STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100030-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: STUDY

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S E ORE T
E N C L O S U R E
State-War.-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee S ecial Studies
and Evaluations
PRO BLE14
1. To determine the responsibilitio-s and functions of a
psychological warfare agency, taking into account the related
functions and activities of other government agencies, with a
view to recommending a suitable organization within the Govern-
ment for the discharge of these functions in tii.:e. of war.
ASSUMPTIONS
2. It is assumed that:
a. Certain of the duties of the existing Committee of
Three will be assumed by the National Security Council;
and that there will be a continuing need for a coordinating
agency composed of representatives of the Departments of
State, Defense, War, Navy and Air.
b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue with
duties substantially as at present and will continue
their existing status as the principal professional
military advisors to the President and the Secretary of
Defense.
c. Active military aggression by an enemy or enemies
will be initiated against, the United States without a
declaration of war.
d. Active aggressive psychological "warfare" will be
initiated against the United States both from without and
within prior to the beginning of active military aggression
by an enemy or enemies.
The time interval that may be available between
the public declaration of a state of emergency by the
President and the beginning of the war may be of the order
of a few hours or at the most a few months under the most
favorable conditions.
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FACTS BEARING ON, THE PROBLEM
3. A National Security Council, has been established for
close and continuous coordination on a high level within the
Government of domestic, foreign and military policies. It is
composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the
Chairman of the National Security. Resources Board, and certain
other members who the President may designate, subject to the
terms of the National Security Act. The, function of the Council
is to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign and military policies, to enable the military
services and the other departments and. agencies of the Government
to cooperate effectively in matters involving the national
security.
The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W. C.) was
established 30 April 1947 as the agency of the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), charged with preparation of
policies, plans and studies for immediate and continuous employ-
ment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat
of war as determined by the President). The Subcommittee shall
have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization
for psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of
approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which
might suddenly arise.
5. No national wartime organization for psychological war-
fare other than the SWNCC P. TAT. C. under the terms of SWNCC 304/1/2/
has been established.
6. Government agencies involved during "wartime". in
activities related to psychological "warfare":
a.
The Executive and the executive agencies of the
Government are primarily involved in the conduct of
psychological "warfare" operations.
b. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and
the National Intelligence Authority have a primary
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interest and responsibility in the direction and support
of a psychological warfare agency of the Government; and
contain resources which can be made available to the
agency's use.
7. The Armed Services have been charged with responsibilitie;
related to training, organization and equipping forces capable of
employing psychological "warfare" methods, techniques and facili-
ties. The Armed Services require (a) policy and strategic guid-
ance; (b) to be apprised of the character and extent of their
contribution of effort to the national psychological warfare
effort.
8. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the
Central Intelligence Group operating within their current limita-
tions of appropriated funds .nd allowed personnel are not in a
position to make any substantial operational contribution to a
national psychological "warfare" effort in time of war or threat
of war without a significant redeployment of personnel and other
operating resources from current and projected operations.
9. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the
Central Intelligence Group are at this time functionally organized
to provide intelligence in support of preliminary pilot studies
and planning.
10. In. time of war or threat of war, as determined by the
President, the implementation of psychological warfare plans and
directivesin actual or projected military theaters of operation
will be the roeponetbi_J ity solely of the theater co=and.ers con-
cerned.
11. In World War TI the effectiveness of psychological war-
fare operations was adversely affected by procedural delays and
deficiencies of integration and coordination in organization. At
the termination of combat operations and with the demobilization
of psychological "warfare" aersonnel and the transfer of psycholo-
gical "warfare" agencies to peacetime activities, no advantage was
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taken of the lessoi;s learned in World War II or no measure taken
to resolve personnel, and methods into an integrated and coordinated
organization for psychological warfare in time of war.
12. yhe existing Government agencies which are engaged in
di.sse,i,inating information to the people of the United States
include: Bureaus and offices of Public Information of the Tatar
and va.vy Departments, the Division of Public Affairs of the
Department of State, Office of Public Information of the Army Air
Forces and the Public Relations agencies of the various Govern-
ment departments.
13. The O;: fice of International Information and Cultural
Affairs in the Department of State is changed, with the performance
of informati.onal activities "which consirs t of or are concerned
with informing the people of other nations about any matter in
which the United. States has an interest", (Executive Order 9608,
31 August 1945) The operational potentials of this agency capable
of being applied to support the psychological warfare operations
of the Government in time of war have been reduced by budgetary
limitations for 1948.
14. No psychological warfare specialist reserves exist
within the Armed Services or this; Department of State.
15. Executive Order, 9621 (20 September 1945) provided for
the termination of the Office of Strategic Services, effective
1 October 1945, and for the transfer of its intelligence functions
to the Department of State and the War Department.
16. The effective conduce of psychological warfare requires:
(1) 0r ientation with national policy;
(2) Coordination with military, political and economic
policy;
(3) Formulation of psycholo;ical warfare plans and
policies;
(r:) Procurement and training of personnel, organizing
and administering, procurement and distribution of supplies
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and equipment; evaluation and analysis of appropriate
intelligence for the purpose of directing psychological
warfare activities; p-_,-reparation and distribution of
psychological warfare material; constant evaluation of
results; research in and development of new psychological
warfare methods, teclnn.iques, equipment and instruments.
17. So-called "black.-11 psychological warfare involves
activities in tires ti. ;le which ai~,e related to the f-cllowing:
(1) SiPeci al type operations conducted by the Armed
Forces, such as deception, demolition, behind-the-lines
reconnaissance and patrolling, Commando type operations,
and counter-intelligence act `i.vitie s.
(2) Secret and subversive operations of the type
performed by special OSS units in World Wa.~r TI.
Secret intelligence and counter--intelligence
oe3? ations of the Central Intelligence Agency,
(4) Specific employment of conventional weapons of
war, such as air or naval attacks, for specific psycholo-
gical warfare objectives.
DISCUSSION
18. The National Security Act establishes the National
Security Council as the primary advisory body to the Chief
Executive on matters pertaining to the national security,
replacing the informal Committee of Three, comprising the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy previously performing this
function. Since the national security involves the integration
of military, political, and economic policy, it therefore
appears essential that there be the closest and most intimate
connection 'between the direction of psychological warfare and
the National Security Council.
19. The report of t'.. ,,e Committee of the San ato on Armed
Services (Senate Report 239 - 5 June 1947) stated in part:
'World War II crowned the American effort with
overwhelming success. ? t the same time, the projection
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of this vast effort into almost every field of civil
and governmental endeavor disclosed certain fundamental
weaknesses in our security structure which should be
remedied while their details are fresh in -mind. For
instance, our slow and costly mobilization, our limited
Intelligence of the designs and capacities of our enemies,
our incomplete rote ;ration of political purpose and military
objective, and finally, our prodi gel use of resources, all
demonstrate convincingly that our national e:,,istance would
be in'.-Periled were we to ignore the costly lessons of war
and fail to recognize our national security structure so
as to prevent the recurrence of these defects.
i'rn loon in g to the fut e, it is apparent from the
potentialities implic"i"t in scientific developments, that
the world is entering an era in which war, if it comes,
will be fought at speeds and accompanied by devastations
that stagger the imaginatioon. Consequently, in order at
once to guard our safety and support our efforts to promote
and maintain 161,1e. peace of the world, it is essential that
this country move without delay to provide itself with the
best organization foxr security which can be devised.tt
20. The translation of national policy into the overall
strategic plans for military, political, economic and psycholo-
gical warfare operations requires complete coordination, to
avoid conflicting processes or objectives, and to insure that
the total resources are employed to a furtherance of the national
objective. The balance of effort as between these several opera-
tions is dependent upon the changing situation.
21. The President may within his powers issue instructions
to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense which
would without a public declaration of a state of emergency set
in motion limited psychological "warfare" o.oerations.
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22. The SWNC Subcommittee is described in the Charter
(SWNCC 304/1 - 304/2) as "an agency of SZ NCC charged with
prey-,!4reLtj.on of psychological warfare policies, plans, and
studies for employment in time of war, (or threat of war as
determined by the President. The Subcomrnit tee shall have
authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization
for psychological warfare to coordinate implementation of
approved psychological warfax'e plans in any war emergency which
might suddenly aa^is
This section of the Charter must be
understood in the light of section d. of the ~roblen ( To
recommend) "a peacetime organization for keeping psychological
warfare in a ready-for-rno bili zat i o i status." Analysis of the
elements involved in these predication of purpose indicate a
breakdown into the following:
a. _e subco_ ~:~it tee is responsible for plans and
policies which presumably might need to be placed in
instant operation and it plementation, without previous
preparation or wa _ing; requiring likewise, the instant
deployment of psy c' ol.ogical .carfare personnel.
b. Neither SWNCC nor the subcommittee have authority
over any appropriated funds in the measure essential to
carrying out these purposes.
c. Activation of psycholok:_;ica.l warfare subsequent
to secret instructions by the President to the State, War
and Navy Departments would depend largely on provision
from the Executive Emergency Funds.
d. A -public declaration of emergency would con-
ceivably be followed by :_,equcst for and Congressional
appropriation of funds for ,- ssential ,o~urposes arising out
of the erme`rgency.
e. No forces exist in the Executive Departments nor
is there any provision for adequate training of psycholo--
~ical warfare personnel. Such. provision would require:
(1) A training school
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(2)
Recruitment policies and measures
('3) A training period of anywhere from three
months to a year.
f. Formal designation by Executive Order of a
Central Psychological Warfare Agency, as planned by the
subco -imittee, will require immediate appropriation of
funds for its activities. The history of congressional
action on similar appropriations does not augur the speed
in implementation which global total warfare will require.
E. The possible "absence of a national wartime
organization for psychological warfax e...in any war
emergency which might suddenly arise" draws attention to
the need of establishing close coordination now on a
tentative basis in the present state of the Subcor.,zm:ittee l s
studies with respective staff j sections of the Armed Forces
and Central Intelligence Group which are concerned with
psychological warfare.
23. The formulation of psychological warfare Plans and
policies in accordance with national policy and in coordination
with military, political and economic planning, requires the
existence of a, policy and planning body which to be effective
must be under the authority and direction of a single responsible
head who is at the. same time responsible for the functional
operations of the agency. It is consider=ed that the individual
so charged will re,oort directly to the National Security Council,
and to the President. This policy and planning body must include
representatives of State Department, Armed Forces, Central Intel-
ligence Agency, who are qualified to participate both as indivi-
duals and representatives of their respective organizations.
24. In time of emergency there is an inevitable tendency
towards the creation of new government agencies to deal with
each new probleril that arises. Since the field of interest and
activity pertaining to psychological warfare is extremely broad,
this tendency must not be permitted to prevent the close coordirri-
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tion of effort required. This danger can be averted only by
the carefully planned organization of an executive agency with
power to act. Coordination of planning and implementation is
not sufficient. Many of the specialist activities involved are
common to the needs of the State Department and the Armed Forces.
some are foreign to the peacetime or wartime capabilities of
these and other departments. These specialist techniques and
operations include the following:
.. Analysis by equipped personnel of the emotional
and ideological vulnerabilities of enemy peoples as well
as those in neutral areas which may becora2 occupied
territory, either by the enemy or by American forces.
Such morals analysis should include cultures (including
literacy and language data), history, political, social,
and economic bacgr~und and current development, military
and naval developr.naent, and geophysical data.
b. Determination of propaganda instruments and
methods suited to particular propaganda targets and to
desired, objectives.
c. Formulation of propogganda content coordinated
with national policy.
d. Analysis of enemy psychological warfare methods,
instruments, propaganda content and activities and deter"
mination of means to counter such activities.
Translators, artists, educators, writers, photo-
graphic and printing specialists, and radio technicians,
with skills applicable to the special problems of psycholo-
gical warfare.
f. Separation must always be kept clearly in mind
between information and intelligence. Specialists in
various foreign fields, such as historians, anthropologists,
publicists, may supply both; but the were professional
title of any observor of the contemporary social scene
of any country should not necessarily qualify him to draw
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interpretative conclusions.on which Important tactical or
strategic psychological warfare projection may be basedi
Authoritative students of the fire rank of various world.
societies are few and these often differ in their conclusions,
Due consideration must be given to the generally accepted
principle among anthropologists that racism as regards homy
sapiens is an untenable principle, but that peoples develop
accordingly to their pysical, spiritual, and ideological climate.
Tactical specialists of this kind, cannot be expected to be use-
ful by themselves, even bringing their best knowledge and
experience to the central psychological warfare or anization.
A training course will be essential to relate their abilities
to these special purposes.
25. A central psychological warfare agency in Washington,
within the framework of relationships outlined herein, can
function smoothly and efficiently as an entity, with clear-
horizontal divisions and clear vertical channels of responsi-
bility established. This simplicity and clarity, so essential
to efficient operations, is more difficult to achieve in
theatres of operations, wherein the military commander is solely
re spons.ibl. e for psychological warfare operations, In World War
II the solution to this problem varied from theatlre to tlheatr e--
in some it was never solved. A constant obstacle to a consistent
and reasonable solution has always been the combined impact of
over-enthusiasm for and reactionary non--acceptance of the value
of psychological warfare. The :present JCS have indicated their
awareness of the ir,.porUance of psychological warfare in relation
to national security. There- would a.apear to 'be no longer any
necessity for "selling" psychological warfare as a part of the
Subcommittee's task. The reasonable working arrangements which
were developed in several instances in World War. TI are variously
adaptable to the future problem. No organizational solution,
however, can replace the essential requirement for the "right
man in the right place",
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264 It is impossible to anticipate what government agencies
may be treated foi what purposes in the event of wax?, but it is
the opinion of the Subcor.:imittee that it's plans for organization
should leave no-gaps in respect to the essential functions
invalved.
"Black' propaganda and activities in World War II vere
in a large ;part carried on by the Office of Strategic Services;
"White" propaganda was the responsibility of the OWI.
Under Executive Order 0601, 20 September 1945, the
functions of the Office of Strategic Services were transferred
W the Department of State and the War Department. It is the
opinion of the Subcommittee that in the event of war, as deter-
mined by the President, initial planning and direction of "Mite"
and"Black" propaganda should lie within the authority of the
central Psychological Warfare organization, with due consinra-
tion of the authority of the theatre commanders in areas of
action, and the services of existing agencies to which certain
activities of OSS have been transferred. It is clear, neverthe-
less, that the total subject of Mack" propoganda will need to
be organized in the planning of the Subcommittee on a functioning
wartime basis under the central Psychological Warfare agency.
Such planning most obviously include insofar as possible the
preservation of available skills in discoverable personnel, and
the continuance and maintenance of techniques in properly
established and coordinated training. Since the, wartime obliga-
tion of the functi.wn:_; .ot sabotage and subversion, "Black" propa-
ganda, and consp'Lrac nowhere now assured within the frame-
work of the Gave: n nan Lp cial study will be required to
ascertain how thr. e :f .znoti )fs may be made available to the
national Psycriologic al 'riarfare Organization.
27. The task of overcoming the enemy's will to resist is
inseparable from that of maintaining at a high level the Qlli tto
victory of the American people. These two tasks do in fact
represent the offensive and defensive objectives towards the
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attainment of which psychological warfare makes its essential
contribution. These offensive and defensive aspects require
close integration to ensure that progress towards one objective
is not at the expense of the other.
V;,ro important aspects must be carefully considered in any
study of the domestic side of the psychological warfare problem.
(1) t ropes ands, for Home consumption is reDuanant to
the American tradition and the nmerican people.
(2) she exDerieJ. ce of World War II indicates that
within the limits of security sensibly interpprete~! honest
information on the progress of a war which draws on all
the resources of the United States must not only not be
withheld from the public but must be imparted in such a
regular manner as to maintain confidence in its integrity.
In wars such as are new envisaged in the future, global
and total, in which not only all the energies of the domestic
population will be drawn upon but in which the domestic popula-
tion will itself be a target, every means must be employed to
retain the confidence of the domestic population and its trust
in the truthfulness of information it receives. This is complete-
ly opposite to the method of dictator countries, which provide
their domestic pouulations only with such information as may
stimulate or maintain the will to war. It is on the other hand
an essential part of the institutions which the American people
would be defending in time of war,
28. From the standpoint of information, SECURITY, is
primary among the realistic aspects of total warfare, especially
in relation to the changed geophysical position of Continental
America. Security considerations, however sensibly administered,
result in something less than a free -press. The care with which
security is administered will play a considerable part in obtain-
ing public understanding of its necessity and faith in the trust-
worthiness or releasable information.
In the very nature of future war, Government agencies will
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become the only source of releasable information about the war:
Voluntary censorship of news and radio, which was successfully
carried out in the main in World War IT, would be subject in any
future war to conditioning and limitation in the event of attach
upon or occupation of any part of a tinpntal United States. In
such an event information pertains not an1y' to securi Us ' 'it equallj
to ' Ae conduct Of l;s; eholog cal warfare; particulo..rly in the sense
that all American information would not only be important to an
enemy's own conduct of its war activities, but would be of signifb
canoe in subversion of the enemy by the iosychologica.l warfare
agency of the U:5, Government.
It is clear that the weapons of psy choloSica 1 warfare are
not always discriminate. Information broadcast to the American
people will be picked up by the enemy. A broadcast under an
smerican signature for enemy consumption will always possibly
reach the American public.
hose facts were recognized in the Executive orders establis ins-, the Office of War Information (13 June 1942, 10 March, 1943).
( opendix)
What they point to is that the careful direction and planninE
of psychological warfare, which is the essence of such a process,
requires unity of guidance, direction and control, and full
coordination in all its operations at the planning-policy level.
22. In the event the continental U.S. or a part thereof
became a zone of combat it is to be expected that psychological
warfare activities within such zone would be the responsibility
of the commander. The national psychological warfare organizatio]
would function in the normal way, i.e., by providing facilities,
}personnel, material, and expert assistance and advice. in any
event, there will be organization within the U. S. for purposes of
civil and internal defense. It is impossible to predict the natu:
and extent of responsibiliies of various existing agencies for
these purposes. it is contemplated, however, that the relation-
ship between the psychological warfare organization and such
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agencies would be similar to that between it and theater com ands.
30. Precedent Oxists in the d. vernment for the harmonious
working together of bot civil and military agencies and. civil and
military personnel in a common en-cer;rise. The organization of a
psychological warfare agency should be flexible enoug i to -,.permit
the continuing of these relationships.. t- ov,rever, in thea trc s of
o-;eration a military status of practical operating personnel may
be desirable. Problems of difference in status, pay and training
between civilian and uniformed ye:~sonnel enter into consideration
of the matter, It is further complicated by necessary rigidity
of military or ganiza ion, WI-Li ch might tend to limit essential
freedom of action in -;articular instances. A possible solution
in part might be to give military status to all but policy
personnel in a theatre of operation) which would thus assist in
solving questions of supnr,ly, logistics, etc. But the problems
of command in connection with psychological warfare organization
in the field and its relation to the central organization at home
are of such a nature that an effective satisfactory solution must
rest on a special study of the problem in all aspects by the
Subcommittee.
CONCLUSIONS,
31. The NI~.tio-)ne.l Psychological +Jarfare Organization to be
established under terms of S' CC 304/1 - 34/2 should be under
the single control and direction of a Director appointed by the
President from military or civil life and be responsible to the
National Security Council.
32. The Director of the National Psychological Warfare
Organization should be the Chairman, with power of decision, of
a planning and Policy Board upon which should sit representatives
of the departments of the Armed Forces, the Department of State
and such other government agencies whose -.osrticipati )n may be
found necessary ar desirable.
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y
33. The necessary authority, strategic guidance, information,
and resources of manpower, funds, facilities and materials should
be orovided the Natloonal Psychological Warfare Organization to
enable its proper functioning in the achievement of national aims
and military objectives in ti: e of war or t reat of war as deter-
mined by the ?resident.
34. The National Psychological Warfare Organization should
merge into a national effort activities and operations related to
posycholo;ical warfare, using already established agencies to
perform their ao1oro --iate functions.
35. T e National Psychological Warfare Organiz-:a,tio , will
plan, develop, and execute all phases of tcth,-e Federal Program of
Radio, press, publications, and related foreign propaganda activi-
ties involving the dissemination of information, and all other
foreign propaganda activities, in time of war, or threat of war
as determined by the President.
36. The National Psychological '.Warfare Organization will
in time of war be charged with all phases of planning, develop-
ment, control, and coordination oo:i all psychological wariare
activities both domestic and foreign and with the coordination
therewith of all domestic and foreign information policies of the
U. S. Government.
3'7. The global strategic nature of psychological warfare will
necessitate centralized eolicy control of all domestic and over-
seas inf orrlat . on agencies.
33. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will
have access to and be provided:ith intelligence available to the
government and shoO.ld have made avail able to it from the LL onitor-
ing and analysis agencies foreign i. ,formation which it may require
i n the furl ,.erance of its assigned functions.
39. ithin established theatres of operations or in
specifically designated operational areas within tr;e continental
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U. S. the implementation of psychological -wmrfa.. e plans and
directives during war or threat of war as determined by the
President should be the responsibility solely of the theater
commander concerned. A special study shall be :.lade by the Sub-
corrmittee to determine the possibility of placing under military
control with regard to status, responsibility, pay, privil--Les
and promotion of such personnel of the psycholo ;ical warfare
organization who are employ-ed in mounting operations in pro jectef,
' he ;..r e s of operation. All psychological warfare combat teams -.,=ill
e coy,: used of -personnel having military status.
40. The sort time interval available for transitional
activities between the public declaration of a state of emergency
by the President (or other significant events which may
presage imminent war) and the beginning of war, krill adversely
effect the mobilization of facilities anC personnel fosr wartime
ii.-;olementation of -psychological 1Nwarfa e plans; a special study
will be required to ascertain how most advantageously this gao
may be bridged.
41. A specialist reserve corps should be established within
the Army and Navy ,.e ser ve Corps.
42. Rosters and files descriptive of personnel as related
to loyalty, qualification and sitabilit,yr for placement should be
maintainer, and available to the Subcommittee to include;
a. Trained civilian personnel on duty in the
De oartment of State.
b. Personnel on duty in World ~rTa.r 11 in the Army,
Navy, OWI, 0SS and other activities which directly
participated in psychological warfare.
c. Personnel trained in such activities subsequent
to b. above.
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.C1E C-0 1,1ENDA1 10 ry~ S
43. It is recommended that:
` ze conclusions above should be approved
for ;?la .nine,, ;-cur- ses .
b. 11e 7.1:7ar and ve,.vy Departments be requested
to consider a specialist reserve corps in the
and Navy Reserve Corps.
c. the Department of State be requested to main-
tain files on experienced civilian personnel for this
activity.
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Enclosure
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P P E N D I X
In the Executive Orders establishing the Of `'ice of War
Information, the Director was empowered to:
a. Formulate and carry out, through the use of press,
radio, motion picture, and other facilities, Information
progremsdesigned to facilitate the development of an informed
and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad., of the
status and progress of the war effort and of the war
policies, activities, and aims of the Government,
b. Coordinate the war informational activities cf all
Federal departments and agencies for the purpose of assuring
an accurate and consistent flow of war information to the
public and the world at large.
co Obtain, study, and analyze information concerning
the war effort and advise the agencies concerned with the
dissemination of such information as to the most a. ropr-iate
and. effective means of keeping the public adequately c.ncl
accurately informed.
d. Review, clear, and approve all proposed radio and
motion picture programs sponsored by Federal departments and
agencies; and serve as the central point of clearance and
contact for the radio broadcasting and motion picture
industries, respectively, in their relationships with
Federal Departments and agencies concerning such Government
programs.
And --
8. The Director of the Office of War Information and
the Director of Censorship shall collaborate in the per-
formance of their respective functions for the purpose of
facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all
available information which will not give aid to the enemy.
9. The Director of the Office of War Information and
the Defense Communications Board shall collaborate in the
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performance of their respective functions for the purpose
of facilitating the broadcast of war information to the
peoples abroad..
The revised Executive Order of 10 March, 1943 stated:
(1) The Office of War Information will plan)
develop and execute all phases of the Federal program
of radio, press, publications and related foreign
propaganda activities involving the dissemination of
Under the authority thus vested, the Director of OWI issued
a regulation to the heads of all Executive Departments and
,Agencies (No. 7 - 17 May, 1943) in which it was stated
the Director would disapprove any release which (a) is
deemed to be confusing to the public; (b) contains state-
ments believed not to be in accordance with the facts;
(c) omits facts which need to be stated in order not to
be misleading to the public. The Regulation stated further
that it was "not to be construed to require the issuance of
information which is deemed to be of aid and comfort to the
enemy."
Appendix
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