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December 21, 2016
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June 24, 2008
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February 4, 1982
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Approved EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip ACTION INF DATE INITIAL 1 DCI . . 2 DOCI 3 E3 D/ICS y DD/NFA 5 DD/A b DD/0 7 DD/S&T 8 Chm/NIC 9 GC .10 IG ii 11 Comet 12 D/EEO 13 D/Pers 14. D/OPP . 15 C/EAS/0PP 15 C/IAS/OPP 17 A0/DCI 19 20 21 22 SUSPENSE, .Remarks: State Dept. review completed. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 4lnter national Office of the Director Co.a Agency CONFIDENTIAL 47 February 4, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson Acting Director SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical Warfare Buildup The revised factsheet and "Q and As" represent in our estimation a solid advance over preliminary versions, and have the makings of a useful public affairs treatment. Your staff has been highly professional in dealing with us in this difficult matter. However, final review of USG plans is needed to achieve the most effective public presentation. Our position is still somewhat defensive. We should seek to focus world attention on the continuing desire of the United States to achieve a verifiable treaty on chemical warfare, while being prepared for production of replacement munitions if necessary. We offer the following recommendations: A brief introductory statement such as prepared by USICA (copy attached) should be drawn on by the State Department press spokes- man to announce the broad U.S. policy response to the Soviet chemical warfare buildup. State would refer additional questions to DoD and ACDA. Following the State announcement, DoD and ACDA briefings should be held which reiterate the Department's policy. announcement and add evidence for our view of the Soviet buildup and of our careful and considered approach. The DoD spokesman would respond to press queries about binary weapons along lines in the factsheet and Q and A's, keeping the stress on: -- The buildup of Soviet chemical forces. -- The use by the USSR of chemical agents in Asia. -- The U.S. search for peace. CONFIDENTIAL Classified by Gilbert A. Robinson GDS 2/4/88 State Dept. review completed. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 CONFIDENTIAL -- The deterrent intent and nature of any foreseeable U.S. chemical munitions. -- The binaries as replacements for older systems. -- The plans to phase down outmoded munitions and arrive at a smaller effective deterrent. -- The U.S. view that we do not need to match the Soviets and therefore perceive no "chemical arms race." ACDA should explain some of the past difficulties in negotiations and some possible new approaches. ACDA would include mention that the U.S. is considering steps to resume negotiations. Together the press statements and additional background briefings should be perceived by the press as a USG effort to prod the Soviets to negotiate a verifiable treaty. It would be'seen that the U.S. is leaving time for negotiation while preparing to produce replacements for existing outmoded munitions if necessary. We also recommend that the principal officials involved in the decision and its public presentation meet as soon as possible to discuss these suggestions, review the factsheet and Q and A's, and map out additional briefings and steps recommended in our proposed scenario (copy attached). With careful and total coordination aimed at the fundamental impression we wish to create, it should be possible to deflect at least some of the opposition. FBIS and other reports of media coverage abroad as well as reports from our Embassies (recent cables from Bonn and London are attached) show that the Soviets are poised to mount a significant propaganda campaign against the U.S. decision, and that they will have receptive audiences in Europe. Independent of whatever mischief the USSR might attempt, recent coverage in the American press attests to ready condemnation here and abroad unless we construct a policy that takes the high ground and directs attention to U.S. peace efforts in this instance. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 CONFIDENTIAL cc: The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger Secretary of Defense The Honorable William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence The Honorable Walter J. Stoessel Deputy Secretary-Designate Department of State The Honorable David R. Gergen Assistant to the President for Communications The Honorable Richard R. Burt Director of Politico-Military Affairs Department of State Mr. Horace Russell Staff Member National Security Council The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane The White House The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci Deputy Secretary of Defense The Honorable Fred. Ikl e Under Secretary for Policy Department of Defense The Honorable Henry. Catto Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LIMITED O'.: FTCIAL USE Statement on the U.S. Despcnse to the Buildup by .the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Muniticns As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably necessary to undertake preparation in the taming year for production two yczrs hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLJCE - --Nor SL2PLE ELT -- older types that are less safe to store and handle. These are not new and they are not biological. ?They are a retaliatory deterren-nt. The United States has already renounced first use of such munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment c il.d only occur after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such consultations have not occurred. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83MOO914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LIt~Li. TED OrT'ICIAL USC i ac}: ound: The Graoth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities Ibr the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special decontaminaticn vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical weapons- Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war. The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect any country. U.S. Restraint The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in 1969 renouu-iced the first use of chemical and biological weapaus and toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LIU?1ITED OI'F1CJIJ, USE president Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing sto&,s of biological agents and weapons. The United states closed research and production facilities, reducing its research and development to a strict study of has to defend against attack. by an adversary. Soviet Use of 2?iycotoxins The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins -- ccmmonly knc n as "Yella?a Rain" - against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. 5 he testimony of those who have suffered, the chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces, amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See attached Department of State report.) U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union tc and a canprehensive, verifiable L MTTED OFFICIAL USE Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83MOO914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LTbiITF.D OFI,ICIAL U_`1: agreement to ban and eliminate d-ieniical wealr-ns. The talks were suspended in .1.9.80 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate verification of both parties' compliance. The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable and provides for adequate verification. We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 SECRET ATTACHMENTS Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 The attached documents were inadvertently omitted from the memo from Gilbert A. Robinson to Judge William P. Clark dated February 4, 1982, subject: The U. S. Response to the Soviet Chemical Warfare Buildup. SECRET ATTACHMENTS International Communication Agency United States of America Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Scenario LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Public Announcement of U.S. Response to the Soviet Buildup of Chemical Weapons Assuming that the FY 1983 budget request, including items for chemical munitions, will be sent to the Congress in early February and thus bea matter of public record, the following scenario for public affairs treatment is proposed. The scenario calls for a coordinated series of U.S. public affairs initiatives in Washington and overseas that seek to direct public attention overseas to the actions of the Soviet Union. 1) Any additional evidence or reports on the Soviet use of mycotoxins should be made available to the press prior-to-the submission of the budget to the Congress. However, the USG should not attempt artificially to generate attention to mycotoxins because it would be reported as a ---transparent effort to distract world attention from our impending decision on chemical weapons. Reports or statements from Congressional leaders, other private American sources, particularly scientists and leaders and experts from other countries, would be useful. 2) Shortly before release of the budget, a number of senior U.S. officials should have deep background briefings on an exclusive basis with a few leading columnists or editors, explaining the forthcoming decision with emphasis on our intent to use binaries as a deterrent and an incentive to the Soviets to attain a verifiable agreement. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - 2 - 3) The State Department Spokesman at the noon briefing on the day of release of the budget should make a brief, forceful statement on U.S. plans regarding chemical weapons (draft attached). He should of course be prepared for questions with a briefing paper drawing on the cables already prepared by State and DoD and talking points consolidated by USICA (drafts attached). 4) At the same time White House, NSC, DoD and State Department senior officials and briefers should brief the press corps including meetings at the Foreign Press Center and followup exclusives for leading foreign press. U.S. officials should have in hand the briefing papers that focus on Soviet buildups and actions, U.S. negotiations and the deterrence intent of our weapons. 5) The Department should instruct Ambassadors in key countries to seek statements from foreign leaders that fix the onus for the buildup of chemical weapons on the USSR and support a US call for renewed negotiations. Similar statements from other public figures should also be sought. 6) A Presidential statement should be prepared either for delivery by the President personally before the press'corps or as part of a press conference, in which the President: -- Regrets the need for US preparations; LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Places the responsibility for our decision on Soviet actions; -- Calls strongly for resumed negotiations; -- Emphasizes that we have consciously-built in time for negotiation before being forced to proceed to production; -- Asks the Soviets to account to the world for their stocks and military preparation; -- Seeks support from the international community for a treaty that is verifiable; _ -- Stresses the deterrent and retaliatory nature of US weapons. 7) Coincident with the actions directly related to the U.S. decision, the USICA Wireless File or USINFO and Voice of America-should carry stories on previous U.S. 'actions and agreements attempting to ban and eliminate biological and chemical weapons, and more general accounts of major U.S. arms reduction and peace initiatives, as well as analyses of Soviet chemical warfare strategy. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 8) It. will be valuable for the Voice of America and the File to cross-play to the field texts or summaries of any supportive media reaction and public stateiments from abroad and from the U.S. 9) At every opportunity senior U.S. officials should voice their commitment to search for ways to make progress in arms reduction and guarantee world peace and security. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83MOO914R002100110043-4 - Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 !il l l: u INI1=T~f~!;'~ C AAG,EN 631565 ICCt12 0)1565 ICC112 ION F,Oil 0)016 2713467 PFCFIIT r'cr-r?r~ ',?T~ LC!;, 011 DIE76 2713467 27113507 Ill PAGE CI ~"` r ACIION EU11 12 ----- --- I. iI.i-1'E~L: - --------------- EEGII;IIItU, GF IL't 1?:~.: A':U I)ED 100 Of CSO 07 F'! ~) PG-,R-0) PGtRP-04 VOA-05 /016 A3 3 -- ~ ------ ----- j t - ---- - G. 111E POIt11 IS Vitt if.P.EM? THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR INFO ESC DO COS PO IHR 10 SS 10 CIAE DO H D1 P11-OS DlSF.'r.l;"r.ERT THRIVES 0;1 DISTRUST OF THE UNITED STALES ESCE-:0 I,Sl.E?CJ 5;0.00 L-03 DOE-10 IRSE OD FM 09 AS? 717E PERCEPTIO+I THAT THERE ARE FEU CO!;IXGLS on pA-DI I"itE PO Sr1 -DI OES 05 ACOA 12 lCAE D0 SP 02 THE DEPLOYMEIJT CF EVER. tIORE FRIGHTEI:II!G U.S. WEAPO!'S DOES-00 MCE PO SF'RS D2 /091 U ----- 106034 2713517 /46 10 USE on P. E'JP2PEP!l CRIILEFIELD. A CU CCIIIRDVERSY COULD UEt1 FUEL THIS S[VTlt;E!IT AI?D REVIVE A 0 2713447 JAN E2 [LAGGING Ct:D--II:GFEASII;G CPPOSITI01 10 OUR DEFENSE ITT IJIEM1ASSY -:';0C11 POLICIES ACRO,S TILE CORED AND 10 SEC57:CF :-5:!OC ?::.Y[OIATE 6019 PARTICULARLY TO IOF DEFLOYIUEOTS. INFD SECDEF L'-StiDC NATO CO:iECTI.E CAI;'IOT I:0^E E':TIFFLY 10 fFE lSlTa.r F';f CC' Tr.I;I IT. SC::: ACTIVITY USI:IL . GELE':A Y.ERE. EJI lC C.?" E iEL?ILL, AS VOULD MCRE USCIi iCECEF UnIHt'!iEN GE j!! 1HE CD CCITTEXT dLC 6_ C1ICUS!?'?EUi: f.El?:t:EFG GE EVICEIICE OF THE EXTENT CF SOVIET PRO TV11S. FOR CIIICIJSSFF. EAY:iEll; 1C GE 1P,E LEST, THE MORE SAID ABOUT CETERRE'ICE AND THE USNIIR Ski:.PE F: LESS ABOUT CEP. "vii:: !;T THE EETTIR. ER.GARDING . DETERRENCE, CEPAETN:1iT SHOULD 607E PREVALENT PERCEPTIC:I HERE THAT HITLER WAS DETERRED FRC"1 USING CU AGENTS Ct:LY El HIS BELIEF THAT ALLIES GENEVA ALSO FCn 101 BAD CAPACITY 10 RETALIATE. LOUIS E.O. 12065: 6DS-1 01/27/12 (STREATOR, EDWARD J-) TAGS: t1POL, L':, t1;?.TO SUBJECT: MA!;.GIKG THE CU ISSUE IN EUROPE 1. S-ENTIRE TEXT y? VIZ CONCUR IM EI!rLRSCY ROSlI'S INSIGHTFUL ANALYSIS OF THE DANGERS POSED TO OUR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY DAIS EY IKE CHENICAL 67_4PO!IS ISSUE. ? , c-c:n~ n^Itt'crcT CRITICAL C;R!P .-~--~- 3. 1HERE 11 AS BEEN A CF TTEti C!1~~ 1550E t!-RE SIlICE THE A,;0AEIIA HUEEER INTERVII U UITH UIER'S, UHICH RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF CU DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN. VIE EXPECT MEDIA IIITEREST TO MULTIPLY FOLLO'JIIIG JANUARY 25 10111011 OF EEC?S 1:EEKLY tIEUS DOCUMENTARY "PANORAMA, V,11ICH FOCUSED C!1 CU ISSUES. PROGRAM REHEARSED HOEBER COIIIROVERS'i, LAID HEAVY EtIPHASIS Oil PIE POSSIBILITY CF CIVILIAU CASUALTIES III ANY CW EXCHANGE, CAST DOUBT Oil U.S. ASSUMPIICIIS OF A SOVIET C'J BUILDUP, SPOKE DARKLY CF TCU CU UEAPO:)S 10 FOLLOW BINARIES, AND FEATURED 2-11ILUTE SEG'1EIIT (APPATEIITLY FROM OLD 111LITARY TEAINI"', FILM WITH U.S. VOICE.OVER) OF Rf,CBIT DYII!G F1011 CU EXPOSURE. THERE WAS ALSO A SIATEI:ENT 1HAT PA!;:RRSMA HAD 'INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED' 1NA1 HIGH-LEVEL CCD OFFICIALS DID, IN FACT, WANT 10 DEPLOY ILEW EIORRY 6EAPC!IS 711 EUROPE. 4. BECAUSE CF RECENT PUULICITY, THE 1100 HAS ALREADY RECEIVED A IR.r.CE lOl'UER OF CUERIES 0.'1 CU AND IS IXFECTIIIG A CELUSE fCLIOWIIIG LAST EVEIIING'S "PLNCRAMA' PROGRAM. IN RESPO'JOIF'G, THE 1103 WILL DRAW FROM L'ASHING1O1'S GUIDI,!;CE (STATE 1131,1 AND 13243). " 5. OUR CO:ITOCTS AT THE ;CO COD THE NOD HAVE BEEN EXPECSSII:,; I!.CF.E0',INS CC:;CERIJ TIIAT A CU CC:IIR:YERSY IS III[ k.:C'IG t'.:UE AT THE ~''OIIG 1IMC. 11115 IS BOT JU,1 11;1 51I.T1011;) Cr ICO CD:ES. A SE11105 1100 CfFICIPI, F[4 I crN'Lf, UIII1E SAY ICS I114) HE PERSOUIGLLY C ,.Iufl:,o CU ULIIUfMH''l 1P fl'i!:PE "A COOD l1 A', CR IIu:JD Ili,1.1'l1.."I?I-L'.':?,?.;Ir',~,r!t_I V.1 1! u': l PLAITS C11"I11 Lt',I,?'.l 1>1 l! ',1?I I? I SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 Approved For Release 2008/0.6/2.4: CIA_ -RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 .)f'vA I_ i ~EGR~tI~I IN I (~1 N A 11( CMANW1 IBA-1-IUCN'! AGENCY PAGE 01 E0101 01611 01 OF 02 2SI155Z 0291&4 ICC?IC ACTION EUR-12 -25/10032 --------------------------------------------------------------- ICO-01 DSO-02 Et}Et10T PGMR-01 P6MP-O4 VOA-05 /016 A2 2 ?----------- ------------------------: -------------------------- INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 IHR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EC-03 H-01 10-15 IISCE-00 IISAE-0D SSO-00 L-03' DOE-10 TRSC-CD PM-09 PA-01 INTE-00 SAL-01 OES-09 ACOA-12 ICAE-00 SP-02 iCE-0 NEC-02 SPRS-02 /101 W ------------------024402 2513092 /41 0 251727Z JAL, 82. f t1 At;ENE'? SSY 6CNN 10 SECSTATE WASHOC It":EDIATE 3463 SECDEF WASHOC IMMEDIATE NATO COLLECTIVE Ir::ED1b1E USCINCEUR VA!HIHGEN CE !.;IEDIATE CINCUSA^EUR HEIOELCERG GE 1rrlEDIATE CIRCUS:FE RAMSTEIT AC CE IT,':EDIATE VSNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE 5 E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOI:!1 01671 E.O. 120&5: RCS-1 1125/52 (WOESSNER. W.H.) OR-1 ZAGS: KPOL, GE SUBJECT:'- MANAGING THE CW ISSUE IN EUROPE ? 2. ALTHOUGH WE WELL U::OERSjAND THE DEFENSE RATIONI;LE BEHIND THE DECISION TO PRODUCE BINARY )UUITIONS, WE ARE FEARFUL THAT WE MAY WELL EE HEADING INTO A RED-HOT POLITICAL COIITROVERSY, SIMILAR TO THE OHL THAT SURRCUNCED ERW, SHOULD THAT DECISION BE FOLLC'Y_D BY ONE TO FCR:.ATT CEFLCY THE M'J1IITION IN THE FEDERAL P.EPUSLIC. WIT`: THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN PARA 4 BELOW, CHEMICAL WEAPCNS HAVE HOT YET BECOME A PUBLIC OR MEDIA ISSUE HERE, EUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME EEFCRE THE "FEACE 110VEIIENT", WHICH IS BADLY IN NEED OF NEW SLOGANS, AND OTHER GROUPS It! EUROPE SEIZE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MItITARY BUILD-UP THE ISSUE. INDEED, STORIES SUCH AS THE RECENT PINCUS ARTICLE LINKING CW AD GLC8 MIT ONLY SERVE TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION 10 THE PROBLEM BUT MAY WELL EE USED BY ANTI-INF ADVOCATES TO PRESSURE BOTH THE CHANCELLOR AND THE SPD/FDP COOLIT10:1 TO REASSESS THEIR PRESENTLY FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE OVAL-TRACK DECISION. EVEN WITH THE BEST OF MANAGEMENT, WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT AVOID SERIOUS POLITICAL STRAINS. 3. IN A RECENT CONVERSATI0 WITH EUR/CE DIRECTOR KORhBLL'M,' A SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL VHO IS CLOSE 10 THE CHANCELLOR IH:ENICK) SAID THAT UNLESS THE HATTER WERE CAREFULLY HANDLED, THE CW ISSUE COULD EE EVEN WORSE THAN THE ERW CC.'ITROVER V. OFFICIALS OF THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED SIMILAR CONCERNS. KCEY!.CK VENTURED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT WE WCuLD HAVE TO TAKE A MEW AND SERIOUS . ARMS CONTROL IIIITIATIVE HEGARDIITG THE ELIMItIA!ICUI OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS I.N. C;CER 10 CCNNTAIII THE ISSUE. LIEYBASSY CC'MHEIII: A ltE HOEYNCK'S SUGGEST ION FOR A TWO-TRACK APPROACH AEA Ill WAS PER:CtIAL, WE WOULD NOT Cf AT ALL SURPRISED IF TONETHItG ALONG THESE LINES E[CO:TES THE FRG POSITI0:1. EED COMMENT). 4. A IURTIIER SIGN CF 19E #0111ICAI CLIMATE III THE FRG CONCEANING CV TURNED UP IN INC NEV; (Al[ LAST YEAR. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 - ECHH 01671 CI OF 02 2511552 0211164 ICC2IG IN T IGIIATEti'> Ili 101 SOL'IIIEXTI OF THE CGUUI1Ill INC p ?? ~' 4 FILED SUIT AGAINST THE FEDERAL POLICY OF STCiIUS GUI MlCA.L MUGIllOUT IN TILE AREA, PARTICULARLY AT IISCHBACH. T111S WEEP. AN EMBASSY SPD CONTACT REMINDED US OF THAT INCIDENT, AND POINTED OUT THE SIGNIFICAYICE OP TRUOE 011IOIIS TOEING THAI ACTION. HE, 100, NOTED THAT THE RESISTLGCE TO NEW Cl ADDIIIC!:AL CS! STORAGE IN THE FIG WOULD EE ALMOST CLRRAIN 10 GROW. 5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN '.DISCUSSItG BINARY IIU:IITIO:: THE '/20,, u;j,!iLl PE AVOIDED IN ORDER TO AVOID THE I!?F PAR41.LEL EEING DP.AI!1I AND THAT A WORD SUCH 'RENEWAL' OR "EYCfii.,.GE" PE "'C;TIlATEO 1:1 ORDER TO IIAKE CLEAR THAT C'W STOCKS ALREAD( Ex.ICT IN EURS?E. 'VE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT RATHER T-=:1 =EFEF.3I'S; PAST `RFGLECT" EF LI_ CW CC?P91LIli VE ,9'i iH? IN US HL E}.EF::.I?EO 1: SIN DECIDING SG"E YEARS AGO NOT TO PROCEED WITH BINARY PRODUCTION IN THE ROPE THAI THE CW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR IN GENEVA WOULD BE FRUITFUL AGO r;IE IT UNNECESS.RY. 11 V.ILL BE IM?ORT6'IT TO LAY TAN ELATE FOR -LACK r: !:EGOTl iT IL_~ __c t"T_1ET:~'-_ PROGRESS IN 1H. LT FONOFF OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT III DISCUSSING THE GREATER SAFETY OF EICIARY WEAPONS 1c BE CAREFUL TO AVOID It'?LYI::G THTT T E :'EA'C'!S 110W sic, %ED IN lYE LuG t:Si lS T EY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT THAT CII;;R:ES C,!I1 ONCE THEY AT:E 1!0LC::GEPNEEDED, EEC -gOtED '!T! -:Y FBI! R EG'd~.&"?E;Trl RISKS YE ALSO SUGGEST PLACIN EIt%Hd j0Nir.: ETc-??_tiT _fOSSLLLELCC" TIt:G G_; F.^':SIE!c _.iuil T~'Y L'S:. FINALLY, is EELtE`.E,iHAT FOCUSSING ATTENTI0:1 THE FACT THAT THE LARGEST PORTION OF OUR EX'EU,DITU=ES r r _ Ji111(1 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4 JI INIT. RNNNATIONN.-AL_ TELEGf~A M /\GEN'NCY PAGE 01 BONN ,01671 02 OF 02 2517552 029165 ICC21S ACT) 0!4 EUrt-12 25/18092 INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 ru-a PGMZ-01 PGMP-04 VOA-05 /016 Al 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------- INFO OCT-OD ADS-CO INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 ED-08 H-01 I0-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-03 DOci-10 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-O1 INRE-00 SAL-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 ICAE-00 SP-F2 MCE-O0 NRC--02 SPRS-02 ' /107 W ------------------ 024414 251809Z /41 0 251727Z JAN E2 FM AM..Et,UASSY DOP:N TO SECSTATE VAEHDC IM MEDIATE 3464 SECDEF Y/ASHDC ?IMM,!EDIATE NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE CINCUS/:'r