POLAR METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE OPTIONS PAPER (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 13, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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13 AUG 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Intelligence
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FROM:
Acting Deputy to
the DCI for Resource Management
SUBJECT:
Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper
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REFERENCE:
A. Memo to DCI fm
Remote Sensor
D/DCl/RM, Subj: Integrated
System Study, dtd 12 Jun
79
NRO, Subj: Comments on Polar
B. Memo to DLI tm
Meteorological Satellite Program Options
Paper, dtd 8 Aug 79
C. Ltr to Chmn, PRC (Space) fm Deputy Administrator
NASA, dtd 7 Aug 79
1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memo (Attach-
ment 2) providing comments to the NSC on the subject options paper.
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2. Background:
a. The potential covergence of the Polar Meteorological
Satellite Program is one part of the Integrated Remote Sensing
Systems Study being carried out as a follow-on to PD/NSC-42, Civil
Space Policy. Dr. Cook is your representative on this study
(Reference A).
25X1 b. The options paper (Attachment 1) has been provided for
formal agency comments. Dr. Press, Chairman of the PRC (Space), is
apparently planning to forward the options paper and agency comm-
ents for Presidential decision without convening a PRC (Space)
meeting to discuss the issue further. He evidently favors this
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approach in view of the firm and opposing positions already on
record for the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce. However,
either Secretary could request such a meeting and Dr. Press would
probably respond favorably if a request is made. 25X1 25X1
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On file DOC release instructions apply.
NRO and OSD review(s) completed.
NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 03/31/04
opy No.
DERIVATIVE CL BY
DDECLXJREVWON IV MU I
DERIVED FROM Multiple
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,SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper ri 25X1
3. Discussion:
a. The options paper is well written and lays out the issue
clearly. The issue has been driven by OMB with the obvious goal of
cost savings. All agree that such savings can be achieved but not
without performance degradation due to potential compromises on the
choice of orbits, orbit timing, and tasking. Options that retain
DoD control alleviate such concerns for DoD missions but exacerbate
these concerns for the civil missions. The civil community also
states that DoD management control is contrary to national policy
and would risk adverse foreign reactions.
b. The Intelligence Community's major concern is the con-
tinuation of effective and viable MTTSAT support to the NRP. Dr.
Cook's memo to you (Reference B) describes the NRC's position.
raur_loposed memo to Dr. Press is consistent with the NRO position.
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c. The alternatives are:
(1) Coordinated dual DoD and DoC programs with
increased emphasis on data, hardware, and
technology sharing.
(2) A jointly managed consolidated DoD-DoC program
to meet both civil and military needs.
(3) A fully converged METSAT program under a
single agency (either DoD or DoC) committef
to meeting the needs of both communities.
d. As far as we know, all of the major affected agencies
currently support Alternative (1), a continuation of the current
management arrangements (see Reference C for NASA'a views). OMB
(and possibly OSTP) support an alternative with a greater degree of
convergence. If OMB's view prevails and a fully converged program
is directed, there are opposing views on which gency--DoD or DoC--
should be selected to manage the program.
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e. The options paper has been distributed to the members of
the DCI Space Policy Working Group. All members basically agree
with our position on this issue. 25X1
TOP SECRET
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SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper
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4. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memo to Dr. Press.
Attachments:
1. Options Paper
2. Proposed Memo to Dr. Press
TOP Hera
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SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper Ti 25X1
25X1 Distribution:
Copy No. 1 - DCi
2 - DDCI
3 - ER
4 - SAFSS
25X1 5 - NSA/W
6 - State/INR (Mr. Chamberlin)
7 - CIA/DDA
25X1 8 - CIA/DDS&
9 - CIA/NFAC
10 - D/DCl/CT
11 - D/DCl/CT/COMIREX
12 - D/DCl/RM/PGO
13 - D/DCl/RM/PBO
25X1 14 - D/DCl/RM/PBO
15 - D/DCl/RM/IRO
D/DCl/RM/CLLO
\11216- D/DCl/RM/PAO
25X1 18 - D/DCl/PAO
19 - D/DCl/RM c;;;;;]
20 - CT Registry
21 - RM Registry
22 - PRO Chrono
23 - PRO Typist
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DCl/RM/PAO
(10 Aug 79)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SECRET
July 27, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the :nterior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of. Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, 'Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
. /Director of Central :ntelligence
Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration .
Director, Office gf-Seience and Technology
Policy
SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options
Paper (U)
The. interagency.tisktorce has,completed-the attached opti?ons-?
paper for your review. Comments should be submitted to the
NSC by Augustf, 1979. The annexes are not included but
in possession of your task force representatives. (S)
Attachment
SECRET
Review: July 27, 1985
Christine. Dodson
Staff Secretary
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are
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NRO
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POLAR TEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE
PROGRAM OPTIONS
PREPARED 3Y TEE INTERAGENCY-TASX FORCE ON INTEGRATED
REMOTE SENSING SYSTEMS (PHASE /I)
JULY 23, 1979
SECRET NOFORN DISSEM
Review for Downgrading on July 1, 1985
SECRET
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PROGRAM OPTIONS
1.ISSE FOR DECISION
Should there be further consolidation or convergence of
the military and civil polar orbiting meteorological
satellite (aTSAT) programs for the 1985-1992 period
and.,
if so, to what extent or under what policy ground
rules? (V)
II. BACXGROUND
A. Task.
PD/NSC-42 directed, "In the PY 1980 budget review,
OMB--in cooperation with Defense, the DCI, NASA, and
NOAA--will conduct a cross-cut review of meteorological
satellite programs to ?determ.ine the potential:for..
future budgetary savings and program efficiency. Based
on this cross-cut, the Policy Review Committee (Space)
-will assess the feasibility., and policy implications of
program consolidation...." The operational civil
?:geostationary METSAT. program is not an issue here. (V)
? ?
?
B. Current Programs.
1. Major civil METSAT requirements are the global
acquisition of quantitative data and domestic and
international dissemination of environmental data
for improved weather, climate and environmental
monitoring and forecasting. The civil DoC program
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litan.
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is open and unclassified, to encourage national
and international use of the data, and to encourage
international cooperation and collaboration in
establishing the capabilities of the satellite
systems themselves, even to the point of other
nations providing some on-board sensors and data
processing systems. (LT)
2. The military TSAT requirements include global
coverage for both imagery and quantitative data
in suppor.t of national security objectives (see
Annex 1), worldwide intelligence collection, and
strategic and tactical military operations. While
? the Don _program is operated primarily to meet
? . .
_
national security needs, archived DoD TSAT imagery
is primarily available to the civil and international
community. All DoD TSAT data are available to
. ?.
? ?''. '...? ? ?
? ? ?
. ? . . .
?
NOLA for operational use. (C)
3. There are significant differences between the civil
and military programs in the priority of individual.
data needs and accuracies; spectral, temporal,
and spatial resolution requirements; orbit
selection; system survivability criteria; and
data formatting, processing, and dissemination.
inrozry
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Command, control, and management procedures are
also significantly different between the two
sectors. This leads to the differences in space-
craft instrumentation, ground suploOrt hardware,
and operational philosophies, as noted in Tables 1
and 2. (II)
4. Some technical convergence has already been achieved
with the joint use by DoD and DoC of a common basic
spacecraft, the DNS? Block 5D of DoD design. Civil .
requirements are accommodated by modification to
the basic spacecraft and supporting subsystems.
Each agency operates two spacecraft for its own
requirements; there is a useful degree of METSAZ
data exchange and cross-serVicing.between'the.civil-: '
and military sectors,esmecially in the event of
spacecraft Malfunctions. (V)
C. Continuity..
In FY 1981, both DoD and DoC must initiate budgetary
actions to maintain continuity data services
? ? .. ?
beyond the 1984-85 period, when the current buy of
spacecraft will have been exhausted. (U)
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?
fallow:Lng NCAA
samaALNIffli.e
aese =salons, but their
-3.
''''-'0474/951573..831ga'b- itikapioftMetb
tr.=
-Lanairy ' -caw ....nreign) also =vx---L'outa.
pricrity is the provisicul of images far severe sta.=
ITDAA Missions (in priority order)
""ical weather analysis and farecasting. (g1,-.1 and -local)
envircruert monitaring and prediction ?
ood forecasting and water' management
ts monitaring
--pmmt of contunicatians, high altitude flight, power transmissicn
suppmmt (agni.cultne, oil spills, research, etc.)
Polar Satellite Data Requirammts (in priority order)
spheric terata and Imzmidity (earth's surface to the uprx=r stra...sphere,
e-tml; 200 km. grid; foL_/day; acoracy eae, 1?C; humidity, 20%)
ter surface terrature 100 km @ 1?C-; local, 10 km @ 0.50C)
and ice cover; detect melting (glo-1, 10 km; local, 1 km)
-th. heat balance for climate change
articles and x-rays frau salar storms
,tations in atmaspheric gases (e.g. ozone)
tispectral imaging for other -environmental uses
tion of major c=an surface ..11-rmts
..Jent of floods (highest reiolutian available)
Data st.plemnt thase tram WES in providing short range for--sting of severe
and local weatimr.
System Rem:di-smuts
nuity and RP-141,ility: TWo spacecraft in orhit at all times with replacement of a fai:
4"-:withim 120 days ::Deliverdiata productsand_services with:rphil4ty,cfbetter
95%, with no breaks Langer than six ham's: ? - - '
and ground systm must survive 'the phenomena it is to detect.
'km hostirgithreats as required by D.
and Control: Must provide immediate response to Changes in tasking resulting from
severe stars, unusual changes in ice and snow cover, oil spills, special experMnaT
and from systam failures.
. .
ge: Global, 4/day,.plus 1 km imagery progranrable for up to 25% of glabe/day.- - ?
ts: Srn synchronous; at least 850 km; crossing the equator at 0730L t 1 hr and 1.130L
hr to meet input needs of U.S. and intat-sa.tianal numerical fameasteas.
ness: .Data must be pmoassedwithin.minutes.as.input.far.ac=tate numerical weather
andpr-artzt. warTi...ng-of totential natural disastersj.value for. these .
ses decays rapiely with time.
' Data Communications: Data onlIwtion/lccaticn sUbsystem is needed for special
in support of data rac.ai.---ormt one. observations must be broadcast
J.yto local users thraughout the world for sammaumaming.
Other Factors
,cgm U.S. casts by providiig for international partie-pation through cantributions of
'stems and satellites.
.:.bute to U.S. foreign policy objectives through training, .data exchange, direct
of vital data, etc.
U.S. benefits frau U.S. particiPation in international programs, such as
Global Atmospheric Research Program and World Weather Watch.
Aga aeXthility to meet unexpected, priority needs, and back 13;
intarnati=ally acceptable platform for search and rescue mission.
.MCD MTTSA. nission requirements are coverec JCZ memoran-a, :ne et.g.a report,
? and the Phase I :ES' report. Special aczess OOD =TEAT requirements are przvided
11.'sePnrac2Afrifr6fie*Ffprikiefera44-7M91106/29 7t219*-M3P8?1314081?ifaM30784151900547 ilave
,r.op DOD
DOD M=TSAT? m:sszens (See Azzen fer additioeal -.missives)
1) Support to special tili-a-y.operations (air, ground, and sea), e.g.,.
air war over North vietnan.
h) r.ov-..e support. -o e-ectre-epmieal reconnaissazze and weapon deliver,
ryliZems.
? 3) Support. of National Defense Ccromunications Systees.
? 4) To provide data to the tactical haztlefield for nill:ary forees eneaged
in
5) Stitport to air defense and early,..armieg radar systems.
6) Support: tr: 0C2.211 surface and undersea systems.
7) Support to land farces, trafficahility, and other surface activities.
8) General Imazher support for worldwide mill:ary operazions.
DOD METSAT DATA 11/07171217=7.15 prioriry order)
1) Visible and Izfrared Inagery (cloud caver) - .1= constant resolutioz,
locatable to within .3tm, low light visual (1/4 noon), terninator 'erage nape-
bili, digitized reflectance, (see P0C=CO3 for other detailed accuracies).
2) Thermal Mapping
3) Snow Cover
? 4) Ice Cover
5) Ionospheric 'Electron Densiry
? 6) Precipitation napping - ? .
d ars
reemir,it 7) Space Envirorment, particle flux, type.
8) Soil Moisture content. r-4,* ;e7 z
?it:v.47h
ulls 1 9) Vertical tenterzturt and naisture Profil4ng - . ?
10) Atmospheric Conszituents.
11) Extent of floods
DOD METSA7S'fZFaCt:71.7-"INTS (See Annex I for additional !yet= reouirenenta)
. . 1) Continuiry and Availability -.A Sizinnum. tuu.spacemraft. cenzinuously
orbit-am-all tines. .? .ZS nusr'be able?to'launch withit-..43-daysaf?natitica4::
tion of need into a s=-synchronous orhit with any ascending/descending node tine
specified. Each satellite is launched into an orbit specifically dictated by :he
military needs at the time of launch.
2) Survivabilit, Satellites must be protected !rem az-orbit attack so than
Military data support will continue unin:arrupted during conflict periods.
? 3) Cenmend and Cantrol - DOD requires nand and contral and payload zanage-
.menz.for.at.least two satellites continuously on-orbit.so-zhaz. payload .tasking underLj
routine or united capability operations will not expose military operations or plans.
4) Coverage - Claial, 4 tines per day, constant resolution data, both day and
night:ime visible data. .
? 5) Orbits -.A: least :we sun synchronous orbits, one usually an early morning
Capp 0630) ascending/dtscezding 'node tine and the othermsually near zoom (1000-1200)
mode. tine orhits-parameters most r=aiz.fleiible'to :set -olassi!ied requirements.
6) Timeliness Complete autanated/conputerized processing of all sensor
onnput most be provided to insure processing within minutes of data receipt. Data
must be available to support military crisis and tactical operations.
7) Data Accuracy - DOD has uniquely rigid spacecraft pointing accuracy and
constant resoluzion data requirements.
8) Data Security - Data rust have the capability for encryption so that
transmission can be effected without compromise of data during crisis periods and
the command and control links zust be encrypted to avoid erroneous co=andieg
from hostile sources.
9) 1,ot/3:teal Suztort - Training and logistics most be compatible with enlisted
personnel skill levels.
OTHER FACTORS (See Annexi far additional faczors)
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? NSC
?
?
.1) Contributes to the security and operations of NATO and other US allies.
2) DMSP permits =ajar reductions in other USAF and Navy weather reconnaissance
assets.
3) DOD 4eisefeillar KRIHRONWAnd: c4A?S11814AUTAIRM20191Fai7N0AA.
4) All DOD =SA: imagery data are arehived az :he University of Wisconsin
riliv,L
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TZ-. KEY CONS:DERAT=ONS
A. Current Policy Framework.
The DoC and DoD METSAT programs operate today under
a body of legislation, agreements, policy, and
tradition. PD/NSC-42, PD/NSC-37, the Space Act and
other Congressional actions, UN treaties, and a broad
range of international agreements and arrangements.
Some of the major policies applicable to the METSAT
issue for decision are: (U)
1. "The Ilnited States wil;..maintain current responsi-
bility and management relationships among the
sectors focused on civil, defense, and national
intelligence objectives." PD/NSC-37 (C)
2. "The United States will pursue space activities to
increase scientific knowledge, develop useful
civil applications of space technology, and maintain
United States leadership in space." PD/NSC-37 (U)
3. "The United States will conduct international
cooperative space-related activities that are
beneficial to the United States scientifically,
politically, economically, and/or militarily."
PD/NSC-37 (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
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4. Tme ec wil avelop 2nc operate on
a
global basis active and passive remote sensing
operations in sup.00rt of civil, military, and..
national intelligence objectives. Such operations
will occur under conditions which protect classified
technology, deny sensitive data, and promote
acceptance and legitimacy of such
PD/NSC-37 (C)
S. "Close coordination, cooperation,
exchange will be maintained among
activities."
and information
the space sectors
to avoid unnecessary duplication and to allow
maximum cross-utilization, in compliance with
security and policy guidance of all capabilities."pp/Nsc.
. 6. "Data and results from the civil space programs
will be provided the widest practical dissemination,
except where specific exceptions defined by legislation,
Executive Order, or directive apply." PD/NSC-37 (U)
7. "... each Department or Agency of the Federal
Government which develops,' launches and operates
meteorological satellite systems, takes action as
a matter of urgency to insure that the National
Command Authority is able to (a) maintain control of
U.S. meteorological satellite systems in the face of
a determined effort by a hostile nation to assume
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transmitted from these sysems when such action
is considered to be in the interest of national
security." USCSB 3-12 (S/NF)
8. Pt ... activities peculiar to or primarily associated
with the development of weapon systems, military
operations, or defense of the United States...
shall be the responsibility of and directed by
the Department of Defense..."; NASA shall conduct
civil space R&D,Space Act (U)
B. Current METSAT Management.
1. The USAF is the DOD piogram manager for research,
development, design, acqusition, and operation
of the military TSAT program in response to
operational Defense, intelligence community, and
treaty monitoring requirements, such as the
Limited Test Ban Treaty and Non-proliferation
Treaty. Budgeting and management are centralized;
data are widely disseminated to military users,
including direct readout to aircraft carriers,
overseas commands, and the military weather services.
Much of the data acquired by the military TSATS are
unclassified and made available to the domestic
civil and international communities. (S1
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2. APSE:Iv!!leiktI liegeaEfl~/28:?fialEggaz3B91q111111q.2.3PA9Regs7 the
operational civil TSAT system, both geosynchronous
and polar orbiting. The NO program responds to
a broad spectrum of environmental data reauirements
from a variety of users. Users include: DoC, USDA,
DCC, USDI, WMO, NASA and foreign weather services.
The NOAA budgets centrally for space and ground
segment acquisition and operations, and uses NASA
as its procurement agent for the space segment.
NASA,.using its own funds but in response to NOAA
requirements, conducts space R&D and prototype
development and demonstrition. (U)
3.. The two DOD METSATs fly in orbits that are to meet
individually changing operational needs, but usually in
sun-synchronous orbits with nodal crossing times of
around 0630 and in the 1030-1200 window. The NOAA
polar TSATs currently have crossing times of
about 0730 and 1500 in order to meet the requirements
for repetitive global observations at about 6-hour
intervals to support the synoptic computer models. (U)
C. Potential Costs and Savings.
There are two different elements of costs and savings
associated with merged'METSAT programs: possible
reduction in the number of spacecraft, and decisions
on developing new spacecraft. The costs and disadvantages
of each are treated separately below. (U)
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? 1 . Sarum& RD-Yet:tee aemzsgs teitcacni4 ma* midiVRWooVIns 01"
mix to meet the stated operational TSAT require-
ments of DoC and DoD suggest that three satellites
rather than four could carry the necessary sensors
under idealized operating conditions. These same
studies have indicated that a potential saving of
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expenditure of some over the period
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FY 1981 to FY 1992 might be realized from a reduction
in the number of spacecraft. With military and civil
sensors redistributed among three satellites, all
vehicles would have to carry both civil and military
sensors and both agencies would have to share data
from each satellite. A three satellite system has
some inherent disadvantages': DOD must have flexibility
in setting the orbits of its current vehicles,
particularly for the late-morning (1030-1200) satellite.
While this flexibility is necessary to support certain
national security missions, it has disadvantages
for the domestic civil community. If the late -
morning vehicle were used for direct transmission
to foreign ground stations, changing schedules would
draw undesired foreign attention to sensitive
aspects of the U.S. space effort.. If the observation
times for those satellites used for direct
* Estimates of savings projected over such extended periods are
necessarily questionable.
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transnission to foreign ground stations were
U.
changed significantly, scheduling of weather
forecasts all over the world would be affected
-
A three-satellite system is less flexible and
therefore less responsive to changing user require-
ments and it provides less information with higher
risks of service interruption with only three
satellites. The loss of one would have greater
impact on the civil, Defense, and national security
missions. Increasing the number of instruments
on each satellite increases the likelihood of
partial payload failures requiring full payload
replacement. (C)
2. The other element of possible savings would be the
decision not to develop a new basic spacecraft for
either a three- or four-spacecraft constellation
for operations in the 1985-1992 period. This would
result in one-time near-term cost avoidance of
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It would, however, reduce flexibility and constrain
growth until the 1992 period and might result in
one or the other agency having to buy a more expensive
or less competent satellite than would otherwise
be necessary. (LT)
* Values derived from parametric models are questionable.
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Budcet.
..????????116
Any merged acproach that requires
integrating multicle sources of funds. (i.e., from
DoC and Dor)), runs a risk in any year of program
disruption from Congressional actions taken in
relation to individual agency budgets rather than
in relation to the program as a whole. There is
no means to guarantee agency shares in a joint
funding program, given the current legislative and
appropriation committee structure. Further, within
the Executive Branch, different internal agency
budget *iorities would affect a joint program. (U)
Z. Coordination. Any merged approach would require
complex interagency coordination to assure that
the-.needs of especiallythose.
users without a =SAT operational role but who
depend on TSAT data and information for their
legislated responsibilities (e.g., USDA, DoT).
This presumes negotiation of service and schedule
priorities from quite different but valid bases 0-f
requirements, a difficult task in an environment
. of constrained technical and budgetary resources. (U)
00
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:nternational Considerations.
1. Data Availability. United States civil meteorological
satellite data are available to foreign users on
an open unclassified, and non-discriminatory basis,
either through direct readout from the satellite
or via ground-to-ground communication services.
The conceots under consideration would continue this
practice. DoD data are encrypted and not read out
directly to foreign users, although most of the
data are unclassified and openly distributed. DOD
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data would continue to be handled in this mode.
Civil data would continue to be openly disseminated,
subject to denial to foreign users for national
security *reasons in'cases of national emergency.: The
current guidelines for data availability and for
implementing emergency denial capability provide for
high level interagency review with provision for
appeal to the President. (S/NF)
2; Benefits.to'the.U.S.. 'Foreign cooperation.
civil =SAT space systems has benefited the U.S.
through general worldwide good will and acceptance
of U. S. systems as international assets; concomitant
absence of technological competition; foreign funding
of shared instruments and spacecraft that is saying
the U.S. about
through 1985;
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greater access to foreign meteorological data
through bilateral and WMO channels; and, commitmeni
by our cooperating partners to the objectives
of U.S. systems. (U)
3. Forel= oarticipation. Foreign cooperation has
taken place in the ground segment, in the provision
of foreign instr=ents on a cooperative basis to
NOAA's polar orbiting satellites (the British have
provided a radiometer and the French a data collection
system)7 and in the provision of three foreign
satellites in the coordinated global network of
five geostationary satellites. This contribution
..of leostationary.satellites was. at least,partially -
predicted on the continuing U.S. commitment to
operate a polar satellite-system providing direct
readout, sounding data, and other present services
on an international basis.. Thus, continued growth
in foreign participation-in the totality cf. civil.
meteorological satellite activities will be affected
by U.S. decisions on the operational polar satellites. (t
4. Foreign perceptions. Merged systems will raise the
visibility of the U.S. military space program and
might give impetus to claims that the U.S. is
militarizing its space program and .o existing
C
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proposals in the UN and elsewhere for limits on
military space activities and extension of limits
on civil activities to cover military programs.
However, to the extent that foreign countries
perceive no change in the basic US policies on data
availability and international cooperation, adverse
foreign reaction should be manageable. In the
case of a merged TSAT system under civilian
management, or a merged system under joint civil/
military management, foreign countries would
probably view as credible a U.S. commitment to
continued data and cooperation policies. Allied
or ootential adversary nations would probably
view civil control of an operational TSAT system
supporting the military as a "cover" for intelligence
activities. In the case of a military managed,
merged system, where civil programs were included
in the Defense budget and the management office
would be under Defense auihority, might be difficult
to persuade other countries that merging would not
risk significant reductions in the level of inter-
national activities now associated with the civil
METSAT system. In such a case, the problem of
foreign perceptions could become acute and, in the
worst case, lead to international actions reducing
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international acceptance and legitimacy of all
U.S. civil and military remote sensing programs. (C) ?
F. National Security Considerations.
1. in addition to the special national security mission
(Annex 1), military weather satellite data acquisition
and processing are important to the combat effective-
ness of both tactical and strategic forces. in
the case of tactical and naval air operations, the
effectiveness of munitions delivery and aerial
reconnakssance is highly dependent on the accuracy
..?'
of weather forecasts for the target area. Inaccurate
forecasting increases the risk of combat losses,
improper ordnance selection, mission diversion,
or ineffective application of combat assets. (C)
2. Strategic forces use military satellite weather data
daily to support strategic operations plans and
strategic reconnaissance, including sensor selection
for both targeting and weapons damage assessment.
In targeting, meteorological support is important
to gauging missile impact accuracies which affects
force application options. In assessment, the proper
sensor package must be installed on the aircraft,
thereby improving the probability that the desired
information is collected (e.g., SLAR vs PEOTO). (S)
ai
nECEZT =ZORN DISSW
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3. Responsiveness of a military TSAT data system is
key to satisfying constantly changing military
requirements. In order to be resoonsive, any_METSAT
system supporting the DoD must permit tasking
priority, flexibility, and freedom to respond rapidly
to Unified or Specified Commands involved in combat
operations. (C)
G. Stated Positions of DoD and DoC.
The Secretaries of Defense and Commerce did not agree
on the management approach to further consolidation or
convergence,. Both agreed that, potential cost savings
notwithstanding, the requirements of the military
and civil programs can best be met by maintaining
separate systems (Annexes 2 and 3) (U)
. .
TV. ALTERNATIVES
Under the alternatives for policy consideration outlined below,
there is a presumption of continued shared data processing
responsibilities and separate but coordinated civil and military
?
.. ? ? . . . . . . . ' ? ? .
information dissemination functions. The alternatives assign
to different agencies the responsibilities for spacecraft
and sensor specification, design, and procurement; continued
supporting R&D; orbit selection; on-orbit command and control;
meeting tasking priorities; and, data reception, protection,
Ent FrmrtP7
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and initial processing.
r11;1:1,??=sz
basic management alternatives
have been identified for policy consideration. Each assumes
that technical decisions on the number and design of the
future operational spacecraft will be made by the responsible
agency or agencies. (U)
A. These alternatives are:
1. Coordinated dual DOD and DoC programs with increased
emphasis on data, hardware, and technology sharing. (U)
2.. A jointly managed consolidated DoD-DoC program to
meet both civil and military needs. (U)
3. A fully converged METSAT program under a single
agency (either DoD or Doc) committed to meeting the
need of both communities. (U)
?
B. The key management elements of these alternatives,
together with their advantages and disadvantages, are
further outlined below:
1. Coordinated Dual Programs.
a. Descrintion. This would be an extension of the
.: ?
present arrangements under which NOAA and USAF
manages their own programs in close coordination
and cooperation with each other and with their
respective user constituencies. If warranted
by service and economic considerations, the
1985-1992 civil and military spacecraft systems
could be dissimilar in design and technical
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capabilities, but would take maximum advantage
of technology and hardware exchange. Where
advantageous, there would be co=on use of
spacecraft, subsystems, and instruments,
with further economies possible through coordinated
single-source procurement. NOAA and USAF plans
to increase nonduplicative TSAT data processing
shared between civil and military centers, in
addition to continuing the exchange of data
between the two communities. Examples are
atmospheric soundings, derivation of sea surface
temperatures, and .global. three-dimensional cloud
analyses. ?No new management structure uniuid' ?
need to be developed, as USAF and NOAA already
have in place efficient systems to meet their
full range of responsibilities, from specification
through operations to information dissemination.
*DoC would continue to use NASA 'as its agent f r*
R&D and spacecraft procurement, and the coordina-
tion mechanisms of the Federal Coordinator for
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research,
Polar Orbiting Operational Meteorological
Satellite Coordination Board (POOMSCOB),
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Aeronautics and Astronautics C ordination Board
(XACB), Program Review Board (PR), and Policy
Review Committee (Space) (PRC(S)), would provide
for continuing and improving coordination,
cooperation, and cross-servicing. The present
DoD, DoC, and NASA budget responsibilities would
remain independent. (C,.
b. Advantages.
1. Retains the maximum flexibility, reliability,
and capability ta-.tespond to evolving user
needs in both the civil and military sectors
while providing opportunities for continued
'economies throUgh common use of-developed* .
ar new hardware; retains and expands upon
existing successful coordination mechanisms
and budget structures. .(7).
2. Would not require .changes to existing policy
.or. law.- -0:7)
3. Preserves the option for future further
integration of civil or military remote
sensing functions within existing civil or
military management structure. Examples
are the provision of certain land and ocean
? ? ?
pnwincitiar
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services from the civil or military METSLT
itself or use of the civil or military-METSAT
spacecraft with different instruments. (u)
4. Supports all domestic and international
civil, military, and national security program
objectives. (U)
c. Disadvantages.
1. Would not realize a potential 1981-1992
cost saving through reduction in number of
spacecraft. (U)
2. Might encourage unnecessary duplication. (U)
3. Maintains present manpower levels. (U)
. .
2? Joint DoD-DoC Management.of a. Consolidated Program
a.
Description. Under this approach, a joint USAF-NOAA
management organization would be established to
design, develop, procure, operate, and task the
METSAT space segment. Supporting research and
space segment development and procurement would
be tasked from the joint office to USAF and
NASA, as appropriate, either with or without
reimbursement. This would take the form of a
joint office staffed by both agencies with the
Director designated by the Secretaries of DoC
and DoD; the office essentially would be an
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? 22
institution separated from both its arent
agencies. To assure that all U.S. interests
were adequately represented, there would need
to be a new mechanism established--an "Executive
Committee"--composed of senior program and
policy officials fram all vitally involved
agencies (e.g., State, Agriculture, Interior,
Commerce, Defense, DCI, NASA, LTA) to validate
requirements, priorities and data service tradeoff.
Decisions of the ExetUtive Committee could be
raised by an agency head to the PRC(S).
Budgeting would be divided among the three main
. .
technical agencies (USAF, NOA2k, VASA). If present ?
international cooperation and data policies
were continued, this alternative would not cause
unmanageable foreign reactions. (:)
b. Advantages.
1. Might allow reduction to a '3 spacecraft -
METSAT system with a consequent reduction
in cost. (U)
2. Reduces the number of independent spacecraft
and instrument developments. (7)
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3. Provides a broader interagency consumer/user
forum for data service requirements. -(U)
4. Preserves the o=tion for future further
integration of remote sensing functions
unaer joint management, such as providing
certain land and ocean services from the
METSAT itself or using the TSAT spacecraft
with different instruments. (U)
c. Disadvantages.
1. .Requires a new and complex interagency
management and budget structure to provide
for adequate services to both the civil
and military communities. ccn
' .?.
2. Might reduce responsiveness of the overall
system to its principal users, DoD and DoC. (U)
3. Funding priority decisions in any year by
any one agency or its respective Congressional
authorization or appropriation Committees
could put.the entire programCin jeopardy. (U)
4. Might require changes to existing policy
or law. (U)
5. Would take considerable time to implement
and to resolve conflicts. (U)
6. Would increase risk of service interruption
to one sector or the other if a three-spacecraft
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3. Conver=ed Program Under Single Agency Management.
a.
Description. Under this approach, there are
two subotrtions: either DoC or DoD would be
selected by the President to fund, develop,
procure, and operate a single polar orbiting
METSAT space segment for the U.S. responsive to
all national interests. The selected operating
agency (USAF or NOAA) would establish an
interagency advisory board (representing State,
USDA, DoI, DoC, Do0,-OCI, NASA, EPA) to assure
that external requirements are understood and
that the operational system is responsive thereto.
Tradeaffs'and oeratio?al. constraints that.
affect external requirements would have to be
appealed by the concerned agency head to the
PRC(S).- (U)
b. Advantages.
. .1.?-11ight-allow reductian.to-e- three?spacecraft ?
METSAT system with a consequent reduction
in cost. (U)
2. Reduces the number of independent spacecraft
and instrument developments. (U)
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3. Streamlines budgetary, development,
25
orocurement,
and. management activities through centralization
in a single agency. (U)
4.If converged under NOAA, might be manageable
in terms of foreign reactions. (U)
C. Disadvantages.
1. Requires a potentially adversary interagenc:
coordination structure to assure the lead
agency understanding of external requiremen.
and encourages conflict between the lead
agency and the others (excessive claims for
servicefrom agencies not required to pay
' 'for theM, and valid .compliants of non-
responsiveness). CU)
2. Places either USAF or NO in the role of
developing and operating systems for anothe:
sector, which might require changes in polic
law*.
?
3. If managed by NOAA, could compromise DoD's
requirements for operational orbital
flexibility, command and control, and suppo:
to military operations. If managed by USAF,
could compromise NOAA's ability to meet its
civil and international responsibilities.
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25X1
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ANNEX 1
CLASSIFIED DOD METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE REQUIREMENT
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The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was initiated
as a National Reconnaissance (NRO) program in 1960 to provide dedicated,
timely weather support for satellite and aircraft intelligence collec?
tion. In 1965, management of DMSP was transferred to the Air Force
in order to improve support of the Vietnam conflict and other JCS opera?
tions. It is now a tri?service program. The critically important
25X1
25X1
highest priority mission of DMSP continues co oe iutu suppurL.
The baseline NRO?DOD requirement for DMSP consists of at least
two sun?synchronous polar orbiting satellites continuously on orbit
with nodal crossinz times selected to meet the stringent NRO mission
requirements.
25X1
The value to the nation of the cloud free imagery which DMSP adds
to our intelligence systems is measured not only in reduced system
operating costs, but also in the more vital area of satisfaction of
intelligence requirements such as SALT monitoring, indications and
warning, crisis monitoring, etc. The NRO systems are a vital element
of our nation's capability to monitor SALT and DMSP is an integral
part of the performance and efficiency of these key NRO systems. Any
actions taken concerning the current or future DMSP development, management
or operations must not degrade this essential NRO capability.
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ANNEX 2
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
? JUN 4 1979
MEMORANDCM FOR DIRECICR, OFFICE OF MAIMGEMENT ANM BUDGET
SUBJECT: Further Convergence of Polar Meteorological Satellite Programs
(U) In response to your memorandum of 1 February 1979, the Polar-
Orbiting Operational Meteorological Satellite Coordinating Board (PCCMSCB)
has forwarded to you their draft report on further convergence. This
report examines several alternatives and concludes that further conver-
gence is functionally feasible. Your memorandum raised other issues
concerning organizational responsibilities, timing, and cost effective
utilization of the Shuttle. I would like to make clear my position on
these subjects.
(U) I believe that farther convergence offers potential savings in the
overall federal budget. Our ability to capture this potential without
unduly compromising operational missions depends, however, upon the
effectiveness of the converged program and management structure. Because
of the importance of the Defense Meteorological Support Program (SP)
to national security missions, I have concluded that further convergence
is viable only by augmentation of the DMSP to support civil needs, .
while retaining DoD management. Such a converged system and the opera-
tional factors which dictate this approach are described in the enclosed
Defense Position Paper (Enclosure 1).
(U) Should further convergence be directed, I will be fully committed
to assuring that DMSP truly serves the civil, as well as military users.
You will note that the position paper retains significant responsibility
for the program within Defense. This is based upon several factors which
I believe must be maintained in any convergence scheme.
(U) First, a single agency line management organization is essential to
execution of a dynamic and cost effective program. Secondly, the I.JLogram
must have a stable funding profile and should avoid multiple agency
budgeting systems, justification processes and appropriations. If
necessary, I am willing to have all program funds included in the
Defense line. Finally, a continuous operational capability must, be
maintained. I request a decision on convergence of the operational polar
meteorological systems no later than 16 July, in time for my budget
activities in August. Decisions on other convergence issues can be made
on the basis of the meteorological convergence outcome.
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(U) Concerning Shuttle utilization, the Defense goal is to use the
Shuttle to achieve our. missions at the lowest practical cost. As you
know, We have studies ongoing which are examining many alternatives for
Shuttle usage, including the potential for retrieval and refurbishment,
for a range of operational and experimental missions. We are seeking the
most cost-effective engineering approach for convergence and I do not
believe that the engineering options are convergence issues. Here again,
an early decision on convergence will help assure that all critical needs
are included in these studies.
Enclosure
cc: Secretary of Commerce
President's National Security Advisor
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Administrator, NASA
?????
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Department of Defense Position
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Further Convergence of DoD and Civil Poiar orbiting
Meteorological Satellite Systems
DoD supports the further convergence of military and civil. polar
orbiting satellite systems, if satisfaction of the operational military
requirements detailed below is maintained.
Certain high priority DoD missions require responsive, high quality
meteorological support. In order to retain adequate support such
as DoD has received from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMS?) and to ensure that future supcort will be equal to the military
.needs, DoD must retain a significant level of control over the develop-
ment, management, operation, and cammand and control of any future polar
orbiting reteorological satellite program which would supercede MS?.
DoD has participated closely with the National Weather Service and has
made full use of civil products and services where applicable. gowever,
neither military nor civil meteorological sources, including the
civil TIROS satellite system, were able to provide all the needed
information.. A military satellite program (currently designated DMS?)
was created to fulfill critical shortfalls in:
- Global imagery coverage with high precision
- Assured daily coverage
- Precise time of collection
- Data through-put for irrnediate operational use
Security ind survivability
The system was successful and DMSP has been fully integrated into the US
force structure.
Military weather reconnaissance aircraft have been cut back.
- Most theater commands and aircraft carriers have or are programmed
for direct readout terminals and a contingency tactical terminal
is on alert.
- The end-to-end system, including personnel, procedures and logis-
tics, has been tailored for assured, responsive support in
dynamic military and national strategic situations.
- Weather support to world-wide operations have been restructured
with much greater reliance upon the Air Force Global Weather
Central and Navy Fleet Numerical Weather Center, which in turn
rely heavily upon DMS?.
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The integration of DMSP into the Defense force sLructure(Lraults in
vital functions which must be acooluaodated in any follow-on meteorolog-
ical satellite program.. From end-to-end, the system has to be carefully
structured to simultaneously support diverse national and in-theater
customers, with training and logistics compatible with enlisted personnel
skill levels, and with tasking and operations geared for assured support
of daily missions of the highest priority.
DMSP was created only with intensive iterations of meteorological,
engineering and user needs to achieve a responsive system within the
constraints of practical system design. This System Engineering infra-
structure is essential to continued operational military support and
cannot be farmed out to another agency. Most of the functions of the
DMSP Program Office and the cadre of participants will have to be
maintained in any further convergence. Specifications cannot be provided
to a civil agency any more easily than to a contractor and the constant
interaction with users during the development, acquisition and opera-
tional phases will still be required. In this regard, the insertion of
a civil agency into these essential functions as merely a middleman
complicates rather than streamlines the process.. Thus, if a joint
orogram is desired, implementation should be by civil augmentation of
the DMSP Program Office.
A single joint program would logically be based upon the DoD system.
Most domestic requirements are satisfied by the separate civil geo-
synchronous satellite system (GOES), augmented by the civil low-alti-
tude polar satellite system filling in for specific operational-needs.
By contrast, key Defense needs demand a low-altitude polar system and
result in such technical requirements such as pointing accuracy, global
coverage, local readout, assured availability and accommodaticn of
special missions which will dominate the development of a further
converged system. A system capable of satisfying Defense requirements
will lend itself well to the typically less demanding civil needs not
satisfied by the geosynchronous system.
For each functional area of the satellite system, vital Defense needs
and corresponding organizational responsibilities for further convergence
are discussed below:
Requirements can be developed jointly with civil agencies.
System Engineering and Development must be the responsibility
of DoD. The CMSP Program Office can be augnented with civil
representatives, including management positions.
Development and acquisition of spacecraft and sensors required
for the primary military mission must be controlled by DoD. A
"core" spacecraft design can be developed which will accept various
mixes of military, civil and joint payloads. The civil community
can share common hardware or they can procure additional items by
(1) adding to Defense contracts, (2) through separate procurement
using Program Office specifications, or (3) their cwn unique
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- Military sensors can be expanded to satisfy some civil needs and
vice versa. Responsibility for sensor development would be assigned
based upon major requirements or interest,- with minimal duplication.
Civil payloads can be carried on militarily required spacecraft
and vice verse.
- Funding for the converged system will be by a single program line,
carried in the Defense budget, with joint justification of the
program.
- DoD must maintain selection of launch dates and times, precise
orbit parameters, daily coverage, command and control and payload
management for at least two satellites continuously on-orbit.
- Launch will be via the standard Space Transportation System division
of responSibility.
- Needed security, including CCMSEC, will be provided for the two
militarily required satellites. Direct readout of selected data
to foreign civil sites in support of international agreements can be
included subject to interruption in case of compromise of national
security in crisis or conflict.
- Survivability is required commensurate with military use in crisis
and conflict. All satellites will be configured to deny data to
the enemy in time of national emergency.
- Operational priorities, including for contingency conditions, will
be established jointly for guidance of day-to-day tasking of the
system.
Shared operating structure, subject to maintaining an essential
wartime capability, can be implemented with integrated military and
civil tasking and participation in spacecraft command and control.
- Free interchange of most planning and tasking information and data
products will continue both ways across the military/civil interface.
Shared processing with complementary responsibilities can he imple-
mented with individual distribution.
- Cooperative R&D will continue with civil agencies responsible for
basic research and performing those efforts they are willing to
perform and fund, and DoD conducting only those projects where there
is a significant military application.
This degree of convergence would result in extensive common hardware,
facilities and procedures, assure the absence of unnecessary duplication,
maintain a sound programmatic and budgeting structure for intolnenting
the program, and retain certain existing management structure elements
to satisfy the requirements of law, policy and international implications
to which both DoD and the civil (.0.witunity must adhere.
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,
.6 . ? . w '" ? " THE SEOP.E.TAVIY OF COMMER
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ei, ot?
? ?
? .. ? . JUN 2 8 1979 ANNEX :
p ????
?
?
?
. . .
Dear Jim,
- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? - ? ?
?? ?
? ? "'tett"- ?
I am writing to convey my views on the options identified
in the draft report prepared by the Polar Orbiting Operational
Meteorological Satellite Coordinating Board (POOMSCOB) for
further convergence of the civilian and military polar
meteorological satellite programs.
As you know, the principal options are two, a converged syster
under single agency management and a consolidated system whicl
provides for a form of joint management. After reviewing the
draft POOMSCOB report and Secretary Brown's ZTune 4 memorandur
to you arguing for convergence of the two programs under
military management by the Department of Defense, we strongl:-
believe that the convergence option is neither feasible nor
desirable. We also have grave doubts about the viability of
the consolidatioh option, but believe that issue should not b
resolved in the context of the budget process.
,.-
Defense's.objection to a converged system iinzer civi: mana71,:-
ment, I. strongly believe that apolar meteorological satella
system under Department of Defens management i alsz. unaccc:
able. As explained more fully in tne enclosed memorandun, t:
Department of Defense's proposal is contrary tc Presidentia:
policy developed over the last twenty years and emhodied,
among other places, in PD/NSC-37; is inconsistent with the
Space Act of 1958: and would compromise our ability to meet
existing internatfonal commitments and tn fester incrasf
international colla'noration. In aMition, it is apparen-.
the Department of Defense's_memnranduM -- which admits tha:
"accommodation of special /military/ missions...wil: dn7.ina:?
the development of a further conver7c:! sl-stcr," a
Department of Defense managed system would be d?cnsc dor"ni
Thus, although the Department of Deiense's.convc-rne.: syster
might save money, it would du so at the cxpens(. o: c;vilian
satellite requirements and fori7:r. i.oncy chjcr
It had been our hopc that further convergence under some for
of joint management would be possible. In view of the Depa:
went of Defense's inflexibility, however, we now tend to bel
that joint management would not work in practice and shou2:3
-.Dot be adopted. The difficulties of.negotiating and i2e-
menting acceptable management arrangements and the risks tz
the civilian program, in our view, appear not to be wort
the saving;. In any event, we believe this issue should no
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be resolved as part of the fiscal year 1981 budget-process,
but should be considered in the broader context of the
remote sensing studies undertaken in response to PD/NSC-42.
This is not to suggest that further savings cannot be achieved.
As you know, over the. past several years we have made
considerable progress toward convergence and have already
achieved many of the savings attributable to a fully converged
system. Most of the additional savings from further convergenc
identified by POOMSCOB fall under spacecraft and sensor design
and procurement. The management.difficulties which concern
us arise because the draft POOMSCOB report suggests that the
present four satellites (2 civilian and 2 military) be replaced
.by three larger satellites servinc.both civil and military
requirements. We believe that many of the savings identifiec!
by POOMSCOB can still be attained, and the management difficult
avoided, by retaining the present system.of four satellites
under separate mana7.,ement and moving to joint procurement cf
an existing spacecraft design and, to the extent possible,'
consolidated procurement of sensors. The National Oceanic
and Atmosphoric Administral..ion (0,%A) will bv Lmploying
1984 an acvancea, s-r(xtonec.
which is capable-of supportinc both the pepartr.,_.nt of Dcfenss
and NOAA polar orbiting prog-rams. Use of this desion wo-J1O
avoid the significant desicn cnsts associatc.e with the P:".SCC
proposal and, by establishinc :loint procurement procedures,
would permit capture of many of the POOMSC01-. snvincs.
recommend this proposal as the most satisfactory resolution
of the difficult policy issues posed by Secretary Brown's
memorandum.
If further consideration will be 7iven to changing thc histeri
U.S. policy of having civil satellites operated by a civilian,
rather than military, agency, I would want to discuss
subject with the rrc:ci6an--
Sincerely,
#7-140440'4
Enclosure
Honorable James T. McIntyre, Or.
Director, Office of Management
and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503
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CCM' EXITS OF MC
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DEPARIMET OF COnIERCE
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O1JCOZWEIGEICE OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL POLAR ORBITIM
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METEOFOLCCICAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS UNDER
DEPAR11.1ENT OF DEFEISE MANAGEnENT
In response to the draft report by the Polar Orbiting Cperational
/%teorological Satellite Coordinatimg Poarri (ponmscnB) on further
convergence of the military and civil polar meteorological satellite
programs, the Departront of Defense (DOD) nas argucd in favor of
ccnver7ence of the twu systems unier nr-s. mananc-nt. 0:77.t" r-,
prorg..15a.: zor the follo.;inn reason:.:
1. Military Manaoement of the civil metenrolooicr.! satr?llite svp.te- ir
contrary to a conrirt&nt natiorz:? n-)11:v
aboroved by several Presirients oY,7?r th..% 13st 2n v^9rE.
The separation of civil and military satcllite function.s haF, 1A7-et
characteristic of national space policy since at least 195. Sectior.
102(b) of the Space Act of 1956 provides:
The Conc:ress further declares that !space
activities] shall he tr.:. responsibility of, ani stall
be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control
ever aeronautical and space activities sponsortd by the
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United States, except that activities pi..culiar to or
primarily: associated with the development of weanons
systems, mil itaa. orations, or the defense of thc!
United States shall be the responsibility of; and
shall be directed by, the Department of Defense; and
that determination as to which such agency has
responsibility for and direction of any such activity
shall be.made by the President...(emphasis added).
Cbviously the functions of the civil operational environmental
.satellite program cannot be oonstrue3 to be excepted fro m the general
provision of this section.
.Consistent with this statutory direction, when the issue cf.
whether to otrribine the civil and military environ..7,anta1 satellite
pr,rars was a3dresse-i enrly in this decane, t!-.e our in
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c5ecide3 to maintain a se7?,-ratc.?civu syste7. reunr,.
decision were state in a fr!cr:n!nr 10, 1972 3,-..tter *.;.enr-.
to then?OMB Director Asn:
'It continue thc., cco7:rative re2ationhip? in t?:.
futurr, we.th?-r
sustailn policy of oren acch.r.:4 tr.
(2) ner t our establisht. co.-:it.ente trt
an.? the Gio.:.41 Atxr,serir
Pr-ra.-.. and L prc.narci to
in the future; (3) encouracv: turtrp.:r inatin
p3rt1-..ion in our prce7r.-.-: I..' t'
civilian char6cter and contc:2 c,f tn,7 -. S. Wf.it?'.7
prrcra-. as it mlates to such internationz2 activitic:
. These conditions can be satisfied bv maintain:n-1 tne
civil aencies' functions of definin?, supern.sin;:,
anri orating our civil weather satellite prrx.irc.r..
More recently, President Carter reaff irrei this basic
in Pt/C-37, which states that "Itlhe United States will maint4ir.
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current responsibility and management relationships among the sector
focused on civil, defense, and (other) objectives.'
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The DOD proposal to vest control of the civil system entirely
within DOD thus flies in the face of established Congressional and
Presidential policy.
2. DOD manaoement of a converoed system wnuld comoromise existinn
intPrnational onmmitmentq an71 undercut effe,rte to fotc.,-
international coOderation.
A second consistent characterlf:tir of nntion-!; s7)arr- ro:ic-
LA:Z; iT 1W1-6.7g4:. M7
the Space Act of 195:r. provi:ien in section 10".c:
"lrs,....sr.Bce activities cf States
tie conducted so as to contrihutr-...to...ccoreratior
by the nnited Stats with rith,..r ntion ani nrou7z
of natinnr, pr-.2ct-ful a77.11cation of th
res.;11..: tlJereof.".
Similarly, President Carter, throuch pn/N:;:-1, stat i tnc.:
U. S. will cond.Ict inttrnationa: coo7erzt:7:
that are benefical to the United States...."
Until now, the civil meteorological satellite program has bE
of the cornerstones of this facet of U.S. space policy. Today,
stations in 128 co;untries use the direct readout services of U.,.
polar orbiting satellites, including imagery, sounding, and spec'
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environmental data. The present civil system is fully cpen and
encoura9es international contributions of Pquilmcnt and services.
........-..........
. Cperattonal instruments contributed by France and Great Britain are now
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aboard NCAA spacecraft, and ground system cooperation is becoming
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routine. We expect these foreign contributions to grow under a
continued oven system providing corresponding decreases in U.S. costs
for the system.
It is precisely those characteristics of t.InE.- civil system whici:
are responsible for its success in pronoting international cooperatiOn
ocenness ano accessibility -- which would be camt:romisei under non ?
managemcnt. This ri:r1Inr f' )r 107: W!At,
decision to maintain a separate civil 5ystr!=r1 anl kc3 tn ?tion:
Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (N5C-1/DM-117, lOcelmber 4,
1973) to state:
Suspicions might be raised that the civil part of th