COMMUNIST CHINA THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000300010019-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: BOOK

r 0.111,11mINI
Approved For Release 2003/06/20 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00030D010019-3
rar-i Tin' People's Vepalair of Chinn
i. Iaiv:an Straits. Shortly
sorea showed the intention
oil toward the yaki
ot this, the Chinese goy-
inited States government that
utted States troops crossed the
'toward the Yalu River. This
ated States throngh the Indian
goN eminent disregarded this
did indeed cross the 38th
:du River,
rmlv take the action of volun-
,
dd-,ir of resistance against the
not taken until four months
'es iso 'CS in the Taiwan Straits
'r)vcr Taiwan, and not until
the 38th Parallel and ap-
made many statements during
is act of aggression against
Moreover, he could not
.,he stationing of United States
diermore, Truman failed to
ongh the Indian Ambassador.
011s an armistice was at last
, iptstits had withdrawn Coin-
United States troops are still
yin not withdraw. Moreover,
dg Taiwan with its land, sea,
ates Navy and Air Force are
Isn't this the best proof that
.itinues to pursue policies of
It is not necessary to cite
'ry bases maintained by the
my aggressive military pacts
! target. China, on the other
Iroad, and the treaties it has
ire all treaties of peace and
Immitted these acts of aggres-
:1 force to settle disputes with
4
the United States? No! I declared already during the Bandung
Conference in 195:5 that the Chinese people were friendly io
the American people and the Chinese gdwcrnnient was willing
to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United Slates
government to discuss existing disputes between the two coun-
tries. though the two countries had not recognized each other
and had no diplomatic! relations. This proposal of ours re-
su:ted, through the good offices of Britain, in ambassadorial
talks between China and the United States which started
August I, 1955, in Geneva.
'In order to create a favorable it (Irina released,
before the talks began, eleven so--called 'preamers of war,' fol-
lowing the mediation of Krishna Menon and IN Secretary-
General Dag I lammarskjiild's visit to Peking,. Why are they
referred to as so-called 'prisoners of war'? Because they were
not captured on the Korean battlefield. With the exception of
a few who chose, of their own will, to stay behind. all prisoners
of war captured on the Korean front were repatriated after the
armistice. Later, among those who stayed behind, some returned
also of their own will. But the eleven so-called 'prisoners of
war' were on a United States plane which intruded into China's
air space, and were captured after their plane was hit, Both
China and the United States had declared that the Korean War
was restricted to Korea and did not extend to China. This plane
was shot down in China. So China did not recognize them as
'prisoners of war.' Nevertheless, China released them--to create
a favorable atmhsphere for the ambassadorial talks at Geneva.
"That was the end of the so-called 'prisoners of war' issue.
"Besides the so-called 'prisoners of war,' however, there
were two other categories of United States nationals in Chinese
prisons. First were United States citizens, guilty of such crimes
as sabotage and espionage, or who had in other ways violated
the laws of China. Since 1955, we have released twenty-five
such United States criminals when their terms were fully served
or were granted clemency and released ahead of time for good
behavior. One of the twenty-five chose to remain in China after
his release. Of this category only three are now still serving
sentences in China.
"There are two United States nationals in Chinese prisons
of another category?a very special one. They are airborne
? ?
1101.-1
:r?r.?rel :Tents sent by- the t limed States to China, namely, the
very famous Downevi and Ic clean. Allen plates of the United
Statc:,: Irrlelligr'ncr? AirencV curild give you all the de-
tails, bin perhaps Ile wouldn't wain in give the information in
such detail ;is we ,,votild. In early 1955, when IlummarskjiAd
v'sinue to Prh inr iii (1/:-;CMS the cpiestion of the United States
nationals in ('Ilinese prisons, even he found it inconvenient to
bring up their case for disede,sion. These two were in no way
related to the Korean War, but were on a mission of pure
espionage and secret-ngent activity. If you arc interested, f
could show you some lantions of the notes of my talks with
I laimititskjiild fur your reference. The notes have never been
published!,
"Five years have elalised since the start of the Chinese-
United States talks in August 1955. At the very outset, we pro-
posed that disputes between China and the United States, in-
cluding the dispute between the two countries in (he Taiwan
region, should be settled through peeicelnl negotiations, without
resorting to the use or threat of force. The I lnited States blocked
all news of this proposal, but China later published it. Why did
[John Foster.' Dulles reject it? Because Dulles realized that
reaching such an agreement implied that the next step would
he discussions on how and when /idled States armed forces
were to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits,
'We liold that the dispute between China and the United
States in the Taiwan region is an international question; whereas
military action between the Central Government of New China
and the. Cliiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan is an internal ques-
tion. The United States has maintained that the two questions
are inseparable. We hold that they can and must be separated.
Since it has been possible for China and the United States to
hold ambassadorial talks in Geneva and Warsaw, talks can also
be held at the same time between the Central Government of
China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The former is an inter-
national question while the latter Is an internal questioc. Parallel
talks can be conducted and solutions reached separately.
"In the talks between China and the United States, agree-
ment on principle must after all be reached first before con-
crete issues can be settled. The two points of principle on which
agreement should be reached are:
The China Reader
ComAunist Chip
edited by Franz
Schurman and (jrville
Schell p.723
as excrpted from
The Other SideT of
the River by Edgar
3nov
The --
"( ) /111,
.Siatev, ineltninf;:
die Tallow,' l'eplon,:,
fiethe'MV, Withiml
"(2) The
armed forces front
the .specific ,riefis on
mailers for ,sith.s-erpte
eminent ceases to p,
China and of resorti,
logical conclusion
"This is the crux of
United States. The achy,
policy toward China hay(
Chinas,' In this respect,
cratie Parties aim at the is
probably be opposed Ina
the Kuomintang in Taiwan
fore such an approach writ.
of Sino-U,S, relations it yr()
"We believe that a so,
timately be found; it is only
point: if me united States ts
Sion and the threat of war af,
We do not believe that thus
allow their government hid
There is no conflict of has,
China and the United Stat
prevail."
asked Chou whether t
been the topic of discussion fo
ambassadorial talks held at NA
THE PREMIER: Yes.,
by China at the end of 1!.,
forward in the autumn OI
QUESTION: Does the
the question of the time.
from Taiwan?
Approved For Release 2003/06/20 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000300010019-3
COMMUNIST CHINA
to China, namely, the
cn Dulles of the United
ild give you all the de-
give the information in
when Ilammarskjold
in of the United States
'found it inconvenient to
SC two were in no way
on a mission of pure
you are interested,
1,1 notes of my talks with
notes have never been
he start of the Chinese-
Idthe United States, in-
the very outset, we pro-
'..countries in the Taiwan
ful negotiations, without
file United States blocked
ter published it. Why did
iise Dulles realized that
hat the next step would
:lied States armed forces
e Taiwan Straits.
en China and the United
ational question:. whereas
Overnment of New China
iwan is an internal ques-
d that the two questions
n and must be separated.
:and the United States to
id Warsaw, talks can also
Central Government of
The former is an inter-
internal question. Parallel
ions reached separately.
the United States, agree-
reached first before con-
iints of principle on which
40 The People's Republic of China 325
A ? proved For Reltias29gyp#391,1' ,PIARRE)?,47P9,4,9RPRP30004001*3
States, incluelbtg the dispute between the two countries in
the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful nego-
tiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force; and
"(2) The United States must agree to withdraw its
armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to
the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are
matters for rid sequent discussion. If the United States gov-
ernment ceases to pursue the policy of aggression against
China and of resorting to threats of force, this is the only
logical conclusion which can be drawn.
"This is, the crux of the dispute between China and the
United States. The activities and direction of United States
policy toward China have been aimed at manufacturing 'two
Chinas.' In this respect, both the Republican and the Demo-
cratic Parties aim 'A the same thing. . . . This scheme would
probably be opposed not only by Mainland China, but also by
the Kuomintang hi Taiwan and the Chinese in Taiwan. There-
fore such an approach would lead nowhere, but in the solution
of Sino-U.S, relations it would tie things up in knots.
"We believe that a Solution to Sino-U.S. relations will ul-
timately be found; it is only a question of time. But there is one
point: if the United States does not give up its policy of aggres-
sion and the threat of war against China, no solution is possible.
We do not believe that the people of the United States will
allow their government indefinitely to pursue such a policy.
There is no conflict of basic interest between the peoples of
China and the United States, and friendship will eventually
- prevail."
I asked Chou whether the two principles he spoke of had
been the topic of discussion for a long time in the Sino-American
ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.
THE PREMIER: Yes. The first principle was put forward
by China at the end of 1955. The second principle was put
forward in the autumn of 1958 at Warsaw.
QUESTION: Does the second principle include as well
the question of the time and manner of the withdrawal
from Taiwan?
Approved For Release 2003/06/20 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000300010019-3