THE RED BRIGADES: A PRIMER

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• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Red Brigades: 25X1
A Primer
A Research Paper
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GI 82-10083
April 1982
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Red Brigades:
A Primer
A Research Paper
Information available as of 15 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared under DDI contract by
Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Terrorism Branch, Instability and Insurgency
Center, Office of Global Issues,
Confidential
GI 82-10083
April 1982
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Summary
A Primer 25X1
The Red Bri ades:
The Red Brigades, founded in 1969 by a group of young Marxists
disillusioned with the Italian Communist Party, have evolved into Italy's
most formidable terrorist organization. Their primary goal is to separate
Italy from the rest of Europe, ultimately creating a true Marxist state. The
Brigades have traditionally focused their terrorism on domestic targets and
issues; the kidnaping of General Dozier was a departure.
Prior to the Dozier operation, there were only 100 to 150 full-time Brigade
members, and probably not more than a dozen key leaders. The Brigades
were geared to conduct a few, well-orchestrated campaigns each year,
normally in the fall and spring. Operations were designed to appeal to
certain constituencies, inspire adherents, and gain recruits. At the time of
the Dozier kidnaping, the Brigades were attracting only a few dozen
recruits each year. The quality of recruits was progressively deteriorating
as students and intellectuals were replaced by dropouts and criminals.
The Red Brigades actively maintain and appear to seek foreign connec-
tions, but these have been of modest importance. There is no convincing
evidence that the Brigades respond to orders from abroad. West German
and Palestinian terrorists have provided weapons, but the Brigades do not
require extensive or advanced arsenals. Training consists primarily of
target practice.
Nor is there hard evidence of any external financial support for the
Brigades. In the past, finances came largely through bank robberies and
ransoms and, perhaps, through connections with organized crime and
narcotics traffic. Italian officials say the Brigades are now hard pressed
and that members have had to resort to jewelry thefts-a less preferred
method since the need to fence the goods raises the risk of apprehension.
While the Red Brigades will probably survive the Dozier episode, they
could evolve into a different sort of organization. Continued arrests by
police have taken a toll. Recruiting may replace the losses in terms of
numbers, but the origins and quality of the recruits will undoubtedly
change. The entrance of more factory workers and common criminals with
less ideological commitment and narrower goals-already on the upswing
prior to the recent crackdown-could ultimately transform the group. It
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might evolve into a militant union gang expressing worker grievances
through assassinations and sabotage. Alternatively, the Red Brigades could
gradually lose their political veneer altogether and turn into another Mafia.
The direction the Brigades take in the immediate future will depend on the
outcome of internal disputes. A victory by the militarist wing that
kidnapped Dozier could bring further actions against foreign targets in
Italy and renewed attempts to strengthen connections with other terrorist
groups in Europe. The rescue of Dozier and the losses suffered in the
process, however, could discredit this line of strategy and bring the Red
Brigades back to the domestic path followed prior to the Dozier kidnap-
ping. At the moment, the Red Brigades are on the defensive, but Italian of-
ficials cautiously avoid declaring that they have been destroyed. Officials
talk instead of a long struggle, and they are probably right.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
Preface
Vii
Introduction
I
Ideology
I
Strategy
2
Organization
3
Operations
7
Recruiting and Membership
8
Dissent and Discipline
9
Funding
10
Sympathy and Support
11
Foreign Connections
12
Outlook
14
Appendix
A Chronology of Significant Actions by the Red Brigades, 1972-81
17
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This primer is a compilation of baseline information about the Red
Brigades. To ensure broad distribution, it is being circulated at the lowest
level of classification consistent with presenting an accurate picture of the
group's goals, members, and activities. The primary source material for
this study comes from:
? The operational activities of the Red Brigades, which reflect the issues
that most concern them, the institutions they regard as enemies, the
people they consider their constituents, and their sensitivity to public
opinion.
? Prolific writings by group members; Red Brigade Strategic Resolutions
are lengthy (number 18 for instance has 300 pages), offering rich
analytical insights into the organization and its members.
Much of the information and analysis in this primer predates the rescue of
Gen. James Dozier. This event and related Italian police efforts are certain
to affect the Brigades in ways that are obscure at this juncture. Neverthe-
less, the primer examines the innards, the external characteristics, and the
objectives of the organization in which the post-Dozier Red Brigades-in
whatever mutation-will be rooted.
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The Red Brigades:
A Primer
Introduction
The formation of the Red Brigades in 1969 coincided
with a time of ferment and violence in Italy. Student
marches had failed, the barricades had come down,
and the large Italian Communist Party-which usual-
ly reaped the harvests of political discontent-had
turned its back on the "movement," by negotiating
"historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats
in a bid to share government power. The leader of the
neofacist party declared that a civil war had begun.
Left-wing militants prepared to leave their homes and
go underground to avoid the massive arrests that
would come if the fascists returned to power. Some
dropped out of sight to plan campaigns of terrorism.
In this setting, Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol,
Mario Moretti, and Albert Franceschini joined to
create a radical terrorist organization to challenge the
Italian Government. Their organization, the Red Bri-
gades, has become Ital 's most formidable terrorist
group
The kidnaping of General Dozier in 1981 brought the
Red Brigades international prominence. The abduc-
tion of the General increased speculation about the
possibility of a foreign hand directing Red Brigades'
operations, particularly among Italian politicians,
whose motives probably were self-serving. No one has
been able to find even a single piece of convincing
evidence that the Red Brigades receive orders from
abroad. The kidnaping of General Dozier was not
inconsistent with the ideology and strategy of the Red
Brigades; it was only a departure from their previous
modus operandi.
Ideology
The Red Brigades are true Marxists. Their ideology is
heavily influenced by the writings of Mao Zedong,
Lin Biao, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, and
Abraham Guillen. These later writers differ from
Renato Curcio, the illegitimate son of a maid and her
employer, grew up revering an uncle who had fought
as a partisan during the German occupation. Al-
though the uncle was killed in an ambush by fascist
gunmen in 1945 when Curcio was not quite four years
old, he remained an important figure for Curcio.
From prison, Curcio would later write to his mother
that he had picked up his uncle's rifle to continue the
struggle against the fascists. A voracious reader of
Marx, Lenin, and Mao, Curcio had participated in
student protests at Trento University.
Margherita Cagol was the daughter of a middle class
family. She loved music and Renato Curcio. They
worked hand in hand in the student struggle. Both
Catholic, they were married in 1969 and spent their
honeymoon in Cuba. When her husband was later
imprisoned, she led a daring raid to rescue him. In
1975, she died in a gun battle with police.
Mario Moretti had been a student in Milan. Upon
graduation, he worked as an electronics technician in
a factory where he became involved in union affairs
and leftist politics. He eventually went underground,
leaving behind his wife and son.
Albert Franceschini came from a militant Commu-
nist family. His grandmother had led a peasant
league in a farm labor struggle in 1922. His grandfa-
ther had fought the fascists, spent time in jail when
they ruled, fled to France, and returned to Italy as a
partisan. Franceschini's father was sent to a labor
camp under the Germans and ended up in Auschwitz,
from which he escaped in 1942. Franceschini himself
joined the Communist Youth Federation, then broke
with it because it was too conservative.
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Carlos Marighella's Blueprint for Terrorists
Marighella, in his Mini-Manual of Urban Guerrilla
Warfare, adapted concepts of rural guerrilla warfare
described in the writings of Mao and Che and applied
them to the city. The Mini-Manual exhorts its read-
ers to wage warfare in the cities and suggests tactics
and techniques. Marighella, however, does not spell
out a broad concept of urban guerrilla warfare, nor
does he explain how terrorist tactics will ultimately
lead to the seizure of political power.
Most of Marighella's readers, particularly those
outside the Third World, miss his point that urban
guerrilla warfare is a means of diverting government
forces while rural guerrillas establish themselves in
the countryside. Those readers include the Red Bri-
gades, who see armed struggle in the cities as the way
to revolution. The Red Brigades carry out no actions
in rural areas, nor do they seek rural support.
traditional Leninists in that they called for armed
struggle, and they developed theories of guerrilla
warfare that would enable militarily inferior groups to
defeat the armed forces of the state.
The Brigades believe that social and political change
are the products of historical forces; developments are
natural, evolutionary, inevitable, and irreversible. In
their view, the Brigades themselves represent a natu-
ral emergence. And they believe that their group will
eventually triumph because it is correctly aligned with
political, economic, and social forces that are now
becoming dominant.
The Brigades claim no responsibility for creating this
wave. History determines events, and history is imper-
sonal. Individuals do not shape events after their own
design. Significant human action can occur only
through roles within movements, not through individ-
ual actions. Individuals require identity and meaning
only by association with movements, and the move-
ment is everything. Red Brigade leaders place a high
premium on central planning, and while commitment
is valued, suggestions from below are not welcome.
There is no place for heroes.
doctrines and false idols of their foes.
Even though Red Brigade members see themselves
astride inexorable forces of history, they feel that it is
necessary to show the state as impotent in order to
confirm their beliefs and demonstrate the righteous-
ness of their cause. They delight in exposing what
they see as the hypocrisy of their opponents. An offer
by one corporation to make concessions to save the life
of a kidnaped executive was sarcastically noted as
evidence that capitalists are not true to their own
principles:
? If profit is the primary objective of corporations,
why offer concessions out of humanitarian concern?
? If humanitarian concerns ,are paramount, why ex-
ploit workers in the name of profit?
? Or do only executives' lives count?
Commitment to principles allows no compromise.
There is a religious quality to the Red Brigade
commitment; they need to demonstrate the superiority
of their beliefs. Their actions must reveal the false
Strategy
The Red Brigades follow a variety of strategies, with
terror as the essential element. They have a better
picture of their opponents than most other left-wing
terrorist groups, and they are more attentive to devel-
oping a genuine constituency within their own coun-
try. The Brigades are also patient. They are prepared
for a struggle lasting many years.
The Red Brigades, like most terrorist groups, are self-
conscious about their image. They want to appear
legal, and they use the language of government to
describe their actions. Hostages are not "killed," they
are "executed"-and only after they are "tried" and
"condemned" in a people's court. The Brigades do not
claim credit for some crime:; because they do not want
to appear to be ordinary criminals. Initiation and
training operations carried out by new recruits are not
claimed, because the risk of failure and of tainting the
group's credibility is too high.
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Many contemporary left-wing terrorist groups view
local struggles as part of a global war of liberation
from imperialism. The class enemy of the proletariat
is not the "national bourgeoisie," but the international
"imperialist bourgeoisie." Thus, a connection is pro-
vided between an urban guerrilla struggle in Latin
America, a rural guerrilla struggle in southern Africa,
the Palestinian struggle in the Middle East, and
terrorist actions in Western Europe. This connection
broadens the range of targets and has been used to
justify terrorist attacks against Western diplomats,
executives of foreign corporations, and American
military personnel in Brazil, West Germany, and,
most recently, Italy. The mainstream of the Red
Brigades have viewed the international connection as
solely rhetorical.
In the Red Brigade view, multinational corporations
are the operative arm of the imperialist bourgeoisie.
These outgrowths of capitalist society move freely
across national borders, while the state provides the
support system. The Red Brigades are committed to
overthrowing both the state and the multinational
corporations.
The Red Brigades believe that their capitalist enemy
is entering an irreversible process of deterioration that
will end with civil war and the inevitable triumph of
the proletariat. Efforts to restructure the economy can
only create new crises, particularly in Italy, which the
Red Brigades see as the weak link among Western
countries. Thus, Italy must be economically and
politically separated from the rest of Europe. It must
not, however, become part of the "socialist-imperial-
ist" area. The Red Brigades do not see Poland as the
model for the new society
Italian Communist Party (PCI) compromises with
Italy's Christian Democrats are seen by the Brigades
as revisionist. Because the PCI has defaulted in its
task of establishing a Communist society, the Red
Brigades feel they must forge a new Communist Party
through armed action. This "Fighting Communist
Party" (Partito Communista Combatante) will repre-
sent the proletariat and complete the task of over-
throwing the imperialist bourgeoisie in Italy
The Red Brigade vision of their final takeover of
power remains hazy. There is no clear indication of
whether they see a single battle between the forces of
"good" and "evil" or a long civil war. Renato Curcio,
the founder of the Red Brigades, wrote in 1969:
This is not the revolutionary movement in which
the takeover is an immediate problem to be consid-
ered, but rather it is a period of organization of
political power. It is adventurism to make people
believe that the takeover ofpower and the attain-
ment of an egalitarian society is something easy
and rapidly obtained. We must on the other hand
continuously underscore that it will be difficult
and long. It is not the Cuban example but the
Chinese example that faces us. That is, it is not
possible to realize the "happy island" with two
years of struggle. But it is possible across 40 years
of struggle.
Organization
The lowest unit of the Red Brigade organization is the
cell, which consists of three to five part-time terror-
ists. Several (usually two) cells comprise a brigade. A
brigade may have as many as 15 members. Each
brigade reports to a column which consists of regular
and part-time terrorists. Each column has responsibil-
ity for a specific geographic area, and each reflects
different tendencies. We know of active columns in
Rome, Milan, Venice, and Naples; there are other
columns in Turin and Genoa, and there is a column
inside Italy's prison system referred to as the Prison
Front. Areas without columns are managed by Re-
gional Revolutionary Committees, the seeds of future
columns. In 1980, there were Regional Revolutionary
Committees in Bologna and Florence.
Red Brigade columns try to generate subcolumns that
could become independent columns. For example, the
Naples Column, itself an offshoot of the Rome Col-
umn, may have spawned new subcolumns in Barletta,
Brindisi, and Sicily. The Genoa Column has created
subcolumns in Savona and in the Imperia and La
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Major Red Brigade Columns
Rome 20/Survived government offen- Universities/ Political figures
sive in 1980; unsuccessfully intellectuals
sought more autonomy for local
columns in 1979
Naples 25/Exploit local issues-labor Created from Political figures
agitation "corruption" in earth- split in Rome
quake relief Column
Milan-The 30/Attempts to exploit griev-
Walter Alasia ances of factory workers
Column
Venice Currently defunct/Focuses on
economic issues
Prison Front 25/Column located inside Ital-
ian prison system
Blue-collar work- Industrial managers;
ers union leaders; jour-
nalists
Proletariat and Industrial managers;
students from government bureau-
northern universi- crats
ties
Imprisoned Bri- Magistrates; prison
gades' members officials, wardens
and doctors
Kidnaped/murdered Aldo Moro in
1978
Kidnaped Ciro Cirillo, the political
boss of Naples, in 1981
Kidnaped Alfa Romeo executive in
19,81 and demanded the rehiring of
500 laid-off workers
Kidnaped and murdered Monte-
dison executive in 1981; kidnaped
General Dozier
Recruiting, vetting prospective
members
Spezia areas. Italian authorities believe that the Red
Brigades also tried to build a column on the island of
Sardinia; several of the Dozier kidnapers had been
active there.
The Red Brigades have two support units called
"fronts":
? The Front of the Masses provides intelligence and
research. It consists of three special interest units
that investigate operational opportunities; the Fac-
tory Brigades focus on the industrial area; the
Political Party Brigades provide information on the
political arena; and the Triple Brigades concentrate
on police, judicial, and prison affairs.
? The Logistics Front supports all of the columns. It
provides weapons, ammunition, documents, commu-
nication equipment, and has charge of codes. It also
disburses salaries and provides medical treatment.
In addition, the Logistics Front identifies possible
targets for theft. Some operations (arsenal thefts
and armed robberies) may be carried out jointly by
members of the Logistics Front and members of the
local column.
Columns and fronts report to the Executive Commit-
tee. two representatives
from each column belong to the Executive Commit-
tee. The Executive Committee:
? Approves all operational plans submitted by the
columns.
? In large operations, assumes direct operational
control.
? Is in charge of finances; each column submits a
quarterly budget to the Executive Committee,
which then directs the Logistics Front to make
disbursements.
? Is in charge of liaison with other terrorist groups in
Italy and elsewhere.
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At the top of the Red Brigade organization is the
Strategic Directorate. It meets only a few times a year
to set policy and strategy, which it communicates in
its lengthy Strategic Resolutions. Members of the
Executive Committee, columns, and fronts are all
theoretically represented. Italian officials estimate
that the Strategic Directorate has at least 10 mem-
bers, but actual control of the organization may be in
the hands of no more than five of the most expe-
rienced and able managers.
The role played by the imprisoned members of the
"historic nucleus," the founders of the Red Brigades,
is not clear. In the late 1970s, the Red Brigades
considered that any member who had been captured
was considered demobilized. Red Brigade members in
prison reportedly lose their decisionmaking power.
Most observers, however, believe that the founding
fathers still play an important leadership role. Several
are believed to still hold membership in the Strategic
Directorate, and the members of the historic nucleus
imprisoned at Asinara (a maximum security prison
located on a small island off the coast of Sardinia)
prevailed in the 1979 dispute with leaders of the
Rome Column. Forty-one Red Brigade members now
imprisoned at Palmi are known to have voted on
another factional dispute shortly before the Dozier
kidnaping.
The organization evolved by the Red Brigades has
certain advantages. By allowing two persons to repre-
sent each unit at the next higher echelon, the organi-
zation can recover more rapidly from individual ar-
rests. The hierarchy of cells, brigades, and columns
permits growth. The structure creates many small
group leaders and allows a degree of local autonomy.
It keeps new recruits at the fringe but allows for the
promotion of the most dedicated. Its top management
is comprised of men who have direct operational
responsibilities.
The organization of the Red Brigades implies a more
formal hierarchy than may exist. Column leaders,
front leaders, members of the Executive Committee,
and members of the Strategic Directorate are. often
the same people. Although theoretically there are 25
to 30 management positions, there probably are not
Decisionmaking begins with discussions within the
Strategic Directorate regarding the future direction
of Red Brigade operations. On the basis of these
discussions, the Directorate issues a major document,
usually a numbered Strategic Resolution. In these
Resolutions, the leadership assesses current condi-
tions in Marxist terms, describes the situation of the
Red Brigades, and provides the political line for the
next offensive. Targets are identified, but only in a
general way. Strategic Resolution No. 17 issued in
the summer of 1981, for example, identified NATO
as a future target. These documents are descriptive
and interpretative; they do not provide specific oper-
ational guidance or enjoin Red Brigade members to
act. Translation of Strategic Resolutions into march-
ing orders requires an additional step, probably at the
level of the Executive Committee.
In accordance with the line laid down in the Strategic
Resolutions, the Front of the Masses identifies possi-
ble targets. Then the columns select the target and
plan the actual operation. The operational plan is
submitted to the Executive Committee for approval.
If the Executive Committee approves the plan, it
mobilizes the necessary resources, augmenting the
column with support from the Logistic Front and, if
required, from the Executive Committee itself The
Fronts, under the direction of the Executive Commit-
tee, are the principal coordinating bodies of the Red
Brigades.
The entire Executive Committee may remain in
permanent session during a major operation. It did so
during the Moro kidnaping and probably also during
the Dozier kidnaping. A decision to kill a captive
almost certainly involves consulting the Executive
Committee or polling the columns.
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 Organization of the Red Brigades
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Factory
Brigades
Political Party
Brigades
Triple
Brigades
Walter Alasia Venice
Columna Columna
Regional Revolutionary Rome
Committee/Bolognaa Columna
Prison Naples
Front Columna
Turin Genoa
Columna Columna
aA typical revolutionary committee or
Regional Revolutionary column has a brigade and two cells.
Committee/Florence a
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more than a dozen key leaders in the entire organiza- responsible but do not claim credit, the percentage of
tion. Moreover, careful analysis of the linguistic style Red Brigade actions directed against human targets is
of Red Brigades documents suggests that decisions high.
are made by a few dominant individuals.
Operations
Red Brigade activity follows a seasonal pattern, with
peaks in the spring and fall corresponding to the
group's announced spring and autumn campaigns.
Each campaign has a theme which is described in a
Strategic Resolution that precedes the campaign. The
theme of the spring 1978 campaign was attacking the
"heart of the state." The Red Brigades kidnaped Aldo
Moro in March of that year. Strategic Resolution No.
17 pronounced NATO to be the target of the autumn
1981 campaign; Dozier was kidnaped in December.
The Red Brigades operate within a limited tactical
repertoire. Assassinations, kidnapings, and leg shoot-
ings account for about three-fourths of their oper-
ations. Arson, thefts, and a few bombings account for
the rest. The Red Brigades have not carried out any
hijackings, nor have they barricaded themselves with
hostages. They are sensitive to public opinion, and
they select their targets carefully. During an oper-
ation, the leader carries the automatic weapon and
grenades, not simply because of the firepower they
provide him, but because he is responsible for avoid-
ing fatalities among bystanders. If an operation seems
likely to imperil people other than the intended target,
it is abandoned. On the other hand, when a Brigade
operation results in multiple fatalities, as when Aldo
Moro's five bodyguards were killed, it is because the
terrorists specifically want to use maximum violence.
Moro could easily have been kidnaped at another time
when he was not protected.
Of the 439 actions credited to the Red Brigades
during the 1970s, about 30 percent were directed
against people, the rest against other targets. The
group decided to concentrate its attacks on people in
1976. During the last five years (1977-81), approxi-
mately three-fourths of the Red Brigade attacks were
directed against persons rather than property. While
this does not include the many bank robberies and
other thefts for which the Red Brigades may be
Kidnapings are a major tool of the group. In most of
their early kidnapings, the Brigades released their
hostages within a day or two. With the kidnaping of
Mario Sossi, an Assistant State Attorney, in 1974,
Red Brigade kidnapings entered a new, more serious
phase. Their hostage incidents have averaged 55 days
in duration. In recent kidnapings, hostages have been
subjected to "trials" and exploited for propaganda
purposes. Invariably, the hostage is judged guilty and
condemned. Only then do the Red Brigades announce
their decision-to release the hostage if concessions
are made or to kill him.
In contrast to other terrorist groups, the Red Brigades
carry out few bombings. Bombings do not suit their
strategy or philosophy. The group has passed through
the "armed propaganda" stage, and it now empha-
sizes such "quality" operations as the kidnapings of
prominent persons. Bombs are indiscriminate weap-
ons; they kill bystanders. They are, in the words of the
group's founder, a "fascist trademark."
On occasion, however, the Red Brigades have tried to
use bombs or other less discriminate weapons to kill
large numbers of carabinieri or police, but without
much success. In January 1980, members of the Red
Brigades bombed a carabinieri barracks in Rome, but
there were no deaths. In May of the same year, the
terrorists fired a 3.5-inch rocket at a carabinieri
headquarters in Milan, again without great effect.
The group also has carried out bombings as diversion-
ary actions or to support other operations. When the
Red Brigades have used bombs, the devices have
generally been small and technically unsophisticated.
The Red Brigades have employed arson as a mode of
economic warfare. Between 1975 and 1979, the group
claimed responsibility for 11 fires at Fiat plants.
a high percentage of Red
Brigade attacks were directed against Italy's largest
private corporations; this includes attacks on persons,
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facilities, and bank robberies carried out for logistical,
not political, purposes. Of the 184 persons attacked by
the Red Brigades, law-enforcement personnel-police
and carabinieri-have been the most frequent targets,
followed by judges, factory managers, prison officials,
political figures, blue-collar workers (often low-rank-
ing union officials), and journalists. The Red Brigades
have never killed a woman, although they did kidnap
and humiliate a Christian Democrat Councilwoman.
The assassinations, kidnapings, leg shootings, and the
other major terrorist operations for which the Red
Brigades claim credit represent the tip of the iceberg.
Italy is also subject to the initiation rites and training
missions the Red Brigades carry out, the many "mini-
kidnapings" in which terrorists abduct a factory
manager, photograph him with a Red Brigade sign
around his neck, then let him go; the firebombings of
managers' cars; the office break-ins to gain intelli-
gence or simply to demonstrate the group's capability
to strike; the many small acts of sabotage; the beat-
ings; the telephoned threats; the propaganda oper-
ations in the factories; the distribution of leaflets; the
posting of huge banners expressing support for the
Red Brigades; or the murders of informants in prison
that are often covered by prison riots instigated by the
Red Brigades.
All these actions contribute to a pervasive atmosphere
of fear. Frightened factory managers distance them-
selves from corporate decisions. Good workers are
warned to work more slowly and to think more about
the safety of their families. Of the hundreds of men on
a shift, not one sees who puts up a 20-foot Brigade
banner. Union men are scared; the unions are infil-
trated. Judges are fearful, and lawyers are reluctant
to take cases. Informants stop talking. Journalists are
afraid to write too critically about the Red Brigades.
The Red Brigades speak of eventual civil war. To
seriously challenge the state, they must first inspire,
militarize, and organize their potential followers, and
they must discipline those followers to the dictates of
the armed party they want to create. The Red
Brigades direct each offensive toward that goal. Every
major operation is calculated to appeal to some
potential constituency in Italy, to inspire adherents, to
gain a few recruits, and to purchase political space.
They kidnap, maim, and kill to build a political
movement.
Recruiting and Membership
The Red Brigades draw their recruits from a deep
reservoir of disaffected Italians. From the many thou-
sands of sympathizers-several thousand of whom are
willing to provide support-the Red Brigades enlist a
few dozen. The recruiting process is slow and cau-
tious. It begins with a careful selection of potential
new members in the universities, the factories, and the
prisons. The terrorists review the candidate's political
beliefs, his determination, and his activism. If the
candidate looks good, the local column authorizes an
approach.
The Red Brigades have demonstrated an impressive
ability to replace their losses. Brigade strength at the
time of the Dozier kidnaping-100 to 150 full-time
combatants living underground, plus about 500 part-
time members who are workers by day and terrorists
by night-represent a remarkable comeback for the
group, which suffered serious losses in 1980 when
police arrested nearly 2, 0,00 terrorists from a variety
of groups.
The increased recruitment of factory workers and
common criminals whose political commitment may
be weak poses a problem. Because the ideological
dedication of such people is low, the Red Brigades
fear that if they are captured they will readily join the
ranks of the so-called repentants and will provide
information to the police. Thus, new recruits are not
brought into the inner circle that provides political
direction for the group, but are used to perform low-
level duties
A new recruit may be asked to commit a crime as a
test of his bona fides. He thereby becomes a criminal.
This practice screens infiltrators, since Italian law
grants no immunity to undercover agents or inform-
ants working for the government.
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"Justicialists" Naples Column Prison Front Politically oriented. Views aligned Have upper hand in disputes with
with "historic nucleus." Criticized Venice and Milan Columns because of
operations against economic targets support of "historic nucleus" and
as unrevolutionary. strong financial position.
"Economicists" Milan-Walter Alasia Column Later generation Brigades mem-
bers. Tough, but stupid. Focus on
economic targets to enhance posi-
tions of workers.
"Militarists" Executive Committee Later generation. Tough, but stu- Asserted leadership with Dozier
Venice Column pid. Claim to be true Marxists- kidnaping.
Rome Column Leninists; rigid in ideology. Believe
Remnants of Genoa Column in centralized struggle. Value links
with other terrorist groups.
"Movementists" Members of Rome and Venice Believe in decentralized struggle Smallest faction.
Columns that permits Red Brigades to exploit
problems in specific sectors such as
factories and persons.
Dissent and Discipline
Like many other terrorist organizations, the Red
Brigades suffer from internal divisions and dissent.
There are continuing tensions between the columns
and the national leadership. Members often disagree
on strategy. As noted, divisions also occur along
generational lines.
In 1979, when members of the Rome Column at-
tempted to overthrow the original leaders, the dissi-
dents wanted the leadership to dissolve itself in a
broader revolutionary movement. The division was
essentially an argument between generations. The
dissenters were second-generation recruits whose
leaders had served for several years in the Front Line.
They wanted more freedom of action for the local
columns, and they rejected big terrorist operations.
Instead, they wanted many low-level actions related
to local issues that people could easily understand.
The dissenting faction also wanted to associate the
terrorist group with other causes, including the femi-
nist movement. It rejected the elitism of the older
generation. It wanted to build a grass-roots organiza-
tion, encouraging participants to carry out individual
acts of sabotage. It consisted of populists or "move-
mentists" typical of the 1970s.
The historic leadership-the "justicialists"-repre-
sented the committed revolutionaries of the 1960s;
they were, and are, the Stalinists of the organization.
Their political grounding and powers of reasoning are
superior to those of the dissenting faction. Class
struggle, not other causes, is for them the central
theater of combat. They branded the dissenters as
"economicists," a pejorative term in Marxist-Leninist
jargon for those who attribute primary importance to
economic order rather than political issues. A Com-
munist society, in the historic leadership's view, is
constructed from the top down, not the bottom up.
The party leads the proletariat, it does not meld with
it. Strategic planning, not spontaneity, makes it possi-
ble to strike at the heart of the state, and strategic
planning is possible only through central manage-
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The historic leadership won the debate, but tension
remained. The spring offensive of 1981 showed that
some of the columns were concentrating on practical
economic issues. The Venice and Milan columns-the
militarists-kidnaped corporate executives to further
develop a constituency among factory workers in the
northern part of Italy. The Naples and Rome columns
concentrated on political targets. The Red Brigades
warned of an autumn offensive, but by late fall it had
carried out no major operations, and observers theo-
rized that the group was in another period of discus-
sion and debate.
While organizational discipline is difficult to main-
tain, Red Brigades' leaders manage to retain control
by a variety of means. The opinions of the imprisoned
historic leadership still carry weight, and their superi-
or political grounding and intellect make them formi-
dable opponents in a debate. The organization's care-
ful recruiting process ensures that only those who
totally accept Red Brigade principles and demon-
strate a willingness to obey orders can gain admit-
tance to inner circles of organization. Careful selec-
tion for promotion probably further guarantees that
those who gain leadership positions think alike.
The Red Brigade leaders are also frontline command-
ers; this gives them credibility that is important to
lower echelon leaders and followers. It also means
that national leaders command men, guns, and other
resources of their own; they are not without real
power in an internal dispute. The fronts, particularly
the Logistics Front, are important levers of internal
discipline-all columns depend on the Logistics Front
for money and other kinds of support. And money
does figure in internal disputes. The Naples Column
refused to share a $1.2 million ransom it received with
other columns.
When other measures to bring the dissidents into line
fail, the leadership may try to eliminate them by
informing on them. Italian officials claim that they
received tips that enabled them to arrest a number of
dissenters during the debate of 1979. The arrest of a
dissenter not only eliminates him from the field, but
brings him into the prison system where the historic
leaders and the Prison Front exercise more direct
power. We do not know if dissidents are ever mur-
dered in prison; repentants who cooperate with police
are. Members of repentants' families may be threat-
ened or killed as well.
Funding
Salary and support for a full-time Red Brigade
member probably totaled $1,000 to $1,250 per month
in 1980. An annual budget for a regular strength of
100 to 150 would be between $1.2 and $2.2 million,
plus the cost of supporting several hundred part-time
terrorists.
The Red Brigades get funds primarily through bank
robberies and ransoms collected for kidnap victims. In
1981 they reportedly robbed' the telephone company
in Rome of $600,000, and they received a ransom of
about 1.45 billion lire (about $1.2 million) for Ciro
Cirillo, the political boss of Naples. Terrorists have
used links with organized crime for ransom negotia-
tions and to launder money. The terrorists may also
obtain funds through their organized crime connec-
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In their early years
the Red Brigades and similar groups may have re-
ceived financial backing from left-wing sympathizers
such as Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a wealthy Italian
publisher who was killed while attempting to plant
explosives on an electrical pylon
the :fled Brigades now are
financially hard pressed. They have been forced to
undertake jewelry thefts as well as bank robberies.
These thefts entail much greater risks, since stolen
jewelry must be fenced, and fencing requires further
contacts with the criminal underworld.
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Observers have speculated about the possibility of
external economic support-the USSR is frequently
mentioned-but there is no solid evidence of outside
financial support.
if the Red Brigades had financial patrons, they
would not be running the risks of bank robberies and
jewel heists.
The bank robberies provide most of the Red Brigade
funding, and Brigadists may be responsible for more
bank robberies than the Italian police credit them
with. It is impossible to know how many armed
robberies they have declined to claim responsibility
for out of a desire to avoid sullying the Red Brigade
banner with common criminal activity.
Sympathy and Support
Red Brigade operations are calculated to appeal to
several specific groups of potential supporters:
? Marginal or uncertified workers who constitute the
clandestine labor force.
? University students who face poor job prospects.
? The street people.
? PCI members discontented with the moderate turn
of the PCI.
? Italy's prison population.
The Red Brigades draw their main support from the
industrial cities of the north, principally Venice, Pad-
ua, Milan, Turin, and Genoa. At Porto Marghera, a
large industrial zone adjacent to Venice and consid-
ered by many to be the ideological headquarters of
Italian terrorism, approximately 3,000 workers-
about 15 percent of the work force-are involved in
the radical workers' movements that operate outside
of the unions. They even echo the slogans of the Red
Brigades in their own leaflets. Approximately 6 per-
cent of the job applicants at an Alfa Romeo plant in
the north are rejected on grounds of suspected in-
volvement with terrorist activity. In another company,
1 to 2 percent of the workers are considered likely to
participate in pro-Red Brigade activities. Thus,
among factory workers, the Red Brigades have a
sympathetic constituency of 15 percent, of whom up
to 2 percent might provide some degree of support.
support the Red Brigades. Autonomia Operaia, a
radical leftwing movement whose members include
workers, students, and unemployed young people,
however, provides an indirect indicator of possible
Red Brigade support, primarily among urban youth.
Its membership is estimated to be somewhere between
4,500 and 10,000.
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1979, 4 percent of the people were so alienated from 25X1
Italian society that they were willing to support any
kind of violent assault on the state. A poll conducted
by L'Espresso magazine just after the kidnaping of
General Dozier indicated that nearly 10 percent of the
respondents thought the Red Brigades fought for a 2 5'0
better society; 30 percent thought that the terrorists
pursued just ends, disagreeing only with their tactics.
Among the 20- to 24-year-olds polled (the age bracket
of the Red Brigade rank and file), there was even
more sympathy: 21 percent thought the Red Brigades
fought for a better society, and 35 percent thought
they pursued just ends with the wrong tactics. One
knowledgeable observer
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that as many as 300,000 persons sympathize with the
terrorists and under certain circumstances could de-
cide to participate in some form of violence them-
selves. Another close observer,
has estimated direct or indirect
consensus with the terrorists' violent line to range
between 0.5 and 1.5 percent of the electorate (200,000
to 600,000 individuals).
The Red Brigades are clearly not without sympathy
and support in Italy. They have demonstrated this in
their ability to survive for 12 years, and some observ-
ers think support for the group had grown, not
declined, in the year prior to the Dozier kidnaping.
While the Red Brigades do not have enough support
to initiate the revolution to which they aspire, they
have thousands of potential supporters; and these,
along with the million or so potential sympathizers
throughout Italy, are well able to sustain the organi-
zation.
Sixty percent of the university and technical school
students face unemployment. No estimates are avail-
able on how many of these sympathize with or might
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Date Joined Social/ Intellectual Operational Attributes Present Status
Background
First Generation 1969 Students, trained in po- "Historic nucleus," Most in midthirties, dead or
litical science and soci- created Brigades. Strong imprisoned. Remain part of
ology; thinkers. Well- political commitment. strategic leadership. Remain
grounded in Marxism; Few have cooperated committed to Brigade cause.
some former PCI mem- with authorities.
bers. Many strong Cath-
olics; taste for martyr-
dom.
Second Generation After 1969 (entered uni- Mixture of university Politicized, angry and Late twenties. Replaced
versities under relaxed students, factory work- aggressive. Psychologi- dead or imprisoned first-
entrance requirements). ers, and low-level gov- cally prepared for vio- generation figures as oper-
ernment employees. lence and technically ations leaders. Some
Catholics, but of looser proficient. "repentants."
persuasion than first
generation.
Third Generation Mid-1970s Origins much lower on Hard, but stupid. Few Went underground follow-
social scale than first two political pretensions. Re- ing Aldo Moro operation.
generations. Dropouts, peat slogans but have lit- Have not held up well in
students of little aca- tle understanding of prison; several "repentants."
demic achievement and Marxism-Leninism.
low cultural levels. Sig-
nificant percentage of
workers and lower rank-
ing union officials. Some
drug addicts.
Greater number of work- Share same attributes as Youngest of Brigades.
ers and those with crimi- third generation. Angry
nal background than any members of the antiboss
preceding generation. proletariat.
Survivors of "Front
Line" terrorist group
wiped out by the Italian
police in 1980.
Foreign Connections
The Red Brigades maintain contacts with terrorist
groups in other countries, some of which date back to
the early 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the Brigades had
hopes of creating a Third International, an alliance of
terrorist groups in Europe that would exchange arms,
information, and advice. To further this objective, the
Red Brigades reportedly participated in a 1977 meet-
ing in Spain that was attended by delegates from the
Revolutionary Cells in Germany, Action Directe in
France, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA),
the Basque separatists (ETA), and the Breton separat- 25X1
ists. Although no agreement was reached, ambitions
for some kind of a coordinated struggle remained.F_~
In a 1978 Strategic Resolution, the Red Brigade
leadership noted "the necessity to develop to the
fullest extent historically possible operational cooper-
ation, reciprocal support, and solidarity" with other
elements of "proletarian internationalism." The reso-
lution specifically mentioned West Germany's Red
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Army Faction (RAF) and France's Armed Nucleus
for Popular Autonony (Noyau Arme pour 1'Autono-
mie Populaire, NAPAP). It also mentioned "autono-
mous movements possessing a socialist nature," in-
cluding the IRA and the ETA.
The Red Brigades maintained contact with French
terrorists and are believed to have participated with
NAPAP in several bank robberies in France. They
may also have shared with the IRA and the ETA
some of the weapons and explosives provided them by
Palestinians, but this does not appear to have been a
regular supply channel.
The Red Brigades have also had contacts with Pales-
tinian terrorists. Ideological links are not considered
important in these contacts, however, as the Brigades
were primarily interested in the Palestinians as a
source of weapons. The Palestinians have provided
weapons and explosives to the Red Brigades
others as having a lower political education.
Links between the Red Brigades and other terrorist
groups seem to have been of only modest importance.
The Third International never came to much, and
interest dwindled. The Red Brigades are cautious and
conceited. Red Brigade leaders generally have a
condescending attitude toward other terrorist groups,
and on occasion even toward groups within the Red
Brigades. The Brigades regard themselves as the only
true Marxist revolutionaries and look down on most
depend on the outcome of this internal debate.
and to cooperate with foreign terrorist groups may
In the first communique issued by General Dozier's
kidnapers, the Red Brigades called for cooperation
with other "European revolutionary forces (ETA,
RAF, IRA)." There is no firm evidence, however, to
link the Dozier kidnaping with any foreign terrorists
or governments. The value of cooperating with foreign
terrorists may be part of an internal debate within the
Red Brigades. The "militarist" wing of the Brigades,
which probably held Dozier, is international in its
outlook and interested in links with terrorists abroad.
The "movementist" wing, with which the "milita-
rists" are apparently at odds, focuses more on social
problems within Italy. The willingness of the Red
Brigades to engage in further international operations
The leader of Dozier's captors claimed links with
Bulgaria at his trial. We have no other evidence of
such a Red Brigade connection, or of an active
Bulgarian role in supporting international terrorism.
The Red Brigades have received some assistance from
Czechoslovakia. Ties between Italian Communists
and Czechoslovakia go back at least to the late 1940s
when the Italian Communist Party exiled its own
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hardliners-ex-partisans who refused to collaborate
with the new Italian Republic-to Czechoslovakia.
Some of the founding fathers of the Red Brigades
made trips to Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s, and
further visits occurred during the decade.
evidence, however, does not support the more dramat-
ic assertions: that Czechoslovakia directs the oper-
ations of the Red Brigades; that Czechoslovakia or
the Soviet Union finances the Red Brigades; or that
Aldo Moro was concealed in the Czechoslovakian
Embassy while police searched for the kidnapers'
hideout.
In December 1980, the President of Italy, while
vacationing in France, complained to French reporters
that Italian terrorists were living in France, unmolest-
ed by French authorities. A common border, the
existence of elements in France sympathetic to Com-
munist or fascist causes, and the French Govern-
ment's adherence to the historic principle of providing
asylum to foreign dissidents made France an attrac-
tive refuge for Italian terrorists. French courts have
not always been cooperative in extraditing those they
see charged with primarily political offenses. The
President's remarks angered French officials. To
soothe French feelings, he later publicly stated that
the "brain center of the Red Brigades is abroad,"
pointing his finger at the Soviet Union.
While there is no question that foreign connections
are actively maintained, there is no evidence of exter-
nal financing for the Red Brigades. German and
Palestinian terrorists have helped out with weapons,
but the preferred tactics of the Red Brigades do not
require extensive or advanced arsenals, and most of
the guns they use appear to have been stolen from
stein. The Pales
gun dealers in S
Italian military
ing. Some mem
or police arsenals, or purchased from
witzerland, Austria, and Liechten-
tinians may have provided some train-
bers of the group were trained to shoot
the training that takes place in Italy
the Italian Army, and
ly of target practice
Outlook
The Red Brigades have been fighting for over 12
years, insulated only by the network of movements,
organizations, and armed groups that make up Italy's
revolutionary left. The rescue of General Dozier, the
arrests, and the discovery of numerous hideouts which
have attended the rescue and its aftermath have badly
wounded the Red Brigades physically and psychologi-
cally. The terrorist group must for the moment be on
the defensive; its image of invulnerability has been
destroyed, its internal disputes intensified. But while
Italian officials speak of having "turned the corner,"
they cautiously avoid declaring that the Red Brigades
have been destroyed. Observers have talked about
their support drying up, but the fundamental econom-
ic, social, and political problems that spawned the
Red Brigades and that have contributed to their
strength remain unchanged. Italian authorities fore-
see no imminent victory. Instead, they talk of a
struggle lasting 10 to 15 years.
The direction the Red Brigades take in the immediate
future will depend on the outcome of internal dis-
putes. A victory by the militarist wing that kidnaped
Dozier could bring further actions against foreign
targets in Italy and renewed attempts to strengthen
connections with other terrorist groups in West Ger-
many, and possibly elsewhere, and could also inspire
new groups. However, the rescue of Dozier-the Rea
Brigades' first major defeat-and the losses suffered
by the Venice Column in the process, could discredit
this line of strategy. A victory by the "movementists"
could bring the Red Brigades back to the domestic
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path followed prior to the Dozier kidnaping. Or the
Red Brigades could divide, with each faction pursuing
its own strategic line, perhaps under different names.
The creation of Front Line provides a precedent.
Front Line was either created by Red Brigade dissi-
dents or was a separate organization deliberately
created by Red Brigade leaders to explore a new
direction. Thus, if one policy of the Red Brigades
dissatisfies a certain number of followers, another new
group could be created to follow a different policy.
Italian terrorism cannot be viewed in strict organiza-
tional terms. There are changing themes and shifting
currents marked by a succession of acronyms.
The struggle has continued for more than a decade
without visibly moving beyond successive campaigns
of terrorism. Some of those who joined the Red
Brigades because they were disillusioned with society
in the first place must now be again disillusioned with
the lack of progress that has been made toward
transforming society, and with the recent defeats
suffered by the group. Italian authorities believe
many terrorists would defect if there were some kind
of amnesty program that allowed them to come back.
Italian officials admit that political violence will
undoubtedly continue to be a problem, but they claim
that their arrests have eliminated the threat to the
state. In their view, the Red Brigade leaders presently
in the field do not possess the political or managerial
skills to rock the Italian Government with another
event like the Moro kidnaping, although these state-
ments were made before the kidnaping of General
Dozier.
The authorities are certainly right in one respect: the
Red Brigades do not constitute an imminent threat to
the state. They are far from being able to launch a
civil war, and their constituency is limited. They are,
however, a continuing irritant on the Italian political
scene. They create repeated crises for the Italian
Government and thereby contribute to Italy's political
instability. Perhaps most dangerous of all, they gener-
ate pressure for an authoritarian solution.
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Appendix
A Chronology of Significant Actions
by the Red Brigades, 1972-81 t
1972 3 March
Milan-Idalgo Macchiarini, the personnel manager at Sit-Siemens, kidnaped and
released the same day.
13 March
Milan-Bartolomeo di Mino, Deputy Secretary of the local section of the Italian
Social Movement (MSI); the legal neo-Fascist Party, kidnaped.
1973 12 February
Turin-Bruno Labate, the Provincial Secretary of CISNAL Metal Workers,
kidnaped and released the same day.
28 June
Milan-Michele Mincuzzi, a manager at Alfa Romeo, kidnaped and released the
same day.
10 December
Turin-Ettore Amerio, the personnel manager at FIAT, kidnaped and held captive
for eight days.
1974 18 April
Genoa-Mario Sossi, the Assistant State Attorney, kidnaped, held captive for 34
days, and then released.
17 June
Padua-Local MSI office raided and two MSI militants, Graziano Giralucci and
Giuseppe Mazzola, killed.
14 October
Milan-Felice Maritano, a carabinieri noncommissioned officer NCO, killed in a
gun battle.
' This appendix is based upon an excellent chronology compiled by Vittorfranco S. Pisano in "The
Structure and Dynamics of Italian Terrorism," supplemented with additional information provided by
Risks International (P.O. Box 115, Alexandria, Va., 22313), Annual of Power and Conflict 1973-74
(Institute for the Study of Conflict, London), government sources, and newspaper reports.
17 Confidential
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16 April
Milan-Carlo Saronio who came from a wealthy family, kidnaped and murdered.
Saronio was in fact a sympathizer of the leftwing terrorists, and before his own
kidnaping had even discussed the abduction of various persons to raise money for
the movement.
15 May
Milan-Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman Massimo de Carolis,
wounded.
4 June
Turin-Vittorio Vallarino Gancia, a wealthy vermouth producer, kidnaped for
ransom. Gancia was freed by the carabinieri.
5 June
Spiotta di Arzello (Acqui)-Carabinieri trooper Giovanni d'Alfonso killed and Lt.
Umberto Rocca and NCO Rosario Cataffi wounded in gun battle.
4 September
Padua-Carabinieri patrolman Antonio Niedda, killed,.
8 October
Genoa-Cassa di Risparmio branch bank, held up.
21 October
Rivoli (Turin) -Enrico Boffa, a plant manager at the Singer Company and a
Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman, kidnaped and wounded. He was
released the same day.
22 October
Genoa-Vincenzo Casabona, the personnel manager at Ansaldo Nucleare, kid-
naped and released the same day.
17 December
Turin-Luigi Solera, the medical officer at the FIAT Mirafiori plant, attacked.
2 March
Pisa, Genoa, Rome, Milan, Florence, and Naples-The Red Brigades and the
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) claimed credit for a series of attacks on
carabinieri barracks and vehicles.
8 June
Genoa-Francesco Coco, State Attorney, and two members of his escort, carabi-
nieri trooper Antioco Deiana and driver Giuseppe Saponard, assassinated.
31 August
Biella-Deputy Police Commissioner Francesco Cusano, assassinated.
Confidential 18
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4-onnaennai
15 December
Milan-Deputy Police Commissioner Vittorio Padovani and Public Security NCO
Sergio Bazzega, killed during an attempted arrest.
1977 12 January
Genoa-Pietro Costa, a shipowner, kidnaped, and released 81 days later after the
payment of 1.5 million lire in ransom. The kidnaping was directed by the executive
committee with participants from the Rome, Genoa, and Turin columns. Proceeds
were divided among the columns.
13 February
Rome-Valerio Traversi, the Inspector General of the prison system, wounded.
17 February
Turin-Mario Scoffone, personnel manager of the FIAT Rivalta Plan, wounded.
19 February
Milan-Lino Ghedini, a Public Security NCO, assassinated and Public Security
patrolman Adriano Comizzoli, wounded.
12 March
Turin-Public Security NCO Giuseppe Ciotta, assassinated.
24 March
Frosinone-An act of sabotage at the FIAT plant carried out.
20 April
Turin-Dante Notaristefano, a Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman, at-
tacked. The gun belonging to the terrorist assigned to kill Notaristefano misfired,
and the backup gunman missed. Notaristefano escaped.
22 April
Turin-Antonio Munari, chief mechanic at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, wounded.
28 April
Genoa-Fulvio Croce, president of the Turin Bar Association, assassinated. At
first, the Turin column only wanted to lame him, but the imprisoned leadership of
the Red Brigades wanted him killed, and the local column leaders agreed.
1 June
Genoa-Vittorio Bruno, editor of Secolo XIX, wounded.
2 June
Milan-Indro Montanelli, editor of II Giornale Nuovo, wounded.
3 June
Rome-Emilio Rossi, editor of the TG 1 newscast, wounded.
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9 June
Sesto San Giovanni (near Milan)--Fausto Silini, a supervisor at Breda, an
engineering firm, wounded.
21 June
Rome-Remo Cacciafesta, Dean of the School of Economics, University of Rome,
wounded.
28 June
Genoa-Sergio Prandi, a manager at Ansaldo, wounded.
30 June
Milan-Luciano Maraccani, a manager at FIAT-OM, wounded.
Turin-Franco Visca, chief of maintenance at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant,
wounded.
11 July
Rome-Mario Peplini, an exponent of Communione e Liberazione, a rightwing
movement, wounded.
Genoa-Angelo Sibilla, a Christian Democrat Regional Secretary, wounded.
13 July
Turin-Maurizio Puddu, a Christian Democrat Regional Secretary, wounded.
23 September
Milan-Carlo Arienti, a Christian Democrat Councilman, wounded.
11 October
Turin-Rinaldo Camaioni, a labor relations officer at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant,
wounded.
25 October
Turin-Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman Antonio Cocozzello, wounded.
2 November
Rome-Publio Fiori, a Christian Democrat Regional Councilman, wounded.
8 November
Milan-Aldo Grassini, an Alfa Romeo manager, wounded.
10 November
Turin-Piero Osella, a manager in the analysis office at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant,
wounded.
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Confidential
16 November
Turin-Carlo Casalegno, the Deputy Editor of La Stampa, assassinated. Casa-
legno was to have been lamed as part of the Red Brigades campaign against
journalists in the spring of 1977, but the Red Brigades could not get at him, so the
operation was postponed. In the meantime, his articles angered the Red Brigades
even more, so they decided to kill him.
17 November
Genoa-Carlo Castellano, a manager at Ansaldo and a member of the PCI
Regional Committee, wounded.
1978 10 January
Turin-Gustavo Ghirotto, foreman at the Mirafiori Plant of FIAT, wounded.
13 January
Rome-Lello de Rose, Chief of the Public Relations Office of the SIP (the Italian
telephone company), wounded.
18 January
Genoa-Filippo Peschiera, a university professor and member of the Christian
Democratic Provincial Committee, wounded.
24 January
Milan-Micola Toma, Chief of the Public Relations Office of Sit-Siemens,
wounded.
14 February
Rome-Riccardo Palma, Supreme Court Judge detailed to the Ministry of Justice,
assassinated.
21 February
Venice-The offices of II Gazzettino bombed. Franco Battagliarin, a watchman,
was killed in the blast.
10 March
Turin-Rosario Berardi, a Public Security NCO assigned to counterterrorism
duties, assassinated.
16 March
Rome-Aldo Moro, President of the Christian Democrat Party, kidnaped. His
five-man escort: Carabinieri NCO Oreste Leonardi and trooper Domenico Rizzi
and Public Security patrolmen Raffaele lozzino, Giulio Rivera, and Francesco
Zizzi were killed. Fifty-five days later, Moro was killed. His body was left in the
trunk of a car parked halfway between the Christian Democrat and Communist
Party Headquarters in Rome.
21 Confidential
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24 March
Turin-Giovanni Picco, Christian Democrat Regional Councilman and former
mayor, wounded.
7 April
Genoa-Felice Schiavetti, President of the Industrial Association of the Province
of Genoa, wounded.
11 April
Turin-Lorenzo Cotugno, a prison guard, assassinated.
20 April
Milan-Francesco de Cataldo, an NCO prison guard, assassinated.
26 April
Rome-Girolamo Mechelli, a Christian Democrat Regional Councilman,
wounded.
27 April
Turin-Sergio Palmieri, manager of the Labor Analysis Office of the Mirafiori
Plant of FIAT, wounded.
4 May
Milan-Umberto degli Innocenti, manager of the Castelletto Plant of Sit-Siemens,
wounded.
5 May
Genoa-Alfredo Lamberti, manager of the Labor Relations Office of Italsider,
wounded.
9 May
Rome-Aldo Moro assassinated.
12 May
Milan-Tito Berardini, Secretary of a local Christian Democrat section, wounded.
16 May
Bologna-Antonio Mazzotti, personnel manager of Menarini S.p.A., wounded.
6 June
Udine-Antonio Santoro, an NCO prison guard assassinated.
21 June
Genoa-Antonio Esposito, Public Security official and former chief of counterter-
rorist operations in Liguria, assassinated.
5 July
Milan-Gavino Manca, a manager at Pirelli, wounded.
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Confidential
6 July
Turin-Aldo Ravaioli, President of the Small Industry Association, wounded.
7 July
Genoa-Fausto Gasparino, manager of Intersind and former Christian Democrat
Deputy Regional Secretary, wounded.
28 September
Turin-Piero Coggiola, foreman of the Paint Division of the Chiavasso Plant of
Lancia, assassinated.
29 September
Milan-Ippolito Bestonso, manager of the Mechanical Works at Alfa Romeo,
wounded.
1 October
Milan-Carabinieri NCO Carmelo Crisafulli wounded in a gun battle.
10 October
Rome-Girolamo Tartaglione, Supreme Court Judge detailed to Ministry of
Justice as Director of Criminal Affairs, assassinated.
24 October
Rome-Vincenzo Garofalo, Public Security patrolman, wounded during an am-
bush on the patrol squad.
15 December
Turin-Public Security patrolmen Salvatore Porceddu and Salvatore Lanza
assigned external surveillance duties in the proximity of the local prison,
assassinated.
21 December
Rome-Public Security patrolmen Gaetano Pellegrino and Giuseppe Rainone
assigned to escort Giovanni Galloni, then Christian Democrat floor leader in the
Chamber of Deputies, wounded.
1979 19 January
Turin-Giuseppe lo Ruso, a prison officer, assassinated.
24 January
Genoa-Guido Rossa, CCIL labor union representative and a PCI member, who
had testified against a Brigade "courier," assassinated.
29 January
Milan-Judge Emilio Alessandrini, assassinated.
2 February
Cremona-A police facility attacked.
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5 February
Turin-Prison Warden Raffaela Napolitano, maimed.
9 February
Rome-Pier Luigi Camilli, a journalist with TGI newscast and a Christian
Democratic activist, attacked.
13 February
Rome-A member of the media attacked.
14 February
Rome-A vehicle parked in a private garage in Rome, which belonged to
Carabinieri Gen. Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, stolen.
3 March
Rome-Unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a member of the police.
9 March
Palermo-PDC official Michele Reina, assassinated.
Turin-A police facility attacked.
13 March
Milan-A police facility bombed.
14 March
Turin-Giuliano Farina, test inspector at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, maimed.
15 March
Trapani-Carabinieri NCO Mario Martorano, maimed.
21 March
Cuneo-Entrepreneur Atillo Dutto, killed when his automobile was blown up.
27 March
Naples-Prison guard Giacomo Begliante, maimed.
29 March
Rome-Christian Democrat Provincial Councilman Italo Schettini, who was also
an owner of low-income housing, assassinated.
31 March
Orvieto-A transportation facility attacked.
4 April
Milan-Andrea Campagna, a member of the police, assassinated.
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Confidential
24 April
Turin-Journalist Franco Piccinelli, with TGI newscast and Christian Democratic
exponent, maimed.
Genoa-A political party member, Giancarlo Dagnino, maimed.
30 April
Genoa-Giuseppe Bonzani, manager of Grandi Turbine Ansaldo, maimed.
3 May
Rome-Christian Democratic committee offices in Piazza Nicosia raided. A
Public Security patrol responding to an emergency call ambushed. NCO police-
man Antonio Mea and patrolman Piero Ollanu killed, and patrolman Vincenzo
Ammirata wounded. Explosives were detonated inside the offices.
4 May
Genoa-A government facility was bombed.
11 May
Rome-Giuseppe Merola, Christian Democrat city section representative, assault-
ed and handcuffed.
23 May
Genoa-Rosella Sborgi, Christian Democratic Municipal Councilwoman, assault-
ed and handcuffed.
29 May
Genoa-Enrico Ghio, Christian Democratic Regional councilman, injured.
Ancona-Christian Democratic regional offices, bombed.
31 May
Genoa-Fausto Cuocolo, Dean of the School of Political Science of the University
of Genoa and Christian Democratic Regional Councilman, maimed.
8 June
Turin-A FIAT watchman, Giovanni Farina, maimed.
14 June
Genoa-Offices of Financiaria Ligure, raided and attempt made to detonate
explosives.
23 June
Rome-A railroad employee, Gaetano Edmondo Pecora, assaulted.
13 July
Rome-Carabinieri Lt. Col. Antonio Varisco, commander of the unit in support of
the Court House, assassinated.
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18 July
Turin-A businessman, Carmine Civitate, assassinated.
17 September
Turin-Unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a member of the police.
21 September
Turin-FIAT executive, Carlo Ghiglieno, assassinated.
24 September
Rome-Public Security patrolman, Pippo Pranzo, assaulted and maimed during a
fire call.
26 September
Padua-Angelo Ventura, a professor of modern history, maimed.
4 October
Turin-Cesare Varetto, manager of Mirafiori Plant of FIAT, maimed.
5 October
Turin-FIAT director Piercarlo Andreoletti, maimed.
17 October
Turin-A facility attacked.
18 October
Turin-A business facility attacked.
31 October
Rome-Michele Tedesco, a Public Security patrolman, maimed.
6 November
Florence-The University Medical Faculty Lecture Hall bombed.
9 November
Milan-A business facility attacked.
Rome-Public Security patrolman Michele Granato, assassinated.
16 November
Turin-An abortive attack with a grenade launcher launched against a carabinieri
barracks.
21 November
Genoa-Carabinieri NCO Vittorio Battaglini and trooper Mario Tosa
assassinated.
24 November
Turin-A bazooka-type bomb fired at a police armored car.
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uonnaennai
27 November
Rome-Public Security NCO Domenico Taverna, assassinated.
30 November
Rome-Doctor of Medicine Giulio de Fabritiis, maimed.
1 December
Naples-A government facility attacked.
7 December
Rome-Public Security NCO Mariano Romiti, assassinated.
11 December
Turin-The School of Business attacked.
12 December
Tivoli (near Rome)-A business facility attacked.
14 December
Turin-Two business facilities attacked.
Turin-Adriano Albertino, a foreman at the FIAT plant, maimed.
15 December
Turin-Unsuccessful attack against a police facility.
19 December
Rome-A business facility attacked.
Turin-A business facility attacked.
21 December
Milan-Two male nurses, Lino Manfredini and Ferdinando Malaterra, maimed.
Turin-A businessman maimed.
Rome-A businessman maimed.
28 December
Bergamo-A police facility bombed.
6 January
Palermo-Christian Democrat Pier Santi Mattarella, President of the region of
Sicily, assassinated.
8 January
Milan-Public Security NCO Rocco Santoro and patrolmen Antonio Cestari and
Michele Tatulli, murdered.
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9 January
Turin-A business facility attacked.
19 January
Rome-A police facility bombed, injuring 18.
25 January
Genoa-Carabinieri Lt. Col. Emanuele Tuttobene and trooper Antonio Casu,
assassinated, and Army Lt. Col. Luigi Ramundo, wounded.
29 January
Venice-Silvio Gori, Deputy Manager, Petrolchimico (Mestre), assassinated.
5 February
Milan-A foreign businessman assassinated.
6 February
Rome-A policeman assassinated.
10 February
Milan-A businessman maimed.
12 February
Rome-Vittorio Bachelet, Professor of Administrative Law, Vice President of the
Superior Council of the Judiciary, and former president of Catholic Action,
assassinated.
21 February
Milan-Pietro dall'Era, manager, Alfa Romeo, maimed.
29 February
Genoa-Roberto della Rocca, manager, Italsider in Genoa, maimed.
Valenzo Po (Alessandria)-The Banco dei Preziosi, robbed.
16 March
Salerno-State Attorney Nicola Giacumbi, assassinated.
18 March
Rome-Girolamo Minervini, Supreme Court Judge, assassinated.
19 March
Milan-A member of the government assassinated.
24 March
Genoa-Giancarlo Moretti, Professor of Tax Law and Christian Democratic
Municipal Councilman, maimed.
Turin-Three policemen on a bus assassinated.
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coniiaennai
28 March
Genoa-Carabinieri NCO Rinaldo Bena, wounded while making an arrest.
29 March
Milan-Three business facilities bombed.
30 March
Padua-An army barracks raided, weapons stolen, and an NCO wounded.
1 April
Milan-Christian Democratic offices in via Mottarone raided, and party expo-
nents Nadir Tedeschi, Eros Robbiani, Emilio de Buono, and Antonio Josa, shot in
the legs.
25 April
Milan-Eight vehicles that were to be delivered to the carabinieri, firebombed.
2 May
Rome-A businessman assassinated.
7 May
Milan-Journalist Guido Passalacqua of La Repubblica, maimed.
Rome-Pericle Pirri, an official of the Labor Ministry, wounded.
12 May
Mestre-Alfredo Albanese, head of the local Public Security Intelligence Unit,
assassinated.
16 May
Rome-Christian Democrat exponent, Savino di Giacomantonio, assaulted.
17 May
Rome-A political party member maimed.
19 May
Naples-Christian Democratic Regional Councilman Pino Amato, assassinated,
and two bystanders, wounded.
20 May
Milan-A carabinieri barracks attacked with a grenade launcher.
28 May
Milan-Walter Tobagi, a journalist of Corriere della Sera, killed.
Rome-Public Security patrolman Franco Evangelista murdered, and two patrol-
men Antonio Manfreda and Giovanni Lorefice, wounded.
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19 June
Turin-Pasquale Viele, a prisoner who reportedly became a BR member in jail,
and was accused of being a "spy," murdered.
26 June
Turin-A transporation facility attacked.
10 November
An Italian businessman was assassinated by the Red Brigades in an unidentified
city.
12 November
Milan-Renato Briano, an industrialist, assassinated.
28 November
Milan-Steel mill director, Manfredo Mazzanti, assassinated.
1 December
Rome-Giuseppe Furci, health director of Regina Coili jail in Rome, assassinated.
13 December
Rome-Judge Giovanni d'Urso, kidnaped.
31 December
Rome-General Enrico Galvaligi, prison security chief, assassinated.
4 February
Turin-A business facility unsuccessfully attacked.
5 February
Rome-A domestic business facility attacked.
17 February
Milan-Luigi Marangoni, director of Milan's largest hospital, assassinated.
12 March
Milan-The foreman of the Alfa Romeo plant, kneecapped.
27 March
Rome-A bank robbed.
7 April
Rome-Raffaele Cinotti, prison warden, assassinated.
27 April
Naples-Ciro Cirillo, Christian Democrat politician, kidnaped and released 87
days later-the longest period of captivity for a Brigades prisoner.
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5 May
Milan-A UK foreign business facility bombed.
15 May
Naples-An Italian Government worker maimed.
20 May
Venice-Giuseppe Talierco, managing director of Monedison Petrochimico, kid-
naped and killed 47 days later.
29 May
Rome-A technical school principal maimed.
3 June
Arese-Renzo Sandrucci, Alfa Romeo executive, kidnaped and released 50 days
later.
5 June
Naples-An Italian policeman assassinated in the suburbs.
10 June
Rome-An Italian domestic businessman maimed.
Rome-Roberto Peci, brother of the repentent Brigadist, Patrizio Peci, in San
Benedetto del Tronto, kidnaped and found dead in Rome on 3 August 1981.
19 June
Rome-A deputy police superintendent assassinated.
Rome-Antonio de Vita, who was a defense attorney for Patrizio Peci, wounded.
Rome-Giuseppe Franconierei, manager of a book publishing company, wounded.
Rome-A police patrol fired upon.
23 June
Spezia-The Oto Melara armaments plant, bombed.
30 June
Naples-Police bombed in three different incidents.
31 July
Rome-An Italian Government facility attacked.
Rome-An Italian utility bombed unsuccessfully.
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Rome-An Italian utility facility attacked.
31 Confidential
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13 November
Milan-A policeman assassinated.
17 December
Verona-Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier, highest ranking army officer in southern
Europe and senior US Army officer at NATO, kidnaped. General Dozier was
rescued on 28 January 1982 (42 days later) by an antiterrorist squad in a surprise
raid on the hideout prison in an apartment in Padua.
3 January
Four Red Brigade women terrorists escaped from Rovigo penitentiary for women.
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Confidential
Confidential
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