gone from 36 deputies in 1948 to 52 in 1979, a period during which the DC fell as low as 15 seats and peaked at 19 seats in the supposedly bad elections of 1976. The district including Rome is quite similar. In a country which is urbanizing so rapidly, this is not an optimistic sign. The assumption that the DC is also strong in rural areas is borne out in some instances, the most striking being district 21 in Molise. However, this area, small to begin with, is losing population faster than any other. But the DC's strength and appeal in rural areas is difficult to discern in Chamber district breakdowns. Instead, provincial and communal figures have to be consulted, since the districting for the Chamber, with only rare exceptions, today includes more and more urban components. A clearer understanding of the DC record is achieved by comparing annual percentages of the party vote in each district rather than noting the number of party deputies in relation to size of district delegation. Figure 16 demonstrates on a national basis not only the steady decline of party fortunes but the slow swing from north to south. A line could almost be drawn across the peninsula from Rome to Pescara below which the party's averages have either held or de- clined more slowly than in the north. Some unusual exceptions do exist in the south, though, such as Sardinia (number 30) which has the most consistent record of DC shrinkage. Curiously, too, DC leader Confidential Emilio Colombo's district 26 in Basilicata shows a rather notable decline. Not to be overlooked are districts like 19 and 22 with Rome and Naples. Even if there is apparently more encouragement there for the DC in national elections, the provincial and communal returns put clouds on the horizon since both cities have reported increasing PCI votes and have had leftist city administrations for some five years now. Still in the comparative percentages of several years, there is a persistent decline in DC strength in its "safe" northeastern areas of districts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11, encompassing parts or all of Venetia, Trentino?Alto Adige, and Friuli?Venezia Giulia. Dis- trict 8, the home of De Gasperi, is no longer a DC stronghold, even if its SVP 6 party quite often sides with the DC in Parliament. Taken together the northeast is still a strong area for the party, but the consistency of decline there is striking as a pattern. Figure 16 shows a comparable pattern in Senate election returns. Nowhere does the complexity of analysis of party performance appear so clearly as in contrasting voting results for both Chamber and Senate with the actual representation achieved (compare figures 9 and 10). If there is in most instances a clear and progressive decline in the DC's share of votes, the regional distribution of the party's delegation members is almost static. At the same time the DC share of the overall delegation from any area has shrunk consis- tently since 1948. If any element appears here to substantiate the erosion hypothesis, it is the size of the DC Chamber delegation. That, however, has re- mained static since 1963. 6 Suedtiroler Volkspartei. 64 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP8313-00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 16 Change in DC Delegation Size by Geographic Region, 1948-79 Key DC proportion of Senators or Chamber of Deputy delegates : Overall regional proportion of Christian Democrats in Senate or Chamber of Deputies CI Total Christian Democratic proportion in Senate or Chamber of Deputies Numbers in red indicate number of Christian Democrat (DC) delegates from a particular region elected to the Senate or Chamber of Deputies Senatea 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Northwest 31 29 29 32 35 34 35 34 Northeast 22 20 21 22 21 23 21 21 --= 3 _1 ____ _ Center 20 15 19 16 19 20 20 19 == =7 3" --, South and Islands 58 49 54 _ 59 60 58 59 64 _ _3 == == == == _ Total ____ ___1 1 131 113 123 129 135 135 _____ 135 138 Chamber of Deputiesb 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Northwest 64 58 56 54 57 56 60 57 _ Northeast 57 ---= 53 --= 54 ____7 52 ____= 51 _ _1 52 ____J 48 47 _._ . Center 44 40 == 41 ?7 36 36 38 --1 38 37 == = = 73 South and Islands 135 106 ?1 122 118 ?1 122 ?1 120 116 120 --j 1 1 = 1 --1 ________1 _= _______I _____= ? Total I ?1 i II I 305 I 263 273 260 266 266 262 261 585816 2-82 a Regions: Northwest: Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria Northeast: Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia Center: Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche South: Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria; Islands: Sicilia, Sardegna b Districts: Northwest: 1-5,7, and 31 Northeast: 6, 8-11, and 32 Center: 12-16, and 18 South: 17 and 19 Islands: 28-30 65 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 22 Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Eight-Year Average 1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli 93.29 94.16 95.83 95.69 95.39 95.70 94.96 93.47 94.81 2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 92.74 94.51 94.99 95.25 95.49 96.01 95.74 93.97 94.84 3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia- Savona 91.53 93.97 94.25 94.02 93.87 94.72 95.10 92.13 93.70 4. Milan-Pavia 93.82 95.83 96.24 96.14 96.49 96.79 95.93 94.39 95.70 5. Como-Sondrio-Varese 93.61 94.81 95.71 95.60 96.18 96.54 95.47 94.11 95.25 6. Brescia-Bergamo 93.75 94.75 94.72 94.69 95.85 96.45 95.96 94.67 95.11 7. Mantua-Cremona 96.56 97.06 97.25 97.17 97.88 97.96 97.53 96.61 97.25 8. Trento-Bolzano 93.40 96.59 96.46 97.00 94.95 95.08 95.67 93.33 95.31 9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo 94.40 95.02 95.16 95.97 96.83 97.10 97.12 94.69 95.79 10. Venice-Treviso 93.00 93.73 93.85 94.35 95.32 95.76 96.21 93.43 94.46 11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia- Pordenone 91.38 90.39 89.76 91.48 90.45 91.66 94.31 90.54 91.25 12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 95.52 96.88 97.42 97.15 97.51 97.86 97.78 96.41 97.07 13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza- Reggio Emilia 95.01 95.39 95.56 95.63 96.36 96.80 96.85 95.05 95.83 14. Florence-Pistoia 96.21 97.12 97.16 97.19 97.03 97.51 97.20 95.71 96.89 15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara 92.99 94.85 95.04 95.27 95.59 96.04 96.40 94.25 95.05 16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 94.92 96.86 96.78 96.68 97.06 97.52 97.54 96.07 96.68 17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata- Ascoli Piceno 94.27 95.76 94.78 94.19 94.73 95.29 95.79 92.79 94.70 18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti 93.61 95.58 94.97 93.86 94.68 95.73 95.93 93.67 94.75 19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone 90.17 94.33 94.72 94.15 93.90 94.19 94.64 91.37 93.43 20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti- Teramo 90.79 90.36 87.41 86.50 86.33 86.80 89.51 82.90 87.58 21. Campobasso-Isernia 92.05 90.14 85.85 79.47 82.04 82.14 85.40 74.66 83.97 22. Naples-Caserta 88.05 92.75 93.40 91.63 90.61 91.19 90.34 87.44 90.68 23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 90.17 91.36 89.33 85.77 85.02 84.86 86.26 84.23 87.13 24. Bari-Foggia 93.54 94.80 94.05 91.70 91.36 90.94 91.70 87.09 91.90 25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 93.78 94.83 93.97 91.82 91.39 90.73 91.59 88.94 92.13 26. Potenza-Matera 91.73 92.01 91.43 88.44 87.92 87.89 88.71 84.55 89.09 27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 88.21 89.21 87.67 85.10 84.33 83.63 84.65 77.46 85.03 28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa- Ragusa-Enna 87.86 89.56 90.67 87.30 86.08 86.96 87.98 82.72 87.39 29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento- Caltanissetta 88.18 90.13 89.53 84.59 82.06 82.76 83.88 77.85 84.87 30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano 90.06 91.69 91.94 88.75 89.20 90.19 91.09 86.70 89.95 31. Valle d'Aosta 85.46 86.69 92.45 93.53 92.30 91.74 92.58 91.83 90.82 32. Trieste 96.35 95.59 94.60 95.22 96.07 93.85 95.28 Italy 92.23 93.82 93.81 92.89 92.79 93.18 93.41 90.35 92.81 a Trieste became a part of Italy in 1954. Confidential 66 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 23 Senate: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Eight-Year Average Piedmont 92.64 93.92 95.18 95.30 95.22 95.15 94.86 93.44 94.46 Valle d'Aosta 82.97 86.22 91.67 92.83 91.66 91.49 91.50 91.12 89.93 Lombardy 93.83 95.60 96.12 96.18 96.44 96.16 95.99 95.07 95.67 Trentino-Alto Adige 92.65 94.73 95.27 94.85 94.42 94.12 94.57 92.88 94.19 Venetia 93.44 93.97 94.21 94.56 95.43 95.06 96.02 94.23 94.62 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 90.48 89.84 86.83 90.67 91.44 92.02 92.89 92.42 90.82 Liguria 90.94 93.48 94.07 93.79 93.70 94.07 94.54 92.14 93.34 Emilia-Romagna 95.15 96.22 96.62 96.67 97.01 96.65 97.33 95.90 96.44 Tuscany 94.47 95.96 96.27 96.26 96.43 96.29 96.73 95.06 95.93 Umbria 94.17 95.60 95.30 94.25 94.62 95.06 95.88 93.76 94.83 Marche 94.61 95.71 95.24 94.55 94.71 94.59 95.66 92.73 94.73 Lazio 89.52 93.90 94.55 93.92 93.68 93.29 94.02 91.86 93.09 Abruzzi 91.53 91.20 88.53 87.30 86.91 86.70 89.22 82.44 87.98 Molise 92.78 91.26 87.54 81.00 83.08 82.42 85.68 74.98 84.84 Campania 89.32 92.24 92.03 89.83 88.90 88.91 89.04 86.38 89.58 Puglia 93.72 94.71 94.31 92.29 91.76 90.81 91.74 88.71 92.26 Basilicata 92.29 93.19 92.46 89.60 88.76 88.30 89.46 85.90 90.00 Calabria 88.75 89.96 88.72 86.24 85.26 84.09 85.14 78.05 85.78 Sicily 88.32 90.16 90.46 86.75 84.53 84.92 85.78 81.10 86.50 Sardinia 90.41 92.11 92.39 89.40 89.55 90.04 91.10 87.25 90.28 Italy 92.15 93.78 93.89 93.04 92.88 92.72 93.27 90.73 92.81 In a nation that utilizes proportional representation, particular attention has to be given population change and growth of the eligible voting public (see tables 22 and 23 and tabulations 3 to 6). Also, since the introduction of suffrage for 18-year-olds in 1975, the orientation of the youth vote is important. The degree to which youth may be leftist in Italy has been disputed, but the success of leftist parties since 1975 probably depended significantly on younger voters. On the other hand, given the increase of abstentions in both 1976 and 1979, youth may have been less concerned about voting. Italians have tended to argue that abstentions and spoiled ballots are protests of disillusioned citizens, whereas the indifference of youth may be an equally valid explanation. With the secrecy of the ballot, the question cannot be answered with any certainty. (See appendix for further informa- tion on this question.) 67 As the population grows and becomes more mobile, and as eligible voters increase, the shift is subtle; but the growth is greater in areas where the DC is sliding, particularly in districts 1 and 4 in Piedmont and Lombardy. This may be offset a bit by high growth in districts 6, 22, and 25 where the DC can be guardedly optimistic on some counts. Basically, it remains a break-even phenomenon, though, which gives the DC no accrued advantage. From a negative viewpoint, however, the growth rate of population and eligible voters in areas of traditional DC strength such as Sicily, Venetia, Molise, and others are below the national average. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Ranking of Chamber Districts, by Average Voter Turnout, 1948-79 1. 97.25 7 Mantua-Cremona 2. 97.07 12 Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 3. 96.89 14 Florence-Pistoia 4. 96.68 16 Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 5. 95.83 13 Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia 6. 95.79 9 Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo 7. 95.70 4 Milan-Pavia 8. 95.31 8 Trento-Bolzano 9. 95.28 32 Trieste (on the basis of six elections, 1958-79) 10. 95.25 5 Como-Sondrio-Varese 11. 95.11 6 Brescia-Bergamo 12. 95.05 15 Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara 13. 94.84 2 Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 14. 94.81 1 Turin-Novara-Vercelli 15. 94.75 18 Perugia-Terni-Rieti 16. 94.70 17 Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno 17. 94.46 10 Venice-Treviso 18. 93.70 3 Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona 19. 93.43 19 Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone 92.81 National Average 20. 92.13 25 Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 21. 91.90 24 Bari-Foggia 22. 91.25 11 Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone 23. 90.82 31 Valle d'Aosta 24. 90.68 22 Naples-Caserta 90.61 Median 25. 89.95 30 Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano 26. 89.09 26 Potenza-Matera 27. 87.58 20 L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo 28. 87.39 28 Catania-Messina-Siracusa- Ragusa-Enna 29. 87.13 23 Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 30. 85.03 27 Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 31. 84.87 29 Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento- Caltanissetta 32. 83.97 21 Campobasso-Isernia Confidential Ranking of Chamber Districts by Rate of Eligible Voter Increase, 1948-79 Percentage Increase District Number Percentage Increase District Number 1. 91.82 19 17. 38.31 12 2. 66.62 4 18. 37.98 27 3. 64.37 25 19. 33.74 26 4. 62.95 22 20. 33.33 3 5. 62.40 5 21. 32.65 9 6. 60.27 30 22. 30.21 20 7. 56.22 1 23. 29.37 15 8. 50.40 6 24. 28.09 17 9. 49.76 24 25. 25.34 13 45.07 (or 44.24) a Average 44.54 Median 10. 44.41 8 26. 22.53 11 11. 44.27 14 27. 20.00 18 12. 43.66 31 28. 18.25 21 13. 42.67 29 29. 15.69 16 14. 41.18 23 30. 4.53 32 a 15. 40.35 10 31. 2.85 7 16. 39.53 28 32. 2.75 2 3 The city and Province of Trieste, incorporated into Italy in October 1954, were formed into District 32 and first voted in national elections in 1958 when the area had 229,071 eligible voters. The increase in voters shown here is for the period 1958-79. All other districts are calculated on the 1948-79 timespan. If the figures for Trieste are subtracted, the rate of growth of eligible voters in Italy since the elections of 1948 is 44.54 percent; the median does not change. 68 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Ranking of Senate Districts, by Average Voter Turnout, 1948-79 Percent Ranking of Senate Districts by Rate of Eligible Voter Increase, 1948-79 1. 96.44 Emilia-Romagna 2. 95.93 Tuscany 3. 95.67 Lombardy 4. 94.83 Umbria 5. 94.73 Marche 6. 94.62 Venetia 7. 94.46 Piedmont 8. 94.19 Trentino-Alto Adige 9. 93.34 Liguria 10. 93.09 Lazio 92.81 National average 11. 93.26 Puglia 12. 90.82 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 90.64 Median 13. 90.28 Sardinia 14. 90.00 Basilicata 15. 89.93 Valle d'Aosta 16. 89.58 Campania 17. 87.98 Abruzzi 18. 86.50 Sicily 19. 85.78 Calabria 20. 84.84 Molise Percentage Increase District 1. 80.74 Lazio 2. 60.26 Friuli-Venezia Giulia a 3. 51.93 Sardinia 4. 48.48 Lombardy 5. 48.43 Puglia 6. 47.10 Campania 40.41 (or 39.65) a Average 7. 38.72 Trentino-Alto Adige 8. 36.64 Valle d'Aosta 9. 34.69 Sicily 10. 32.81 Calabria 31.52 Median 11. 31.34 Emilia-Romagna 12. 31.06 Venetia 13. 30.77 Piedmont 14. 29.78 Liguria 15. 29.50 Abruzzi 16. 29.40 Tuscany 17. 29.31 Basilicata 18. 27.39 Marche 19. 25.73 Umbria 20. 17.71 Molise a The figure for Friuli-Venezia Giulia is calculated with the city of Trieste which was incorporated into Italy in October 1954. Trieste first voted in the region's senatorial elections in 1963 when it had 193,882 eligible voters. In 1979 the number was 196,894, an increase of 1.55 percent. Natural growth of the eligible voter group, without Trieste, would place the region in 19th place with an increase of 24.05 percent. Adjustment of the national average would bring it to +39.65 percent. 69 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential A partial projection can be made about DC prospects in future elections, particularly following seat redis- tribution due after the 1981 census. (The Chamber and Senate seats are reallocated following each decen- nial census.) Chamber representation, while deter- mined largely on population per district, has remained fixed at 630 members since 1963. An initial assign- ment is made for each area, but it can be altered by party performance. The system is complex, but it allows for addition or subtraction of seats from dis- tricts according to the relationship between a party's showing nationally and in the given constituency. Generally the north has been favored with additional seats since it is more civic minded and produces better voter turnouts. With DC strength sliding in the north, this is a negative adjustment. However, even if a projection based on 1979 population figures could be accurately done now, it would be altered by the returns in the next election. But the numbers-game factor in a reallocation is evident already because the northwest would lose four to six seats, the northeast would remain the same, the center would decline by perhaps five, and the beneficiary in any instance would be the south with a rise of at least five. This would occur despite the fact that the south as a whole is losing population. Even after adjustments for the election record itself, the DC probably can expect more or less to hold its own nationally, thanks to the added southern seats. On the other hand, if one considers DC representation by geographical region (see figure 16) the old pattern is replicated. But again, when translated into percent- ages, the growth of DC strength in the south and, modestly, in the center, together with decline in the northwest and, surprisingly, also in the northeast, has been going on roughly since 1968. Except for the northwest, though, change is so slight that once again Italian politics appear to be stagnant. In conclusion, as regards the Chamber, there is no sign that the DC is improving its situation nationally. But its weaken- ing is coming in the areas considered most dynamic and vital, those of the north and center. Strength in the south may ensure some future numerical stability for the DC, but in the nonquantifiable area of human perceptions the question arises as to how long Milan and Turin will continue to submit to a majority party whose strength is increasingly in Palermo or the Mezzogiorno more generally. Confidential Table 24 Ranking of Chamber of Deputies Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979 District Number Number of Voters Current Seats Projected Change a 1. 19 3,482,136 54 NONE 2. 4 3,388,216 52 -1 3. 1 2,503,112 39 -3 4. 22 2,437,809 38 +3 5. 9 1,883,682 29 -1 6. 28 1,870,890 27 +1 7. 29 1,783,366 26 +1 8. 12 1,777,675 27 -2 9. 27 1,508,930 23 NONE 10. 3 1,477,501 23 -3 11. 24 1,474,834 23 +1 12. 6 1,372,897 23 -2 13. 13 1,333,688 19 -1 14. 23 1,288,593 18 +1 15. 5 1,271,566 20 NONE 16. 25 1,202,198 18 +1 17. 10 1,152,485 17 +1 18. 14 1,133,129 14 +2 19. 17 1,102,747 17 -1 20. 30 1,101,657 17 +1 21. 15 1,035,617 14 +1 22. 20 996,896 14 NONE 23. 2 979,024 15 -1 24. 11 946,337 11 +2 25. 18 743,491 10 +1 26. 8 636,264 10 NONE 27. 16 627,602 9 NONE 28. 7 548,522 8 NONE 29. 26 447,636 7 NONE 30. 21 285,372 4 NONE 31. 32 239,456 4 -1 32. 31 87,821 1 NONE a Estimated variation resultant from 1981 census and consequent redistribution of seats. 70 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential The DC's record in the Senate, even though the body is elected by a smaller and presumably more "ma- ture" electorate, differs only slightly from that in the Chamber. Again there are the same declining ratios between the size of a DC group and a region's number of seats. And once more the areas of DC stability or growth are below the line beginning with Lazio and the Abruzzi, although for 1979 Marche can be includ- ed. Again Sardinia and Basilicata demonstrate behav- ior comparable to the Chamber returns. The DC share of geographic regions' portion of the delegations is still small with a bit more strength in the south and islands and less slippage in the northeast and northwest. Projection of Senate seats in a reapportionment can be done with certainty because no election pattern alters it. Even if population figures are only for 1979, there seems little likelihood the 1981 census will change them much. Three regions from the northeast and center, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, and Tus- cany, lose seats; one southern region, Puglia, and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia each pick up a seat. Given the patterns of recent elections, the DC might have a chance here of a small gain simply because of the role of the southern base. This could be offset, however, by the strength of the leftist parties in the center regions where their chance of holding their present share is excellent. With one less seat to contest in those areas, the DC could be hard pressed to hold its present numbers. Data are plentiful to suggest that the DC has been slowly but steadily going downhill for a long time and that events of the mid- 1970s should not have been as surprising as they were. Conversely, when the idiosyn- cracies of the proportional representation system and its distribution of seats come into play, the DC's future looks less bleak, even if signs of growth are virtually nonexistent. Still, the deep feelings of preju- dice in Italy between north and south are important. To go one more step, the impression remains that so long as Italy experienced some measure of economic prosperity and growth the country was willing? perhaps reluctantly?to muddle along with its politi- cal representation and governing system. With in- creasingly high inflation, trade deficits, and unem- ployment, as well as persistent terrorism, the DC's stewardship of the nation may look less tolerable. 71 Table 25 Ranking of Senate Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979 Elections Province Number of Voters Current Seats Projected Change a 1. Lombardy 5,724,503 48 NONE 2. Lazio 3,178,384 27 NONE 3. Campania 3,082,703 29 NONE 4. Sicily 3,074,663 26 +1 5. Piedmont 3,067,301 25 ?1 6. Emilia-Romagna 2,751,273 22 ?1 7. Venetia 2,751,182 23 NONE 8. Tuscany 2,482,823 20 ?1 9. Puglia 2,226,952 20 +1 10. Liguria 1,321,860 10 NONE 11. Calabria 1,257,160 11 NONE 12. Marche 964,248 8 NONE 13. Sardinia 917,284 8 +1 14. Friuli?Venezia Giulia 871,346 7 NONE 15. Abruzzi 864,162 7 NONE 16. Umbria 559,154 7 NONE 17. Trentino?Alto Adige 541,766 7 NONE 18. Basilicata 374,762 7 NONE 19. Molise 247,295 2 NONE 20. Valle d'Aosta 77,066 1 NONE Estimated variation resultant from 1981 census and consequent redistribution of seats. Although the evidence is not conclusive, extensive study of Italy's postwar legislative elections leaves the unavoidable impression of slow Christian Democratic decline. The party is not likely to disappear, but its capacity to merge itself with the government is near- ing an end. Furthermore, the day may come when the DC will not be the largest group emerging from a national election. Even more importantly, the party may ultimately slip enough that it cannot hold either a majority of the Cabinet posts or those which are most important. Because the DC is more than ever a coalition of factions for power sharing, that kind of loss of access to the spoils could cause elements of the party to break away. Again, this is not likely in the next few years, but loss of the premiership in 1981 is Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential another significant chip at the party's power struc- ture. Finally, if the prognosis for the party on the national level is unclear, further unsettling clues as to its health and viability appear in regional, provincial, and communal elections, where distinctions that are merged and lost in Chamber and Senate races often show up. Administrative Elections: The Regions Evolution of the Regions. The region is Italy's largest administrative subdivision and represents a profound innovation in the country's governmental structure. These units did not, however, come into existence easily or rapidly, and a word of background clarifies not only their evolution but the DC's role in the process. Basically, the region is a contemporary revival of sovereign political divisions existing in Italy before national unification. More than one plan for "stitch- ing the boot" in the 19th century envisioned a feder- ation of these states as semiautonomous regions in a larger political entity. Such schemes acknowledged that Italians traditionally identified more with their home locale than with a national state. ' That old loyalty remains a sort of mystique or historic identity felt by most Italians and is an obvious counterattrac- tion to the sense of nationality. When Italian unity was achieved under the leadership of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, its governing institutions were extended to the whole nation. The system was a close copy of the French centralized state instituted by Napoleon. Although there were provincial councils, all power was concentrated in the national govern- ment, and the various provinces, the basic administra- tive unit, were ruled through prefects appointed by the central government. The regions ceased to exist in any formal sense. Although the idea of regions never died, plans to institute them which came up on several occasions never reached fruition. When the fascists came to power, most remaining vestiges of local autonomy were either rapidly eliminated or wholly appropriated by the regime. The heavyhanded central authority ' The untranslatable word campanilismo, alluding to the bell tower, symbol of a town, refers to this attitude. Confidential exercised by Mussolini's government exasperated the populace and made the desire for more local power a principal aspiration of the groups that rebuilt Italy after the war. Centralization, in fact, was identified in the popular mind with the fascists, their misgovern- ment and corruption, as well as ultimate national defeat. Hence, the dream of local self-government and democratization of political life below the national level captivated many sectors of the Constituent As- sembly. Of the major sponsors of regionalism immedi- ately after the war, the Christian Democrats were preeminent, notably in opposition to the Socialists and Communists who wanted no reduction in the powers of the national parliament. But, as in virtually all significant issues faced by the Assembly, the debate over regionalism resulted in a compromise solution providing only partial decentralization. Hence, the regions were given fewer powers than desired by the Christian Democratic representatives. Ironically, in the years of building the new republican state the DC became the most determined obstructor of regionalism. Once rooted firmly in power, the party became reluctant to implement the regions, particu- larly when it became obvious that in so doing DC power would be limited and, in the Red Belt, might be completely excluded. Moreover, the fear was quite common that semiautonomous regions, particularly those dominated by the PCI, might be exploited by alien elements?in this case the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, centrifugal political forces were so strong in some areas that local initiatives for new government preceded even the election of the Con- stituent Assembly. Sicily, always prone to separatism, entertained the idea of trying to become part of the United States, but the island settled for a statute of local government which stopped just short of independence. The first De Gasperi government, faced with this fait accompli, had little alternative but to endorse it officially in May 1946, an act later sanctioned by the Constituent Assembly in February 1948. 72 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Administrative Regions Ranked by Population as of 1979 1. Lombardy 8,929,703 2. Campania 5,420,390 3. Lazio 5,037,255 4. Sicily 4,970,595 5. Piedmont 4,538,020 6. Venetia 4,338,292 7. Emilia-Romagna 3,963,151 8. Puglia 3,889,422 9. Tuscany 3,594,607 10. Calabria 2,067,269 11. Liguria 1,852,903 12. Sardinia 1,592,964 13. Marche 1,409,845 14. Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1,245,611 15. Abruzzi 1,233,397 16. Trentino-Alto Adige 873,995 17. Umbria 805,329 18. Basilicata 618,312 19. Molise 332,914 20. Valle d'Aosta 114,537 Meanwhile, the draft constitution made specific provi- sion for the establishment of regions, giving them a certain autonomy in some spheres. The Assembly specifically recognized Sicily and three other regions which had also written statutes for themselves: Sar- dinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d'Aosta. These, with Sicily, were classified as areas of "spe- cial" statute because of their status as border regions and because of their particular ethnic and linguistic differences. Subsequently, in 1963 the one remaining area with such characteristics, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, was also made a special statute region. Thus, with only four regional goverments in place when it took office in April 1948, the first Italian Government under the new constitution became re- sponsible for completing these units in the remainder of the country. In practice, though, every government for more than 20 years fell far short of fulfilling that 73 Ranking of Administrative Regions by Rate of Population Change, 1951-79 Percentage Change District 1. +50.78 Lazio 2. +36.00 Lombardy +34.48 Median 3. +34.06 Friuli-Venezia Giulia a 4. +28.99 Piedmont 5. +24.84 Sandinia 6. +24.71 Campania 7. +21.67 Valle d'Aosta 8. +20.77 Puglia +20.35 (or +19.73)' Average 9. + 19.95 Trentino-Alto Adige 10. +18.25 Liguria 11. +13.80 Tuscany 12. +11.82 Emilia-Romagna 13. +10.78 Sicily 14. +10.73 15. +3.36 16. +1.12 17. +0.18 18. -1.48 19. -3.43 20. -18.17 Molise Venetia Marche Calabria Umbria Basilicata Abruzzi The city and province of Trieste were incorporated into Italy in October 1954, adding at that time 297,003 inhabitants to Friuli- Venezia Giulia. Ranked at number 3, the region's growth reflects the addition of Trieste. Subtracting the 1979 population of Trieste (294,062) in order to determine natural growth of the region would place it at 15, a growth rate of +2.41 percent. The national average, if adjusted without Trieste, would be +19.73 percent. requirement, except for the case of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Not until 1976 did the law pass that specified the powers that were granted to the 15 regions of "regular" statute, and even today major questions remain unsolved as to their finances. Still, a basic framework was in place by 1970, and on 7 June of that year the first elections for the regular regions took place. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Through all the labored years of creating the regions, the DC's conduct gave many Italians the impression of deliberate delay and bad faith. Such a feeling has not been dispelled by the party's political maneuver- ing within the regional governments once they came into existence. The DC's attitude and conduct toward its rivals, particularly the PCI, has often appeared to be obstructionist and a mirror reflection of the politi- cal wheeling and dealing that goes on in Rome. Although the party's view is that actions taken in regional affairs could become precedents for unwant- ed national events, critics see the DC attitude as one of perfidy and arrogance, or even as outright proof of a willingness to use any device to hang on to power. Because this touches individual voters closer to home the DC has created more problems for itself with the electorate. Not surprisingly, then, the party's share of the vote at the regional level falls below what it gets nationally. Although the parallel is poor, an Italian region might roughly be compared with an American state. The regions vary among themselves in terms of their power. This is notably true of those in the "special" statute group. All, however, are basically administra- tive units interposed between the central government and the provinces, but they are more subject to Rome's control than states are to Washington. The old provincial structure, as well as the office of prefect, still exists but in altered importance. Prefects, in fact, although once presumed to be destined for elimination, continue to function in the provincial organization, but regional commissioners now replace them as the principal link to the national government. These new officials, however, are essentially invested with coordination functions between Rome and the regions. The 15 regular regional governments consist of a Council (legislative assembly) elected by universal suffrage, a Junta chosen by the Council from among its own members, and a president of the Junta, elected by that body from among its own ranks. The Council sits as the legislative body while the Junta serves as the executive organ?a kind of cabinet, where each member (assessore) is responsible for such sectors as finance, agriculture, planning, and so forth. The Confidential president is the head of the executive branch and represents the region in outside relations as well as promulgating laws and directing the administrative functions of the regional government. Regional councils are elected every five years, but some of the special statute areas are not yet in synchronization with the others. The size of councils varies according to population. Areas with more than 6 million inhabitants elect a Council of 80 members; smaller regions have proportionately smaller councils down to a minimum of 30 for areas of fewer than 1 million. Sicily, with 90 members, is the sole exception to this pattern. This basic structure for the assembly exists in all 15 regular regions, but the five special statute arrangements are each somewhat different, the most unusual being Trentino?Alto Adige. There the two provincial councils sit as a single body on the regional level. The true significance of the overall system today is that in the 10 years since it became almost wholly operational there has been a major shift of many governmental activities from Rome to the various regional administrations. Consequently, much of the political leverage once exercised in Rome is now dispersed to the 20 regional capitals. There has been a resultant loss of power for the DC which illustrates the reasons for its opposition to implementation of the system. The spoils that go with any governing body and that once were controlled from Rome have been dispersed in part to the new regional capitals. If the DC was once able to control more patronage as the majority party when spoils were dispensed from Rome, the new situation quite simply means that some regions where the DC is not dominant are slipping under the control of other parties (see table 26). The potential for power struggles is extremely important at the regional level, and the tenacity of some parties in their determination to be part of those governments illustrates their significance. If the po- litical makeup of Italy appears to have changed in the 1970s, the regions have been an important element in that process. Indeed, it should be emphasized that the years when the regions have been fully operational are coincident with the period when Italian national politics began to change. 74 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 ial Table 26 Party Composition of Regular Statute Region Governments DC controlled Venetia Lazio Molise Basilicata None Venetia Coalitions including DC Piedmont: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Liguria: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Marche: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Abruzzi: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Campania: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Puglia: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Calabria: DC, PSI, PSU Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Venetia: DC, PRI Marche: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Abruzzi: DC, PSI, PDSI, PRI Molise: DC, PSDI, PRI Campania: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Puglia: DC, PSI, PRI Basilicata: DC, PSI, PSDI Calabria: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Regions With Giunta Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI (no change) Campania: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI (same plus PLI) Basilicata: DC, PSI, PSDI (no change) Abruzzi: DC, PSDI, PRI (same plus PSI) Molise: DC, PSDI (no change) Regions Without Giunta (situation at election) Puglia: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Calabria: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Marche: PSI, PSDI, PRI (DC external support) Coalitions without DC Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSIUP Tuscany: PCI, PSI, PSIUP Umbria: PCI, PSI, PSIUP Piedmont: PCI, PSI Liguria: PC!, PSI Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSI Tuscany: PCI, PSI Umbria: PCI, PSI Lazio: PSI, PSDI, PRI PCI controlled None None Piedmont: PCI, PSI (same plus PSDI) Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSI PCI controlled Tuscany: PC!, PSI (no change) Umbria: PCI, PSI (no change) Regions Without Giunta (situation at election) Liguria: PCI, PSI Lazio: PCI, PSI, PSDI (PRI external support) Emilia-Romagna (effective following 1980 election) 75 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 27 Regional Council Election Results in 15 Regular Statute Regions, 1970-80 a 1970b 1975c 1980d Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 10,305,258 37.85 287 10,707,682 35.29 277 11,153,439 36.77 290 PCI 7,584,439 27.86 201 10,149,135 33.45 247 9,555,767 31.50 233 PSI 2,838,276 10.43 67 3,636,647 11.98 82 3,851,722 12.70 86 PSU 1,897,092 6.97 41 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 1,700,983 5.61 36 1,505,607 4.96 31 PRI 785,238 2.88 18 961,016 3.17 19 922,970 3.04 18 PLI 1,290,890 4.74 27 749,749 2.47 11 816,418 2.69 15 PSIUP 877,285 3.22 16 NONE 0 NONE NONE ) 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 417,725 1.37 8 372,102 1.23 8 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 274,100 0.90 2 MSI-DN 1,424,411 5.23 32 1,951,011 6.43 40 1,785,750 5.89 37 Other 222,643 0.82 1 70,789 0.23 NONE 95,491 0.32 NONE Total 27,225,532 100.00 690 30,344,737 100.00 720 30,333,366 100.00 720 a These returns are for the 15 regions of regular statute category which includes the 75 provinces that according to the 1971 census had a population of 45,817,864. b 92.32-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.50 percent of ballots cast were invalid. c 92.79-percent eligible voter turnout; 3.96 percent of ballots were invalid. d 89.59-percent eligible voter turnout; 6.21 percent of ballots were invalid. See tables A-17-A-24 in appendix. The Regional Elections. To an extent, comparison of election returns on the regional level is complicated by the fact that the five special regions vote at different times as a result of their earlier beginnings. Originally each of the special areas elected its council at four- year intervals, a divergence recently eliminated. In any event, the 15 regulars that vote simultaneously include some 80 percent of the national population and are regarded as more homogeneous. Still, the two groups are more easily analyzed in separate sets of statistics (see tables 27 to 30). Confidential Regional elections were not ignored prior to 1970, but when the majority of the nation voted simultaneously for the first time that year the significance attached to the new assemblies was almost as great as for national legislative consultations. And the regional council elections of 1975, called the "earthquake of 15 June," were those which gave the DC more cause for alarm than any other vote since World War II. Aside from the DC's great slide in power that year, the critical new element of 1975 was that the 18- to 20-year-old age groups voted for the first time in Italy. 76 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R0001000500067_al Because of the secret ballot it is difficult to ascertain how the youngest group voted. However, the elector- ate was increased by approximately 2 to 3 million, roughly 6 percent of eligible voters. Also the highest turnout of eligible voters to participate in regional elections on a national basis cast ballots that year (92.79 percent; see appendix for detailed regional statistics.) An increase of only 6 percent is not great in relation to the entire electorate, but it is more than sufficient to alter the outcome. Certainly the DC could find little encouragement for the future in a poll published in August 1974 by the widely respected Demoskopea organization. Newly enfranchised youth were asked to express their party preferences and responded thus: PCI, 38 percent; DC, 16 percent; MSI, 12 percent; PSI, 10 percent; PSDI and PLI, 4 percent each; and the remainder scattered among splinter groups, a noteworthy segment of which went to the extreme left. The significant increase for the PCI and other left parties was probably owed to those who could vote for the first time in 1975. In general, regional elections since 1970 show pro- gressively how close the political contest between the two major parties has become. Mathematically the DC can still claim to be the largest national party in regional voting results, but whether the party contin- ues to be the largest nationally is less important at this level. For example, the 1980 returns from the 15 regular regions gave the DC a smaller percentage of the vote and of the total number of Council seats by only one point or so below that of 1970. However, the makeup of regional juntas was slipping more and more out of DC control as shown in table 26. The PCI for its part showed an improvement in 1980 over 1970, but it was not able to equal its 1975 showing. Again, though, the evidence of rising Communist power is found in the composition of regional govern- ments. More noteworthy, perhaps, is how the parties' regional totals add up nationally. In that context, the PCI made a major leap in 1975. While it fell back in 1980, the loss may be only temporary. In any event, the PCI's gain of 2.6 million votes in 1975 translated into a plurality of seats in the councils of Piedmont, 77 Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and La-. zio. Although the PCI remained farther behind the DC in the southern regions, its rate of growth there was approximately the same as in the north and center. Of greatest importance for 1975, however, is the DC's achievement of a majority of council seats in only two regions, Venetia and Molise. In sum, if party dominance on a regional basis truly counts for influence and shoring up a party elector- ate?its clientela and parentela?then 1975 was in- deed a bad year for the DC which, at best, had to contemplate coalition arrangements, some of which resulted in its exclusion. And since the PSI has been willing to collaborate with the PCI on the regional level, the mathematics of party representation in various regions theoretically?and in some real in- stances?permits coalitions without the DC. Special note can be made for another phenomenon developing on the regional level in the special areas. With the sole exception of Sicily, regional parties are progressively cutting farther into the DC's dominant position there. In some instances the political orienta- tion of local groups is not too far from the DC?as in the case of the Suedtiroler Volkspartei in Trentino? Alto Adige, but the DC nevertheless is facing a challenge to its patronage potential. And while there is great fragmentation of voting in the specials, a trend to the left is evident. Concerning the 1980 regional elections, many pundits made the same error in evaluating them as they did in 1979 for the national parliament, erroneously pro- claiming a DC comeback from its slump in the middle of the decade. Total votes and percentages do, it is true, suggest a modest recovery as well as an increase in the DC's lead over its principal competitor, the PCI; but the reality of returns on the regional basis does not substantiate this optimism. Broken down by region, the DC's greater rebound in southern areas was just enough higher than in the remainder of the country as to create a misleading impression for the Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 28 Regional Council Election Results by Geographical Region, 1970-80 North a 1970b 1975c 1980 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 5,522,649 38.48 112 5,613,979 35.55 109 5,687,829 36.51 112 PCI 3,887,639 27.09 78 5,303,710 33.58 103 4,970,942 31.91 97 PSI 1,553,980 10.83 26 2,036,476 12.89 36 2,049,353 13.16 36 PSU 1,086,630 7.57 18 ... . . . PSDI ... . . . . . . 918,334 5.81 14 776,449 4.98 13 PRI 400,239 2.79 7 513,036 3.25 8 485,614 3.12 8 PLI 828,952 5.78 14 483,637 3.06 7 561,281 3.60 9 PSIUP 497,255 3.46 7 ... PdUP 229,938 1.46 3 197,787 1.27 4 DP . . . . . . 162,334 1.04 1 MSI-DN 493,431 3.44 8 664,150 4.21 10 613,156 3.94 10 Others 82,008 0.57 . . . 30,249 0.19 73,331 0.47 Total 14,352,783 100.00 270 15,793,509 100.00 290 15,578,076 100.00 290 Center e DC 1970 f 1975g 1980h 2,088,698 32.73 61 2,197,747 30.81 60 2,285,076 32.11 62 PCI 2,182,463 34.20 64 2,819,152 39.52 75 2,719,994 38.22 73 PSI 560,116 8.78 13 743,827 10.43 18 799,729 11.24 19 PSU 430,215 6.74 9 ... PSDI . . . . . . . . . 351,674 4.93 8 299,828 4.21 6 PRI 198,052 3.10 5 227,139 3.19 5 237,994 3.34 5 PLI 250,333 3.92 5 126,516 1.77 1 134,301 1.89 3 PSIUP 201,200 3.15 4 .. . PdUP 123,528 1.73 3 86,033 1.21 3 DP . . . .. . 63,377 0.89 MSI-DN 424,259 6.65 9 532,306 7.46 10 478,265 6.72 9 Others 46,515 0.73 11,532 0.16 12,724 0.17 Total 6,381,851 100.00 170 7,133,421 100.00 180 7,117,321 100.00 180 Confidential 78 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 al Table 28 (continued) South i 19701 Number Percentage Number of Votes of Seats 1975' Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats 19801 Number Percentage Number of Votes of Seats DC 2,693,911 41.50 114 2,895,956 39.04 108 3,180,534 41.64 116 PCI 1,514,337 23.33 59 2,026,273 27.32 69 1,864,831 24.42 63 PSI 724,180 11.16 28 856,344 11.54 28 1,002,640 13.13 31 PSU 380,247 5.86 14 PSDI 430,975 5.81 14 429,330 5.62 12 PRI 186,947 2.88 6 220,841 2.98 6 199,362 2.61 5 PLI 211,605 3.26 8 139,596 1.88 3 120,836 1.58 3 PSIUP 178,830 2.76 5 PdUP 64,159 0.87 2 88,282 1.16 1 DP 48,389 0.63 1 MSI-DN 506,721 7.81 15 754,555 10.17 20 694,329 9.09 18 Others 94,120m 1.46 1 29,008 0.39 9,436 0.12 Total 6,490,898 100.00 250 7,417,807 100.00 250 7,637,969 100.00 250 Ellipsis indicates the party presented no candidates. a Regular statute regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna (34 provinces, 22,799,444 population by 1971 census). h 94.87-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.18 percent of ballots were invalid. c 94.95-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.76 percent of ballots were invalid. d 92.25-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.24 percent of ballots were invalid. e Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio (20 provinces, 10,298,269 population by 1971 census). f 93.68-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.13 percent of ballots were invalid. 79 g 93.99-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.21 percent of ballots were invalid. h 91.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.89 percent of ballots were invalid. Regular statute regions of Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria (21 provinces, 12,720,151 population by 1971 census). 86.08-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.55 percent of ballots were invalid. k 84.90-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.25 percent of ballots were invalid. 183.48-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.44 percent of ballots were invalid. m In Campania the monarchists of PDIUM won one seat. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 29 Regional Election Results in Five Special Statute Regions, 1968-81 1968.71a 1973-76 1978-81 e Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 1,669,358 37.68 127 1,962,810 39.47 130 1,967,054 38.98 125 PCI d 969,835 21.89 70 1,187,160 23.87 71 1,037,139 20.55 70 PSI e 629,961 14.22 40 526,678 10.59 36 602,242 11.93 33 PSDI NONE 0 NONE 233,730 4.70 13 180,342 3.57 12 PRI 160,834 3.63 6 147,988 2.98 7 180,559 3.58 11 PLI 179,719 4.06 13 121,342 2.44 6 94,327 1.87 6 Local parties f 203,603 4.60 29 203,783 4.10 36 281,876 5.59 44 DP NONE NONE 15,163 0.30 NONE 44,879 0.89 3 PdUP NONE NONE NONE NONE 19,740 0.39 1 MSI-DN 522,330 11.79 23 445,337 8.96 22 334,446 6.63 14 Others g 94,974 2.14 4 128,667 2.59 9 303,740 6.02 17 Total 4,430,614 100.00 312 4,972,658 100.00 331 5,046,344 100.00 336 a 84.21-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.21 percent of ballots were invalid. b 87.18-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.43 percent of ballots were invalid. e 88.55-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.28 percent of ballots were invalid. Figures do not include Sicily for which the 1981 statistics are not available. d In 1968 includes PSIUP in all Five regions. For breakdown, see separate regional tables. e In 1968, PSI and PSDI were united as PSU, Partito Socialista Unificato. Figures also include PSDI in Sicily in 1971. f Included are PPTT, SVP, and Nuova Sinistra in Trentino-Alto Adige; Union Valdotaine, Rassemblement Valdotain and Democra- zia Popolare in Valle d'Aosta; and Part ito Sardo d'Azione in Sardinia. g For groups included, see individual regional tables. nation as a whole. Only in four regions-Lombardy, Lazio, Abruzzi, and Campania-did the party gain more than one Council seat. Although this is not negligible, because the three largest regions of the country are included, the gain was not enough to alter the fundamental situation. Furthermore, attention Confidential should be paid to the composite vote for the leftist parties, as well as to their seat count in councils. The result is not quite an approximation of the PCI's 1975 highwater mark, but the left as a whole remains extremely close to the DC. Conversion of the 1980 raw vote into actual seats in the various regions left 80 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006:7_i the DC in virtually the same position as 1975 in that the combined forces of other parties could force its hand and in some cases exclude it altogether. In fact, the evidence of static or reduced DC power is found in the party combinations in various regional governments. The regional government situation as of 1980 also demonstrates the DC's drift toward becoming a sec- tional party of the south with a remaining stronghold elsewhere only in Venetia. The situation is no better in the special regions. Sardinia's government has been in crisis since late 1980 with every hint that the PCI will enter the coalition or have sufficient strength to cause a stalemate. The regional election in Sicily earlier this year suggests imminent difficulties for the DC there. Although the party gained 0.6 percent of the popular vote?with fewer voters participating?it lost one Council seat because of proportional representation. In Sicily the party can comfort itself that the PCI slumped significantly, but this does not convert into ultimate advantage for the DC. And the three re- maining special regions, because of their ethnic and linguistic differences as well as local issues, may be unknown quantities for the future. If the regions continue to grow in importance as they have in their first decade of full operation, and even if the DC can hold its own in their governments, the fact remains that its part of the vote is not sufficient to ensure it freedom of action except in a backwater like Molise. The new access of other parties to the spoils of power at the regional level is of maximum significance for building bases of support which doubtless will enhance their national strength. The detailed infor- mation provided here on the regions' voting patterns may be the best data for assessing and projecting the potential for change in national politics in the future. The DC's hold on power is tenuous at best in the regions, and scandal or any excess of factional strife could seriously, perhaps permanently, erode the par- ty's position. 81 Administrative Elections: Provinces and Communes Provincial Elections. The province, once the principal administrative element of the Kingodm of Italy, is now reduced to a second-echelon unit of relatively small importance. At the end of World War lithe country was divided into 92 provinces, to which three have been added under the Republic: Pordenone (Friuli?Venezia Giulia), Isernia (Molise), and Oris- tano (Sardinia). The once powerful figure of provincial prefect has been demoted to a position of liaison between the province and the regional government. In their structure provincial governments mirror those of the regions. The Council is elected by universal suffrage, and its size is determined by the province's population. From its ranks a Junta is elected?again reflecting party strengths?and the Junta then elects the president. The latter's responsibilities are to pre- side over Council and Junta meetings and perform general executive duties. In practice, the provincial government is relatively unimportant, except for the favors or spoils its leaders can dispense. Essentially, the province manages af- fairs of a technical and business character concerning public works. Reduced in importance as they may be, the larger provinces clearly still have some signifi- cance for political parties. From an analytical point of view, provinces and communes have the advantage of giving a small enough sector of voting information to show the diversity that is lost when amalgamated into regional and national figures. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 30 Regional Election Returns, 1968-81 a Region Percent 1970 1975 1980 Region 1970 1975 1980 Regular Statute Group Abruzzi Marche DC 48.3 42.5 45.8 DC 38.6 36.5 37.1 PCI 22.8 30.3 27.5 PCI 31.8 36.9 37.2 PSI 9.0 10.2 10.8 PSI 8.5 9.8 10.1 Basilicata Molise DC 42.5 41.9 45.2 DC 52.1 50.6 55.4 PCI 24.0 27.1 24.9 PCI 15.0 17.9 15.8 PSI 12.7 13.2 13.7 PSI 9.5 10.0 9.4 Calabria Piedmont DC 39.7 39.5 41.2 DC 36.7 32.1 32.5 PCI 23.3 25.2 24.2 PCI 25.9 33.9 31.6 PSI 14.1 14.7 16.6 PSI 10.6 12.9 14.2 Campania Puglia DC 39.7 36.7 39.0 DC 41.3 39.3 42.1 PCI 21.8 27.1 24.1 PCI 26.3 28.5 24.6 PSI 11.0 10.4 12.6 PSI 10.7 11.9 13.3 Emilia-Romagna Tuscany DC 25.8 25.3 25.6 DC 30.6 28.5 28.7 PCI 44.0 48.3 48.2 PCI 42.3 46.5 46.4 PSI 8.1 10.2 10.3 PSI 8.7 10.7 11.8 Lazio Umbria DC 35.2 31.5 34.1 DC 30.2 27.6 27.6 PCI 26.5 33.5 30.7 PCI 41.8 46.2 45.2 PSI 8.8 9.8 10.6 PSI 9.5 13.9 14.3 Liguria Venetia DC 32.1 30.4 30.7 DC 51.9 48.1 47.6 PCI 31.3 38.4 36.1 PCI 16.8 22.8 21.8 PSI 11.3 13.5 13.4 PSI 10.5 12.8 12.1 Lombardy DC 40.9 37.5 38.9 PCI 23.1 30.4 28.1 PSI 12.4 14.1 14.5 Confidential 82 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 30 (continued) Percent Region 1970 1975 1980 Region 1970 1975 1980 Special Statute Group 1968 1973 1978 Friuli-Venezia Giulia DC 44.9 39.7 39.6 PCI 20.1 20.9 21.8 PSI b 10.1 12.3 9.5 1971 1976 1981 Sicily DC 33.3 40.9 41.5 PCI 20.8 26.8 20.6 PSI 11.3 10.3 14.4 1968 1973 1978 Valle d'Aosta DC 37.8 21.4 21.2 PCI 20.4 19.5 19.5 PSI b 10.3 8.5 3.6 1969 1974 1979 Sardinia DC 44.6 38.3 37.7 PCI 19.8 26.8 26.3 PSI 11.9 11.7 11.2 1968 1973 1978 Trentino-Alto Adige DC 37.1 35.6 30.4 PCI c 7.9 7.5 8.9 PSI b 11.4 8.4 6.3 a For detailed data on each region's elections with returns for all parties, see appendix, pages 129-143. b PSI and PSDI as PSU in 1968. PCI with PSIUP and independents in 1968. 83 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table 31 Provincial Council Results by Party in 91 Provinces a 1970 1975 1980 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Votes Percentage Number of Votes Percentage DC 11,392,741 36.73 11,794,271 34.24 12,239,062 35.60 PCI 8,383,976 27.03 11,389,053 33.07 10,780,232 31.35 PSIUP 1,056,521 3.41 PSI 3,351,159 10.80 4,345,017 12.62 4,531,850 13.18 PSDI 2,254,976 7.27 2,002,567 5.81 1,842,351 5.36 PRI 975,407 3.15 1,187,693 3.45 1,201,527 3.49 PLI 1,533,285 4.94 935,425 2.72 1,005,254 2.92 MSI-DN 1,995,686 6.43 2,468,856 7.17 2,233,693 6.50 Others 74,651 0.24 318,320 0.92 547,925 1.60 Total 31,018,402 100.00 34,441,202 100.00 34,381,804 100.00 Footnote to be provided later. The provinces hold elections every five years, and at least 75 of them normally vote simultaneously. Thus only 20 are out of phase, and some of those can be integrated easily into composite figures for an over- view (see table 31 and figure 17). At the provincial level the DC's fate at the hands of the electors appears to sound real danger warnings. In fact, taking the figures in table 32, the DC record is not even good at the national level. The distance between DC and PCI in 1975 was the smallest of any election, and even its presumed "recovery" in 1980 did not put it as far ahead of the Communists as on other electoral levels. Conversely, the number of votes for the parties shows a greater difference. But the test of the fate of the parties is in the seats they won and the councils they were able to dominate. Figures 18 and 19 present the provincial council votes and party seats on a national basis and by geographical regions. Beyond the regional and national tables, the evidence in tables 24 and 25 permits a view of where each party Confidential stands in the various provinces. This table shows, for example, that if Piedmont reports national and re- gional electoral strength for the PCI, the breakdown by province reveals pockets of otherwise hidden DC strength and at least one case of decline (Cuneo). This type of analysis also illustrates that the DC has some beachheads even in the Red Belt which disappear in composite figures for larger areas. In Tuscany, for example, Lucca stands out as a party stronghold. On the other hand, entering wedges of PCI strength in the DC's preserve of the south can be found, areas which bear watching in the future to ascertain the degree to which that area might be altering its political orientation. Puglia and Sicily are consistently faithful to the DC at higher level elections, but areas of PCI strength appear in lesser elections in places like Taranto and Ragusa. Taken overall, however, the evidence again shows the DC to be rural and southern but without a large number of growth areas even in that sphere. 84 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 17 Provincial Council Election Results by Party in 91 Provinces, 1960-80' Percent 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 DC PCI PSI MSI-DN 10 PSDI 5 PL Others 1960b 64b 70 75 80 a Not included are the provinces which did not hold provincial elections in the years 1960, 1964 and 1970: Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo Avellino and Foggia. For the years 1975 and 1980 statistics were not available for the province of Gorizia, but Avellino, which conducted provincial elections in 1974 and in 1980, is included. b Sicilian provincial elections held in 1959 and 1963 are included in figures for 1960 and 1964. cmn 1964 and 1970 PSIUP won, respectively, 2.75 percent and 3.46 percent of the total. Ideologically close to the PCI, figures for the two parties could be combined for more comnlete internretation of halIntc rad' for the extreme left 585817 2-82 Here, though, decline in agrarian activity as well as urbanization cannot be forgotten as regards tradition- al DC electoral support (see figures 11 and 12). The makeup of provincial councils is particularly revealing for the hypothesis of DC erosion. Using the office of provincial president as an indicator of party strength, the DC record in 1974 was 68 presidencies out of 94 (Oristano Province had not yet been created). Four years later in 1978, the DC had lost so much that it held only 34 of 95 provincial presidencies-17 of those lost went to the PSI and 11 to the PCI. Of note 85 are locations where the DC had to surrender the office: in the south to the PSI in Bari, Brindisi, Catanzaro, Naples, and Reggio Calabria; also in the south or islands in Cagliari, Foggia, Matera, and Sassari to the PCI. The erosion, then, must be said to have made a significant incursion into the traditional DC south. Even in Venetia the DC lost Belluno to the PSDI and Rovigo to the PCI. Despite the relative unimportance today of the prov- ince, it remains at a level where the individual voter can be influenced by the perception he gets of party activity affecting him. The rising strength of other parties and the serious decline of the DC in provincial executives is therefore to be watched carefully. Communal Elections. The commune, the smallest of Italian administrative subdivisions, encompasses a city or town and its immediate hinterland. It varies some from the municipal structure in the United States, but the largest communes?Milan, Turin, Rome, and Naples?might be compared to American urban areas with regional organs that attempt to coordinate a metropolis and its suburbs. There are 8,081 communes in Italy, and they range in popula- tion from the millions of the big cities to a few hundred in rural areas. The importance of some communes stems from their being larger than several of the regions. Good electoral data are readily available only for those communes that are also provincial capitals. Not all communes vote at the same time, but the councils are renewed at five-year intervals. In communes of more than 5,000 inhabitants the council is elected by proportional representation; in the smaller ones, a so- called limited vote is used where the elector picks a given number of names from a list. The larger communes are more likely to register significant political change. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 32 Provincial Council Election Returns by Party in 86 Provinces, 1975 and 1980 a 1975 1980 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 10,747,421 34.73 949 11,116,374 35.96 981 PCI 10,105,682 32.65 860 9,603,214 31.06 816 PSI 3,949,176 12.76 333 4,119,964 13.33 343 PSDI 1,816,471 5.87 143 1,673,324 5.41 129 PRI 1,050,755 3.40 72 1,062,303 3.44 78 PLI 847,850 2.74 42 911,445 2.95 52 MSI-DN 2,110,815 6.82 162 1,923,005 6.22 144 Others 320,661 b 1.03 10 505,480 d 1.63 28 Total 30,948,831 . 100.00 2,571 30,915,109 . 100.00 2,571 a The official 1971 census gave the population of these provinces as 47,760,090. b Includes 9,993 (0.03 percent, one seat) for center-left groups; 205,133(0.66 percent, four seats) for extreme left groups; and 46,449 (0.15 percent, five seats) for local parties. . 91.6 percent of eligible voters. d Includes 268,118 (0.87 percent) for extreme left parties. . 88.3 percent of eligible voters. See table A-32 in appendix. Confidential 86 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 - - Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Province DC PCI PSI 2; .), 28.2 38.3 11.6 32.. cAsutnle0 .Perugia 39.1 27.6 10.1 , g , 4. Novara . 47.6 14.4 15.6 51 52, .,,T e r? n I 5Province.si e n 1. Alessandri a . 31.6 33.5 14.4 : 9 'Pisto 5. Turin 27.2 37.7 52.,Aneglia, _ 12.4 ' 56,Pekaro I Urbino 6, Vercelli 30.2 38.3 12,4 54. Ascoli Picerio 7. Aosta 55. Nlacerata .,',., 8. Bergamo 55.2 18.1 13.3 n 11.1 9 46.1 25.0 13.3 5566974: ?fiF:aigetitS7i?On?n 9. Brescia .5 - 25:1 12.8 2.1 ' 20.7 44.8 22.8 - 14.4 11.1 28 1103.. Cmoumano , 40.5, 31.8 16.6 11. Cremona 14.1 12. Mantua 30.2 38.3 17.4 0.6 2287..58. 14. Pavia . 6P,r!.9"?.,. 44.6 30'6 ' 34'6 148..26 77776541,:. LNre.eoraigpncgideeiiass; _ - - - 6: .." ,tY:eqr,buil 9.3 15. Sondrio 45.3 17.7 21.2 36.7 26.3 12.4 16. Varese 17. Bolzano 67,1sernia ''', 32,4 32.4 10.9 46.2 37.1 167 3" ' 36_74 14.! 6-642:PC:'41ectair" 665; re naem,6,6,. - , 41.5, , 21.3 11.6 < ., _ _ 211098.: TrentPI3aedi Iuuna ? 40.7 19.9 17.4 42.5 ' 10.9 14.6 52.5 38.5 4.2 21.3 15.7 7,6 ?6. 11.7' 49.4 18.6 14.2 6668.: A Campobassov e I .1i no * O. Caserta 21. Rovigo 22. Treviso 32 73: 1 0:8 23.5 22.8 15.1 29.0 34.7 ' 9.7 23. Venice 24. Verona 34.6 35.0 15.9 34.7 23.3 12.9 48.6 20.6 14.1 25. Vicenza 72. Salerno 34.1 28.6 13.2 58.1 14.6 11...6 - / 3, Bart ' ' 36.1 29.6 12.5 26. Gorizia 27. Pordenone 39.6 24.4 16.4 31.7 28.5 - - 40.7 20.7 16.5 28. Trieste 41.2 20.8 15.4 77. Taranto 78. Matera ' , 35.1 34.4 9.8 29. Udine 30. Genoa 35.7 32.2 / 2.6 28.0 39.4 13.3 . 31. imperia 36.3 30.4 11.6 - 79. Potenz% 39.9 26.9 14.5 32. La Spezia 29.5 43.0 13.1 " 80, Catanzaro < . 37.4 36.2 14.4 33. Savona 29.7 39.1 15.1 Of. Cosenza . < 35.8 27.4 18.1 34. Bologna 23.2 51.7 3365: Fort uara 21.4 48.8 194i63 8623:,,ARge9riig9iegn.foai,,a,bria . 3329:58 ' 2266:33 1144;76 24.2 48.3 9.3 84. Caltanissetta 37.7. 23.3 13.8 37. Modena259 54.2 8.9 86, Catania 37.0 22.5 10.2 . ' 4365.46 216661 - 1143:82 28.8 40.5 16,4 ' 86. gone '''' 38. Parma 39, Piacenza 32.9 38.0 16_3 81. Messina 40. Ravenna - - 41.0 _ 2.1.1 10.3 86, Paierm0 26.4 53.3 10,5 ag, Ragusa 36.8 - 30.6 '" 12.0 4421.. AR reegzgzioo E m di a 32.3 46.2 10,3 ' -' 96, SyracuSe 53 43. Florence 26.7 50.1 9.4 - - 91, Trapani- 3,0.5 25.4 14.3 37.6 21./ 16.0 44. Grosseto 23.9 43.9 ' 12,4 , 96 Cagliar,L 31.0 36.7 12.2 5 5 443: Lucca aorn 20.9 54.3 11.1 93, Nuoro-;., 367. 31.2 12.3 6 42.6 29.1 11.3 94 OristanO 34.6 26.0 10.0 47. Massa Carrara 29.5 35.5 14.7 95, Sassari: 34.1 28.9 13.0 48. Pisa 26.6 47.6 167 Province data will sum 100 when the f ejcy coher i included, Party Vote Percentage Other Socialist (PSI) Communist (PCI) 9 *The total number of Italian provinces is 95. Those not included are Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Gorizia, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, and Foggia. Aosta does not have a true provincial council. In Trent and Bolzano, the regional councillors elected in their respective territories sit separately for provincial councils. The remaining provinces voted at otter times: Pavia and Viterbo in 1977; Rome and Foggia in 1976; and Ravenna in 1978. *1Avellino election data from 1974. 87 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83600228R000100050006-7 - - Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Province DC PCI PSI 2; .), 28.2 38.3 11.6 32.. cAsutnle0 .Perugia 39.1 27.6 10.1 , g , 4. Novara . 47.6 14.4 15.6 51 52, .,,T e r? n I 5Province.si e n 1. Alessandri a . 31.6 33.5 14.4 : 9 'Pisto 5. Turin 27.2 37.7 52.,Aneglia, _ 12.4 ' 56,Pekaro I Urbino 6, Vercelli 30.2 38.3 12,4 54. Ascoli Picerio 7. Aosta 55. Nlacerata .,',., 8. Bergamo 55.2 18.1 13.3 n 11.1 9 46.1 25.0 13.3 5566974: ?fiF:aigetitS7i?On?n 9. Brescia .5 - 25:1 12.8 2.1 ' 20.7 44.8 22.8 - 14.4 11.1 28 1103.. Cmoumano , 40.5, 31.8 16.6 11. Cremona 14.1 12. Mantua 30.2 38.3 17.4 0.6 2287..58. 14. Pavia . 6P,r!.9"?.,. 44.6 30'6 ' 34'6 148..26 77776541,:. LNre.eoraigpncgideeiiass; _ - - - 6: .." ,tY:eqr,buil 9.3 15. Sondrio 45.3 17.7 21.2 36.7 26.3 12.4 16. Varese 17. Bolzano 67,1sernia ''', 32,4 32.4 10.9 46.2 37.1 167 3" ' 36_74 14.! 6-642:PC:'41ectair" 665; re naem,6,6,. - , 41.5, , 21.3 11.6 < ., _ _ 211098.: TrentPI3aedi Iuuna ? 40.7 19.9 17.4 42.5 ' 10.9 14.6 52.5 38.5 4.2 21.3 15.7 7,6 ?6. 11.7' 49.4 18.6 14.2 6668.: A Campobassov e I .1i no * O. Caserta 21. Rovigo 22. Treviso 32 73: 1 0:8 23.5 22.8 15.1 29.0 34.7 ' 9.7 23. Venice 24. Verona 34.6 35.0 15.9 34.7 23.3 12.9 48.6 20.6 14.1 25. Vicenza 72. Salerno 34.1 28.6 13.2 58.1 14.6 11...6 - / 3, Bart ' ' 36.1 29.6 12.5 26. Gorizia 27. Pordenone 39.6 24.4 16.4 31.7 28.5 - - 40.7 20.7 16.5 28. Trieste 41.2 20.8 15.4 77. Taranto 78. Matera ' , 35.1 34.4 9.8 29. Udine 30. Genoa 35.7 32.2 / 2.6 28.0 39.4 13.3 . 31. imperia 36.3 30.4 11.6 - 79. Potenz% 39.9 26.9 14.5 32. La Spezia 29.5 43.0 13.1 " 80, Catanzaro < . 37.4 36.2 14.4 33. Savona 29.7 39.1 15.1 Of. Cosenza . < 35.8 27.4 18.1 34. Bologna 23.2 51.7 3365: Fort uara 21.4 48.8 194i63 8623:,,ARge9riig9iegn.foai,,a,bria . 3329:58 ' 2266:33 1144;76 24.2 48.3 9.3 84. Caltanissetta 37.7. 23.3 13.8 37. Modena259 54.2 8.9 86, Catania 37.0 22.5 10.2 . ' 4365.46 216661 - 1143:82 28.8 40.5 16,4 ' 86. gone '''' 38. Parma 39, Piacenza 32.9 38.0 16_3 81. Messina 40. Ravenna - - 41.0 _ 2.1.1 10.3 86, Paierm0 26.4 53.3 10,5 ag, Ragusa 36.8 - 30.6 '" 12.0 4421.. AR reegzgzioo E m di a 32.3 46.2 10,3 ' -' 96, SyracuSe 53 43. Florence 26.7 50.1 9.4 - - 91, Trapani- 3,0.5 25.4 14.3 37.6 21./ 16.0 44. Grosseto 23.9 43.9 ' 12,4 , 96 Cagliar,L 31.0 36.7 12.2 5 5 443: Lucca aorn 20.9 54.3 11.1 93, Nuoro-;., 367. 31.2 12.3 6 42.6 29.1 11.3 94 OristanO 34.6 26.0 10.0 47. Massa Carrara 29.5 35.5 14.7 95, Sassari: 34.1 28.9 13.0 48. Pisa 26.6 47.6 167 Province data will sum 100 when the f ejcy coher i included, Party Vote Percentage Other Socialist (PSI) Communist (PCI) 9 *The total number of Italian provinces is 95. Those not included are Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Gorizia, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, and Foggia. Aosta does not have a true provincial council. In Trent and Bolzano, the regional councillors elected in their respective territories sit separately for provincial councils. The remaining provinces voted at otter times: Pavia and Viterbo in 1977; Rome and Foggia in 1976; and Ravenna in 1978. *1Avellino election data from 1974. 87 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83600228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 33 City Council Election Results Shown With and Without Eight Major Cities, 1975 and 1980 a 1975 1980 Total With Cities Total Without Cities Total With Cities Total Without Cities Percent of Vote Number of Seats Percent of Vote Number of Seats Percent of Vote Number of Seats Percent of Vote Number of Seats DC 32.06 1,434 35.35 1,260 33.13 1,515 37.00 1,333 PCI 30.90 1,110 28.88 922 28.91 1,038 26.95 860 PSI 12.44 500 13.23 439 13.59 527 13.53 453 PSD! 6.31 229 6.19 194 5.51 207 5.62 177 PRI 4.54 145 4.26 120 4.40 157 4.51 134 PLI 3.40 86 3.04 70 3.86 98 3.37 79 MSI-DN 8.16 272 7.18 220 7.23 213 5.68 166 Others 2.19 54 1.87 45 3.38 75 3.34 68 Total 100.00 3,830 100.00 3,270 100.00 3,830 100.00 3,270 a The figures given are for 82 provincial capitals with a total population of 13,459,722 in 1971. Percentages in parentheses show the change that occurs if the eight major cities (Turin, Milan, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Naples, Catania, and Palermo) with 6,480,817 population are eliminated. The cities of Bolzano, Trento, Frosinone, and Isernia are included in these statistics although they voted out of phase (on 17 November 1974) until 1980. Communes are structured like regions and provinces with a Communal Council which in turn elects a Junta or Municipal Council as well as the Mayor. Table 33 and figures 20 and 21 illustrate the political composition of the communal electorates in a number of cities; the largest communes in the area are shown separately. This picture is one of rapidly increasing gloom for the DC, because by 1981 it had lost the position of mayor in all the largest cities except Palermo. It is also in communal elections where the DC has had the largest losses relative even to the 1975 or 1976 elections. The few cases of DC improvement in recent elections have not come in the largest cities, suggesting that urbanization has promoted the for- tunes of the left and seriously damaged the DC. Even the commune of Venice, largest city in the Catholic northeast, kept the PCI as the plurality party in 1980; and in Rome and Naples, once considered DC 91 strongholds, the party's share of the vote dropped by 3 percent in the 1980 and 1981 elections. Noteworthy as the PCI's slippage was in the communal election of 1981, this still seems to be an administrative level where the DC has now truly lost its hegemony. In 1974 it held the mayorality in 67 of 94 provincial capitals; in 1978 that had fallen to 51 of 95. The drop is neither slow nor small, and nothing short of a miracle or cataclysm seems likely to reverse the trend. In some communes, the DC may soon have to concen- trate its efforts so as not to fall into third place among the three major parties. While Italy becomes rapidly more urban, nowhere is party erosion so visible as in the communal elections, although it is moving at varying rates from area to area. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 20 City Council Election Results by City and Geographic Region-1975 Northeast Turin (Torino) Milan (Milano) /? Gepoa,_ _ *I (Geno-va) Bologna Venice --- (Venelia) ?7 7 Florence (Firenze) Center \\. me*1 \> Ro- - (Roma) Nap lis (Napoli) Party Vote Percentage IIOther Christian Democratic Socialist*. ommunist 6311162-62 *Regional data exclude cities located on map *1 Rome, Genoa, and Bari elections were held in 1976 93 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure 21 City Council Election Results by City and Geographic Region-1980 Turin (Torino) Milan (Milano) Genoa*I en ova) Bologna Northeast Venice (Venezia) Florence iFirenze) Center Rome* (Roma) Party Vote Percentage Other Christian Democratic Socialist Communist 631117 2-82 Palermo Naples (Napoli) *Regional data exclude cities located on map *1 Rome. Genoa. and Bari elections were held in 1981 95 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 34 Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1975 and 1981: A Composite of 98 Communes With More Than 5,000 Inhabitants Party 1975-80 a 1981 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 1,202,763 33.49 1,007 1,031,012 30.83 997 PCI 1,242,694 34.60 858 1,099,327 32.88 801 PSI 361,085 10.06 333 458,474 13.71 418 PSDI 160,712 4.48 127 194,792 5.83 163 PRI 139,778 3.89 61 126,269 3.78 71 PLI 58,274 1.62 9 91,964 2.75 20 Dem. Prol. 48,834 1.36 10 30,689 0.92 9 MSI-DN 302,239 8.42 117 218,155 6.52 83 Others 74,711 2.08 78 92,971 2.78 58 Total 3,591,090 100.00 2,600 3,343,653 100.00 2,620 a These 98 communes voted over this entire timespan until 1981 when they were brought into synchronization. Composite national figures for the 1975-80 period do not seem to indicate DC erosion, but the reports from the largest cities in that group do show overall party decline. The data provided in table 34 encompass a broader cross section of communes?towns and cities that range in population from 5,000 to nearly 3 million, some provincial captials and other simple communes?and illustrate the hypothesis more clear- ly. When the five largest cities are separated out, the DC decline again appears, underscoring the future prospects with on-going urbanization (see table 35). Admittedly, these two sets of statistics derive from different bases and suggest the opportunity for multi- ple interpretation. The most objective analytical judg- ment is probably that they indicate a process which is in a relatively early stage. If the critical and pivotal change for the party occurred in 1974-75, both tables portray the beginning of this shift. Also, because this level permits the closest scrutiny of voter behavior, it bears continuing observation to identify movement that is lost in national and regional returns. Confidential Another curious aspect of voting patterns appears when they are simultaneously examined at the provin- cial and communal levels. Political science assumes that urban areas are more liberal, progressive, or leftist, and that rural areas tend to be traditionalist and conservative. Separating out the returns from the provincial capitals in provincial and communal elec- tions?in effect, dividing the urban from the rural vote?shows this belief not infrequently to be errone- ous in the Italian case. In fact, the city or provincial capital may give more conservative returns than its surrounding province. One such example from the elections in June 1981 is Foggia where the DC won 47.8 percent of the vote in the communal election (up from 41.1 percent in 1976) and the PCI dropped from 22.9 percent to 15.4 percent. However, the election held the same day in Foggia Province produced 33.2 percent for the DC (1976, 35.6 percent) and a very close 32.3 percent for the PCI (1976, 37.6 percent). 96 Approved For Release 2007/12/17 : CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table 35 Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1976 and 1981, in Five Provincial Capitals a Party 1976 1981 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 932,770 32.93 116 748,785 29.28 106 PCI 1,001,264 35.35 103 871,121 34.06 92 PSI 258,902 9.14 33 326,609 12.77 50 PSDI 115,788 4.09 16 139,017 5.44 23 PRI 116,786 4.12 10 101,050 3.95 10 PLI 53,406 1.89 4 84,624 3.31 9 Dem. Prol. 41,256 1.46 1 26,730 1.05 MSI-DN 262,716 9.27 25 185,872 7.27 18 Others 49,922 1.75 2 73,548 2.87 2 Total 2,832,810 100.00 310 2,557,356 100.00 310 a Rome, Genoa, Bari, Foggia, Ascoli Piceno. Whether this peculiar rural-urban phenomenon indi- cates a broad national trend is difficult to say. If so, the implications for the DC are more negative since it has long been assumed that the party's strength lay in its hold on rural areas. Again, urbanization means the decline of a traditional DC preserve. There is, though, another side of this coin. If the DC's vote-drawing power in some urban areas is indeed improving, perhaps another base is coming into existence. How- ever, the earlier admonition is still valid; Italian election returns must be handled with care if they are not to become a mere numbers game and skew analytical judgment. Finally, the law regulating the structure and function- ing of provinces and communes also has implications for the DC. Unlike the regions, legislation governing these lowest units was already on the books at the institution of the Republic. Legal arguments not yet settled arose in connection with the 1946 referendum which abolished the monarchy, specifically as to whether that vote also implied abolition of laws passed under the Kingdom. That discussion is largely aca- demic today, but the fact remains that no action was 97 taken by the Constituent Assembly to abolish old legislation. Therefore, a certain part of the legal framework regulating today's provinces and com- munes is still that instituted by Mussolini's law of 1934. Modifications were introduced with legislation in 1951 and 1960, but citizens are often annoyed when regulations dating to the fascist era still affect them. The DC is held responsible for this failure to make a clean break with the dictatorship, even if the reason was political expediency at a time when the alternative of starting over meant doing so in an assembly where the far left's influence seemed dan- gerously large. This element combined with the pro- gressively worsening position of the DC, in elections as well as in council offices, places the party in the least promising perspective yet surveyed. Trends on these levels closest to the grass roots are the clearest and most ominous of all for the DC in the future. The trend is subtle, though, and is identifiable most clearly now in the largest communes but in varying degree as one moves down in size. Both provincial and commu- nal elections may prove to be the most reliable barometer for predicting any changes in national voting patterns. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential DC Policy, the Other Parties, and Prognosis For many years the Christian Democrats, as they so often claim, represented a broad interclass cross sec- tion which reflected the sentiments of a significant share of the nation. Also, the party has pursued a pragmatic policy, often devoid of ideas and scant on ideology, which accommodated the changing aspira- tions of at least some of the Italian people. This ease of adaptation not infrequently brings charges of op- portunism. In foreign policy, the DC has been some- what more consistent in its support of?or conform- ism to?the goals of the Western alliance, taking an independent line only on the colonels' government in Greece and in certain facets of Middle Eastern af- fairs. But events of the last decade have increasingly raised the question of whether the party continues to be effective in comprehending and promoting the public's aspirations. Perhaps more ominous or even hazardous is the expediency practiced by the DC. In a dramatically changed nation, it is questionable wheth- er the party has grasped the new ethos or whether pragmatism may not have led to excessive compro- mise of what it claims to stand for. More germane for US interests is whether the DC continues to serve as a valid and valued ally. Does it even become a liability? Answers and analyses for any of these questions or observations are extremely important and potentially far reaching in their implications. Aside from Italy's pivotal geographic location, the country's internal political spectrum, simultaneously fragile and rigid, permits only minimal maneuvering space among a few coalition alternatives, all of which seem to include a powerful and previously unacceptable PCI or an unrealistically small PSI. In foreign policy, the DC's support of NATO, the European Community, theater nuclear forces, and most facets of US policy has made Italy an ally so taken for granted as, in effect, virtually to discount any need for involving her in great power consulta- tions, a tactic that has greatly annoyed her leaders of late. Despite irritants in the relationship or minor deviations Italy may have attempted internationally, any basic change in national political orientation that would alter foreign policy could create a serious need for reevaluation of US calculations. Backing compa- rable to that of the DC has come only from tiny Confidential parties such as the PRI, PLI, and to an extent PSDI, with some erratic PSI support. The formulation and successful implementation of any foreign policy, how- ever, is dependent on the relative internal political strengths and alignments of a nation's parties. Hence, the DC's continuing prosperity has been considered as sine qua non for the nation's foreign policy and its role in the Western alliance. Clearly the DC is slowly becoming less representative of majority opinion. Even if conclusive evidence is lacking, more than a few signs give cause for appre- hension. Various elements suggest, for example, that a changing Italian public is not aligning with a DC which has been unable?its many expressions of desire for "renewal" notwithstanding?to maintain more than a tenuous hold on its already weakened position. Erratic as the work of strengthening the party's hold on the public may be, what has been attempted is insufficient and cause for pessimism. First, contrary to wide belief?the DC has not won back its old positions lost in the early 1970s. The PCI may have appeared to suffer a slippage greater than that of the DC, but this may not be symptomatic of a continuing trend. Any assumption that the threat from the left is declining defies facts. Second, the DC has maintained its ratio of the vote in legislative elections by siphoning support from smaller parties largely to its right. How long can that type of transfusion give life to the party when it has so often been forced to rely on those very groups to govern in coalition? Where, then, does the party seem to be moving? What may be its future in the overall Italian political spectrum? Has the DC Lost the Way? The DC gives more than a little evidence of having lost its way, except for its inveterate reliance on pragmatism. This is the least damning mode of describing the party's flirtation in recent years with "historic compromise," a euphemism for an alliance or some kind of modus vivendi with the PCI. The process has been tortuous, reminiscent of the twists and turns of the early 1960s that led to the apertura a 98 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential sinistra (opening to the left) with the PSI, an arrange- ment causing no little alarm even before it was concluded. In some sense a repeat of that process might be considered as an attempt on the DC's part to arrive at a more modern or responsive approach to the nation's demands. In practice, though, it comes across overwhelmingly as an implicit negation of the party's anti-Communism, a fundamental and unchanging te- net from its founding and, to many now, a crass device to ensure DC retention of power. In terms of domestic policy demands and what they signify for the party and the electorate, the DC did at least acquiesce in the Programmatic Accord of 29 July 1977, a document the PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI, and PCI adhered to as well. No more comprehensive document exists outlining the critical issues in Italian life which cried for action. DC underwriting of this, commendable as it is, still approximated signature of a list of its own unfulfilled promises. Be that as it may, the accord was a collective commitment by the six parties to address and resolve these issues. Had it not become a dead letter, as much as anything because of the DC and its internal differences, the program might have been a turning point for solving many nagging national problems, some at least two decades old. Although the program did threaten some DC areas of influence, there is no reason to believe that even its partial fulfillment would have constituted the kind of renewal the DC was seeking in the eyes of the voting public. That the PCI would have had an important role in this, doubtless more than desired in Washington, was also evident. Events altered all this, but the fatal flaw of the Programmatic Accord was that it was contingent on the initiative and direction of Aldo Moro. Moro's sudden and violent death left the DC, for all intents and purposes, without gifted leadership. As a result, the party's failure to provide the support necessary to revitalize the nation?and itself?through these reforms has placed it in the same or worse position than before the initiative was undertaken. In its own terms, perhaps it was guilty of a sin of omission. As of 1981, the perspective on the decade of the 1970s is not as great as might be desired, yet some tentative conclusions may prove valid. First is the impression 99 that despite its continuation as Italy's largest party in the last decade, the DC appears to have been wander- ing in a wasteland, one somewhat of its own creation either by inaction or erroneous judgment. Whether in its faulty assessments that allowed the divorce refer- endum fiasco in 1974 or its lack of response to student and worker upheavals in 1968 and 1969, the party showed its inability to determine a clear and consist- ent course for itself. Its attitudes toward the "historic compromise" and the Programmatic Accord are evi- dence of this loss of direction. The DC's first steps in seeking renewal, under Moro and after Zaccagnini became party secretary, do allow the assumption that things might have been different. The DC's major electoral setbacks between 1974 and 1976 not only prompted the calls for renewal, they also forced an awareness of the party's growing inability to govern without some acknowledgment of the PCPs vastly enhanced strength. In various quar- ters at that juncture, questions were also being raised for the first time about the DC's ultimate ability to survive. To an extent, the DC leadership of that moment saw a pragmatic escape hatch in the flirta- tions of Italy's Marxist left with Eurocommunism, a phenomenon that altered thinking in various quarters about the PCI. And Eurocommunism, at least hypo- thetically, deserved consideration if only because the arguments advanced against it were self-serving, if not downright specious. During the time it captivated Italian political thinking, Eurocommunism served to make "historic compromise" more palatable. Indeed, such a deal could be rationalized into yet one more example of transformism, a practice characteristic of years of government in Italy.' Historically, transformism is dated even to preunification political tactics used by Cavour in the 1850s and utilized by several famous politicians after him, notably Giolitti early in this century. Most simply described, this is the practice whereby one party or faction, usually the majority of the moment, co-opts the principles and practices of its opposition, ostensibly for the general good. Implicit in the concept, however, is an unprincipled desire to retain power even at the cost of a major sellout. At best it has always been viewed as amoral opportunism. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Whatever the justification offered, the very entertain- ment of such a compromise with the PCI was not only antithetical to the DC's past but was also a tacit admission that the party was considerably less autono- mous than before. The 1976 parliamentary election, in fact, verified this. Even in coalition with its small allies of the past, the DC could hardly proceed to govern thereafter without some acknowledgment of the growth of Communist power. In the judgment of many at the time, the DC was reaching the inevitable moment of truth deriving from its unfulfilled prom- ises, and the voters were penalizing it for its years of immobilism. On regional, provincial, and communal levels, notably since the 1975 administrative election, the reality of PCI power was forced on the DC. It was at this juncture that the PCI's momentum contributed to reaching the Programmatic Accord, in all likeli- hood the pivotal tactic in Moro's game plan for beating the PCI on its own grounds. Moro's leadership, convoluted even for Italians accus- tomed to Byzantine maneuverers, was remarkably effective as a moderating force which muted factional frictions quietly behind the scene. Although the con- servative correnti in the party opposed any move toward the PCI, Moro was slowly and determinedly moving the DC his way. The tactic first met heavy weather when the United States spoke out in January 1978 against any PCI involvement in the Italian Government. The Red Brigades, the force least inter- ested in promoting US interests, inadvertently aided these and altered the political landscape by kidnaping Moro in March. Although it was not evident even in May when Moro's corpse was found in downtown Rome, there already was a premonition that not only the DC but perhaps Italian politics had reached a critical juncture. Certainly the Communists soon un- derstood the implications of a newly emerging politi- cal world. The largest majority ever to vote confidence in an Italian cabinet hastily approved the government of "national solidarity" on the day Moro was kidnaped. In some senses, this ministry presided over by Giulio Andreotti was a realization of historic compromise because of PCI backing. Nevertheless, in the suspi- cion, innuendo, and recrimination that typified the Confidential political scene in the weeks of limbo until Moro's body was found, the always latent makings of political division soon reappeared. Without the master manip- ulator, the grand coalition fell apart almost immedi- ately, and for its part the DC went back to its earlier positions, those more coherent with its traditional opposition to the PCI, and to a tense relationship with its erstwhile ally, the PSI. Whether hidden or visible, the DC's division between Moro's flagbearers and the more conservative anti-PCI elements effectively re- established the party's old immobilism. Against this backdrop, Italy went to the polls in 1979. Whether mistakenly or with self-induced optimism, the DC persuaded itself that the response of the electorate that year was rejection of the PCI, even if the DC's own showing was far from an overwhelming endorsement by the voters. Detailed analysis of that election in this report points out that the old fissures were not only still present but even growing. Notwith- standing this failure to make a leap forward, faction- alism continued to paralyze the party until the conserv- atives succeeded at the party congress in February 1980 in establishing as DC policy opposition to any understanding with the PCI. The majority at that meeting approved a preamble to the party's general reaffirmation of principle which encompassed this stand, thus labeling its backers as the preambolisti (backers of the preamble) (see above pages 15-17). The stresses and strains remained, eventually reappearing at the fall of Cossiga's second government and forcing party secretary Piccoli to demand again at the De- cember 1980 National Council meeting that factions be disbanded?a demand still unmet almost a year later. Finally, in late July 1981, after the party's loss of the premiership, the Council abandoned the pream- ble and reopened the way for alternative possibilities envisioned by Moro. Tiresome as is the narrative of the DC policy flip-flop, it illustrates the party's continuing crisis, what the Italian press has occasionally called "the Christian Democratic question." Without doubt this reflects an erosion of leadership and a resultant indecisiveness on basic policy. Simultaneously, however, it is an inad- vertent recognition by the DC that it must respond to 100 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential a different political orientation but that it feels its very foundation threatened. The party's future thus seems to become a question of whether the price that must be paid for continued primacy is indeed compro- mise with the traditional enemy, the PCI. The composite described here demands to be placed in the broader context of Italian affairs. If not, it becomes readily evident that crucial issues in Italy are increasingly lost in this morass of political jockeying. Another phrasing would pose the question of whether Italy can long afford this public internal thrashing about by the DC while national problems worsen. Terrorism continues to be a major issue in Italy, and even the public's reactions to it?persistent criticism of government ineffectuality in dealing with terrorism and its causes?are taken as examples of disgust with the DC. Inflation persistently rises with only the most ephemeral moments of respite. Unemployment re- mains high, and old labor problems continue unre- solved. Reforms in the judicial, penal, economic, welfare, educational, and other sectors are constantly delayed. Ironically, these are all major aspects of the Programmatic Accord, almost all still far from realization. Leadership Vacuum? If DC domestic policy vacillates, is there any evidence of a will in the leadership for a change which might reestablish stability? As so common in the past, the number of names that rise above the party rank and file is small. Although there are nearly 400 DC members of Parliament, the only ones who might fill the bill are the same figures who have been on the scene for years. Superstars like Andreotti and Fanfani now get attention primarily as candidates to succeed Alessandro Pertini at the Quirinale Palace. Even if Fanfani, perennially available, has less than subtly expressed his willingness to form an "institutional" government, his popularity is quite limited, and to some he is totally unacceptable. Fanfani, for all his boundless ambition, has no youth following. Further- more, he was party secretary when the DC wallowed into the trough of its mid-1970s losses. Andreotti, on the other hand, still enjoys high esteem as revealed in a January 1981 Demoskopea poll, but he reputedly has no desire to be premier again. Zaccagnini, as 101 much because of his poor health as his age, is no alternative. Since his departure from the party secre- taryship two years ago, the DC has had only second- rate leadership either in its own administration with Piccoli or with Cossiga and Forlani as Prime Minis- ters. Discussion of these most obvious men must take note, too, of the fact that they are older figures; and, whether in years or events, they are associated with party fatigue, scandal, and inactivity. New and youn- ger blood is what the DC leadership desperately needs, but little on the horizon augurs the arrival of a savior. When Zaccagnini was chosen as political secretary in 1975 at age 63, the DC probably missed its most critical opportunity for rejuvenating itself. What chances there have been of late among younger men appeared well over a year ago and came from the right, but the capi storici (historic leaders) viewed the major individuals in question as mavericks and too rebellious. A name often mentioned from this group was Massimo de Carolis of Milan, but he was already jeopardizing himself within the party before his name was included on lists of members reputed to belong to the P-2 Masonic Lodge.9 Another Milanese political figure, Andrea Borruso, for all the backing he enjoys from the Comunione e Liberazione movement (see section on auxiliary support organizations), gives no evidence of drawing the mass support essential for a broad-based party. 9 The "Propaganda-2" Masonic Lodge scandal began attracting public attention in Italy in the early spring of 1981 and became a major issue in mid-May when Prime Minister Forlani felt it necessary to release the names of purported members of the group, a total of nearly 1,000. The list included numerous high-ranking figures from government, political parties, banking, the media, security agencies, and other important sectors of public life. Aside from historic attitudes in Italy toward Masonry?which regard the organization as antithetical to Catholicism?the P-2 Lodge was alleged to have sinister implications for government stability, democratic institutions, and national security. Italy's regular Free- masons denounced P-2 as "illegal" and disavowed any connection with it. Numerous figures named as P-2 members denied any involvement with the group, and various statements caused skepti- cism as to the actual role of some individuals who appeared on the list. Regardless of these and other doubts, this renegade lodge was believed to have sinister and semitreasonous goals, and the reputa- tions of all who were said to be involved with it were seriously compromised. P-2 was most frequently referred to as "a covert center of power." Since the Constitution explicitly bans all secret organizations, anyone proved to be associated with P-2 could be liable for criminal prosecution. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential The truly ominous nature of the DC leadership situation appears on the party's left. While a large number of DC rank-and-file youth are moving left, as documented studies show, there are no party leaders of that ideological persuasion with any stature, much less any charisma. And, based on even the most judicious assessment of the laicization of Italian soci- ety, it seems that only the realm of fantasy could conjur a rightist DC leader who might attract to the party those thousands of voters who no longer accept the religious tenets important to the conservatives of the party. And if some compromise figure, a man of the center with moderate tendencies either right or left, is the final alternative, names are still lacking since none has a sufficient track record to permit predictions. One of several figures who could be cited in such a category would be Roberto Mazzotta, the 40-year-old deputy from Milan. Even if ideas and a formulated policy might be achieved by a party group, the dynamic leadership to carry it forward cannot be so easily devised and is currently nowhere in sight. Another facet of Italian politics that must be weighed is scandal, particularly as it has so often concerned either the DC or its leading figures.' If the DC has or has not had a monopoly on government and political scandal in postwar Italy, the party still seems guilty in many eyes. Even if the most skeptical view is taken, the sheer number and occasional magnitude of DC scandals is nothing short of appalling. One book on the subject, muckraking and sensational as it may be, makes it impossible to reject the fact that malfeasance is an old strain in the DC that has been associated with the party even before 1946. In only the most recent years, Giovanni Leone's forced resignation from the Presidency of the Republic for various '? Here, however, a brief comment is necessary. The Italian public does not simply assume corruption, and hence scandal, is inherent in government; nor do they indifferently tolerate it. The man in the street may seem more cynical or acquiescent than, say, an Ameri- can, but this does not make it axiomatic that he, even as a Latin, accepts unprincipled government as a way of life. Italians do tend to dismiss scandal a bit more rapidly as evidence of human frailty, but political sociologists find this reaction the norm in societies?such as Italy?with a long-accumulated public consciousness of the governing experience. Therefore, the Italians perhaps respond a bit differently, but their sense of ethical outrage in the face of a scandal is very real. Confidential misdeeds, the $2 billion petroleum scandal of 1980, presumed incompetence in earthquake relief in and around Naples in 1980, and the recent P-2 Masonic Lodge scandal all deeply involved the party. These examples also make one wonder when and how Italy, or the DC, will contrive to produce the ultimate scandal. Almost any natural disaster in Italy auto- matically produces a scandalous tale on the DC. The press points out in such instances that the DC first presented a bill to provide relief mechanisms for such disasters in 1951. The bill is still to be approved 30 years later, just another example of DC immobilism. Why does the Italian voter continue to cast his ballot for the DC when, as has occasionally been said, it represents a 35-year Watergate? Progressive accumu- lation of public disapproval undoubtedly does account in some degree for the party's failure to improve at the polls. In reality, what Italians consider the lack of a good alternative has given them no place else to go except to the spoiled ballot or abstention (see appen- dix, pages 125-128). The Italian voting public, though, is certainly sophisticated enough to weigh the relative merits of a corrupt incumbent DC and the potentially duplicitous nature of the PCI, or just protest by abstention or spoiled ballot. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that sooner or later the Italian voter will reject the offenders; what the catalyst will be is impossible to guess. A last element, one always nominally central to the DC as a party of Catholics, concerns the Vatican and its role in the party's future. The shrinkage of the Catholic segment of the electorate and its significance must be juxtaposed to the occupancy of the Holy See by a non-Italian pope. The presence of the first foreign pontiff in well over four centuries is in many ways almost as important for Italy as for the Church. On the other hand, John Paul II assumed his mantle well after fundamental changes had begun in Italy between Church and state. Indeed, since the reign of John XXIII the Vatican has not only been declining, relatively speaking, as a factor in Italian affairs, but 102 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 . the entire relationship has also undergone a continu- ing metamorphosis. Except for issues such as divorce and abortion, pronouncements by the pope or mem- bers of the Curia have progressively been more inter- mittent, one reason being that the Church found? sooner than the DC?that interjecting religion into Italian politics can be counterproductive. But even prior to the death of Pius XII, in the final days of the traditional Church, Italian attitudes toward interven- tion in state matters were changing. Outsiders again have to note that Italians, and particularly Romans, have lived so closely with the passage of popes over the centuries that they long ago developed a certain nonchalance about the Church and its leaders. Never has the average Italian, devout practicing Catholics included, been as subservient or uncritical of his Church as many other nationalities. And today, with the immensely changed and modernized institution? by its own term, the Church is aggiornata (updated)? Italians and the Vatican have a profoundly different view of religion as it relates to politics. If the separa- tion of Church and state in Italy has not yet been legally sanctioned, the practice approaches something comparable. Political activism of Catholic figures in Italy may now, in fact, be leftist and distinctly non- DC, quite often in social spheres. During the long pontificate of Paul VI the Church fitfully but generally drew back from Italian politics, albeit with a few noteworthy exceptions. Still the attitude increasingly was one of benign tolerance or indifference, neither of which militated much to the DC's benefit. When Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla became the first non-Italian pope in centuries, the change meant somewhat less for Italy than for the Vatican. In other words, he was merely one more step in the detachment of the Church from Italian politics. Although John Paul II reiterated the papal view on abortion in the 1981 referendum, not even the attempt on his life four days before the voting had any influence on its outcome. The present Pope certainly is more conservative or traditional than parts of the post-Council Church would like. Still, his experiences in Poland have made him a realist. He may make his views known in terms that are not widely acceptable in Italy, but he has 103 given no indication of any desire to reverse the trend of 20 years of Church-state developments. Nothing suggests that he will do other than accept reality there, albeit with occasional attempts to influence public opinion. In any event, the Roman Catholic Church is no longer an avenue open or willing to place heavy pressure on Italian governments, even in the event of a consummated DC-PCI compromise. Finally, what prognosis may be tendered for the Italian Christian Democrats in 1981? What might reasonably be foreseen for the party if Italy, as increasingly more often is mentioned, were to have an election in the near future? The thrust of this report has sought to indicate less the DC's imminent demise than its fundamentally altered position in the national political spectrum. The party, to state the obvious, is less in control of the nation, as for the first time neither the President nor Prime Minister belongs to the DC. Party leadership is tarnished, aging, and fatigued; its policy orientation and electoral position are shaky. Practicing Catholics committed to the DC are declining in numbers; Catholic youth is moving left; and Church-related support organizations long crucial to party success are slipping into independent courses of their own. Nominally this panorama calls for pessimism. But, be that as it may, Christian Democracy is not in immi- nent danger of rolling over and dying. The party is, and may remain through one or more elections, the largest in Italy. Loss of the premiership is undoubted- ly only temporary, and the Spadolini Cabinet's make- up is a monument to the continuing importance of the DC in government. Its role in and manner of govern- ing cannot, however, be the same again. The sacred images have been shattered; the DC's control of the premiership is no longer invulnerable. Even if the party has other prime ministers, their performance and that of the DC must now produce concrete results or risk another expulsion from the top. Fundamentally the party is master of its own fate, but whether its continuing importance derives from the continued size of its following or from revitalized response to the needs of government will depend on events of the next Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 two or three years. If it fails to shake itself from being a coalition of factions primarily intent on enjoying power, it can never again presume to govern alone, even with benevolent abstentions from other parties. In short, its record will be scrutinized more critically from now on. To what extent might the DC, so as to assure its survival in power, accept some accommodation with the PCI? The potential for variables here is too large to answer with any certainty, but the possibility or even likelihood of a DC-PCI "historic compromise" cannot be ruled out. On levels beneath the national, some such arrangement even seems probable in the not too distant future, now that the Preamble has been dropped. The precedent would certainly have more validity in such a domestic case than would the recent inclusion of Communists in the Mitterrand government of France. The dangers that are presumably implicit in a DC- PCI accommodation are of a far different nature than popularly perceived. Leaving aside the vulnerability of the DC to charges of perfidious betrayal of its heritage, the PCI might well risk even more. The very least either party would have to answer for would be responsibility for inevitably unpopular decisions and possible failure of programs. In short, such an experi- ment might well fall of its own weight on the national or any other level. Another possibility for the Christian Democrats is the intensification of ever-present centrifugal forces at work in the party. This may seem remote, but so did the party's loss of the premiership only a few years ago. In the case of a prolonged absence from the prime ministry or that of a DC-PCI coalition, splin- tering even appears likely. If the prime ministry has now been lost, a key ministry with access to sotto- governo spoils will also perhaps be lost in the future. The resultant reduction of access to power and pa- tronage could cause some elements to split off or simply wither out of existence for lack of their clientelistic bases. A compromise with the PCI, on the other hand, quite probably would drive factions of the DC right into the independence they have always Confidential threatened when hints of such a deal have been dropped. Implications of any splintering have to be viewed in light of what they would do to the DC's strength relative to all other parties. The DC could become less than the nation's largest party with the loss of only a small segment of the electorate. In a similar vein, note must be taken of some general characteristics of Italian voting as they relate to the DC and public opinion. First is the clear evidence in almost all Italian elections since the war of a broader segment of voters casting ballots for parties of the left than those of the right. Exceptions do exist, particu- larly in smaller constituencies such as provinces or communes, but ever since the Constituent Assembly election of 1946 a majority of the nation has voted to the left. This ideological tendency has persisted until the present even if votes continue to be scattered among several groups. Despite this longstanding pat- tern, the consistently right or center-right orientation brought by the DC?notwithstanding the years of presumed "opening to the left" with the PSI?marks a distinction between the majority desire of citizens and the governments that have ruled them. Second, there is a striking constancy of the Italian electorate in giving 75 percent of the vote to DC, PCI, and PSI in almost every election at any level for 35 years. The configuration for potential coalitions has thus been and may yet long remain determined largely by these three parties and the combinations they can devise. Were the PCI to emerge as a truly legitimate alternative, the PSI would become even more pivotal than now; and the small parties' future might become very uncertain. Speculation on possible coalition combinations in such an event suggests interesting turns. In a more finite sense of the present, the size of the vote segment accruing to the major groupings suggests that Italy is primarily a three- party system where only political circumstances have unduly enhanced the role of small parties to make the country exemplary of the dominant party system by default. 104 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 contmential Implications for US Policy What in all this are the implications policymakers might glean for the future? Fundamentally, the pic- ture is relatively clear, and the options are rather few, some perhaps less than palatable. In light of the probable persistence of conditions that require government by coalition, what political allies will the United States have to contemplate as DC partners? The most obviously viable party is the PSI under Bettino Craxi. Here, however, any assumption that future US hopes can be pinned to the PSI, with or without the DC, are probably foolhardy. No matter how optimistic the view?or how fortuitous the events?the PSI has little hope of sustaining the growth essential to making it a real alternative, except as a coalition member. Neither the recent French nor Greek elections of socialist governments seem to augur victory for the PSI. The influence of those events May indeed reflect in Italy, but differences peculiar to Italian politics seem to preclude a socialist victory in the foreseeable future. The PSI has shown vigor and seemingly unusual growth since Craxi became party secretary. However, as the DC discov- ers almost daily, socialist strength depends very much on the whims of this one politician. Without Craxi? whose dominance of the PSI has tolerated no obvious successor?the party's chance of increasing signifi- cantly its current 10-percent share of the national electorate is problematical. Assuming, hypothetically, that Craxi survives the political wars and leads his party to as much as 20 percent of a national vote, his ambitions as well as his abrasive and brittle personal- ity will make him a difficult ally. Nothing precludes 105 also that Craxi might turn to a coalition with the PCI?excluding the DC?if this would make him prime minister. The PSI rank and file certainly has more in common with PCI views than with those of the DC. Speculation on any other combinations?except for the PCI which has been considered above?must include the miniparties and, hence, coalitions with built-in vulnerability. While useful to the DC in the past, such an arrangement at best now promises a fragile and temporary viability. If the DC can be counted on to muddle through and live a while yet as the plurality party (dropping even to 30 to 32 percent), the overall trend of the mass of data presented here for all levels suggests that alternative possibilities must at least be contemplated in the not- too-distant future. There is no clear evidence to indicate that Italy will depart from its normal pace of politics which has been described in this paper in metaphors of geological time. Thus, the stolidity of the election returns does seem to give a certain temporal margin, should the DC take advantage of it. One cannot avoid recognizing, however, how delicate- ly poised the political balance has become, and it can not be ignored that one-third of the voters (the PCI electorate) is knocking harder at the door to power. Recapitulating, the evidence concerning failed efforts at DC renewal and the erosion of support from auxiliary groups, the party's surrogate for its own organization, are showing more and more that a divergence has developed between the public's politi- cal tendencies and the response it has found from the DC. Most telling, perhaps, is the rapid rise of powers in the regional governments and the simultaneous near collapse of traditional DC control of the nation at the grass roots. Fast capture of provincial govern- ments and particularly the largest communal councils by other parties augurs little but ill for the patronage central to DC power. The challenge to the party, Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X6 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 which it has not met to date, is broad and deep. If meeting it is not impossible, the record of the last decade nevertheless indicates that the party has not made the necessary changes either with sufficient alacrity or appropriate appeal. Even if it did accom- plish a turnaround of its fortunes, the price would be rejection of at least some of the fundamental tenets which have determined its nature to date. The myriad peculiarities of Italian politics seem to add up to some kind of Third World sum in today's international scene. The same nation that is placed by all international norms among the leading seven or eight industrial powers of the world is stereotypically conceived of as constantly unstable and thus some- what unreliable. The DC almost certainly must bear responsibility for this image of backwardness despite the contribution it made to national reconstruction after 1945. One can only wonder how long the Italian populace will wait until it forces the DC to answer for its failures. Increasingly critical economic problems in Italy, worsened, if not created, by political shortcom- ings, seem closer than ever to forcing basic changes. The DC squandered Italy's potential for international strength commensurate with its industrial power, a price not easily paid by the country. As the gravity of politically derived problems threatens the domestic scene more directly, the DC will unavoidably be called to account. If and when the electorate decides "to throw the rascals out," it should be no surprise. Some political manifestation of the sentiments of the DC's old following will long be significant in the national political spectrum, but its form and the success it can expect will depend on its leaders' capacity to get back in step with the party's own constituency. Confidential 106 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Appendix National Referendums and Elections for the European Parliament The provision for popular referendums, like the cre- ation of regions, was designed to achieve greater democratization of Italian political life. Article 75 of the Constitution permits a referendum for repeal of any law (with a few excepted categories) upon the demand of either 500,000 voters or five regional councils. The first use of this provision did not occur until some 25 years after adoption of the Constitution, but the outcome of the referendum on divorce in 1974 has become the landmark event of postwar Italian politics. (The one previous referendum, that of June 1946 which abolished the monarchy, predated the Constitution.) After long and acrimonious debate, Parliament voted a law in 1970 that for the first time permitted civil divorce. Passage of the law did not quiet opposition to what Catholics believed was an intolerable interfer- ence with their faith and a challenge to the marriage sacrament. The DC, which had opposed passage of the bill, permitted itself to be drawn into this contro- versy. When enough signatures assured that there would be a referendum on the issue, the party, in effect, submitted itself to a vote of public confidence. If the national election of 1948 is viewed as the high water mark of the DC, the divorce referendum of 12 May 1974 is?to date?its nadir." To an extent the vote can also be interpreted as a public rejection of the Church in public affairs. The initiative tying the DC to the antidivorce position was primarily the respon- siblity of party elder stateman, Amintore Fanfani, who also made it an anti-Communist issue. Shortly before the vote, the Church lined up behind the DC when Pope Paul VI expressed his desire to see the law repealed. Both party and Church, then, submitted themselves to a vote of confidence. The results, an " Some authorities regard the 1975 administrative elections as the DC's postwar low mark because of the party's loss of seats in regional, provincial, and communal councils. 107 overwhelming expression of a desire to maintain the law, became the greatest postwar rebuff by the Italian public of the country's traditional establishment. . As voting day drew near in the spring of 1974, indications were that the prodivorce position would win, but the actual three-fifths majority it achieved was a major surprise. Analyzed by region (see figure A-1), the voting results demonstrate where Catholic and/or DC influence still held some sway. Seven of the 20 regions voted to abolish divorce, including two of the three in the "white" northeast and five in the south. In some of these, however, the margin was paper thin. No region favoring repeal came close to the two-thirds majority scored by the prodivorce forces in six regions of the center and north. But the chinks in the DC's power structure appear even worse than immediately meet the eye when areas long known for their loyalty to the Church are reviewed. For example, even in Catholic Venetia, despite its regional plurality favoring repeal, a majority of its provinces expressed approval of divorce. In Tuscany, the Catholic enclave of Lucca in the Red Belt also favored retention of the law (see table A-1). With this referendum, a clear distinction still shows between traditionalist areas in the south and independent regions of the center and north. There are important exceptions, however; both Sicily and Sardinia voted against the DC stand. Rome itself, by more than two-thirds, indicated its approval of di- vorce. Only 10 of the 95 provincial capitals voted to abolish divorce, all of them south of Naples. If the DC hypothetically could comfort itself with the loyalty of a few of its old centers of strength in 1974, such was not the case in 1981. The referendum on 12 May 1981 seeking to abolish a 1978 law permitting abortion came close to producing a nationwide sweep of regions voting against the DC position. The lesson Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure A-1 Results of Divorce Referendum by Province, 1974 Percent Voting in Favor of Divorce a 0 20 40 60 80 Piemonte Valle d'Aosta Lombardia Veneto Trentino-Alto Adige Friuli-Venezia Giulia Liguria Emilia-Romagna Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio Abruzzi Molise Campania Puglia Basilicata Calabria Sicilia Sardegna Italy Divorce Referendum Results in Selected Provincial Capitals More than 75% in favor: More than 500/0 in favor: Less than 500/0 (opposed) 79.8 Turin 73.7 Milan 60.3 Naples 49.9 Foggia 79.7 Ravenna 73.2 Bologna 59.6 Bari 49.8 Campobosso 79.5 Savona 72.5 Trieste 58.5 Trento 49.3 Macerata 78.3 Livorno 72.4 Bolzano 56.2 Palermo 49.0 Messina 75.9 Alessandria 71.2 Florence 54.9 Verona 48.5 Potenza 75.7 Ferrara 70.8 Venice 50.0 Bergamo 47.4 Avellino 75.6 Genoa 68.1 Rome 44.3 Caserta 75.6 Imperia 66.8 Siracusa 43.7 Isernia 75.1 Terni 64.6 Cagliari 41.6 Benevento 75.1 Modena 63.0 Catania 40.6 Reggio Calabria 75.0 Aosta 61.8 Brescia aPlease note that a vote in favor of the DC and the church. of divorce was a vote against the position 585981 2.82 Confidential of 1974 was at least partially learned by the DC, which did not tie itself so adamantly to the issue as before. The Church, specifically the Pope, did make a strong stand against abortion, but it kept enough distance to avoid the degree of embarrassment in losing that befell it earlier. For DC interests, this was fortunate because the 1981 vote was to an extent a surprise similar to that of 1974. While preelection opinion polls favored the proabortion forces, their victory margin was not predicted to be large. How- ever, when the vote was tallied, 19 of the 20 regions opted to retain abortion (see figure A-2). Only Tren- tino-Alto Adige, by the infinitesimal margin of 0.4 percent, voted for repeal. Victory in one region was scant consolation when juxtaposed to the solid proa- bortion vote of the entire south and the islands. In fact, for the first time in Italian history both north and south voted alike. Regions in the north and center repeated their prodivorce vote with a general increase of some 4 percent in 1981; the south, in changing its position, added 20 percent to its vote on divorce. Even Molise, with 60.3 percent, joined in to make the vote of the whole of the traditionalist south and islands three-fifths or more against positions well known to be held by DC and Church. Whether these two referendums should be taken as evidence of DC erosion across the board is open to question. But they clearly indicate a loss of the party's ability to discipline its supporters in traditionalist regions. Even if the party can still maintain a majority position in many parts of the south, the voters of the area nevertheless have indicated an independence of thought and action unknown heretofore. In short, the results showed continued dramatic decline of the Catholic subculture. Consequently, the DC can no longer assume that its position in traditionalist areas is firm. If the emotionally charged divorce and abortion issues went against the DC, the results on other issues submitted to referendum could possibly be taken as guardedly positive. To be sure, these issues enjoyed enough support in most other parties so that indica- tors for any one party are difficult to distinguish. But since most of the initiatives which were approved had 108 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R0001 00050006-7 Confidential Table A-1 Results of May 1974 Divorce Referendum in Provincial Capitals a Ranked in Order of Vote Favoring Retention of Divorce Bill b Percentage Capital Percentage Capital Percentage Capital 79.84 Turin 68.91 Perugia 55.24 Catanzaro 79.73 Ravenna 68.87 Piacenza 54.90 Verona 79.54 Savona 68.32 Pisa 54.76 Taranto 78.33 Livorno 68.14 Rome 54.66 Rovigo 75.99 Alessandria 67.48 Ancona 54.52 Cosenza 75.79 Ferrara 66.89 Siracusa 53.99 Matera 75.67 Genoa 66.74 Udine 53.95 Ascoli Piceno 75.65 Imperia 65.50 Pordenone 53.75 Lecce 75.13 Terni 65.37 Cremona 53.58 Caltanissetta 75.10 Modena 65.21 Arezzo 53.48 Vicenza 75.05 Aosta 64.63 Cagliari 53.24 Teramo 74.26 Vercelli 64.36 Sassari 53.02 Latina 73.81 La Spezia 64.04 Gorizia 52.93 Lucca 73.73 Milan 63.33 Sondrio 52.68 L'Aquila 73.57 Forli 63.23 Rieti 52.33 Frosinone 73.22 Bologna 63.08 Catania 52.31 Trapani 72.53 Trieste 62.06 Varese 52.06 Ragusa 72.48 Bolzano 61.82 Belluno 52.06 Enna 72.38 Novara 61.81 Brescia 51.40 Chieti 72.18 Mantua 61.75 Pescara 50.97 Salerno 72.07 Asti 60.66 Nuoro 50.02 Bergamo 72.03 Reggio Emilia 60.35 Naples 49.43 Foggia 71.97 Grosseto 59.88 Cuneo 49.86 Campobasso 71.60 Parma 59.82 Treviso 49.33 Macerata 71.23 Florence 59.65 Bari 49.08 Messina 70.89 Venice 59.02 Brindisi 48.56 Potenza 70.58 Pistoia 58.53 Trento 47.49 Avellino 69.72 Siena 57.67 Como 44.59 Agrigento 69.38 Massa Carrara 57.10 Padua 44.31 Caserta 69.34 Pesaro 56.80 Viterbo 43.79 Isernia 68.97 Pavia 56.21 Palermo 41.69 Benevento 40.66 Reggio Calabria a In 1974 Italy had 94 provinces. Regional capitals are shown in boldface. b The wording of the proposition stated, in effect, "I favor repeal of the law permitting divorce." Hence a negative vote favored divorce, and the percentages given in this table are for that negative vote. 109 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Figure A-2 Results of Abortion Referendum by Province, 1981 Percent Voting in Favor of Abortion Piemonte Valle d'Aosta Lombardia Veneto Trentino?Alto Adige Friuli?Venezia Giulia Liguria 0 20 40 60 80 Emilia?Romagna Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio Abruzzi Molise Campania Puglia Basilicata Calabria Sicilia Sardegna Italy The proposition was phrased as follows: YES: I agree to limit abortion to cases of danger to the life and physical health of the woman. NO: I want the present law to be maintained (which permits, among the reasons for an abortion, that it be done within the first 90 days of pregnancy for the psychological health of the woman relative to her social and family condition). 585982 2-82 Confidential Table A-2 Returns of Election in Italy for the European Parliament, June 1979 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC: Christian Democrats 12,753,708 36.45 29 PCI: Communists 10,345,284 29.57 24 PSI: Socialists 3,858,295 11.03 9 PSDI: Social Democrats 1,515,425 4.32 4 PRI: Republicans 895,558 2.56 2 PLI: Liberals 1,270,152 3.63 3 PRad: Radicals 1,283,512 3.67 3 PdUP: Proletarian Unity 406,007 1.16 1 DP: Proletarian Democracy 251,927 0.72 1 MSI-DN: Neo-Fascists and National Right DN-CD: National Right and Constituent of the Right 2,050,234 5.86 4 SVP: South Tyrolean People's Party 196,277 0.56 1 Others 166,194 0.47 0 Total 34,989,573 100.00 81 Voter Turnout 36,170,620 (85.73) been supported originally by the DC, the votes show at least some public approval of the party's stand. Laws tested by referendum in 1978 concerned provi- sion of financial subsidies to political parties and greater government power to maintain public order. In 1981, life imprisonment, the right to bear arms, and broader powers to combat terrorism were all upheld against repeal by a respectable margin. Another major national election in June 1979?for Italy's delegation to the European Parliament?pro- vides additional opportunity to scrutinize DC strength. This vote, the first of its kind, was held one week after the national election for Legislature VIII of Parliament, prompting many observers to express skepticism on voter reaction to a second call to the polls in so short a time. Although the returns of the two elections have a few points of contrast, there is little to suggest that the electorate was reluctant to vote again. In any event, the two elections bear consideration side by side (see table A-2, figure A-3, 110 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 25X Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure A-3 Election Results* for the Italian National Delegation to the European Parliament by Political Region-1979 0 , K-, c 7/6---c-- ? '\ (r-., 'c''' ''''''' c-Y 1. Piemonte 2. Valle d' Aosta 3. Lombardia 4. Trentino-Alto Adige 5. Veneto 6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia 7. Liguria 8. Emilia-Romagna 9. Toscana 10. Umbria 11. Marche 12. Lazio 13. Abruzzi 14. Molise 15. Campania 16. Puglia 17. Basilicata 18. Calabria 19. Sicilia 20. Sardegna 14 Party Vote Percentage Other 'V Socialist 631118 3-82 Christian Democratic Communist *These figures do not include votes from total number of ballots cast. Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. Italian residents abroad which is 0.35 percent or 126,630 of the 111 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-3 European Parliamentary Election Vote Restructured by Chamber of Deputies Districts Percent DC PCI PSI Difference a 1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli 28.16 31.52 11.56 -2.81 2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 39.19 23.56 10.25 -2.16 3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona 29.23 33.87 12.64 -2.93 4. Milan-Pavia 30.52 30.70 13.95 -2.85 5. Como-Sondrio-Varese 41.27 22.17 13.26 -2.33 6. Brescia-Bergamo 50.53 20.67 10.86 -0.53 7. Mantua-Cremona 36.23 33.98 13.59 -1.52 8. Trento-Bolzano 30.80 9.71 7.96 -0.23 9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo 52.68 18.42 10.46 -1.27 10. Venice-Treviso 43.67 23.62 13.59 -0.97 11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone 41.60 21.63 12.42 -0.07 12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 22.97 47.46 9.87 -1.78 13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia 28.92 45.71 10.44 -1.77 14. Florence-Pistoia 26.60 47.07 10.58 -2.51 15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara 30.47 39.76 11.68 -1.96 16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 26.80 47.26 10.99 -1.26 17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli-Picena 36.90 35.90 8.97 -0.98 18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti 29.46 41.19 11.55 -1.67 19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone 33.61 28.86 10.10 -2.89 20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo 45.78 29.18 8.50 +0.13 21. Campobasso-Isernia 52.58 19.38 8.18 -2.15 22. Naples-Caserta 36.74 26.84 10.19 -2.28 23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 46.18 19.65 9.98 -2.39 24. Bari-Foggia 40.11 26.80 9.77 -2.03 25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 43.67 25.67 10.61 -0.05 26. Potenza-Matera 47.70 25.94 10.13 +4.08 27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 40.39 26.63 13.60 -2.33 28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna 40.99 22.13 10.91 -1.41 29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta 41.28 22.28 11.09 -3.96 30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristana 39.41 32.71 8.15 +1.30 31. Valle d'Aosta 17.67 25.00 4.12 32. Trieste 23.21 22.19 5.67 -0.10 a Percent of change in DC vote as compared with that for Chamber election one week earlier. Confidential 112 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 4.-L11111UVIILla1 and tables 13 and 17), and for that reason, the vote for the European Parliament has been recast here as though it were for either the Chamber or Senate in Italy. Total figures for the European parliamentary election show a bit smaller voter turnout than for the Italian Parliament, but the margin between the two leading parties, DC and PCI, varies only slightly. The DC vote was about 2 percent smaller and the PCI 1 percent less than their respective showings one week earlier, with a relatively larger increase for the PSI; the small parties alone showed any noteworthy vari- ation. Changes of significance appear, however, if the vote is structured as though it were a repeat of the Chamber election (see table A-3). While the DC fell in 22 of 32 districts in 1979 compared with 1976, in the second election of June 1979 it fell in 28 districts relative to the vote achieved only a week earlier. However, the decline in eight districts was less than 1 percent. Only districts 26 and 29 (Basilicata and western Sicily), normally areas of DC strength, devi- ated from the general pattern of modest loss. The former, already a party bastion, increased its share to the DC by slightly more than 4 percent, and the latter, also a party stronghold, dropped by a bit less than 4 percent. By restructuring the figures as though they were returns in a Senate election, the DC slump appears once again (see table A-4). Fourteen regions gave the party's candidates less than they had the preceding week. Only in Liguria did the loss exceed 4 percent, and five areas of the south increased their share for the DC. (In neither case can the Valle d' Aosta be compared since no DC list was presented in the national elections of 3 June.) If any knowledge derives from these figures, it possi- bly appears in the relationship of DC returns to voter turnout. In the national parliamentary balloting of 3 June, 90.4 percent of the electorate turned out, 4.7 percent more than voted for the European body. On a 113 Table A-4 Percent Returns of Elections for the European Parliament, June 1979 if Presented as a Senate Election Region DC PCI PSI Difference a 1. Piedmont 31.26 29.28 11.19 -3.75 2. Valle d'Aosta 17.67 25.00 4.18 3. Lombardy 37.24 27.27 13.14 -3.41 4. Trentino-Alto Adige 30.80 9.71 7.96 -2.62 5. Venetia 49.08 20.26 11.68 -2.26 6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia 36.66 22.33 10.75 -1.76 7. Liguria 29.23 33.87 12.64 -4.12 8. Emilia-Romagna 25.48 46.72 10.11 -2:40 9. Tuscany 28.06 44.43 11.08 -2.97 10. Umbria 27.68 43.63 11.57 -2.78 11. Marche 36.90 35.90 8.97 -2.53 12. Lazio 33.80 28.80 10.14 -2.99 13. Abruzzi 45.78 29.18 8.50 -0.57 14. Molise 52.58 19.38 8.13 -0.80 15. Campania 39.97 24.38 10.12 +0.76 16. Puglia 41.72 26.29 10.15 +0.23 17. Basilicata 47.70 25.94 10.18 +3.08 18. Calabria 40.39 26.63 13.60 +0.05 19. Sicily 41.10 22.20 10.99 +0.82 20. Sardinia 39.41 32.71 8.15 -0.22 Note: These figures do not include votes from Italians resident abroad. That total, however, was only 126,630 or 0.35 percent of the total number of ballots cast. a Percent of change in DC vote as compared with that for Senate election one week earlier. national basis, this may suggest that lower participa- tion is more harmful to the DC than others. But, as in the case of all other Italian voting, what significance might derive from this would have to be found in careful comparison of statistics from each district. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 The validity of treating the European Parliament vote in this way is open to question for several reasons. First, the recasting of votes as though they were a Senate contest is artificial in view of the age factor in a normal election for the upper house,'2 whereas this restriction did not apply in the European vote and cannot be calculated. Second, although it cannot be conclusive, this restructuring without the age differ- ential allows some speculation on the voting prefer- ences of the youngest citizens. Using the Senate data, it would appear that younger voters in the north are less disposed to vote for the DC and those in the south more sympathetic to the party. (To make the compari- son, one must take the European vote as restructured for the Senate?where the 18- to 20-year-olds are included?and note that the DC decline is greater than in the true Senate election. This is most easily done with Senate districts such as Liguria, Umbria, Basilicata, and Sardinia which are identical to those of the Chamber, numbers 3, 18, 26, and 30.) Finally, since these were the first elections for the European parliament there is no comparable refer- ence point. In short, this device should be used with caution. On the other hand, the DC from its founding has identified itself firmly with European integration, and this election can be considered as a test of the Italian public's view of the party in that context. If the experiment has some validity, it once again sug- gests DC erosion and provides little reason for opti- mism about the party's future. DC Parliamentary Delegations and the Party's Hold on Power Basically, Christian Democracy's hold on govern- ment?its so-called occupation of power?derives from its representation in the two houses of Parlia- ment. Close examination of the men and women who make up these delegations and of their records pro- vides some interesting insights. First, the senior lead- ership, those who could be classified as DC superstars, are relatively few and are distributed between Cham- ber and Senate. The upper house, it should be empha- sized, is constitutionally equal to the lower, despite the negligible importance sometimes attributed to it. " See footnote 5, page 52. Confidential Nevertheless, in some instances it is a sort of haven for elder statesmen past their prime but far from eclipse. Second, turnover in the makeup of DC parlia- mentary delegations is significant although often overlooked because of the monotonous consistency of their size over many years. A third and less evident development is a slow erosion of DC influence in the various parliamentary commissions, less in number of seats and chairmanships than in the extent to which the DC controls the commissions' activities. None of these other factors alters, though, what is probably the most important of all features of the DC parlia- mentary delegations: the permanence of party figures in certain ministries and under-secretaryships. This is a key factor in the DC's control of government, but its nature is elusive. In terms of DC leadership generally, but particularly in the Chamber, there appear to be two echelons distinguishable to an extent by age and/or length of service?a two-tiered phenomenon of a limited num- ber of superstars and a larger group of lesser stars. At the apex are perhaps 10 to 15 deputies who have served in at least six legislatures. Seven DC deputies, however, have served in every legislature as well as in the Constituent Assembly (see table A-5). Four of these are 65 or older. Only one, Paolo Bonomi, has never been a Cabinet member, but his strength as head of Coldiretti for more than 35 years once gave him more influence than many Cabinet members, particularly in the 1950s when his power rivaled even that of De Gasperi. The other three, Andreotti, Colombo, and Scalfari, held a combined total of 42 Cabinet portfolios over the years, not counting An- dreotti's five times as Prime Minister and the one such term of Colombo. All held assorted appointments also as under secretaries early in their careers. This degree of experience in wielding power distinguishes them from literally hundreds of other DC legislators who on occasion have held Cabinet offices. Compara- ble figures for the Senate's DC elder statesmen, such as Scelba, Rumor, and Fanfani, show an overwhelm- ing power role for a relatively few figures. In any event, the composite of a few such elite careers again belies the argument that Italy is unstable. 114 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-5 Seniority of Christian Democratic Deputies, VIII Legislature Names Number of DC Members Number of All Deputies Who Have Served in All Legislatures Constituent Assembly and eight Legislatures Andreotti, Bonomi, Caiati, Colombo, Gui, Scalfaro, Zaccagnini 7 14 Eight Legislatures Micheli, Sedati 2 7 Seven Legislatures L. M. Galli, Gaspari, Giglia 3 7 Six Legislatures Cavaliere, Cossiga, Forlani, Fusaro, Gioia, Gullotti, Lattanzio, La Penna, Malfatti, Misasi, Pennacchini, F. Piccoli, Pucci, Radi, V. Russo, Scalia, Scarlato, Sinesio, Tantalo 19 25 Five Legislatures Armato, Arnaud, Azzaro, Bassi, Bianchi, Bova, Bressani, Degan, Dell'Andro, De Mita, Evangelisti, Laforgia, Lettieri, M. E. Martini, Piccinelli, Ruffini, Salvi, G. Urso 18 34 Beneath this august level of DC capi storici (historic leaders) is another group, both younger and more numerous, which constitutes an entrenched echelon on its own. Two of these who have recently been Prime Minister and seem headed into the top tier are Cossiga and Forlani. But more characteristic of the group are figures like Gullotti, Lattanzio, Malfatti, Evangelisti, and even Tina Anse1mi and Maria Eletta Martini. In all instances they are people who have served in the Chamber continuously since at least 1963, individuals who not infrequently give the im- pression of greater concern for party interests and tenure of power than for national or constituent concerns. Significant as this group is to the party, its presence and longevity in office have caused many ambitious younger DC deputies to feel that access to the highest tiers is blocked for them. 115 In effect, then, this next part of the hierarchy, made up of perhaps 35 to 50 people, appears as the next-to- the-top layer of a pyramid. The base level consists of a much larger group of deputies that rotates into and out of the Chamber for one or two terms. While this revolving mass is often granted a portion of the spoils of office holding?an under secretary's post or ap- pointment to one of the lesser ministries?the likeli- hood for advancement and thus of leadership renewal in the higher circles is rather limited. The avenues of entry into the top two layers are a combination of long service on lower levels of the DC or in its auxiliary support groups, plus a considerable degree of subservi- ence or conformity to the views of the elite and loyal adherence to one's own faction. One example of success appears to be Angelo Lobianco, now in his Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential fourth term as deputy and the newly elected head of the major rural support force of the party, Coldiretti. On the other hand, Milanese deputy Massimo de Carolis, seems to epitomize the promising future star who suddenly burned out. As the top votegetter for the DC in northern Italy in 1976, de Carolis seemed to presage a new and younger generation rising in the party, but in 1979 his preference votes dropped dramatically. De Carolis consistently refuses to play by the rules and has not followed any faction, and his individual initiatives, which smack of great personal ambition, make him less attractive as a good ally for the old guard. The recent inclusion of his name on the membership lists of the P-2 Masonic Lodge has probably completed his exclusion from future power in the party. In general, regarding deputies who might rise in the party, the younger group is essentially rightist in orientation but not well in step with the old hierarchy. At present renewal possibilities for the leadership are not immediately evident. The view toward the left wing of the party is more grim with no leadership figure of any seeming promise. After at least seven years of party commitments to renewal, therefore, the outlook is bleak. Younger leaders and women in particular are factors that could appeal to the contemporary Italian elector- ate and the DC should consider them for party renewal as well as continued delegation strength. And in both areas the DC's position is not entirely nega- tive. As regards young and new blood, particularly with the lowered voting age, widely heard criticism about the aging of the DC does not hold up as far as delegation age is considered (see figure A-4). Conven- tional wisdom in Italy in the last few years has asserted that the DC has an older group in Parliament than, say, the PCI. The attached chart shows that in Legislature VIII this is not the case. Although the PCI has a slight edge in the group under 35, there is almost no difference between the two delegations for those aged 35 to 54. And as far as the preferences of younger voters are concerned, the positions a deputy takes on issues are doubtless more important than his age. Confidential Table A-6 Women in Parliament 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Elected to the Senate DC PCI PSI PLI SI a 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 2 0 1 2 7 2 8 8 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 Elected to the Chamber of Deputies DC PCI PSI 18 12 21 16 3 3 11 11 8 8 9 9 11 15 9 17 39 37 3 1 0 1 1 1 a Sinistra Indipendente. In the matter of women, certainly quite important for the DC when the female population makes up so much of its electorate, the record is rather different. Although the DC has supported some women as candidates for the Chamber and Senate, the party's roster of elected women is far smaller than that of the PCI (see table A-6). In fact, from an alltime high of 18 DC women elected to the Chamber in 1948, the number has fallen to 9 in the present legislature and its predecessor. Meanwhile the PCI as of mid-1981 is only two short of its alltime high of 39. The extent to which women's candidacies influence the electorate is perhaps exaggerated by some Italian observers, al- though Italian women have recently become far more independent and articulate, particularly for a Latin and Mediterranean nation. Another element of significance for a deputy, particu- larly in Italy's form of proportional representation, is the preference vote he achieves (see tables A-7 and A-8). To an extent this vote indicates the party's degree of support for individual candidates, but also it can be a measure of the public's feelings for them. The importance of these performances is, however, 116 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Uommenual Figure A-4 Relative Ages of Parliamentary Delegations: DC, PCI, and PSI, 1948-79 Number of Persons in a Delegation by Age Group, Percent of Total Delegation, and Party Key o Christian Democrats 0 PCI PSI 50 100 150 1948 574 (total) 306 25-34 14.38 28.78 15.68 I I 29.41 28.03 I 132 35-44 23.53 39.22 35.61 I 45-54 31.38 14.70 I 5.31 i] 55-64 23.53 2.29 j_j 2.27 ] 65-74 5.88 75+ 1953 11.83 20.28 ,I 590 25-34 12.00 262 31.68 I 32.87 I 143 35-44 25.33 35.50 31.46 45-54 22.67 17.18 I 13.99 55-64 29.33 3.81 0.70 65-74 10.67 0.70 75+ 1958 10/5 8.57 jj 596 25-34 20.24 273 37.36 i 47.86 I 140 35-44 32.15 33.70 I 25.71 I 45-54 19.05 17.22 16.43 - 1 55-64 15.47 1.47 IA3 1 65-74 11.90 75+ 1.19 1963 3.85 3.62 -1- 630 25-34 2.30 260 40.00 I 54.82 166 35-44 54.02 34.62 25.90 45-54 24.14 18.07 I 13.86 I 55-64 11.49 3.46 .20] 65-74 5.75 0.60 75+ 2.30 Notes: I. A candidate must be 25 years of age or older on the date of elections to be eligible to become a member of the Chamber of Deputies. 2. In the 1968 elections, PSI and PSDI presented a common ticket under the label PSU (United Socialist Party). 0 50 100 150 1968 630 25-34 3/9 265 34.71 -, 36.26 i 171 35-44 32.97 41.13 -- 49.71 45-54 46.15 1 18.11 9.35 55-64 12.09 3.03 1 2.34 1 65-74 4.40 0.59 75+ 1.10 1972 3.39 8.00 630 25-34 4.92 266 28.57 29.72 175 35-44 31.15 43.23 53.71 45-54 44/6 21.43 7.43111 55-64 14.75 3.0! .54] 65-74 3.28 0.37 75+ 1.64 1976 9.92 630 25-34 3.51 262 26.34 222 35-44 28.07 49.24 46.85 45-54 45.61 .1 11.07 12.16 55-64 17.55 3.43 045 65-74 3.51 5.45 75+ 1.75 1979 5.36 630 25-34 9.68 261 29.89 ._ _ 3M34 201 35-44 35.48 43.68 40.30 45-54 32.26 _. 18.77 17.91 55-64 16.13 2.30 j 2.49 i 65-74 4.84 0.50 75+ 1.61 3 Figures in this chart are based on a study Because of certification practices used in Italian published by the Italian parliament's Office of electoral procedures, the total number of Statistical and Documentary Services. Each deputies in a party's delegation can change in deputy's age isdetermined by how old he/she the first weeks of a session. Hence the size of was on the day when the first meeting of the each party group may vary slightly from figures new legislature to which he/she was elected given elsewhere in this report. occurred. 585983 2-82 117 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-7 Preference Votes for Leading Christian Democratic Deputies a 1968 1972 1976 1979 Giulio Andreotti 252,369 367,235 191,573 302,745 Vincenzo Scotti 61,339 80,164 68,923 210,911 Luigi Ciriaco de Mita 65,231 127,876 112,792 169,431 Vito Lattanzio 120,857 134,911 101,627 151,361 Attilio Ruffini 46,385 93,032 109,555 144,614 Francesco Cossiga 102,814 94,855 178,124 136,383 Antonio Gaya 96,676 100,877 134,053 Antonino Gullotti 91,308 126,231 127,713 128,580 Remo Gaspari 141,927 136,022 91,168 120,452 Gerardo Bianco 57,117 83,188 90,425 117,112 Vincenzo Russo 69,072 104,410 78,764 110,294 Antonino Drago 113,070 78,656 91,087 110,151 Giuseppe Caroli 48,216 76,232 79,743 108,629 Paolo Cirino Pomicino 79,546 105,856 Giuseppe Gargani 54,867 76,511 105,735 Arcangelo Lobianco 74,342 97,561 113,380 105,351 Giuseppe Sinesio 73,135 121,961 107,674 104,706 Arnaldo Forlani 77,333 156,949 177,905 102,969 Giovanni Amabile 58,929 101,092 Calogero Mannino 83,006 100,060 Ellipsis indicates that the individual was not a candidate. a These 20 deputies are ranked according to their showing in the general elections of 1979 and are all the DC candidates receiving more than 100,000 preference votes. questionable because no pattern seems to fit a signifi- cant number of individual careers. On the other hand, a steadily declining preference vote must be regarded as ominous, a portent of possible impending defeat. One of the charts shown here gives the record of the 20 highest DC preference votegetters in 1979 and their levels in three preceding elections. Table A-9 demonstrates the same figures for that group of DC deputies that appears generally to constitute the party's "establishment" today, the stars and super- stars. From the latter, such figures as Gerardo Bianco, Luigi Ciriaco de Mita, Filippo Maria Pan- dolfi, Vincenzo Scotti, and others would appear to be Confidential Table A-8 DC Chamber of Deputies Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979 a More than 100,000 20 90,000-99,999 80,000-89,999 70,000-79,999 60,000-69,999 50,000-59,999 40,000-49,999 30,000-39,999 20,000-29,999 Fewer than 20,000 10 (first election to Chamber: 2) 16 (first election to Chamber: 4) 17 (first election to Chamber: 5) 31 (first election to Chamber: 7) 28 (first election to Chamber: 3) 38 (first election to Chamber: 9) 59 (first election to Chamber: 17) 36 (first election to Chamber: 11) 3 a Of the newly elected deputies in 1979, 10 were last on their party list, nine were next to last; only one (Casini in District 14, Florence- Pistoia) led his ticket. rising in importance. Others such as Gian Aldo Arnaud, Emilio Colombo, Andrea Borruso, and Fran- co Salvi, seem to be declining, a conclusion which may not be valid. In essence, while these votes can be exploited for influence, a deputy's power-once he is established-is not necessarily critically measured by them. A number of improved preference vote stand- ings would seem to validate a certain resuscitation of the DC in 1979 compared to 1976. Again, though, no evidence exists to demonstrate that this is of any great significance. Finally, a point must be made concerning the DC delegation's changes of personnel in 1976 and 1979. If the party managed to hold almost exactly the same number of seats in both elections, the earlier case was curious in that, poor though the overall party record may have been, 74 new deputies were elected. In short, if the electorate in 1976 was, on the one hand, not demonstrating disapproval by the number of DC deputies it elected, it was at least willing to return a number of new faces, in a sense to permit a kind of re- newal. The return of 60 new people in 1979 apparent- ly confirms a continuation of this feeling. Behind the general picture, however, seems to lie a deeper mal- aise: that deputies may be renewed but the party 118 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-9 Preference Votes for Selected DC Deputies, 1968-79 1968 1972 1976 1979 1968 1972 1976 1979 Giulio Andreotti 252,369 367,235 191,593 302,745 Antonio Gaya 96,676 100,877 134,053 Tina Anse1mi 40,467 38,389 74,403 77,944 Giovanni Gioia b 77,869 123,381 111,037 90,939 Gian Aldo Arnaud 60,608 77,916 54,211 29,538 Luigi Gui 58,768 61,327 c 46,999 Gerardo Bianchi 57,117 83,188 90,425 117,112 Antonino Gullotti 91,308 126,231 127,713 128,580 Guido Bodrato 30,326 39,935 43,890 46,101 Vito Lattanzio 120,857 134,911 101,627 151,361 Paolino Bonomi 145,875 154,966 119,653 89,160 Franco Maria Malfatti 59,638 70,746 49,110 46,458 Andrea Borruso ... 107,829 33,249 Vincenzo Mancini 56,536 74,204 67,553 91,990 Manfredi Bosco 98,312 117,977 86,379 95,777 Filippo Maria Pandolfi 41,439 49,476 67,448 85,864 Bartolomeo Ciccardini 48,476 64,599 96,749 55,774 Flaminio Piccoli 54,256 84,378 37,402 41,800 Emilio Colombo 103,322 118,118 90,420 90,818 Virginio Rognoni 24,918 40,380 30,903 89,313 Francesco Cossiga 102,814 94,855 178,124 136,383 Liugi Rossi di Montelera ... 142,227 81,236 Clelio Darida 57,446 a 74,855 59,468 Attilio Ruffini 46,385 93,032 109,555 144,614 Massimo De Carolis ... 151,555 86,219 Vincenzo Russo 69,072 104,410 78,764 110,194 Costante Degan 34,122 42,325 56,533 52,450 Franco Salvi 44,453 40,626 52,983 39,401 Luigi Ciriaco De Mita 65,231 127,876 112,792 169,431 Oscar Luigi Scalfaro 92,979 114,187 87,459 56,815 Franco Evangelisti 52,216 89,731 63,805 93,206 Vito Scalia 115,336 d 96,608 70,142 Arnaldo Forlani 77,333 156,949 177,905 102,969 Vincenzo Scarlato 82,632 113,407 95,138 89,390 Franco Foschi 50,651 58,843 60,396 57,063 Vincenzo Scotti 61,339 80,164 68,923 210,911 Carlo Fracanzani 38,689 57,623 51,623 38,761 Giuseppe Sinesio 73,135 121,961 107,674 104,706 Giovanni Galloni 66,303 75,805 74,029 74,386 Benigno Zaccagnini 37,866 39,444 101,911 67,673 Remo Gaspari 141,927 136,022 91,168 120,452 Giuseppe Zamberletti 47,523 38,233 68,637 65,257 Ellipsis indicates that the individual was not a candidate. a Darida resigned his Chamber seat in 1969 to become mayor of Rome, a post he held until 1976. b Gioia died 27 November 1981. c In 1976 Gui ran for and was elected to the Senate. d Scalia resigned from the Chamber in 1969 to devote himself to activities in CISL. He did not run again for the Chamber until 1976. consistently fails to create the comparable revitaliza- tion of ideals and actions necessary for it to hold its own. This is the rinnovamento which has now eluded the DC for seven years. As concerns the Senate-where the size of the DC delegation increased in 1979 for the first time since 1968, despite a smaller share of the raw vote-the delegation is distinguished by the presence of such ex- greats as Mario Scelba and Mariano Rumor, not to mention the party's one senator-for-life, Amintore 119 Fanfani, who has been president of the Senate since 1968. Certainly this delegation, if perhaps more dis- tinguished because of the accomplishments of its members, is slightly less influential than that in the Chamber. Carlo Donat Cattin, who moved up to the Senate from the Chamber in 1979, is one of today's principal faction leaders. Other DC leaders who are also Senators are Giovanni Marcora, Vittorino Co- lombo, and Luigi Granelli. But one former DC pre- mier and president of the Republic, Giovanni Leone, Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-10 Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote a 1968 1972 1976 1979 Marino Carboni (Lazio: Rome 6) b 65,294 146,713 (percent of turnout) 50.10 33.25 Giovanni Marcora (Lombardy: Vimercate) 97,299 100,723 103,528 105,341 (percent of turnout) 46.39 44.13 41.91 40.55 Vittorino Colombo (Lombardy: Monza) c (70,676) (81,923) 100,876 99,680 (percent of turnout) 40.00 38.38 Enzo Berlanca (Lombardy: Clusone) 96,773 (percent of turnout) 59.34 Luigi Carraro (Venetia: Cittadella) d 84,877 91,119 96,368 96,715 (percent of turnout) 64.12 64.74 63.76 61.55 Gian Pietro Rossi (Lombardy: Busto Arsizio) 99,497 96,580 (percent of turnout) 42.61 40.38 Vittorino Colombo (Venetia: Verona I) 95,127 95,619 (percent of turnout) 47.03 46.33 Fermo Mino Martinazzoli (Lombardy: Brescia) 84,749 90,708 90,137 (percent of turnout) 43.43 44.44 43.27 Vincenzo Bombardieri (Lombardy: Treviglio) 88,801 89,487 (percent of turnout) 55.38 53.25 Mariano Rumor (Venetia: Vicenza) (168,828) (266,710) (73,279) 88,028 (percent of turnout) 53.73 Carlo Donat Cattin (Piedmont: Pinerolo) (43,660) (72,024) (50,357) 86,311 (percent of turnout) 35.51 Angelo CasteIli (Lombardy: Bergamo) (33,246) (38,838) 90,812 85,947 (percent of turnout) 57.58 53.62 Aristide Marchetti (Lombardy: Varese) (45,685) (30,948) 88,457 85,085 (percent of turnout) 39.42 37.09 Delio Giacometti (Venetia: Schio) 84,941 84,919 (percent of turnout) 60.24 58.80 Pietro Schiano (Venetia: Padua) 88,574 84,643 (percent of turnout) 48.68 45.77 Luigi Granelli (Lombardy: Cantu) (47,047) (50,929) (35,965) 83,930 (percent of turnout) 45.18 Guido GoneIla (Venetia: Verona Collina) (55,992) 77,958 82,949 83,130 (percent of turnout) 59.97 59.99 58.36 Alessandro Codazzi (Venetia: Treviso) 82,619 81,657 (percent of turnout) 55.61 53.47 Mario Costa (Lazio: Latina) 70,192 77,444 81,554 (percent of turnout) 38.40 38.13 38.38 Ellipsis indicates individual was not a candidate. NOTE: Senators nominally represent a region, but they are elected in districts within the region. Each party may present a minimum of three candidates in a region but no more than the equivalent number of regional districts. Each voter may vote for only one candidate. The tally is made by counting votes for each candidate and, in turn, calculating that figure as a percentage of the total valid votes cast, thus determining personal preference. According to seats assigned to the district, the victors are determined on their percentage of the total. For example, in Rome 6 in 1979, 441,194 valid votes were cast, 146,713 (33.25 percent) of which were for Marino Carboni, the highest single total in the district. Confidential a This table shows the 19 DC senators who received more than 80,000 votes in 1979. Numbers in parentheses are for an individual's vote when elected to the Chamber of Deputies in preceding legislatures. b Senator Carboni died 29 December 1979. In 1976 he was elected to the Senate from Puglia. c In 1976 Colombo opted for a seat in the Senate although he was si- multaneously elected to the Chamber from District 4 (Milan-Pavia) with 59,122 votes. d Carraro died 8 November 1980. e In 1979 Donat Cattin was elected to the Chamber from District 1 (Turin-Novara-Vercelli) with 41,619 votes but opted for the Senate. 120 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uommential Table A-11 Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Personal Preference Vote a Percent (except where indicated) 1968 1972 1976 1979 Antonio Bisaglia (Venetia: Bassano del Grappa) (74,577) (138,241) (103,819) 62.27 Luigi Carraro (Venetia: Cittadella) b 64.12 64.74 63.76 61.55 Enzo Berlanca (Lombardy: Clusone) 59.34 Tarcisio Salvaterra (Trentino-Alto Adige: Mezzolombardo) 60.58 58.07 Delio Giacometti (Venetia: Schio) . . . 60.24 58.80 Guido Gonella (Venetia: Verona Collina) (55,992) 59.97 59.99 58.36 Mario Pedini (Lombardy: Chiari) (55,467) (76,339) 55.40 54.43 Mariano Rumor (Venetia: Vicenza) (168,828) (266,710) (73,729) 53.73 Angelo Castelli (Lombardy: Bergamo) (33,246) (38,838) 57.58 53.62 Alessandra Codazzi (Venetia: Treviso) 55.61 53.47 Vincenzo Bombardieri (Lombardy: Treviglio) 55.38 53.25 Angelo Pavan (Venetia: Vittorio Veneto-Montebelluna) 53.05 Domenico Raffaello Lombardi (Molise: Campobasso-Isernia) . . . 51.79 52.46 Luciano Dal Falco (Venetia: Verona Pianura) 45.10 47.59 52.31 52.07 Onorio Cengarle (Venetia: Este) 66.68 . 70.42 . 65.77 . 51.62 Giacomo Mazzoli (Lombardy: Breno) 55.09 66.68 . 53.21 51.61 Errico D'Amico (Abruzzi: Lanciano Vasto) . 49.49 51.20 Adolfo Sarti (Piedmont: Alba) (63,422) 51.90 54.18 50.62 Osvaldo Di Lembo (Molise: Larino) 50.14 Adriano Bompiani (Abruzzi: Chieti) 46.53 50.11 Ellipsis indicates individual was not a candidate. NOTE: See explanatory note on table of Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote for key to determining a candidate's preferential vote. In this table, for example, the district of Bassano del Grappa had 124,343 valid votes cast in 1979, of which 77,435 (62.27 percent) went to Antonio Bisaglia. a This table shows the 20 DC senators, in order of preference, who achieved more than 50 percent of the vote cast in their districts. Numbers in parentheses are for an individual's vote when elected to the Chamber of Deputies in preceding elections. b Senator Carraro died 8 November 1980. . When a candidate achieves 65 percent or more of the vote in his dis- trict, he is proclaimed as elected by quorum. No other candidates can be elected in any district where this occurs. now styles himself as an "independent." In fact, having been driven from the Quirinale by scandals prior to the end of his term, Leone is hardly a figure from whom the DC wants support, nor is he likely to give it after being sacrificed-he feels-by men who were no cleaner than he. In any event, from the party's viewpoint Leone is now a nonperson. 121 As in the case of the Chamber, the Senate's elections help measure the strength of DC candidates (see tables A-10 to A-12). Senate elections are more complex. But given the different modes of Chamber and Senate districting and election, large personal preference votes tend to produce winners in those areas where the population is largest. For the Senate Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-12 DC Senate Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979 More than 100,000 90,000 to 99,999 80,000 to 89,999 70,000 to 79,999 60,000 to 69,999 50,000 to 59,999 40,000 to 49,999 30,000 to 39,999 20,000 to 29,999 Less than 20,000 2 6 11 (first election to Senate: 3) 8 (first election to Senate: 2) 13 (first election to Senate: 2) 30 (first election to Senate: 9) a 39 (first election to Senate: 9) 23 (first election to Senate: 7) 7 (first election to Senate: 4) 1 Personal Preference Vote More than 60 percent 50.0 to 59.9 percent 40.0 to 49.9 percent 30.0 to 39.9 percent Less than 30.0 percent 2 (first election to Senate: 1) 19 (first election to Senate: 4) a 55 (first election to Senate: 9) a 61 (first election to Senate: 21) 3 (first election to Senate: 1) a Includes senators replacing deceased members. delegation, however, comparative records cannot be compiled for even as many as four legislatures be- cause only about half of the top votegetters have been in the Senate that long. As in the case of the Chamber, though, these statistics do not necessarily reflect any apparent position of power or influence on the part of the individual DC Senators. Between the two lists, on the other hand, there is with the Senate a slightly greater likelihood that figures of known politi- cal clout, such as Antonio Bisaglia or Giovanni Mar- cora, will be found. Mixed in with them are other DC Senators whose stature is not outstanding. These statistics, for the Chamber or the Senate, have at best only a relative value. They indicate the rise or fall of various DC office seekers in the eyes of the electorate, and politicians like to attach importance to good showings; but their value for establishing a candidate's power in the party is limited. Confidential Ultimately, the question has to be raised of where or what is the true base of the DC's hold on government. The answer appears to be almost deceptively simple and potentially easy to overlook: the DC's longstand- ing ability to maintain key ministries (see figure A-5). This has been achieved?unbroken in a few instances since 1945?by the endless grip of the DC on the office of minister or under secretary. The fruits in the lush patronage vineyards of sottogoverno thus assure a lasting bounty of influence. The full significance of continued DC control in certain ministries is not always obvious. Cases in point are the Ministries of Public Instruction, Post and Telecommunications, and State Participations. In the first instance, with extensive control over schools from elementary to university level, the Minister has a potential monopoly or predominant influence over curriculum content as well as the teacher corps and, in one way or another, is able to inject political criteria into the educational establishment. Erosion of DC power in this area is a bit less evident than in some others, but as regional governments have come into operation and assumed some functions in the school system, the party has experienced a decline in influence because its role in several of the regions has been, at best, peripheral. And in the case of long and noisy demands for school reforms, such as occurred between 1968 and 1970, the DC's ability to remain immobile has worked to obstruct publicly desired changes the party thought detrimental to its views. Post and Telecommunications not only controls the mails and telephone and telegraph systems but, more importantly, manages information such as the state radio and television networks, RAI (Radiotelevisione Italiana). Until a very few years ago, radio and TV were a government monopoly, and ever since removal of that control, specific networks or channels are known as party mouthpieces, either DC or leftist (PCI and PSI). RAI-TV's first channel and radio's second program are still known as DC preserves. The break- ing of that state monopoly?tantamount to breaking what was regarded as a DC hammerlock?knocked another stone out of the wall of the party's power structure. 122 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential With its overseer's role for the vast network of state- managed industries and holding companies, State Participations clearly is a cornucopia of spoils as well as a potential and frequently exploited source of financial contributions to the DC itself. The virtually constant DC tenure of these three Ministries is shown on figure A-5 for the full span of the party's governments. If these three portfolios have a vital and not too subtle meaning in domestic affairs, other major ministries such as Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Agri- culture also have been almost permanent preserves of the party. The triad of economic ministries, Treasury, Finance, and Budget, has also been managed in such fashion as to assure permanent DC "occupation of power." Particular note ought to be paid to the tenure of DC figures in first-echelon ministries. Examples of promi- nent DC figures who have starred in various minis- tries include Taviani and Andreotti (Defense), Emilio Colombo (12 times at the Treasury), Marcora (Agri- culture), Bo and Bisaglia (State Participations), Gui and Malfatti (Public Instruction), and Rognoni (Inte- rior). Also not to be overlooked are the longtime DC under secretaries, some of whom have held office as many as eight consecutive terms. Indeed, the trade of a ministerial post to a coalition ally has rarely cost the DC its control of that portfolio when the under secretary(ies) stayed through one government after another. These phenomena, while describing a certain stagna- tion in government, are supplemented by yet another element suggesting stability in Italy comparable to that in the United States. Since de Gasperi's first government in 1945, when Truman had been Presi- dent less than a year, Italy had only 10 prime ministers until the summer of 1981 when the first postwar non-DC premier took office. In the same period, eight men were President of the United States. American chief executives, however, came from two parties; all the Italian heads of government were from only one, the DC. Furthermore, two of them (Segni and Leone) became head of state as well. If the 123 systems of government are sufficiently different to raise questions on the validity of this comparison, the fact remains that some of the premiers of Italy have had a greater composite time in office than some US presidents since the war. In conclusion, the impression is almost overwhelming that DC control of the Italian Government has been extensive, intensive, and pervasive for more than a third of a century. Not only did the practice devel- op?broken only a few months ago?that the DC should always hold either the premiership or the presidency, but the party also has consistently main- tained a large bloc of members in both houses of Parliament. On the other hand, the influence and relative importance of particular DC figures has been diverse, and a notably small number has occupied a majority of the most powerful and influential posts of government for years on end. Even if this may be viewed as the prerogative of the majority party in a democracy, the practice has appeared frequently to large segments of public opinion as the flouting of representative principles. Without doubt the DC's exercise of power as expressed in tenure of the ministries seems quite out of line with the proportion of votes it received. Its occupation of power lamented by other parties, occasionally in strident tones, has been the target of DC figures themselves who felt they were being excluded. Hence, DC rule of Italy has by any definition been that of an oligarchy?even within the party itself. If oligarchy has been a typically Italianate form of government for centuries, there remains the assump- tion common to many Italians that their republican regime was supposed to be something different. Even if there were not seemingly endemic scandal associat- ed with DC rule, it should be no surprise if large parts of the Italian public are today cynical about their national government. The earlier credit an idealist might say was due the DC for its achievement of a new policy in Italy after World War II has, by 1981, been largely offset by cynicism. Such feelings, which derive unavoidably from DC conduct, benefit neither nation nor party. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-13 Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Eight-Year Average 1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli 98.19 95.21 96.34 95.98 95.33 95.64 96.78 94.87 96.04 2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 97.60 93.91 96.01 95.59 95.38 95.53 95.97 93.96 95.49 3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia- Savona 98.20 96.07 96.92 96.78 96.12 96.95 97.55 95.76 96.79 4. Milan-Pavia 98.50 96.88 97.41 97.17 96.84 97.11 97.73 96.97 97.33 5. Como-Sondrio-Varese 97.75 94.95 97.12 96.96 96.47 96.25 96.95 95.49 96.49 6. Brescia-Bergamo 97.90 95.19 97.27 96.88 96.69 96.99 97.40 96.17 96.81 7. Mantua-Cremona 97.83 95.52 97.45 97.15 96.71 97.00 97.50 96.24 96.93 8. Trento-Bolzano 98.32 96.82 98.02 97.10 97.25 96.52 97.32 96.26 97.20 9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza- Rovigo 98.13 96.12 97.32 97.14 97.07 97.09 97.44 96.33 97.09 10. Venice-Treviso 97.85 94.89 96.85 96.94 96.78 96.97 97.52 96.57 96.80 11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia- Pordenone 97.52 94.09 97.01 96.94 96.64 96.92 97.24 96.22 96.57 12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna- Forli 98.28 96.66 97.28 97.32 96.97 97.69 98.11 97.53 97.48 13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza- Reggio Emilia 97.96 95.14 96.79 96.73 96.67 97.08 97.58 98.68 96.83 14. Florence-Pistoia 97.78 96.51 97.06 96.97 96.72 97.05 97.91 96.49 97.06 15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca- Massa Carrara 97.64 94.78 96.85 96.72 96.01 96.82 97.47 95.91 96.53 16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 97.76 95.04 96.94 97.21 96.83 98.46 97.94 97.06 97.16 17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata- Ascoli Piceno 97.94 95.19 97.14 96.93 96.32 96.69 97.23 95.73 96.65 18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti 97.04 94.37 96.80 96.58 96.27 97.13 97.64 96.66 96.56 19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo- Frosinone 98.58 96.44 97.78 97.70 97.06 97.59 97.92 97.46 97.57 20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti - Teramo 97.82 95.57 96.99 96.82 96.65 97.16 97.31 95.79 96.76 21. Campobasso-Isernia 97.18 93.92 96.17 94.94 95.01 96.16 96.31 95.18 95.61 22. Naples-Caserta 97.69 95.15 97.27 97.16 96.87 97.00 97.36 96.40 96.86 23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 97.27 94.05 96.85 95.98 96.31 96.63 96.80 94.42 96.04 24. Bari-Foggia 97.97 95.34 97.81 97.45 97.05 97.03 96.99 96.33 97.00 25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 97.30 93.26 97.37 97.02 96.73 96.76 97.01 96.09 96.44 26. Potenza-Matera 96.14 94.24 96.60 95.31 95.55 96.42 96.27 94.79 95.67 27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 96.99 93.06 96.68 95.98 95.54 96.22 96.31 95.30 95.76 28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa- 97.37 95.12 97.26 96.34 95.22 95.88 96.21 92.49 95.74 Ragusa-Enna 29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento- 97.14 94.66 97.10 96.25 93.67 95.82 95.92 94.70 95.66 Caltanissetta 30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro- 97.64 96.31 97.63 97.77 96.58 96.90 97.75 95.89 97.06 Oristano 31. Valle d'Aosta 93.40 93.97 96.05 94.96 94.78 91.70 94.61 91.14 93.83 32. Trieste a 98.29 97.90 95.96 97.21 97.96 97.06 97.40 Italy 97.82 95.36 97.13 96.83 96.36 96.79 97.26 96.01 96.70 a Trieste became a part of Italy in October 1954. Confidential 124 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential The DC and the Italian Electorate In most representative political systems it is standard practice to measure public protest sentiments by the ratio of eligible voters who turn out for elections and the number who deliberately cast invalid ballots. In Italy the attention devoted to these phenomena is considerable, more than factual evidence seems to justify. Still, no election occurs in Italy without floods of journalistic post mortems which consistently find that abstentions or spoiled ballots appear in such quantity as to indicate public discontent with govern- ment and, inferentially, varying degrees of annoyance with the DC. Italian electoral behavior is sufficiently atypical as to complicate analysis of this pattern, but the repeated attention given to it requires that it be examined. Among industrialized Western democracies Italy has set an unparalleled record of high voter participation. More than 90 percent of eligible voters have partici- pated in each of the eight national elections since 1948, and the overall average turnout for all elections to both Chamber and Senate is 92.81 percent (see tables 22 and 23). The ratio of valid ballots has never fallen below 95.36 percent for the Chamber and 94.67 percent for the Senate (see tables A-13 to A-16). In the times that elections have been held for the 15 regular statute regions the record is almost as high. Provincial and communal elections demonstrate a similar pattern. The only feature distinguishing the various levels of voting is a small but steady rise in abstention and spoiled ballots as one moves to lower levels of representation. In all instances, the ratio of voter turnout and invalidated ballots is so small as to make distinctions seem negligible. Nevertheless, Ital- ian commentators regard the fluctuations as significant. When compared with other nations' voting habits, the Italian record is admittedly remarkable. In those instances where eligible voter turnout has fallen below 85 percent, the press has taken it as reprehensible, even scandalous, and made it the subject of extensive editorial comment. To foreign observers, though, the examples of voter protest are so small numerically as to seem inconsequential despite the interest they 125 Table A-14 Percent Ranking of Chamber Districts, by Percentage of Valid Ballots in Eight Parliamentary Elections 97.57 19 Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone 97.48 12 Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 97.40 32 Trieste (six elections, 1958-79) 97.33 4 Milan-Pavia 97.20 8 Trento-Bolzano 97.16 16 Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 97.09 9 Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo 97.06 14 Florence-Pistoia 30 Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano 97.00 24 Bari-Foggia 96.93 7 Mantua-Cremona 96.86 22 Naples-Caserta 96.84 5 Como-Sondrio-Varese 96.83 13 Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia 96.81 6 Brescia-Bergamo 96.80 10 Venice-Treviso 96.79 3 Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona 96.76 20 L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo 96.70 Average 96.65 17 Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno 96.57 11 Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone 96.56 18 Perugia-Terni-Rieti 96.53 15 Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara 96.44 25 Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 96.04 1 Turin-Novara-Vercelli 23 Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 95.76 27 Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 95.74 28 Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna 95.70 Median 95.67 26 Potenza-Matera 95.66 29 Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta 95.61 22 Campobasso-Isernia 95.49 2 Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 93.83 31 Valle d'Aosta Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-15 Senate: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast by Eligible Voters in Eight National Parliamentary Elections 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 Eight-Year Average 1. Piedmont 94.98 94.78 94.67 93.73 93.58 94.78 96.04 93.60 94.52 2. Valle d'Aosta 93.56 94.21 95.28 94.28 94.71 91.59 94.26 88.57 93.31 3. Lombardy 95.17 96.04 95.95 96.11 95.26 96.16 97.13 95.73 95.94 4. Trentino-Alto Adige 94.56 95.25 93.16 94.98 95.10 95.14 96.22 95.52 94.99 5. Venetia 94.98 95.29 95.87 95.60 95.24 96.17 97.03 95.58 95.72 6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia 95.07 95.16 96.00 95.99 95.51 96.74 96.99 96.12 95.95 7. Liguria 95.92 95.50 95.49 95.07 94.45 95.99 96.52 94.96 95.49 8. Emilia-Romagna 95.30 96.01 95.26 95.82 95.70 96.76 97.59 96.72 96.15 9. Tuscany 94.01 95.78 95.40 95.49 94.87 96.07 96.77 95.87 95.53 10. Umbria 93.15 94.84 94.47 93.68 94.68 96.27 97.31 96.07 95.06 I 1 . Marche 94.17 94.83 95.55 95.27 94.33 95.56 96.59 94.86 95.15 12. Lazio 95.65 95.90 95.59 95.55 95.09 96.39 97.22 95.76 95.89 13. Abruzzi 95.02 93.44 94.78 94.33 94.10 95.32 96.39 94.68 94.76 14. Molise 94.16 93.40 93.75 93.40 94.43 94.98 94.72 92.79 93.95 15. Campania 93.94 94.39 95.04 94.80 94.69 95.24 96.15 94.34 94.82 16. Puglia 94.88 95.57 95.68 95.35 95.11 95.86 96.19 94.70 95.42 17. Basilicata 93.78 93.94 94.13 93.58 93.88 95.29 95.13 93.18 94.11 18. Calabria 94.39 93.63 94.25 93.50 93.42 94.42 95.01 93.12 93.97 19. Sicily 94.94 95.41 95.56 94.50 95.53 94.41 95.32 93.07 94.84 20. Sardinia 94.53 95.61 95.05 95.40 94.99 95.44 96.75 94.98 95.34 Italy 95.03 95.39 95.48 95.28 94.67 95.74 96.59 95.03 95.40 rouse. Recently, however, a few more significant elements have appeared. In any event, given the national penchant for observation of these protests, what do they say about the DC? In regard to any party's electoral showing and to the national voting record, three factors must be cited. First, qualification for voting is automatic since each citizen is registered by his commune on his/her 18th birthday. When an election occurs, each voter has merely to pick up his/her registration certificate at a municipal office and go to the polls. Second, Italian legislation provides mild civil sanctions for failure to vote, and social pressure is heavy on everyone for electoral participation. Everyone is given time off from work to vote, and rail fares are greatly reduced Confidential to get voters back to their home districts (until recently Italy had no absentee voting). Finally, con- tinuing memories of fascist dictatorship stimulate citizen participaton as a safeguard against any return to authoritarian government. Evaluation of the overall record of voter participation and ballot box protest, given the record in the at- tached tables, is almost statistical hairsplitting. Ob- servers in Italy argue extensively nevertheless over meanings of the figures. One common assertion is that low voter turnout benefits the DC and high participa- tion assists parties of the left. Comparison of statistics does not, however, bear this out either for the Cham- ber or the Senate. In the cases of Veneto and Molise, 126 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006z7ial. Table A-16 Percent Ranking of Senate Districts by Average Valid Ballots, 1948-79 1. 96.15 Emilia-Romagna 2. 95.95 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 3. 95.94 Lombardy 4. 95.89 Lazio 5. 95.72 Venetia 6. 95.53 Tuscany 7. 95.49 Liguria 8. 95.42 Puglia 95.40 Average 9. 95.34 Sardinia 10. 95.15 Marche 11. 95.06 Umbria 12. 94.99 Trentino-Alto Adige 13. 94.84 Sicily 14. 94.82 Campania 15. 94.76 Abruzzi 94.73 Median 16. 94.52 Piedmont 17. 94.11 Basilicata 18. 93.97 Calabria 19. 93.95 Molise 20. 93.31 Valle d'Aosta both bastions of DC strength, the former ranks among the highest areas in voter participation and the latter is nearly always the lowest. To a small degree better correlation of the view can be found for high voting ratios favoring the left, but exceptions are not wanting here. In short, attempts to read partisan interpreta- tions into the number of people going to the polls seems pointless. Voting for Parliament in 1979 ap- pears to be the single possible exception. In that year every district for both Chamber and Senate had a smaller voter participation. Most observers interpret- ed this as public discontent with the national govern- ment. Some went so far as to say that the larger abstentions indicated dissatisfaction with the DC because of its being the majority party in government and thus most responsible for failed aspirations and programs. Until other evidence in later elections substantiates this view, its validity is questionable. 127 A bit more of a pattern seems to be indicated by the record of invalidated ballots. In this case Italian voters use two methods of registering protest: handing in a blank ballot, or deliberate spoiling of the ballot, often by writing derogatory comments on it. Ironical- ly, the highest number of spoiled ballots appeared in the elections of 1953. In 24 of 31 Chamber districts an alltime high of invalidated ballots was cast. Pre- sumably that indicated dissatisfaction with the so- called "swindle law" the DC had sponsored for the elections, a gimmick which would have ensured it of an absolute majority of Chamber seats if it had achieved a given vote plurality. Curiously, though, there is no discernible similar pattern in Senate elections of the same year. Thus, at a distance of three decades, the 1953 case is little more than a historical oddity. The only other manifestation of electoral protest through the ballot was an alltime high of blank ballots reported in 24 of 32 '3 Chamber districts in 1979. Although the number of such ballots was significantly higher in a few districts than for previous elections, the number rarely exceeded 3 percent of the total number cast. However, there does not appear even here sufficient evidence of voter discontent that could be regarded as directed specifically or exclusively at the DC. Generally the indications are that manifestations of protest at the ballot box are no guide to DC popular- ity. If there is any validity in the claims about voter protest, the more significant aspect is apparently the fluctuation of valid votes given to the parties, not the spoiled or blank ballot. In this vein, voter desire for change seems to have turned to parties of the ex- tremes such as the MSI in 1968 and the Radicals in 1979. If 1976 was indeed a disastrous year for the DC, the evidence is not in absenteeism from the polls or blank ballots cast. In 1979 the unusual number of blank ballots cast might be interpreted by some as dissatisfaction with the government and hence the " In the national legislative elections of 1948 and 1953, Italy had 31 electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies. The city and Province of Trieste became a part of the country in 1954 and were constituted as district 32 for the 1958 and subsequent elections. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 DC. Still, if 1976, clearly a critical year for the DC, was not unusual in protests manifest at the polls, then 1979 is also quite suspect. If there is utility in analyzing voter turnout and invalidated ballots, it is more appropriately to be considered as evidence of civic responsibility. The participation of voters differentiates Italy into two distinct sections: the responsible north and the lacka- daisical south. There is, however, the argument that lower southern voter turnout is the result of bureau- cratic inefficiency and not some sign of backwardness. In other words, communal administrations in areas of major migration have failed to remove citizens from the voting rolls when they moved away. The accuracy of such assertions is quite dubious, though, since voter absenteeism does not appear when the largest migra- tions occurred. Also in the south DC control of government offices and the presumed political prefer- ences of the areas is such as to say that the party's interests would be served by full and accurate registration. For regional elections little can be said about the distinction between blank and spoiled ballots, since figures reported do not categorize them. Also the elections have occurred for only 10 years and provide less perspective for analytical accuracy. Again, though, the broad patterns delineated in national elections seem to be similar on the regional level (see figures on the individual regional tables). The one possible major indicator of voting protest of noteworthy size seems to have occurred in June 1981. Regional, provincial, and communal elections were held then in areas containing approximately 9 million voters, one-fourth of the electorate. Final figures are not available for these elections, but reports from reliable newspapers give information on genuinely large voter abstention in places like Sicily and Rome, drops of 10 to 20 percent. However, in some other areas equally large increases in voter turnout oc- curred, all of which suggests that guidelines of any uniformity are difficult or impossible to establish. In these elections, the press has begun using a new phrase in refering to large-scale absenteeism. In those Confidential instances where the number of nonparticipating voters was high it was cited as "ii partito invisibile." In instances such as Rome where the absentees added up to a figure that would have come in just behind the DC's returns, the invisible party was thus the third- largest numerical element in the election. Finally, if outside opinion finds the issue of blank and spoiled ballots rather exaggerated, the interest it arouses in Italy cannot be ignored. With the seeming likelihood of widespread electoral change in Italy now, the data provided here may serve as useful background information in the future. To date, the utility of any of it as directly explaining DC positions is obscure at best. 128 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uonnuential Regular Statute Group Table A-17 Regional Council Election Results Piedmont 7 June 1970 a 15 June 1975b 8 June 1980 e Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 1,030,606 36.70 20 976,817 32.06 20 956,867 32.45 20 PCI 728,455 25.94 13 1,032,842 33.90 22 933,179 31.64 20 PSI 296,687 10.57 5 394,241 12.94 8 418,228 14.18 9 PSU 231,273 8.24 4 NONE NONE NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 224,153 7.36 4 176,413 5.98 3 PRI 86,760 3.09 1 109,156 3.58 2 98,210 3.33 2 PLI 226,197 8.06 4 152,834 5.02 2 174,743 5.93 3 PSIUP 87,554 3.12 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 29,652 1.01 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 24,925 0.85 NONE MSI-DN 92,796 3.30 2 130,753 4.29 2 117,839 4.00 2 Others 27,717 0.99 NONE 25,645 0.84 NONE 18,973 0.64 NONE Total 2,808,045 100.00 50 3,046,441 100.00 60 2,949,029 100.00 60 Lombardy 7 June 1970" 15 June 1975a 8 June 1980 f Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 2,137,409 40.90 36 2,186,378 37.50 32 2,241,568 38.87 34 PCI 1,208,968 23.14 19 1,770,540 30.37 25 1,623,256 28.14 23 PSI 648,679 12.41 9 819,964 14.07 11 834,231 14.46 11 PSU 376,463 7.20 5 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 301,145 5.17 3 260,632 4.52 3 PRI 125,563 2.40 2 179,605 3.08 2 152,638 2.65 2 PLI 310,463 5.94 4 163,465 2.80 2 197,207 3.42 2 PSIUP 188,955 3.48 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 143,400 2.46 2 86,554 1.50 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 96,650 1.68 1 MSI-DN 195,583 3.74 3 263,849 4.53 3 251,897 4.37 3 Others 33,371 0.64 NONE 1,331 0.02 NONE 22,858 0.40 NONE Total 5,225,454 100.00 80 5,829,677 100.00 80 5,767,491 100.00 80 a 93.56-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.32 percent of ballots were invalid. b 94.12-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.53 percent of ballots were invalid. c 91.52-percent turnout of eligible voters; 7.89 percent of ballots were invalid. d 95.41-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.11 percent of ballots were invalid. e 95.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.45 percent of ballots were invalid. f 92.47-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.17 percent of ballots were invalid. 129 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-18 Regional Council Election Results Venetia 7 June 1970 a 15 June 1975b 8 June 1980c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number Percentage of Votes Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 1,287,713 51.91 28 1,339,940 48.06 31 1,337,703 47.63 32 PCI 417,291 16.82 9 636,251 22.82 14 610,788 21.75 13 PSI 259,211 10.45 5 357,384 12.82 8 340,527 12.12 7 PSU 189,266 7.63 3 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 175,377 6.29 3 150,696 5.37 3 PRI 46,684 1.88 1 69,231 2.48 1 73,173 2.61 1 PLI 104,730 4.22 2 63,498 2.28 1 73,933 2.63 1 PSIUP 85,954 3.47 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 41,183 1.48 NONE 29,789 1.06 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 26,829 0.96 NONE MSI-DN 81,237 3.28 1 105,240 3.77 ' 2 101,941 3.63 2 Others 8,410 0.34 NONE NONE 0 NONE 13,249 0.47 NONE Total 2,480,496 100.00 50 2,788,104 100.00 60 2,808,628 100.00 60 Liguria 7 June 1970 d 15 June 1975e 8 June 1980 f Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number Percentage of Votes Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 393,893 32.10 14 396,787 30.41 13 378,673 30.74 13 PCI 383,753 31.28 13 500,483 38.36 16 444,329 36.07 15 PSI 138,754 11.31 4 175,714 13.47 5 165,250 13.42 5 PSU 93,620 7.63 3 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 71,409 5.47 2 55,595 4.51 2 PRI 37,737 3.08 1 45,094 3.46 1 38,731 3.14 1 PLI 90,125 7.35 3 51,598 3.95 1 55,768 4.53 2 PSIUP 35,198 2.87 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 11,819 0.96 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 13,930 1.13 NONE MSI-DN 46,334 3.78 1 60,373 4.63 2 51,785 4.20 2 Others 7,533 0.61 NONE 3,273 0.25 NONE 15,896 1.29 NONE Total 1,226,947 100.00 40 1,304,731 100.00 40 1,231,776 100.00 40 a 94.57-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.09 percent of ballots d 92.83-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.26 percent of ballots were invalid, were invalid b 95.10-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.59 percent of ballots c 93.03-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.56 percent of ballots were invalid, were invalid. c 91.93-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.18 percent of ballots f 88.92-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.36 percent of ballots were were invalid invalid. Confidential 130 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-/ndi Table A-19 Regional Council Election Results Emilia-Romagna 7 June 1970a 15 June 1975 b 8 June 1980c Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats 25.28 13 723,018 25.63 13 48.28 26 1,359,390 48.19 26 10.24 4 291,117 10.32 4 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 5.18 2 133,113 4.72 2 3.89 2 122,862 4.36 2 1.85 1 59,630 2.11 1 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 1.61 1 . 39,973 1.42 1 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE DC 673,028 25.77 14 714,057 PCI 1,149,172 44.00 24 1,363,594 PSI 210,649 8.07 3 289,173 PSU 196,008 7.50 3 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 146,250 PRI 103,495 3.96 2 109,950 PLI 97,437 3.73 1 52,242 PSIUP 99,594 3.81 2 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 45,355 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE MSI-DN 77,481 2.97 1 103,935 Others 4,977 0.19 NONE NONE Total 2,611,841 100.00 50 2,824,556 Tuscany 7 June 1970 d 3.68 1 89,694 3.18 1 0 NONE 2,355 0.08 NONE 100.00 50 2,821,152 100.00 50 15 June 1975e 8 June 1980 f Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats DC 711,140 30.57 17 716,539 28.48 15 713,323 28.72 15 PCI 984,227 42.31 23 1,169,616 46.49 25 1,152,696 46.41 25 PSI 203,441 8.74 3 269,406 10.71 4 292,426 11.77 5 PSU 148,640 6.39 3 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 97,372 3.87 2 77,369 3.12 1 PRI 51,726 2.22 1 66,678 2.65 1 70,606 2.84 1 PLI 61,178 2.63 1 29,869 1.19 NONE 31,817 1.28 1 PSIUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 51,587 2.05 1 26,672 1.08 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 26,533 1.07 NONE MSI-DN 88,798 3.82 1 106,543 4.23 2 92,016 3.70 1 Others 3,308 0.14 NONE 8,342 0.33 NONE 221 0.01 NONE Total 2,326,353 100.00 50 2,515,952 100.00 50 2,483,679 100.00 50 a 96.54-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.11 percent of ballots were invalid. b 96.47-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.72 percent of ballots were invalid. e 94.48-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.62 percent of ballots were invalid. d 95.87-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.79 percent of ballots were invalid. e 95.84-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.42 percent of ballots were invalid. 193.10-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.19 percent of ballots were invalid 131 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-20 Regional Council Election Results Umbria 7 June 1970 a 15 June 1975 8 June 1980c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 155,207 30.15 9 154,288 27.61 9 155,098 27.58 9 PCI 215,044 41.78 13 257,881 46.15 14 254,024 45.17 14 PSI 48,842 9.49 3 77,489 13.87 4 80,188 14.26 4 PSU 22,851 4.39 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 13,610 2.44 1 14,530 2.58 1 PRI 12,015 2.34 1 13,466 2.41 1 14,887 2.65 1 PLI 9,386 1.82 NONE 4,377 0.78 NONE 5,838 1.04 NONE PSIUP 23,669 4.60 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 6,210 1.11 NONE 7,228 1.29 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE MSI-DN 27,960 5.43 2 31,517 5.64 1 30,628 5.45 1 Others NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE Total 514,704 100.00 30 558,838 100.00 30 562,421 100.00 30 Marche 7 June 1970 d 15 June 1975 c 8 June 1980 f Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 333,453 38.56 17 346,099 36.46 16 354,464 37.11 16 PCI 275,110 31.81 14 349,962 36.87 15 355,646 37.24 15 PSI 73,086 8.45 3 93,002 9.80 4 96,060 10.06 4 PSU 54,455 6.30 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 50,660 5.34 2 42,790 4.48 1 PRI 36,076 4.17 1 32,587 3.43 1 36,289 3.80 1 PLI 23,510 2.72 1 14,591 1.54 NONE 13,668 1.43 1 PSIUP 33,644 3.89 1 PdUP NONE 0 NONE 20,119 2.12 1 14,555 1.52 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE MSI-DN 34,312 3.97 42,127 4.44 41,121 4.31 Others 1,162 0.13 NONE NONE 0 NONE 531 0.06 NONE Total 864,808 100.00 40 949,147 100.00 40 955,124 100.00 40 a 94.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.78 percent of ballots were invalid. b 95.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.15 percent of ballots were invalid. 92.63-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.81 percent of ballots were invalid. Confidential d 94.07-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.57 percent of ballots were invalid. 94.81-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.94 percent of ballots were invalid. f 91.53-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.12 percent of ballots were invalid. 132 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006:7 Table A-21 Regional Council Election Results Lazio 7 June 1970a 15 June 1975b 8 June 1980c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 888,898 33.22 18 980,821 31.54 20 1,062,191 34.09 22 PCI 708,082 26.46 14 1,041,693 33.50 21 957,628 30.73 19 PSI 234,747 8.77 4 303,930 9.77 6 331,055 10.62 6 PSU 204,539 7.64 3 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 190,032 6.11 3 165,139 5.30 3 PRI 98,235 3.67 2 114,408 3.68 2 116,212 3.73 2 PLI 156,259 5.84 3 77,679 2.50 1 82,978 2.66 1 PSIUP 69,992 2.62 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 45,612 1.47 1 37,578 1.21 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 36,844 1.18 NONE MSI-DN 273,189 10.21 5 352,119 11.32 6 314,500 10.09 6 Others 42,045 1.57 NONE 3,190 0.10 NONE 11,972 0.38 NONE Total 2,675,986 100.00 50 3,109,484 100.00 60 3,116,097 60 Abruzzi 7 June 1970d 15 June 1975e 8 June 19801 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 326,091 48.28 20 323,152 42.50 18 355,934 45.83 20 PCI 153,813 22.78 10 230,501 30.32 13 213,726 27.52 12 PSI 60,512 8.96 3 77,478 10.19 4 84,111 10.83 4 PSU 36,799 5.45 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 46,993 6.18 2 35,660 4.59 2 PRI 16,983 2.52 1 19,701 2.59 1 18,966 2.44 1 PLI 19,386 2.87 1 13,417 1.76 NONE 11,317 1.46 NONE PSIUP 21,572 3.19 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 9,899 1.27 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE MSI-DN 38,885 5.76 2 49,076 6.45 2 45,693 5.88 1 Others 1,314 0.19 NONE NONE 0 NONE 1,266 0.16 NONE Total 675,355 100.00 40 760,318 100.00 40 776,572 100.00 40 a 91.69-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.35 percent of ballots were invalid. b 92.11-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.83 percent of ballots were invalid. c 89.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.56 percent of ballots were invalid. d 85.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.87 percent of ballots were invalid. e 87.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.13 percent of ballots were invalid. f 82.35-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.27 percent of ballots were invalid. 133 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-22 Regional Council Election Results Molise 7 June 1970 a 15 June 1975" 8 June 1980 c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 92,805 52.05 16 100,740 50.64 16 112,769 55.35 17 PCI 26,710 14.98 5 35,621 17,90 6 32,151 15.78 5 PSI 16,922 9.49 3 19,969 10.04 3 19,105 9.38 3 PSU 13,582 7.62 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 12,355 6.21 2 9,804 4.81 2 PRI 5,300 2.97 8,996 4.52 1 7,583 3.72 1 PLI 10,879 6.10 2 8,928 4.49 1 8,331 4.09 1 PSIUP 4,087 2.29 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 2,383 1.20 NONE 1,557 0.76 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE MSI-DN 8,018 4.50 1 9,954 5.00 1 8,287 4.07 1 Others NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 4,144 2.03 NONE Total 178,303 100.00 30 198,946 100.00 30 203,731 100.00 30 Campania 7 June 1970 15 June 1975e 8 June 1980 f Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 1,004,437 39.66 25 1,068,364 36.69 23 1,175,672 39.03 25 PCI 551,800 21.79 13 788,874 27.09 16 725,978 24.10 15 PSI 277,205 10.95 7 302,344 10.38 6 378,018 12.55 7 PSU 178,314 7.04 4 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 191,362 6.57 4 187,355 6.22 3 PRI 77,899 3.08 2 105,465 3.62 2 89,877 2.98 1 PLI 90,376 3.57 2 60,225 2.07 1 51,140 1.70 1 PSIUP 64,045 2.53 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 32,486 1.12 1 30,552 1.01 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 32,909 1.09 1 MSI-DN 223,222 8.81 5 354,870 12.17 7 339,262 11.26 7 Others 65,1838 2.57 1 7,830 0.27 NONE 1,662 0.06 NONE Total 2,532,481 100.00 60 2,911,820 100.00 60 3,012,425 100.00 60 a 80.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.55 percent of ballots were invalid. b 84.41-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.08 percent of ballots were invalid. c 75.37-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.82 percent of ballots were invalid. d 86.77-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.77 percent of ballots were invalid. e 88.32-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.70 percent of ballots were invalid. 184.97-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.37 percent of ballots were invalid. One seat won by monarchists (PDIUM). Confidential 134 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-23 Regional Council Election Results Puglia 7 June 1970 a 15 June 1975 b 8 June 1980 . Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 766,153 41.27 22 835,086 39.26 21 924,437 42.10 22 PCI 488,654 26.32 14 607,175 28.54 15 539,894 24.59 13 PSI 197,690 10.65 5 252,739 11.88 5 291,606 13.28 6 PSU 76,178 4.11 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 100,067 4.70 2 114,545 5.22 2 PRI 43,475 2.34 1 48,843 2.30 1 54,400 2.48 1 PLI 56,210 3.03 1 36,030 1.69 1 35,604 1.62 1 PSIUP 45,001 2.42 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 28,652 1.30 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE MSI-DN 162,078 8.73 4 229,060 10.77 5 204,137 9.30 4 Others 20,930 1.13 NONE 18,263 0.86 NONE 2,364 0.11 NONE Total 1,856,369 100.00 50 2,127,263 100.00 50 2,195,689 100.00 50 Basilicata 7 June 1970 d 15 June 1975 . 8 June 1980 f Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 131,865 42.45 14 144,416 41.87 13 161,638 45.17 14 PCI 74,675 24.04 7 93,625 27.14 9 89,190 24.92 8 PSI 39,306 12.65 4 45,655 13.24 4 49,073 13.71 4 PSU 27,311 8.79 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 23,704 6.87 2 18,666 5.22 2 PRI 5,227 1.68 NONE 5,515 1.60 NONE 5,627 1.57 NONE PLI 9,600 3.09 1 7,077 2.05 NONE 6,118 1.71 NONE PSIUP 7,675 2.47 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 4,612 1.29 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 3,238 0.90 NONE MSI-DN 14,985 4.82 1 22,024 6.39 2 19,711 5.51 2 Others NONE 0 NONE 2,915 0.85 NONE NONE 0 NONE Total 310,644 100.00 30 344,931 100.00 30 357,873 100.00 30 a 88.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.66 percent of ballots e 87.40-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.31 percent of ballots were were invalid, invalid. b 89.43-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.70 percent of ballots 84.56-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.40 percent of ballots were were invalid, invalid. c 86.35-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.44 percent of ballots were invalid. d 85.51-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.94 percent of ballots were invalid. 135 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-24 Regional Council Election Results Calabria 7 June 1970 a 15 June 1975 8 June 1980 c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number. of Seats DC 372,560 39.73 17 424,198 39.48 17 450,034 41.22 18 PCI 218,685 23.32 10 270,477 25.17 10 263,892 24.17 10 PSI 132,545 14.13 6 158,159 14.72 6 180,727 16.55 7 PSU 48,063 5.13 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PSDI NONE 0 NONE 56,494 5.26 2 63,300 5.80 2 PRI 38,063 4.06 1 32,321 3.01 1 22,909 2.10 1 PLI 25,154 2.68 1 13,919 1.30 NONE 8,326 0.76 NONE PSIUP 36,450 3.89 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE 29,390 2.74 1 13,010 1.19 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 12,242 1.12 NONE MSI-DN 59,533 6.35 2 89,571 8.34 3 77,239 7.08 2 Others 6,693 0.71 NONE NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE Total 937,746 100.00 40 1,074,529 100.00 40 1,091,679 100.00 40 a 81.83-percent turnout of eligible voters; 7.04 percent of ballots were invalid. b 82.73-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.95 percent of ballots were invalid. c 76.66-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.87 percent of ballots were invalid. Confidential 136 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Special Statute Group Table A-25 Regional Council Election Results Friuli-Venezia Giulia 26 May 1968 a 17 June 1973b 25 June 1978 c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 344,039 44.93 29 315,198 39.71 26 332,684 39.60 26 PCI 153,923 20.10 12 166,018 20.91 13 182,84521.76 14 PSI PSU d PSDI 76,964 10.05 4 d 6 2 97,259 64,959 12.25 8.18 8 4 79,656 41,979 9.48 5.00 5 3 PRI 19,138 2.50 1 21,306 2.68 1 19,716 2.35 1 PLI 37,092 4.84 3 28,883 3.64 2 10,575 1.26 1 PSIUP 35,677 4.66 3 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 11,228 1.34 1 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 11,184 1.33 1 MSI-DN 39,197 5.12 3 59,585 7.51 4 35,084 4.18 2 Others 59,642 e 7.79 4 40,585 f 5.11 3 115,1758 13.71 7 Total 765,672 100.00 61 793,793 100.00 61 840,126 100.00 61 a 87.92-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.85 percent of ballots were invalid. b 89.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.75 percent of ballots were invalid. e 90.60-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.14 percent of ballots were invalid. d Part ito Socialista Unificato. During the council's term in office, PSI and PSDI split. Four members pronounced themselves as members of PSI and two of PSDI. e Figures for four local parties and a monarchist ticket. Two local parties gained seats: Unione Slovena (one seat) and Movimento Friuli (three seats). Vote figures are not available. f Unione Slovena (one seat); Movimento Friuli (two seats). Voting statistics not available. s "Per Trieste" (four seats); Movimento Friuli (three seats). Voting statistics are not available. Note: Previous regional election: 10 May 1964. 137 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-26 Regional Council Election Results Sardinia 15 June 1969a 16 June 1974 b 17 June 1979 c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 329,835 44.59 36 305,071 38.33 32 343,020 37.74 32 PCI 146,155 19.76 15 213,300 26.80 22 238,751 26.28 22 PSI d 87,650 11.85 9 93,007 11.69 9 101,461 11.17 9 PSDI NONE 0 NONE 46,906 5.89 3 42,274 4.65 4 PRI c 22,187 3.00 1 20,570 2.58 1 29,660 3.26 3 PLI 33,484 4.53 3 22,159 2.78 1 18,066 1.99 1 PSIUP 32,810 4.44 3 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE PdUP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 8,512 0.94 NONE Partito Sardo d'Azione 395 38 3 24,829 3.12 1 30,220 3.33 3 MSI-DN 49,291 6.67 4 62,294 7.83 6 57,618 6.34 4 Others 5,845 0.79 NONE 7,668 0.96 NONE 39,038 f 4.30 2 Total 739,652 100.00 74 795,804 100.00 75 908,620 100.00 80 a 86.43-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.62 percent of ballots were invalid. b 87.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.65 percent of ballots were invalid. e 84.46-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.30 percent of ballots were invalid. d In 1969 and 1974 PSI ran a combined list including other socialists of the PSU. Although a remnant of the PSU was still active in 1974, PSDI had assumed its own identity again. e In 1969 PRI ran a combined ticket with MSA, Movimento Sardo d'Azione. f Includes 28,068 votes (3.09 percent) for Partito Radicale Sardo which won two seats. Note: Previous regional council elections: 8 May 1949, 14 June 1953, 16 June 1957, 18 June 1961, and 13 June 1965. Confidential 138 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R0001 00050006-7 Confidential Table A-27 Regional Council Election Results Sicily 13 June 1971a 20 June 1976" 21 June 1981 c Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 794,414 33.32 29 1,153,109 40.85 39 1,108,975 41.45 38 PCI 495,579 d 20.78 23 757,247 26.82 24 552,292 20.64 20 PSI 269,515 11.30 11 289,437 10.25 10 383,887 14.35 14 PSDI 135,118 5.67 4 97,254 3.45 2 79,941 2.99 2 PRI 110,238 4.62 3 92,052 3.26 4 117,162 4.38 5 PLI 88,083 3.69 3 59,839 2.12 2 57,669 2.16 3 PSIUP 52,980 2.22 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE 15,163 0.54 NONE 25,675 0.96 NONE MSI-DN 418,258 17.54 15 306,720 10.86 9 227,988 8.52 6 Others 20,190 0.85 NONE 52,193 1.85 NONE 122,031 . 4.56 2 Total 2,384,375 100.00 90 2,823,014 100.00 90 2,675,620 100.00 90 a 81.36-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.25 percent of ballots were invalid. b 85.64-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.68 percent of ballots were invalid. . 76.2-percent turnout of eligible voters; reported by press; other figures not available to date. d In several provinces a combined PCI-PSIUP list was presented. Separated by parties, the results are PCI 251,168 votes (10.53; 11 seats) and PCI-PSIUP (10.25; 12 seats). e A coalition list of PRI-PLI-PSDI ran in several provinces and won 79,990 votes (2.99; two seats). Note: Previous regional council elections: 20 April 1947, 3 June 1951,5 June 1955,7 June 1959,9 June 1963, and 11 June 1967. 139 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 o Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-28 Regional Council Election Results Valle d'Aosta 21 April 1968 a 10 June 1973" 25 June 1978 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 25,467 37.78 13 14,980 21.40 7 15,723 21.24 7 PCI 13,742 20.39 7 13,638 19.49 7 14,442 19.51 7 PSI PSDI d 6,954 10.32 4 5,975 1,409 8.54 2.01 3 1 2,648 1,543 3.58 2.08 1 1 PRI 525 0.78 NONE 904 1.29 NONE 1,395 1.88 1 PLI 3,765 5.59 2 2,052 2.93 1 NONE 0 NONE PSIUP 1,560 2.31 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE UV e 11,237 16.67 6 8,081 11.55 4 18,344 24.78 9 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 1,454 1.96 1 MSI-DN 533 0.79 NONE 1,452 2.07 1 944 1.28 NONE RV f 3,627 5.38 2 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE 15,643 22.35 8 8,700 11.75 4 Others NONE 0 NONE 5,856g 8.37 3 8,822h 11.92 4 Total 67,410 100.00 35 69,990 100.00 35 74,015 100.00 35 a 92.64-percent turnout of eligible voters; 8.71 percent of ballots were invalid. h 91.77-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.22 percent of ballots were invalid. 89.60-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.94 percent of ballots were invalid. d United with PSDI in 1968 as PSU. Union Valdotaine. f Ragruppamento Valdese. s Includes 4,707 votes (6.73 percent, two seats) for Union Valdotaine Populaire and 1,149 (1.64 percent, one seat) for Ragruppamento Valdese. h Includes 1,959 votes (2.65 percent, one seat) for Autonomia Sociale; 1,183 (1.78 percent, one seat) for Associazione Liberia e Progresso; 2,315 (3.13 percent, one seat) for Union Valdotaine Populaire; and 1,118 (1.51 percent, one seat) for Artigiani e Commercianti. Note: Previous regional council elections: 24 April 1949, 14 November 1954, 17 May 1959, and 27 October 1963. Confidential 140 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-29 Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige a Part 1: Trento 17 November 1968 18 November 1973 19 November 1978 b Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 142,882 58.05 16 141,463 55.28 21 137,847 49.04 18 PCI 16,140 6.56 2 23,614 9.23 3 30,028 10.68 4 PSI PSDI ' 37,483 15.23 4 27,786 15,166 10.86 5.93 4 2 25,645 8,473 9.12 3.01 3 1 PRI 6,017 2.44 1 9,922 3.88 1 9,742 3.47 1 PLI 11,404 4.63 1 5,603 2.19 1 5,092 1.81 1 PPTT d 18,182 7.39 2 23,045 9.01 3 36,811 13.10 5 PSIUP 7,721 3.14 1 NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 5,412 1.93 1 MSI-DN 4,046 1.64 NONE 5,865 2.29 1 5,028 1.79 1 NS . NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 12,315 4.38 1 Others 2,257 0.92 NONE 3,417 1.34 NONE 4,707 1.67 NONE Total 246,132 100.00 27 255,881 100.00 36 281,100 100.00 36 a The regional council is made up of the provincial councils of the Provinces of Trento and Bolzano. In 1968, the provincial council of Trento had 27 members. Growth of the region increased the allotted council members, hence raising the number to 36 in 1973. b 91.71-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.99 percent of ballots cast were invalid. Comparable figures on the provincial level are not available for 1968 and 1973. See regional chart for totals in these years. c In 1968, PSU, Partito Socialista Unificato. d PPTT, Part ito Popolare Trentino Tirolese. Nuova Sinistra. 141 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-30 Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige a Part 2: Bolzano (Bozen) 17 November 1968 18 November 1973 19 November 1978 b Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 32,721 14.39 4 32,989 14.09 5 28,805 10.79 4 PCI PSIUP c Ind. 13,548 5.96 1 13,343 5.70 2 18,781 7.04 3 PSI 16,277 7.16 2 13,214 5.64 2 8,945 3.35 1 PSDI NONE 0 NONE 8,036 3.43 1 6,132 2.30 1 PRI 2,729 1.20 NONE 3,234 1.38 NONE 2,884 1.08 NONE PLI 5,891 2.59 1 2,806 1.20 NONE 2,925 1.10 NONE PPTT d NONE 0 NONE NONE NONE NONE 2,274 0.85 NONE SVP . 138,162 60.76 16 132,185 56.45 20 163,458 61.25 21 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE NONE NONE 1,154 0.43 NONE MSI-DN 11,005 4.84 1 9,421 4.02 1 7,784 2.92 1 NS f NONE 0 NONE NONE NONE NONE 9,754 3.66 1 Others 7,040 3.10 NONE 18,948 s 8.09 3 13,967 h 5.23 2 Total 227,373 100.00 25 234,176 100.00 34 266,863 100.00 34 a The regional council is made up of the provincial councils of Trento and Bolzano. In 1968 the provincial council of Bolzano had 25 members; increased to 34 in 1973 due to the reigon's growth. b 93.38-percent turnout of eligible voters in 1978; 2.61 pecent of ballots cast were invalid. Comparable figures are not available for the province in 1968 and 1973. For regional composite, see table A- 31. c In 1968, Sinistra Unita. d Part ito Popolare Trentino Tirolese. Sudtiroler Volkspartei. In Italian, PPST, Part ito Popolare Sud Tirolese. f Nuova Sinistra. Includes 12,056 votes (5.15 percent, 2 seats) for SPS, Socialdemo- cratici sudtirolese; and 4,014 (1.71 percent, one seat) for SFP, Socialprogressisti Sudtirolesi. h Includes 5,914 votes (2.22 percent, one seat) for SPS, Socialdemo- cratici Sudtirolesi; and 3,536 (1.33 percent, one seat) for PDU, Part ito Democratico Unitario. Confidential 142 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7..w Table A-31 Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige a Part 3: Regional Composite Party 17 November 1968 h 18 November 1973 c 19 November 1978 d Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats DC 175,603 37,09 20 174,452 35.60 26 166,652 30.41 22 PCI PSIUP e Ind. 37,409 7.90 4 36,957 7.54 5 48,809 8.91 7 PSI PSDI f 53,760 11.35 6 41,000 23,202 8.37 4.73 6 3 34,590 14,605 6.31 2.67 4 2 PRI 8,746 1.85 1 13,156 2.68 1 12,626 2.30 1 PLI 17,295 3.65 2 8,409 1.72 1 8,017 1.46 1 PPTT s 18,182 3.84 2 23,045 4.70 3 39,085 7.13 5 SVP h 138,162 29.18 16 132,185 26.97 20 163,458 29.83 21 DP NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 6,566 1.20 1 MSI-DN 15,051 3.18 1 15,286 3.12 2 12,812 2.34 2 NS g NONE 0 NONE NONE 0 NONE 22,069 4.03 2 Others 9,297 1.96 NONE 22,365 h 4.56 3 18,674 h 3.41 2 Total 473,505 100.00 52 490,057 100.00 70 547,963 100.00 70 a The regional council is composed of the provincial councils of Trento and Bolzano. For breakdown by province, see appropriate chart. h 89.55-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.23 percent of ballots were invalid. c 92.23-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.63 percent of ballots were invalid. d 92.51-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.32 percent of ballots were invalid. In 1968, Sinistra Unita in Bolzano. f PSU in 1968 in Trento. See chart for Trento. h See chart for Bolzano. Note: Previous regional council elections: 28 November 1948, 16 November 1952, 11 November 1956,6 November 1960, and 15 November 1964. 143 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 _ - 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-32 Provincial Council Election Results by Party in Geographical Regions, 1975 and 1980 1975 1980 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats North a DC 5,596,299 35.38 411 5,639,732 36.21 416 PCI 5,255,642 33.23 366 4,955,006 31.82 347 PSI 2,097,453 13.26 145 2,057,335 13.21 141 PSDI 979,497 6.19 65 847,921 5.44 55 PRI 515,417 3.26 26 494,318 3.17 29 PLI 520,623 3.29 23 594,101 3.81 34 MSI-DN 698,871 4.42 40 640,079 4.11 38 Others 153,206 b 0.97 4 345,285 d 2.22 20 Total 15,817,008 c 100.00 1,080 15,573,777 c 100.00 1,080 Center f DC 1,401,170 30.37 161 1,418,941 30.81 166 PCI 1,963,189 42.55 220 1,951,448 42.55 218 PSI 525,119 11.38 58 559,767 12.15 60 PSDI 218,120 4.73 22 189,952 4.13 20 PRI 148,612 3.22 15 155,586 3.38 15 PLI 60,428 1.31 1 68,478 1.49 1 MSI-DN 247,932 5.37 25 231,724 5.03 24 Others 49,634 g 1.07 2 29,464 . 0.64 0 Total 4,614,204h 100.00 504 4,605,360i 100.00 504 Confidential 144 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 t..ontwential Table A-32 (continued) 1975 1980 Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats South k DC 2,415,445 34.78 225 2,606,203 36.50 237 PCI 1,984,559 28.58 169 1,875,886 26.27 155 PSI 883,682 12.73 79 1,014,457 14.21 86 PSDI 422,606 6.21 34 443,338 6.21 34 PRI 227,385 3.27 14 237,472 3.33 16 PL I 159,898 2.30 10 143,476 2.01 7 MSI-DN 783,335 11.28 58 761,316 10.66 54 Others 67,498 I 0.97 2 58,162 a 0.81 2 Total 6,944,408 m 100.00 591 7,140,3100 100.00 591 Islands P DC 1,334,507 37.35 152 1,451,498 40.37 162 PCI 902,292 25.25 105 820,874 22.83 96 PSI 442,922 12.40 51 488,405 13.58 56 PSDI 196,248 5.49 22 192,113 5.34 20 PRI 159,341 4.46 17 174,927 4.86 18 PLI 106,901 2.99 8 105,390 2.93 10 MSI-DN 380,677 10.65 39 289,886 8.06 28 Others 50,323 q 1.41 2 72,569 s 2.03 6 Total 3,573,211 100.00 396 3,595,662 100.00 396 a The 35 provinces of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna; 22,992,299 population. h Included are 2,170 (0.01 percent) votes for center-left groups, 123,124 (0.78 percent, one seat) for extreme left parties; and 24,222 (0.15 percent, three seats) for local parties. c 94.6-percent turnout of eligible voters. d Includes 184,468 (1.19 percent, five seats) for groups of the extreme left. 91.9-percent turnout of eligible voters. The 18 provinces of Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio; population 6,550,817. g Includes 49,283 votes (1.07 percent, two seats) for extreme left groups. h 94.8-percent turnout of eligible voters. Total figures for extreme left groups. i 91.0-percent turnout of eligible voters. 145 k The 20 provinces of Abruzzi Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria; population 12,0062,459. 'Includes 7,823 (0.11 percent, one seat) for center-left groups; 32,726 (0.47 percent, one seat) for extreme left parties. m 87.0-percent turnout of eligible voters. a Includes 42,019 (0.59 percent, one seat) for extreme left groups. 83.3-percent turnout of eligible voters. P The 13 provinces in Sicily and Sardinia; population 6,154,515. q Includes 12,877 (0.36 percent) for extreme left groups and 22,227 (0.62 percent, two seats) for local parties. 85.0-percent turnout of eligible voters. 'Includes 2,813 (0.08 percent) for center-left groups and 12,167 (0.34 percent) for extreme left elements. Local parties drew 44,795 (1.25 percent, five seats) votes. 80.7-percent turnout of eligible voters. Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Figure A-6 Showing of DC, PCI, and PSI in Regional Council Elections (Special Statue) Percent I I I I I 1 I I I 1 I I I 1111111111 1111111 I I r7-1-?11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 Valle d'Aostac 60 40 20 Trentino?Alto 60 Adiged Friuli?Venezia 60 Giulia 40 20 IihiiiiitIllititimilmilimhi 0 1948 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 ala 1947 and 1951 PSI and PCI ran a common ticket, and in 1947 it also included PSIUP. In 1967, PSI and PSU ran a common list. bin 1969, PSI figures include PSU. 51n 1949, the DC ran a common list with Union Valdotainc; in 1954 and 1959 the DC joined a cornbined list of centrist parties. PC1. PSI and PS1UP ran a comrnon list in 1949, 1954 and 1959. In the last year it was joined also by the Union Valdotaine. dln 1968 PCI and PSIUP ran a common list. In 1956 PSI figures include list partners, PSU and PSD1. 586083 2-82 Confidential 146 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Figure A-7 Chamber of Deputies Districts 1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli 2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 3. Genoa- Imperib-La Spezia-Savona 4. Milan-Pavia 5. Como-Sondrio- Varese 6. Bergamo-Brescia 7. Mantua-Cremona 8. Trent-Bolzano 9. Verona- Padua- Vicenza-Rovigo 10. Venice-Treviso 11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone 12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia 14. Florence-Pistoia 15. Pisa-Leghorn- Lucca- Massa Carrare 16. Siena-Arezzo- Grosseto 17. Ancona-Pesaro e Urbino-Ascoli Piceno- Macerata 18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti 19. Rome- Latina-Viterbo- Frosinone 20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo 21. Campobasso-lsernia 22. Naples-Caserta 23. Benevento-Avellino- Salerno 24. Bari-Foggia 25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 26. Potenza-Matera 27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 28. Catania-Messina-Syracuse-Ragusa-Enna 29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta 30. Cagliari- Sassari- Nuoro-Oristano 31. Aosta 32. Trieste 147 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Figure A-8 Senate Districts 1. Piemonte 2. Valle d' Aosta 3. Lombardia 4. Trentino-Alto Adige 5. Veneto 6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia 7. Liguria 8. Emilia-Romagna 9. Toscana 10. Umbria 11. Marche 12. Lazio 13. Abruzzi 14. Molise 15. Campania 16. Puglia 17. Basilicata 18. Calabria 19. Sicilia 20. Sardegna 20 19 Confidential 148 631120 3-82 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R0001000500067?ai Chamber of Deputies Table A-33 1 Torino-Novara-Vercelli 1972 1976 1979 District population 2,684,677 3,190,079 3,233,393 Eligible voters in district 2,301,297 2,460,817 2,503,112 Actual votes (percent turnout) 2,201,444 (95.66) 2,338,532 (95.03) 2,339,699 (93.47) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 96,333 (4.38) 74,094 (3.17) 119,922 (5.13) District percent national vote 6.38 6.21 6.13 Seats assigned district 33 37 37 Electoral quotient 60,146 58,062 56,917 Seats won by whole quotients in district 30 33 33 Seats won by residuals in national pool 4 5 6 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 704,911 33.49 11 + 1 DC 741,841 32.76 12 + 1 DC 687,440 30.97 12 PCI 601,773 28.59 10 - PCI 865,252 38.21 14 + 1 PCI 729,210 32.85 12 + 1 PSI 228,932 10.87 3 + 1 PSI 231,557 10.22 3 + 1 PSI 234,037 10.54 4 - PSDI 146,185 6.94 2 - PSDI 99,971 4.41 1 - PSDI 107,829 4.86 1 + 1 PSIUP 38,148 1.81 DP 42,037 1.86 - + 1 PdUP 39,315 1.77 1 PLI 166,333 7.90 2 + 1 PRad 38,840 1.71 - + 1 PRad 111,839 5.04 1 + 1 PRI 71,310 3.39 1 - PLI 61,488 2.72 1 - PLI 89,986 4.05 1 + 1 MSI-DN 111,397 5.29 1 + 1 PRI 89,592 3.96 1 - PRI 94,780 4.27 1 + 1 MSI-DN 91,881 4.06 1 MSI-DN 87,066 3.92 1 - Others 36,122 1.72 - Others 1,979 0.09 - - Others 38,275 1.73 149 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-34 2 Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,229,573 1,242,234 1,304,627 Eligible voters in district 926,475 969,499 979,024 Actual votes (percent turnout) 888,865 (95.94) 925,881 (95.50) 919,983 (93.97) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 29,194 (3.28) 36,181 (3.91) 55,589 (6.09) District percent national vote 2.58 2.46 2.41 Seats assigned district 15 15 15 Electoral quotient 50,568 52,335 50,846 Seats won by whole quotients in district 13 12 12 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 4 3 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 384,577 44.73 7 DC 384,340 43.20 7 - DC 357,466 41.35 7 PCI 175,772 20.45 3 - PCI 252,169 28.34 4 + 1 PCI 213,214 24.67 4 - PSI 99,917 11.62 1 + 1 PSI 84,641 9.51 1 - PSI 83,836 9.70 1 - PSDI 59,914 6.97 1 PSDI 48,455 5.44 - + 1 PSDI 48,034 5.56 - + 1 PSIUP 14,150 1.65 - DP 15,638 1.76 - PdUP 12,125 1.40 - - PLI 57,144 6.65 1 PRad 11,177 1.26 PRad 29,969 3.47 PRI 27,530 3.20 - PLI 32,996 3.71 - + 1 PLI 50,461 5.84 - + 1 MSI-DN 29,328 3.41 - PRI 34,398 3.87 - + 1 PRI 33,513 3.88 - + 1 MSI-DN 25,886 2.91 MSI-DN 23,720 2.74 Others ' 11,339 1.32 - Others 0 0 - - Others 12,056 1.39 Confidential 150 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7..ai Table A-35 3 Genoa-limperia-La Spezia-Savona 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,735,349 1,853,578 1,852,903 Eligible voters in district 1,393,456 1,456,231 1,477,501 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,319,522 (94.69) 1,382,651 (94.95) 1,361,158 (92.13) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 40,067 (3.04) 33,594 (2.43) 57,711 (4.24) District percent national vote 3.83 3.67 3.57 Seats assigned district 22 22 22 Electoral quotient 53,310 56,210 54,310 Seats won by whole quotients in district 20 20 18 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 2 5 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 428,681 33.51 8 - DC 464,575 34.44 8 - DC 419,195 32.16 7 - PCI 404,477 31.61 7 - PCI 527,236 39.08 9 - PCI 462,943 35.52 8 - PSI 143,557 11.22 2 + 1 PSI 147,571 10.94 2 - PSI 150,260 11.53 2 + 1 PSDI 68,111 5.32 1 - PSDI 39,972 2.96 - PSDI 43,144 3.31 - + 1 PSIUP 19,339 1.51 - DP 14,089 1.05 - - PdUP 11,346 0.87 - PLI 74,925 5.86 1 - PRad 20,484 1.52 - + 1 PRad 63,092 4.84 1 - PRI 45,371 3.55 - + 1 PLI 24,064 1.78 PLI 43,647 3.35 - + 1 MSI-DN 78,684 6.15 1 - PRI 51,670 3.83 - + 1 PRI 44,821 3.44 - + 1 MSI-DN 58,672 4.35 1 - MSI-DN 48,794 3.74 - + 1 Others 16,310 1.27 - Others 724 0.05 Others 16,205 1.24 151 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-36 4 Milan-Pavia 1972 1976 1979 District population 3,675,008 4,430,074 4,566,032 Eligible voters in district 3,050,397 3,315,036 3,388,216 Actual votes (percent turnout) 2,951,236 (96.75) 3,181,031 (95.96) 3,198,089 (94.39) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 84,974 (2.88) 73,384 (2.31) 96,962 (3.03) District percent national vote 8.56 8.44 8.38 Seats assigned district 46 52 52 Electoral quotient 59,713 57,549 57,428 Seats won by whole quotients in district 42 49 50 Seats won by residuals in national pool 3 3 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 981,922 34.26 16 DC 1,092,254 35.15 18 + 1 DC 1,034,717 33.37 18 - PCI 807,810 28.18 13 PCI 1,113,369 35.83 19 PCI 994,768 32.08 17 PSI 352,922 12.31 5 + 1 PSI 368,246 11.85 6 - PSI 348,495 11.24 6 - PSDI 140,150 4.89 2 PSDI 98,173 3.16 1 PSDI 125,090 4.03 2 PSIUP 51,218 1.79 DP 79,933 2.57 1 PdUP 60,428 1.95 1 - PLI 174,939 6.10 2 + 1 PRad 44,423 1.59 1 - PRad 147,531 4.76 2 - PRI 112,966 3.94 1 + 1 PLI 44,883 1.44 - + 1 PLI 94,834 3.06 1 + 1 MSI-DN 195,108 6.81 3 PRI 127,019 4.09 2 - PRI 108,355 3.49 1 + 1 MSI-DN 132,163 4.25 2 - MSI-DN 124,661 4.02 2 Others 49,227 1.72 - Others 2,184 0.07 - - Others 62,248 2.00 - - Confidential 152 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-37 5 Como-Sondrio-Varese 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,365,110 1,615,435 1,785,746 Eligible voters in district 1,103,948 1,227,056 1,271,566 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,064,884 (96.46) 1,169,633 (95.32) 1,196,683 (94.11) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 39,061 (3.68) 34,099 (2.92) 54,019 (4.51) District percent national vote 3.09 3.10 3.14 Seats assigned district 19 19 19 Electoral quotient 53,990 54,073 54,412 Seats won by whole quotients in district 15 16 15 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 3 5 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 471,005 45.92 8 + 1 DC 515,915 45.43 9 - DC 498,173 43.60 9 - PCI 182,220 17.76 3 PCI 308,481 27.17 5 PCI 267,419 23.40 4 + 1 PSI 130,761 12.75 2 PSI 134,459 11.84 2 PSI 143,174 12.53 2 - PSDI 69,158 6.74 1 - PSDI 42,539 3.75 - - PSDI 49,798 4.36 - + 1 PSIUP 24,090 2.35 - - DP 23,152 2.04 + 1 PdUP 20,490 1.79 - - PLI 55,290 5.39 1 PRad 11,886 1.05 PRad 41,041 3.59 - + 1 PRI II-DN 26,576 2.59 - - PLI 20,029 1.76 - - PLI 32,807 2.87 - + 1 51,826 5.05 - + 1 PRI 37,849 3.33 - + 1 PRI 33,440 2.93 MSI-DN 41,224 3.63 - + 1 MSI-DN 38,086 3.33 - + 1 Others 14,897 1.45 - - Others o o - - Others 18,236 1.60 - - - Approved For Release 2007/12/17 : CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 153 Confidential Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-38 6 Brescia-Bergamo 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,627,619 1,786,705 1,863,439 Eligible voters in district 1,177,126 1,316,534 1,372,897 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,138,935 (96.76) 1,261,235 (95.80) 1,299,783 (94.67) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 33,303 (2.92) 31,572 (2.50) 49,818 (3.83) District percent national vote 3.30 3.35 3.41 Seats assigned district 20 21 21 Electoral quotient 50,256 53,463 54,346 Seats won by whole quotients in district 19 19 17 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 2 6 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 613,071 55.45 12 - DC 654,729 53.25 12 DC 638,294 51.07 11 + 1 PCI 169,043 15.29 3 PCI 283,537 23.06 5 - PCI 269,755 21.58 4 + 1 PSI 106,568 9.64 2 - PSI 125,910 10.24 2 - PSI 124,305 9.94 2 - PSDI 58,821 5.32 1 - PSDI 40,977 3.33 - - PSDI 44,758 3.58 - + 1 PSIUP 29,452 2.66 DP 29,383 2.39 - + 1 PdUP 26,221 2.10 - + 1 PLI 41,432 3.75 - + 1 PRad 11,334 0.92 - - PRad 34,544 2.76 - + 1 PRI 18,527 1.68 PLI 16,900 1.37 - - PLI 25,722 2.06 MSI-DN 51,215 4.63 1 - PRI 25,901 2.11 - - PRI 24,659 1.97 MSI-DN 40,992 3.33 - + 1 MSI-DN 39,333 3.15 - + 1 Others 17,503 1.58 - Others 0 0 - - Others 22,374 1.79 - - Confidential 154 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 commential Table A-39 7 Mantua-Cremona 1972 1976 1979 District population 738,415 711,173 714,486 Eligible voters in district 512,354 541,284 548,522 Actual votes (percent turnout) 496,704 (96.95) 526,075 (97.19) 529,924 (96.61) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 9,835 (1.98) 11,991 (2.28) 19,948 (3.76) District percent national vote 1.44 1.40 1.39 Seats assigned district 9 8 8 Electoral quotient 44,260 51,408 50,997 Seats won by whole quotients in district 8 7 7 Seats won by residuals in national pool 0 1 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 186,338 38.27 4 - DC 197,938 38.50 3 -I- 1 DC 192,514 37.75 3 + 1 PCI 145,266 29.84 3 - PCI 187,274 36.43 3 - PCI 175,743 34.46 3 - PSI 71,003 14.58 1 - PSI 69,329 13.49 1 - PSI 63,008 12.36 1 - PSDI 18,579 3.82 - PSDI 15,328 2.98 PSDI 16,434 3.23 - - PSIUP 11,575 2.38 - DP 6,482 1.26 - - PdUP 9,852 1.93 - - PLI 14,968 3.07 - PRad 4,502 0.88 - - PRad 12,590 2.47 PRI 7,924 1.63 - - PLI 4,169 0.81 - PLI 7,696 1.51 - - MSI-DN 26,089 5.36 - - PRI 9,577 1.86 - PRI 8,663 1.70 - - MSI-DN 19,485 3.79 - MSI-DN 18,038 3.54 Others 5,127 1.05 - - Others 0 0 Others 5,438 1,07 - - 155 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-40 8 Trento-Bolzano 1972 ? 1976 1979 District population 785,967 841,886 873,995 Eligible voters in district 556,374 610,064 636,264 Actual votes (percent turnout) 528,852 (95.05) 582,523 (95.49) 593,795 (93.33) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 18,720 (3.54) 15,141 (2.60) 22,231 (3.74) District percent national vote 1.53 1.55 1.56 Seats assigned district 10 10 10 Electoral quotient 42,511 47,281 47,630 Seats won by whole quotients in district 7 7 8 Seats won by residuals in national pool 3 2 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 200,136 39.23 4 + 1 DC 186,190 32.81 3 + 1 DC 177,362 31.03 3 + 1 PCI 38,855 7.62 - + 1 PCI 74,822 13.19 1 PCI 63,374 11.09 1 - PSI 35,846 7.03 + 1 PSI 44,681 7.87 + 1 PSI 37,876 6.63 - + 1 PSDI 25,215 4.94 - - PSDI 14,062 2.48 - PSDI 15,326 2.68 - - PSIUP 6,793 1.33 DP 13,030 2.30 PdUP 5,008 0.88 PLI 14,826 2.91 - - PRad 6,960 1.23 - PRad 24,270 4.25 - - PRI 9,567 1.88 - - PLI 5,618 0.99 - - PLI 7,143 1.25 - - MSI-DN 19,044 3.73 PRI 15,319 2.70 - PRI 12,439 2.17 SVPI 153,674 30.12 3 - MSI-DN 14,661 2.58 - - MSI-DN 13,453 2.35 - - SVP 184,375 32.50 3 - SVP 205,007 35.87 4 Others 6,176 1.21 Others 7,664 1.35 Others 10,306 1.80 Confidential 156 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-41 9 Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo 1972 1976 1979 District population 2,254,852 2,426,385 2,540,043 Eligible voters in district 1,625,002 1,798,094 1,883,682 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,574,667 (96.90) 1,743,454 (96.96) 1,783,667 (94.69) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 53,518 (3.40) 46,520 (2.67) 65,517 (3.67) District percent national vote 4.57 4.63 4.68 Seats assigned district 28 28 28 Electoral quotient 50,704 56,564 57,271 Seats won by whole quotients in district 26 26 25 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 2 4 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 867,645 57.04 17 - DC 942,301 55.53 16 - DC 926,990 53.95 16 - PCI 238,681 15.69 4 + 1 PCI 362,442 21.36 6 - PCI 336,693 19.60 5 + 1 PSI 128,984 8.48 2 - PSI 162,179 9.55 2 + 1 PSI 150,745 8.77 2 PSDI 81,009 5.33 1 - PSDI 62.073 3.66 1 - PSDI 65,084 3.79 1 - PSIUP 32,244 2.12 - - DP 23,344 1.37 - PdUP 20,356 1.18 - - PLI 54,850 3.61 1 - PRad 17,789 1.05 - - PRad 60,717 3.53 1 - PRI 29,863 1.96 - 1 PLI 19,343 1.14 PLI 33,273 1.94 - + 1 MSI-DN 70,474 4.63 _? 1 - PRI 47,162 2.78 - + 1 PRI 45,107 2.63 - + 1 MSI-DN 59,347 3.50 1 - MSI-DN 57,057 3.32 - + 1 Others 17,399 1.14 - Others 954 0.06 - - Others 22,128 1.29 - - 157 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-42 10 Venice-Treviso 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,356,789 1,475,871 1,597,284 Eligible voters in district 997,367 1,097,717 1,152,485 Actual votes (percent turnout) 955,319 (95.78) 1,054,432 (96.06) 1,076,716 (93.43) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 29,156 (3.05) 30,507 (2.89) 36,974 (3.43) District percent national vote 2.77 2.80 2.82 Seats assigned district 17 17 17 Electoral quotient 48,745 53,890 54,723 Seats won by whole quotients in district 14 15 14 Seats won by residuals in national pool 4 1 3 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 438,488 47.34 8 + 1 DC 466,092 45.52 8 - DC 464,157 44.64 8 - PCI 188,742 20.38 3 + 1 PCI 284,076 27.74 5 - PCI 263,046 25.30 4 + 1 PSI 102,686 11.09 2 - PSI 118,756 11.60 2 - PSI 111,713 10.74 2 - PSDI 62,322 6.73 1 - PSDI 47,434 4.63 - + 1 PSDI 47,155 4.54 - + 1 PSIUP 24,560 2.65 - - DP 18,552 1.81 - - PdUP 17,415 1.68 - - PLI 33,707 3.64 - + 1 PRad 11,925 1.16 - - PRad 41,300 3.97 - + 1 PRI 22,520 2.43 - - PLI 10,709 1.05 - - PLI 18,519 1.78 - - MSI-DN 38,779 4.19 - + 1 PRI 35,107 3.43 - - PRI 33,180 3.19 - - MSI-DN 30,778 3.01 - - MSI-DN 29,474 2.83 - - Others 14,359 1.55 - - Others 496 0.05 - - Others 13,783 1.33 - - Confidential 158 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 tAmmuential Table A-43 11 Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,140,574 1,134,383 1,152,514 Eligible voters in district 849,852 900,708 946,337 Actual votes (percent turnout) 778,027 (91.55) 846,083 (93.94) 856,815 (90.54) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 21,506 (2.76) 21,535 (2.55) 32,353 (3.78) District percent national vote 2.26 2.24 2.25 Seats assigned district 14 13 13 Electoral quotient 47,282 54,969 54,964 Seats won by whole quotients in district 12 10 11 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 3 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 347,284 45.91 7 - DC 365,838 44.37 6 - DC 343,654 41.68 6 PCI 133,866 17.70 2 + 1 PCI 209,269 25.38 3 + 1 PCI 192,591 23.36 3 PSI 96,331 12.73 2 - PSI 106,703 12.94 1 ? 1 PSI 74,561 9.04 1 PSDI 72,663 9.60 1 - PSDI 54,864 6.65 - + 1 PSDI 62,610 7.60 1 PSIUP 16,253 2.15 - DP 14,609 1.77 - PdUP 10,677 1.30 - PLI 23,625 3.12 - PRad 0 0 - - PRad 30,695 3.72 - - PRI 16,545 2.19 PLI 9,831 1.19 PL I 12,975 1.57 MSI-DN 42,049 5.56 - ? 1 PRI 27,222 3.30 PRI 22,881 2.78 - - MSI-DN 32,779 3.98 MSI-DN 30,601 3.71 - - Others 7,905 1.04 Others 3,433 0.42 - Others 43,217 5.24 - - 159 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-44 12 Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli 1972 1976 1979 District population 2,095,379 2,219,829 2,283,731 Eligible voters in district 1,617,010 1,736,158 1,777,675 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,580,906 (97.77) 1,691,887 (97.45) 1,713,852 (96.41) Blank and invalid ballots s (percent of total) 34,970 (2.21) 27,767 (1.64) 42,413 (2.47) District percent national vote 4.58 4.49 4.49 Seats assigned district 26 26 26 Electoral quotient 55,212 59,432 59,694 Seats won by whole quotients in district 23 24 23 Seats won by residuals in national pool 4 3 4 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 379,542 24.55 6 + 1 DC 430,104 25.85 7 - DC 413,764 24.76 6 + 1 PCI 693,342 44.85 12 PCI 819,224 49.23 13 + 1 PCI 802,158 47.99 13 PSI 119,636 7.74 2 PSI 147,273 8.85 2 - PSI 138,005 8.26 2 PSDI 90,814 5.87 1 + 1 PSDI 63,054 3.79 1 - PSDI 65,422 3.91 1 PSIUP 40,367 2.61 - - DP 15,542 0.93 - PdUP 16,642 1.00 - - PLI 54,730 3.54 - + 1 PRad 18,263 1.10 - PRad 49,385 2.95 - + 1 PRI 87,313 5.65 1 + 1 PLI 15,749 0.94 PLI 24,086 1.44 - - MSI-DN 65,043 4.21 1 - PRI 99,783 6.00 1 + 1 PRI 100,111 5.99 1 + 1 MSI-DN 52,331 3.14 - + 1 MSI-DN 45,539 2.72 - + 1 Others 15,149 0.98 - Others 2,797 0.17 - Others 16,327 0.98 - - Confidential 160 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uonnaennal Table A-45 13 Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,571,301 1,626,926 1,679,420 Eligible voters in district 1,211,340 1,292,359 1,333,688 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,173,962 (96.91) 1,249,363 (96.67) 1,267,675 (95.05) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 35,583 (3.03) 29,409 (2.35) 42,045 (3.32) District percent national vote 3.40 3.31 3.32 Seats assigned district 20 19 19 Electoral quotient 51,744 58,093 58,363 Seats won by whole quotients in district 17 16 16 Seats won by residuals in national pool 3 3 3 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 340,722 29.93 6 - DC 390,179 31.98 6 - DC 376,092 30.69 6 PCI 486,124 42.70 9 - PCI 579,845 47.53 9 + 1 PCI 569,457 46.46 9 + 1 PSI 100,912 8.86 1 + 1 PSI 110,022 9.02 1 + 1 PSI 110,261 9.00 1 + 1 PSDI 70,098 6.16 1 - PSDI 47,460 3.89 - + 1 PSDI 46,597 3.80 - + 1 PSIUP 32,780 2.88 DP 13,139 1.08 - - PdUP 13,612 1.11 PLI 38,773 3.41 - + 1 PRad 10,684 0.88 - PRad 29,594 2.41 - PRI 15,988 1.40 - - PL I 10,157 0.83 - PLI 16,121 1.32 - - MSI-DN 43,916 3.86 - + 1 PRI 23,605 1.93 - - PRI 22,908 1.87 - - MSI-DN 34,863 2.86 - MSI-DN 31,276 2.55 - Others 9,066 0.80 - - Others 0 0 - - Others 9,712 0.79 - 161 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-46 14 Florence- Pistoia 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,245,702 1,400,702 1,432,859 Eligible voters in district 1,027,377 1,106,146 1,133,129 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,000,032 (97.34) 1,072,055 (96.92) 1,084,523 (95.71) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 27,765 (2.78) 20,883 (1.95) 38,077 (3.51) District percent national vote 2.90 2.84 2.84 Seats assigned district 16 16 16 Electoral quotient 50,014 58,398 58,135 Seats won by whole quotients in district 14 15 14 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 288,685 29.69 5 DC 319,031 30.35 5 DC 304,654 29.11 5 PCI 438,360 45.09 8 PCI 529,458 50.37 9 PCI 506,156 48.37 8 - PSI 81,627 8.40 1 PSI 91,952 8.75 1 PSI 93,607 8.95 1 PSDI 43,382 4.46 + 1 PSDI 23,929 2.28 PSDI 23,290 2.23 - PSIUP 14,522 1.49 - - DP 13,220 1.26 - PdUP 14,582 1.39 PLI 26,197 2.69 - PRad 10,117 0.96 PRad 28,382 2.71 PRI 18,487 1.90 - - PLI 6,011 0.57 PLI 10,040 0.96 - - MSI-DN 47,428 4.88 - -I- 1 PRI 25,142 2.39 - PRI 25,649 2.45 MSI-DN 32,312 3.07 MSI-DN 28,222 2.70 - - Others 13,579 1.40 - - Others 0 0 - - Others 11,864 1.13 - - Confidential 162 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-47 15 Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,241,127 1,292,509 1,354,809 Eligible voters in district 949,894 1,011,541 1,035,617 Actual votes (percent turnout) 912,382 (96.05) 973,265 (96.22) 976,089 (94.25) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 29,390 (3.22) 23,663 (2.43) 39,947 (4.09) District percent national vote 2.65 2.58 2.56 Seats assigned district 15 15 15 Electoral quotient 51,940 55,858 55,067 Seats won by whole quotients in district 13 13 12 Seats won by residuals in national pool 3 1 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 296,254 33.55 5 + 1 DC 321,240 33.83 5 + 1 DC 303,637 32.43 5 PCI 323,410 36.63 6 - PCI 406,341 42.79 7 PCI 385,006 41.13 6 + 1 PSI 83,417 9.45 1 - PSI 101,642 10.71 1 - PSI 97,122 10.37 1 + 1 PSDI 46,743 5.29 - + 1 PSDI 24,803 2.61 - - PSDI 27,807 2.97 PSIUP 20,954 2.37 DP 12,275 1.29 PdUP 13,817 1.48 - - PLI 18,821 2.13 - - PRad 7,439 0.78 - - PRad 23,945 2.56 - - PRI 29,530 3.35 - + 1 PLI 5,652 0.60 - - PLI 8,984 0.96 MSI-DN 53,983 6.11 1 - PRI 31,167 3.28 - - PRI 30,498 3.26 MSI-DN 39,043 4.11 MSI-DN 35,430 3.78 Others 9,880 1.12 Others 0 0 Others 9,896 1.06 - - 163 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-48 16 Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto 1972 1976 1979 District population 799,331 779,886 806,939 Eligible voters in district 578,703 614,949 627,602 Actual votes (percent turnout) 563,443 (97.36) 598,595 (97.34) 602,965 (96.07) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 13,599 (2.41) 11,523 (1.93) 17,717 (2.94) District percent national vote 1.63 1.59 1.58 Seats assigned district 10 9 9 Electoral quotient 45,820 53,370 53,204 Seats won by whole quotients in district 9 9 9 Seats won by residuals in national pool 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 159,913 29.08 3 - DC 172,999 29.47 3 DC 164,226 28.06 3 - PCI 251,951 45.82 5 - PCI 293,040 49.91 5 - PCI 285,289 48.75 5 PSI 50,167 9.12 1 - PSI 60,510 10.31 1 PSI 59,938 10.24 1 - PSDI 21,142 3.85 - - PSDI 11,675 1.99 PSDI 12,896 2.20 - - PSIUP 13,399 2.44 DP 7,294 1.24 - - PdUP 7,309 1.25 PLI 10,299 1.87 PRad 3,605 0.61 - PRad 10,997 1.88 PRI 12,344 2.25 - - PLI 2,874 0.49 - - PUT 5,004 0.86 MSI-DN 26,824 4.88 PRI 14,896 2.54 - - PRI 14,571 2.49 MSI-DN 20,179 3.44 MSI-DN 19,680 3.36 - - Others 3,805 0.69 - - Others 0 0 - - Others 5,338 0.91 Confidential 164 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-49 17 Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,347,489 1,359,907 1,409,845 Eligible voters in district 975,043 1,049,455 1,102,747 Actual votes (percent turnout) 928,921 (95.27) 1,003,303 (95.60) 1,023,232 (92.79) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 30,449 (3.28) 26,602 (2.65) 43,735 (4.27) District percent national vote 2.69 2.66 2.68 Seats assigned district 17 16 16 Electoral quotient 47,288 54,261 54,416 Seats won by whole quotients in district 14 15 13 Seats won by residuals in national pool 3 1 4 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 354,708 39.48 7 - DC 381,223 39.03 7 DC 371,036 37.88 6 + 1 PCI 295,156 32.85 6 PCI 389,556 39.89 7 PCI 373,016 38.08 6 + 1 PSI 70,808 7.88 1 PSI 80,877 8.28 1 - PSI 77,604 7.92 1 - PSDI 39,321 4.38 - + 1 PSDI 27,957 2.86 - - PSDI 27,494 2.81 - - PSIUP 22,721 2.53 DP 10,826 1.11 - - PdUP 15,212 1.55 PLI 21,817 2.43 PRad 7,035 0.72 - PRad 22,829 2.33 - - PRI 33,525 3.73 - + 1 PLI 6,560 0.67 - - PLI 9,772 1.00 MSI-DN 47,109 5.24 - + 1 PRI 33,588 3.44 PRI 34,627 3.54 - + 1 MSI-DN 39,079 4.00 - + 1 MSI-DN 38,757 3.96 - + 1 Others 13,307 1.48 - - Others 0 0 - - Others 9,150 0.93 - - 165 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-50 18 Perguia-Terni-Rieti 1972 1976 1979 District population 957,150 918,945 949,252 Eligible voters in district 672,740 718,739 743,491 Actual votes (percent turnout) 644,035 (95.73) 688,905 (95.85) 696,423 (93.67) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 18,533 (2.88) 16,068 (2.33) 23,277 (3.34) District percent national vote 1.87 1.83 1.83 Seats assigned district 12 11 11 Electoral quotient 44,678 51,756 51,780 Seats won by whole quotients in district 10 10 10 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 2 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 201,618 32.23 4 DC 215,618 32.05 4 - DC 209,524 31.13 4 PCI 244,642 39.11 5 PCI 303,770 45.15 5 + 1 PCI 289,598 43.02 5 - PSI 60,907 9.74 1 PSI 74,571 11.08 1 PSI 75,187 11.17 1 PSDI 24,117 3.86 - PSDI 11,008 1.64 - PSDI 12,792 1.90 - - PSIUP 16,842 2.69 - DP 6,446 0.96 PdUP 8,526 1.27 PLI 10,414 1.67 PRad 3,865 0.57 PRad 13,671 2.03 PRI 16,005 2.56 - - PLI 3,054 0.45 - PLI 5,115 0.76 MSI-DN 44,362 7.09 - + 1 PRI 17,046 2.53 - - PRI 17,736 2.63 - - MSI-DN 37,182 5.53 - + 1 MSI-DN 34,447 5.12 - - Others 6,595 1.05 - - Others 277 0.04 - Others 6,550 0.97 - - Confidential 166 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 k.onimenual Table A-51 19 Rome-Viterbo-Latina-Frosinone 1972 1976 1979 District population 3,796,552 4,546,320 4,893,332 Eligible voters in district 3,045,065 3,413,948 3,584,800 Actual votes (percent turnout) 2,868,464 (94.20) 3,220,885 (94.34) 3,275,483 (91.37) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 70,054 (2.44) 61,704 (1.91) 83,191 (2.54) District percent national vote 8.32 8.55 8.59 Seats assigned district 47 53 53 Electoral quotient 57,110 57,439 58,041 Seats won by whole quotients in district 44 50 49 Seats won by residuals in national pool 4 5 5 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 963,134 34.42 16 + 1 DC 1,127,263 35.68 19 - DC 1,164,944 36.49 20 PCI 761,554 27.21 13 PCI 1,138,531 36.04 19 + 1 PCI 965,403 30.24 16 PSI 212,354 7.59 3 + 1 PSI 240,205 7.60 4 - PSI 274,332 8.59 4 + 1 PSDI 154,616 5.53 2 + 1 PSDI 105,134 3.33 1 + 1 PSDI 109,405 3.43 1 + 1 PSIUP 27,981 1.00 - - DP 44,528 1.41 + 1 PdUP 29,135 0.91 + 1 PLI 115,268 4.12 2 - PRad 57,709 1.83 1 - PRad 166,628 5.22 2 + 1 PRI 96,232 3.44 1 + 1 PLI 38,581 1.22 + 1 PLI 61,262 1.92 1 MSI-DN 413,437 14.77 7 - PRI 104,961 3.32 1 + 1 PRI 106,133 3.33 1 + 1 MSI-DN 298,643 9.45 5 - MSI-DN 257,877 8.08 4 Others 53,834 1.92 Others 3,626 0.12 Others 57,173 1.79 - - 167 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-52 20 L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,206,266 1,166,694 1,233,397 Eligible voters in district 847,753 909,082 996,896 Actual votes (percent turnout) 735,237 (86.73) 811,500 (89.27) 826,424 (82.90) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 20,966 (2.85) 21,562 (2.66) 34,771 (4.21) District percent national vote 2.13 2.15 2.17 Seats assigned district 15 14 14 Electoral quotient 42,015 49,371 49,478 Seats won by whole quotients in district 14 14 12 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 0 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 344,061 48.17 8 - DC 349,123 44.20 7 - DC 361,367 45.65 7 - PCI 192,601 26.96 4 - PCI 275,536 34.88 5 - PCI 246,080 31.08 4 + 1 PSI 49,004 6.86 1 - PSI 61,325 7.76 1 - PSI 59,751 7.55 1 PSDI 28,107 3.94 - + 1 PSDI 19,943 2.52 - - PSDI 20,536 2.60 PSIUP 9,791 1.37 - - DP 10,308 1.31 PdUP 8,372 1.06 - PLI 14,671 2.05 PRad 4,865 0.62 - - PRad 18,316 2.31 PRI 11,467 1.61 - PLI 5,083 0.64 - - PLI 6,829 0.86 MSI-DN 54,646 7.65 1 PRI 13,744 1.74 PRI 14,123 1.78 MSI-DN 50,011 6.33 1 - MSI-DN 46,195 5.84 - + 1 Others 9,923 1.39 - - Others 0 0 - - Others 10,084 1.27 Confidential 168 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Lontmential Table A-53 21 Campobasso-Isernia 1972 1976 1979 District population 358,052 319,807 332,914 Eligible voters in district 236,701 247,977 285,372 Actual votes (percent turnout) 194,373 (82.12) 211,452 (85.27) 213,070 (74.66) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 7,382 (3.80) 7,574 (3.58) 10,262 (4.82) District percent national vote 0.56 0.56 0.56 Seats assigned district 4 4 4 Electoral quotient 31,165 33,979 33,801 Seats won by whole quotients in district 4 4 4 Seats won by residuals in national pool 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 102,959 55.06 3 DC 103,396 50.72 3 DC 110,990 54.73 3 - PCI 32,430 17.34 1 PCI 52,956 25.97 1 PCI 43,658 21.53 1 PSI 9,484 5.07 PSI 13,618 6.68 - - PSI 14,927 7.36 PSDI 13,455 7.19 PSDI 7,349 3.60 PSDI 5,614 2.77 PSIUP 3,097 1.66 DP 3,266 1.60 - - PdUP 3,557 1.75 PLI 5,383 2.88 PRad 1,000 0.49 - - PRad 3,915 1.93 PRI 4,555 2.44 PLI 3,885 1.91 PLI 4,430 2.18 MSI-DN 13,403 7.17 PRI 6,220 3.05 - - PRI 4,203 2.07 MSI-DN 12,188 5.98 - - MSI-DN 10,535 5.20 Others 2,225 1.19 Others 0 0 - - Others 979 0.48 169 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-54 22 Naples-Caserta 1972 1976 1979 District population 3,070,570 3,387,888 3,668,673 Eligible voters in district 2,042,059 2,319,555 2,437,809 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,858,596 (91.02) 2,074,915 (89.45) 2,131,678 (87.44) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 53,833 (2.90) 37,365 (1.80) 76,790 (3.60) District percent national vote 5.39 5.51 5.59 Seats assigned district 38 39 39 Electoral quotient 45,119 49,696 50,119 Seats won by whole quotients in district 36 36 36 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 3 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 641,626 35.55 14 DC 739,177 36.28 14 + 1 DC 801,798 39.02 15 + 1 PCI 460,661 25.53 10 - PCI 730,693 35.86 14 - PCI 556,615 27.09 11 PSI 138,198 7.66 3 PSI 146,968 7.21 2 + 1 PSI 177,389 8.63 3 - PSDI 82,918 4.59 1 + 1 PSDI 59,694 2.93 1 PSDI 83,805 4.08 1 PSIUP 21,526 1.19 DP 32,127 1.58 + 1 PdUP 25,571 1.24 - + 1 PLI 42,568 2.36 - + 1 PRad 16,429 0.81 - - PRad 74,699 3.64 1 PRI 47,471 2.63 1 - PLI 22,311 1.09 PLI 24,362 1.19 - - MSI-DN 335,104 18.57 7 - PRI 53,408 2.62 1 - PRI 60,240 2.93 1 MSI-DN 233,566 11.46 4 - MSI-DN 207,990 10.12 4 Others 34,691 1.92 - Others 3,177 0.16 - - Others 42,419 2.06 - - Confidential 170 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-55 23 Benevento-Avellino-Salerno 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,690,189 1,671,460 1,751,717 Eligible voters in district 1,117,057 1,220,406 1,288,593 Actual votes (percent turnout) 946,045 (84.69) 1,046,082 (85.72) 1,085,418 (84.23) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 30,095 (3.18) 28,122 (2.69) 60,530 (5.58) District percent national vote 2.74 2.78 2.84 Seats assigned district 21 19 19 Electoral quotient 39,823 48,474 48,804 Seats won by whole quotients in district 19 17 17 Seats won by residuals in national pool 4 1 1 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 425,374 46.44 10 + 1 DC 467,888 45.96 9 DC 497,813 48.57 10 - PCI 157,698 17.22 3 + 1 PCI 257,129 25.26 5 - PCI 211,147 20.60 4 - PSI 82,553 9.01 2 - PSI 90,058 8.85 1 PSI 111,973 10.93 2 PSDI 43,012 4.70 1- - PSDI 43,459 4.27 - + 1 PSDI 44,958 4.39 + 1 PSIUP 18,728 2.04 DP 13,096 1.29 - - PdUP 14,724 1.44 PLI 29,554 3.23 - + 1 PRad 4,950 0.49 - PRad 18,677 1.82 - PRI 25,028 2.73 - + 1 PLI 17,054 1.67 - - PLI 12,966 1.27 MSI-DN 120,575 13.16 3 - PRI 24,585 2.41 PRI 19,479 1.90 MSI-DN 99,741 9.80 2 MSI-DN 74,446 7.26 1 Others 13,428 1.47 Others 0 0 Others 18,705 1.82 171 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-56 24 Bari-Foggia 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,928,531 2,008,580 2,197,950 Eligible voters in district 1,234,562 1,377,333 1,474,834 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,121,789 (90.87) 1,258,487 (91.37) 1,284,387 (87.09) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 32,909 (2.93) 34,093 (2.71) 47,085 (3.67) District percent national vote 3.25 3.34 3.37 Seats assigned district 24 23 23 Electoral quotient 41,880 48,975 49,492 Seats won by whole quotients in district 23 22 21 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 1 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 435,694 40.01 10 DC 497,345 40.62 10 DC 521,409 42.14 10 - PCI 301,295 27.67 7 PCI 398,490 32.55 8 - PCI 335,671 27.13 6 + 1 PSI 111,373 10.23 2 + 1 PSI 110,597 9.03 2 - PSI 126,313 10.21 2 - PSDI 44,730 4.11 1 - PSDI 41,317 3.37 - + 1 PSDI 51,469 4.16 1 - PSIUP 14,110 1.30 DP 12,729 1.04 - - PdUP 12,131 0.98 PLI 23,589 2.17 - PRad 8,781 0.72 PRad 31,407 2.54 - + 1 PRI 15,691 1.44 - PLI 12,920 1.05 - - PLI 18,874 1.52 - MSI-DN 133,305 12.24 3 PRI 22,352 1.83 - - PRI 23,712 1.92 - MSI-DN 119,863 9.79 2 - MSI-DN 102,668 8.30 2 - Others 9,093 0.83 - - Others 0 0 - - Others 13,648 1.10 - - Confidential 172 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 ? Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-57 25 Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,492,686 1,574,207 1,691,472 Eligible voters in district 1,010,147 1,141,404 1,202,198 Actual votes (percent turnout) 914,691 (90.55) 1,043,626 (91.43) 1,069,197 (88.94) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 27,657 (3.02) 30,048 (2.88) 41,853 (3.91) District percent national vote 2.65 2.77 2.80 Seats assigned district 19 18 18 Electoral quotient 42,239 50,678 51,367 Seats won by whole quotients in district 17 16 16 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 2 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 386,808 43.61 9 - DC 435,890 43.01 8 - DC 448,165 43.62 8 + 1 PCI 206,149 23.24 4 + 1 PCI 310,484 30.63 6 PCI 269,743 26.26 5 - PSI 87,013 9.81 2 PSI 94,200 9.29 1 + 1 PSI 104,474 10.17 2 PSDI 27,081 3.05 - - PSDI 28,049 2.77 - - PSDI 36,067 3.51 PSIUP 5,861 0.66 - DP 12,881 1.27 - PdUP 13,643 1.33 - - PLI 18,999 2.14 - - PRad 5,786 0.57 PRad 18,748 1.82 PRI 22,404 2.53 - - PLI 6,410 0.63 - PLI 11,178 1.09 - - MSI-DN 114,225 12.88 2 - PRI 21,339 2.11 PRI 20,431 1.99 MSI-DN 97,558 9.63 MSI-DN 92,580 9.01 1 + 1 Others 18,494 2.08 - Others 981 0.09 - Others 12,315 1.20 173 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-58 26 Potenza-Matera 1972 1976 1979 District population 644,297 603,064 618,312 Eligible voters in district 387,536 423,726 447,636 Actual votes (percent turnout) 340,466 (87.85) 375,119 (88.53) 378,467 (84.55) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 11,992 (3.52) 14,164 (3.78) 19,728 (5.21) District percent national vote 0.98 0.99 0.99 Seats assigned district 8 7 7 Electoral quotient 32,847 40,106 39,859 Seats won by whole quotients in district 6 7 5 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 1 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 161,476 49.16 4 + 1 DC 160,491 44.46 4 DC 156,485 43.62 3 + 1 PCI 81,858 24.92 2 - PCI 120,341 33.34 3 PCI 103,572 28.87 2 PSI 32,169 9.79 + 1 PSI 37,065 10.27 + 1 PSI 39,296 10.95 + 1 PSDI 15,948 4.86 PSDI 8,842 2.45 - PSDI 12,770 3.56 - - PSIUP 5,856 1.78 - - DP 4,317 1.20 PdUP 7,104 1.98 PLI 4,630 1.41 - PRad 1,572 0.44 - - PRad 5,949 1.66 PRI 2,850 0.87 PLI 2,454 0.68 PLI 3,293 0.92 MSI-DN 22,531 6.86 - - PRI 3,367 0.93 PRI 4,410 1.23 - - MSI-DN 21,778 6.03 - - MSI-DN 20,870 5.82 - _ Others 1,156 0.35 Others 728 0.20 Others 4,990 1.39 Confidential 174 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Table A-59 27 Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria 1972 1976 1979 District population 2,045,047 1,988,051 2,067,269 Eligible voters in district 1,247,229 1,377,466 1,508,930 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,042,914 (83.62) 1,161,150 (84.30) 1,168,782 (77.46) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) -39,084 (3.75) 42,129 (3.63) 54,883 (4.70) District percent national vote 3.02 3.08 3.06 Seats assigned district 25 23 23 Electoral quotient 37,178 44,760 44,555 Seats won by whole quotients in district 22 21 20 Seats won by residuals in national pool 2 2 3 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 392,790 39.13 10 DC 440,458 39.36 9 + 1 DC 475,879 42.72 10 - PCI 260,038 25.91 6 + 1 PCI 368,406 32.92 8 - PCI 297,384 26.70 6 - PSI 124,553 12.41 3 PSI 128,732 11.50 2 + 1 PSI 142,640 12.81 3 - PSDI 33,247 3.31 - + 1 PSDI 29,889 2.67 PSDI 35,712 3.21 - + 1 PSIUP 20,564 2.05 - - DP 16,773 1.50 - - PdUP 19,526 1.75 - + 1 PLI 16,394 1.63 PRad 5,538 0.50 - - PRad 21,612 1.94 PRI 20,271 2.02 - - PLI 7,652 0.68 - PLI 7,364 0.66 - - MSI-DN 122,381 12.19 3 PRI 23,602 2.11 PRI 18,540 1.66 MSI-DN 97,971 8.76 2 - MSI-DN 77,910 6.99 1 + 1 Others 13,592 1.35 Others 0 0 Others 17,332 1.56 - - 175 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-60 28 Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna 1972 1976 1979 District population 2,406,474 2,415,193 2,528,691 Eligible voters in district 1,599,371 1,758,700 1,870,890 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,388,561 (86.82) 1,541,462 (87.65) 1,547,497 (82.71) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 54,906 (3.95) 54,749 (3.55) 116,235 (7.51) District percent national vote 4.03 4.09 4.05 Seats assigned district 30 28 28 Electoral quotient 41,676 49,557 47,708 Seats won by whole quotients in district 27 25 24 Seats won by residuals in national pool 3 4 3 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 519,531 38.96 12 - DC 612,595 41.20 12 - DC 606,836 42.40 12 PCI 275,725 20.67 6 + 1 PCI 410,588 27.62 8 - PCI 309,154 21.60 6 - PSI 101,710 7.63 2 - PSI 124,241 8.36 2 PSI 144,528 10.10 3 PSDI 44,527 3.34 1 PSDI 47,268 3.18 + 1 PSDI 70,754 4.94 1 - PSIUP 39,135 2.93 - DP 15,553 1.04 PdUP 15,942 1.11 - - PLI 50,663 3.80 1 - PRad 12,948 0.87 PRad 39,526 2.76 - + 1 PRI 36,704 2.75 - + 1 PLI 29,253 1.97 - + 1 PLI 26,883 1.88 - - MSI-DN 243,661 18.27 5 + 1 PRI 43,220 2.91 - + 1 PRI 46,902 3.28 - + 1 MSI-DN 189,080 12.72 3 + 1 MSI-DN 135,534 9.47 2 + 1 Others 21,999 1.65 Others 1,967 0.13 Others 35,203 2.46 - - Confidential 176 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 kA/1111UCH dal Table A-61 29 Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta 1972 1976 1979 District population 2,314,527 2,265,522 2,441,904 Eligible voters in district 1,515,157 1,663,595 1,783,366 Actual votes (percent turnout) 1,253,286 (82.72) 1,393,628 (83.77) 1,388,416 (77.85) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 56,585 (4.51) 55,815 (4.01) 73,605 (5.30) District percent national vote 3.63 3.70 3.64 Seats assigned district 29 26 26 Electoral quotient 38,603 47,779 46,957 Seats won by whole quotients in district 26 23 22 Seats won by residuals in national pool 4 2 4 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 487,342 40.72 12 + 1 DC 580,189 43.37 12 - DC 594,800 45.24 12 PCI 262,524 21.94 6 + 1 PCI 366,743 27.41 7 - PCI 267,999 20.38 5 + 1 PSI 115,565 9.66 2 + 1 PSI 130,116 9.72 2 - PSI 131,539 10.01 2 + 1 PSDI 48,178 4.03 1 PSDI 43,830 3.28 - + 1 PSDI 57,089 4.34 1 - PSIUP 27,059 2.26 - - DP 15,633 1.17 PdUP 16,025 1.22 PLI 38,554 3.22 - + 1 PRad 12,790 0.96 - - PRad 42,724 3.25 - + 1 PRI 40,357 3.37 1 - PL I 19,634 1.47 PLI 25,567 1.94 - - MSI-DN 158,424 13.24 4 - PRI 43,775 3.27 - + 1 PRI 60,212 4.58 1 - MSI-DN 122,691 9.17 2 - MSI-DN 83,924 6.38 1 + 1 Others 18,698 1.56 Others 2,412 0.18 - Others 34,932 2.66 - - 25X1 177 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-62 30 Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro (Oristano) a 1972 1976 1979 District population 1,419,362 1,473,800 1,592,964 Eligible voters in district 916,949 1,046,035 1,101,657 Actual votes (percent turnout) 826,143 (90.10) 945,508 (90.39) 955,134 (86.70) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 24,525 (2.97) 15,380 (1.63) 29,715 (3.11) District percent national vote 2.40 2.51 2.50 Seats assigned district 18 17 17 Electoral quotient 40,080 48,954 48,706 Seats won by whole quotients in district 16 15 15 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 1 2 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 327,901 40.91 8 - DC 370,682 39.85 7 - DC 352,689 38.11 7 PCI 202,593 25.27 5 - PCI 330,585 35.54 6 + 1 PCI 293,535 31.72 6 PSI 65,289 8.14 1 - PSI 86,529 9.30 1 - PSI 82,345 8.90 1 + 1 PSDI 30,937 3.86 - + 1 PSDI 23,959 2.57 - - PSDI 30,142 3.26 PSIUP 22,626 2.82 - - DP 14,584 1.57 - - PdUP 12,236 1.32 - - PLI 26,655 3.33 - PRad 7,792 0.84 - PRad 31,918 3.45 -+1 PRI 19,993 2.49 - - PLI 10,294 1.11 - PLI 12,100 1.31 MSI-DN 90,547 11.30 2 - PRI 18,573 2.00 - PRI 17,703 1.91 MSI-DN 67,130 7.22 1 MSI-DN 57,860 6.25 1 Others 15,077 1.88 Others 0 0 Others 34,891 3.77 - - a The Province of Oristano was created in 1975. Confidential 178 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 uommential Table A-63 31 Valle d'Aosta 1972 1976 1979 District population 100,599 109,150 114,537 Eligible voters in district 79,053 86,031 87,821 Actual votes (percent turnout) 74,308 (94.00) 79,660 (92.59) 80,647 (91.83) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 5,402 (7.27) 4,369 (5.48) 7,145 (8.86) District percent national vote 0.22 0.21 0.21 Seats assigned district 1 1 1 Electoral quotient NONE NONE NONE Seat won by simple majority 1 1 1 1972 1976 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 34,083 49.47 1 PCI 26,748 35.53 1 ? PCI 28,886 41.92 ? PSI PSI 0 0 ? PDUP PSDI 0 0 ? ? DC 24,091 32.00 ? ? PSIUP 0 0 ? ? PRI PL I 3,462 5.02 ? ? UV b PRI 0 0 ? ? UVP c MSI-DN 2,475 3.59 ? RV DP d 20,234 26.87 UVP- MReg e PRad 2,020 2.68 MSI-DN 2,198 2.92 Others 0 0 a Unita Sinistra. b Union Valdotaine. c Union Valdotaine Progressiste. d Democrazia Popolare. e Union Valdotaine Progressiste pour la Reunification des Mouve- ments Regionalistes. 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC PSDI PRI 13,442 18.29 US a 23,909 32.53 UV b UVP c DP d PLI 33,250 42.24 1 MSI-DN 2,077 2.82 ? ? Others 824 1.12 179 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-64 32 Trieste 1972 1976 1979 District population 298,645 300,304 294,062 Eligible voters in district 235,375 241,074 239,456 Actual votes (percent turnout) 224,188 (95.25) 231,579 (96.06) 224,724 (93.85) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 6,303 (2.81) 4,771 (2.06) 6,604 (2.94) District percent national vote 0.65 0.61 0.59 Seats assigned district 4 4 4 Electoral quotient 36,314 37,801 36,353 Seats won by whole quotients in district 3 3 3 Seats won by residuals in national pool 1 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats DC 78,270 35.92 2 - DC 82,615 36.42 2 - DC 50,854 23.32 1 - PCI 54,345 24.94 1 PCI 65,007 28.66 1 - PCI 49,901 22.88 1 PSI 14,251 6.54 - - PSI 15,776 6.95 - PSI 8,338 3.82 - - PSDI 13,642 6.26 - PSDI 7,025 3.10 - - PSDI 5,127 2.35 - - PSIUP 2,850 1.31 DP 2,239 0.99 - - PdUP 1,490 0.68 PLI 16,959 7.79 - - PRad 6,931 3.06 PRad 13,572 6.22 - - PRI 9,443 4.33 - - PLI 4,504 1.98 - - PLI 2,193 1.01 MSI-DN 27,350 12.55 - ? 1 PRI 10,357 4.57 - PRI 3,800 1.74 - MSI-DN 23,064 10.17 - - MSI-DN 13,133 6.02 - AT a 62,704 28.75 1 Others 775 0.36 - - Others 9,290 4.10 - - Others 7,008 3.21 a Associazione Triestina. Confidential 180 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 F9UapljUO3 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Senate Table A-65 1 Piedmont 1972 1976 1979 Region population 4,434,802 4,541,271 4,538,020 Eligible voters in region 2,987,409 3,029,886 3,067,601 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,842,430 (95.15) 2,874,220 (94.86) 2,866,334 (93.44) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 148,364 (5.22) 113,841 (3.96) 183,500 (6.40) Regional percent of national vote 9.04 8.83 8.69 Seats assigned to region 24 25 25 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 n c, = :1 0. ft. 0 f-k-. ro' Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates DC 983,606 36.51 9 51.90 DC 1,004,108 36.38 10 54.17 DC 939,229 35.01 9 50.61 PCI- PSIUP 736,706 27.34 7 36.08 PCI 957,961 34.70 9 39.76 PCI 854,527 31.85 9 40.21 PSI 309,165 11.48 3 16.71 PSI 291,131 10.55 2 13.11 PSI 282,547 10.53 3 13.18 PSDI 206,620 7.67 2 10.52 PSDI 139,463 5.05 1 7.48 PSDI 152,946 5.70 1 7.52 PRI 96,267 3.57 0 0 PRI 124,986 4.53 1 8.23 PRI 124,819 4.65 1 8.07 PLI 230,796 8.57 2 18.51 PLI 99,920 3.62 1 8.51 PLI 140,307 5.23 1 15.69 MSI-DN 130,906 4.86 1 5.69 PRad 35,390 1.28 0 0 PRad 79,675 2.97 0 0 MSI-DN 107,420 3.89 1 7.87 MSI-DN 94,424 3.52 1 6.31 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 14,360 0.54 0 0 2 5 X 1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 ppUapuUO3 pproved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-66 2 Valle d'Aosta 1972 1976 1979 Region population 109,252 113,720 114,537 Eligible voters in region 72,743 75,473 77,066 Actual votes cast 66,555 69,059 70,226 (percent of total) (91.49) (91.50) (91.12) Blank and invalid ballots 5,597 3,964 8,026 (percent of total) (8.41) (5.74) (11.43) Regional percent of national vote 0.21 0.21 0.21 Seats assigned to region 1 1 1 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate a Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate a Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate a DC RV b UV c PSDI 30,296 49.70 1 DC RV b UVC UVP d PRI 22,917 35.21 1 UV e UVP d DP e PLI 37,082 59.62 1 PLI 2,926 4.80 0 PCI PSI PdUP 21,072 32.37 0 US f 19,814 31.85 0 MSI-DN 2,073 3.40 0 MSI-DN 1,806 2.77 0 MSI-DN 2,003 3.22 0 DP e 25,663 42.10 0 DP e UVP MR a 17,699 27.19 0 PRad 1,601 2.46 0 Others 3,301 5.31 0 a The region's one Senator is elected by majority vote. b Ragruppamento Valdese. c Union Valdotaine. d Union Valdotaine Progressiste. e Democrazia Popolare. Union Sinistra. g Union Valdotaine Progressiste pour la Reunification des Mouve- ments Regionalistes. Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 lepuapijuoj 25X1 1 iulluapuuop Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-67 3 Lombardy 1972 1976 1979 Region population 8,526,718 8,837,656 8,929,703 Eligible voters in region 5,375,903 5,578,858 5,724,503 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 5,169,312 (96.16) 5,355,016 (95.99) 5,442,167 (95.06) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 198,653 (3.84) 153,955 (2.87) 232,198 (4.27) Regional percent of national vote 16.44 16.45 16.51 Seats assigned to region 45 48 48 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 2,072,677 41.70 20 64.24 DC 2,171,018 41.74 21 61.90 DC 2,117,789 40.65 21 59.34 PCI- PSIUP 1,219,216 24.53 12 39.63 PCI 1,598,078 30.73 16 43.38 PCI 1,530,781 29.38 15 41.21 PSI 644,706 12.97 6 17.38 PSI 613,429 11.79 6 14.70 PSI 620,900 11.92 6 16.19 PSDI 265,065 5.33 2 8.86 PSDI 183,398 3.53 1 5.62 PSDI 217,704 4.18 2 6.51 PRI 157,474 3.17 1 8.77 PRI 185,901 3.57 1 9.07 PRI 162,090 3.11 1 7.64 pu 279,909 5.63 2 15.62 PLI 109,046 2.10 1 9.11 PLI 156,745 3.01 1 9.31 MSI-DN 303,817 6.11 2 14.37 PRad 48,679 0.94 0 0 PRad 154,257 2.96 1 5.73 MSI-DN 213,343 4.10 2 8.75 MSI-DN 186,412 3.58 1 7.08 Others 27,795 0.56 0 0 Others 78,169 1.50 0 0 Others 63,291 1.21 0 0 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 IMJUapljUOD Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-68 4 Trentino-Alto Adige 1972 1976 1979 Region population 839,025 866,377 873,995 Eligible voters in region 508,058 522,012 541,766 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 478,185 (94.12) 493,660 (94.57) 503,218 (92.88) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 23,246 (4.86) 18,667 (3.78) 22,553 (4.48) Regional percent of national vote 1.52 1.52 1.53 Seats assigned to region 7 7 7 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 1 1972 1976 1979 ..- .D. Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 185,854 40.85 5 59.30 DC 168,375 35.45 3 60.58 DC 160,634 33.42 3 58.35 PCI- PSIUP 35,956 7.90 0 0 PCI 60,820 12.80 1 18.40 PCI 55,372 11.52 1 16.68 PSI 37,968 8.35 0 0 PSI 43,835 9.23 1 13.16 PSI 32,960 6.86 0 PSDI 20,604 4.53 0 0 PSDI PRI 23,443 4.93 0 0 PSDI 14,281 2.97 0 PRI 7,210 1.59 0 0 PRI 9,115 1.90 0 PLI 8,229 1.81 0 0 PLI PLI PRad 6,581 15,897 1.37 3.31 0 0 0 0 MSI-DN 16,937 3.72 0 0 MSI-DN 12,669 2.67 0 9 MSI-DN 11,706 2.43 0 SVP 102,018 22.42 2 60.26 SVP 165,851 34.92 2 80.73 SVP 172,582 35.90 3 86.99 Others 40,163 8.83 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 1,537 0.32 iuDuaplluop Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 mjuapuuop Approved For Release 2007/12/17: - Table A-69 5 Venetia 1972 1976 1979 Region population 4,109,787 4,277,501 4,338,292 Eligible voters in region 2,558,972 2,643,515 2,751,182 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,432,578 (95.06) 2,538,380 (96.02) 2,592,521 (94.23) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 93,090 (3.83) 75,437 (2.97) 114,660 (4.42) Regional Percent of national vote 7.73 7.80 7.86 Seats assigned to region 23 23 23 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 1,245,737 53.25 14 64.74 DC 1,291,119 52.42 14 63.76 DC 1,272,142 51.34 14 62.27 PCI- PSIUP 434,839 18.59 4 33.10 PCI 572,425 23.24 6 38.39 PCI 559,446 22.58 6 36.72 PSI 253,899 10.85 2 15.39 PSI 261,355 10.61 2 13.82 PSI 246,369 9.94 2 12.55 PSDI 157,847 6.75 1 11.07 PSDI 113,270 4.60 1 9.35 PSDI 125,213 5.05 1 11.05 PRI 44,837 1.92 0 0 PRI 81,654 3.32 0 0 PRI 77,889 3.14 0 0 PLI 94,887 4.05 1 7.13 PLI 36,933 1.50 0 0 PLI 56,517 2.28 0 0 PRad PRad 19,474 0.79 0 0 PRad, NSU 53,637 2.17 0 0 MSI-DN 107,442 4.59 1 7.37 MSI-DN 85,741 3.48 0 0 MSI-DN 75,988 3.07 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 972 0.04 0 0 Others 10,660 0.43 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 g Table A-70 6 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1972 1976 1979 Region population 1,209,810 1,244,553 1,245,611 Eligible voters in region 853,783 860,892 871,346 Actual votes cast 785,641 799,666 805,314 (percent of total) (92.02) (92.89) (92.42) Blank and invalid ballots 25,626 24,046 31,275 (percent of total) (3.26) (3.01) (3.88) Regional percent of national vote 2.50 2.46 2.44 Seats assigned to region 7 7 7 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 1972 1976 1979 0-- a, Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 336,358 44.26 4 48.08 DC 348,177 44.89 4 49.66 DC 297,399 38.42 4 44.33 PCI- PSIUP 161,177 21.21 2 31.10 PCI 198,864 25.64 2 33.31 PCI 184,582 23.85 2 30.23 PSI 85,574 11.26 1 19.12 PSI 105,476 13.60 1 21.13 PSI 64,872 8.38 1 13.05 PSDI 67,003 8.82 0 0 PSDI PRI PLI 57,538 7.42 0 0 PSDI 45,219 5.84 0 0 PRI 19,331 2.54 0 0 PRI 17,871 2.31 0 0 PLI 31,196 4.10 0 0 PLI 11,102 1.43 0 0 MSI-DN 59,376 7.81 0 0 PRad 11,025 1.42 0 0 PRad 23,596 3.05 0 0 MSI-DN 45,483 5.86 0 0 MSI-DN 32,665 4.22 0 0 Asso. Trieste 61,911 8.00 0 0 Others Others 9,057 1.17 0 0 Others 34,822 4.50 0 1E9UapljUOJ 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 ? I A IV9UaptJU03 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-71 7 Liguria 1972 1976 1979 Region population 1,848,539 1,867,383 1,852,903 Eligible voters in region 1,306,832 1,309,579 1,321,860 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 1,229,308 (94.07) 1,238,082 (94.54) 1,217,928 (92.14) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 49,266 (4.01) 43,135 (3.48) 61,422 (5.04) Regional percent of national vote 3.91 3.80 3.70 Seats assigned to region 11 10 10 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 n 0 0 :21 56, Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 396,182 33.57 5 41.66 DC 406,436 34.01 4 40.46 DC 385,723 33.35 4 38.20 PCI- PSIUP 384,235 32.56 5 42.19 PCI 464,506 38.87 4 47.79 PCI 418,257 36.17 5 44.49 PSI 141,798 12.02 1 13.43 PSI 149,102 12.48 1 13.97 PSI 136,492 11.80 1 12.88 PSDI 67,243 5.70 0 0 PSDI PRI PLI 103,406 8.65 1 18.90 PSDI 42,528 3.68 0 0 PRI 41,594 3.52 0 0 PRI 42,493 3.67 0 0 PLI 76,183 6.46 0 0 PLI 38,521 3.33 0 0 MSI-DN 72,807 6.17 0 0 PRad 16,581 1.39 0 0 PRad 44,624 3.86 0 0 MSI-DN 54,916 4.60 0 0 MSI-DN 42,987 3.72 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 4,881 0.42 0 0 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Is 1E9U4p1JUOD Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-72 8 Emilia-Romagna 1972 1976 1979 Region population 3,841,103 3,935,834 3,963,151 Eligible voters in region 2,634,221 2,687,822 2,751,273 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,545,924 (96.65) 2,615,948 (97.33) 2,638,597 (95.91) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 82,395 (3.24) 63,123 (2.41) 86,641 (3.28) Regional percent of national vote 8.09 8.03 8.00 Seats assigned to region 22 22 22 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 665,881 27.03 6 38.00 DC 740,426 29.00 7 38.92 DC 711,580 27.88 6 37.62 PCI- PSIUP 1,126,206 45.72 11 51.32 PCI 1,231,925 48.26 12 56.72 PCI 1,229,204 48.17 12 53.60 PSI 221,406 8.99 2 13.68 PSI 234,478 9.18 2 14.23 PSI 224,489 8.80 2 13.17 PSDI 153,400 6.23 1 11.54 PSDI 102,563 4.02 0 0 PSDI 110,544 4.33 1 9.39 PRI 98,261 3.99 1 15.14 PRI 114,306 4.48 1 14.44 PRI 114,278 4.48 1 14.35 PLI 95,470 3.86 0 0 PLI 26,157 1.03 0 0 PLI 39,583 1.55 0 0 MSI-DN 102,905 4.18 1 5.94 PRad 19,657 0.77 0 0 PRad, NSU a 44,150 1.73 0 0 MSI-DN 80,247 3.14 0 0 MSI-DN 68,404 2.68 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 3,066 0.12 0 0 Others 9,724 0.38 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 mluaplluop 25X1 IMOUaptiUO3 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-73 9 Tuscany 1972 1976 1979 Region population 3,470,915 3,566,763 3,594,607 Eligible voters in region 2,379,162 2,430,932 2,482,823 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,290,970 (96.29) 2,351,426 (96.73) 2,360,143 (95.06) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 90,120 (3.93) 75,580 (3.21) 97,541 (4.14) Regional percent of national vote 7.28 7.22 7.16 Seats assigned to region 20 20 20 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 692,880 31.48 7 47.73 DC 730,045 32.08 7 42.21 DC 702,170 31.03 7 47.76 PCI- PSIUP 960,586 43.65 9 50.68 PCI 1,077,969 47.37 10 54.17 PCI 1,055,528 46.65 11 55.02 PSI 215,436 9.79 2 12.27 PSI 250,384 11.00 2 14.14 PSI 234,679 10.37 2 14.22 PSDI 101,747 4.62 1 6.75 PSDI PRI PLI 114,591 5.03 1 11.06 PSDI 60,882 2.69 0 0 PRI 55,549 2.52 0 0 PRI 64,787 2.86 0 0 PLI 52,980 2.41 0 0 PLI 24,787 1.10 0 0 MSI-DN 121,609 5.53 1 9.09 PRad 16,635 0.73 0 0 PRad, NSU a 38,150 1.69 0 0 MSI-DN 86,222 3.79 0 0 MSI-DN 75,575 3.34 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 6,044 0.27 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. lepuapguo 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 0 Table A-74 co Fr 10 Umbria 1972 1976 1979 Region population 772,601 795,218 805,329 Eligible voters in region 528,672 539,727 559,154 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 502,531 (95.06) 517,511 (95.88) 524,235 (93.76) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 18,728 (3.73) 13,935 (2.69) 20,620 (3.93) Regional percent of national vote 3.73 1.59 1.59 Seats assigned to region 7 7 7 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 ,--, o 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 159,378 32.94 3 45.92 DC 158,822 31.54 2 35.97 DC 153,413 30.46 2 34.30 PCI- PSIUP 210,205 43.45 3 41.30 PCI 237,588 47.18 4 52.00 PCI 233,211 46.31 4 51.79 PSI 53,283 11.01 1 9.71 PSI 58,687 11.66 1 12.81 PSI 59,134 11.74 1 13.44 PSDI 15,027 3.11 0 0 PSDI 7,698 1.53 0 0 PSDI 9,457 1.88 0 0 PRI 9,208 1.90 0 0 PRI 11,601 2.30 0 0 PRI 12,260 2.44 0 0 PLI 6,255 1.29 0 0 PLI 2,032 0.40 0 0 PLI 3,365 0.67 0 0 MSI-DN 30,447 6.30 0 0 PRad 2,323 0.46 0 0 PRad 6,752 1.34 0 0 MSI-DN 24,825 4.93 0 0 MSI-DN 22,331 4.43 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 3,692 0.73 0 0 I - ? Ig!luaPLIU?3 2 5X 1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 ,-' 1109UapljUOD pprove or e ease uuIiiii I. - 00100050006-7 Table A-75 11 Marche 1972 1976 1979 Region population 1,359,063 1,390,388 1,409,845 Eligible voters in region 902,352 917,237 964,248 Actual votes cast 853,516 877,399 894,129 (percent of total) (94.59) (95.66) (92.03) Blank and invalid ballots 37,869 29,944 45,939 (percent of total) (4.44) (3.41) (5.14) Regional percent of national vote 2.71 2.69 2.71 Seats assigned to region 8 8 8 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 ca. 25X1 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 331,846 40.69 4 45.92 DC 345,519 40.77 4 46.74 DC 334,444 39.43 4 44.86 PCI- PSIUP 284,346 34.86 3 41.30 PCI 336,226 39.68 4 44.59 PCI 330,767 39.00 4 45.00 PSI 72,024 8.83 1 9.71 PSI 71,396 8.43 0 0 PSI 71,537 8.43 0 0 PSDI 35,547 4.36 0 0 PSDI 23,302 2.75 0 0 PSDI 25,164 2.96 0 0 PRI 29,554 3.62 0 0 PRI 28,171 3.32 0 0 PRI 29,932 3.53 0 0 PLI 18,714 2.29 0 0 PLI 5,254 0.62 0 0 PLI 8,294 0.98 0 0 MSI-DN 43,616 5.35 0 0 PRad 4,579 0.54 0 0 PRad 13,991 1.65 0 0 MSI-DN 33,008 3.89 0 0 MSI-DN 31,609 3.73 0 0 Others Others 0 0 0 0 Others 2,452 0.29 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 * Table A-76 eD LS' 12 Lazio 1972 1976 1979 Region population 4,702,093 4,921,859 5,037,255 Eligible voters in region 2,886,332 3,037,859 3,178,384 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,692,720 (93.29) 2,856,273 (94.33) 2,919,780 (91.86) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 97,140 (3.60) 79,281 (2.78) 123,684 (4.24) Regional percent of national vote 8.56 8.77 8.86 Seats assigned to region 24 27 27 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 .-- t?..) Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 875,075 33.71 8 45.98 DC 1,006,180 36.23 10 44.10 DC 1,028,568 36.79 11 44.54 PCI- PSIUP 732,186 28.21 7 34.75 PCI 981,816 35.36 10 42.67 PCI 864,022 30.90 9 36.77 PSI 222,372 8.57 2 13.66 PSI 221,856 8.00 2 9.61 PSI 245,380 8.77 2 10.40 PSDI 143,909 5.54 1 11.47 PSDI 92,233 3.32 1 7.98 PSDI 104,739 3.75 1 8.96 PRI 97,077 3.74 1 5.28 PRI 100,675 3.63 1 5.89 PRI 101,452 3.63 1 5.54 PLI 118,363 4.56 1 12.27 PLI 44,232 1.59 0 0 PLI 62,538 2.24 0 0 MSI-DN 403,885 15.56 4 23.47 PRad 38,085 1.37 0 0 PRad 124,305 4.44 1 6.87 MSI-DN 289,259 10.42 3 14.37 MSI-DN 250,056 8.94 2 11.39 Others 2,713 0.11 0 0 Others 2,656 0.08 0 0 Others 15,036 0.54 0 0 Ig!JuaPiluo3 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 IERUaMJUOD Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-77 13 Abruzzi 1972 1976 1979 Region population 1,163,334 1,211,323 1,233,397 Eligible voters in region 777,156 784,278 864,162 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 673,788 (86.70) 699,723 (89.22) 712,450 (82.44) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 31,538 (4.68) 25,271 (3.61) 37,919 5.32) Regional percent of national vote 2.14 2.15 2.16 Seats assigned to region 7 7 7 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 304,658 47.44 4 49.40 DC 305,807 45.34 4 49.49 DC 312,667 46.35 4 51.22 PCI- PSIUP 173,145 26.96 2 33.85 PCI 229,860 34.08 3 40.40 PCI 213,670 31.68 3 37.70 PSI 62,461 9.72 1 10.60 PSI 55,788 8.27 0 0 PSI 56,568 8.38 0 0 PSDI 23,416 3.65 0 0 PSDI 16,863 2.50 0 0 PSDI 15,695 2.33 0 0 PRI 9,510 1.48 0 0 PRI 11,061 1.64 0 0 PRI 13,577 2.01 0 0 PLI 13,351 2.08 0 0 PLI 4,513 0.67 0 0 PLI 6,599 0.98 0 0 MSI-DN 55,709 8.67 0 0 PRad 3,450 0.51 0 0 PRad 11,175 1.66 0 0 MSI-DN 45,216 6.71 0 0 MSI-DN 39,773 5.90 0 0 Others 0 0 0 Others 1,894 0.28 0 0 Others 4,807 0.71 0 0 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-78 dt, E 14 Molise 1972 1976 1979 Region population 319,629 329,705 332,914 Eligible voters in region 216,645 213,476 247,295 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 178,563 (82.42) 182,900 (85.68) 185,431 (74.98) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 8,960 (5.02) 9,654 (5.28) 13,371 (7.21) Regional percent of national vote 0.57 0.56 0.56 Seats assigned to region 2 2 2 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 ,--? 4Q? 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 99,043 58.40 2 56.57 DC 93,535 53.99 1 51.79 DC 95,295 55.38 2 52.46 PCI- PSIUP PSI 41,835 24.67 0 0 PCI 52,922 30.55 1 32.41 PCI 39,280 22.83 0 0 PSI 12,716 7.39 0 0 PSDI 10,523 6.20 0 0 PSDI 6,421 3.71 0 0 PSDI 4,311 2.51 0 0 PRI 3,409 2.01 0 0 PRI 4,548 2.63 0 0 PRI 3,876 2.25 0 0 PLI 4,519 2.66 0 0 PLI 4,447 2.56 0 0 PLI 3,512 2.04 0 0 MSI-DN 10,274 6.06 0 0 MSI-DN 11,373 6.56 0 0 PRad 2,430 1.41 0 0 MSI-DN 9,977 5.80 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 663 0.39 0 0 2/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 IM)UVUUOD 25X1 imluapguop Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-79 15 Campania 1972 1976 1979 Region population 5,054,822 5,280,268 5,420,390 Eligible voters in region 2,832,246 2,934,413 3,082,703 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,518,013 (88.91) 2,612,929 (89.04) 2,662,853 (86.38) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 119,770 (4.76) 100,518 (3.85) 150,682 (5.66) Regional percent of national vote 8.01 8.03 8.08 Seats assigned to region 29 29 29 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 1972 1976 1979 ft) Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 858,429 35.79 11 46.82 DC 954,660 38.00 12 47.97 DC 984,934 39.21 13 48.89 PCI- PSIUP 567,873 23.68 7 34.32 PCI 798,191 31.77 10 45.92 PCI 657,744 26.18 8 37.60 PSI 221,223 9.23 3 12.15 PSI 209,753 8.35 2 12.37 PSI 255,731 10.18 3 21.46 PSDI 135,563 5.65 1 11.09 PSDI 97,165 3.87 1 11.36 PSDI 118,204 4.70 1 9.39 PRI 94,512 3.94 1 14.21 PRI 78,676 3.13 1 9.20 PRI 100,214 3.99 1 10.23 PLI 83,259 3.47 1 10.43 PLI 45,470 1.81 0 0 PLI 38,958 1.55 0 0 MSI-DN 422,128 17.60 5 33.66 PRad 15,216 0.60 0 0 PRad, NSU a 52,679 2.10 0 0 MSI-DN 313,280 12.47 3 20.39 MSI-DN 270,900 10.78 3 19.92 Others 15,256 0.64 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 32,807 1.31 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 2 5X 1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 S Table A-80 :711 (si r45. 16 Puglia 1972 1976 1979 Region population 3,562,377 3,771,329 3,889,422 Eligible voters in region 2,006,880 2,099,810 2,226,952 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 1,822,400 (90.81) 1,926,457 (91.74) 1,975,617 (88.71) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 75,524 (4.14) 73,482 (3.81) 104,768 (5.30) Regional percent of national vote 5.79 5.92 5.99 Seats assigned to region 21 20 20 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 1972 1976 1979 ,-- c" Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 686,567 39.30 9 48.55 DC 761,560 41.10 9 50.10 DC 776,234 41.50 9 46.74 PCI- PSIUP 461,658 26.43 6 36.40 PCI 582,221 31.42 7 40.31 PCI 518,333 27.71 6 37.03 PSI 193,066 11.05 2 16.23 PSI 177,893 9.60 2 13.23 PSI 198,106 10.59 2 14.18 PSDI 75,167 4.30 1 9.19 PSDI 66,812 3.61 0 0 PSDI 87,805 4.69 1 11.42 PRI 33,809 1.94 0 0 PRI PLI 45,840 2.47 0 0 PRI 41,991 2.24 0 0 PLI 53,451 3.06 0 0 PLI 24,485 1.31 0 0 MSI-DN 228,941 13.11 3 22.48 PRad 10,590 0.57 0 0 MSI-DN 186,761 9.98 2 13.05 MSI-DN 208,059 11.23 2 15.13 PRad, NSU a 26,990 1.44 0 0 Others 14,217 0.81 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 10,144 0.54 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. IR9UaptIJUOD 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 lulluaNu?3 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-81 17 Basilicata 1972 1976 1979, Region population 602,389 614,596 618,312 Eligible voters in region 349,688 354,873 374,762 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 308,762 , (88.30) 317,475 (89.46) 321,919 (85.90) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 14,540 (4.71) 15,467 (4.87) 21,969 (6.82) Regional percent of national vote 0.98 0.98 0.98 Seats assigned to region 7 7 7 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 135,810 46.16 4 50.75 DC 130,673 43.27 3 45.48 DC 133,837 44.62 4 45.96 PCI- PSIUP 75,042 25.50 2 30.73 PCI 99,162 32.83 3 35.43 PCI 87,109 29.04 2 32.69 PSI 37,744 12.83 1 24.84 PSI 36,309 12.02 1 23.47 PSI 38,176 12.73 1 26.08 PSDI 14,543 4.94 0 0 PSD! 8,993 2.98 0 0 PSD! 12,007 4.00 0 0 PRI 2,223 0.76 0 0 PRI PLI 5,509 1.83 0 0 PRI 3,306 1.10 0 0 PLI 5,968 2.03 0 0 PLI 3,179 1.06 0 0 MSI-DN 22,892 7.78 0 0 MSI-DN 20,113 6.66 0 0 PRad, NSU 3,902 1.30 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 1,249 0.41 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 fo. eD 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 0 Table A-82 CD ? 18 Calabria 1972 1976 1979 Region population 1,962,899 2,034,425 2,067,269 Eligible voters in region 1,115,585 1,140,525 1,257,160 Actual votes cast 938,132 971,072 981,243 (percent of total) (84.09) (85.14) (78.05) Blank and invalid ballots 52,383 48,421 67,474 (percent of total) (5.58) (4.99) (6.88) Regional percent of national vote 2.98 2.98 2.98 Seats assigned to region 12 11 11 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 .- oo 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 334,440 37.76 5 47.92 DC 365,414 38.63 5 44.79 DC 368,625 40.34 5 42.35 PCI- PSIUP 247,001 27.89 4 41.97 PCI 306,374 33.21 4 46.03 PCI 260,501 28.51 3 40.19 PSI 117,552 13.27 1 16.69 PSI 117,840 12.77 1 16.04 PSI 139,062 15.22 2 19.42 PSDI 27,493 3.10 0 0 PSDI 20,118 2.18 0 0 PSDI 22,865 2.50 0 0 PRI 15,346 1.73 0 0 PRI 12,269 2.18 0 0 PRI 12,633 1.38 0 0 PLI 8,777 0.99 0 0 PLI 5,300 1.33 0 0 PLI 6,152 0.67 0 0 MSI-DN 135,140 15.26 2 36.77 PRad 4,603 0.50 0 0 PRad, NSU 12,444 1.36 0 0 MSI-DN 99,733 10.81 1 21.49 MSI-DN 84,217 9.22 1 17.14 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 7,270 0.80 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. IZ9UapljUOD 25X1 ' 8 MlUapUU03 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-83 19 Sicily 1972 1976 1979 Region population 4,667,316 4,861,230 4,970,595 Eligible voters in region 2,809,466 2,882,528 3,074,663 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 2,385,671 (84.92) 2,472,648 (85.78) 2,493,620 (81.10) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 133,417 (5.59) 115,838 (4.68) 172,865 (6.93) Regional percent of national vote 7.59 7.59 7.56 Seats assigned to region 29 26 26 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal? Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate DC 810,223 35.97 11 41.91 DC 940,198 30.89 11 44.59 DC 934,772 40.28 12 45.41 PCI- PSIUP 502,603 22.32 7 29.41 PCI 644,022 27.33 8 35.78 PCI 519,190 22.37 6 33.31 PSI 257,022 11.41 3 20.03 PSI 229,562 9.74 2 19.47 PSI 260,693 11.23 3 19.91 PSDI 92,886 4.12 1 8.55 PSDI 88,472 3.75 1 6.29 PSDI 127,759 5.51 1 9.41 PRI 102,818 4.57 1 9.03 PRI 92,657 3.93 1 11.13 PRI 116,287 5.01 1 11.34 PLI 108,236 4.81 1 11.58 PLI 53,447 2.27 0 0 PLI 49,415 2.13 0 0 MSI-DN 378,466 16.80 5 28.10 PRad 17,509 0.74 0 18.95 PRad, NSU 54,327 2.34 0 0 MSI-DN 289,883 12.30 3 0 MSI-DN 225,356 9.71 3 16.97 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 1,060 0.05 0 0 Others 32,956 1.42 0 0 a Nuova Sinistra Unita. Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 5 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Table A-84 r.? 20 Sardinia 1972 1976 1979 Region population 1,468,737 1,552,767 1,592,595 Eligible voters in region 821,790 864,424 917,284 Actual votes cast (percent of total) 739,937 (90.04) 787,529 (91.10) 800,329 (87.25) Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total) 33,741 (4.56) 25,633 (3.25) 40,152 (5.02) Regional percent of national vote 2.35 2.42 2.43 Seats assigned to region 9 8 8 Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum 0 0 0 t.) c), Cz) 1972 1976 1979 Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates Party Total Percent- age Number of Seats Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates DC 292,057 41.36 4 44.52 DC 313,696 41.17 4 45.59 DC 301,261 39.63 4 44.47 PCI- PSIUP 162,161 22.96 3 33.70 PCI 262,463 34.45 3 40.92 PCI 244,427 32.15 3 37.05 PSI 79,105 11.20 1 12.17 PSI 81,713 10.73 1 13.78 PSI 71,999 9.47 1 13.03 PSDI PRI 31,931 4.523 0 0 PSDI PRI 35,985 4.72 0 0 PSDI 23,406 3.08 0 0 PRI 13,496 1.78 0 0 PLI 25,515 3.61 0 0 PLI PLI 11,078 1.46 0 0 MSI-DN 88,206 12.49 1 15.69 MSI-DN 68,039 8.93 0 0 PRad 16,417 2.16 0 0 MSI-DN 51,372 6.76 0 0 Others 27,221 3.86 0 0 Others 0 0 0 0 Others 26,721 3.51 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 tcpuopuuoj 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7 Confidential Confidential Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7