SEMINAR ON PRODUCER-CONSUMER RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002700040022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: July 13, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR: EA/DDCI
Note Copy Addressed to Exec Reg' try - forwarded
in case you have not seen. ooks like orig trans note)
Date
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 TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO: Exec Registry
FROM: DDI/PES
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DDI 5771-82
13 July 1982
SUBJECT: Seminar on Producer-Consumer Relations
Herewith, asi equested, are
the original and two copies of the summary and
notes from our Office Director-level seminar on
Producer-Consumer Relations. I have gone through
them and made a few changes with an eye to ensuring
that they are intelligible to PFIAB members, if you
think they would find them of interest or use. We
would, of course, be happy to discuss either the
User Survey or the seminar itself in greater detail
with the PFIAB members or staff if they desire.
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Producer-Consumer Relations Seminar
Summary of Discussions
1. User Survey indicates need to educate policymakers about intelligence,
clarify the work of NIOs in producer-consumer relations and improve
timeliness and relevance. Should consider a similar survey of
current administration.
2. Personal relationships with intelligence consumers are vital to
getting our message thru.
--Need frequent contact. Alerting consumers to important papers
creates a moral commitment to read them. Confidence in people
creates confidence in product.
--Important to institutionalize contacts so they outlive changing
individuals.
--It was suggested that the DDI have a "circuit rider" to
market the DDI product and stay in touch with consumer needs.
--Assistant Secretaries and staff aides are the key people. The
Assistant Secretary level is where people are trying to look
ahead. Aides determine what gets thru.
3. For top customers, speed and brevity are the keys-to being heard.
--President Carter often took action as a result of PDB
items; so does President Reagan.
--PDB is by far the most important intelligence input to SecDef.
--Shultz already getting PDB and reading it closely.
--SecDef likes to get the news fast. NMCC and DIA call frequently
with latest news; but not CIA. (We assume our representatives
at NMCC are taking care of this.)
--SecDef wants to know of alternative views And seldom gets them
from papers.
--The focus at senior levels of State is on hot issues. Top
Defense people care about hot issues but also focus on longer
range when military threat/capabilities are at issue.
--For the top people everywhere, keep items short.
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--Raw reporting is most useful to highest level consumers if one
or two sentences of analysis (no more) are added.
4. Longer papers are read mostly-at lower levels and need different
attributes.
--Short (one page), tight summaries are the key to utility of
longer papers at all levels. A good table of contents, short
paragraphs using bold-faced headings for new sections, good
graphics, and detailed data relegated to annexes is the best
prescription.
--The more provocative the better.
--Need to explain the basis of our judgments.
--Keep papers at the lowest possible classification, allow
foreign dissem if at all possible. More highly restricted
intel is less widely used.
--Kudos to OSWR paper proclaiming Japanese computers are coming.
Very useful as early warning even though based largely on
unclassified data. Without it, people who could take action
wouldn't have known.
--The best attribute of CIA publications is that they provide an
intelligent, neutral approach using the best possible sources.
Whether classified or not, whether already in the newspapers,
the CIA view is valued by consumers.
5. The market for periodicals is wide and varied.
--The format and variety of the IEEW were praised. The apparent
move of regional reviews in the direction of the IEEW style
was encouraged.
--Moving from weekly to biweekly on IEEW would be a mistake--the
less current the info the less useful it is. The "Weekly
Reader" for the Secretary of Treasury draws items from IEEW
regularly.
--Regional Reviews got strong endorsement from Treasury and
Commerce. Particularly useful to readers who are not regional
specialists. Fills gap between NIDs (too shallow) and IAs
(not timely enough); serves as reference material and eliminates
need for many short-fuzed requests. Timeliness often is the
key to whether they are read and by whom.
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 --CIA's greatest impact on Members of Congress comes through
briefings.
--Papers are more useful to staffers--forces them to look at the
broader picture.
--It's a low cost operation to send an extra copy of a paper to
the Hill.
--CIA would have more impact if it was more in tune with the
schedule for Congressional hearings and committee activity.
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--Commerce and Treasury would like to get sanitized SOVA Reviews
even if they can't get ORCON items.
6. Some useful comments on other. product forms:
--Papers on visiting dignitaries need to be delivered to State
6-10 days ahead of the visit to be effective.
--A NID piece that runs the morning of a high-level visit is too
late to reach Sec/Treasury (and presumably others).
--But there are real trade-offs between these needs and the
desire for timeliness.
--Fold-out maps with text and pictures are very helpful; praise
for recent one on Israel/Lebanon.
--Biographic material on foreign leaders is widely used and
often provides the entre to senior USG officials for other
intelligence. But everyone gives it low priority for
collection/reporting.
--Task forces at State are administered by their Ops Center but
the Ops Center has no substantive control. They have a huge
SOP notebook which everyone ignores--and a short checklist
that is useful. They will gladly share this with us.
--INR Morning Summary items are not coordinated with policy
bureaus.
7. As to the view from Capitol Hill:
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 --The best time to establish contacts with policymakers is
early in a new term, before the new Administration is immersed
in implementation of already-set policies.
--Defense attaches might be available for a week or so to share
their experiences after an overseas tour. Also we could use
some military intelligence detailees to help us on 3rd world
until we get up to strength; after that it could be an exchange
program. General Smith will pursue.
--NITS are not a useful vehicle for expressing consumer needs.
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--Personal contact is the best way to gain entre and establish
credibility with Congress.
--Congressmen and senior staffers would probably be willing to
be debriefed after foreign travel or visits with foreign
diplomats in the US--apparently we seldom ask.
8. And some miscellany:
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Seminar on the Producer-Consumer Relationship
Conference Notes
Wednesday, 30 June 1982
I. Opening Remarks
Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence
A. Primacy of Personal Relationship.
1. Product does not sell itself.
2. Know consumer personally.
3. Develop personal relations and keep up continuing
dialogue (emphasize our objectivity, integrity;
solicit feedback).
4. Perception of intelligence can be as important as
the substance.
5. Need for more frequent contact for long-term
servicing of accounts.
6. Gates said his article in Studies gives more specifics.
II. User Surve
Chairman, IPC Working Group on User Survey
A. Survey relates to questions of the quality of intelligence
as perceived by high-level consumers during the Carter
Administration.
1. Patterns in use of intelligence.
a. 50% spent 1/2 hour on intelligence each day.
b. 70% said intelligence influenced policy.
c. 80% were influenced by intelligence.
2. Producer-Consumer communications.
a. Staffs provided intelligence to principals.
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b. Less than 30% used NIO system for tasking.
c. Desired more contact with intelligence analysts.
3. Quantity and Quality, by type.
a. Military and S&T intelligence get high marks.
b. Political and economic intelligence get somewhat
lower marks.
4. Evaluation by type.
a. High satisfaction with intelligence overall.
b. Problem areas:
(1) Timeliness.
(2) Relevance.
(3) Ambiguity--evidence needs to be cited in
papers.
(4) Filtering--how to get around agency filters
(i.e., staffs).
c. Problems with consumers.
(1) Know little about intelligence process or how
to use it.
(2) Passive--expect intelligence will come to them.
(3) Change in relationship of policymaker (Congress
part of the process now).
B. Recommendations.
1. Educate policymakers about intelligence.
2. Clarify role of NIOs in producer-consumer relationship.
3. Improve timeliness, relevance.
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 A. Different uses of intelligence by Presidents.
1. Carter used intelligence in relation to his policy
concerns on nuclear nonproliferation, conventional
arms transfer, and human rights.
2. Reagan.
a. PDB--only intelligence seen which is not adulterated
by staff.
b. Summaries and cables are read.
c. Copies of wire stories are read.
d. The written word is very important at Presidential
level.
e. Reagan wants and gives instructions as a result of
his morning reading.
B. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1. Needs: Advises President on the execution of SIOP.
a. Current intelligence on threat issues and
developments.
b. Requires excellent communications and large
staff.
2. Briefing is preferred to the written word.
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4. Survey current Administration.
5. Institutionalize contacts.
6. More rotational assignments in policy agencies.
III. The White House and JCS as a Consumer
Col. Les Denend, White House Staff
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a. DIA briefs are given for 15-20 minutes daily. On
Tuesdays the SecDef joins. The style is highly
polished; parallels the NID in substance. The
briefs are quite detailed, emphasizing military or
broad politico-military developments, depending upon
needs; followed by an operations brief.
b. DIA Commentary is two-three items, much like NID;
prepared for a few military consumers.
a. 24-hour/day, staffed by three people who are
in touch with the President and the National
Security Advisor at all times.
b. More effective than the NMCC because of communications
tie-ins.
c. Ability to keep in touch with world events without
White House pressure.
d. Able to contact when they have to and are known for
ability to keep principals informed.
a. More bureaucratic barriers.
b. Watch sections alert everyone in chain of
command enroute to the Secretary and the
Chairman.
3. NSC.
a. Concerned with political implications.
b. Concerned with which side of issue each agency
has lined up on and why.
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c. In the final analysis many principals judge
by gut feelings as well as "facts."
D. Recommendations/Comments.
1. Much CIA material filtered by DIA; this creates one more
layer between CIA and DoD consumers.
2. Paul Gorman has own links with CIA, and he continues
to get direct support. More CIA product now getting
through to JCS.
3. Need for frequent contacts. NITs too cumbersome. Need
first-hand knowledge.
4. Need to sensitize people as to basis for our judgments.
5. Adequate warning--alert ahead of time that important
papers are enroute (i.e., Global Economics which led to
review of military strategy).
a. National Intelligence Estimates on Warsaw Pact
forces and Soviet strategic forces very helpful.
b. Fold-out maps with text and pictures are also
very helpful (i.e., Israel/Lebanon).
c. Graphic presentations are well received.
d. "On the one hand--on the other hand" type
conclusions are not useful to the Chairman.
e. Chairman likes some analytical risk/speculation
(Morocco and Sudan papers were not found to be
very useful because they said situation unlikely
to change drastically.)
A. Secretary of Defense.
IV. Defense Department as Consumer
Major General Carl L. Smith, Senior Military Assitant to
Secretary of Defense
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1. Reads PDB every morning. Considers this the most
useful product he gets because of quality of-the
product and availability of briefer for discussion.
Will postpone meetings to finish reading the PDB.
2. Reads DIA morning summary in his car. If no news,
it says so.
3. Sees only a few cables.
4 Receives:
a. State Morning Summary.
b. Alerts from NMCC.
c. NOIWON traffic.
d. Press ticker.
e. Biographic information on foreign visitors.
f. Special briefings on selected subjects.
5. Weekly breakfast with DCI/DDCI on Friday.
6. Supported by DIA staff group which selects and filters
his material.
B. Most important information needs.
1. Threat assessments--for US force structure and sizing.
2. Crisis management.
3. Intelligence relevant to decision points and trips.
4. Speed--he wants to get things fast (so long as it is
clear-that it is raw intelligence--e.g., NSA products).
5. International situation.
C. In the case of Weinberger.
1. Rather read than be briefed; he looks for convenience
and speed.
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 2. "Exclusive for" now goes to Director, DIA, but not to
DIRNSA.
3. We (DDI) do not know what DIA is telling SecDef--e.g.,
casualty figures in Lebanon when they differ from ours;
it is useful to know what DIA briefers are saying.
Our relations with DIA are closer in the technical areas.
4. NODIS--a problem for all. Control is too tight and/or
capricious.
5. How to facilitate exchanges of people, especially
military analysts. DDI needs more active-duty people on
loan.
6. Let us spend more time with returning military attaches
(Smith said he could look into).
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2. Likes to know about conflict and differences of opinion
(Tuesday briefers usually inform him).
3. Reads NIEs (at least key judgments), SNIEs, and keeps
11-3/8 in vault; gets NID and State Morning Summary
each AM (although Smith doesn't know how much/often
Secretary reads them).
4. Close relationship between Weinberger and Mr. Casey;
phone calls are frequent.
D. Relationship between NSA and CIA.
1. Better than in the past.
2. This is helped by analyst training programs and
rotational assignments between the two agencies.
3. NSA failure to distinguish clearly between evidence and
analysis is still a problem.
E. Points raised:
1. We (DDI) are not seeing enough raw NSA intercepts,
only reports extracted therefrom.
 1. Focus is almost wholly on current intelligence. Hot
issues are main concern.
2. Raw reporting is most useful if one-two sentences of
analysis are added.
3. Items should be short, snappy, current for the senior
level; more background okay at lower levels.
4. Timeliness--we're not doing badly, but pieces on visiting
heads of state need to arrive six-ten days ahead instead
of evening before.
5. Problem: how to get analysis through to senior level in
a way that is helpful.
6. Written products should be used during a crisis--they
take less time to absorb and provide a record; briefings
are okay for a discussion of problems, but they are hard
to work into people's schedules.
7. "Hot item cables" usually need some explanation (e.g.,
sense of urgency, perspective; what does the Secretary
need to know to make sense out-of the item?)
8. Intelligence which can be shared with third parties is
especially useful at State.
9. State officials don't want to tip their hands on an
impending decision, so it is hard to ascertain their real
intelligence needs.
10. Policy relevance is vital. Give policymaker your
analysis in time for him to be able to take it into
account.
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Thursday, 1 July 1982
V. The State Department as a Consumer
John Stempel, Director, State Operations Center
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B. Secretary versus Assistant Secretary level.
1. Intelligence needs vary.
2. With key people at State, staff aides are important.
There are two or three for every key official. Some have
never been to Langley and know next to nothing about the
Community.
C. Operations Center.
1. Operations Center and INR often are cut off from the
information flow in the Secretary's office. Much stays
in the Secretary's suite.
2. Intelligence which arrives early enough for the US to
take action is most useful (Iranian troops moving to
Lebanon) but we need to reduce the number of false
alarms--"cry wolf."
3. During crises, the Operations Center is responsible for
Task Force administration, not substance.
4. In setting up a Task Force, everyone ignores the detailed
SOP notebook in favor of two-page checklist (Stempel will
gladly share this with CIA).
5. Operations Center gets involved in operational decisions
(e.g., evacuation) because of its expertise in such
areas.
6. When Secretary travels, his phone calls are usually
to Executive Secretary, Eagleburger, or Stoessel.
7. Stempel tries to get his Operations people out to Langley.
8. Everything for the Secretary flows through Jerry Bremer
(Executive Secretary); codeword material goes thru INR
first.
9. Again the suggestion--build and use personal contacts to
get access to NODIS and telephonic exchanges.
D. INR (Intelligence and Research) Morning Book
1. Focuses on Secretary of State, whereas NID serves the
whole policy community.
 A. Treasury
1. Daily Report for Secretary and his principal assistants:
presents lots of financial data; foreign,.domestic
reporting only up to confidential. Special annex contains
more highly classified material.
2. Little time available for reading.
3. Weekly Reader contains selections from IEEW (e.g.,
perspective article on Japan); Secretary likes current
information that Weekly provides.
4. Biographic reports: Regan likes bios (wants them up
front in briefing books); features on foreign leaders
(e.g., NID) helpful if sent well ahead of visit so they
can be folded in with other material.
5. Self-initiated vs. requested studies: summaries of self-
initiated studies are used, especially if they provide
early warning. Premonitory paper on Japanese computer
industry was a great triumph, even though it was based
largely on open source material; NIE on Mexico also well
received. Customs very interested in Soviet technology
transfer; Secret Service interested in counterintelli-
gence.
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2. Useful, accurate, and timely product; INR's proximity to
policymakers gives it a leg up.
3. Circulation: Secretary, Deputy Secretary, D/INR, and
Watch Office; Assistant Secretaries get selective
briefings; copies also go to White House, Clark,
President, DoD, DCI.
4. Content: three pages--never more--for cable highlights,
jointly produced by Operations Center and INR, plus
three pages for longer analytic pieces by INR.
5. Secretary also gets one-page cable summary in afternoon.
VI. Commerce Department and Treasury as Consumers
Robert Gallagher, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of
Commerce
Art Long, National Intelligence Advisor, Treasury Department
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 1. Need short, snappy summaries to get papers past staff
assistants.
2. One-page summary best with good table of contents.
3. Need more copies of IEEWs.
4. Like our graphics; NID maps very useful.
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6. There is a handling problem with codeword papers; they
have to be read in staff space (same true in-other
Departments).
B. Commerce
2. Liaison officers often use articles from Regional Reviews
rather than request special typescripts and/or briefings.
Political items in the Regional Reviews often constitute
the only good political reporting they get on back burner
areas.
3. Regional Reviews also good vehicles for getting people
downtown in touch with analysts.
4. Monthly Reviews (like Soviet Monthly) usually are too big
and not timely enough.
5. Technical information should be relegated to Appendices
for the lower-level readers.
6. NID doesn't get to enough people. Reviews are Commerce
and Treasury's only regular political analysis.
7. IAs aren't timely enough.
8. Biweekly regional reviews would not be timely enough.
9. Release of ORCON material sometimes a problem. (Would
rather have sanitized product than nothing at all.)
10. Biographic material is heavily used.
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 A. Congress is more powerful than before but is less effective
in using its power due to:
1. Weakened leadership structure and control.
2. Members more dependent upon their staffs for support.
3. No systematic flow of information--an opportunity for
intelligence.
4. Spread too thin.
B. What is most useful to Congress:
1. Virtually no interest in current intelligence (Glenn and
Percy are the only regular readers of the NID he knows
of on the Hill, aside from a few staffers).
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11. Concern with maintaining high quality of economic
analysis since the reorganization. Believe integration
of political and economic is good, though product doesn't
really seem much more interdisciplinary.
12. Face-to-face briefings are extremely valuable.
13. Regional. reviews are useful in covering non-NID
readership. Fills the gap between NID and IA.
15. Gallagher provided good description of role of staff aide
(e.g., for Casey at State); four large stacks of material
each day, two which contained action items. Intelligence
is mixed in with the rest. Problem is to keep principal
on schedule and condense reading to a minimum.
16. Don't avoid controversy; CIA is expected to call it like
it is, without policy bias. Policymakers want and
expect our neutral views.
17. Do Office Directors need to get around? Yes, especially
during the first months of a new administration, to talk
relevant substance and establish entre for selves and
others in the office.
VII. Congress as a Consumer
William J. Barnds, Staff Director, Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs Committee
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3. Beyond specific requests, written reports are rarely
asked for (Glenn is an exception on Verification).
4. Only staffers use written transcripts after a briefing.
5. Briefings have much more impact on Members than written
products.
6. Biographic information useful for Members in their
travels, but classified material is a problem when
traveling. Basic geographic intelligence is of little
use.
7. Agency looks best in military and S&T areas where
intelligence can provide unique information/insights.
8. Separate briefings by CIA, DIA, State are better,
but there seldom is enough time.
C. Concerns.
1. Would like to see more speculation.
2. CIA could be more in tune with Congressional concerns.
3. Need for wider distribution of CIA products.
4. Many staffers and/or Congressmen probably are willing
to be debriefed after foreign trips, but they apparently
are seldom asked.
1. Congressional opinion on quality of intelligence is not
worth much because Congressmen aren't frequent users of
products.
2. Attitude common that CIA gets A- or B+ on quality; main
complaint is that Agency is not speculative enough.
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