MARKETING OF INTELLIGENCE: PRODUCT AND SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100050018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 3, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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National Intelligence Council
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
25X1
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Marketing of Intelligence: Product and Services
1. You asked for some comments on the marketing of intelligence products
and services by the intelligence elements of CIA. I did a cursory check of
written material and memories to cover the past decade. The results of that
survey and my impressions and comments are offered as the basis for further
discussion of how the NIOs might assist the overall marketing responsibility
of the DCI, the CIA, and the Intelligence Community.
2. There have been several surveys and studies in the past ten years to
determine customer satisfaction with the intelligence product. Some efforts
have been clearly labeled as such but others have been less than obvious. An
example of the former is the attached three part monograph--The Impact of
Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process--published in 1980. A
less obvious survey of customer satisfaction was Andy Marshal's stint in the
Old Executive Office Building in the early 1970's where he, among other tasks,
evaluated intelligence support to selected policy issues and offered guidance
to the producers. The Arthur D. Little, Inc. report to the DDI in 1976
contained specific suggestions on marketing products and services. Although
there is no particular survey to cite as reference, I know that a perceived
need for systematic marketing was one of the major reasons for establishing
the National Intelligence Officers in 1973.
3. Some of the background to the formation of the NIOs is relevant to
your current interest in marketing. James Schlesinger had done an extensive
study of the Intelligence Community while he was at the OMB and brought with
him to the job of DCI a comprehensive plan for reform and management
initiatives. His OMB study led to conclusions that the intelligence
production elements were out of touch with the policy problems, the product
lacked quality, and that there was a pronounced bias to the political and
socio-economic analysis as a result of the academic orientation of the
analysts and their managers.
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4. By the time he arrived as DCI, Schlesinger had acquired additional
views on marketing from and his endeavors mentioned earlier, he
had some defense oriented views from Lew Allen and I I and he 25X1
brought with himl as an executive assistant. 25X1
experience as a CIA officer, both in the Office of Current Intelligence and on
detail to Kissenger's staff, left him with some strongly held views on the
quality and relevance of the CIA product. The sum of this incomplete listing
of factors was a Schlesinger conviction that something was wrong and that
adjustments in marketing procedures offered the possibility of immediate pay-
off. The agency was not doing any marketing. The assumption was that "the
customer will call if he needs something, if he doesn't call he is
satisfied." There were frequent contacts between DO officers and consumers
but little feed-back. The contacts by DI officers were not wide-spread and
were not systematic. By contrast, the DIA had two officers out everyday
marketing products and services to the NSC Staff, the WH.SR, Director/OMB, and
to the budget, foreign relations, and armed services committees on the Hill.
5. Several activities and preconceptions converged in the early months
of 1973. 0 and Schlesinger saw the organization of the Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA) under George Carver as a successful
model for focusing the intelligence product on policy problems. There were,
of course, other functions of SAVA relevant to coordination of intelligence
and operations, geographic organization for production, etc. that were
subjects of both agreement and sharp disagreement at the same time. Bill
Colby, as Executive Director, was unsuccessfully urging Schlesinger to
reorganize the Directorate of Intelligence on a geographical basis; partly to
address the marketing and relevance issues. More or less independently, Lew
Allen asked the IC Staff (newly formed under his leadership) to develop a
model organization, process, and publications to meet the same set of needs
perceived by people mentioned earlier.
6. Two of us on Lew Allen's staff developed a proposal for community
production, marketing of DCI and Community product, coordination of collection
and production, etc. that drew upon the SAVA model as well as the Andy Marshal
criticisms and the 0/Schlesinger perceptions. By the time we had the
proposal ready, Colby had become DDO, Schlesinger knew he was going to
Defense, and the process of extensive changes was shortened to get an
immediate pay-off in marketing in order to improve relevance and to replace
what was seen as "a burned-out Office of National Estimates." To make a short
story of what was about 4-5 months of refinements and deliberation, DCI Colby
accepted our proposal for National Intelligence Officers in late summer of
1973.
7. Colby accepted our concept (perhaps he already held the same view)
that the NIOs would be his personal staff officers, his personal
representatives, who would work at the Assistant Secretary level to do what
the DCI would do if he had the time to pursue all the policy issues. The
primary duty of the NIO was to determine what intelligence support was needed,
inform the DCI and act for him to order up what was required. This was a
responsibility across the intelligence spectrum of collection, processing,
current intelligence, estimates, and special support. An example of special
support was a set of specific policy proposals for an Arab-Israeli cease-fire
and truce monitoring operation developed by me that became the framework for
the post-October War arrangements that are still in place.
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8. The original concept did not call for the NIOs to spend much of their
time writing, editing, and chairing the estimates process. The NIO was to have
responsibility for estimates in his area but was not to become a slave to the
estimates process., Much'of the detail work you see some NIOs doing today was
done by chairmen and drafters detailed from the Community for the project. It
was recognized-'that research of the market place and the marketing of products
and services across-'the spectrum of the DCI capabilities would occupy well
over oneehalf of the NIO's time.
9. The concept was adapted by individuals to fit their personalities,
interests, and their market. Colby prodded the N10s to stay involved in the
policy process and to report frequently to him. He held one hour sessions
with the NIOs every week or ten days for oral exchanges that served to focus
attention on his priorities. The DDO and the DDI usually attended those
sessions. This policy was continued under Bush but other forces gradually
shaped a more passive role for the NIOs. Estimates occupied more of their
time, a more academic approach to estimates was sought, and the NIOs began to
be selected accordingly.
10. A pause in the narrative is appropriate to make some comments about
Colby's views. He wanted to organize the Directorate of Intelligence on a
geographic basis largely for reasons of internal effectiveness and
efficiency. He believed that there would be some improvements in "marketing"
flowing from such a change but he also saw that the managerial duties of a
regional office director would limit the time available for the marketing
function. His near term solution was to encourage the DDI's managers to
become involved in marketing but to rely on the NIOs as his principal
agents. Colby was uncertain of the long-term but he hoped to uncover broad-
guaged people with sufficient vitality to enable some combination of NIOs and
regional production offices.
11. My overall judgment of the NIOs in the 1973-76 period is that they
were active in marketing and systematically fed back market research to the
DCI and his production and collection elements. Colby and Bush recognized
that an active marketing role for NIOs would introduce some strain into the
relationships among Community elements. They accepted that as a price to be
paid for the marketing service. The Intelligence Community at large adapted
well and accepted the NIO activist role better than the Directorate of
Intelligence. The loudest complaints and the most aggressive attacks upon the
NIOs came from the DDI elements. The DDI attitude was not homogeneous but
they opposed the NIOs as a symbol of executive direction intruding where
heretofore the office directors largely decided what would be produced. There
were other comments about diminished access and prestige,. for the production
managers but I believe that the intrusion of the DCI was the principal cause
for resentment. The'culture in the DDI elements, even today, is best
characterized as collegial.. As the opportunities presented themselves in the
1977-80 period, the "old hands" reared in the Directorate of Intelligence
successfully urged changes to the overall character of the NIO organization.
I do not mean to imply that all changes of that period were initiated by
reactionary elements of an old "DDI Mafia"-because many of the changes were
directed by DCI Turner. I do wish to emphasize that the preferences of the
old hands are for a passive NIO role, minimizing the market-place, and
maximizing time spent on the procedural aspects of producing estimates.
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12. There is a new survey of the market-place nearing completion by the
DDI. Bruce Clarke and agreed last year that a survey of about
140 Carter administration officials should be made to determine consumer
satisfaction with Community products and to elicit suggestions for
improvement. That project is under (management and involves 25X1
representatives from NSA, State, and DIA. Their report is expected in April.
A questionnaire is attached.
13. I believe that the DCI should have a systematic marketing program
and that the NIOs are the appropriate element to perform the principal
effort. There is a need for each of the directorates to have a marketing
effort and the NIOs should not be encouraged to view marketing as their
exclusive charter. The Director should be encouraged to view the NIOs as an
instrument for collecting an overview of the market and the effort to satisfy
the interests of the consumer. If the DCI accepts that role for the NIOs he
must meet with them as a group and reinforce their self-perception and
encourage them in their efforts.
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Attachments
A. Review of National Intelligence
Feb 75
B. Review of National Intelligence
I Aug 76
C. r ur i e, Inc. Report
to the DCI Nov 76
D. The Impact of Intelligence on the
Policy Review and Decision
Process--Part One: Findings
E. if --Part Two: A Framework
for the Relationship Between
Intelligence and Policy
F. " it --Part Three: Recommendations
G. Survey on Intelligence Community Production
All Portions of this Memorandum
are Classified SECRET
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DDI 1609-82
SUBJECT: Marketing of Intelligence: Produce and Services 3 March 1982
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (w/atts.)
1 - NIO/W (wo/atts.)
1 - NI0/Chrono (wo/a.tts.)V
1 - DDI Registry (wo/atts.)
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
9 March 1982
25X`1
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
25X1
25X1
25X1
SUBJECT:
Memo on Marketing of Intelligence
1. Although II brings up some useful points, I believe his memo is
mmisleading in certain respects. My reactions no doubt are colored by the
fact that I took an "old hand" DDI perspective for many years, but I
believe the problem is not well understood and has been misinterpreted many
times in the past.
2. In the first place, the term "marketing of intelligence" is
inappropriate. What is needed is not marketing the CIA product but rather
gaining a sufficient understanding of the actual and potential policy
concerns of the US government, so that the CIA product may become more
relevant. This is not just a semantic problem. DIA, for example, has been
strong on "marketing," but has rarely been involved meaningfully in the
policy process.
3. The allegation that CIA (NFAC, DDI) did not make much effort to
deal with policymakers is greatly overdrawn. Since military, technical,
and scientific analysis consisted mainly of basic research which took
highly institutionalized forms--largely, contributions to elaborate
national estimates--there was relatively little reason for many direct
contacts with consumers. In economic intelligence, OER prided itself on
developing and maintaining a wide network of contacts throughout the
economic policy community. Indeed, OER took Schlesinger's criticisms very
much to heart and shifted resources substantially in favor of what came to
be called "policy support." In the political area, the record was a mixed
one, with some division chiefs maintaining close relations with their
counterparts at State and the NSC, while others stayed close to home. The
main problem in political intelligence was, and to some extent still is
that much of the product is driven by cables rather than by issues.
4. I agree with 0 that NIOs have and can play a crucial role in
developing -a sophisticated understanding of US policy issues and
processes. They can thereby help make DDI intelligence product more
relevant, more timely, and generally more useful. DDI office and division
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chiefs, however, should be strongly encouraged to develop their own
customer network. NIOs should help to stimulate this process and assure
that the linkages are at a sufficiently high level so that we can be
confident that requests for intelligence support are on issues of truly
high priority and not just grist for the desk officer's mill. It is useful
to support lower level requests as well, but not with the same resource
commitment.
5. I am very skeptical about the notion of establishing a "systematic
marketing program;" if by "systematic' means establishing a formalized
system, including consumer surveys, etc. Surveys will give you any answer
you want. The important thing is for the NIOs, the DDI line of command,
and some senior analysts to understand that dealing with customers is an
important part of their responsibility.
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