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I3Ei'f YORK TAE BOOK RWIEW v NOVTstziac ' -_ Approved For RQIaa~e 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP84-(l~G R001000080002-6 America in Vietnam. By h ? er L. Coo er. Foreword by Ambassaaor verell Harriman. 559 pp. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. $12. There are some subjects about which it is hard to assume an air of enlightened detachment. One is, or at least used to be, religion. Another is sex. And one is surely the Vietnam war. Over the past 20 years (yes, 20, for it was in May, 1950, that Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the United States would aid France in its struggle to subdue 'the Com- munist-led Vietminh) there have been passionate denunciations of America's role in Indochina and (although with increasing rarity) fervent justifications. The hawks told us we were defending the Free World, holding the line against aggression, protecting a brave people, making the world safe for democracy- you name it. The doves were aghast at our support of self-seeking autocrats and, incompetent generals, or our systematic devastation of Vietnam, or. the toll wrought on our own society-name it again. The issue long ago became a moral one. The lines have become so tightly drawn and the arguments so famil- iar that even to launch discussion of the subject seems redundant. Operation Total Victory has now given way to Operation Face-Saving. Nixon's so-called Vietnamization plan,afor all its loopholes and booby-traps, is designed to ease us out the back door of a war that cannot be won, that the American people are fed up with, and that no one is quite sure how we ever go into. We are now in the "I must have been really drunk last night to have done that" stage of the war, the morning-after when it is hard to remember how we ended up where we did, or what possibly could have been on our minds along the way. It 'is a moment when we want to listen to someone who was there when it happened, but remained sober through it all. It is time to demystify the war, and perhaps no one is better equipped.for the task than Chester Cooper, an old Asia hand whose service in government stretched from the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina right through to the present impasse in Paris. Perched high in the upper strata of the foreign- pokey bureaucracy, he was there when the whole thing happened, and Mr. Steel is the author of "Pax Amer- icana," and of a forthcoming book of essays on inter ntionism and cold ward lomacy like a true professional he tells it the way he saw it, a foreign policy unclut- tered by moral issues, a Vietnam without tears. Some may find such an approach insensitive, but diplomats.are not paid to be indignant. They are professionals whose job it is to carry out, or occasionally impede, policies made higher up. The policy-makers, those who orchestrated our interventions in Vietnam and elsewhere have not been consumed by indignation or carried away by paroxysms of moral fervor. They were sober men conducting a foreign policy which, however aberrant it may now seem, was based on very real principles: the division of the world between Communists and non-Communists, and the determina- tion to preserve existing ideological boundaries- by force of arms where need be. Vietnam was a logical result of that policy. It became important only because that was where the policy finally broke down. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 bc?ntinuod WP S 811101 POST Ran i n Approved For Fse 2001/03/06 :?CI~ P84-998001000080002-6 Itemnanz Tiffstorical, 'r 7o ..Subtle View It has taken a quarter cen- tury since World War ii to begin to produce definitive examinations of the origins and meanings of that con- flict. The same time span doubtless will be required to do the same for what most Americans call the Vietnam War but what, in reality, is most likely to take its place in history as the second In- dochina War. Books about Vietnam' have hardly been in short supply thus far, but too many of them have been passionate expositions bf the American effort, either pro or con, and too few can claim any subtlety let alone qualify as history. Thus it is with pleasure that one can report Chester L. Cooper's The Lost Crusade is an im- portant contribution to the historiography of what has become America's 'longest and most divisive war. The sweep of Cooper's ac- count is total-from the full- est account yet of President Roosevelt's aborted efforts to prevent Indochina's re- turn to France after World War II down to President Nixon's "incursion" into Cambodia three decades later. The book as history, however, is uneven; others have told much more of many past periods and it is far too soon to fix the Cam- bodian affair in proper con- text. Where The Lost Crusade shines is when Mr. Cooper is writing about his own par- THE LOST CRUSADE: Am.erica_ in Vietnam. `By C c ster L. Cooper. Foreword by Ambassador JV. vere arrcrnan. later a dove, but he denies' 'such an oversimplification though his shift of views is evident enough. He came out with "no nostrums and no ready answers" but with a clear belief that "the fruits of Vietnam (win, lose or draw) are likely to be sour." And like many others Reviewed by Cheliners M. Roberts The reviewer is a staff reporter on The Washington Post who has been writing about the Indochina War since 1954. ticipation. Ile was not a principal actor, but he has been deeply involved in many twists and turns, most especially in the ill-fated 1967 efforts of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to do a deal with visiting So- viet Premier Alexei Kosygin while a suspicious Lyndon Johnson fussed back at the White House. The bulk of this account is appearing Sunday in The Washington Post Outlook section. Mr. Cooper's credentials include, in his 25 years in government service with the OSS in the China-Burma- India theater, with the CIA as an analyst and intelli- gence estimator, and attend- ance at both the 1954 Ge- neva and 1962 Laos confer- ences plus the SEATO founding conference of 1954. He was on the National Se- curity Council planning board, was:Fan Asian affairs aide to McGeorge Bundy In the White House and, to cap it, was an assistant to W. Av- erell Harriman during Iiar- riman's period as Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam peace ne- gotiator. He went into Vietnam a hawk and emerged ' years rather than the official ver- sions so far produced and still to come, most" notably that of President Johnson. One sees Ambassador Harri. man cut off from key infor. mation: What did Johnson and Kosygin say to each other at Glassboro? Why did the Joint Chiefs of Staff want Mr. Johnson to ap- prove "a raid on the one juicy target left in Hanoi" at the moment support was growing to end all bombing ' north of the 20th parallel? A great deal previously published has been omitted by Cooper, which tends to throw the book off balance. he concludes, with some In some cases he deliber hope, that perhaps this bit-',Aely holds back on what he,. ter experience will teach. surely knows--he barely Americans that their foreign touches on his CIA coniiec- policy "will have to be based tions and that agency's role, more on an appeal to reason But Mr. Cooper is honest and self-interest than to. enough to concede that the emotion and righteousness" merican correspondents in and thus perhaps the lost Saigon in 1364.6.5, so casti-, crusade "may provide us gated by Washing-' with something of value, ton turned out to be more after all." right than the government. Maybe. Yet what is dso The very title, The Lost much clear from so Crusade is a judgment yet much of Mr. Cooper's book to be affirmed in. history abis lessortive the efforts t too false starts find a and depending, of course, oh way to peace, so often de- one's view of the crusade it pending on hazy or misun- self. Cooper would like to derstood "signals" from the see the United States Communists, as the shock- emerge with something, ing inability of American of. ficialdom to understand the though whether that would people they were dealing fit Richard Nixon's prescrip- -with. tion of "peace with honor" M G orcre Bundy he is something else again. (couldn't cut through the Mr. Cooper has contrib- ooze of generalities. Two uted to our understanding cultures and two educa of what happened; he would tional backgrounds did not be the first to say, however, directly conflict but rather' that. the total story has yet slid past one another." to be written. writes, "cane out reeling Says Cooper of his own from a two-hour session suggestions for a new Sai- gon government: "If this with a Iist hierat-chyer. Ilisof the Buddhist adds up to a 'coalition' so be hierarchy. , Cooper's book probably, will be most valuable to, those future historians for its vignettes, those insights into how the American sys- tenm of dealing with thei problem realty .worked Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 U. S. NEWS & WORLD. "fUMT PY RACE 9N THE SKY Global spying by U. S. and Russia was never more exten- sive than in today's shaky world. To meet the .need: novel, eye- opening techniques. Latest friction between U. S. and Rus- sia in the Mideast and Cuba is shedding new light on the spying techniques of the two superpowers, demonstrating how closely they watch each other. For example: . planes from the Azores spotted a Soviet task force en route to Cuba, other spy planes started a continuous watch. In late September, Russians were photo- graphed unloading machinery which ex- perts took to be the start of a permanent Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos. ? American U-2 planes flying along the Suez Canal from Cyprus are able to report to President Nixon the movement of Soviet-built missiles before the Krem- lin itself gets the information relayed from its men on the ground. ? When the Russians test-fired their multiple-warhead missiles into the Pa- cific in August, the U. S. photographed the re-entry in color. It is doubtful that A huge Titan Ill booster rises from Cape Kennedy, Fla., to station a nuclear-detection satellite 55,000 miles in space. Air Force cargo planes equipped with "skyhooks" snatch spy-satellite capsules from air by the method shown here. Approved For Rye 2001/01/~6~'Ca?9DP84-00 8001000080002-6 The controversial U-2 spy planes, still on active duty spot ting Soviet missiles in the Suez truce zone and Russian fleet build-up off. Cuba, take photographs similar to the one below, made during the Cuba missile crisis of 1962. ? When the U. S. first test-fired its latest submarine missile, the Poseidon, off Cape Kennedy recently, Russian ships were on hand to monitor the tra- jectory and to try to recover some of the launch debris. ? If the Russians begin construction of a new missile site deep inside the So- viet Union, the Pentagon knows about it ,vithin a natter of days. Russia keeps a similar watch on the U. S. How is all this done? The U. S. watch is maintained by an astonishing array of cameras, sensors and electronic monitors planted in the earth, submerged in the oceans, or orbiting through space aboard spy satellites. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6 OOr~'frru ,?. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00001000080002-6 The watchers move in a world not only of satellites, ships and manned airplanes, but also unmanned aircraft. They use re- mote seismic sensors to discover under- ground atomic" explosions, sound-detec- tion systems on the oceans' floors to spot the passage of submarines, and over- the-horizon radars capable of "seeing" around the world, Benefits. Thus, when the U. S. and Russia sit down in Helsinki November 2 for the third round in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, each will have excel- lent knowledge of what is in the other's arsenal. U. S. officials make the point that should the negotiators agree to a ceiling on strategic weapons, it will be remote surveillance that will check whether either side is cheating. What a surveillance system can do, these officials say, is make it possible for the 'superpowers to limit armament costs -and thereby reduce arms budgets- without fear that a "cheater" will devel- op a massive superiority and subject the other to nuclear "blackmail." Each device in the surveillance sys- tem has its own special mission. For ex- ample, to cover hour-to-hour develop- meats along the Suez, the U. S. called on the U-2 reconnaissance plane that many thought was outmoded after one was shot down over Russia in 1960. For another kind of mission, the U. S. has just put into orbit a spy satellite designed to "hang" 22,300 miles over Southeast Asia, watching for missile launchings in Red China and Russia. SOVIET MISSILE BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION NUCLEAR WARHEADS PREFAB CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS I 1A ` 4 proofer - For I elelse Gemini V astronauts, with hand camera, photo- graphed Kenyan airfield from over 100 miles out. The need for specialized intelligence, say American officials, has never been greater. Crisis in the Mideast, Russia's race for nuclear superiority, develop- ments off Cuba have all put a new strain on the American spy `system. "Collection:'., tost. This year the U. S. will employ 136,114 persons and spend 2.9 billion dollars gathering stra- tegic intelligence. That was given in a public accounting to Congress. Knowledgeable sources estimate the Soviets will employ about 150,000 per- sons and spend around 3.5 billions doing the same thing. These figures are the tip of a very -large iceberg: Billions more will be expended in peripheral activities, and in laboratories devising more ways to collect infonnation more quickly and accurately. . - To the question of whether the effort is worth the costs, U. S. officials reply in essence: Without it, the world would be a far more unstable place, with both sides re- duced to dangerous guessing in an age when the flight time of a hydrogen war- head between the two countries is only 30 minutes. As of now, neither can make a move of broad military significance without the other's being in position to make a countermove almost immediately. Efficiency, the sources say, borders on the incredible. One official declares: "When Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird reports to the nation that the Russians have 67 anti-ballistic-missile sites around Moscow, he doesn't mean 66. He is speaking precisely, from" pre- cise information." Satellites of vastly improved efficien- cy over early models make that possible. When the U. S. launched its latest August it was at least the 263rd sent aloft since No- vember, 1961, to collect military information. In that same period, the Russians have launched at least as many. Once or twice a month a secret satellite is launched into polar orbit from Van- denberg Air Force Base in California. The Russians make similar launches from Tyuratam near the Aral Sea. These satellites whirl around the world once about every 90. minutes at altitudes of 86 to 114 miles, carrying cameras of such high resolution that they can discern on the ground an object the size of a basketball. At the end of 8 to 12 days, these sat- ellites eject a capsule, containing thou- sands of photographs, which eventually floats to earth via a parachute. The U. S. recovers its capsules near Hawaii while they are still in the air, using an air- plane equipped with a "skyhook." The Russians ? vary their capsule-landing patterns. A Russian satellite in polar orbit will appear over the various regions of the U. S. about 40 times in the course of a flight lasting 100 hours. Infrared devices. Cameras are not the only instruments carried aloft. There are infrared sensors able to differentiate between the rays given off by a blast furnace and those of a missile at launch. The sensors can locate a truck at night, or tell whether crops are healthy or dis- eased by measuring heat radiation. Far out in space-55,000 miles-so- called Vela satellites are in orbit. Three of them are always on station searching for concentrations of gamma rays, X rays, neutrons and large electrified fields which would indicate the explosion of an atomic bomb in the atmosphere. In addition, there are satellites to map terrain, enable ships to locate their posi- tions, allow military men to talk to the "other side" of the world, and report on global weather. As the spy satellites pass over their homeland, they transmit their findings to computer receiving stations on the ground. Computers are a vital element in the information network. Even though there are more than 1,800 man-made ob-' jects traveling in space, the moment a new one appears on a radar screen a computer will analyze its trajectory and flash a warning. Also in the spy family are the "Fer- - 2OO1i/01/06 ~GtA t'D84IEb0499R0010('09'OO02n6ct p(7 ge) Approved For R? e a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004"R001000080002-6 "Ferret" ships, such as U.S.S. Pueblo, captured off North Korea, monitor code transmitters worldwide. THE SPY RACE [continued from preceding page] ret" satellites which monitor radio and radar emissions, determine their location, power and transmission frequency. With precise information of this sort, electron- ic engineers can figure out methods of jamming enemy transmitters and con- fusing their receivers. - In a discussion of the precision with which satellites operate, one source said: "Let's put it this way: If a car is parked in downtown Washington for 24 straight hours-and the Russians are fly- ing-they would be able to notify Presi- dent Nixon of a parking violation." Says another official: "The Russians have become so sensi- tive to our satellites, they are roofing their submarine-construction pens to try to keep us from knowing how many boats they are working on and what type." Rocket clues. From another source, commenting on how spy satellites are able to tell so much about the number of rockets Russia has in place: " "You just don't build a missile and stick it in the ground overnight. First, you have to dig an enormous hole. You have to clear an area, build roads, in- stall communications, pour concrete and then haul in a missile that fits the hole. All that takes about a year. When we spot a missile we know from its size just about what it can do because at one time or another we built one similar. Its size gives a clue to what kind of war- head it can carry. We know about war- heads from our tests and from monitor- ing theirs. When the Russians shot those 3-in-1 multiple warheads into the Pacific .in August, we had people hanging around with gadgets and cameras. That's how we photographed the re-entry of the because they could be dan- gerous." Sea sentries. While satel- lites glean ' most of the strategic intelligence, a vast array of what Washington calls "other means" also is employed. There is, for example, a vast network of underwater detection devices, linked to land by cable, which tells the U. S. or its allies when a Soviet submarine is pass- ing through any one of the narrow straits leading from Russia into the oceans. If a Soviet submarine approaches the East Coast and passes a sensor line, lo- cated at a classified depth, the U. S. Navy knows it immediately. A worldwide network of seismic sta- tions-the latest are in Norway and Alas- ka-tries, with only marginal success so far, to keep track of underground atomic tests in the Soviet Union. On any given day, a 2,100-mile-per- hour reconnaissance plane-the SR-71- may streak along. the edges of Siberia or approach Murmansk, taking photographs from nearly 100,000 feet, while also test- ing Russian radar capabilities. Again, on any given day, American- supplied U-2s, flown by Nationalist Chi- nese pilots, may take off from Formosa for a leisurely flight above 60,000 feet over Lob Nor in Red China's Sinkiang Province. Their mission is to see whether the Communists are preparing to ex- plode an atomic deviee or launch a mis- sile.' It was through such a mission that Red China was found to be working on an A-bomb before .1964. By and large, the U. S. does not now fly U-2s over nations that have modern missiles and are likely to use them. The planes are tog slow. From time to time, supersonic drones -unmanned aircraft equipped with tele- vision cameras or other sensors-streak over Red China or North Vietnam look- ing for anything unusual. Finally, there are "Ferret" ships and airplanes which have the mission of sail- ing or flying along the coasts of unfriend- ly nations to make tape recordings of. short-range military-radio broadcasts, especially those in code. Cryptographers learn to "break" codes by the repeated appearance of symbols in hundreds of messages. The Pueblo, which was captured off North Korea in January, 1968, with 83 men aboard, was such a ship. The Navy plane shot down by the North Koreans in April, 1969, with the loss of 31 lives was on a similar mission. From the U. S. viewpoint, this mas- sive effort produces an extraordinarily accurate picture of what is going on in, the world militarily, especially in the Soviet Union. It permits an almost pre= cise assessment of the damage that po- tential enemies can inflict on the Unit- ed States and its allies with strategic weapons. . Intelligence experts, making that point, are quick to note, however, that collecting information is only part of the game. One authority explains: "While we know their capabilities- and the Russians know ours-neither is ever certain of the other's intentions. For that we would need a good spy right inside the Kremlin." mess is pproveed "orl eie1se 2oOlO3? . G PAU I ~ 04 eflect sn spairi camera which can tect light- rions osrrig tlamilete miles in space. N:61,7 YO TI 'S Approved For Re`fb a 2001 /03/Gi6QMI1AZkDP84-00 9R001000080002-6 SALT after Suez Fissile Cheating' By ROBERT RLEIMAN Moscow's violation of the missile standstill along the Suez Canal has thrown a somber shadow across all aspects of Soviet-American relations, But in preparing for the third round of the. strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), which opens in Helsinki four weeks from today, the White House Insists that it remains "cautiously optimistic." And recent press briefings have emphasized fundamental differ- ences between the cheating at Suez and violations of a SALT agreement. At Suez, 100 mobile missiles, moved In virtually overnight, altered the tac- tical military balance before they were 'detected. But it takes 18 months to construct an SS-9 ICBM silo; the Rus- sions would have to construct many hundreds over many years to change the strategic nuclear balance. Satellite photos at monthly intervals would de- tect this in time for the U.S. to react. Morevoer, SALT does not depend on Soviet good faith but on the Soviet self-interest in curbing missile com- petition, stabilizing the nuclear balance and holding down defense expendi- tures, Violations would be deterred by Moreover, SALT does not depend on fear of matching "countermeasures" and resumption of the arms race. Nevertheless, when all this is said, It is evident that the Administration's cautious optimism about SALT has reason now to be more cautious and less optimistic than before. A greater wariness in Congress and within the Administration undoubtedly will force American negotiators to bargain hard- er over the fine print in any SALT treaty. The difficulties in achieving agreement, already formidable before Suez, undoubtedly will be magnified, One difficulty is that both govern= .ments have paid lip service to a com- Cautious Optimism- But More Cautious, Less Optimistic plete prohibition of antiballistic Mis- siles- (ABM). But both . have now signaled a preference for an American suggestion of "limited" systems cover- ing large regions centering on Wash- ington and Moscow. Since the U.S.-proposed 100-inter. ceptor system would be more mod- ern than the present obsolete 64-in. terceptor Moscow system, the Rus- sians would want to match it. That could trigger a qualitative ABM race. And infinitely complex negotiations over the size, number, characteristics and locations of radars and intercep- tors could make agreement impossible. Other difficulties fading the SALT negotiators are. Russian insistence on limiting American tactical bombers in Europe capable . of reaching the U.S.S.R. and American insistence on a ceiling of 250 on the giant Soviet SS-9 ICBM's. A first detailed Soviet proposal at Helsinki. Is expected to respond more or less favorably to Washington's plan to limit long-range missiles and bombers globally to under 2,000, roughly the current level. The MIRV multiple warhead missile, the chief lever now in the arms race, remains the main challenge to SALT. Each government would like to halt the other's deployment. , But neither seems willing to stand up to its mili- tary on the issue. The United States a year ago took the position that a high-confidence MIRV deployment ban would require on-site inspection. That Impeded dis- cussion with Moscow. Now0ronically,?. the. Nixon Administration's prestigious verification panel, after lengthy study,' has concluded that no practicable amount of on-site inspection would add assurance' to a MIRV deployment ban. Moscow, meanwhile, has reacted coolly to American probes about an- other control method - a halt in de- velopment and reliability flight-testing; the U.S. has shown a one-year lead. A high Soviet diplomat, however, recently denied to a visitor. that Mos- cow was not interested in a combined MIRV test-and-deployment ban. "Try us! Tell them to try us!" he said Several key State Department, Pen- tagon and White House officialsrecent4 ly expressed the view in private that a Soviet proposal to halt MIRV deploy- ment and flight-testing without on-site inspection would be accepted by Pres- ident Nixon - after a bloody inter- agency struggle. ,Why doesn't Mr. Nixon put this proposal to the Kremlin himself? One reason may be that the President is unwilling to overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proposal Moscow might then reject. Is the same true in Mos- cow? Or are both sides playing the old diplomatic game of "onus-putting?" Meanwhile, with deployment start-, Ing, both MIRV and ABM may get be- yond SALT's effective control. Some Senators and former Presidential sci- ence advisers are urging a brief mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of ABMs and MIRV missiles to avoid this. Otherwise, in expressing "cautious optimism" about SALT in the wake of the Suez missile crisis, the White House may find It has been whistling its way past the graveyard of its hopes. Robert Kleiman is'a member of The Times Editorial Board, . Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Relse 2001/03/0d:Q?-irAbP84-0R001000080002-6 A HISTORY OF TILE BRIT- ISH SECRET SERVICE. By Richard Deacon. Taplinger. 440 pages. $7.95. To this reviewer's knowl- edge there is only one other book-length treatment of the subject here discuss a d, Mildred G. Richings' "Espion- age: The Story of the Secret Service of the British Crown" (1934). Though a serious- minded effort, that work is marred by various deficien- cies, and in any event runs only through the reign of Ed- ward VII, who died in 1910. The publication of Deacon's ti- tle, therefore-he is an Eng- lish biographer of John Dee, the confidential agent for Eliz- abeth I, and evidently an Intel- ligence alumnus in his own right-gave every promise that those deficiencies would be remedied. Well, the author has at least brought his topic up to the 1970s. In so doing he has, alas, an inherently glamorous su grossly neglected his responsi- bilities. For a narrative begin- ning at the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509) the author's bibli- ography is almost laughably inadequate. The chapter anno- tation at rear is riddled with - citations either imprecise or outdated. In a volume ostensibly, de- signed for general consultation the index is nominal, with al- most no topical entries, and betrays an over-all skimpi- ness. There are 30 illustra- tions, but many of them are poorly reproduced, and all of them are insufficiently cap- tioned. From time to time the author throws out unsupported or unelaborated generaliza- tions, e.g., "... the Dutch are . . highly. vulnerable as se- cret agents." It is, finally, dif- ficult to understand how any writer could transform such ject into dull reading, but Dea- con's flat, at times awkard, style has managed to turn this trick. Let it be conceded, neverthe- less, that what Deacon has given us is, after all, a fresh survey of an important field. The mere coverage involved is daunting, and would require the expertise of a seminar of scholars properly to evaluate. Moreover, as one .approaches recent times official secrecy in all nations enjoins anything better than an informed guess as to the workings of their intelligence organizations. Deacon has appraised Brit- ain's modern period with due breadth (and some first-hand knowledge), treating the counter-espionage, Security, and military branches impar- tially. -CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-.00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Re ease ?001 ffft s F?R001000080002-6 ICA TILE EXTENDED FAMILY OCTOBER 1970 Government Network As the American empire expanded in the post-war period, the U.S. government created and staffed an immense network for administering it. By one piece of legislation, the National Security Act of 1947, the various branches of the military, and new Air Force, were placed under a centralized Department of Defense with the power to draft in peacetime. The Act also formed the National Security Council (NSC) and gave unprecedented powers to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Together these well funded agencies erected the apparatus of the Empire: instruments for intelligence collection and military intervention that formed the backbone of America's heralded rise to the status of "World Power". That power depends in no small part on the government's ability to know what people and other governments throughout the world are planning and doing. As the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations observed in a study on the "Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy," American policy abroad is "predominantly concerned with the internal affairs of other countries. ..there is no country in the world whose changing internal power structure is irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy." Keeping tabs on the internal political and economic situation in every country in the world is a vast and delicate enterprise. Its maintanence is essential for the ability to predict political events and covertly intervene when necessary on the Empire's behalf. The Central Intelligence Agency performed the critical task of conceptualiz- ing and coordinating the vast network of interlinked research and intelligence agencies. In 1969, the Federal government spent $33.3 million for social and behavioral research on foreign areas and international affairs. In 1967, the same government agencies spent $40.6 million in contracted research that drew on virtually every major academic center in the nation and many abroad. These millions are only a fraction of what it takes to keep the Intelligence and Defense Agencies alive. Moreover, each of these government complexes-- the Defense agencies and the intelligence community--support secret research for which figures are not available. The actual attention Africa receives from U.S. government-sponsored research is greater than,the figures lead us to believe. In 1969, only 11% of all ,the government research funds allocated to out-house work (research not con- ducted in government agencies) was directly about Africa. But Africa cannot be isolated from the larger international context. American research on Europe, for example, has to consider Africa as well, and Africa's economic underdevelop- ment is often researched in the context of international economic and political problems. In this way, research about Africa is often hidden under different names. The activities of U.S. Federal agencies clearly illustrate how an imperialist.. government collects and analyzes data about Africa to form its varied strateg- ies of intervention. The scope of the research and action programs carried out by these agencies, which are coordinated with varying degrees of bureaucratic "efficiency", present a picture of formidable U.S. impact on Africa countries. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 1Dpin 1uued Approved ;For Ruse 20.01 /03/BSMOCt&DOp0080002-6 CIA f The Central Intelligence Agency is not an "Invisible Government". It is.. an integrated part of an indivisible system. It plays a critical and central role in overseeing all government and private area research. The CIA had its hands in generating social science research about Africa in the United States and in creating American agencieswhich can covertly operate as extensions of American policy in Africa. The CIA's own research program, staffed by approximately 30,000 employees, is-the most extensive information gathering and evaluation program in the world. At least 80% of its research utilizes overt sources: eg.,newspapers, radio-monitoring, research papersyand contacts with "private citizens." That material is fed into and retrieved by a highly advanced automated computer system, especially developed for this use by IBM. That computer-- b .Ls a le to deal W.LLII 200,000 such Open sources every month. The CIA has on its staff more Ph.D.'s than several major universities combined, and far more than any other government agency. Its role in social science research has never been publicly revealed, 'although it is known that many contracts go through the External Research Division,. of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is now headed by Ray Cline, a past deputy director of "the Agency". The CIA's information gathering intelligence, activities are paralleled, by its cloak and dagger type activities. These include electronic- espionage, reconaissance (U-2 planes) and spy networks. The CIA's covert action program aims to be able to manipulate the internal political situation in any "target" country. Such manipulation could include assasinations, coups, and even para-military operations aimed at containing revolutionary efforts. In a more "positive" situation, the CIA often is directly involved in advising chiefs of state, shaping local institutions, or managing a country's economic development program. The CIA's program of subsidies to various "non-profit" organizations is central to this strategy. CIA headquarters, Langley, Va.: All the info's here.. In.most countries, the CIA bases its activities in the American Embassy and places them under the minimal control of the local Ambassador. CIA personnel, often political officers in the Embassy, are integrated into the coordinated "multi-agency country-team", often in leadership' positions. This means, quite simply, that the CIA often directs the overall thrust of U.S. penetration, seeking to fashion a "strategy of cumulative impact." Such a strategy aims at creating or reinforcing pro-western institutions which collectively shape a country's political and ecye gpip *cele3o a2W0idCCAAM 00ftSAG011OW080002--6 atQ>at i,~xuell Approved For Rehe se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00* R001000080002-6 worked to rationalize foreign aid as a policy weapon. A network of organ- izations ---teachers, students, cultural program associations, trade unions, etc.--were founded or subsidized through various conduits. Many of these sought to co-opt important African leaders and act as non-official channels of American influence. Many of the organizations active in Africa which have direct links to the .CIA have been exposed in newspapers and magazines: African-American Institute (AAI), American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), Congress of Cultural Freedom, International Student Conference, World Assembly of Youth,-,' Peace with Freedom, Inc., African American Labor Center. The CIA as well helped to organize the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs East African Publishing House, Jomo Kenyatta Educational Institute, Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, and Milton Obote Foundation. As a matter of caution, not conscience, the CIA has also had a hand in subsidizing African libera- tion movements, or splinters from such movements. CIA money has helped finance nationalist parties or back individual African politicians friendly to the United States. Some of the organizations once funded by the CIA folded when their links were exposed; others have had their funding picked up by the Ford Foundation or other national and international agencies. In many cases,. individuals oozed from a-CIA payroll to a Foundation payroll; in all cases, the source of the funding was less important than the nature of the task. THE CIA AND AFRICAN STUDIES It should not be surprising that it was the CIA which played the crucial role in stimulating interest in African affairs in the United States. In the late fifties, the political handwriting on the African wall was quite visible to Washington's super sleuths even if the State Department seemed blinded by its racist loyalty to its British and French allies. In 1954, it was the CIA that put the African American Institute on a solid financial footinggin close cooperation with the American Metal Climax Corporation, the African mining concern whose Chairman became the AAI's big angel. In that year, when Boston University launched its own African Studies program, William 0. Brown left the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence to head it up. As the nation's chief central intelligence agency, the CIA understood that generating information and contacts in Africa was a priority if the U.S. was to be assured access to the Contin- ent's "emerging" political leaders and economic resources. In late 1956, Max Millikan, the economist who took a leave of absence from M.I.T. to become a deputy director of the CIA, and then returned to direct that university's CIA-subsidized Center for International Affairs, invited a former State Department employee Arnold Rivkin to develop and direct an African Research Program at M.I.T. Rivkin worked out a "suitable research" design with fellow professor, Walt Rostow, an intelligence officer and close advisor to Lyndon Baines Johnson, now in exile with that war criminal in Texas. Rivkin's assignment was to forge policy proposals within the context of a broader "free world" framework. Standard procedure at the M.I.T.. center at that time was the practice of publishing books in two versions, one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the. other "sanitized" for public consumption.. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 ,;Coat iuuetl Approved For Rase 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0'0 9R001000080002-6 V?DoooV?Dff ~Iunj, V7o~~ c!oJ ooQDc ScoSrVoHg O~c~p020o0w ,on col, V0015 ccr?cp Whether your major interest is in Interna- tional Relations, Economics, Science, Law, Research, whatever ... the CIA offers you a chance to work with problems that are con- stantly changing, that require your utmost skill and talent. Not only is the work fascinat- ing, its vital contribution to the nation's se- curity is a source?of personal satisfaction to those who carry it out. The CIA has its own career training program. Each year highly qualified college graduates are enrolled in it. This training provides a valuable foundation for a professional career in intelligence and produces many of CIA's future leaders and managers. Applications will be accepted from gradu- ates with degrees in: Accounting Biology Business Chemistry " Computer Science Earth Sciences Economics Electrical Engineering Finance Foreign Language and Area Studies Geography History Physics International Relations Police Science Law Library Science Mathematics Political Science Psychology Public Administration. Medicine Sociology, Photogrammetry Space Technology and other specialized fields. . . The CIA offers liberal vacation, insurance and retirement benefits. Assignments are both in the United States and overseas. Sal- aries are commensurate with training and ex- perience. The work is classified and U. S. citizenship is required. If you are presently in military service and are about to be separated, inquire about opportunities for men with training in CIC, CID, ONI, OSI, Communications, Electronics, Logistics, Photo Interpretation, Foreign Lan- guages, Special Forces, and other specialties who may qualify without a college degree. For further information write, enclosing resume, to: Director of Personnel, Central In- telligence Agency, Washington, D. C. 20505. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ,Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6 oofntinued Approved For Refe 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00+4a9R001000080002-6 While the CIA was "inspiring" university African Affairs programs, it was also getting its own African intelligence division organized. In August, 1958, the Committee of Africanists selected by the Ford Foundation to "survey the present condition and future prospects of African Studies', had a rare direct interview with the CIA to assess its need for personnel. According to their report, the Agency said it would need "a constant staff level of something like 70 people specializing in the African area; they particularly desire those who have training in economics, geography, or- political science. They are, however, prepared to train a man if they can- get a person whom they feel is suitable for their type of work." Their type of work, indeed! The CIA still recruits for new personnel-on the campuses (see the enclosed ad if you are looking for a job!). The State Department, interestingly, only projected a need for fifty officers over the next 10 years. By 1961, according to State Department Advisor Vernon McKay, "the professional staff of the Africa office declined from twenty three to fifteen when certain long range research activities were trans- ferred to the Central Intelligence Agency" (Africa in or Politics p. 296). The CIA continues to shape and monitor all government sponsored research on Africa through its participation in the Foreign Area Coordination Group and its close links with the State Department Intelligence Agency. It has access to all other academic output through the willing cooperation of many scholars who register their work with the State Department--or through close and over- lapping ties with such agencies as the Ford Foundation and its academic front committees. As well, many individual scholars have ties with the CIA or its front groups. L. Gray Cowan, for example, the 1969-1970 President of the African Studies Association was known to have liaisons with one Willard Mathias, a high-level CIA funtionary. Mathias was a visiting fellow in 1958- 1959 at Harvard!s Center of International Affairs. His topic of study: Africa, of course. Cowan has also been a long time member of the African-American Institute's Board of Directors. And on and on. The close ties between the CIA and so many African Studies programs suggests more than the insidiousness of the former or the submissiveness of the latter, What more of a symbiotic relationship; a game in which the players wear different uniforms but play by the same rules. LOOK editor William Attwood, the one time ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, inadvertently offered. some clues about the CIA's attractiveness to many scholars in his memoirs, The Reds and Blacks. On his return to the U.S., Attwood recalls, "I put in long hours answering questions for roomfuls of people at CIA (pipes, casual sports jackets and yellow pads) and State (cigarettes, dark suits and. white notebooks)". jackets and pref.t those pipes and yellow pads every time. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 SAWRnnv Pi VIEl W ti Approved For Remise 200'1O1O6 -~-=-RDP84-00 JROO1000080002-6 THE', IN E' LICLNCE ISOvcrcign nations, and that it over- that, in tile words of Allen Dulles. "it ESTAL'LISI?IMEN'f ttu?ows anti-Americatl governments, gives our Government's top policy even democratically elected ones, to makers exactly the information they by Harry Ilow'c Ransoni install anti-communist governments- need, no more and no less, in order to Harvard UnivIcrsity Press, 309 pp., $9.95 'with a special preference for non. make the right decisions." clelnocratic anti-conllnullist . govern- "Information" - or "raw inforina --- ulents. tion," as intelligence analysts call it-- Revielved by Miles Copeland Fortunately, such books have been may be good or bad, accurate or in weak in logic and unclear in rhetoric, accu ate, relevant or irrelevant, tiriieIy, f:3 "The intelligence operation," a Cen- and the more fact that they have cline or out of date; "intelligence," on the tral Intelligence Agency instructor under the heading of sensational jour- other hand, is information that has tells his pupils, "is in two parts: first, llalislll has tended to rob them of crecii- been evaluated, correlated, boiled attaining the objective; second, con- bility. But one wonders. A Washington down to manageable dinicnsions,'and ceasing the fact that the objective has -Post editorial writer spoke for many put into reports which can be quickly beds attained. Usually we must also 1of 'is: when lie said, "It is obviously and easily react. CIA's main function conceal the fact that we have made impossible for anyone who is not him- 4 is to supervise the process. No one who any efforts to attain the objective." In self deep inside the intelligence tom. understainds management can question other words, when an espionage opera- mtulity to write a comprehensive book, the assertion that some one agency Lion is. Successful tile victim goes Oil about it, but w1'OIl't someone please at must have this function; few question about his business in happy ignorance least give its a basis for using common , that it should be the CIA. / of the fact that his secrets are known sense to judge what lie hears?" "A 'pure' doctrine of intelligence," to the CIA. When a "political action" Harry Howe Ransom has provided says Mr. Ransom, "demands that in- operation is successful the goverin- -telligence officers 'present the facts' rnent against which it was conducted such a basis. The I:ztelligemice Estab slut play no role in policy choice." But seems to have disintegrated or cone lisinnc t supplies exactly the back- ground we need to understand why we lie goes on to show how those who to an end solely through natural rntist have all "intelligence conlinuni? decide what facts to present are in a causes. special position of influence. Indeed, tY " what Nve can expect of it, and 11 , "And "And if there is any clanger at all of where its real dangers and weaknesses a pure' theory of decision making in- the CIA instructor continues, are. The late Allen Dulles, while lie sists that if 'all the facts' are known, ` It'is almost always better to leave the the optimum choice becomes appar- Probler1i unsolved rather than risk was director of CIA, used to keep a copy of Mr. Ransom's Central Intelli- est." (President Liscnhotvcr, used to failure or discovery." Theoretically insist that all the facts" pertinent to there should "almost always" be no Vence and National Security, on a shelf behind his desk. Richard Ilelnls, the a particular prablem be presented failures. to him in a report no longer than one present director, Would be well ad- But there have been failures: the vised to do the same with The Intelli- page; he would then make his deci- Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, and one o sion. A wagon his staff used to say, or two others. Taking into account the aence Fstablislur.ellt, which has been revised and enlarged from the earlier CIA's policy towards caution, it would book. Although it is far from compli- these one-page reports I could run the seem reasonable to assume that for nlentar country.") It is .tilts position of influ- every failure there have been, say, ten y, at least the book sets forth the faults with which Mr. Helms is once, rather than the occasional em- or more successes. Reasonable people barrassnlents we suffer from exploded may be forgiven for suspecting the CIA tr in-a to grapple rather titan the non- existent ones of which the Agency is clandestine operations, which draws of having brought about the downfall M R ' r. ansom s attention. I Espionage and accused. The Intelligence Establish- of Nkrumah and Sukarno, of having mnent is, in fact, the only up-to-date seri- "special operations" services can cause installed the military junta in Greece, Otis study of the organization and effec- occasional embarrassment, but they of having thrown out Sihanouk. And, tiveness of our country's intelligence are dangerous only when under the since the CIA--not only because of its. system. direct control of an agency which can bloopers but because of official posits- - influence, if not actually make, policy. sions by its senior members--is known to have a ca nabilit ' for Thy have an intelligence commu- r } "political ac- nitv" of a117 Thic nnnctinn A ith the eve of a ma11aeement pc_ th e public be blamed 101. be- which seems so absurd to those who are Pert, as well as of a political ?"- ]ieving that th bili e capa ty is activated members of it, has in fact been asked enlist, Mr. Ransom sees a vast inteIli- now and again? by Congressmen and journalists to z, Bence bureaucracy, topped by the CIA, Reasonable or not, the public does whom "intelligence" connotes spies" which has grown up in great confusion so believe; the public's thirst for saboteurs and political activists, and over its purpose and functions, with stories about international political it deserves an answer in depth; evcri the effect that "the government does intrigue being what it is, there has in- those who understand "intelligence" not always know what it is doing in evitably been a flood of trashy specu- , in its proper light do not often appre- the intelligence field." He gives us the lations purporting to reveal the true date exactly why it is indispensable. historical development of intelligence, inside story. One of them, an encyclo- Whether he gets it from the necvspa. including a chapter on British intelli- peclia of misinformation called The pegs, from briefings by his suborcli. Bence and our use of it as a model (the Invisible GovernlWll?, stayed on the . Hates or reports from consultants, any author spent a whole year in Britain best-seller lists for several weeks. OtI1- chief-of-state or president of a. large gathering material), and then lie gets ers, notably some three or four books corporation or head. of any other kind - down to how intelligence relates to dc- by ~~1 ashington columnist Andrew Tul- of organization must have intelligence cision making at top levels of our ly, have been less successful in sales in order to fulfill his responsibilities. government, how the breakdown of but have made substantial contribu- 'file primary function of the CIA has decision-making responsibility at these Lions to the popular notion that the been to coordinate theii~~whole ii~ntelLou- li- levels i-esul}tys~ iinn~} the proliferation of interferes iI lF a1ReN~eas 8 CIA is a latiJ unto itself, rbVtidll L freely e?20Otllll' cQel 11:1, . 1-Ldl 4.4 4000#319i~11~t~tiY~' 4004 `t, icon Petition cA} p wedrPdre(R& se 2001/03/06 CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000080002-6 and how solving the problem of co.. fusion can produce an overly powerful central intelligence authority-and, of course, how any overly powerful cen- tral authori.y, by the nature of tliings, becomes i, efficient and sometimes counterproductive while putting itself. beyond the reach of effective govern- mental controls. Because of their demonstrable in- accuracies, such books as The Invis- ible Gove)-uruent scare only the inno- cent and uninformed. Mr. Ransom's. book will enlighten anyone, from the reader with a 'sophisticated under standing, of how governments work to an intelligent innocent who knows only what he reads in the newspapers. Miles Copeland, who helped organize the CIA disclosed in "The Game of Nations" how it has operated iu the United Arab Republic. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Re se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0OOMR001000080002-6 VANDALIA, OHIO CHRONICLE SIP 31970 WEEKLY _. 5,398 IA stays U. By CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR. U.S. Congress, Third Ixistrict The activities attributed to America's intelligence agencies - most notably the Central Intelligence Agency have generated much heat during the last several years but very little light. There have been fears that this Nation's intelligence organizations may have tended to exceed their authority in performing their missions as information- gathering security instruments. As we all know, there has been considerable speculation that unauthorized foreign adventures have been undertaken which have gone beyond the objectives desired by our government. The fact that these reports or rumors are neither confirmed nor denied merely adds fuel to the fire. Further, I must say, even as a Member of Congress, that I do not know whether these reports are true. An overview of the Nation's intelligence operations by the Congress certainly is in order. There is, at present, only a limited provision made for this requirement, however. Two armed services subcommittees - one in the Senate and one in the House of Representatives exercise limited intelligence oversight. In view of the questions that persist about our national intelligence effort, this oversight should be broadened. 1 The Constitution empowers and directs the legislative branch, the Congress, to To insure that questions concerning the actions of our intelligence agencies are answered, I believe that an annual accountability to the Congress should be established. To achieve this goal, I have introduced a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence. Joining with me in this bipartisan effort are Senators Eugene McCarthy and Mark Hatfield and Congressman Donald Fraser. The Committee would be composed of seven Senators, appointed by the President of the Senate, and seven Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of the House. Two of the House Members would be from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and two of the Senators from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Similarly, two members from each body would be from their respective Armed Services Committees. 't'his joint committee would have the authority to coordinate and review the function of the nation's big intelligence agencies. These include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department's' Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the intelligence departments of the military services. The Joint Committee would conduct hearings and assemble information with the intent of assisting as well as monitoring intelligence operations. One of the key objectives, as stated in the. resolution, would be to "insure that a minimum oversee the formulation and number of covert activities regulation of our foreign are in process and that they Approved For Rise 2001/03/06 : CIA.RDP84-004891R001000080002-6 Apprp,ved Fo, In (5 .0, 01 Ks a G Ti _=04 714' T E, I' M CM NE AUG T IWO R se 2001/03/06 : CIA--DP84-0 'R001000080002.6 ~~ r f GD, W11 C, 3 PATRICK J. McGARVEY Associate Editor 1-America's spy apparatus involves no less than 10 Federal agencies. 2-Their functions are reviewed with an eye toward uncovering problem areas. 3-The duplication of effort, while necessary to a degree, seems to have outgrown its rationality. 4-The impact of sophisticated intelligence collection systems such as satellites is far-reaching and worrisome. 5-An impartial review of the national intelligence structure might im- prove this vital segment of Government. INTELLIGENCE, when used in the context of espionage, seems to be a virility symbol for most Americans- one that immediately equates the pro- fession to such allegedly masculine ven- tures as murder, coup-plotting, intrigue and a dash of illicit lovemaking. Their minds somehow entangle the violence of pro football, the screen an- tics of James Bond and lingering WWII memories of parachuting behind enemy lines ' with an exaggerated sense of "duty, honor, country." The contrast between the Hollywood version and the actual profession of intelligence is stark. In a word a career in intelligence is "dull." "Bureaucracy," "conformity." and "paper-mill" are more meaningful power phrases to an intelligence professional than "power- play," "clandestine operations" or even spY.,, The sole reason behind all U.S. intel- ligence efforts is what comes out as the finished product-the report that in- forms the President of developments abroad vital to U.S. interests. And there are today considerably more peo- pie engaged in the complex intelligence community processing, analyzing and reporting on the flow of paper than there are collecting it. Additionally, the remarkable advances in technology which have~afforded the U.S. Government the use-oT such devices as satellite-borne camer k electronic impulse sensors and infrared and micro- wave receivers have injected the neces- sity for having a wide variety of technical specialists operating in terrain once occupied by the lone wolf spy. In this article on U.S. intelligence, it is hoped that an understanding of what the "community" is can be con- veyed. Who, in other words, is in the spy business in the U.S. Government and why. What they produce in the form of finished reports may also help stied some light on basic yet largely ignored problems within the com- munity, such as the enormous duplica- tion of effort and the cumbersome bureaucracy. At the top of the pyramid sits the President. Directly beneath him is his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board- a group of men from outside Govern- ment set up by President Kennedy on May 4, 1961 in an attempt to avoid getting railroaded into another Bay of Pigs fiasco. Their charter says they are to "conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the CIA and other executive departments or agencies in the foreign intelligence THE INTELLIGENCE COMILMITY PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD CIA DIA NSA STATE AEC FBI Approved F Or Release 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP84-00499R09.1000080001~-6 Army Intelligence Navy Intelligence Marine Corps Into igence Air arce Intelligence fields."h 'A tplJo tPbr, Nation- 1e sq ZPQ0J1PAQQ?gh tCt j rQ?t 470044 ROO110eve 010080002-6el~orts on Staff to the director. only the "hot" items. This is also a Security Council (NSC) which preys an The DIA controls DOD intelligence coordinated report requiring agreement important overseer role in intelligence resources and reviews and coordinates by all other agencies. matters. They are privy to CIA and b other agency programs and activities those intelligence functions assigned to DIA, NSA and State also put out and theoretically, insure that these blend the military departments. They also daily summaries for their worldwide with broad foreign policy objectives, service the intelligence requirements of customers in embassies and military Under the NSC and directly objectives. respon- the major components of the Depart- bases abroad., They are not coordinated sive to it is the United States Intelligence ment of Defense. with other agencies and generally go Board (USIB), which is chaired by the The National Security Agency 'into more detail than CIA's daily. Director of Central 'Intelligence, Rich- (NSA), the codebreaking arm of the On a weekly basis CIA produces for and Ilelrns. You will note that his title Intelligence structure, was established the President and his Cabinet what is not the Director of Central Intelli- by Presidential directive in 1952 as a amounts to a top secret Time magazine gence Agency. separately organized agency within the exploring the past week's developments Known in town as "the DCI," Helm's Defense Department. NSA has two more analytically and placing them into responsi n ies are "t broader than primary functions, a security mission of the broader context of political, eco- merely running the CIA, monitoring secure U.S, communications nomic, social, military and diplomatic A?CIA booklet sent to curious inquir- and an intelligence information mission reality. ers describes Helm's duties this way: which involves manning listening posts The economic and scientific re-' "The DCI is responsible for coordi- the world over for monitoring the com- search areas of CIA, DIA and NSA nating the foreign intelligence activ- munications of other nations and proc- produce daily weekly and special reports itics of the United States. I is chair- essing this into usable intelligence for of a more detailed technical nature for man of USIB which advises and assists other components of the community. the use of the variety of experts work- him in this coordinating role. The The State Department's intelligence ing within the community. These saute deputy director of CIA is a member activities are carried on in the Bureau elements also put out quarterly, semi- de the board representing CIA. The of Intelligence and Research (INR). annual and annual wrap-up studies on other board members are heads of the The bureau conducts a coordinated pro- such diverse topics as Soviet foreign intelligence organizations of the State `ram of intelligence research and analy- aid, prospects for the Chinese rice crop, De lgence 's Bureau of Intelli cute tale sis for the Department. They produce Soviet missile and radar defenses, p` g and Intetlrgence stuares and spot reports French aircraft production---you name Research, the Pentagon's Defense In- ,essential to foreign policy determination telligence Agency and the National Sc- and execution for the secretary of State. it. curity Agency, plus representatives of The community also produces bed- the Atomic Energy Commission and Who Produces Intelligence? rock studies on a continuing basis on the FBI." The four service intelligence The Atomic Energy Commission is a every conceivable aspect of basic into]- liPCIlCe tudies such as geography with detailed chiefs, it should be added, sit in as consumer and producer of intelligence s observers on these meetings and are in the critical national- security field of studies on ports, landing beaches and not without a great deal of influence. nuclear energy. Accordingly it is repre- urban areas the world over. Other areas Acting in consultation with USIB the sented on the USIB by an intelligence such as a nation's industry, receive DCI makes recommendations to the division expert. They provide techni- close scrutiny and basic political, demo- NSC concerning the intelligence strut- cal guidance to CIA and other mem_ graphic, social, economic and military ture of the Government as a whole, to bers in collecting nuclear intelligence pota are also closely followed and re insure that each element is functioning information. The AEC, in turn, be- poThd on regularly. properly. in the national intelligence conics a producer of intelligence when serving This greaa outpouring repo effort. it processes information on nuclear has created various users e intelligence hi energy and develops esti0ates on the, an atmosphere Wherein Primary Duties of The CIA atomic weapons capabili of foreign customer demands require that agen- With equal status the six USIB mem- powers. ties duplicate the work of others. For bers and the four service observers. The FBI is a major member of the example, a military commander in Ilon- then, operate under the chairmanship of national intelligence community, yet its orals serviced by DIA n~irst be ap- the DCI as a corporate body. Each of direct role in the production of. positive praised not only of the military facts of these agencies has slightly different in- foreign intelligence is limited. Their life in Asia but also the political and, telligence functions to perform. counter intelligence operations often economic facts. The responsibilities of the CIA are: turn up information of value to positive The result has been that DIA, of necessity, broa ? To advise the NSC in matters con- intelligence. th ese areas, des espited its expertise into cerning intelligence activities of the The community as a whole puts out CIA nd St pite the fact that both Government departments and agencies a wide variety of reports daily, weekly CIA and State had expolit watt dg and that relate to national security. and nn an ad hoc basis. Most important reporting Asian political and eco ? To stake recommendations to the are the National Intelligence Estimates nomic developments. NSC for the coordination of such in- which project the thinking of the corn- The State Department, to further telligence activities. munity's experts into the future on illustrate. the point, finds that to realis- e To correlate and evaluate intelligence specific foreign situations of national tically discuss the arms limitation talks relating to the national security and security concern. They are thoroughly and Vietnam it must cultivate its own provide for the appropriate dissemina- coordinated throughout the community anderts in Comet nsitary arya intelli- tion of such intelligence within the before going to the President or NSC. and Asian Communist military ntelli Government. They may, and frequently do, embody gence. The Defense Intelligence Agency dissenting views. CIA, too, which has no real charter (DIA) was established on August 1, to get deeply involved in military intc1li- 1961 by Secretary McNamara. The CIA's Daily Word gence fount} itself required to divert chain of command runs from the secre- Each day the CIA several hundred people into this subject Lary of Dqf ItH prints a top secret secretary o~+171 cnose? I ~o`r' d`n' it sk Vtt #J!C2t President. the cream of Veal 'p, lit es ndBintODti ~sina en- Unequa 5liciu of I It lige e - The 4, PKIRvt!d e9 Ig lq of duplication of effort is "necessary to generate sufficient diversity of opinion" is offered as the first salvo in rebuttal to this criticism. And, it is a sound argu- ment-diversity on many of these issues is needed to get a balanced appraisal. But, the argument doesn't seem to stand up too well under a detailed exami- nation of how the intelligence pie is shared. Professionals call the constant interagency disputes "professional in- cest," wherein intelligence officers pro- duce finished intelligence for other in- telligence officers to rebut. Aside from the formal organization of each of the agencies there is a cor- porate phalanx of intelligence officers working on several dozen intelligence committees in Washington. This has conic about over the past .20 years because of the enormous tech- nical strides this country has made in sophisticated intelligence collection techniques. The natural result was the estab- lishment of a series of committees manned by specialists to oversee the collection and requirements and priori- ties of usage of these systems. Perhaps the one collective fault of the committee approach--which, by the way, is used extensively in the daily the community has served ,,h Nzt', ~{ ~j e~ e of a mili- 2Q01/A13FQ6naal/4ri~Q+xt4f$~~Pd~oicr wants to heralded while only its failures receive wage war well must look for good in This is not to say, however, that its skirts are entirely clean. We all, for example; are well aware of the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, the Pueblo seizure and the shootdown of the US EC-121 reconnaissance plane off the coast of North Korea. And, while each of these incidents can be "rationalized and explained," perhaps, collectively, they are symptomatic of some basic problems of management within the in- telligence community. There is room for improvement. There is, for example, a seeming need for the professionals to step back from the firing line and take a look at the community as it now exists as it nears its 25th birthday. Perhaps some stream- lining or realigning of functions is in order. Perhaps the management skills available in. industry could help. Con- sidering the diversity of talents and functions in the intelligence community to clay, it approaches conglomerate stature. Perhaps the Congressional committees which maintain a frag- mented and seemingly disjointed sur- veillance activities selves to role. of the Nation's intelligence could better realign them- play a more effective coordination required for the pioduc- _-Y__M._..-. tion of reports going to the administra- tion's operating officials---is that it dif- fuses responsibility to a point where it is difficult for the individuals involved in such work to feel a vital involvement in their craft. Moreover, it has a tend- ency to blunt initiative and results, in what is called "intelligence to the least common denominator." In the Pueblo case, for example, it would be extremely difficult today to point to any particular person in the Washington intelligence community and state that he made the final "go" de- cision, yet several committees passed on the mission. The committees seem to get caught, in the tremendous swirl of paper that; surrounds the management of say, a satellite recon program or the produc- tion of a National Intelligence Estimate. Almost imperceptibly they can be- conic impersonal paper mills, at tinges seeming more interested in getting the paper on to its next destination than with the fundamental issue at stake such as the risk for the Pueblo or an esti- mate concerning Soviet intentions in the missile field. The entire Co111n1LInity has been in a constant state of flux during the past 20 years, reorganizing and adapting to new problems as they arose with. frankly, remarkable agility. On balance; The "Second-Oldest" Profession The craft of intelligence, an ancient activity, has been with man since the dawn of time. The Bible records that Moses was instructed to send intelli- gence agents "to spy out the land of Canaan." In the sixth Century B.C. Sun Tzu, a Chinese military theorist, wrote in On the Art of War: ".... what enables the wise sovereign and the good gen- eral to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge." The Mongols of the 13th Century had a well organized intelligence sys- tem which prompted one authority on the period to write: ". . . whereas Europe knew nothing of the Mongols the latter were fully acquainted with European conditions down to every detail not excepting the family con- nexions of the rulers." The history of intelligence is filled with descriptions of its shortcomings. Shakespeare put a plaintive query into King John's mouth when he wrote: "0, where hath our intelligence been drunk? Where hath it slept?" Spies themselves have always been suspect. In 142$ a Bavarian Duke in- telligence. but you must not trust them (the spies) and not tell them what you intend to do on the strength of their findings." In l6th Century England Queen Elizabeth had a well-maintained intel- ligence apparatus. It was the personal domain of her State Secretary Sir Francis Walsingham. Ile developed the art of using his personal fortune to maintain agents in all European capi- tals. His motto was: "Knowledge is never too dear." The creation of an institutionalized and systematically organized intelli- gence service is credited to Frederick the Great. Under him the Prussians carefully developed an intelligence sys- tem as a vital general staff function. Late in the 19th Century, Europe had become a vast network of spies and counterspies. Few hotels and restaurants did not have secret agents operating in disguise. "The whole continent began to look like the stage of a comic opera," one historian wrote. An accelerating military technology and the competitive war plans of Coil-, tinental powers required an increasing amount of information. Much of it was of a technical nature. Captain Dreyfus was wrongfully accused of transmitting to the Germans the design of a new artillery recoil mechanism, for example. By the dawn of the 20th Century all the great powers, with the notable exception of the United States, began to develop elaborate intelligence sys- tems. U.S. Intelligence . . . You've Calve A Long Way I3caby Although the Confederacy supported many spies its intelligence service was even less well organized and poorly coordinated than that of the Union. When the U.S. entered WWI Army intelligence was a tiny section buried within a division of the general staff, consisting of two officers and two clerks. Intelligence was clearly neglected in the decades between the two world wars. Army and Navy intelligence hobbled along in those years, rarely attracting the most promising officers and receiving only meager Congres- sional appropriations. - In the military the intelligence sec- tion became a dumping ground for officers unsuited for command assign- ments. an attitude which lingers in todav's military. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 With a more aloof and independent foreign policy the U.S. relied chiefly on its diplomatic agencies and military attache system for intelligence in the 118th and 19th Centuries. According to its own official history the U.S. Army was "slow to recognize the importance of military intelligence and backward in its use in the solution of military problems." During the Civil War, Allan Pink- erton, a famous detective, was hired as chief of intelligence for McClellan's Union Army. Pinkerton and his men, adept at snaring bank robbers. pos- sessed little competence in military intelligence. His estimates of Confed- crate troop strength were greatly ex- aggerated, a fact which bolstered McClellan's excessive caution in the Peninsula Campaign. Eisenhower described the War De- tpartment's intelligence at the outbreak of WWII as "a shocking 'deficiency , that impeded all constructive plan- ning." The State Department, too, was poorly equipped to gather intelligence in 1941. Dean Acheson testifying to Congress in 1945 described their tech- niques as "similar to those used by Ben Franklin in Paris." In 1909 State had four persons. working in intelli- gence; by 1922 it had risen to five; and, by 1943 to no more than 18. .1'carl harbor provided the impetus for the development of a centralized intelligence community. There was no joint intelligence mechanism at the national level to evaluate, analyze and disseminate the available information. In February 1942 with the forma- tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Intelligence Committee was set up with representatives from the services, the State Department and Bill Donovan's recent creation, the OSS. The wartime intelligence services amidst much confusion, duplication I and interagency conflict sometimes measured up to the high standards set by combat forces, such as the Navy's codebreaking at Midway which led to the location and defeat of Japan's car- rier force, the identification of the German missile center at Peenemunde, and Allan Dulles' political apparatus in Eastern Europe. At the end of WWII it was evident to the President and Congress that permanent changes were required in national intelligence organization. This resulted in, first, the creation of the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 by Executive Order, and, finally, the establishment of the CIA in 1947 un- der the National Security Act. -----Approved-For-ReIeas 01 /03/06: CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6 ~P~XtiIl Pv Approved - For Rise 2001/O e6' IR7kP84-0W9ROOl OOO080002-6 CIA Spooks Req~fre F~ItW By Robert Hunter -A Washington free-lance writer, Hunter has been teaching at the Lon- don School of Economics. The follow- Ing is excerpted by permission from the British Broadcasting Corp. maga- zine The Listener. IN THE Ashenden stories, Somer- . set Maugham put a human face on the British Secret Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexican killed the wrong man; this bumbling helped soften the image of a ruthless and ever- competent machine dedicated to doing His Majesty's dirty business, and made everything right. Not so with the Central Intelligence Agency. No humor here; just the sense of a sinister and heartless manipula- tion of the democrats of a hundred countries, designed to support the new, Imperialism of those sons-of-Britain, the Americans. ? What is myth and what reality? Since it was organized from the post- war, remnants of the old Office of Strategic Services, the CIA has cer- tainly had its fingers in many political `pies, and has been accused of myriads more. Mossadegh fell in Iran; a Guate- malan coup replaced a left-wing re- gime; America was humiliated at the Bay of Pigs; a private American air force has fought the Laotian war, and Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia. These events, which have all, rightly or wrongly, been attributed to the CIA, are the glamorous side of the business. But most of what the agency does is far more prosaic. It is basically an organization of fact-gatherers: aca- demics who never teach a class; pe- dants who rarely parade their nuances in learned journals-and never with the CIA's imprimatur. It has many of the world's most skilled linguists, the most patient ar- chivists, the cleverest analysts of iso- lated data and, surprisingly, some of the most liberal people, politically, in Washington. Indeed, if the American government ever does come to accept that the Soviet Union is not preparing to launch a nuclear attack and that China is not populated with madmen, It will probably be because the CIA has succeeded In putting across its es- timate of the situation. The Iceberg's Tip THIS, OF COURSE, is a rosy view Like any great, sprawling institu- tion, the CIA does suffer from a great deal, of intellectual myopia, the com- promises oA litical~philoso try at any moment. And if anything, Its reporting is usually dull, tedious, banal and sometimes dead wrong, as anyone will testify who has been privileged- or compelled-to read the Daily Digest and other classified reports that circu- late about the government. This part of the CIA-the part that is styled "overt"-is quartered in a large building across the Potomac from Washington, unmarked and unob- served. But the 8,000 or so particularly gray-faced men and women who work there are only the tip of the intelli- gence iceberg. It has been estimated, By Bob Burchette-TheWashinston Post Richard Helms, the ebulient di- rector of the gray-faced CIA. receptions;. the agency has a listed phone number, and the day has long passed when junior employees went through the absurd ritual of telling people whom they met at Washington cocktail parties simply that they, worked for "the government." Another Department A LL THIS is straightforward enough; and is hard to fault in any government. It is true that Francis Gary Powers did help disrupt the sum- mit conference in 1960 by having the ill-luck to be shot down over Russia in his U-2 aircraft. But those reconnais- sance flights, and the reconnaissance. satellites later sent aloft by both-, Russia and America, have helped{ to slow down the arms race and to in- spire mutual confidence that the other; side is not building some new super.. weapon in secret. Few people who take seriously the problems of running a government and a 'reasonably enlightened foreign pol- icy would question the role that the CIA shares with other agencies inn gathering and interpreting Informa- tion; but they do argue against the op- erational responsibilities that shelter -under the same roof-what is popu- larly called the "department of dirty tricks." - - There is considerable justice in the view that the same bureaucrats who, carry through policy should not have the right to gather the information needed to judge their actions. And since the ill-starred adventure at the for example, that more than 100,0001 Bay of Pigs, there has been a much people are actively engaged in the one., greater effort throughout the Asneri- function of gathering and interpreting, can government to end this overlap of information about Soviet military- authority. President Kennedy reacti- capabilities. vated his Foreign Intelligence Advi- The CIA budget, too, is- immense, al- gory Board and all the bureaucratic; though not one item appears anywhere strings were pulled much tighter. in the compendia of federal expendi- Ironically, however, the test of intel" . tures, there is no congressional debate .=t lectual purity has not been applied as and few people know its true magni-- rigorously to the CIA's competitors.- tude. By conservative estimates, more than $1 billion of CIA money is hidden. under other categories and another $2 billion is spent on similar activities by other agencies-such as the National ; Security Agency-whose existence is never formally acknowledged. The Defense Department and its many-; military offshoots also devote large re- sources to knowing the enemy, and there is far less concern to see that re- sponsibility for information and action are kept separate. The Vietnam war is an excellent example of this. The blun- Yet despite the secretive nature of ders that have occurred in that wqr the "intelligence community," many from bad espionage involve the mili: CIA officials lead surprisingly public! - : tary more than they do their civilian; lives. Unlike the heads of MI5 and counterparts at the CIA. ved P drt eteas6I'O@4/O Pa RDP84400499ROO10000800021- 13oI1'~1Tiu' c$ i001 a v Foe' Reiea'`~s 2aQ,Idg~d0 , z ~ :004 001000080002-6 UT IN ALL, it is fair to say that tions that an order from the CIA-or one. At heart, it is a question of very little if anything that is done whatever-could indeed produce what mans striving to secure the right to BUT the CIA today goes contrary to the we see In Athens today? know what forces are shaping his life, wishes of the e President and his imme to know how far he is a free agent. ..- Deliciously y Sinister diate advisers. Many people think that y A Guidepost Warped it is bad enough that the President can.. THE EFFORT by many Greeks T was ANGER directed at the CIA .sometimes act in secret and with con- today to pin most if not all of ,j~ was not eased by the irony of the siderable impact, but it is necessary to. ;their troubles on the Americans is only CIA's choice of what is considered at Separate this concern about American one example of the force exerted by least by Americans to be a left-of-cen. behavior in general from perennial the conspiracy theory of history. In. ter publication. If anything, it intensi- worries that the CIA, as the estab- deed, there is a certain appeal in the fied this anger, particularly on the dished villain, will run amok. truly sinister and secret operation that part of those who needed to measure Again, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it is lacking in the more obvious one. their own radical progress against ,suited President Kennedy and his hag- Everyone knows that Air America, their image of CIA activities. uited Pre to emphasize the bad ad- which forms the backbone of the anti- There was also a sense that the bar- s iographers c m i , o mun st air war in Laos, is directly gain with the devil had been unfairly vice given by the CIA. Here was a rec- fi nanced by the CIA Yet this kn 1 struck. It i thm ognized scapegoat whose involvement ow _ is one ' softened criticism of executive deci- edge has never produced an outcry, or willingly; it is quite another to do so , sions. Surely, the argument ran, even even much interest, largely because even if the temporal payment is made, the President could not be expected to the whole affair is conducted with min- without being able to share in the be proof against the agency's machina- imum secrecy and maximum routine awareness of complicity with evil. To be tions? and boredom, used by a capricious god maybe toler- This incident illustrates what may Compared to the killing of Che Gue- able if everyone is in on the secret, but be the most Important fact to bear in vara-widely believed to be the work What could es worse than to be denied ~cnind about the CIA: What it actually of the CIA-the fighting in Laos is far the sweetness that comes from the does or does not do is far less impor- 'more important in terms of current Perhaps this sin? is the tant than what it is believed to do. Politics and lives lost, but it is totally like this way an agency Like a belief in religion or witchcraft lacking in those elements that make ake the this must nceao of dupeli and cit In other times, belief in the potency of for a basic confrontation between good only einf rc fresh evidence ref a.e CIA provides a point of stability in and evil. For the purposes of theater that only reinforced the comforting abound. disorganized world_ and the politics that depend on it, Gue. conspiracy does, indeed, boud As such, the CIA has a value in the vara's death symbolizes this kind of It is far easier to accept that evil is realm of drama, in the realm of the being done consciously than to under-confrontation. perfectly. Indeed, his stand it as the simple morality play, whatever its impact on product of life and work would be incomplete un- the world's policies human failings. Good intentions gone less he had been killed in t , his or some awry are far harder to tolerate than similar way. the knowledge that a conspiracy is This sense of the conflict between truly afoot. One doesn't have to be par- good and evil was also present in the anoid to gain a certain comfort from most celebrated instance of CIA in- suspicions of conspiracy; and the few volvement in Great Britain: the funnel- times that the CIA actually does gain ing of money through the Congress for direct publicity-almost always when a Cultural Freedom to the magazine En- job has been bungled-merely confirm counter. The hue and cry from that af? them, fair have subsided, but the moral is- The political impact of this desire to -sues that were raised have still not believe in the CIA's skulduggeries is-been adequately settled. considerable-however many thou A number of authors, and some indi. sands or millions of conscious agents viduals who had helped with the edit- one must assume to exist for the ing, in entire innocence of the secret agency to be involved in all the actions source of funds, were horrified to dis. attributed to it. This was made quite cover who had actually been making clear recently on BBC Television's possible the "Line-Up," when Michael Dean inter- T publication of their views. viewed Andreas Papandreou, the most hate men and lid women had written no publicized leader of the Greek resist- what they believed, and were in no ance-in-exile. way t way influenced by the character bf, their ultimate benefactor. Can it be Papandreou recounted in some said that they were suborned? detail the nature of the CIA plot Likewise, do articles written for a to overthrow the democratic govern- magazine that has been compromised ment in Athens and install the cola- by the CIA have no value? Do they nels, and completed his narrative with lose the significance which the authors quotations from a top-secret meeting: thought they were imparting to their of the American National Security work when the Council. they produced it? Perhaps this is all true. But even if This is not really a question about it is, what does it say for the strength the nature of the -sponsoring institu- of Greek political life and institutions? tion-whether one that serves the ends Must we believe that every, Greek of of a government, or one like the great foundations that give out money political influence is employed by the g to sell one's soul amassed b devious means n at 1. Americans "DM 01W (Fr0*e> s1?1it20QU=Q* MWIr -00499R001000080002-6 t I' Approved- For Release 2001/0 605uLC RDP84-OO ROO1000080002-6 "There . he is again." Wright in the Dayton Daily News Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 ..........-,i... MrA Approved For Refiease 2001/03/062:1CJRDR84-00R001000080002-6 ,The secret Team and the. Games It P1as L. FLETCIIER PROUTY secret, whose very identities as of- gion, and, quite importantly, alumni ten as not are -in short a Se, of -a servic. "The hill costumes of the Meo c et Team who eeactions only those f omewh chgthe esare no uncondi tribesmen contrasted with the civili- ,implicated in them are in a position tional resignations. an clothes of United States military to monitor. - ? Thus the Secret Team is not a men riding in open jeeps and car- How clandestine super-planning board or rying M-16 rifles and pistols. These determinedly this secrecy is young Americans are mostly ex- preserved, even when preserving it super-general staff but, even more Green Berets, hired on CIA contract means denying the U.S. Army the damaging to the coherent conduct of. oreign affairs, a bewildering collec- to advise and train Laotian troops ." right to discipline Its own personnel, foreig'n' Thoe matter-of-fact, almost wea not to say the opportunity to do jus- tion of temporarily assembled action ry flee, was strikingly.' illustrated not ;committees that respond pretty long ago by the refusal of the Cen- much ad hoc to specific troubles in L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air tral Intelligence' Agency to provide various part of the world, sometimes Force colonel, is now vice president witnesses for the court-martial that in ways that duplicate the actin !ties of a Washington, D.C., bank. ir/hilo was to try eight Green Beret officers 'ot regular American missions, some- ..,..... .,.:.., ro 1 cam. uns arrr? .., . e Army to drop th charges. that interfere with and muddle cle is from The Washington Monthly. The Secret Team consists of se- them. curity-cleared individuals in and out the speed source with of which cich it can team's power is sentences, written late in February government who receive secret an act. The of CIA's communications system is so o by T. D. Allman of the Washington, intelligence data gathered by the extraordinarily efficient, especially Post after he and two other enter- CIA and the National Security by contrast with State's,. that the prising correspondents left a guided Agency and who react to those data team can, in a phrase that often gets tour and walked 12 miles over some when it seems appropriate to them used at such times, "have a plane in hills in Laos to a secret base at Long with paramilitary plans and activi- the air" responding to some situation Cheng, describe a situation that to- ties, e.g., training and "advising"-a overseas while State is still decoding day may seem commonplace to any- not exactly impenetrable euphe- the cable informing it of that situ one familiar with American opera- mism for "leading into battle"-Lao- tion. tions overseas, but that no more tian troops. Membership in the than 10 years ago would have been team, granted on a "need to know" A few years ago, for exampln unthinkable.. basis, varies with the nature and the while the government strongest that th that the n an To take a detachment of regular location of the problems that come States was strenu e anted troops, put its members Into dis- to its- attention. . aously supporting guise, smuggle them out of the coun- At the heart of the team, of course, in a (call him Tokyo hospital, Maospwword as came shat try so that neither the public nor are a handful of top executives of a in group of discontented young oh Congress Congress knows they ,have left, and the CIA and of the Ntional Security cent was i a coup young offi- assign them to clandestine duties on Council, most notably the chief planning a coup in his ab- soil under the command of a White House adviser on foreign oli- to the e. Ina mattter of hours, thanks' nonmilitary agency-it is doubtful cy. Around them revolves a sort of way home in~a rU.SI AiX s -on his r Force jet that anyone would have dared to inner ring of presidential staff mem- fighter; he arrived at his office in, suggest taking such liberties with bers, State Department officials, ci- plenty of time to frustrate-the plot-' the armed forces and foreign rela- vilians and military men from the -ter& tions of the United States, not to say Pentagon, and career professionals The power to pull off feats -like! with the Constitution, to any Pres- in the intelligence services. ident up to and especially including And out beyond them is an exten- that is more than operational power; Dwight D. Eisenhower. sive a n d - i n t r i c a t e network of it is in'a real sense policyemaking Indeed, the most remarkable de- government officials with responsi- power, In this particular case it was velopment in the management of bility for or expertise in some specI- the power to commit the United 5L1t America's relations with other coup- fic field that touches on national se- of Rhes to the protection and support tries during the nine othe 1 X. years since curity, think-tank analysts, bus(- Another source of the Lcrirn'S po-v- Gen. Eisenhower left. office has been nessmen who travel a lot or whose er is its ability to manipulato "need the assumption of more and more businesses (e.g., import-export or to kirow" classifications, 'On(,% way to control over military and diplomatic operating a cargo airline) are useful, make sure that there Jr, little opposi- operations abroad by men whose ac- academic experts in this or. that i ties is to gV0M@1 W01AVRW*i19 4VIi ~~e~i~ t oppose..... c oat cue ' them tv a~ ]~i ~ ~tCtiFvIQI~s'r ~e a 001 /icr 03/06s,'wfien~v~cr~1P A0 9'9R0010Q0080002-6 men with high-ranking policy- guerrilla operations. After a visit to 1? wanted to do anything on a large the training center, Air. Kennedy, ing jobs and the appropriate top Sc- scale it had to secure assistance over opposition from the Army bu- cret clearances often are kept in the from and therefore share authority; reaucracy, revivified the Special dark about team plans. Thus Adlal with, other agencies, chiefly the De- Forces, and training centers we r e, Stevenson, ambassador to the Unit- partments of State and Defense. organized in Panama, Okinawa, Viet- ed Nations, was not informed about Slowly Dulles changed these condi- nam, and West Germany. the Bay of Pigs invasion plans until tions. One way he did it was to give The CIA is most adept at working the very last minute when rumors about. it began to appear in the natelligence . activities intellectual in and around and through all levels ; and even then Tracy 'Barnes, nd social credibility by surround- of the U.S. government. No one, not pruse Y ing himself with men from industry, even the majority of agency person- the CIA man sent to brief Steven- finance, and academia. ' nel, knows the full extent of agency son, -gave him a vague and incom- Of course Dulles did not increase manipulations w i t It i n the govern- plete picture of the operation, the CIA's influence as much as lie mental structure. The agency can "Need to know" also can be bent in (lid just by image building. He was 'obtain what it,desires in any quanti- the other direction in order to secure .in organizer and a clandestine open-,ty, and often for no cost. the support of potential allies and ator of great ability, and between the During the depression years of the further those allies' careers. 1Vicm- end of the Korean war and the clue-, 1930s, Congress passed a Jaw which hers of the Secret Team who favored tion of John Kennedy, he had begun was known as the Economy Act of the election of John F. Kennedy over building the team-with the CIA 1932 and, as amended, is still on the Richard Nixon played a very special usually calling its signals, of course books. This act, whose purpose is to role in the 1960 election campaign. -and it had had a number of sub- save money and discourage needless Vice President Nixon presided stantial successes. spending, permits an agency that over the National Security Council Overthrowing t h e Mossadegh needs material to purchase it at an and therefore knew in detail the government in Iran was one; over- agreed price from another agency plans fen the Bay of Pigs operation. throwing the Arbenz government in by an accounting ? off-set without. Sen. Ke s For, presumed not~ as know these he id from was connoisseur'slapoint ample,nthe"D Department -of Agri ul- classified details. However, he did Perhaps know. In his book, 'Six Crises," Mr. of vices. the latter operation was a bit Lure can buy surplus tractors from wrote that Sen. Kennedy was on the blatant side. Perhaps the the Army at a price agreed upon by Nixon Nix about the invasion n Allen most brilliant of all was the specta-. both parties, even if it is only a dol- told during the traditional CIA cular building up of ]tamon Magsay- har each. (Since most such equip- Dulle Dulle but there say from obscure army captain to ment is declared surplus, whether it briefing for candidates;, president and national hero of the is or not, by the selling agency, the was more than that to the story. Philippines. This latter feat was price usually is low.) . A former staff member from the mostly organized by Col. Edward G. - By means of authority of'this kind, office of the secretary of defense re-Lansdale of the CIA, via the Air the CIA has learned how to "buy" c 1960 lie ollects that during the summer of topic to the Senate Office Force, a public relations genius of from all agencies of the government, Buildin ng to pick up and escort to the the old selling-iceboxes-to-Eskimos Defenserimaril,Y from a the Detremendous)amount of Building of Pentagon four Cuban exile leaders, school. new" nd sur lus equi ment-and to among them the future commander Lansdale conceived the idea of take eve} bases at home and abroad of the Bay of Pigs invasion team, making Magsaysay into the savior of for its own use without appearing to who had been meeting with Mr. Ken- his country from the Communist have spent substantial funds and nedy. Those men were supposed to 1-Iuks by recruiting, and paying with many times without the selling par- be under special security wraps, but CIA funds a few bands of b ilipinaty knowing the true identity of the certain CIA officials had introduced soldiers who, every night or soy buyer. ' them to the senator, thus making would put on peasant clothes, in With these hidden sources of sup- sure that he knew as much about the vade some villages with much ado, ply, the CIA often can build' an ar- invasion as Mr. Nixon-if not more and then allow themselves to besenal and support clandestine opera., as the result of a. personal relation- driven out again by the intrepid for. tions in some foreign country with- ship that the Vice President did not ces under Magsaysay's command. out the Department of D e f.e n s q, have with the Cuban refugee front All of which, perhaps it need be much less the Department of State, and the Americans.who were. secret- emphasized, is not to say that Mag- ever knowing it - though presuma- ly helping it. ' saysay was a faker or a figurehead; bly Defense could find out if it took When the candidates appeared on, on the contrary, it is a mark of Lans- the trouble. television together during the cru- dale's skill he chose as the central It was the CIA's power and free- al campaign debates, Mr. Nixon, figure in his hero-making exercise a Join to move forces and equipment abiding by security restrictions, dim- man with the attributes of a genuine quickly without the usual review by il.eci himself in his diselission of the hero. proper authority that made possible government's plans for Cuba. This, The Army Special Forces had been:the first entry of troops and equip- official control did not apply to Mr. formed after World War II. In event ment into South Vietnam In the Kennedy, lie could and (lid advocate of a Russian invasion, the 10th Spc- early 1900s In order to mount a cer- overthrowing the Castro govern- cial Forces in Germany were to be tain peration it'considered import-? sent into Eastern Europe to create Mr. m and sustain artisan movements be- ant, the CIA needed 24 helicopters, Mr. Kennedys election was a big partisan it obtained White House permis- boost for Secret Teamwork, but an hind the lines. With a small head- ion over strenuous objections from earlier and bigger one had been the quarters and reserve unit main- the Pentagon tr to have o them sent m' appointment of Allen Dulles as di- tamed at Fort Bragg, N.C., the Spe- the rector of the CIA in 1953, after two cial Forces in 1960 consisted of only years as deputy director. At that 1,800 men, poorly equipped and in- Sending 24 helicopters a y Vhere time the. -agency was not permitted adequately trained, automatically g 40 by the National. Security Council to The President read Mao and Che men as well, counting only pilots build up a big.enough force of .men Guevara rind told the Army to do and gunners and mechanics and an((~~,~ tg red t rm i it to carry likewise. Then be i n 4 L r u c t e d the cooks and clerks and bakers and the out ld i 6~rt 9 seleaSe 200= W0 Itt' 6 ItPIMR6Pi114a* 4ybo 6615 b t hment. 0XIt1nu.ed Approved For Re se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0a '9R001000080002-6 If the intention is-and the inten- tion always is=to give those 24 heli- copters real support, then it involves sending 1,200 men. Moreover, the statistics are that, in any helicopter squadron, because of maintenance servicing requirements, only half the machines will be operational at any one time. So if 24 operational heli- copters are needed, 43 will have to be sent, which means 2,400 men. But if you're sending a supporting force involving 2,400 men, then the support for them-PXs, movies, mo- tor pools, officers', and enlisted men's clubs, perimeter guards to protect all this, and so on and so on -becomes really extensive, and thousands more men get attached to it. And so it goes. "Twenty-four heli- copters" can, in fact did, ultimately mean a full-scale military involve. ment. In sum, during the last decade the White House's National Security Council apparatus and the CIA- particularly its operational side which now has nine overseas em- ployes to every one on the intel- ligence-gathering side-have grown enormously both in size and in in- fluence. More and more foreign-poli- cy decisions are 'being made In se- cret, in response only to immediate crises rather than in accordance with long-range plans, and all too of- ten with very little consultation with professional foreign policy or military planners. More and more overseas opera- tions are being conducted in secret, and ad hoc, and with very little con- trol by professional diplomats or sol- diers. And the one organ of the government that, on behalf of the people that elected it, should be mo- nitoring these goings-on, is today as ignorant as the public-because Congress submitted to secrecy on a grand scale- years ago when it au-. thorized the CIA. It is hard to imagine how or when the Secret Team can be brought into, the open and made publicly accour -. -table for its actiolrs: Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For ReM!(" ~g2jfi M: -ZDP84-OO JR001000080002-6 23 June 3 July 70 Pss st ! e Central Intelligence Agency Th (CIA), created in 1948 to improve . Nkwo V"10 !:. `4M0 and coordinate Amerikan intelligence. D3.xectly behind the M Street institutional complicity, this art- operations, now involves hundreds 6uildiilg'rests - an old red warehouse icle should serve as a lesson for of thousands of people and hundreds ' on Grace Street. This building has those people who would deny that of millions of dollars--all undis- I just recently been purchased by the Amorika has in fact an existing closed. Primarily established to network of fascism which permeates counter the emergence, of the Soviet I Government Services Administration, of life i tn both public Union as a threat to U.S. world acting as a front, and quietly turne all mer domination, . the "Agency" has been over to the C.I.A. for use as an and of f A private institutions extension of the training center. So, the next time you're visiting caught actively involved in clan- I Geor erha s you will want destine operations throughout the Sure nice to see at least one busi- 8etownP p s world and, indeed, within the bor- ness booming during the recession. to visit some of our public servants ders of the United States itself. About four doors to the east of I at the. C.I.A. training center--or Infiltrating student, labor, protest; the 3222 address on M Street is an maybe use their parking lot. After. ears of s and professional groups in and out enclosed parking lot, painted to ome wel very Payroll accounting for the C.I.A.I all the attention the public can as a secret arm of U.S. imperialism, foe is done every other week on a five- give them. They're lonely people. has become the staunchest foe of all liberation movements. state area basis. The payroll for lvannia P , I ennsy Unlike the handful of books and the District plus articles exposing the C.I.A. in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, i the past, this article is not an and North Carolina amounts to attempt to show C.I.A. fallibility roughly $800,000, with occassional or to level a broadside attack on "special deposits" upping the total.I its many activities. Instead, the Computed in a special accounting topic here is the secrecy and com- office in Arlington. Virginia, the plicity used locally in Washington payroll then travels a curious D.C. to support C.I.A. operations. route before entering the pockets of, Across M Street from some of our dedicated public servants. Georgetown's most chic shops,-and Specifically, in Washington, the only a couple doors away from Wash- C.I.A. payroll travels from the ington's most famous French res- accounting office to the Arlington taurant lies a major C.I.A. train- Trust Company. At this point, the ing center. Located at,,-,.3U2 M Street. payroll is "re-deposited" by the NW, the training center receives bank into the account of American ersities are i v dozens of trainees and instructors ;University(other un daily. With casual observation, you. used in other areas). can watch the numerous 'out-of-state In the meantime, using blank cars enter the training center's. American University checks,'the fills out and sends payroll P I lot around the C ki . I . . ng open air par corner on Wisconsin Avenue, just checks to their employees, thus using south of M Street; it's marked American University as a cover for "private property" despite the fact at least a sizeable portion of their that the property is government fi- payroll system. Special deposits, nanced. Or, if you're more patient, mentioned earlier, involve people you can catch a glimpse of.these who receive payment under different public servants leaving the, front `names each time, thus avoiding W-2's, door still wearing their identifica-taxes, and other official records. Lion cards i d to b ly ouchin the sur- their 'chost ~ 6 sr eleas~e4 3d `ova ~A++R 84.004998001000080002-6 Approved For Rese 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-009ROO1000080002-6 0 SANTA ANA, CAL. REGISTEAN 17 1970 - 90,087 - 129,439 Trust Can't -Be Bought "For the world as a whole, Dr. Toynbee asks what Amer- the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America," writes Eng- .land's historian, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, in the New York Times. "Wherever there is trou- ble, violence, suffering, trage- dy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the C hand in Let's pursue this and see our- selves as others see us. Dr. Toynbee is author of "The His- tory of Civilization." He has lectured at Stanford University on several occasions as a visit- ing professor from England. Dr. Toynbee observes: "Our t phobia about CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as America's phobia about world communism; but, in this case, . 44 too, there is just. enough con- vincing evidence to make the ica is doing about her problems. "As we see it, she is failing to deal with them and this is the most terrifying feature of American life today," he says. He says the outside world watched "with growing anxie- ty" as America gets involved in entangling alliances, and also asks the question: "Is there no hope of reconciliation on Ameri- ca's home front?" He answers that an American officer two years ago said "mothers of America won't like" more Viet- nams, and concludes: "The mothers of America, have still to go into action. ..I believe this is a battle the Pen- tagon cannot win. In the moth ers of America I -do still see- some hope for the world." Experienced American travel- ers, particularly those who have the knack of talking to some of the common people in the con- tries they visit, recognize some truth in what Dr. Toynbee is phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of America and Russia have been reversed in the world's. eyes. Today America has become the world's night- mare. "Like communist R u s s i a, .America has committed atroci- ties in the cause of truth and justice as she sees them. We believe that American fanati- cism, too, is sincere. This m a k c s it all the more alarming.. "Would I rather be a Viet- namese who is being `saved' by the American Army, or be a Czech who was being `saved' by the Russian army?" "Of course, I would rather be the Czech: The number of lives taken and the amount of devas- tation caused by the 1968 Rus- sian military intervention in Czechoslovakia were s m a 11, measured by the standard of trying to tell us. We've sta- tioned armies around the world to assure us that the world will be' the kind of a world we want. We have spent billions upon billions of dollars to "help" the underprivileged, if they would hold elections and choose theirsi officials in the American way.i Only they most often don't know! winnt freedom means, and off cials are willing to "put on the America show" in order to get the money. Buying the world's friendship; just doesn't work. We've got to' earn the trust and friendship of the world, rather than try to` buy it. We talk to ourselves about our noble hopes and aspi-s rations, but we've got to solvei our own problems before the; world will respect t and be our! Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499ROO1000080002-6 Approved For RR1ease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-ad'499R001000080002-6 1110?,"D0, 01110 BLADE JUN 1 6 1970 F 170,683 S -- 20(!,'02 AID And The CIA FINALLY, the American people have a But the CIA, as hd~s?been documented by crit-') government of-,ics of American foreign policy, has not been -t frank admission from Americo 'an licial that the Central Intelligence Agency content to confine its role to that of informa-t" (CIA) does, indeed, wear the cloak of at least tion-gathering. It has heen accused of in- one other federal agency in at least one coun- itiating, directing, and engaging in political or try to wage undercover guerrilla war -re. 'military coups in numerous trouble spots of the John A. Hannah, director of the At; ney for world. And, done sa without the it has week International Development (AID), last. ha 7 consent of others who bear final responsibility. publicly ly acknowledged d that CIA agents have consent continued to use the U.S. foreign aid mission in (Ire some instances it has been accused of count- overnment directives through hest hi ? g g ng use of its own hidden funds. This assumption of independence that at times appears to surmount rather than follow' policies of administrations present and past has raised serious questions about the unre- vealed power of the CIA. An open society such as America is, at best, uneasy with the existence of an agency engaged in clandestine work. The necessity of a CIA is beyond challenge. But if its revealed involve- ment In the AID program is any measure, of its. conduct, not only will it cloud the integrity'of' other American agencies and organizations; ,it will discredit the legitimacy of the CIA itself. role in Laos, plus its war-related activities in. Vietnam, "might" have an adverse effect on AID programs to other nations. "It certainly has not helped ... It distorts the role of AID," he said in expressing hope that his agency could "get rid of this kind of operation." We should think so. The American foreign aid program has been under fire for years from critics in and out of Congress - but for quite different reasons. But to use an aid mis- sion as a covert means of engaging in para- military actions assuredly discredits the agen- cy and could likely plant seeds of widespread mistrust in American intentions elsewhere. As for the CIA - in this modernday world every major power must maintain an in- telligence-gathering agency. Only through such far-flung and diverse listening posts. can a gov- ernment protect against surprise, or use such information for direction through other official channels to head off events deemed contrary to our national interest. Laos since 1962 as a cover for recruiting and traitling guerrilla fighters, in that formally "neutral" country. The former Michigan State University presi- dent said that CIA operatives have masque- raded as field workers of AID - posing as ru- ral development' workers. In addition to guer- rilla actions, they also have monitored enemy movements and have acted as ground con- trollers for U.S. air strikes on Laos from Thai- land and other bases. Mr. Hannah is a 1969 appointee to the office, but he is not innocent of federal operations in this connection. He was president of MSU when it agreed to train South Vietnamese police offi- cers for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime - and that program turned.out to be run by the CIA. But now Mr. Hannah concedes that the AID Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Rel a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004WR001000080002-6 1) F.Tf0IT, MT CIi. NEWS E - 5x)2,(,16 S ,7,0136 ork of CB hamper e`d," e 1r0% el. r j By COL. R. D. HEINL JR. THE ATTITUDE taken by Newe Military Aealsel Hannah, as well as by two WASHINGTON - Thed former Peace Corps director., Agency for International. De- Sargent' Shrivor and .lack velo meet (AID) is a cover Hood Vaughan, and the pres- P ent director, Joseph H. for the' CIA in Laos` and Blatcliford, is that their agen- wishes it weren't. . Gies are or ought to be too Since 1962, according to it, pure to dirty their hands with 'admiliistrator, John A. Han intelligence matters. It infers nah, the mission in Vientiane that such work should be kit has maintained a "rural de- tortheeC A which, the - ent" division which Is a in fact of amoral tricksters and in fact a CIA front for train-,ccrrew ew ongers. ing individuals and units in counter insurgency and other + The increasing desire of military skills. various agencies of the gov- Expressing the hope that ernment to turn their back on the relationship between AID the CIA -(AID and the Peace and CIA could be severed by Cods are u totthalone) hinders per- per- legislatinnow pending, for Han- for forming , crucially important nah expressed distaste functions on which the sur- working with the CIA. "Our vival of i the United States preference is to get out of this literally depends. kind of operation," he said. di- Like Hannah's AID and vorcing Hannah sand eCIAn his iBlatchforTs Peace Corps, agency will then make corn-,Richard Helm's CIA is a men cause with the Peace statutory a g e n c y of the Corps, which has always held United e Sstates,, provided for from mind dfor itself , off-limits to the murky l -but ?vitally necessary-game ! the public treasury. Whether l of, intelligence..,-.,, ! or not given individuals.. or -:. --j even other government agen- cies, apploud the kind of work -CIA sometimes does, the fact remains that CIA business is government business-no less than AID business - and usu- ally a good bit more import- ant. Yet the stance of AID and the Peace Corps suggests that there is a kind of pousse-cafe !stratification of government .,'functions: some at the top above -board, pure, disinter- s .eted, moral in the Wilsonian view of international rela- needs an answer badly, the tions being suitable and "re- CIA may not be able to pro- spectable." Others in the dark duce. depths disingenuous, amoral Such a situation would be. if not immoral, covert, and pleasing in Moscow, Peking, selfishly' pro-American, being Cairo, Damascus, and very "disrespectable, lil:aly in Berkeley or Cam- Obviously, AID would notj bridge, but perhaps not so, want its acronym tarnished much. so to high-minded, de- )., by disrespectable assnriationsi cent men like Hannah- who that is why Hannah withdraws secretary of d e f e n s e and the hem of his garment. I should know better. IN ITS EARLY DAYS as Before he disdains the CIA to k, o Hannah might Col. Donovan's Office of Stra-' look its worl tegic Services (OSS), during , who, World War If, our pre-CIA scconban,aaNat thaan Hale, whwhen when reproached in 1775 by a friend i n t e l l i g e n c e organiza- for "dirtying himself" by spy- tion planted representatives ing within the British lines, at any point in the govern-i replied: "Every kind of ser- mental structure where re-, vice, necessary to the public suits could best be attained. good,.,, becomes honorable by Since World ' War II was a !I being necessary:'' patriotic, ""moral" war, no jections were raised. Nor, for the same reason, during the Korean War, was there any tendency on the part of U.S. government agencies,to shun CIA, It is only because of the domestic unpopularity of Viet- nam and a simplistic view of government and its interests and their defense, that organi- zations like 'AID and the P e a c e. Corps conclude that ,thcy',should be allowed to re. f u s e government business that some internal opinion 1i disapproves. This notion - that govern- ment agencies paid for by the taxpayer can pick and choose' the kind of work they take in -is a philosophical sibling lo' the doctrine so popular in in tellectual and even some ju- dicial circles: that people enjoy the "right" to choose which wars they will fight and which they will sit out. As a practical matter, it hardly requires n manpower, expert to recognize that the' "right" of selective service' (in which the individual se-, lects his own wars), means that the day the bugle blows will never be the day for a' "I j lot of high-minded young men: to go to that particular war.. Strictly on principle, you un IN THE SAME WAY, if various government agenciesi acquire the discretion to cold shoulder the CIA for the sake, venience, or because agency P of image, administrative con officials are lukewarm on, a particular tenet of defense or: foreign policy, then some fine L morninhwhen the. President Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved .Ee : CIA-RDP84-0f9R001000080002-6 DOTHAN, ALA. EAGI E 28,355 JUN 10 1970 11i Level Decision" That the American people aren't national interest. always fully informed of what their Whether the government should government is doing to and for them act in this fashion brings to mind has been underscored twice in re- an article by the United Press Inter- cent days. Whether the government national of several months ago. The should maintain such secrecy is an- article dealt with a book by William other question. J. Bads, a.former official of CIA. A heavily censored summary of a In the book, Bards said that the peo- Nov. 9, 1967 agreement between the ple's right to know is a basic ele- United States and Thailand-,made ment of a free and self - governing public in a 310-page transcript of society. "If a people are to r u 1 e hearings conducted by a Senate For- themselves," he went on, "they must eign Relations Subcommittee -- re- be adequately Informed to know, vealed that the United States has what they are doing but "in a secretly paid Thailand more than world such as this, complete open- $200,000,000 to send 12,000 troops ness and candor on the part of any to fight in Vietnam. government, is impossible." Under the agreement, the United Bards agreed that "the govern- States absorbed the costs for send- ment must as a general practice Ing a Thai combat division to Viet- conduct an honest dialogue with its nam and maintained and improved citizens" and argued that "there are the defense capability of Thai forces situations when it seems to even the remaining at home. Absorbing the most intelligent and conscientious' costs for the combat division in- statesmen that the price of telling cluded equipping the division,. pro- the truth, or not lying, is greater viding logistic support, paying over- than can be borne.". seas allowances, assuming the ex- penses of preparing and training, Situations in which government and distributing a muster-out bon- officials may have "not only the us. Improving the capability of right but the obligation" to lie, ac- forces on duty at home came cording to Bards, are: through a modernization program 1. To" mislead an enemy about which involved an increase in the wartime operations. military assistance program by $30,- 2.'To protect covert intelligence 000,000 for the years 1968 and 1969. activities in peacetime. At almost the same time this 3. To avoid a financial panic when agreement was disclosed, John A. currency devaluation is pending. Hannah, head of the United States' 4. At times such as the Cuba mis- foreign aid program, revealed under sile crisis, when officials fear that questioning on a news program that telling the, truth might lead to the the program Is being used as a cover danger of nuclear war. for Central Intelligence Agency ac- The sad part of the foregoing, of tivities In Laos. Hannah emphasiz-, course, is that public officials are ed that he disapproved of the CIA's only human and could, be hard put use of his organization and added not to use the obligation to lie for that Laos was the only place where reasons 'other than security. And, this is being done and that such ac- too, there's always room for honest tivity was deemed in 1962 as in the . error, but error nevertheless. Approved ForRe-Iease-2001-103106-.-CiA-RDP84-0049"9R001-0000-80002-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0499R001000080002-6 0 ,.The World's Nightmare' There were never more than suspicions, gen- orated by patterns of the past, that the United states Central Intelligence Agency had any- thing to do with the deposing of Prince No- rodom Sihanouk of ? Cambodia last March 18. rlie possibility of CIA participation was prompt- 1o discounted 1 Amerlcafi and neutral sources, and now it is reported from Phnom Penh that Communist East Bloc intelligence agents have concluded the CIA played no part In the coup. This is gratifying, but why should the CIA STATOTHR be so automatically suspect throughout t h e world? A recent commentary by the eminent British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, bears on ST. LOUIS, MO. POST-MAYP 24H 1970 E - 333,224 S - 558,018 the subject: For the world as a whole, the CIA has now r become the bogey that Communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, vio- lence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it. Our phobia about the CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as America's phobia about world Communism; but; in this case, too, there is just enough convincing evidence, to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of Russia and America have been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has be- come the world's nightmare. Is that what has happened to the American dream? This may be only one man's opinion but it is the opinion of a leading world citizen N whose profession is the evaluation and analy- sis of historic events. Professor Toynbee, who has lived in America, in the Middle West, and 0,1y thinks the fate of the world will be pro- Ioundly affected by whether America manages who_has a good understanding of America, e- lieves that "the most terrifying feature" of American life today is America's failure to deal with its domestic problems, and he right- the responsibilities that go with pre-eminent world power, and start exercising the construc- !SMtive leadership of which lhi `are'capable? F Isn't it about time that Americans assumed Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For" WWM1( fp8U0WJ)2M;g048`9R001000080002-6 21 May 1970 Robert Hunter on the CIA --Is. it a department of dirty tricks, or an organisation of f act-gatherers ? id it underwrite the seizure of power by the Greek Colonels? ` In the Ashenden stories, Somerset Maug- ham put a human face on the British Secret Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexi- can killed the wrong man: this bumbling helped soften the image of a rpthless and ever?conmpetent machine dedicated to doing His Majesty's dirty business, and made Richard Ilelins, Director of the CIA everything right. Not so with the Central Intelligence Agency-or the CIA as it is everywhere known. No humour here; just' the sense of a sinister and heartless manipu-- lation of the democrats of a hundred count Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 loontirtuedf 'tries, designed to support the new i' c'riai-;1 whom they met at Washington r?ocktall I'll of thosA rte~fibla noYt-R~er"g'"s. ~'tyG~Pk kbT)8 '664.WF 1000080002-6 1V'hat is mind %ch:rt reality? ?,ilia' r was organised from the post-war rerrurants All this is straightforward enough, and of the old 0111ce of Strategic Services, the Is hard to fault in any government. It is true CIA has certainly had its fingers in m;~np that Francis Gary Powers did help disrupt political pies, and has been accused +;f the Summit Conference in 1960 by having ~--" myriads more. Mossadeq fell in Iran* a the ill-luck to be shot down over Russia in Guatemalan coup replaeed a left-wing re- his U-2 aircraft. But those reconnaissance gime; America was humiliated at the Bay flights, and the reconnaissance satellites of Pigs: a private American air force has later sent aloft by both Russia and America, fought. the Laotian war; and Che t;ue~ar;, have helped to slow down the arms race was killed in Boltvia. These events, which and to inspire mutual confidence that the have all. rightly or wrongly, been attributed other side is not building some new super. to the CIA, are the glamorous side of the weapon in secret. business. But most of what the agency dues Few people who take seriously the prob- is far more prosaic. It is basically an lems of running a government and a reason- organisation of fact-gatherers: academics ably enlightened foreign policy would ques- who never teach a class; pedants who rarely tion the role that the CIA shares with other parade their nuances in learned journals- agencies in gathering and interpreting in and never with the CIA's imprimatur. It formation; but they do argue against the has many of the world's most skilled operational responsibUltics that shelter linguists: the most patient. archivists; the under the same roof-what is popularly cleverest analysts of isolated data; and, called the 'department of dirty tricks'. surprisingly, some of the most liberal There i~ considerable justice in the view people, politically, in Washington. Indeed, !that the same bureaucrats who carry if the American government ever does come !, through policy should not have the right to to accept that the Soviet Union is not pro- gather the information needed to judge paring to launch a nuclear attack and that their actions. And since the ill-starred China is not populated with madmen, it adventure at the Bay of Pigs, there has will probably be because the CIA has sue- ,been a much greater effort throughout the ceeded in putting across its estimate of the American government to end this overlap situation. of authority. President Kennedy re-acti- This, of course, is a rosy view. Like any f vated his Foreign Intelligence Advisory great, sprawling institution, the CIA does Board, and all the bureaucratic strings were suffer from a great deal of intellectuA. pulled much tighter. myopia, the compromises of}?, Ironically, however, the test of intellec- and the political philosophy dominating t; tual purity has not been applied as rigor country at any moment. And if anythin;, its ously'to the CIA's competitors. The Defence reporting is usually dull, tedious, banal. and Department and its many military offshoots sometimes dead wrong. as anyone will tv.,t i- , also devote large resources to knowing the' fy who has been privileged-or compelled enemy, and there is far less concern to see -to read the Daily Digest and other that responsibility for information and classified reports that circulate about the, action are kept separate. The Vietnam Ware government. 'Is an excellent example of this; but If any- This part of the CIA-the part that is, thing, the blunders that have occurred In styled 'overt'-is quartered in a large that war from bad espionage-including building across the Potomac from Washing- President Nixon's current venture in Cam? ton, unmarked and unobserved. But the 'I bodia-Involve the military more Omni' eight thousand or so particularly grey-faced they do- their civilian counterparts at the men and women who -work there are onlyI.M. the tip of the Intelligence ice-berg: it has But in all, it Is fair to sa.t that very little been estimated, for example, that more ,if anything that Is done by the CIA today thana hundred thousand people are actively goes contrary to the wishes of the President engaged in the one function of gathering, and his immediate advisers. 'Many people and interpreting information about Soviet' think that it is bad enough that the Presi- military capabilities. The CIA budget, too, dent can sometimes act in secret and with is immense, although not one item appears ;'J considerable impact; but it is necessary to anywhere in the compendia of Federal separate this concern about American be- expenditures; there is no Congressional haviour in general from perennial worries debate; and few people know its true -lag- ':that the CIA, as the established villain, will nitude. By conservative estimates, more run amok. Again, after the Bay of Pigs than $1,000 million of CIA money is hidden fiasco, it suited President Kennedy and his under other categories, and another $2,000 hagiographers to emphasise the bad advice million is spent on similar activities by, given by the CIA: at least here was a recog- other agencies-such as the National nised scapegoat whose Involvement soft- Security Agency-whose existence is never tined criticism of executive decisions. formally acknowledged. Surely, the argument ran, even the Presi- Yet despite the secretive nature of the' dent could not he expected to' be proof intelligence community', many CIA olli- against the Agency's machinations? icials. lead surprisingly public lives. Unlike This incident illustrates what may be the .the heads of M15 and 'IIG, the Director of most important fact to bear in mind about Central Intelligence is a familiar figure at the CIA: what it actually does or does not diplomatic ~receptions; the A n y h: ?,,ct (~At ss,,~c;rairy,~v}~1000080002-6 listed pho lIf~r41~M$d I A olo ,.. -1i . MW Ct passed when junior employees ttient `witchcraft In other times, belief in the aontirtuei>? through the absurd ritual of telling people 'potency of the CIA provides a point of stability In a disorganised world. It Is far less he had been killed in this or some easier to accept that v' is b n ne (wt. i 1 r v y. sciously U NUMPAt"i I [~I if~ di ' seC~l/41+RE R84-At( ~F E 1000080002-6 product of human failings. Good intentions and evil was also present in the most cele- gone awry are far harder to tolerate than braced instance of CIA involvement in this the knowledge that a conspiracy is truly country: the funnelling of money through afoot. One doesn't have to be paranoid to the Congress for Cultural Freedom to the gain a certain comfort from suspicions of magazine Encounter. The hue and cry from conspiracy; and the few times that the 'that affair has subsided, but the moral CIA actually does gain direct publicity- issues that were raised have still' not been almost always when a job has been bungled adequately settled. A number of authors, -merely confirm them. and some individuals who had helped with, The political impact of this' desire to the editing in entire innocence of the believe in the CIA's skulduggeries is secret source of funds, were horrified to considerable-however many thousands or discover who had actually been making. millions of conscious agents one must possible the publication of their views. assume to exist for the agency to be These men and women had written what involved in all the actions attributed to it. they believed, and were in no way influ- This was made quite clear recently on enced by the character of their ultimate' BBC Television's Line-Up, when Michael benefactor. Can it be said that they were Dean interviewed Andreas Papandreou, the . suborned? iJ most publicised leader of the Greek resist- This is an old dilemma, put recently in a ance-in-exile. Mr Papandreou recounted in new guise by Kurt Vonnegut. In his novel some detail the nature of the CIA plot to Sirens of Titan, he reveals that the whole overthrow the democratic government in of human history has been engineered by Athens and install the Colonels, and com- the planet Tralfamadore in order to flash pleted his narrative with quotations from a signals of comfort and hope to a messenger- top-secret meeting of the American stranded on a moon of Jupiter many eons National Security Council. ; ago, The architectural marvels of each Perhaps this is all true. But even if it is, civilisation have spelt out simple sentences what does it say for the strength of Greek in an alien sign language. But does this political life and institutions? 'Must we be- negate all of human effort? Likewise, do'; livve that every Greek of political influence is employed by the Americans? Or were the Greeks so lax in developing their politi- cal institutions that an order from the CIA -or wherever-could indeed produce what we see in Athens today? Mr Papandreou is an astute politician of a sort. He knows that, as in the case of 'Who killed Kennedy? ', it Is impossible to prove a negative:, to show that Oswald did it alone, or that the Americans were not rigging everything in Athens. And he knows that nothing is easier to believe in than the existence of the organised plot. But it seems a bit narrow to look no further, and to deny that the Greek Left bore any responsibility for what happened in April 1967, whatever the role of the CIA, or of Mr Walt Rostow' in the White House, or of the Nato military articles written for a magazine that has been compromised by the CIA have no value? Do they lose the significance which the authors thought they were imparting to their work when they produced it? This is not really a question about the nature of the sponsoring institution-whether one that serves the ends of a government, or one like the great foundations that give out money amassed by devious means in the past-but of the secrecy with which it is done. At heart, it is a question of man's striving to secure the right to know what forces are shaping his life, to know how far he is a free agent. The anger directed at the CIA was not eased by the irony of the CIA's choice of .what is considered at least by Americans to be a left-of-centre publication. If any-j thing, it intensified this anger, particu-I larly on the part of those who needed to measure ther own radical progress against ,their image of CIA activities. There was also a sense in which the' bargain with the devil had been unfairly, struck. It is one thing to sell one's soul g in the more obvious one. Everyone knows ' willingly: it is quite another to do so, even! that Air America, which forms the back. ? if the temporal payment is made, without bone of the anti-communist air war in Laos, 'being able to share in the awareness of is directly financed by the CIA. Yet this . complicity with evil. To be used by a capri- knowledge, has never produced an outcry, cious god may be tolerable if everyone is in or even much interest, largely because the on the secret; but what could be worse than whole affair is conducted with minimum to be denied the sweetness that comes from !. secrecy, and maximum routine hnd bore- the knowledge of sin? dom. Compared to the killing. of the Perhaps this 'is the way an agency like Guevara-widely believed to be The work the CIA must operate; and certainly this of the CIA-the fighting In Laos is far more fresh evidence of duplicity only reinforced Important in terms of current politics and the comforting belief that conspiracy does, lives lost, but it is totally lacking in those indeed, abound. As such, the CIA has a elements that make for a basic confronta. value in the realm of drama, in the realm tion between good and evil. For the per- of the morality play, whatever its impact oses of the?ctre and th 1't' tI t d on the world's politics. p e o i command. The effort by many Greeks today to pin most if not all of their troubles on the Americans is, only one example of the force exertsA by the conspiracy theory of history. Indeed, there is a certain appeal in the truly sinister and secret operation that is lackin . p tcs a 1:1 s n School of pend on 1APPIMMedi oir'sRAIMO S e i r > D01FD3ffl 6 clrt i i at ?rd1000080 d@ School kind of confrontation perfectly. Indeed, his life and work would be incomplete un is now based in Washington. Approved For Rele se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004 R001000080002-6 PUBLIC IMAGE OF CIA DISTORTED, WRITER SAYS Krticle by M.L.s "What the CIA Is"; Florence, Il Mondo, Italian, 17 May rq., 1970, p J nrox} Washington -- A few evenings before he was named director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) in 1966, Richard McGarrah Helms, one of the most outstanding career officers of the American espionage service, was in- vited to dinner by the President of the United States. Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy was among those invited'. During dessert, McCarthy, who had heard of the imminent appointment of Helms, asked him about the French wine being served: "Do you think 1953 was a good year for this Chateau d'Yquem?" Helms said he knew nothing about it. Then the Senator pointed to some yel- low roses on the table and asked Helms if he could identify the variety. Helms said he knew nothing about roses. "Well, then," 'McCarthy said sarcastically turning to President John- son, "James Bond would have been able to give better answers." The episode was recalled several days later by Johnson himself when he nominated Helms as Chief of the American intelligence service. Johnson added that the anecdote did not decrease the esteem in which Helms was held .Approved, For Release-2001/03/96 rCIA-I DP$4 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00R001000080002-6 but served only to demonstrate how widespread, even among senators, was the absurd concept of directors of the intelligence service as cloak and dagger men, equally at ease among the most refined social affairs and bloody in- trigue. Johnson added, "I only know diligent officials at the CIA, So far,, I have never met a person like 007," The official position of the American.government is to consider those in the intelligence service as bureaucrats liRW any others, and the CIA as just another government agency. When one talks about the CIA's tasks with Washington executives, they inevitably point out that the activities of the intelligence service consists to a very large degree of the simple collection and analysis of information data which are then put, into reports in the form of National Intelligence Estimates (periodical) or Special National Intelli- gence Estimates (special reports), for the use of the-President of the United States. Washington officials do not deny that the CIA sometimes is Involved in "special" operations abroad -- those known as "black operations" in espi- onage jargon -- but they deny that they represent an important part of the CIA's work. They deny flatly -- and this is the polemical reply -- that there are cases in which these operations may take place without the know- ledge of the American government itself. They point out that any operation involving the CIA abroad beyond the simple collection of information must be authorized by a special committee of the National Security Council, which is the organ that brings together the civilian and military leaders of the Approved fflr-R ease 2001/q. / ;f.Cl'A fl ~ I$ . I ? a f i f ` ~ Approved For Reuse 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00`9R001000080002-6 nation under the chairmanship of the Chief Executive. This view of the CIA as a simple organization of disciplined offi- cials at work on the detached investigation of political situations and the decoding of cryptograms is certainly sweetened and onesided. Equally exag- gerated, however, is the view that the CIA is always involved in and respon- sible for any important political change taking place in any nation in the world. If the CIA really possessed these attributes, it would be an organi- zation of unheard of efficiency and unlimited means. In truth, it is not the first and does not possess the others. ;TH rrrot+ This does not mean that the image of the CIA in its function as an omnipresent, omnipotent agency for evil is not the most widespread both in the United States and abroad. It is so deeprooted that nothing can change it. An example of this was seen in the removal of Sihanouk from Cambodia. When Counsellor Henry Kissinger gave Richard Nixon the story of the coup d+etat, the first person the President wanted to see was Richard Helms. Nixon asked whether the CIA had had any hint of what was about to happen in Cambodia. Had it, perhaps, contributed in some way? As in other circumstances of the same kind, Helms replied that the CIA was taken completely by surprise by the events. Naturally, it had been in contact with clandestine Cambodian groups opposing Sihanouk but had no ties with army circles that had organized the coup. Senator Mike Mansfield, head of the democratic opposition in the senate, who went to the White House that same evening to get a report from the President on the situation, was able to assure newspapermen the next days "I can tell you that this time the CIA played no part in the event." Such a precise statement, coming not Approved For-:Release-2001/03/O61 :rCIA=DP84-QQ Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00R001000080002-6 from an administration spokesman but from an authoritative member of the opposition, should have nipped in the bud the hypothesis concerning the CIA+s co-responsibility. This was all the more true since the Cambodian events did not seem to have resulted in any visible advantage for the CIA or for American policy. In the days following, Jack Anderson, colleague of the deceased Drew Pearson, a "columnist" who specialized in unveiling behind-the-scenes sto- ries, investigated the matter and arrived at the same conclusion:'. the CIA had not been involved. rq. ^'YO? All this did not serve to wipe out the very widespread conviction that the CIA was responsible for Sihanouk's overthrow. The American press of the new and old left continued in fact to present it as the only incon- trovertible act in the Cambodian situation. Abroad, the conviction that the CIA is always present everywhere is still more widespread. In Bolivia, an anti-American leftist newspaper Jornada, went so far as to distribute to its readers -- mostly semi-literate and superstitious Indians -- an amulet "for protection against the CIA mach- inations." In France, on a more sophisticated level, the newspaperman Jean- Jacques Servan-Sohreiber gave his word that the CIA today is capable of con- trolling without exception all the levers of the Greek government. A few days after the statement by Servan-Schreiber, one of the deans of world journalism, Cyrus Sultzberger of The New York Times noted at Paris that the CIA to which his French colleague referred must really be the Greek Military Intelligence Service, KYP, which in its English version is called, even in Greece itself, Central Intelligence Agency or CIA. Members of this CIA are Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 almost all the Colonels who govern Greece and this was known from the be- ginning. This explanation was not accepted by Servan-Schreiber, nor was it reported by all the European newspapers. The CIA has its own agents in almost all American embassies abroad -- exactly like the Soviet KGB and the GRU or the British M15 or the French SDECE, or the intelligence services of all the other nations which can af- ford them. Their job is to collect information from as many groups as pos- sible and to keep in contact with as many forces as possible, including those which are clandestine. For these reasons itrgcan be said that the CIA has some influence on political life in all these nations. Instead, if we speak only of the "intervention of the CIA" only in those cases .in which, after a deliberate activity intended to provoke a certain political change, that change is actually carried out, it must be asserted that "CIA intervention" takes place in certain countries and in certain situations. They do not take place in other nations and in other situations. From Persia to Laos Examples of intervention expressly authorized by the American execu- tive were the overthrow of Mosadeq in Iran in 1953, the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the catastrophic Cuban expedition of 1961, decisive intervention for the settlement of the Congolese civil war in 19611 and the arming of Meo guerrillas in Laos beginning in 1968. Examples of important foreign changes in which the CIA, even though it was naturally present on the scene, did not have a determining part were the installation of dictatorship in Pakistan, the seizure of power by the Colonels in Greece, the rightist coup d'etat in Brazil. An extreme case is t Q 0 0800,02 6 ; Approved For.Release 2001/0 /P CIA-RDP84- 91 1~p 1 Approved For Rel`ase 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00R001000080002-6 represented by Indonesia, The CIA (which unsuccessfully organized a revolt against Sukarno in 1958) was neither the promoter nor the organizer of the bloody anti-communist repression of 1969 following the ouster of Sukarno but despite this it supported him with ample means. In a reverse situation, this same thing obviously would have been done by the Soviet KGB or the Chinese news agency Hsinhua which notoriously is a screen for the intelli- gence activities of Mao's China. What means does the CIA really possess? How does it function? Who are its officers? It is impossible to get jigformation on these points from official sources. In brief, this is the substance of an interview we had with Joseph Goodman, Assistant Director of the CIAs Questions How many men does the CIA have in the United States and abroad? Answers I'm sorry, but I cannot answer that question. Q.: Roughly, what is your annual budget? A.: Given the nature of our work, we do not give out information.of that kind. Q.s How many positions does the CIA have abroad? A.: No comment. Q.: Who is presently head of the Planning Division? A.s We give no details either about the, offices of the CIA, nor who heads them. However, I can tell you that the Director of the CIA is Richard Helms. The Planning Division is the moat notorious of the CIA departments, because it is concerned with "black operations,", Only a colossal mistake -?Approveq For-R lease 200110j; Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-009R001000080002-6 by the White House some time ago made it possible to learn that it was directed by Desmond FitzGerald well-known New England gentleman and scholar. He was the first husband of Marietta Tree who was a close collaborator of Adlai Stevenson and is the mother of the famous model Penelope Tree. Fitz- Gerald, Helms and all the other executives of the CIA were invited to the White House for a ceremony. The protocol office published and ingenously released to the press, including the Soviet press, the list of those invited along with their titles. In addition to Helms and FitzGerald, they were: Albert Wheelon, Director of Research; Laurence Houston, General Counsel; Jack Smith, head of Cryptography; Cord Meyer, Chief of the Office for rela- tions with trade unions and student organizations; William Colby, Chief of the Asia Department; J. C. King, Chief of the Latin American Department and Bronson Tweedy, Chief of the European Department. Cigars Loaded with Dynamite FitzGerald died shortly afterward in 196? of a heart attack. Who replaced him? And are all the others still at the same jobs? Perhaps there will be no way of knowing this until the CIA officials again go to a ceremony at the White House. Information on what is happening in the CIA occasionally is leaked to the press through some anonymous official of the department of State because of the ferocious antipathy between the two organizations, or through the ini- tiative of some internal faction of the CIA itself which seeks to damage an- other faction. It is obvious that information of this kind, disclosed for purposes of denigration, point up the failings of the CIA rather than its successes. Thus, it is difficult to get an impartial picture from them, v4ApprovedjFor Ruse 2oa a3 Approved For Reease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00`J9R001000080002-6 It was information of this kind, for example, that made it possible to learn that a CIA official had seriously submitted to his superiors a plan to blow Fidel Castro's head off by giving him cigars loaded with dynamite while he was in New York in 1960 for the United Nations Assembly. Other de- liberate leaks, circulated by the faction of CIA carreer officials who are in permanent conflict with the "political" appointees in the government, made it possible for the public to learn that Admiral Raborn, Director of the CIA until he was succeeded by Helms, had asked in a meeting of his employees what the meaning of the word "oligarchy" was. rat nynt: According to sufficiently reliable information on the number of per- sons who work for CIA, the figure is 15,000 employees, of whom 10,000 are in the American headquarters. (It,is a gigantic building which looks like a hospital hidden among the fields and forests of Langley, Virginia). The re- mainder are in foreign countries. Administrative funds hidden in various ways in the Defense Budget amount to $1.5 billion per year. This is equal to at least five times what the CIA, founded in 19117, had available in the first years of its life when because of the hostility of Congress its re- sources were so impoverished that in order to carry out certain operations its officials were obliged to resort to private charity. Among the cases of this kind is that of a substantial contribution collected one evening in March 19118 by some CIA officials who were members of the prestigous Brook Club of New York. The money was to be used for a CIA campaign in Italy to influence the elections of that year in an anti- communist direction. The episode, reported at that time by two American newspapermen Thomas Ross and David Wise, has never been denied. Approved, For Release :200110.31iCIA-R K4rQ 89R 000 ;Qty Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00`9R001000080002-6 M. L. 034 CSO: o2415/D Appreve4 For Reiease;2flp~-I8 !P6i:TC1A- P ~fY~. The Washington Monthly Approved For Reldage 2001/0SIO6jg7?IA-RDP84-0049.8001000080002-6 The Secret Team and the Games They Play was strikingly illustrated not long ago b I by L. Fletcher Prouty, the refusal of the Central Intelligence' Agency to provide witnesses for the "The hill costumes of the Meo tribes- court-martial that was to try eight Green men contrasted with the civilian clothes Beret officers for murdering a suspected of United States military men riding in North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and (Army to drop the charges. istols. These The Secret Team consists of security- pistols. young Americans are cleared individuals in and out of govern- mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA ment who receive secret intelligence data contract to advise and train Laotian gathered by the CIA and the National troops. Those matter-of-fact, almost Security Agency and who react to those weary sentences, written late in Feb- ruary by T.D. Allman of The Washington data when it seems appropriate to them Post after he and two other enterprising with paramilitary plans and activities,- correspondents left a guided tour and e.g., training and "advising"-a not ex-' walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos actly impenetrable euphemism for "lead-' to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe mg into battle -Laotian troops. Mein a situation that today may seem com- bership in the Team, granted on a "need monplace to anyone familiar with to know" basis, varies with the nature American operations overseas, but that 1and the location of the problems that no more than 10 years ago would have come to its attention. At the heart of the been unthinkable. Team,of course, are a handful of top ex- To take a detachment of regular 1ecutives of the CIA and of the National troops, put its members into disguise, Security Council, most notably the chief smuggle them out of the country so that White House adviser on foreign policy. neither the public nor the Congress Around them revolves a sort of inner knows they have left, and assign them to ring of Presidential staff members, State clandestine duties on foreign soil under Department officials, civilians and mili- the command of a non-military agency tary men from the Pentagon, and career -it is doubtful that anyone would have professionals in the intelligence services. dared to suggest taking such liberties And out beyond then-is an extensive: tions of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. ficials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security: think-tank analysts,. Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remark- buss 1ess111en who travel a lot or wnose able development in the management of businesses (e.g., import-export or operat- America's relations with other countries Ing a cargo airline) are useful, academic during the nine years since Mr. Eisen experts in this or that technical subject bower left office has been the assum or geographic region, and, quite impor p-! tantly, alumni of the intelligence ser lion of more and more control over mili vice-a service from which there are no' tary and diplomatic operations abroad unconditional resignations. by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very iden Thus the Secret Team is not a clan- tities as often as not are secret-in short destine super-planning board or super- a Secret Team whose actions only those general staff but, even more damaging to implicated in them are in a position to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a monitor. How determinedly this secrecy; bewildering collection of temporarily is preserved, even when preserving it assembled action committees that means denying the United States Army] respond pretty much ad hoc to specific the right to discipline its own personnel, troubles in various parts of the world, not to say the opportunity to do Justice,{;sometimes in ways that duplicate the Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6 Approved For Rele 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004R001000080002-6 0 activities of regular American missions, appropriate lop Secret clearances often sometimes in ways that undermine those are kept in the dark about Team plans. activities, and very often in ways that Thus Adlai Stevenson, ambassador to the interfere with and muddle them. For United Nations, was not informed about example, when serious border troubles the Bay of Pigs invasion plans until thei broke out along the northern frontiers of: very last minute when rumors about it India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Ilhutan in began to appear in the press; and even 1902. the ('IA brought in U.S. military then Tracy Barnes, the CIA man sent to equipment and manpower, including brief Stevenson, gave him a vague and, Special Forces (Green Beret) troops, to incomplete picture of the operation. train Indian police, despite the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already sent "Need to know" also can be bent in to New Delhi for the same purpose a spe- the other direction in order to secure the cial team, headed by General Paul support of potential allies and further Adams, founder and commanding gen- those allies careers. Members of the eral of the U.S. Strike Command. The Secret Team who favored the election of CIA operators practically ignored Gen- John F. Kennedy over Richard Nixon oral Adams and Ambassador John Ken- played a very special role in the 1960 neth Galbraith in proceeding with their election campaign. Nixon presided over plans, and there is no evidence that the the National Security Council and there- U.S. Congress ever knew the CIA was in fore knew in detail the plans for the'Bay the picture at all. " ' . of Pigs operation. Senator Kennedy, as an outsider, was presumed not to know One source of the Teams power is those highly classified details. However, the speed with which it can act. The he did know. In his book, Six Crises, CIA's communications system is so ex- Nixon wrote that Kennedy was told traordinarily efficient,, especially by con- about the invasion by Allen Dulles dur- trast with State's, that the Team can, in ing the traditional CIA briefing for can-' a phrase that often gets used at such dilates; but there was more than that to times, have a plane in the air" respond- ing to some situation overseas while the story, it appears. State is still decoding the cable inform- A former staff' member from the ing it of that situation. A few yeah ago, Office that the during Secretary tile summDefon I rc hl- for example, while the strongest member went to the Senate Office Building to of an Asian government that the United States was strenuously supporting (call pick up and escort to the Pentagon four him Marshal X) was lying sick in a Cuban exile leaders, among them the fu Tokyo hospital, word came that a group sion tore commander of the Bay of Pigs inva- of discontented young officers was team, who had been meeting with planning a coup in his absence. In a, Senator Kennedy. Those men were sup- matter of hours, thanks to the Team,' posed to be under special security wraps,' Marshal X was on his way home in a U.S. but certain CIA officials had introduced Air Force jet fighter; he arrived at his' them to Kennedy, thus making sure that office in plenty of time to frustrate the he knew as much about the invasion as plotters. The power to pull off feats like Nixon-if not more, as the result of a that is more than operational power; it personal relationship that Nixon did not is in a real sense policy-making power. In have with the Cuban refugee front and this particular case it was the power to, the Americans who were secretly he'Yping commit the United States to the protec- it. When the candidates appeared on tele- tion and support of Marshal X, even vision together during the crucial cam- though many officials who dealt with paign debates, Nixon, abiding by Marshal X's government on a workaday security restrictions, limited himself in basis regarded him as the most obnox- his discussion of the government's plans ious member of it. Calling back "a plane for Cuba. This official control did not in the air" is not an easy thing to do, and apply to Kennedy. He could and did ad- the Team knows and benefits from this vocate overthrowing the Castro govern- fact. ment. Nixon's frustration and anger at Another source of the Team's power Kennedy's tactics were evident on the is its ability to manipulate "need to TV screen. Many observers believe that know"classifications. One way to make that confrontation over Cuba was one of sure that there is little opposition to the moments during the debates when your proposed activities Is to fail to tell Kennedy scored most heavily -land of those who might oppose them what course most observers credit Kennedy's' those ac i ~ 1 1- ` p V1I~ ! RF c` ff.a g b~600080002-6 rankiing Approved For Relrfse 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004'9AR001000080002-6 That Kennedy's connection with the old man." The fact that a number of Cuban refugee's before his 'election was such volunteers ended up serving time in O anything but casual or fortuitous was' communist prisons never seemed to de-' demonstrated more than two years later ter new ones. In Dulles's view the infor-' in the Orange Bowl in Miami, before a mation these people provided, although national television audience, at a often helpful, was the least of their welcome-back celebration for the ran-'value; they were influential men who, soured prisoners from the Bay of Pigs. At because they had put in some time as one point during the ceremonies, the "Agents," would always have a soft spot President walked over to the group of in their hearts for the Agency. returnees and threw his arm around the Of course Dulles did not increase the shoulders of one of them. If those. CIA's influence as much as he did just by ,watching thought he had chosen his man image building. He was an organizer and at random, they were mistaken. The a clandestine operator of great ability,, Cuban he embraced was his old friend and between the end of the Korean war from the summer of 1960, Manuel and the election of John Kennedy, he Artime, the commander of'the invasion had begun building the Team-with the brigade. CIA usually calling its signals, of course- and it had had a number of substantial successes. Overthrowing the Mossadegh. Kennedy's election was a big boost government in Iran was one; overthrow- for Secret Teamwork, but an earlier and ing the Arbenz government in Guatemala bigger one had been the appointment of was another- although perhaps from a Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA in connoisseur's point of view the latter op- 1953, after two years as Deputy Direc- eration was a bit.on the blatant side. Per- tor. At that time the agency was not per- haps the most brilliant of all was the mitted by the National Security Council spectacular building up of Ramon to build up a big enough force of men Magsaysay from an obscure army captain and materiel Jo permit it to carry out to the President and national hero of the i operations on its own. In other words, Philippines. This latter feat was mostly; whenever the CIA wanted to do any-organized by Colonel Edward G. thing on a large scale, it had to secured Lansdale of the CIA. via the Air Force, a i t f ass s ance rom, and therefore share public relations genius of the old selling; authority with, other agencies, chiefly iceboxes- to-Eskimos school. the Departments of State and Defense. Lansdale conceived the idea of Slowly Dulles changed these conditions. making Magsaysay into the savior of his' One way he did it was to give intel- country from the communist "Iluks" by ligence activities intellectual and social recruiting, and paying with CIA funds, a credibility by surrounding himself with few bands of Filipino soldiers who, every men from industry, finance, and aca- night or so, would put on peasant' demia. ; clothes, invade some villages with much The CIA always had been a haven for' ado, and then allow themselves to be, Ivy League people and Dulles made it. driven out again by the intrepid forces even more so. It was not unusual to find under Magsaysay's command. Not infre- the Director, perched on a hassock in his quently after such an episode, the stage living room, wearing a V-neck sweater 1"Huks" and the loyalists would rendez-' and tennis shoes, with a racquet on the vous in a nearby grove or field and re floor beside him, discoursing on the lit- enact the evening's performance to the est cables from his agents around the' accompaniment of much hilarity and world to a similarly clad group of disci- beer. All of which, perhaps it need be ples, many of whom may not have emphasized, is not to say that Magsaysay known that meanwhile back at the office was a faker or a figurehead; on the con- workaday CIA officials were wrestling trary, it is a mark of Lansdale's skill that with such mundane problems as how to lie chose as the central figure in his. introduce Special Forces men into Boli- hero-making exercise, a man with the via and Colombia, or whether it would attributes of a genuine hero. better serve the interests of the United Dulles was as adept at domestic, as at States to dispose of a certain counterspy overseas manipulation, and, during the with poison or a garrote. Eisenhower years, when the CIA was Particularluseful to Dulles in his' i ll .7 e ng part a y restrained, he recruited to empire building were businessmen and the Team a number of frustrated young educators who traveled frequently, and Army officers who were chafing against therefore were well qualified to assist in?v r the colle pr~tVet7oFrear'tia~lt?lcets I ~ t!d$%M1000080002-6 Pi Approved For ReIe'*'d''se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00 R001000080002-6 cans had vowed "never again" when it Arthur Schlesinger, in his book A came to committing American troops to Thousand Days, recounts that President battle in "brushfire " wars, especially on Kennedy "made anti-guerrilla instruction Asian soil, and turned to reliance on nu- a personal project;" After reading clear weapons as the core of American Colonel Lansdale's report on guerrilla' defense policy. This meant to the CIA operations in Vietnam (where Lansdale, that it could not get the troops it often had been busily and quite successfully. would have liked to have to further its helping Ngo Dinh Diem become a savior plans. It meant to the Army that the Air of his country it la Magsaysay), Kennedy ' asked his special assistant Walt Rostow, fresh from the CIA-run Center for International Studies at MIT, to check valries, that by declining to fight any l into what the Army was doing about battles smaller than nuclear ones, counter-guerrilla training. The President s share of Force would receive the lion professional opportunities and glory and, beyond the eternal matter of service ri- America was giving up its capacity to influence any events smaller than apoca- lyptic ones. Such bright and eloquent generals as Matthew Ridgeway, James Gavin, and particularly Maxwell Taylor argued this case vigorously. Their notion as that it was essential for. the United read Mao and Che Guevara and told the Army to do likewise. Kennedy instructed the Special Forces to expand its anti-guerrilla operations. Lansdale and his associate, Samuel Wilson, wrote new texts on counter-insurgency for Fort Bragg. After a visit to the training center, States to have a special counter- Kennedy, over opposition from .the insurgency force prepared to put out Army bureaucracy, revivified the Special brushfires around the world. Obviously, Forces, and training centers were or- Dulles shared this view, if indeed he ganized in Panama, Okinawa, Vietnam, hadn't been one of the first to advance and West Germany. "In Washington," it. Kennedy, the activist, also agreed, and. writes Schlesinger, "Robert Kennedy, :so it is no wonder that many leading Maxwell Taylor, and Richard Bissell members of the Secret Team favored ' pushed the course. Roger Hilsman, draw., him over Nixon, the Vice President in a ing on his wartime experience in the hills non-activist administration-though of Burma, and Walt Rostow, analyzing probably himself less of a non-activist the guerrilla problem as part of the path- than his boss. By the same token, it also, ology of economic development, carried is no wonder that the. Secret Team, the gospel to the State Department." .especially by gaining control over the Fort Bragg and the regional centers. Special Forces, fared well after were opened to foreign trainees. Osten- Kennedy's election. For when the action ;sibly, the foreign officers represented the- came, under Kennedy, it was the Special, uniformed services of their countries, Forces which got the first call. but actually some of them were hand- The Army Special Forces had been ; p icked by their nations' intelligence formed after World War 11. In event?of a organizations and then had to be ap- Russian invasion, the 10th Special) proved by the CIA. Under the guise of Forces in Germany were to be sent into military aid programs, these men at- Eastern Europe to create and sustain par-. tisan movements behind the lines. With a small headquarters and reserve unit maintained at Fort Bragg, North Car- olina, the Special Forces in 1960 con- sisted of only 1,800 men, poorly equipped and inadequately trained. Wil- liam Pfaff, a consultant to the Hudson Institute and a member of the Special Forces reserves, described them as being "composed of self-consciously uprooted men, emotionally and intellectually de- tached from the mainstream of civilian society but also from that securely bland and sentimental Southern institution, the American Army itself." Under the rubric of counter-insurgency and nation-, building, these men soon became CIA mercenaries. tended the Special Forces School at Fort Bragg. Officers came from over 60 coun- tries, representing, among others, such surprising nations as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, the Netherlands, Jor- dan, Bolivia, Sierra Leone, and Haiti. A Green Beret-CIA team trained the Bolivians who captured Che Guevara. They have trained Iranian police, Chinese forces on Taiwan, King Hus- sein's Elite paratroops in Jordan, and troops in South Korea. The CIA-Green Beret team has undertaken special train-, ing missions in Liberia and in the Congo. And currently Green Berets are advising the troops of'Haile Selassie in the Ethio- pian .province of Eritrea. Under some- what :similar Army-sponsored programs. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 continued C Approved For Rel a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004 R001000080002-6 the CIA provided for the training of a' the build-up, and the build-up led to number of Tibetans. A Washington Post more power for the Secret Team. Be- reporter who visited Fort Bragg in tile' cause of the favored' position of the summer of 1969 wrote that the Special Army's Green Berets, the other services Forces "anticipate endless `insurgencies' thought it would be wise for them to have in the underdeveloped countries of the Special Forces of their own in Vietnam. world-from Africa to Latin ? America. The Air Force had a number of special- And they are counting on American ized aircraft and crews left over from the intervention in many of these situa- Bay of Pigs operation; these were or- tions." "In a way, we're a kind of Peace ganized into the nucleus of Special Air Corps," the training director of the Warfare units and hurried to Vietnam to Green Beret center explained. work with the CIA. Not to be outdone by the Army and the Air Force, the Navy created special After the Day of Pigs, which some units known as SEAL ,(Sea-Air-Land) people vainly hoped would end large- teams and sent them to Vietnam to work scale,paramilitary CIA clandestine opera- with the Agency. Since the Navy did not tions, President Kennedy appointed a have the kind of small boats required for board of inquiry to review the fiasco. Its some of the action there (and perhaps members were Admiral Arleigh Burke, because President Kennedy had been a Allen Dulles, Attorney General Robert PT-boat man), the Navy ordered a flo- Kennedy, and General Maxwell Taylor. tilla of PT-boats from Norwegian, ship- General Taylor, dissatisfied with the role builders and had them delivered directly the Eisenhower Administration had a~ to Vietnam to join other small boats signed to the Army, had retired from, the, which were transferred from the U.S. service after his tour as Army Chief of Coast Guard-all to support potential ; Staff to write The Uncertain Trumpet. clandestine naval activities and to keep While serving on the board of inquiryken-, he up with the other services in the favor became close friends with Robert of the Agency. nedy. Dulles and Bobby Kennedy recom- Such actions resulted in a consider- mended him for the post of Special Mili- able clandestine build-up of forces in tary Advisor to the President, and the Vietnam long before the official escala- President later named him Chairman of tion took place. And of course, once the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In those posts, those forces were there something had to by playing the game with the CIA, espe- be done with them. cially with respect to Vietnam, Taylor For example, the Air Force contribu-, was able to preside over a major rebirth tion consisted of units of C-123 medium of the Army. The Vietnam build-up, transport aircraft. However, there 'al- whose beginning was engineered by the ready were plenty of medium transports CIA, ultimately meant the abandonment in Vietnam-Caribous, under Army con- of Eisenhower's exclusive reliance on trol, that had been flown there via the Strategic Air Command and missile stra- Atlantic, not having enough range to tegy in favor of the policy Taylor cross the Pacific. Consequently, Defense wanted-of developing a capacity to Secretary Robert McNamara had a meet brushfire situations with conven- squadron of C-123's converted at con- tional ground forces, Army forces natu- siderable cost to become defoliant spray-, rally. er aircraft. It may be too much to, say, The most important respect in which that the defoliation program would Taylor played the Secret Team game was never have been undertaken if those Viet- C-1 23's hadn't been sitting idly in Viet- to acquiesce in giving the CIA opera- nam, but there is no doubt that their tional control of the Green Beret forces presence gave the program considerable in Vietnam and Laos. The CIA took full stimulation. advantage of this unprecedented situa- tion, which saw the agency in control of The CIA is most adept at working those forces at least through 1963, by in and around and through all levels of using it to stimulate inter.-service rival- the U.S. government. No one, not even rise. The rivalries led to an increase in the majority. of Agency personnel, Approved. For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Rese 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-009R001000080002-6 knows the full extent of Agency manipu- for the CIA to requisition Air Force lations within the governmental strut- items using an Army or Navy unit than ture. The Agency can obtain what it an Air Force unit, because the services desires in any quantity, and often for no monitor their own units more carefully c cost. During the depression years of the than those of another service. Therefore, 1930's, Congress passed a law which was the CIA keeps a number of service units known as the Economy Act of 1932 on tap at all times. With these hidden and, as amended, it is still on the books. sources of supply, the CIA often can This act, whose purpose is to save money build an arsenal and support clandestine, and discourage needless spending, per- operations in some foreign country with- mits an agency that needs material to out the Department of Defense, much purchase it at an agreed price from less the Department of State, ever know, another agency by an accounting off-set `ing it-though presumably Defense could without spending "new money." For find out if it took the trouble to scrutin- example, the Department of Ag~Aculture size carefully the activities of its various can buy surplus tractors from the Army l 234's. at a price agreed upon by both parties, It was this power aid freedom to even if it is only a dollar each. (Since move forces and equipment quickly most such equipment is declared surplus, without the usual review by proper au- whether it is or not, by the selling thority that made possible the first entry agency, the price usually is low.) By of troops and equipment into South means of authority of this kind, the CIA Vietnam in the early Sixties. In order to has learned how to "buy" from all agen- mount a particular operation it con-' cies of the government, primarily from sidered important, the CIA needed 24 the Department of Defense, a tremen- helicopters and it obtained White House dous amount of new and surplus equip- permission over strenuous objections ment-and to take over bases at home from the Pentagon to have them sent to and abroad for its own use without Vietnam. Sending 24 helicopters any- appearing to have spent substantial funds i, where automatically means sending 400 and many times without the selling party men as well, counting only pilots and knowing the true identity of the buyer. gunners and mechanics and cooks and This method cif budgetary by-passing clerks and bakers and the rest of the im- `~ works something like this: The Agency mediate establishment. If the intention creates an Army unit. for some minor is-and the intention always is-to give purpose which the Army and the De-'those 24 helicopters real support, then it fense Department are willing to agree to. involves sending 1,200 men. Moreover, The unit is listed on the Army roster as, the statistics are that, in any helicopter say, the 1234 Special Supply Company, squadron, because of maintenance ser- Fort Wyman (fictional name), New Jer-'vieing requirements, only half the sey. This small and inconspicuous unit is machines will be operational at any one mostly manned by regular Army per- time. So if' 24 operational helicopters are sonnel but will have a few Army per- needed, 48 will have to be sent, which sonnel who are actually CIA employees means 2,400 men. But if you're sending with reserve status, and a few CIA career a supporting force involving 2,400 men, employees. It can serve as a supply re- then the support for them-PX's, movies, ceiving point for holding Agency materi- motor pools, officers' and enlisted men's al prior to overseas shipment. After 1234 clubs, perimeter guards to protect all has been operating for a time and ap- this, and so on and so on-becomes pears to he a bona-fide Army unit, not really extensive, and thousands more only to the rest of the Army personnel men get attached to it. And so it goes. at Fort Wyman but also to (lie real Army, "Twenty-four Helicopters" can, in fact people who are serving with it, it will did, ultimately mean a full-scale military begin to requisition supplies of all kinds involvement. and amounts from the Army. This pro The CIA also knows how to get re- .cedure continues for a time, then the search and development contracts it ini- unit will begin to requisition in a normal tiates transferred to the Department of manner items from the Navy and the Air Defense when it comes time to make Force. Cross requisitioning is acceptible quantity purchases of the new equip- practice in all services today. The Navy and Air Force will charge the Army for ment, and then, once DOD has spent the money, requisition that equipment back the items transferred and the Army, through outfits like 1234. Something having records on the validity of the very much like this happened with the unit, will honor the charges. It is easier. M-16 rifle, which, as the result of the Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 oontinueff 0 Approved For Re`fase 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-039R001000080002-6 Team's machinations, is now a standard veal their existence. These people are in infantry weapon. The reasons the CIA addition to the large number of military first wanted the M-16 developed are personnel carried on its budget for the obscure, though perhaps one of them is ostensible purpose of cross-training; and that it is a "NATO caliber" piece and this does not count the Special Forces therefore does not rely on American- troops that may be attached to the made ammunition, and perhaps another Agency in certain countries. Sometimes is that it is small and light and therefore the official military may be unaware of suitable for use by guerrillas and coun- the activities,of supposed members of its ter-guerrillas. In any case, a decision was own MAAG groups or other military or-' made that the M-16 was needed in ganizations. In similar fashion, as re- quantity by the CIA for certain opera- vealed by Los Angeles Times reporter tions in Asia, and Fairchild, the aircraft Jack Foisic, the CIA is using the State company, was given a research and de- Department's AID program as a cover velopment contract. At the time, the for clandestine operations. In Laos, the CIA was unable to elicit any interest at number of agents posing as civilian AID all in the project from the Army, which workers totals several hundred. They are, was fighting a rear-guard action against listed as members of the AID mission's Secretary McNamara's decision to close Rural Development Annex. There is also its venerated Springfield Arsenal; it re- a Special Requirements Office in the fused to look at a weapon that had not AID compound which provides supplies gone the Army Ordnance route, How- for CIA clandestine operations. ever, the CIA was able to push the M-16 The military aid' given to a foreign through the office of the Secretary of country is carefully- tailored by military Defense, over the head of the Army, and planners and is related to what is given then induce the Air Force to put in a to other countries in the region. How- procurement order for 60,000 of the ever, a foreign air force chief of staff, for M-16 s. Not long after the Air Force re- example, may wish to have a squadron ceived delivery of the 60,000 rifles, they of modern reconnaissance aircraft for his vanished mysteriously somewhere over- country's use. He contacts the local CIA seas. station chief and explains that he would The CIA is careful to maintain close employ these aircraft on missions of relations with industry. It has been es- interest to the Agency. The Department pecially friendly for many years with of Defense might have turned down the Lockheed Aircraft, which developed the request, but the local commander will U-2 spy plane, and many other military press his claim with the CIA. The A- contractors. The CIA was involved with gency might want to have the added ser- the support of the Hclio Corporation of vices and will take the request to the Bedford, Massachusetts- a firth that pro- Agency headquarters in Washingtorr?-,and duces a Short Take-off and Landing the country will get the squadron of plane that has been very important to modern reconnaissance fighters. Such a CIA-Green Beret operations over the scenario is not unlike very recent trans years in Laos. (The founders of the firm ,,actions that have taken place between are two former professors, Arthur Kop- pen, who used to head the aeronautics laboratory at MIT, and Lynn Bollinger the U.S. and Taiwan. In sum, during the last decade the White House's National Security Council of the Harvard Business School. 1301- 1; apparatus and the CIA - particularly its linger flew into Laos with early Green operational side which now has nine Beret teams which had established con- overseas employees to every one on the tacts with the Meo tribes.) Some plants intelligence-gathering side-have grown manufacture equipment solely for the enormously both in size and in influ- Agency; they are, of course, provided ence. More and more foreign- policy de- with elaborate covers. I cisions are being made in secret, in The Agency's operatives appear in the response only to immediate crises rather organizations of many other government than in accordance with long- range agencies. A visitor to the overseas office plans, and all too often with very little of a Military Advisory Group that pre-'consultation with professional foreign- sumably has a staff of 40 might find a policy or military planners. More and hundred men working in the MAAG more overseas operations are being con- compound; these are CIA people whose ducted in secret, and ad hoc, and with salaries are paid by the Agency so that very little control by professional diplo-, budget reviews in Washington will not re-:,,mats or soldiers. And the one organ of Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Rele 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0049t001000080002-6 government that, on behalf of the people that elected it, should be monitoring these goings-on, is today as ignorant as the public-because Congress submitted to secrecy on a grand scale years ago when it authorized the CIA. It is hard to imagine how or when the Secret Team can be brought into the open and made publicly accountable for its actions. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Rel a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0042 R001000080002-6 WINSTON SALEM, N.C. JOURNAL M - 77 , 944 JOURNAL SENTINEL S - 93,770 APR 2 7 1970 The Transparent bask SECRECY has always been an obses- sion with government agencies; and rarely has it been practiced with such vigor as in Washington. But the larger federal agencies and departments, under pressure from the press and Con- gress, have relaxed the secrecy vigil in recent years. It only remains to inform some of the smaller "attached" services about the new rules. The Federal Broadcast Information Service is a case in point. The FBIS has the job of monitoring foreign broadcasts. It makes translations of these broadcasts available to the press corps. Any news- paperman, including reporters from the Soviet Union, can have these transla- tions, since they are little more than handouts. In the past, the FBIS - which is ad- ministered by the Central Intelligence Agency - has required that correspon- dents not publish the name of the monitoring service. Since the handouts carry the BIS initials, the CIA, as the parent agency, must have thought it absurd to continue with this secrecy; and recently, the warning against use of the service's name was dropped. A CIA spokesman said "it's no secret we monitor everything that falls freely in the air," so why pretend otherwise? Apparently, the CIA underestimated the paranoia of its monitoring service. An FBIS official declared last week that there was no change in the policy of for- bidding identification of the service in connection with the translations. He add- ed that the ban would be re-imposed just as soon as the FBIS could convince the IA that such secrecy is necessary. It is just this sort of ridiculous "secrecy" that makes a laughing stock of. the entire federal establishment. Ob- viously, there must be a restriction on certain kinds of government information. This goes for the Internal Revenue Ser- vice as well as the intelligence and regulatory agencies. But when a small bureaucratic enclave such as the FBIS behaves so childishly, the whole pattern and practice of restricting information is demeaned, causing the average citizen to suspect that the entire federal system is engaged in lies and evasions and decep- tion at his expense. who allow such absurdities to continue wonder why millions of Americans epn- sider them, the 'foe. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Release 2001/9J(Q DP84-O K99R001000080002-6 12 April 1970 ?lCharter ,airline Resents C. I. By ARNOLD ABRAMS The repair facility, which employs 3,700 workers, is on property owned TAIPEI, Taiwan - Having their, by Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air Lat m c o pany dubbed th "C I A e... Air- America. The property adjoins Tain-. ;,... line" riles some executives of Air an airbase a center of American in. g Tigers, supplied the National-'l,_ A , merica thi ,e prvate charter firm telligence activities on Taiwan. fists during the Chinese civil war. whose bases ha { ppen to be in South- Not surprisingly, the nature of When Chiang fled the mainland in east Asia's better war zones. They insist their firm is no differ- many Air America missions often 1949, CAT, followed him to Taiwan. ent from any other charter airline, leads to bizarre incidents. This firm, Air America was established 10 years We are willing to carry cargo any- for example, may be the only private later. where in this region for any customer charter company in the have. _ United States withdrawal from has cut back Air Vietnam alread y downed an enemy plane. who can pay," says one executive. America operations there, but com-11 . It happened somewhere over But Air America has just one cus Northern Laos in January, 1968. The pany officials do not seem unduly d when on Air America worried. it e d States govern- ? t U n e battle star toner: the ment. And it primarily services the crewman looked out the open door of (~ THERE'LL STILL BE plenty of elop n t - De d v fQ jQj saw a Agencyj?- his helicopter an vence_ business in Southeast Asia," says one nd Central I te1ligen- smade Antonov 2 - an obsolete, sin- ; t a men executive . cy. gle engined aircraft - cruising by. The C. I. A. label will continue tn, NEVERTHELESS, executives at THE CREWMAN grabbed a car- rankle, however. the firm's subsidiary offices here em bine and fired a full clip at the Com=) `"Air America does not engage in. lcall deny that Air America is munist craft, presumably part of the ,, espionage and is not part of the C. I:; diminutive North Vietnamese air ,. A,, says John A. Bottorff, regional' plane plummeted I % director of Air Asia, "and I frankly m h u y e ene T farc4 . to earth. resent being considered some kind of t, i " Company officials in Taipei do not secret agent or spy. AinoId ?Abrams Is The confirm or deny the "kill"; they just; Bottorff, 47, handles public role- ou factual sto tions as part of his Air Asia duties.- 2 "I ive ld y g cou Timea' eorre-wink. spondent Iii s s vies a lot more implausible than He is a veteran hand who came toy that" says one. this region in 1944 as a United States' Southeast Asia.) r y} Many of Air America's approxi-government employe with a special-! ' United States ^Air Force per- That function? He was an intelli.=_ former w.5~. u~=?w?. - `or *'.,.,.,;,,o: genre agent - with the 0. C. 5 fore.' iigtlgieil!~p~pppi~I;1~Iplpl;,m;iPJaiili0liulimimimimmitinl from purely mercenary to wildly ro- ''.runner of the,C I. A_az.._~_ mantle. an "arm" of the C. I. A. Both needs can be satisfied with "Our customer gives us an order Air America: the money is good ;and we fill it," says a spokesman. (some pilots earn over $25,000 a "That's all there is to it.-We carry year) and adventure is plentiful. cargo. We don't ask questions. t, E Air America is owned by a hold- Those cargoes can be quite exot- . ing company, the Pacific Corp.,, with] le: ranging from arms and ammuni- offices in Washington, D. C. tion to rice bags, live pigs, special agents, troops, refugees and opium, THE BOARD chairman is Felix B. the chief cash crop of Meo hill tribes- Stomp, a retired admiral who was, men in Laos. commander-in-chief of United States,, One recent order involved, ferry- Pacific forces before retiring from ling several hundred Thai "volun- military service in 1958. teers" into Laos to help defend the The airline's origins go back to ,besieged C. I. A. stronghold at Long 1941, when the late Gen. Claire Chen- 'Cheng, about 100 miles north of the nault organized the Flying Tigers, a Lcapital. paramilitary group supporting t r . Chiang Kai-shek's forces against the, . A VARIED Air America fleet of. Japanese. about 170 planes carries cargo from Ilse Flying Tigers gained fame, bases in South Vietnam, Laos, Thai- and some fortune during World War ; land, the Philippines and Japan. II, when they flew supplies Into China, In Taiwan, the firm owns the larg- over the Burma "hump." est aircraft maintenance and repair After the war, Chennault founded :facility in Southeast Asia. It did $8 Civil Air Transport, forerunner of Air., `million worth of repair work last America and still operating-as a car-', year on United States aircraft operat go carrier in Asia. er lu inVie am, a.? 'Io Approved For'ReleaSe` 6e1O f06": 61A-kto .' =00499 R001000080002-6 71 "" RAMPARTS Approved For R tease 2 1O k6? : CIA-RDP84-0A4e9R001000080002-6 respect are: (1) Trends in power poten- tial rating; (2) Trends producing or en- couraging mass participation; (3) Trends in elite relationships, public, political and bureaucratic; (4) Trends in relevant sections of elite and mass value systems, perceptions and attitudes. These are the categories of informa- tion needed by policymakers in order to successfully influence developments in any given country or area. has come up with a theoretical model OTTAM BELIEVES THAT the sig- in order, Cottam would have it make intended to help the U.S. government use of systematically developed "situa- r7l nificance of U.S. power must be manipulate ore effective) the politics L evaluated in terms of its leverage p }n y P tional analyses" to guide the shaping of over specific issues or areas. Effective of foreign countries. strategy. Present bureaucracies, he says ' With what appears to be a combina- are unable to produce usable objective diplomatic strategy can have many tion of personal bitterness and academ- studies; as a result, strategists are crip- faces: a passive lever might be a threat; a ctive is arrogance, Cottam's study argues that pled by reliance on distorted intelli- more a one could range from the the thrust of U.S. competition with gence and simplistic policy options. withdrawal of aid or, failing everything other powers "whether recognized as Cottam proposes to remedy this by else, to direct military intervention. such or not, is to be found primarily on making greater use of academic and This type of approach provides a precise the levels of political warfare, economic non-academic specialists who "need not way of estimating the target country's warfare, and psychological warfare." necessarily understand the manipula- "tolerance for interference," as well as His central complaint is that the govern- tion potential of their work." helping to'measure U.S. impact. Such a ment, particularly the CIA, is not More specifically, he states: "The sug- leverage system allows policymakers sophisticated enough to successfully gestion here is that the academic area more control over their own machinery use these tools to influence global polit- specialist can play a significant role in and minimizes the 'possibility of work- ical trends in "a direction favorable to the policy formulation process without ing at cross purposes with other agen- Western objectives." Obsessed with the departing from his scholarly standards cies or policy objectives. need to insure America's long-run he- and without becoming involved in spe- It is this thinking which leads Cottam gemony in the world, Cottam offers his cific policy recommendations. The role to criticize the war in Vietnam. He be- solution to what he regards as the dan- he can play is that of constructing situa- ' lieves in the need for intervention but gerous lack of a focused long-range tional analyses that have operational thinks that in this case the government strategy for American foreign policy. relevance. But in most cases that rele- has made a mess of it. In his view, the Radicals should treat his book as a vance will not be apparent to the lay correctness of 'any one intervention captured enemy document, offering, as reader. must be determined in the context of it does, a glimpse into the tactical arse- The "situational analysis," which our global objectives. "The impact of .nal of covert action strategies and big avoids the sterility of most ideologically American policy in Vietnam on every power political engineering. Although loaded, cold war-infected area studies, other aspect of American foreign poli- his concepts are camouflaged by the aims at diagnosing strategic institutions cY," he writes, "has been so great as to elusive and dense jargon that typifies and members of the political elite in the threaten a systemic change." And that political science, the academic "cover" "target" country. In ti,e dry language of is frightening to one whose basic objec- for this scholarly policy memorandum political science: "The type of opera- tive is to defend and rationalize an inter- is thin and t t' national status quo. 5tt ed For Release MiY0~10'8 C1A-' Pt.y -6b499R001000080002-6 cont. CIA Capers COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE AND 20TH CENTURY DIPLOMACY. By Rich- ard IN. Cottmn. University of Pitts- burgh,1967. THE CIA HAS BEEN back on the front pages lately with tales of its full-scale "secret army" in Laos and its role in the assassination of a sus- pected Vietnamese double-agent. These are the exploits which capture the head- lines while at the same time tending to mystify and obscure the critical and in- tegrated role which covert action has come to play in the formulation and ex- ecution of American foreign policy. Now, a recent and relatively unknown book by a political scientist who ap- pears to have had some intimate associa- tions with the CIA allows us to detect more clearly than ever before some of the overall strategic notions which in- form these CIA maneuvers. From in- sights developed during two years of service at the American Embassy in Iran-and most likely, therefore, with the CIA-Richard Cottam, now a pro- fessor at the University of Pittsburgh I'^JOTTAM'S ARGUMENT centers around the need for continuing: U.S. interference in the internal affairs of countries around the globe. He slakes short work of those fuzzy-, headed politicians who use "ethical" arguments to avoid the realization that the protection of U.S. interests requires more than simply a policy of interven- tion in moments of crisis. "Overturning a regime is the easy part of political en- gineering," he writes. "Creating a sta- ble, popular, and ideologically compat- ible regime is infinitely more complex and seems at this stage to be beyond the theoretical com etence of the Unites proposed here calls for a tightly con- structed frame within which attitudinal and perceptual trends can be categor- ized and evaluated." Cottam's hone, of course, is to introduce techniques to im- prove the administration and control of the American empire. Cottam argues that the long-range goal of preserving American hegemony requires a well-balanced strategy, ori- ented primarily towards "the greatest possible effect in altering long-term trends in a direction consistent with policy objectives." This notion of trend alteration is paramount; it involves "re- inforcing some trends, redirecting States. Yet the probability remains ti t others, and reversing some." The trends the United States will be increasingly; in- which Cottam sees as'significant in this volved in operations that can be de- scribed as competitive interference and that a failure to perform well in these operations could be decisive." Developing the competence necessary for such a task, says Cottam, requires a new and more systematic approach to policymaking. First, he calls for institu- tional changes to allow a more effective integration of covert and overt diploma- cy. Once the institutional apparatus is Cot tam's 1? AP1X9vtedt Fr ,6ii 'ase 22G01GIO6r(? c~lALROP ~ ~Oe ,l '4 e ` makes more sense when viewed against "audacious" interventions, r, i~liorce Ca e the backdrop of the intense interdcpart_ placing them with more sophist development in favorable directions. mental feud which has raged in Vietnam cated political engineering. Rather th:, The foundations on which this system rstsr, ;ire beginning to crack. ever since the military replaced the CIA inextricably tying ourselves to ;; ?, sts, hour howev.? re to crack. as the dominant force on the scene. Cot- Sh;:.' he believes the U.S. should p~ ? gghout world, the tam's views on the war echo the sophis- tcct its long-range options through i grelites" 1 h groom strategists are eithes ticated corporate liberal argument that policy of "more critical" support, ~~ ?Quinunah;; t mgroo the contra the political costs of the war-particu- could support the Shah, for instanc. g ~.~ies, or are larly the increasing polarization at without wholeheartedly backing ,fict ict fions or in in .: . ~ urn own n repression societies, are home and abroad-now require its liqui- hated secret police. We could pro'- ,engif tee. ue of controas t dation. Predictably, those views moti- more covert help to acceptable .,rit l . ueof l. They are are vated Cottam to an active and pronhi_ ments within the opposition, particu?.^- caught ht nin tc tre;ld, to z towards between ro more inequal- McCarthy position in the Pittsburgh area ly to Iranian students who might other- ti between rich and poor e nequal- McCarthy campaign in 1968. wise be radicalized. To implement such. ity the rends c their own people. As One of his complaints, bout Vietnam a policy change, Cottam suggests several and movements develop is that the political engineering job has types of diplomatic probes which could revolutionary been so half-hearted: Rather than the tip the Shah off to U.S. intentions with- throughout the Third World, the U.S. is U.S. controlling Saigon, as is widely be- out completely alienating him. This forced to reinforce those repressive re- lieved, the corrupt generals actually scheme, similar to some of the back- gimes in order to maintain its control. control us; despite the major invest- stage maneuvers in the Vietnam negoti- These trends, accompanied by the ment of men and material, the U.S. ations game, offers insights into the military defeat being suffered by the lacks complete decisive leverage on the common techniques of U.S. policy- U.S. in Vietnam, suggest that political polarization between the U.S. and the Saigon government. Cottam does not makers. of the Third World will con- Vietnam his illustration of this point to Speaking of the "second phase" of a people Vietnam but fills it out most complete- much more complicated scenario, in- tinue. This may mean that policy- ly in the case of Iran, the country that tended to mystify public understand- makers will be forced to rely even more served as his operational and intellec- ing, Cottam explains: "The second on Cottam's nifty bag of covert tual stomping ground. (In addition to phase could take advantage of the sepa- "tricks." On the other hand, his pro- his "foreign service" work there, he has ration of powers in the United States. In posals may have been rejected because also written a historical account of this action, a junior Democratic Senator they are too threatening to existing Iranian nationalism. He is dismayed by who had criticized the government poli- bureaucratic that concrete with unworkable which U.S. policy there-not because, as the cy of supporting right-wing dictator- given van U.S. must now te forces wit wit Perhaps his Perhaps radicals think, U.S. imperialism has too ships could be utilized. He could be in- published contend. much control in Iran, but because we formed by a State Department repre- that than submitting sub don't have enough!) sentative that the government would in i~ book wh form Cottam rather o While all appearances and statistical not only not resent his airing his views them as an internal memorandum. In data would argue that Iran is practically but would even welcome a public state- either case, Cottam's candid' call for a dependency of the U.S., Cottam con- ment from him evaluating his support more refined techniques of internation- tends that, in actual fact, this country's of the Shah's regime. There is no reason al manipulation by the U.S. offers valu- allegiance to the Shah's despotic regime whatever for the Senator to say any- able insights into imperialist political has actually decreased U.S. leverage thing he did not believe. The optimum thinking. -DANIEL SCHECHTER there. "Since August 1953," he writes, hope would be for the Senator to accept AFRICA RESEARCH GROUP alluding to the CIA-engineered coup the necessity of working with the Shah, which toppled Mossadegh, "the impact but to argue that unless the Shah en- of American policy has been quite sub- gages in basic political reform any sup- stantial in influencing trends in a direc- port of his regime would be useless. This tion viewed unfavorable." As a result, is a much stronger probe and reactions' the U.S. has over-identified itself with a from official and non-official groups regime which uses the U.S. as much as could be_anticinated." . the U.S. uses it. In the long run, Cottam ED-COLONIALISM is the fragile fears, this policy will threaten U.S. strategy underlying the Ameri- hegemony because it ties us too tightly can empire. By centralizing the to a regime against which pressures for intelligence about nations and peoples change are beginning to mount. Already who are little-known to most Ameri- the growing movement of opposition to cans, the CIA has managed to coordi- the Shah is characterized by a deeply- nate the multi-level penetration of the based anti-Americanism and an "attrac. Third World on behalf of American cor- tion" to revolutionary communist ide- porate interests. Through a variety of ologies. If these trends continue, the covert instruments, the CIA has provid- U.S. might be confronted with "overt ed the institutional network through political rebellion" which would re- which the Empire is administered. quire "interference on the most auda- Throughout the Third World, CIA strat- cious level as in Guatemala, Lebanon, egists seek to forge a "strategy of cunhu- the Dominican Republic and South, lative impact"; one in which many dif- ++ e e ov rt and covert, Vietnam."Approved For Release 1~0~i t oIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6 Approved For Ruse 2001&I :.$4-00O9R001000080002-6 15 Mar 1970 By WWILL1A3r TIEIS Chief, Sunday Advertiser lVaahington Bureau. WASHINGTON, - Is t h e public. debate over the Central Intelligence Agency's military role in Laos jeopardizing its primary information-gathering assignment in this big - still bad - world? Has the time been reached when Senate and other critics of the Laotian involvement should more carefully define their terms and targets? y c on Should somebody, p e r h a p of ~ government, should not be carelessly, p e r,h a p s inadvcr- tenily damaged. CIA director Richard helms, a career official, has made staunch friends on Capitol hill by his candor and coopcra tier. Most lawmakers recognize that some clandestine opera- tions are necessary and that such operations don't remain secret if talked about. I1ut, remembering the CIA. run Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, those most concerned a r e determined to make sure the agency is not misused. some feeling that format or?in~ ~ what some senators do not formal limits or guidelines' say, but what 1s generally ac- should be adopted in the :CIA- cepted as fact, Is that. a small Mike Mansfield, an Asian ex- pertlong concerned about U. S. involvement in Laos, Is one who thinks "some terms ought to be defined." Jnvils also said he felt that the ground rules affecting CIA activities should be disclosed except when the "paramount national Interest" Is Involved. Mansfield points out that the North Vietnamese have long had forces in the northeastern areas of Laos, along the Ho Chi Minh trail, along which the Cwnmmilsts move troops and material Into South Vietnam. And he notes that because the U. S, has been bombing that area, both countries have in ef- fect been Ignoring the 1962 group of their colleagues who constitute a CIA "watchdog" subcommittee have 'been in- formed all along about the agency's Laotian role. And the CIA's training ac- tivity in the struggle to keep Laos from being overrun by the Communists has been widely The Foreign Relations com- I, reported in news dispatches., mitteeman 1s quick to defend the fundamental role of the CIA, while regretting its ap- parent m 11I t a r y operational assignment in Laos. "T have grefrt faith In Dick Helms," Mansfield said. "Not to criticize clandestine operations as such, it Is too bad they are being undertaken in Laos. They r e p r e s e n t a counter-effort against counter-forces w h I c h have stayed in: Laos regardless of the Geneva Agreement." Sen. Albert Gore ), also a Senate Foreign, Relation,Commlltee member, said he had found helms and the CIA "completely candid." He reflected an understanding. In the Senate that the civilian agency has been performing essentially a military task on orders of the National Security Council. Hclnns briefed members ct the Foreign Relations Commit- tee Friday in a dosed session on CIA activities In Laos. Choir- man J. W i i 11 a m Fulbright (D-Ark.) told reporters that the use of CIA members In the U. S. foreign aid program in Laos was a long-standing policy established by the National Se- curity Council. Fulhritht, spcalcing for hint- self, said the policy was laid down before helms took office.. Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.):' said that the Foreign.Relations~ committee has been "having trouble gcuLting certain in- formation," One thing that is .not acceptable," said the ? for- mer World- War TI officer, is even the President, help clear confusion in the public mind about CIA operations, without compromising its vital tasks? The feeling In the Senate to- day is that the big intelligence agency, created after World War TI to Improve this import- ant and largel secret fun ti Approved For Release 2001 /03 'l:'"fit`MV 84-0 499RO01000080002-6 The Progressive February 1970 Approved For Re a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00+4WR001000080002-6 by ERWIN KNOLL .A. DOCUMENT filed with the U.S. District Court in Baltimore in be- half of a young Army lieutenant seek- ing release from the service as a con- scientious objector. . . . ,r An unusual press conference cony, ducted by the commandant of the Army's intelligence school. . . . A startling speech delivered by a self-styled "country lawyer" who visited Vietnam last summer. . . . These are among the fragments that are suddenly drawing attention to Project Phoenix, a mysterious "advi- sory program" jointly operated by the U.S. Army and the Central Intelligence A.~c~ ncy to help the Saigon govern- ment attack the Vietcong "infrastruc- ture" in South Vietnam. Established in 1967, Project Phoenix has been officially described-on those rare occasions when it has been offi- cially described at all-as a scientific, computerized, intelligence operation designed to identify, isolate, capture, or convert important Vietcong agents. In one of the few public accounts of Phoenix issued by the American mis- sion in Saigon, it was claimed a year ago that 8,600 blacklisted suspects had been "captured, killed, or, welcomed as defectors" in a nine-month peri- od. More recently the Pentagon has claimed a total "bag" of 30,000 Viet- cong suspects. Among the strong supporters of Project Phoenix in the Nixon Admin- istration is Henry A. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, who is known to be- lieve the program can play a crucial role in destroying the Vietcong oppo- nam. Emissaries from Kissinger's White House office have carried encouraging reports on Phoenix to Capitol 11111. Despite the pervasiveness of the Phoenix operation-?--American "l'lroe- nix advisers" are assigned to the forty- four provinces, most of the 212 dis- tricts, and all the major cities of South Vietnam-American news dispatches 'have made only scant mention of the program. Two articles in The Wall Street Journal-in September, 1968, and March, 1969-indicated that Phoe- nix teams occasionally step outside the bounds of due process and conven- tional warfare to achieve their results. Reporting from Saigon last summer on the "semipolice state" maintained by President Nguyen Van Thieu, Richard Dudman wrote in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch: "Critics say the Phoenix system often is abused. Huong Ho, a member of the National Assembly from Kien Phong Province, says police often pick up someone on the street, order him-have described Songmy as a "deplor- to denounce a wealthy citizen as a Vietcong agent, arrest the rich man, and then release him on payment of 25,000 or 50,000 piastres in ransom. "Ngo Cong Due, a deputy from Vinh Binh Province in the Mekong Delta, says that malicious informants and sometimes actual Vietcong agents supply names to the Phoenix blacklist, getting around the Phoenix system of cross-checks by reporting a person through several different agencies. "U.S. officials contend that necessary flexibility makes some abuses incvita- sition during the period of American ERWIN KNOLL Is the Washington editor military withdrawals from South Viet- of The Progressive. ble. The mission's report says that a person arrested is taken before a mil- itary field court 'if the evidence and the testimony add up to a legal case.' But it notes that 'such legally admis- sible evidence may be impossible to oh- tain if most of the witnesses and the evidence are beyond the court's reach in enemy territory,' "'If the case against the suspect is nevertheless conclusive, he is detained,' says the report. 'Under Vietnamese law, such a man may be detained without judicial charge up to two years, and that detention period may be extended if the detainee's freedom would constitute a threat to the secu- rity of the nation.' " When Dudman filed his report last July, he wrote that the Phoenix black- list of Vietcong . suspects had been re- fined "to eliminate mere rank-and-file and leave only the Vietcong leaders members of the newly elected village and hamlet 'liberation committees' and such officials as political, finance and security chiefs in the shadow govern- ment." The new, refined list totaled 70,000 names. That American military advisers are lending their good offices to a system susceptible to such abuses as blackmail, false arrest, and detention without trial can hardly he expected to arouse mas- sive indignation at this stage of the sordid Vietnam adventure. But the most recent allegations about Project Phoenix raise a much larger question -particularly in view of the disclo- sures about the massacre of Vietnam- ese civilians at Songmy. American officials, from President Nixon down, able but isolated incident." How iso- lated and to what extent deplored? Project Phoenix, it has been charged, is a concerted, deliberate program of torture and assassination. Francis T. Reitemeyer, twenty-four years old, of Clark, New Jersey, had a degree in classical languages and phi- losophy from Seton Hall University and was studying for the priesthood at Immaculate Conception Seminary when he enlisted in the Army in 1967. He' was commissioned a second lieu- Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Approved For Ruse 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00409R001000080002-6 tenant, and was assigned from October 18, 1968, to December 6, 1968, to the Army Intelligence School at Fort Ilola- bird, Maryland, where he was trained to be a "Phoenix adviser." When he received orders for Vietnam, he ap- plied for discharge as a conscientious objector and retained a Baltimore ACLU attorney, William It. Zinnian, to carry his appeal through the courts. On February 14, 1969, Zinnian filed in Reitcmcyer's behalf a "proffer," or offer to prove certain facts in connec- tion with the appeal. The proffer stated in part: "Your petitioner was informed that he would be one of many Army offi- cers assigned as an adviser whose func- tion it was to supervise and to pay with funds from an undisclosed source eighteen mercenaries (probably Chinese, none of whore would be of- ficers or enlisted men of the U.S. nill- itary) who would be explicitly directed, by hire and other advisers to find, cap= ture, and/or kill as many Vietcong and Vietcong sympathizers within a given number of small villages as was possi- ble under the circumstances. "Vietcong sympathizers were meant to include any male or female civilians of any age in a position of authority or influence in the village who were politically loyal or simply in agree- ment with the Vietcong or their ob- jectives. The petitioner was officially advised by the lecturing U.S. Army officers, who actually recounted from their own experiences in the field, that the petitioner as an American ad- viser might actually be required to maintain a 'kill quota' of fifty bodies a month. "Your petitioner was further in- formed at this Intelligence School that he was authorized to adopt any tech- nique or employ any means through his mercenaries, which was calculated to find and ferret out the Vietcong or the Vietcong sympathizers. "Frequently, as related by the lectur- ing officers, resort to the most extreme forms of torture was necessary. On one occasion, a civilian suspected of being a sympathizer was killed by the paid mercenaries, and thereafter decapitated and dismembered, so that the eyes) head, cars, and other parts of the dece- dent's body could be and in fact were prominently displayed on his front lawn as a warning and an inducement "Project Phoenix, i' has been charged, is a concerted, deliberate program of torture and assassination." to other Vietcong sympathizers, to dis- close their identity and turn themselves in to the adviser and the mercenaries. "Another field technique designed to glean information from a captured Vietcong soldier, who was wounded and bleeding, was to promise medical assistance only after the soldier dis- closed the information sought by the interrogators. After the interrogation had terminated, and the mercenaries and advisers were satisfied that no fur- ther information could be obtained from the prisoner, he was left to die in the middle of the village, still bleed- ing and without any medical atten- tion whatsoever. On the following morning, when his screams for med- ical attention reminded the interroga- tors of his presence, he was unsuccess- fully poisoned and finally killed by decapitation with a rusty bayonet. The American advisers, who were having breakfast forty feet away, acquiesced in these actions, and the death of this soldier was officially reported 'shot while trying to escape.' "Another field instructor suggested that the advisers would not always be engaged in such macabre ventures, and cited an incident on the 'lighter side.' The instructor recounted the occasion when a group of advisers together with South Vietnamese soldiers sur- rounded a small pool where a number of Vietcong soldiers were attempting to hide themselves by submerging under water, and breathing through reeds. The advisers joined the South Viet- namcse soldiers in saturating this pond with hand grenades; at this juncture, the instructor remarked to his stu- dents, which included your petitioner, 'that, although this incident might ap- pear somewhat gory, while you listen to it in this classroom it was actually tor as 'one who no whether we win or lose, have a war to fight.' "The petitioner was officially in- structed that the purpose of the 'Phoe- nix Program' to which he was assigned was not aimed primarily at the ene- my's military forces, but was essentially designed to eliminate civilians, political enemies, and 'South Vietcong sympa- thizers.' Your petitioner was further in- formed that the program sought to ac- complish, through capture, intimida- tion, elimination, and assassination, what the United States up to this time was unable to accomplish through the conventional use of military power.... "Your petitioner was warned that loss of the war and/or his personal capture by the enemy could subject him personally to trial and punish- ment as a war criminal under the precedents established by the Nurem- berg Trials as well as other precedents such as the Geneva Convention. "Your petitioner sincerely urges that this kind of activity was never envi- sioned by him, whether concretely or abstractly, as a function and purpose of the United States Army, before and even after he entered the service. . . ." Lieutenant Reitemeyer was never called to testify on the allegations in his proffer. His case-and a parallel appeal for conscientious objector sta- tus from another student at the Army Intelligence School, Lieutenant Mi- chael J. Cohn-were heard by Fed- eral Judge Frank A. Kaufman, who ruled on July 14 that the two men had demonstrated they were entitled to discharge as conscientious objectors. The Army filed notice of appeal, but withdrew it last October. The case is closed. longer cared as long as we a lot of fun, to watch the bodies of Lieutenant Reitemeycr's allegations the Cong soldiers fly into the air like received only brief and cursory notice fish,' as the hand grenades exploded in the media when his proffer was in the pond. This instructor was sub- filed with the court a year ago. Press sequently described by another instruc- interest was revived after the Songmy Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 ?pTit'nu`' Approved For Rel ads 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 affair erupted into headlines. I he first de(ailcd account of the Rs,ilrm yrr case appcarcd on December 11 in in article in The i'illagr Voir.r by Jndith Coburn and Geoffrey Cowan, who dsn reported on a visit they had paid to Fort I ioward, a rugged, isolated tract on the grounds of a Veterans Admin- istration hospital near Baltimore. Fort Howard has a mock Vietnamese village that serves as a training adjunct to Fort Ilolabird's intelligence school. "As we walked around the edge of the, fence toward the concrete bunker we could hear the sound of voices," Miss Coburn and Cowan wrote. "There were brutal shouts a few dozen yards away: You get his arm, I'll get his leg. You get the, other one.' Then, there were anguished, indistinguishable shouts, then the sound of a wornanis voice, and a child's. It wasn't a veter'- ans' hospital, we decided, and quickly, headed back down the road." The two reporters said they "got the runaround" when they attempted to ask questions at Fort IIolabird about the Phoenix training program. On December 12, however-the day after The Village Voice article ap- peared-Colonel Marshall Faliweli, the commandant of the intelligence school, opened the closely guarded gates of Fort Ilolabird to the press. His pur- pose, he said, was to deny Reitemey- er's "wild allegations" and "bring some reason" into the public discussion of Project Phoenix. The intelligence school graduates 9,000 Army men a year, of whom only "a small percentage" are assigned to Project Phoenix, Colonel Faliwell said, although almost the entire class of forty-nine second lieutenants to which Reitemeyer ? and Colin belonged was destined for the Phoenix program. The commandant said he had con- ducted an "informal review" of Rcite- nicyer's charges that terror tactics and assassination were taught at Fort IIola- bird. "It just isn't done," he said. "We know precisely what the individual in- structor is supposed to get across and how he is supposed to get it across. He is supposed to follow that script." Some instructors may stray from their carefully prepared material to tell "war stories" to their students, Colonel Fallwell acknowledged, but the kind of instruction described by Reite- meyer would be "completely against the Geneva Convention, the Universal Code of Militaiy Justice, and Depart- ment of the Army regulations." As for the training exercises at Fort Iloward, "almost every Army post has a Vietnam village," Fallwell said. In- structors at the intelligence school "draw up lists of individuals with known or suspected Vietcong syrnpa- thics in that village," lie continued, and students "plan and mount an op- eration for seizure of that village" and interrogation of its occupants. Mem- bers of the school's staff play the role of villagers. A Pentagon spokesman also offered sonic comments on December 12, Both Reitemeyer and Cohn, he told rcport- crs, were dismissed from the intelli- gence school for academic failure. What's more, Reitemeyer had given the Army a sworn statement on Dc- ccrnber 6, 1968-three months before his proffer was filed in the Baltimore court-in which he had denied that he was receiving training in assassina- tion techniques. The statement had been requested, according to the Pen- tagon spokesman, after reports were re- ceived that Reitemeyer had told a girl- friend he was being trained in murder. "I am not being trained in any p0. it T -,~au~A rr.. Mauldin in Chicago Sun-Tames "There's a tough bunch. Under the VC they survived liberation, orien- tation, and taxation. From us they took defoliation, interrogation, and pacification." ]itical assassination," said the statement attributed to Reitenuyer by the spok, - man. "I never told [her] that I was being trained to he an assassin, nor that I was to be in charge of a group of assassins." Students at the intelligence school are required to execute a pledge that they will not disclose details of their training. Reitemeyer is reported to be traveling in the West, and I could not reach him for comment. George W. Gregory, who practices law in Cheraw, South Carolina, knows nothing about the intelligence school at Fort Ilolabird. lie knows a little bit about Victnarn, which he visited last August as the attorney for Major Thomas E. Middleton Jr. of Jefferson, South Carolina, one of the eight Green Berets charged with the murder of a suspected South Vietnamese double-agent. The charges against all eight were abruptly dropped for the official reason that their trials would compromise American intelligence op- erations in Vietnam. While represcnt- .ing Major Middleton, Gregory learned a few things about Project Phoenix, and on December 19 he discussed some of his findings at a luncheon of the Atlanta Press Club. Phoenix, Gregory told the Atlanta newsmen, is a program "where you in- filtrate the Vietcong and exterminate" those in the "infrastructure." Quite often, Americans must do their own killing because the Vietnamese, he said, are "half-hearted" about the Phoe- nix work. When he was in Saigon, Gregory observed, "the smart money was going Uncle Ho so the Americans had to do their own dirty work." When the Green Berets were charged with murder, Gregory recount- ed, Americans in the Phoenix program sought out military lawyers in Saigon "in droves" to inquire about their pos- sible vulnerability to similar charges. I called Gregory in Cheraw to con- firm press reports of his Atlanta speech and ask for more details. He said he heard about the assassination phase of Project Phoenix both from ,"people who were in on the deal" and from Army lawyers whose advice had Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 Appproved For R&$se 2001/03/06 CIA-RDP84-0Q419R001000080002-6 been solicite . "I said to myself, 'My God, this is quite relevant to my sit- uation,' " Gregory told me. "'llow can they charge my people [the Green Berets] when they are ordering other people to do these things?"' Gregory said he had questioned a CIA agent whose name he recalls as Chipman about the assassinations car- riec on under Project Phoenix, and the agent replied, "Certainly I know all about it." But on the stand', the agent added, "I would have to claim executive privilege." Gregory professed to be surprised at press interest in his Atlanta speech. "I'm just a country lawyer," he told me, "but everybody knows about Phoe- nix in Saigon, and I just figured you all knew about it in Washington." Well, we don't know, but there is a` chance we may find out. In responsF to urgings from William Zinnian, the ACLU lawyer in Baltimore, and que- ries from the press, several Senators have begun looking into Project Phoe- nix. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is preparing for a new round of hearings on the Vietnam war, is known to be giving active con- sideration to the possibility of taking public testimony on Project Phoenix. Meanwhile, those who still have faith can draw comfort from the as- surances offered by Dennis J. Doolin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of De- fense for East Asian Affairs, who says Phoenix makes every effort "to capture and reorient former members of the VCI [Vietcong infrastructure] toward support of the government of Vietnam and to obtain information from them about the VCI." A counter-terror cam- paign, he adds, "obviously would sub- vert and be counterproductive to the basic purpose of pacification in reor- ienting the allegiance of all the South Vietnamese people toward support of the government of Vietnam." How is this "basic purpose of paci fication" served by the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, the burning of villages, and the forced relocation of their occupants? Doolin is right, of course, in suggesting that tactics of counter-terror would be "counterpro- ductive." The dark allegations about Project Phoenix make no sense. Is there any aspect of the American effort in Vietnam that does? Approved For Release 2001103/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 CLR-ISTI11ii SCIn MONITOR Approved For R&lease 2001/03~1N7kDP84-06998001000080002-6 Intelligence gathering only By Daniel Southerland Special correspondent of C armsorandsma' id role The chief American adviser in' the pro. Saigon : gram remains a CIA man, but the CIA has in most places withdrawn its men from The United 'States Central Intelligence A (CIA) has been gradually cutting, of the effort in the 44 provinces. It has back its involvement in a number of para. turned over the financing of Phoenix opera- , military and pacification operations In Viet- tions to the U.S. Army. ;earn, The agency is concentrating more and more of its efforts here on its tradition- The CIA has also been yielding its con- al role of intelligence gathering. "trol over the provincial reconnaissance.; units (PRUs), one of the main arms of The U.S. Embassy, the U.S. military com- the Phoenix program. The PRUs special. mand, and the agency itself appear 'to ize In night raids into enemy territory' agree that the shift is in the right direction aimed at capturing Viet Cong agents. Un- and will permit the CIA to do a more effec- der the CIA, they, have been. paid better', tive job in the intelligence field. than most regular troops. In the early stages of U.S. involvement' : , ? In Vietnam, the CIA was used to carry out Denland8 exceeded capacity a number of tasks which required great The CIA still, advises agencies involved flexibility, and a capacity for swift funding. '. in the Phoenix program, but its involve-: .and action .which neither the State Depart- ment has noticeably diminished and is more .ment nor' the Defense Department appeared indirect, ? to possess. Informed sources say the CIA will also :It is no secret that the CIA controlled . give up control over,its "census grievance" the operations of U.S. Special Forces troops? network in the villages and hamlets, which working with montagnards watching the ?? provides a flow of information to the prov iniilt' ation routes in the central highlands .ince level that circumvents the Vietnam- of South Vietnam in the early 1960's, funded ese chain of command, and helped train the Vietnamese Special ;, Forces in their early years, and later did ;. When we came into Vietnam in a . big.?? the same for the black-paj am a clad Viet- 'Way, there' were a number of revolutionary namese Rural Development (RD)' cadre, .concepts involved in fighting this.. kind. of `who now are more than 40,000 strong in war.which our conventional government and army machinery were unable ? to the countryside. handle," said ?a well-informed source. Phaseout gradual "When the PRUs were set up for in-,,` Several years ago, the agency started' stance,: there was a need for mobile recon-, giving up whatever control it had over- the . naissance units not subject to all the Ares Special Forces. Last year, it got out,of the;sures. of- the Vietnamese apparatushe training program for RD cadre at Vung said. "The U.S. Army was not in a position,, Tau and stopped being their paymaster , in ito issue them weapons. The agency was. more flexible. the provinces. recently, the CIA has started cut-' "But the larger these programs became; More recently, ice fitly, the e the more they came under people's control,` ling its involvement in other has rat develop in Vietnam. and the more the Vietnamese became .capa which back it helped i ble of running them," the source said.. Among them is the Phoenix program, a ' ? "As these programs became .'less novel,,. two-year-old, nationwide effort which pools and more routine, the CIA became less.sult-s information from half a dozen U.S. ' and able to run them," South Vietnamese intelligence agencies with ??, ;. 'r ., .''the object of identifying and capturing Viet 'Dad experience' charged ? Cong political agents. According to American advisers, the pro- After, the CIA had ' gotten such programs gram is not doing so well as it should. be moving, the U:S. mission and the?US . 'mill for a variety of reasons,' including a,.Iack' Lary command wanted more control, over,; of leadership. and interest on the part of -. them, the source said. 'It appears the CIA the Vietnamese, was more 'than happy to relinquish come ? Phoenix operations, which range from a mend. single policeman going after a single agent "This has been a bad experience fbr to hundreds of troops surrounding whole ahem," the source said. "In some 'cases,. villages, are aimed at destroying the' Viet their reputation has suffered. The' CIA, likes ,Cong infrastructure, or "phantom govern, melt." Approved For. Release 2 boil iendenb6 Rbut here BQ10';1000080002-6 uontinuod ring pto jpyPniSaFpglrep plgu 4P1/03/06: CIA-RDP84-O@M9ROO 1000080002-6 completely control. "With programs reaching into each province, they were forced to recruit peo-. ple from outside the agency to do some of. the-jobs for them, and this diluted the pro- fessionalism of their own people. Many of the outsiders were a lot less dedicated' to their jobs than the professional CIA men. And a lot of the professional people resent- ed being taken away from their traditional ?; 'intelligence-gathering role to do other jobs.' "The. agency has gone through 'a large personnel and budget cutback," he said. "It would prefer to preserve most of its resources for its classical intelligence role." Data reputation solid Despite its dispersal of talent and re. sources, the CIA has enjoyed the reputation here of frequently providing Washington with more-realistic , reports on,, political, military, and economic developments than do the political section of tlie'U.S. embassy, ;`,; the U.S. military command, and.the U.S. aid mission. In some cases where other agencies appeared to have, been unduly op. timistic, CIA analysts came up,.with, cau. tious and pessimistic assessment which later proved more accurate. 'There were times several years ago when .the CIA appeared on some levels to be ...working at cross purposes ?with the U.S. ambassador. and, the U.S. military ' com- ' mand. 'Today, however, these relationships. appear for. the most part to work rather smoothly.. Although there seems to be general agree- ment on. the. wisdom of the shift in CIA activities, not everyone is happy with the cutback. A U.S. Army officer complained to'a re= porter that. it was, going to'. be larder to- get good and 'fast material support in the Phoenix program now .that the Arrhy' is in ' ,, charge of the ? logistical 'side of .' Phoenix operations. Flexibility praised And a civilian-pacification official-he isl not a CIA man-said: "It is unfortunate that the CIA Is the only. organization in Vietnam with the flexibility, and' imaginatjon needed to sustain special operations where' we have had to bring a, lot,of people in quickly. The only reason they got involved was that they were the only` . ones with the flexibility to respond." , The CIA does continue to offer advice. to, the Vietnamese police, and the police agent' ties are the backbone of the Phoenix pro. gram., Although Saigon government officials have' 'denied it, there is good reason to believe the' CIA last year helped the police uncover an. espionage ring that reached all the way, into, the Presidential Palace. The subsea, quent', trial , in November resulted, ip 'the. . conviction of 41 persons; Including a Yormer special'assistant' to? President-ThieU,? Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6 SECRET (When Filled In) AREA OR HQ Congress Public image Security Public relations History IOENTIYICATION OF OOCUM4NY (aufhar, farm, addreeeee, fief A ten/eh) File of unclassified press clippings about CIA arranged in chronological order. DOCUMENT DATE:197D1 fq7~? CLASS. i None NO.1 HS/HC-950?; ABSTRACT The source of this material is the clipping service maintained by the; Assisttant to the Director for Public Relations. These items included, editorial comment about CIA as well as reports o events -- not the- subject of individual files in the Historical Staff. ,o - ... ;. , a ,' ~. i t. t ~. I t ? ~: ti F~ i !~`I ~-i , i it,~ r4~~:64 ti Approved For Release 2001/03/06 CIA-RDP84-00499R06,1060080002-6 ' 1 05 2628 eairieMi PUVIOU5 HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET Place card upright in place of charged out folder. 1 i KAW* file folder. C ARGE TO DATE C, RGE TO DATE Approved For Releasi 01FdAP ArR-'R- T848%9R001000080002-6 FORM NO. 119 REPLACES FORM.3i5.152 (7) 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.