Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 2004
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 13, 1979
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7.pdf2.27 MB
Approved For Release 200iiii34a/41:1P83M00171R002300100005-7 13 AUG 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: VIA: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Intelligence 25X1 FROM: Acting Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper 25X1 REFERENCE: A. Memo to DCI fm Remote Sensor D/DCl/RM, Subj: Integrated System Study, dtd 12 Jun 79 NRO, Subj: Comments on Polar B. Memo to DLI tm Meteorological Satellite Program Options Paper, dtd 8 Aug 79 C. Ltr to Chmn, PRC (Space) fm Deputy Administrator NASA, dtd 7 Aug 79 1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memo (Attach- ment 2) providing comments to the NSC on the subject options paper. 25X1 2. Background: a. The potential covergence of the Polar Meteorological Satellite Program is one part of the Integrated Remote Sensing Systems Study being carried out as a follow-on to PD/NSC-42, Civil Space Policy. Dr. Cook is your representative on this study (Reference A). 25X1 b. The options paper (Attachment 1) has been provided for formal agency comments. Dr. Press, Chairman of the PRC (Space), is apparently planning to forward the options paper and agency comm- ents for Presidential decision without convening a PRC (Space) meeting to discuss the issue further. He evidently favors this 25X1 approach in view of the firm and opposing positions already on record for the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce. However, either Secretary could request such a meeting and Dr. Press would probably respond favorably if a request is made. 25X1 25X1 25X1 On file DOC release instructions apply. NRO and OSD review(s) completed. NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 03/31/04 opy No. DERIVATIVE CL BY DDECLXJREVWON IV MU I DERIVED FROM Multiple 25 Approved For Release 2004/0T6OP : g613411)EE3M00171R 02300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/0W:SallittM00171R002300100005-7 ,SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper ri 25X1 3. Discussion: a. The options paper is well written and lays out the issue clearly. The issue has been driven by OMB with the obvious goal of cost savings. All agree that such savings can be achieved but not without performance degradation due to potential compromises on the choice of orbits, orbit timing, and tasking. Options that retain DoD control alleviate such concerns for DoD missions but exacerbate these concerns for the civil missions. The civil community also states that DoD management control is contrary to national policy and would risk adverse foreign reactions. b. The Intelligence Community's major concern is the con- tinuation of effective and viable MTTSAT support to the NRP. Dr. Cook's memo to you (Reference B) describes the NRC's position. raur_loposed memo to Dr. Press is consistent with the NRO position. 25X1 c. The alternatives are: (1) Coordinated dual DoD and DoC programs with increased emphasis on data, hardware, and technology sharing. (2) A jointly managed consolidated DoD-DoC program to meet both civil and military needs. (3) A fully converged METSAT program under a single agency (either DoD or DoC) committef to meeting the needs of both communities. d. As far as we know, all of the major affected agencies currently support Alternative (1), a continuation of the current management arrangements (see Reference C for NASA'a views). OMB (and possibly OSTP) support an alternative with a greater degree of convergence. If OMB's view prevails and a fully converged program is directed, there are opposing views on which gency--DoD or DoC-- should be selected to manage the program. 25X1 25X1 25X1 e. The options paper has been distributed to the members of the DCI Space Policy Working Group. All members basically agree with our position on this issue. 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : 61A-RDP83M00171R 25X1 2300100005-7 3 Approved For Release 200 killerI E Dr83M00171R002300100005-7 t SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper 25X1 fl 4. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memo to Dr. Press. Attachments: 1. Options Paper 2. Proposed Memo to Dr. Press TOP Hera Approved For Release 2004/06/29 3CIA-RDP83M00171R0023 25X1 25X1 25X1 00100005-7 AI? Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper Ti 25X1 25X1 Distribution: Copy No. 1 - DCi 2 - DDCI 3 - ER 4 - SAFSS 25X1 5 - NSA/W 6 - State/INR (Mr. Chamberlin) 7 - CIA/DDA 25X1 8 - CIA/DDS& 9 - CIA/NFAC 10 - D/DCl/CT 11 - D/DCl/CT/COMIREX 12 - D/DCl/RM/PGO 13 - D/DCl/RM/PBO 25X1 14 - D/DCl/RM/PBO 15 - D/DCl/RM/IRO D/DCl/RM/CLLO \11216- D/DCl/RM/PAO 25X1 18 - D/DCl/PAO 19 - D/DCl/RM c;;;;;] 20 - CT Registry 21 - RM Registry 22 - PRO Chrono 23 - PRO Typist 25X1 DCl/RM/PAO (10 Aug 79) Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R0023001000057 c+ Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Approved For Release 2kfliffei64a9-tPjah;BPPAIM00171R002300100005 SECRET July 27, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the :nterior The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of. Commerce The Secretary of Energy The Director, 'Office of Management and Budget Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff . /Director of Central :ntelligence Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration . Director, Office gf-Seience and Technology Policy SUBJECT: Polar Meteorological Satellite Options Paper (U) The. interagency.tisktorce has,completed-the attached opti?ons-? paper for your review. Comments should be submitted to the NSC by Augustf, 1979. The annexes are not included but in possession of your task force representatives. (S) Attachment SECRET Review: July 27, 1985 Christine. Dodson Staff Secretary Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 are 25X1 NRO Approved For Releacpe..t.20144/116??,11.,ElyEF18c3sM99;171R002300100005-7 POLAR TEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM OPTIONS PREPARED 3Y TEE INTERAGENCY-TASX FORCE ON INTEGRATED REMOTE SENSING SYSTEMS (PHASE /I) JULY 23, 1979 SECRET NOFORN DISSEM Review for Downgrading on July 1, 1985 SECRET Approved For Retutsli/04tittth&tfilfanI00171R002300100005-7 Approved Forpl;Ilirge.7310140a8th675/83ffilaR2H300100005-7 PROGRAM OPTIONS 1.ISSE FOR DECISION Should there be further consolidation or convergence of the military and civil polar orbiting meteorological satellite (aTSAT) programs for the 1985-1992 period and., if so, to what extent or under what policy ground rules? (V) II. BACXGROUND A. Task. PD/NSC-42 directed, "In the PY 1980 budget review, OMB--in cooperation with Defense, the DCI, NASA, and NOAA--will conduct a cross-cut review of meteorological satellite programs to ?determ.ine the potential:for.. future budgetary savings and program efficiency. Based on this cross-cut, the Policy Review Committee (Space) -will assess the feasibility., and policy implications of program consolidation...." The operational civil ?:geostationary METSAT. program is not an issue here. (V) ? ? ? B. Current Programs. 1. Major civil METSAT requirements are the global acquisition of quantitative data and domestic and international dissemination of environmental data for improved weather, climate and environmental monitoring and forecasting. The civil DoC program Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 bp V litan. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 2 is open and unclassified, to encourage national and international use of the data, and to encourage international cooperation and collaboration in establishing the capabilities of the satellite systems themselves, even to the point of other nations providing some on-board sensors and data processing systems. (LT) 2. The military TSAT requirements include global coverage for both imagery and quantitative data in suppor.t of national security objectives (see Annex 1), worldwide intelligence collection, and strategic and tactical military operations. While ? the Don _program is operated primarily to meet ? . . _ national security needs, archived DoD TSAT imagery is primarily available to the civil and international community. All DoD TSAT data are available to . ?. ? ?''. '...? ? ? ? ? ? . ? . . . ? NOLA for operational use. (C) 3. There are significant differences between the civil and military programs in the priority of individual. data needs and accuracies; spectral, temporal, and spatial resolution requirements; orbit selection; system survivability criteria; and data formatting, processing, and dissemination. inrozry Approved For 64W;210 ;TIA1 61451383M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 3 Command, control, and management procedures are also significantly different between the two sectors. This leads to the differences in space- craft instrumentation, ground suploOrt hardware, and operational philosophies, as noted in Tables 1 and 2. (II) 4. Some technical convergence has already been achieved with the joint use by DoD and DoC of a common basic spacecraft, the DNS? Block 5D of DoD design. Civil . requirements are accommodated by modification to the basic spacecraft and supporting subsystems. Each agency operates two spacecraft for its own requirements; there is a useful degree of METSAZ data exchange and cross-serVicing.between'the.civil-: ' and military sectors,esmecially in the event of spacecraft Malfunctions. (V) C. Continuity.. In FY 1981, both DoD and DoC must initiate budgetary actions to maintain continuity data services ? ? .. ? beyond the 1984-85 period, when the current buy of spacecraft will have been exhausted. (U) Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? fallow:Lng NCAA samaALNIffli.e aese =salons, but their -3. ''''-'0474/951573..831ga'b- itikapioftMetb tr.= -Lanairy ' -caw ....nreign) also =vx---L'outa. pricrity is the provisicul of images far severe sta.= ITDAA Missions (in priority order) ""ical weather analysis and farecasting. (g1,-.1 and -local) envircruert monitaring and prediction ? ood forecasting and water' management ts monitaring --pmmt of contunicatians, high altitude flight, power transmissicn suppmmt (agni.cultne, oil spills, research, etc.) Polar Satellite Data Requirammts (in priority order) spheric terata and Imzmidity (earth's surface to the uprx=r stra...sphere, e-tml; 200 km. grid; foL_/day; acoracy eae, 1?C; humidity, 20%) ter surface terrature 100 km @ 1?C-; local, 10 km @ 0.50C) and ice cover; detect melting (glo-1, 10 km; local, 1 km) -th. heat balance for climate change articles and x-rays frau salar storms ,tations in atmaspheric gases (e.g. ozone) tispectral imaging for other -environmental uses tion of major c=an surface ..11-rmts ..Jent of floods (highest reiolutian available) Data st.plemnt thase tram WES in providing short range for--sting of severe and local weatimr. System Rem:di-smuts nuity and RP-141,ility: TWo spacecraft in orhit at all times with replacement of a fai: 4"-:withim 120 days ::Deliverdiata productsand_services with:rphil4ty,cfbetter 95%, with no breaks Langer than six ham's: ? - - ' and ground systm must survive 'the phenomena it is to detect. 'km hostirgithreats as required by D. and Control: Must provide immediate response to Changes in tasking resulting from severe stars, unusual changes in ice and snow cover, oil spills, special experMnaT and from systam failures. . . ge: Global, 4/day,.plus 1 km imagery progranrable for up to 25% of glabe/day.- - ? ts: Srn synchronous; at least 850 km; crossing the equator at 0730L t 1 hr and 1.130L hr to meet input needs of U.S. and intat-sa.tianal numerical fameasteas. ness: .Data must be pmoassedwithin.minutes.as.input.far.ac=tate numerical weather andpr-artzt. warTi...ng-of totential natural disastersj.value for. these . ses decays rapiely with time. ' Data Communications: Data onlIwtion/lccaticn sUbsystem is needed for special in support of data rac.ai.---ormt one. observations must be broadcast J.yto local users thraughout the world for sammaumaming. Other Factors ,cgm U.S. casts by providiig for international partie-pation through cantributions of 'stems and satellites. .:.bute to U.S. foreign policy objectives through training, .data exchange, direct of vital data, etc. U.S. benefits frau U.S. particiPation in international programs, such as Global Atmospheric Research Program and World Weather Watch. Aga aeXthility to meet unexpected, priority needs, and back 13; intarnati=ally acceptable platform for search and rescue mission. .MCD MTTSA. nission requirements are coverec JCZ memoran-a, :ne et.g.a report, ? and the Phase I :ES' report. Special aczess OOD =TEAT requirements are przvided 11.'sePnrac2Afrifr6fie*Ffprikiefera44-7M91106/29 7t219*-M3P8?1314081?ifaM30784151900547 ilave ,r.op DOD DOD M=TSAT? m:sszens (See Azzen fer additioeal -.missives) 1) Support to special tili-a-y.operations (air, ground, and sea), e.g.,. air war over North vietnan. h) r.ov-..e support. -o e-ectre-epmieal reconnaissazze and weapon deliver, ryliZems. ? 3) Support. of National Defense Ccromunications Systees. ? 4) To provide data to the tactical haztlefield for nill:ary forees eneaged in 5) Stitport to air defense and early,..armieg radar systems. 6) Support: tr: 0C2.211 surface and undersea systems. 7) Support to land farces, trafficahility, and other surface activities. 8) General Imazher support for worldwide mill:ary operazions. DOD METSAT DATA 11/07171217=7.15 prioriry order) 1) Visible and Izfrared Inagery (cloud caver) - .1= constant resolutioz, locatable to within .3tm, low light visual (1/4 noon), terninator 'erage nape- bili, digitized reflectance, (see P0C=CO3 for other detailed accuracies). 2) Thermal Mapping 3) Snow Cover ? 4) Ice Cover 5) Ionospheric 'Electron Densiry ? 6) Precipitation napping - ? . d ars reemir,it 7) Space Envirorment, particle flux, type. 8) Soil Moisture content. r-4,* ;e7 z ?it:v.47h ulls 1 9) Vertical tenterzturt and naisture Profil4ng - . ? 10) Atmospheric Conszituents. 11) Extent of floods DOD METSA7S'fZFaCt:71.7-"INTS (See Annex I for additional !yet= reouirenenta) . . 1) Continuiry and Availability -.A Sizinnum. tuu.spacemraft. cenzinuously orbit-am-all tines. .? .ZS nusr'be able?to'launch withit-..43-daysaf?natitica4:: tion of need into a s=-synchronous orhit with any ascending/descending node tine specified. Each satellite is launched into an orbit specifically dictated by :he military needs at the time of launch. 2) Survivabilit, Satellites must be protected !rem az-orbit attack so than Military data support will continue unin:arrupted during conflict periods. ? 3) Cenmend and Cantrol - DOD requires nand and contral and payload zanage- .menz.for.at.least two satellites continuously on-orbit.so-zhaz. payload .tasking underLj routine or united capability operations will not expose military operations or plans. 4) Coverage - Claial, 4 tines per day, constant resolution data, both day and night:ime visible data. . ? 5) Orbits -.A: least :we sun synchronous orbits, one usually an early morning Capp 0630) ascending/dtscezding 'node tine and the othermsually near zoom (1000-1200) mode. tine orhits-parameters most r=aiz.fleiible'to :set -olassi!ied requirements. 6) Timeliness Complete autanated/conputerized processing of all sensor onnput most be provided to insure processing within minutes of data receipt. Data must be available to support military crisis and tactical operations. 7) Data Accuracy - DOD has uniquely rigid spacecraft pointing accuracy and constant resoluzion data requirements. 8) Data Security - Data rust have the capability for encryption so that transmission can be effected without compromise of data during crisis periods and the command and control links zust be encrypted to avoid erroneous co=andieg from hostile sources. 9) 1,ot/3:teal Suztort - Training and logistics most be compatible with enlisted personnel skill levels. OTHER FACTORS (See Annexi far additional faczors) 25.X1 ? NSC ? ? .1) Contributes to the security and operations of NATO and other US allies. 2) DMSP permits =ajar reductions in other USAF and Navy weather reconnaissance assets. 3) DOD 4eisefeillar KRIHRONWAnd: c4A?S11814AUTAIRM20191Fai7N0AA. 4) All DOD =SA: imagery data are arehived az :he University of Wisconsin riliv,L IIAL Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 6 TZ-. KEY CONS:DERAT=ONS A. Current Policy Framework. The DoC and DoD METSAT programs operate today under a body of legislation, agreements, policy, and tradition. PD/NSC-42, PD/NSC-37, the Space Act and other Congressional actions, UN treaties, and a broad range of international agreements and arrangements. Some of the major policies applicable to the METSAT issue for decision are: (U) 1. "The Ilnited States wil;..maintain current responsi- bility and management relationships among the sectors focused on civil, defense, and national intelligence objectives." PD/NSC-37 (C) 2. "The United States will pursue space activities to increase scientific knowledge, develop useful civil applications of space technology, and maintain United States leadership in space." PD/NSC-37 (U) 3. "The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related activities that are beneficial to the United States scientifically, politically, economically, and/or militarily." PD/NSC-37 (U) CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Aamovedfor Releas_g.2004/06/29.4Q1A-R2P83M0017R0023000005-7 4. Tme ec wil avelop 2nc operate on a global basis active and passive remote sensing operations in sup.00rt of civil, military, and.. national intelligence objectives. Such operations will occur under conditions which protect classified technology, deny sensitive data, and promote acceptance and legitimacy of such PD/NSC-37 (C) S. "Close coordination, cooperation, exchange will be maintained among activities." and information the space sectors to avoid unnecessary duplication and to allow maximum cross-utilization, in compliance with security and policy guidance of all capabilities."pp/Nsc. . 6. "Data and results from the civil space programs will be provided the widest practical dissemination, except where specific exceptions defined by legislation, Executive Order, or directive apply." PD/NSC-37 (U) 7. "... each Department or Agency of the Federal Government which develops,' launches and operates meteorological satellite systems, takes action as a matter of urgency to insure that the National Command Authority is able to (a) maintain control of U.S. meteorological satellite systems in the face of a determined effort by a hostile nation to assume Approved FW:- ceiM14/06/29 : CIA-RbP83M00171R0023001000054- 510EET =PORN iglar Nor, limp Ale I '11 imus AppromffecEelaits&21M/06-.13M~Fafte-1991CLOSOlta c transmitted from these sysems when such action is considered to be in the interest of national security." USCSB 3-12 (S/NF) 8. Pt ... activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapon systems, military operations, or defense of the United States... shall be the responsibility of and directed by the Department of Defense..."; NASA shall conduct civil space R&D,Space Act (U) B. Current METSAT Management. 1. The USAF is the DOD piogram manager for research, development, design, acqusition, and operation of the military TSAT program in response to operational Defense, intelligence community, and treaty monitoring requirements, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Non-proliferation Treaty. Budgeting and management are centralized; data are widely disseminated to military users, including direct readout to aircraft carriers, overseas commands, and the military weather services. Much of the data acquired by the military TSATS are unclassified and made available to the domestic civil and international communities. (S1 Approved For Release 2 Sc E170171R002306ROFF N?F?RN DIS' 2. APSE:Iv!!leiktI liegeaEfl~/28:?fialEggaz3B91q111111q.2.3PA9Regs7 the operational civil TSAT system, both geosynchronous and polar orbiting. The NO program responds to a broad spectrum of environmental data reauirements from a variety of users. Users include: DoC, USDA, DCC, USDI, WMO, NASA and foreign weather services. The NOAA budgets centrally for space and ground segment acquisition and operations, and uses NASA as its procurement agent for the space segment. NASA,.using its own funds but in response to NOAA requirements, conducts space R&D and prototype development and demonstrition. (U) 3.. The two DOD METSATs fly in orbits that are to meet individually changing operational needs, but usually in sun-synchronous orbits with nodal crossing times of around 0630 and in the 1030-1200 window. The NOAA polar TSATs currently have crossing times of about 0730 and 1500 in order to meet the requirements for repetitive global observations at about 6-hour intervals to support the synoptic computer models. (U) C. Potential Costs and Savings. There are two different elements of costs and savings associated with merged'METSAT programs: possible reduction in the number of spacecraft, and decisions on developing new spacecraft. The costs and disadvantages of each are treated separately below. (U) Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 'alif *lip It I MP VIM I 11 Ji 1 dos ? 1 . Sarum& RD-Yet:tee aemzsgs teitcacni4 ma* midiVRWooVIns 01" mix to meet the stated operational TSAT require- ments of DoC and DoD suggest that three satellites rather than four could carry the necessary sensors under idealized operating conditions. These same studies have indicated that a potential saving of 25X1 approximately (against an expected expenditure of some over the period 25X1 FY 1981 to FY 1992 might be realized from a reduction in the number of spacecraft. With military and civil sensors redistributed among three satellites, all vehicles would have to carry both civil and military sensors and both agencies would have to share data from each satellite. A three satellite system has some inherent disadvantages': DOD must have flexibility in setting the orbits of its current vehicles, particularly for the late-morning (1030-1200) satellite. While this flexibility is necessary to support certain national security missions, it has disadvantages for the domestic civil community. If the late - morning vehicle were used for direct transmission to foreign ground stations, changing schedules would draw undesired foreign attention to sensitive aspects of the U.S. space effort.. If the observation times for those satellites used for direct * Estimates of savings projected over such extended periods are necessarily questionable. i; ?WiPTi 1:171R002300100005-7 Approved For Releas .100 I I- UUrcaf CidLail Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 transnission to foreign ground stations were U. changed significantly, scheduling of weather forecasts all over the world would be affected - A three-satellite system is less flexible and therefore less responsive to changing user require- ments and it provides less information with higher risks of service interruption with only three satellites. The loss of one would have greater impact on the civil, Defense, and national security missions. Increasing the number of instruments on each satellite increases the likelihood of partial payload failures requiring full payload replacement. (C) 2. The other element of possible savings would be the decision not to develop a new basic spacecraft for either a three- or four-spacecraft constellation for operations in the 1985-1992 period. This would result in one-time near-term cost avoidance of 25X1 some the FY 1981-85 period. It would, however, reduce flexibility and constrain growth until the 1992 period and might result in one or the other agency having to buy a more expensive or less competent satellite than would otherwise be necessary. (LT) * Values derived from parametric models are questionable. Approved For ReleeT ?igEillital:7100171R002300100005-7 : ManaPcpprzetactF6Olazikaia2004i015129 ; CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 1. Budcet. ..????????116 Any merged acproach that requires integrating multicle sources of funds. (i.e., from DoC and Dor)), runs a risk in any year of program disruption from Congressional actions taken in relation to individual agency budgets rather than in relation to the program as a whole. There is no means to guarantee agency shares in a joint funding program, given the current legislative and appropriation committee structure. Further, within the Executive Branch, different internal agency budget *iorities would affect a joint program. (U) Z. Coordination. Any merged approach would require complex interagency coordination to assure that the-.needs of especiallythose. users without a =SAT operational role but who depend on TSAT data and information for their legislated responsibilities (e.g., USDA, DoT). This presumes negotiation of service and schedule priorities from quite different but valid bases 0-f requirements, a difficult task in an environment . of constrained technical and budgetary resources. (U) 00 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ,051,7C:RET NO7ORN =SSW Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 13 :nternational Considerations. 1. Data Availability. United States civil meteorological satellite data are available to foreign users on an open unclassified, and non-discriminatory basis, either through direct readout from the satellite or via ground-to-ground communication services. The conceots under consideration would continue this practice. DoD data are encrypted and not read out directly to foreign users, although most of the data are unclassified and openly distributed. DOD 25X1 data would continue to be handled in this mode. Civil data would continue to be openly disseminated, subject to denial to foreign users for national security *reasons in'cases of national emergency.: The current guidelines for data availability and for implementing emergency denial capability provide for high level interagency review with provision for appeal to the President. (S/NF) 2; Benefits.to'the.U.S.. 'Foreign cooperation. civil =SAT space systems has benefited the U.S. through general worldwide good will and acceptance of U. S. systems as international assets; concomitant absence of technological competition; foreign funding of shared instruments and spacecraft that is saying the U.S. about through 1985; AprSErt UR gase 2004/06/29 (JEtlif33.319PrarOBET-144005-7 ? Pi1 PilairPj t Approved For Rjas ? /QL:tiALIkIi?3M001 71R002300100005-7 14 greater access to foreign meteorological data through bilateral and WMO channels; and, commitmeni by our cooperating partners to the objectives of U.S. systems. (U) 3. Forel= oarticipation. Foreign cooperation has taken place in the ground segment, in the provision of foreign instr=ents on a cooperative basis to NOAA's polar orbiting satellites (the British have provided a radiometer and the French a data collection system)7 and in the provision of three foreign satellites in the coordinated global network of five geostationary satellites. This contribution ..of leostationary.satellites was. at least,partially - predicted on the continuing U.S. commitment to operate a polar satellite-system providing direct readout, sounding data, and other present services on an international basis.. Thus, continued growth in foreign participation-in the totality cf. civil. meteorological satellite activities will be affected by U.S. decisions on the operational polar satellites. (t 4. Foreign perceptions. Merged systems will raise the visibility of the U.S. military space program and might give impetus to claims that the U.S. is militarizing its space program and .o existing C Approved For Re a RF/ NRA'13M00171R002300100005-7 LO p, ftt Approved For Relea4ald4 .birtbikaiD0171R002300100005-715 proposals in the UN and elsewhere for limits on military space activities and extension of limits on civil activities to cover military programs. However, to the extent that foreign countries perceive no change in the basic US policies on data availability and international cooperation, adverse foreign reaction should be manageable. In the case of a merged TSAT system under civilian management, or a merged system under joint civil/ military management, foreign countries would probably view as credible a U.S. commitment to continued data and cooperation policies. Allied or ootential adversary nations would probably view civil control of an operational TSAT system supporting the military as a "cover" for intelligence activities. In the case of a military managed, merged system, where civil programs were included in the Defense budget and the management office would be under Defense auihority, might be difficult to persuade other countries that merging would not risk significant reductions in the level of inter- national activities now associated with the civil METSAT system. In such a case, the problem of foreign perceptions could become acute and, in the worst case, lead to international actions reducing Approved For Release NfigEtipTilkin R002300100005-7 k?' rit 1 ?ASECEIT NOZOIU DIA5=2 VLAJ Ap6ioved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 16 international acceptance and legitimacy of all U.S. civil and military remote sensing programs. (C) ? F. National Security Considerations. 1. in addition to the special national security mission (Annex 1), military weather satellite data acquisition and processing are important to the combat effective- ness of both tactical and strategic forces. in the case of tactical and naval air operations, the effectiveness of munitions delivery and aerial reconnakssance is highly dependent on the accuracy ..?' of weather forecasts for the target area. Inaccurate forecasting increases the risk of combat losses, improper ordnance selection, mission diversion, or ineffective application of combat assets. (C) 2. Strategic forces use military satellite weather data daily to support strategic operations plans and strategic reconnaissance, including sensor selection for both targeting and weapons damage assessment. In targeting, meteorological support is important to gauging missile impact accuracies which affects force application options. In assessment, the proper sensor package must be installed on the aircraft, thereby improving the probability that the desired information is collected (e.g., SLAR vs PEOTO). (S) ai nECEZT =ZORN DISSW sx Approved s 04/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7- A 17 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 3. Responsiveness of a military TSAT data system is key to satisfying constantly changing military requirements. In order to be resoonsive, any_METSAT system supporting the DoD must permit tasking priority, flexibility, and freedom to respond rapidly to Unified or Specified Commands involved in combat operations. (C) G. Stated Positions of DoD and DoC. The Secretaries of Defense and Commerce did not agree on the management approach to further consolidation or convergence,. Both agreed that, potential cost savings notwithstanding, the requirements of the military and civil programs can best be met by maintaining separate systems (Annexes 2 and 3) (U) . . TV. ALTERNATIVES Under the alternatives for policy consideration outlined below, there is a presumption of continued shared data processing responsibilities and separate but coordinated civil and military ? .. ? ? . . . . . . . ' ? ? . information dissemination functions. The alternatives assign to different agencies the responsibilities for spacecraft and sensor specification, design, and procurement; continued supporting R&D; orbit selection; on-orbit command and control; meeting tasking priorities; and, data reception, protection, Ent FrmrtP7 -I 1*ItV Approved For Rel .49;200S/ i Wi_1Ln11-1 1/11M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 8 and initial processing. r11;1:1,??=sz basic management alternatives have been identified for policy consideration. Each assumes that technical decisions on the number and design of the future operational spacecraft will be made by the responsible agency or agencies. (U) A. These alternatives are: 1. Coordinated dual DOD and DoC programs with increased emphasis on data, hardware, and technology sharing. (U) 2.. A jointly managed consolidated DoD-DoC program to meet both civil and military needs. (U) 3. A fully converged METSAT program under a single agency (either DoD or Doc) committed to meeting the need of both communities. (U) ? B. The key management elements of these alternatives, together with their advantages and disadvantages, are further outlined below: 1. Coordinated Dual Programs. a. Descrintion. This would be an extension of the .: ? present arrangements under which NOAA and USAF manages their own programs in close coordination and cooperation with each other and with their respective user constituencies. If warranted by service and economic considerations, the 1985-1992 civil and military spacecraft systems could be dissimilar in design and technical Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ' Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 19 capabilities, but would take maximum advantage of technology and hardware exchange. Where advantageous, there would be co=on use of spacecraft, subsystems, and instruments, with further economies possible through coordinated single-source procurement. NOAA and USAF plans to increase nonduplicative TSAT data processing shared between civil and military centers, in addition to continuing the exchange of data between the two communities. Examples are atmospheric soundings, derivation of sea surface temperatures, and .global. three-dimensional cloud analyses. ?No new management structure uniuid' ? need to be developed, as USAF and NOAA already have in place efficient systems to meet their full range of responsibilities, from specification through operations to information dissemination. *DoC would continue to use NASA 'as its agent f r* R&D and spacecraft procurement, and the coordina- tion mechanisms of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, Polar Orbiting Operational Meteorological Satellite Coordination Board (POOMSCOB), Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Releas 'NFZEIT : 4_ 4 0171R002300100005-7 20 Aeronautics and Astronautics C ordination Board (XACB), Program Review Board (PR), and Policy Review Committee (Space) (PRC(S)), would provide for continuing and improving coordination, cooperation, and cross-servicing. The present DoD, DoC, and NASA budget responsibilities would remain independent. (C,. b. Advantages. 1. Retains the maximum flexibility, reliability, and capability ta-.tespond to evolving user needs in both the civil and military sectors while providing opportunities for continued 'economies throUgh common use of-developed* . ar new hardware; retains and expands upon existing successful coordination mechanisms and budget structures. .(7). 2. Would not require .changes to existing policy .or. law.- -0:7) 3. Preserves the option for future further integration of civil or military remote sensing functions within existing civil or military management structure. Examples are the provision of certain land and ocean ? ? ? pnwincitiar uuhriuLAN Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83 Ou 1R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 21 services from the civil or military METSLT itself or use of the civil or military-METSAT spacecraft with different instruments. (u) 4. Supports all domestic and international civil, military, and national security program objectives. (U) c. Disadvantages. 1. Would not realize a potential 1981-1992 cost saving through reduction in number of spacecraft. (U) 2. Might encourage unnecessary duplication. (U) 3. Maintains present manpower levels. (U) . . 2? Joint DoD-DoC Management.of a. Consolidated Program a. Description. Under this approach, a joint USAF-NOAA management organization would be established to design, develop, procure, operate, and task the METSAT space segment. Supporting research and space segment development and procurement would be tasked from the joint office to USAF and NASA, as appropriate, either with or without reimbursement. This would take the form of a joint office staffed by both agencies with the Director designated by the Secretaries of DoC and DoD; the office essentially would be an Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? ? 22 institution separated from both its arent agencies. To assure that all U.S. interests were adequately represented, there would need to be a new mechanism established--an "Executive Committee"--composed of senior program and policy officials fram all vitally involved agencies (e.g., State, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, Defense, DCI, NASA, LTA) to validate requirements, priorities and data service tradeoff. Decisions of the ExetUtive Committee could be raised by an agency head to the PRC(S). Budgeting would be divided among the three main . . technical agencies (USAF, NOA2k, VASA). If present ? international cooperation and data policies were continued, this alternative would not cause unmanageable foreign reactions. (:) b. Advantages. 1. Might allow reduction to a '3 spacecraft - METSAT system with a consequent reduction in cost. (U) 2. Reduces the number of independent spacecraft and instrument developments. (7) Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 23 3. Provides a broader interagency consumer/user forum for data service requirements. -(U) 4. Preserves the o=tion for future further integration of remote sensing functions unaer joint management, such as providing certain land and ocean services from the METSAT itself or using the TSAT spacecraft with different instruments. (U) c. Disadvantages. 1. .Requires a new and complex interagency management and budget structure to provide for adequate services to both the civil and military communities. ccn ' .?. 2. Might reduce responsiveness of the overall system to its principal users, DoD and DoC. (U) 3. Funding priority decisions in any year by any one agency or its respective Congressional authorization or appropriation Committees could put.the entire programCin jeopardy. (U) 4. Might require changes to existing policy or law. (U) 5. Would take considerable time to implement and to resolve conflicts. (U) 6. Would increase risk of service interruption to one sector or the other if a three-spacecraft Approved For litigliidlifeMeteMP.1172S401P830bb171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 24 3. Conver=ed Program Under Single Agency Management. a. Description. Under this approach, there are two subotrtions: either DoC or DoD would be selected by the President to fund, develop, procure, and operate a single polar orbiting METSAT space segment for the U.S. responsive to all national interests. The selected operating agency (USAF or NOAA) would establish an interagency advisory board (representing State, USDA, DoI, DoC, Do0,-OCI, NASA, EPA) to assure that external requirements are understood and that the operational system is responsive thereto. Tradeaffs'and oeratio?al. constraints that. affect external requirements would have to be appealed by the concerned agency head to the PRC(S).- (U) b. Advantages. . .1.?-11ight-allow reductian.to-e- three?spacecraft ? METSAT system with a consequent reduction in cost. (U) 2. Reduces the number of independent spacecraft and instrument developments. (U) Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 3. Streamlines budgetary, development, 25 orocurement, and. management activities through centralization in a single agency. (U) 4.If converged under NOAA, might be manageable in terms of foreign reactions. (U) C. Disadvantages. 1. Requires a potentially adversary interagenc: coordination structure to assure the lead agency understanding of external requiremen. and encourages conflict between the lead agency and the others (excessive claims for servicefrom agencies not required to pay ' 'for theM, and valid .compliants of non- responsiveness). CU) 2. Places either USAF or NO in the role of developing and operating systems for anothe: sector, which might require changes in polic law*. ? 3. If managed by NOAA, could compromise DoD's requirements for operational orbital flexibility, command and control, and suppo: to military operations. If managed by USAF, could compromise NOAA's ability to meet its civil and international responsibilities. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 D=. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ANNEX 1 CLASSIFIED DOD METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE REQUIREMENT Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was initiated as a National Reconnaissance (NRO) program in 1960 to provide dedicated, timely weather support for satellite and aircraft intelligence collec? tion. In 1965, management of DMSP was transferred to the Air Force in order to improve support of the Vietnam conflict and other JCS opera? tions. It is now a tri?service program. The critically important 25X1 25X1 highest priority mission of DMSP continues co oe iutu suppurL. The baseline NRO?DOD requirement for DMSP consists of at least two sun?synchronous polar orbiting satellites continuously on orbit with nodal crossinz times selected to meet the stringent NRO mission requirements. 25X1 The value to the nation of the cloud free imagery which DMSP adds to our intelligence systems is measured not only in reduced system operating costs, but also in the more vital area of satisfaction of intelligence requirements such as SALT monitoring, indications and warning, crisis monitoring, etc. The NRO systems are a vital element of our nation's capability to monitor SALT and DMSP is an integral part of the performance and efficiency of these key NRO systems. Any actions taken concerning the current or future DMSP development, management or operations must not degrade this essential NRO capability. Approved For Release 2004/06 CONTROL NO 4np_crpprT P: OFF f2eY:ICIN-1-415PtaM00171R002300100005-7::G O Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ANNEX 2 Approved For Rergia.13047i6672191:itIRFR@FEEIMM71R002300100005-7 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301 ? JUN 4 1979 MEMORANDCM FOR DIRECICR, OFFICE OF MAIMGEMENT ANM BUDGET SUBJECT: Further Convergence of Polar Meteorological Satellite Programs (U) In response to your memorandum of 1 February 1979, the Polar- Orbiting Operational Meteorological Satellite Coordinating Board (PCCMSCB) has forwarded to you their draft report on further convergence. This report examines several alternatives and concludes that further conver- gence is functionally feasible. Your memorandum raised other issues concerning organizational responsibilities, timing, and cost effective utilization of the Shuttle. I would like to make clear my position on these subjects. (U) I believe that farther convergence offers potential savings in the overall federal budget. Our ability to capture this potential without unduly compromising operational missions depends, however, upon the effectiveness of the converged program and management structure. Because of the importance of the Defense Meteorological Support Program (SP) to national security missions, I have concluded that further convergence is viable only by augmentation of the DMSP to support civil needs, . while retaining DoD management. Such a converged system and the opera- tional factors which dictate this approach are described in the enclosed Defense Position Paper (Enclosure 1). (U) Should further convergence be directed, I will be fully committed to assuring that DMSP truly serves the civil, as well as military users. You will note that the position paper retains significant responsibility for the program within Defense. This is based upon several factors which I believe must be maintained in any convergence scheme. (U) First, a single agency line management organization is essential to execution of a dynamic and cost effective program. Secondly, the I.JLogram must have a stable funding profile and should avoid multiple agency budgeting systems, justification processes and appropriations. If necessary, I am willing to have all program funds included in the Defense line. Finally, a continuous operational capability must, be maintained. I request a decision on convergence of the operational polar meteorological systems no later than 16 July, in time for my budget activities in August. Decisions on other convergence issues can be made on the basis of the meteorological convergence outcome. Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 2 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 (U) Concerning Shuttle utilization, the Defense goal is to use the Shuttle to achieve our. missions at the lowest practical cost. As you know, We have studies ongoing which are examining many alternatives for Shuttle usage, including the potential for retrieval and refurbishment, for a range of operational and experimental missions. We are seeking the most cost-effective engineering approach for convergence and I do not believe that the engineering options are convergence issues. Here again, an early decision on convergence will help assure that all critical needs are included in these studies. Enclosure cc: Secretary of Commerce President's National Security Advisor Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Administrator, NASA ????? Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Department of Defense Position Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : OP-RDP83M0.0171R002300100Q05-7 Further Convergence of DoD and Civil Poiar orbiting Meteorological Satellite Systems DoD supports the further convergence of military and civil. polar orbiting satellite systems, if satisfaction of the operational military requirements detailed below is maintained. Certain high priority DoD missions require responsive, high quality meteorological support. In order to retain adequate support such as DoD has received from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMS?) and to ensure that future supcort will be equal to the military .needs, DoD must retain a significant level of control over the develop- ment, management, operation, and cammand and control of any future polar orbiting reteorological satellite program which would supercede MS?. DoD has participated closely with the National Weather Service and has made full use of civil products and services where applicable. gowever, neither military nor civil meteorological sources, including the civil TIROS satellite system, were able to provide all the needed information.. A military satellite program (currently designated DMS?) was created to fulfill critical shortfalls in: - Global imagery coverage with high precision - Assured daily coverage - Precise time of collection - Data through-put for irrnediate operational use Security ind survivability The system was successful and DMSP has been fully integrated into the US force structure. Military weather reconnaissance aircraft have been cut back. - Most theater commands and aircraft carriers have or are programmed for direct readout terminals and a contingency tactical terminal is on alert. - The end-to-end system, including personnel, procedures and logis- tics, has been tailored for assured, responsive support in dynamic military and national strategic situations. - Weather support to world-wide operations have been restructured with much greater reliance upon the Air Force Global Weather Central and Navy Fleet Numerical Weather Center, which in turn rely heavily upon DMS?. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 2 Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171RCL02300100 05- The integration of DMSP into the Defense force sLructure(Lraults in vital functions which must be acooluaodated in any follow-on meteorolog- ical satellite program.. From end-to-end, the system has to be carefully structured to simultaneously support diverse national and in-theater customers, with training and logistics compatible with enlisted personnel skill levels, and with tasking and operations geared for assured support of daily missions of the highest priority. DMSP was created only with intensive iterations of meteorological, engineering and user needs to achieve a responsive system within the constraints of practical system design. This System Engineering infra- structure is essential to continued operational military support and cannot be farmed out to another agency. Most of the functions of the DMSP Program Office and the cadre of participants will have to be maintained in any further convergence. Specifications cannot be provided to a civil agency any more easily than to a contractor and the constant interaction with users during the development, acquisition and opera- tional phases will still be required. In this regard, the insertion of a civil agency into these essential functions as merely a middleman complicates rather than streamlines the process.. Thus, if a joint orogram is desired, implementation should be by civil augmentation of the DMSP Program Office. A single joint program would logically be based upon the DoD system. Most domestic requirements are satisfied by the separate civil geo- synchronous satellite system (GOES), augmented by the civil low-alti- tude polar satellite system filling in for specific operational-needs. By contrast, key Defense needs demand a low-altitude polar system and result in such technical requirements such as pointing accuracy, global coverage, local readout, assured availability and accommodaticn of special missions which will dominate the development of a further converged system. A system capable of satisfying Defense requirements will lend itself well to the typically less demanding civil needs not satisfied by the geosynchronous system. For each functional area of the satellite system, vital Defense needs and corresponding organizational responsibilities for further convergence are discussed below: Requirements can be developed jointly with civil agencies. System Engineering and Development must be the responsibility of DoD. The CMSP Program Office can be augnented with civil representatives, including management positions. Development and acquisition of spacecraft and sensors required for the primary military mission must be controlled by DoD. A "core" spacecraft design can be developed which will accept various mixes of military, civil and joint payloads. The civil community can share common hardware or they can procure additional items by (1) adding to Defense contracts, (2) through separate procurement using Program Office specifications, or (3) their cwn unique d940gifffts or Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? 3 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 - Military sensors can be expanded to satisfy some civil needs and vice versa. Responsibility for sensor development would be assigned based upon major requirements or interest,- with minimal duplication. Civil payloads can be carried on militarily required spacecraft and vice verse. - Funding for the converged system will be by a single program line, carried in the Defense budget, with joint justification of the program. - DoD must maintain selection of launch dates and times, precise orbit parameters, daily coverage, command and control and payload management for at least two satellites continuously on-orbit. - Launch will be via the standard Space Transportation System division of responSibility. - Needed security, including CCMSEC, will be provided for the two militarily required satellites. Direct readout of selected data to foreign civil sites in support of international agreements can be included subject to interruption in case of compromise of national security in crisis or conflict. - Survivability is required commensurate with military use in crisis and conflict. All satellites will be configured to deny data to the enemy in time of national emergency. - Operational priorities, including for contingency conditions, will be established jointly for guidance of day-to-day tasking of the system. Shared operating structure, subject to maintaining an essential wartime capability, can be implemented with integrated military and civil tasking and participation in spacecraft command and control. - Free interchange of most planning and tasking information and data products will continue both ways across the military/civil interface. Shared processing with complementary responsibilities can he imple- mented with individual distribution. - Cooperative R&D will continue with civil agencies responsible for basic research and performing those efforts they are willing to perform and fund, and DoD conducting only those projects where there is a significant military application. This degree of convergence would result in extensive common hardware, facilities and procedures, assure the absence of unnecessary duplication, maintain a sound programmatic and budgeting structure for intolnenting the program, and retain certain existing management structure elements to satisfy the requirements of law, policy and international implications to which both DoD and the civil (.0.witunity must adhere. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? , .6 . ? . w '" ? " THE SEOP.E.TAVIY OF COMMER Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA'fittlspopi irktatemied865-f?23? ? .. . .. -:. ei, ot? ? ? ? .. ? . JUN 2 8 1979 ANNEX : p ???? ? ? ? . . . Dear Jim, - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? - ? ? ?? ? ? ? "'tett"- ? I am writing to convey my views on the options identified in the draft report prepared by the Polar Orbiting Operational Meteorological Satellite Coordinating Board (POOMSCOB) for further convergence of the civilian and military polar meteorological satellite programs. As you know, the principal options are two, a converged syster under single agency management and a consolidated system whicl provides for a form of joint management. After reviewing the draft POOMSCOB report and Secretary Brown's ZTune 4 memorandur to you arguing for convergence of the two programs under military management by the Department of Defense, we strongl:- believe that the convergence option is neither feasible nor desirable. We also have grave doubts about the viability of the consolidatioh option, but believe that issue should not b resolved in the context of the budget process. ,.- Defense's.objection to a converged system iinzer civi: mana71,:- ment, I. strongly believe that apolar meteorological satella system under Department of Defens management i alsz. unaccc: able. As explained more fully in tne enclosed memorandun, t: Department of Defense's proposal is contrary tc Presidentia: policy developed over the last twenty years and emhodied, among other places, in PD/NSC-37; is inconsistent with the Space Act of 1958: and would compromise our ability to meet existing internatfonal commitments and tn fester incrasf international colla'noration. In aMition, it is apparen-. the Department of Defense's_memnranduM -- which admits tha: "accommodation of special /military/ missions...wil: dn7.ina:? the development of a further conver7c:! sl-stcr," a Department of Defense managed system would be d?cnsc dor"ni Thus, although the Department of Deiense's.convc-rne.: syster might save money, it would du so at the cxpens(. o: c;vilian satellite requirements and fori7:r. i.oncy chjcr It had been our hopc that further convergence under some for of joint management would be possible. In view of the Depa: went of Defense's inflexibility, however, we now tend to bel that joint management would not work in practice and shou2:3 -.Dot be adopted. The difficulties of.negotiating and i2e- menting acceptable management arrangements and the risks tz the civilian program, in our view, appear not to be wort the saving;. In any event, we believe this issue should no Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 4 ? ? ? .Approved Fot.Retease 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 .???.. be resolved as part of the fiscal year 1981 budget-process, but should be considered in the broader context of the remote sensing studies undertaken in response to PD/NSC-42. This is not to suggest that further savings cannot be achieved. As you know, over the. past several years we have made considerable progress toward convergence and have already achieved many of the savings attributable to a fully converged system. Most of the additional savings from further convergenc identified by POOMSCOB fall under spacecraft and sensor design and procurement. The management.difficulties which concern us arise because the draft POOMSCOB report suggests that the present four satellites (2 civilian and 2 military) be replaced .by three larger satellites servinc.both civil and military requirements. We believe that many of the savings identifiec! by POOMSCOB can still be attained, and the management difficult avoided, by retaining the present system.of four satellites under separate mana7.,ement and moving to joint procurement cf an existing spacecraft design and, to the extent possible,' consolidated procurement of sensors. The National Oceanic and Atmosphoric Administral..ion (0,%A) will bv Lmploying 1984 an acvancea, s-r(xtonec. which is capable-of supportinc both the pepartr.,_.nt of Dcfenss and NOAA polar orbiting prog-rams. Use of this desion wo-J1O avoid the significant desicn cnsts associatc.e with the P:".SCC proposal and, by establishinc :loint procurement procedures, would permit capture of many of the POOMSC01-. snvincs. recommend this proposal as the most satisfactory resolution of the difficult policy issues posed by Secretary Brown's memorandum. If further consideration will be 7iven to changing thc histeri U.S. policy of having civil satellites operated by a civilian, rather than military, agency, I would want to discuss subject with the rrc:ci6an-- Sincerely, #7-140440'4 Enclosure Honorable James T. McIntyre, Or. Director, Office of Management and Budget Washington, D.C. 20503 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? 4 ? ! ? ????? Approved For Relew 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 . . CCM' EXITS OF MC . . DEPARIMET OF COnIERCE ? : .. .4...44 ? ? O1JCOZWEIGEICE OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL POLAR ORBITIM ? METEOFOLCCICAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS UNDER DEPAR11.1ENT OF DEFEISE MANAGEnENT In response to the draft report by the Polar Orbiting Cperational /%teorological Satellite Coordinatimg Poarri (ponmscnB) on further convergence of the military and civil polar meteorological satellite programs, the Departront of Defense (DOD) nas argucd in favor of ccnver7ence of the twu systems unier nr-s. mananc-nt. 0:77.t" r-, prorg..15a.: zor the follo.;inn reason:.: 1. Military Manaoement of the civil metenrolooicr.! satr?llite svp.te- ir contrary to a conrirt&nt natiorz:? n-)11:v aboroved by several Presirients oY,7?r th..% 13st 2n v^9rE. The separation of civil and military satcllite function.s haF, 1A7-et characteristic of national space policy since at least 195. Sectior. 102(b) of the Space Act of 1956 provides: The Conc:ress further declares that !space activities] shall he tr.:. responsibility of, ani stall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control ever aeronautical and space activities sponsortd by the Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ????. d F R ? Approve or elease 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R00230010.000 United States, except that activities pi..culiar to or primarily: associated with the development of weanons systems, mil itaa. orations, or the defense of thc! United States shall be the responsibility of; and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense; and that determination as to which such agency has responsibility for and direction of any such activity shall be.made by the President...(emphasis added). Cbviously the functions of the civil operational environmental .satellite program cannot be oonstrue3 to be excepted fro m the general provision of this section. .Consistent with this statutory direction, when the issue cf. whether to otrribine the civil and military environ..7,anta1 satellite pr,rars was a3dresse-i enrly in this decane, t!-.e our in " "?? c5ecide3 to maintain a se7?,-ratc.?civu syste7. reunr,. decision were state in a fr!cr:n!nr 10, 1972 3,-..tter *.;.enr-. to then?OMB Director Asn: 'It continue thc., cco7:rative re2ationhip? in t?:. futurr, we.th?-r sustailn policy of oren acch.r.:4 tr. (2) ner t our establisht. co.-:it.ente trt an.? the Gio.:.41 Atxr,serir Pr-ra.-.. and L prc.narci to in the future; (3) encouracv: turtrp.:r inatin p3rt1-..ion in our prce7r.-.-: I..' t' civilian char6cter and contc:2 c,f tn,7 -. S. Wf.it?'.7 prrcra-. as it mlates to such internationz2 activitic: . These conditions can be satisfied bv maintain:n-1 tne civil aencies' functions of definin?, supern.sin;:, anri orating our civil weather satellite prrx.irc.r.. More recently, President Carter reaff irrei this basic in Pt/C-37, which states that "Itlhe United States will maint4ir. e 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? ? Approved .For Release 2004/06/29.: CIA-RDP83.M00171R002300100005-7 ? ? current responsibility and management relationships among the sector focused on civil, defense, and (other) objectives.' ? The DOD proposal to vest control of the civil system entirely within DOD thus flies in the face of established Congressional and Presidential policy. 2. DOD manaoement of a converoed system wnuld comoromise existinn intPrnational onmmitmentq an71 undercut effe,rte to fotc.,- international coOderation. A second consistent characterlf:tir of nntion-!; s7)arr- ro:ic- LA:Z; iT 1W1-6.7g4:. M7 the Space Act of 195:r. provi:ien in section 10".c: "lrs,....sr.Bce activities cf States tie conducted so as to contrihutr-...to...ccoreratior by the nnited Stats with rith,..r ntion ani nrou7z of natinnr, pr-.2ct-ful a77.11cation of th res.;11..: tlJereof.". Similarly, President Carter, throuch pn/N:;:-1, stat i tnc.: U. S. will cond.Ict inttrnationa: coo7erzt:7: that are benefical to the United States...." Until now, the civil meteorological satellite program has bE of the cornerstones of this facet of U.S. space policy. Today, stations in 128 co;untries use the direct readout services of U.,. polar orbiting satellites, including imagery, sounding, and spec' Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 ? ? ? . ? . ? . ? Approved For:Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100005-7 . ? ? ? ? - ? ? . environmental data. The present civil system is fully cpen and encoura9es international contributions of Pquilmcnt and services. ........-.......... . Cperattonal instruments contributed by France and Great Britain are now ....A.- -??.? . aboard NCAA spacecraft, and ground system cooperation is becoming ? routine. We expect these foreign contributions to grow under a continued oven system providing corresponding decreases in U.S. costs for the system. It is precisely those characteristics of t.InE.- civil system whici: are responsible for its success in pronoting international cooperatiOn ocenness ano accessibility -- which would be camt:romisei under non ? managemcnt. This ri:r1Inr f' )r 107: W!At, decision to maintain a separate civil 5ystr!=r1 anl kc3 tn ?tion: Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (N5C-1/DM-117, lOcelmber 4, 1973) to state: Suspicions might be raised that the civil part of th