THE LOST CRUSADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 8, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

I3Ei'f YORK TAE BOOK RWIEW
v NOVTstziac ' -_
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America in Vietnam.
By h ? er L. Coo er.
Foreword by Ambassaaor verell Harriman.
559 pp. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. $12.
There are some subjects about which it is hard to assume an air of
enlightened detachment. One is, or at least used to be, religion. Another
is sex. And one is surely the Vietnam war. Over the past 20 years (yes, 20,
for it was in May, 1950, that Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced
that the United States would aid France in its struggle to subdue 'the Com-
munist-led Vietminh) there have been passionate denunciations of America's
role in Indochina and (although with increasing rarity) fervent justifications.
The hawks told us we were defending the Free World, holding the line against
aggression, protecting a brave people, making the world safe for democracy-
you name it. The doves were aghast at our support of self-seeking autocrats
and, incompetent generals, or our systematic devastation of Vietnam, or. the
toll wrought on our own society-name it again. The issue long ago became a
moral one. The lines have become so tightly drawn and the arguments so famil-
iar that even to launch discussion of the subject seems redundant. Operation
Total Victory has now given way to Operation Face-Saving. Nixon's so-called
Vietnamization plan,afor all its loopholes and booby-traps, is designed to ease us
out the back door of a war that cannot be won, that the American people are fed
up with, and that no one is quite sure how we ever go into.
We are now in the "I must have been really drunk last night to have done
that" stage of the war, the morning-after when it is hard to remember how
we ended up where we did, or what possibly could have been on our
minds along the way. It 'is a moment when we want to listen to
someone who was there when it happened, but remained
sober through it all. It is time to demystify the war, and
perhaps no one is better equipped.for the task than
Chester Cooper, an old Asia hand whose service in
government stretched from the 1954 Geneva
conference on Indochina right through to
the present impasse in Paris. Perched
high in the upper strata of the foreign-
pokey bureaucracy, he was there
when the whole thing happened, and
Mr. Steel is the author of "Pax Amer-
icana," and of a forthcoming book of essays on
inter ntionism and cold ward lomacy
like a true professional he tells it the way he saw it, a foreign policy unclut-
tered by moral issues, a Vietnam without tears.
Some may find such an approach insensitive, but diplomats.are not paid
to be indignant. They are professionals whose job it is to carry out, or
occasionally impede, policies made higher up. The policy-makers, those
who orchestrated our interventions in Vietnam and elsewhere have not
been consumed by indignation or carried away by paroxysms of
moral fervor. They were sober men conducting a foreign policy
which, however aberrant it may now seem, was based on
very real principles: the division of the world between
Communists and non-Communists, and the determina-
tion to preserve existing ideological boundaries-
by force of arms where need be. Vietnam was a
logical result of that policy. It became important
only because that was where the policy finally
broke down.
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bc?ntinuod
 WP S 811101 POST
Ran i n
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Itemnanz Tiffstorical,
'r 7o
..Subtle View
It has taken a quarter cen-
tury since World War ii to
begin to produce definitive
examinations of the origins
and meanings of that con-
flict. The same time span
doubtless will be required to
do the same for what most
Americans call the Vietnam
War but what, in reality, is
most likely to take its place
in history as the second In-
dochina War.
Books about Vietnam'
have hardly been in short
supply thus far, but too
many of them have been
passionate expositions bf the
American effort, either pro
or con, and too few can
claim any subtlety let alone
qualify as history. Thus it is
with pleasure that one can
report Chester L. Cooper's
The Lost Crusade is an im-
portant contribution to the
historiography of what has
become America's 'longest
and most divisive war.
The sweep of Cooper's ac-
count is total-from the full-
est account yet of President
Roosevelt's aborted efforts
to prevent Indochina's re-
turn to France after World
War II down to President
Nixon's "incursion" into
Cambodia three decades
later. The book as history,
however, is uneven; others
have told much more of
many past periods and it is
far too soon to fix the Cam-
bodian affair in proper con-
text.
Where The Lost Crusade
shines is when Mr. Cooper
is writing about his own par-
THE LOST CRUSADE: Am.erica_ in Vietnam. `By
C c ster L. Cooper. Foreword by Ambassador JV.
vere arrcrnan.
later a dove, but he denies'
'such an oversimplification
though his shift of views is
evident enough. He came
out with "no nostrums and
no ready answers" but with
a clear belief that "the
fruits of Vietnam (win, lose
or draw) are likely to be
sour." And like many others
Reviewed by Cheliners M. Roberts
The reviewer is a staff reporter on The Washington Post
who has been writing about the Indochina War since 1954.
ticipation. Ile was not a
principal actor, but he has
been deeply involved in
many twists and turns, most
especially in the ill-fated
1967 efforts of British Prime
Minister Harold Wilson to
do a deal with visiting So-
viet Premier Alexei Kosygin
while a suspicious Lyndon
Johnson fussed back at the
White House. The bulk of
this account is appearing
Sunday in The Washington
Post Outlook section.
Mr. Cooper's credentials
include, in his 25 years in
government service with the
OSS in the China-Burma-
India theater, with the CIA
as an analyst and intelli-
gence estimator, and attend-
ance at both the 1954 Ge-
neva and 1962 Laos confer-
ences plus the SEATO
founding conference of 1954.
He was on the National Se-
curity Council planning
board, was:Fan Asian affairs
aide to McGeorge Bundy In
the White House and, to cap
it, was an assistant to W. Av-
erell Harriman during Iiar-
riman's period as Lyndon
Johnson's Vietnam peace ne-
gotiator.
He went into Vietnam a
hawk and emerged ' years
rather than the official ver-
sions so far produced and
still to come, most" notably
that of President Johnson.
One sees Ambassador Harri.
man cut off from key infor.
mation: What did Johnson
and Kosygin say to each
other at Glassboro? Why did
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
want Mr. Johnson to ap-
prove "a raid on the one
juicy target left in Hanoi" at
the moment support was
growing to end all bombing '
north of the 20th parallel?
A great deal previously
published has been omitted
by Cooper, which tends to
throw the book off balance.
he concludes, with some In some cases he deliber
hope, that perhaps this bit-',Aely holds back on what he,.
ter experience will teach. surely knows--he barely
Americans that their foreign touches on his CIA coniiec-
policy "will have to be based tions and that agency's role,
more on an appeal to reason But Mr. Cooper is honest
and self-interest than to. enough to concede that the
emotion and righteousness" merican correspondents in
and thus perhaps the lost Saigon in 1364.6.5, so casti-,
crusade "may provide us gated by ofi:ie.al Washing-'
with something of value, ton turned out to be more
after all." right than the government.
Maybe. Yet what is dso The very title, The Lost
much clear from so Crusade is a judgment yet
much of Mr. Cooper's book to be affirmed in. history
abis lessortive the efforts t too false starts
find a and depending, of course, oh
way to peace, so often de- one's view of the crusade it
pending on hazy or misun- self. Cooper would like to
derstood "signals" from the see the United States
Communists, as the shock- emerge with something,
ing inability of American of.
ficialdom to understand the though whether that would
people they were dealing fit Richard Nixon's prescrip-
-with. tion of "peace with honor"
M G orcre Bundy he is something else again.
(couldn't cut through the Mr. Cooper has contrib-
ooze of generalities. Two uted to our understanding
cultures and two educa of what happened; he would
tional backgrounds did not be the first to say, however,
directly conflict but rather' that. the total story has yet
slid past one another." to be written.
writes, "cane out reeling Says Cooper of his own
from a two-hour session suggestions for a new Sai-
gon government: "If this
with a Iist hierat-chyer. Ilisof
the Buddhist adds up to a 'coalition' so be
hierarchy. ,
Cooper's book probably,
will be most valuable to,
those future historians for
its vignettes, those insights
into how the American sys-
tenm of dealing with thei
problem realty .worked
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 U. S. NEWS & WORLD. "fUMT
PY RACE 9N THE SKY
Global spying by U. S. and
Russia was never more exten-
sive than in today's shaky world.
To meet the .need: novel, eye-
opening techniques.
Latest friction between U. S. and Rus-
sia in the Mideast and Cuba is shedding
new light on the spying techniques of
the two superpowers, demonstrating how
closely they watch each other.
For example:
. planes from the Azores spotted a Soviet
task force en route to Cuba, other spy
planes started a continuous watch. In
late September, Russians were photo-
graphed unloading machinery which ex-
perts took to be the start of a permanent
Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos.
? American U-2 planes flying along
the Suez Canal from Cyprus are able to
report to President Nixon the movement
of Soviet-built missiles before the Krem-
lin itself gets the information relayed
from its men on the ground.
? When the Russians test-fired their
multiple-warhead missiles into the Pa-
cific in August, the U. S. photographed
the re-entry in color. It is doubtful that
A huge Titan Ill booster rises from Cape Kennedy, Fla., to
station a nuclear-detection satellite 55,000 miles in space.
Air Force cargo planes equipped with "skyhooks" snatch
spy-satellite capsules from air by the method shown here.
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The controversial U-2 spy planes, still on active duty spot
ting Soviet missiles in the Suez truce zone and Russian
fleet build-up off. Cuba, take photographs similar to the
one below, made during the Cuba missile crisis of 1962.
? When the U. S. first test-fired its
latest submarine missile, the Poseidon,
off Cape Kennedy recently, Russian
ships were on hand to monitor the tra-
jectory and to try to recover some of the
launch debris.
? If the Russians begin construction
of a new missile site deep inside the So-
viet Union, the Pentagon knows about
it ,vithin a natter of days. Russia keeps
a similar watch on the U. S.
How is all this done?
The U. S. watch is maintained by an
astonishing array of cameras, sensors and
electronic monitors planted in the earth,
submerged in the oceans, or orbiting
through space aboard spy satellites.
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The watchers move in a world not only
of satellites, ships and manned airplanes,
but also unmanned aircraft. They use re-
mote seismic sensors to discover under-
ground atomic" explosions, sound-detec-
tion systems on the oceans' floors to spot
the passage of submarines, and over-
the-horizon radars capable of "seeing"
around the world,
Benefits. Thus, when the U. S. and
Russia sit down in Helsinki November 2
for the third round in the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, each will have excel-
lent knowledge of what is in the other's
arsenal.
U. S. officials make the point that
should the negotiators agree to a ceiling
on strategic weapons, it will be remote
surveillance that will check whether
either side is cheating.
What a surveillance system can do,
these officials say, is make it possible for
the 'superpowers to limit armament costs
-and thereby reduce arms budgets-
without fear that a "cheater" will devel-
op a massive superiority and subject the
other to nuclear "blackmail."
Each device in the surveillance sys-
tem has its own special mission. For ex-
ample, to cover hour-to-hour develop-
meats along the Suez, the U. S. called on
the U-2 reconnaissance plane that many
thought was outmoded after one was
shot down over Russia in 1960.
For another kind of mission, the U. S.
has just put into orbit a spy satellite
designed to "hang" 22,300 miles over
Southeast Asia, watching for missile
launchings in Red China and Russia.
SOVIET MISSILE BASE
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
NUCLEAR WARHEADS
PREFAB CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS I 1A
` 4 proofer - For I elelse
Gemini V astronauts, with hand camera, photo-
graphed Kenyan airfield from over 100 miles out.
The need for specialized intelligence,
say American officials, has never been
greater. Crisis in the Mideast, Russia's
race for nuclear superiority, develop-
ments off Cuba have all put a new strain
on the American spy `system.
"Collection:'., tost. This year the
U. S. will employ 136,114 persons and
spend 2.9 billion dollars gathering stra-
tegic intelligence. That was given in a
public accounting to Congress.
Knowledgeable sources estimate the
Soviets will employ about 150,000 per-
sons and spend around 3.5 billions doing
the same thing.
These figures are the tip of a very
-large iceberg: Billions more will be
expended in peripheral activities, and
in laboratories devising more ways to
collect infonnation more quickly and
accurately. . -
To the question of whether the effort
is worth the costs, U. S. officials reply
in essence:
Without it, the world would be a far
more unstable place, with both sides re-
duced to dangerous guessing in an age
when the flight time of a hydrogen war-
head between the two countries is only
30 minutes. As of now, neither can make
a move of broad military significance
without the other's being in position to
make a countermove almost immediately.
Efficiency, the sources say, borders
on the incredible.
One official declares:
"When Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird reports to the nation that the
Russians have 67 anti-ballistic-missile
sites around Moscow, he doesn't mean
66. He is speaking precisely, from" pre-
cise information."
Satellites of vastly improved efficien-
cy over early models make that possible.
When the U. S. launched its latest
August it was at least the
263rd sent aloft since No-
vember, 1961, to collect
military information.
In that same period, the
Russians have launched at
least as many.
Once or twice a month a
secret satellite is launched
into polar orbit from Van-
denberg Air Force Base in
California. The Russians
make similar launches from
Tyuratam near the Aral Sea.
These satellites whirl
around the world once
about every 90. minutes at
altitudes of 86 to 114 miles,
carrying cameras of such
high resolution that they
can discern on the ground
an object the size of a
basketball.
At the end of 8 to 12 days, these sat-
ellites eject a capsule, containing thou-
sands of photographs, which eventually
floats to earth via a parachute. The U. S.
recovers its capsules near Hawaii while
they are still in the air, using an air-
plane equipped with a "skyhook." The
Russians ? vary their capsule-landing
patterns.
A Russian satellite in polar orbit will
appear over the various regions of the
U. S. about 40 times in the course of a
flight lasting 100 hours.
Infrared devices. Cameras are not
the only instruments carried aloft. There
are infrared sensors able to differentiate
between the rays given off by a blast
furnace and those of a missile at launch.
The sensors can locate a truck at night,
or tell whether crops are healthy or dis-
eased by measuring heat radiation.
Far out in space-55,000 miles-so-
called Vela satellites are in orbit. Three
of them are always on station searching
for concentrations of gamma rays, X
rays, neutrons and large electrified fields
which would indicate the explosion of
an atomic bomb in the atmosphere.
In addition, there are satellites to map
terrain, enable ships to locate their posi-
tions, allow military men to talk to the
"other side" of the world, and report on
global weather.
As the spy satellites pass over their
homeland, they transmit their findings
to computer receiving stations on the
ground.
Computers are a vital element in the
information network. Even though
there are more than 1,800 man-made ob-'
jects traveling in space, the moment a
new one appears on a radar screen a
computer will analyze its trajectory and
flash a warning.
Also in the spy family are the "Fer- -
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"Ferret" ships, such as U.S.S. Pueblo, captured off
North Korea, monitor code transmitters worldwide.
THE SPY RACE
[continued from preceding page]
ret" satellites which monitor radio and
radar emissions, determine their location,
power and transmission frequency. With
precise information of this sort, electron-
ic engineers can figure out methods of
jamming enemy transmitters and con-
fusing their receivers. -
In a discussion of the precision with
which satellites operate, one source
said:
"Let's put it this way: If a car is
parked in downtown Washington for 24
straight hours-and the Russians are fly-
ing-they would be able to notify Presi-
dent Nixon of a parking violation."
Says another official:
"The Russians have become so sensi-
tive to our satellites, they are roofing
their submarine-construction pens to try
to keep us from knowing how many
boats they are working on and what
type."
Rocket clues. From another source,
commenting on how spy satellites are
able to tell so much about the number
of rockets Russia has in place: "
"You just don't build a missile and
stick it in the ground overnight. First,
you have to dig an enormous hole. You
have to clear an area, build roads, in-
stall communications, pour concrete and
then haul in a missile that fits the hole.
All that takes about a year. When we
spot a missile we know from its size just
about what it can do because at one
time or another we built one similar.
Its size gives a clue to what kind of war-
head it can carry. We know about war-
heads from our tests and from monitor-
ing theirs.
When the Russians shot those 3-in-1
multiple warheads into the Pacific .in
August, we had people hanging around
with gadgets and cameras. That's how
we photographed the re-entry of the
because they could be dan-
gerous."
Sea sentries. While satel-
lites glean ' most of the
strategic intelligence, a vast
array of what Washington
calls "other means" also is
employed.
There is, for example, a
vast network of underwater
detection devices, linked to
land by cable, which tells
the U. S. or its allies when
a Soviet submarine is pass-
ing through any one of the
narrow straits leading from
Russia into the oceans.
If a Soviet submarine approaches the
East Coast and passes a sensor line, lo-
cated at a classified depth, the U. S.
Navy knows it immediately.
A worldwide network of seismic sta-
tions-the latest are in Norway and Alas-
ka-tries, with only marginal success so
far, to keep track of underground atomic
tests in the Soviet Union.
On any given day, a 2,100-mile-per-
hour reconnaissance plane-the SR-71-
may streak along. the edges of Siberia or
approach Murmansk, taking photographs
from nearly 100,000 feet, while also test-
ing Russian radar capabilities.
Again, on any given day, American-
supplied U-2s, flown by Nationalist Chi-
nese pilots, may take off from Formosa
for a leisurely flight above 60,000 feet
over Lob Nor in Red China's Sinkiang
Province. Their mission is to see whether
the Communists are preparing to ex-
plode an atomic deviee or launch a mis-
sile.' It was through such a mission that
Red China was found to be working on
an A-bomb before .1964.
By and large, the U. S. does not now
fly U-2s over nations that have modern
missiles and are likely to use them. The
planes are tog slow.
From time to time, supersonic drones
-unmanned aircraft equipped with tele-
vision cameras or other sensors-streak
over Red China or North Vietnam look-
ing for anything unusual.
Finally, there are "Ferret" ships and
airplanes which have the mission of sail-
ing or flying along the coasts of unfriend-
ly nations to make tape recordings of.
short-range military-radio broadcasts,
especially those in code. Cryptographers
learn to "break" codes by the repeated
appearance of symbols in hundreds of
messages.
The Pueblo, which was captured off
North Korea in January, 1968, with 83
men aboard, was such a ship. The Navy
plane shot down by the North Koreans
in April, 1969, with the loss of 31 lives
was on a similar mission.
From the U. S. viewpoint, this mas-
sive effort produces an extraordinarily
accurate picture of what is going on in,
the world militarily, especially in the
Soviet Union. It permits an almost pre=
cise assessment of the damage that po-
tential enemies can inflict on the Unit-
ed States and its allies with strategic
weapons. .
Intelligence experts, making that
point, are quick to note, however, that
collecting information is only part of the
game.
One authority explains:
"While we know their capabilities-
and the Russians know ours-neither is
ever certain of the other's intentions. For
that we would need a good spy right
inside the Kremlin."
mess is pproveed "orl eie1se 2oOlO3? . G PAU I ~ 04 eflect sn spairi
camera which can tect light- rions osrrig tlamilete miles in space.
 N:61,7 YO TI 'S
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SALT after Suez Fissile Cheating'
By ROBERT RLEIMAN
Moscow's violation of the missile
standstill along the Suez Canal has
thrown a somber shadow across all
aspects of Soviet-American relations,
But in preparing for the third round
of the. strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT), which opens in Helsinki four
weeks from today, the White House
Insists that it remains "cautiously
optimistic." And recent press briefings
have emphasized fundamental differ-
ences between the cheating at Suez
and violations of a SALT agreement.
At Suez, 100 mobile missiles, moved
In virtually overnight, altered the tac-
tical military balance before they were
'detected. But it takes 18 months to
construct an SS-9 ICBM silo; the Rus-
sions would have to construct many
hundreds over many years to change
the strategic nuclear balance. Satellite
photos at monthly intervals would de-
tect this in time for the U.S. to react.
Morevoer, SALT does not depend on
Soviet good faith but on the Soviet
self-interest in curbing missile com-
petition, stabilizing the nuclear balance
and holding down defense expendi-
tures, Violations would be deterred by
Moreover, SALT does not depend on
fear of matching "countermeasures"
and resumption of the arms race.
Nevertheless, when all this is said,
It is evident that the Administration's
cautious optimism about SALT has
reason now to be more cautious and
less optimistic than before. A greater
wariness in Congress and within the
Administration undoubtedly will force
American negotiators to bargain hard-
er over the fine print in any SALT
treaty. The difficulties in achieving
agreement, already formidable before
Suez, undoubtedly will be magnified,
One difficulty is that both govern=
.ments have paid lip service to a com-
Cautious Optimism-
But More Cautious,
Less Optimistic
plete prohibition of antiballistic Mis-
siles- (ABM). But both . have now
signaled a preference for an American
suggestion of "limited" systems cover-
ing large regions centering on Wash-
ington and Moscow.
Since the U.S.-proposed 100-inter.
ceptor system would be more mod-
ern than the present obsolete 64-in.
terceptor Moscow system, the Rus-
sians would want to match it. That
could trigger a qualitative ABM race.
And infinitely complex negotiations
over the size, number, characteristics
and locations of radars and intercep-
tors could make agreement impossible.
Other difficulties fading the SALT
negotiators are. Russian insistence on
limiting American tactical bombers in
Europe capable . of reaching the
U.S.S.R. and American insistence on
a ceiling of 250 on the giant Soviet
SS-9 ICBM's. A first detailed Soviet
proposal at Helsinki. Is expected to
respond more or less favorably to
Washington's plan to limit long-range
missiles and bombers globally to under
2,000, roughly the current level.
The MIRV multiple warhead missile,
the chief lever now in the arms race,
remains the main challenge to SALT.
Each government would like to halt
the other's deployment. , But neither
seems willing to stand up to its mili-
tary on the issue.
The United States a year ago took
the position that a high-confidence
MIRV deployment ban would require
on-site inspection. That Impeded dis-
cussion with Moscow. Now0ronically,?.
the. Nixon Administration's prestigious
verification panel, after lengthy study,'
has concluded that no practicable
amount of on-site inspection would
add assurance' to a MIRV deployment
ban. Moscow, meanwhile, has reacted
coolly to American probes about an-
other control method - a halt in de-
velopment and reliability flight-testing;
the U.S. has shown a one-year lead.
A high Soviet diplomat, however,
recently denied to a visitor. that Mos-
cow was not interested in a combined
MIRV test-and-deployment ban. "Try
us! Tell them to try us!" he said
Several key State Department, Pen-
tagon and White House officialsrecent4
ly expressed the view in private that a
Soviet proposal to halt MIRV deploy-
ment and flight-testing without on-site
inspection would be accepted by Pres-
ident Nixon - after a bloody inter-
agency struggle.
,Why doesn't Mr. Nixon put this
proposal to the Kremlin himself? One
reason may be that the President is
unwilling to overrule the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on a proposal Moscow might
then reject. Is the same true in Mos-
cow? Or are both sides playing the old
diplomatic game of "onus-putting?"
Meanwhile, with deployment start-,
Ing, both MIRV and ABM may get be-
yond SALT's effective control. Some
Senators and former Presidential sci-
ence advisers are urging a brief mutual
moratorium on testing and deployment
of ABMs and MIRV missiles to avoid
this.
Otherwise, in expressing "cautious
optimism" about SALT in the wake of
the Suez missile crisis, the White
House may find It has been whistling
its way past the graveyard of its
hopes.
Robert Kleiman is'a member of The
Times Editorial Board, .
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 WASHINGTON STAR
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A HISTORY OF TILE BRIT-
ISH SECRET SERVICE. By
Richard Deacon. Taplinger.
440 pages. $7.95.
To this reviewer's knowl-
edge there is only one other
book-length treatment of the
subject here discuss a d,
Mildred G. Richings' "Espion-
age: The Story of the Secret
Service of the British Crown"
(1934). Though a serious-
minded effort, that work is
marred by various deficien-
cies, and in any event runs
only through the reign of Ed-
ward VII, who died in 1910.
The publication of Deacon's ti-
tle, therefore-he is an Eng-
lish biographer of John Dee,
the confidential agent for Eliz-
abeth I, and evidently an Intel-
ligence alumnus in his own
right-gave every promise
that those deficiencies would
be remedied. Well, the author
has at least brought his topic
up to the 1970s.
In so doing he has, alas, an inherently glamorous su
grossly neglected his responsi-
bilities. For a narrative begin-
ning at the reign of Henry VII
(1485-1509) the author's bibli-
ography is almost laughably
inadequate. The chapter anno-
tation at rear is riddled with
- citations either imprecise or
outdated.
In a volume ostensibly, de-
signed for general consultation
the index is nominal, with al-
most no topical entries, and
betrays an over-all skimpi-
ness. There are 30 illustra-
tions, but many of them are
poorly reproduced, and all of
them are insufficiently cap-
tioned. From time to time the
author throws out unsupported
or unelaborated generaliza-
tions, e.g., "... the Dutch are
. . highly. vulnerable as se-
cret agents." It is, finally, dif-
ficult to understand how any
writer could transform such
ject into dull reading, but Dea-
con's flat, at times awkard,
style has managed to turn this
trick.
Let it be conceded, neverthe-
less, that what Deacon has
given us is, after all, a fresh
survey of an important field.
The mere coverage involved
is daunting, and would require
the expertise of a seminar of
scholars properly to evaluate.
Moreover, as one .approaches
recent times official secrecy in
all nations enjoins anything
better than an informed guess
as to the workings of their
intelligence organizations.
Deacon has appraised Brit-
ain's modern period with due
breadth (and some first-hand
knowledge), treating the
counter-espionage, Security,
and military branches impar-
tially.
-CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS.
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 Approved For Re ease ?001 ffft s F?R001000080002-6
ICA TILE EXTENDED FAMILY
OCTOBER 1970
Government Network
As the American empire expanded in the post-war period, the U.S. government
created and staffed an immense network for administering it. By one piece
of legislation, the National Security Act of 1947, the various branches of
the military, and new Air Force, were placed under a centralized Department
of Defense with the power to draft in peacetime. The Act also formed the
National Security Council (NSC) and gave unprecedented powers to a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Together these well funded agencies erected the
apparatus of the Empire: instruments for intelligence collection and military
intervention that formed the backbone of America's heralded rise to the status
of "World Power".
That power depends in no small part on the government's ability to know what
people and other governments throughout the world are planning and doing.
As the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations observed in a study on the
"Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy," American policy abroad is
"predominantly concerned with the internal affairs of other countries.
..there is no country in the world whose changing internal power structure
is irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy." Keeping tabs on the internal political
and economic situation in every country in the world is a vast and delicate
enterprise. Its maintanence is essential for the ability to predict political
events and covertly intervene when necessary on the Empire's behalf.
The Central Intelligence Agency performed the critical task of conceptualiz-
ing and coordinating the vast network of interlinked research and intelligence
agencies. In 1969, the Federal government spent $33.3 million for social
and behavioral research on foreign areas and international affairs. In 1967,
the same government agencies spent $40.6 million in contracted research that
drew on virtually every major academic center in the nation and many abroad.
These millions are only a fraction of what it takes to keep the Intelligence
and Defense Agencies alive. Moreover, each of these government complexes--
the Defense agencies and the intelligence community--support secret research
for which figures are not available.
The actual attention Africa receives from U.S. government-sponsored research
is greater than,the figures lead us to believe. In 1969, only 11% of all
,the government research funds allocated to out-house work (research not con-
ducted in government agencies) was directly about Africa. But Africa cannot be
isolated from the larger international context. American research on Europe,
for example, has to consider Africa as well, and Africa's economic underdevelop-
ment is often researched in the context of international economic and political
problems. In this way, research about Africa is often hidden under different
names.
The activities of U.S. Federal agencies clearly illustrate how an imperialist..
government collects and analyzes data about Africa to form its varied strateg-
ies of intervention. The scope of the research and action programs carried
out by these agencies, which are coordinated with varying degrees of bureaucratic
"efficiency", present a picture of formidable U.S. impact on Africa countries.
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CIA
f
The Central Intelligence Agency is not an "Invisible Government". It is..
an integrated part of an indivisible system. It plays a critical and
central role in overseeing all government and private area research.
The CIA had its hands in generating social science research about Africa
in the United States and in creating American agencieswhich can covertly
operate as extensions of American policy in Africa.
The CIA's own research program, staffed by approximately 30,000 employees,
is-the most extensive information gathering and evaluation program in the
world. At least 80% of its research utilizes overt sources: eg.,newspapers,
radio-monitoring, research papersyand contacts with "private citizens."
That material is fed into and retrieved by a highly advanced automated
computer system, especially developed for this use by IBM. That computer--
b
.Ls a
le to deal W.LLII 200,000 such Open sources every month.
The CIA has on its staff more Ph.D.'s than several major universities
combined, and far more than any other government agency. Its role in
social science research has never been publicly revealed, 'although it
is known that many contracts go through the External Research Division,.
of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is now headed
by Ray Cline, a past deputy director of "the Agency".
The CIA's information gathering intelligence, activities are paralleled,
by its cloak and dagger type activities. These include electronic-
espionage, reconaissance (U-2 planes) and spy networks. The CIA's
covert action program aims to be able to manipulate the internal
political situation in any "target" country. Such manipulation could
include assasinations, coups, and even para-military operations aimed
at containing revolutionary efforts. In a more "positive" situation,
the CIA often is directly involved in advising chiefs of state, shaping
local institutions, or managing a country's economic development program.
The CIA's program of subsidies to various "non-profit" organizations
is central to this strategy.
CIA headquarters,
Langley, Va.: All
the info's here..
In.most countries, the CIA bases its activities in the American Embassy
and places them under the minimal control of the local Ambassador.
CIA personnel, often political officers in the Embassy, are integrated
into the coordinated "multi-agency country-team", often in leadership'
positions. This means, quite simply, that the CIA often directs the
overall thrust of U.S. penetration, seeking to fashion a "strategy of
cumulative impact." Such a strategy aims at creating or reinforcing
pro-western institutions which collectively shape a country's political
and ecye gpip *cele3o a2W0idCCAAM 00ftSAG011OW080002--6
atQ>at i,~xuell
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worked to rationalize foreign aid as a policy weapon. A network of organ-
izations ---teachers, students, cultural program associations, trade unions,
etc.--were founded or subsidized through various conduits. Many of these
sought to co-opt important African leaders and act as non-official channels
of American influence.
Many of the organizations active in Africa which have direct links to the
.CIA have been exposed in newspapers and magazines: African-American
Institute (AAI), American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), Congress of
Cultural Freedom, International Student Conference, World Assembly of Youth,-,'
Peace with Freedom, Inc., African American Labor Center. The CIA as well
helped to organize the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs
East African Publishing House, Jomo Kenyatta Educational Institute, Kenneth
Kaunda Foundation, and Milton Obote Foundation. As a matter of caution,
not conscience, the CIA has also had a hand in subsidizing African libera-
tion movements, or splinters from such movements. CIA money has helped
finance nationalist parties or back individual African politicians friendly
to the United States. Some of the organizations once funded by the CIA
folded when their links were exposed; others have had their funding picked
up by the Ford Foundation or other national and international agencies.
In many cases,. individuals oozed from a-CIA payroll to a Foundation payroll;
in all cases, the source of the funding was less important than the nature
of the task.
THE CIA AND AFRICAN STUDIES
It should not be surprising that it was the CIA which played the crucial
role in stimulating interest in African affairs in the United States.
In the late fifties, the political handwriting on the African wall was
quite visible to Washington's super sleuths even if the State Department
seemed blinded by its racist loyalty to its British and French allies.
In 1954, it was the CIA that put the African American Institute on a
solid financial footinggin close cooperation with the American Metal Climax
Corporation, the African mining concern whose Chairman became the AAI's
big angel. In that year, when Boston University launched its own African
Studies program, William 0. Brown left the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence to head it up. As the nation's chief central intelligence
agency, the CIA understood that generating information and contacts in
Africa was a priority if the U.S. was to be assured access to the Contin-
ent's "emerging" political leaders and economic resources.
In late 1956, Max Millikan, the economist who took a leave of absence from
M.I.T. to become a deputy director of the CIA, and then returned to direct
that university's CIA-subsidized Center for International Affairs, invited
a former State Department employee Arnold Rivkin to develop and direct an
African Research Program at M.I.T. Rivkin worked out a "suitable research"
design with fellow professor, Walt Rostow, an intelligence officer and close
advisor to Lyndon Baines Johnson, now in exile with that war criminal in
Texas. Rivkin's assignment was to forge policy proposals within the context
of a broader "free world" framework. Standard procedure at the M.I.T..
center at that time was the practice of publishing books in two versions,
one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the. other
"sanitized" for public consumption..
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,;Coat iuuetl
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V?DoooV?Dff ~Iunj,
V7o~~
c!oJ
ooQDc ScoSrVoHg O~c~p020o0w
,on col, V0015 ccr?cp
Whether your major interest is in Interna-
tional Relations, Economics, Science, Law,
Research, whatever ... the CIA offers you a
chance to work with problems that are con-
stantly changing, that require your utmost
skill and talent. Not only is the work fascinat-
ing, its vital contribution to the nation's se-
curity is a source?of personal satisfaction to
those who carry it out.
The CIA has its own career training program.
Each year highly qualified college graduates
are enrolled in it. This training provides a
valuable foundation for a professional career
in intelligence and produces many of CIA's
future leaders and managers.
Applications will be accepted from gradu-
ates with degrees in:
Accounting
Biology
Business
Chemistry "
Computer Science
Earth Sciences
Economics
Electrical Engineering
Finance
Foreign Language and
Area Studies
Geography
History Physics
International Relations Police Science
Law
Library Science
Mathematics
Political Science
Psychology
Public Administration.
Medicine Sociology,
Photogrammetry Space Technology
and other specialized fields. . .
The CIA offers liberal vacation, insurance
and retirement benefits. Assignments are
both in the United States and overseas. Sal-
aries are commensurate with training and ex-
perience. The work is classified and U. S.
citizenship is required.
If you are presently in military service and
are about to be separated, inquire about
opportunities for men with training in CIC,
CID, ONI, OSI, Communications, Electronics,
Logistics, Photo Interpretation, Foreign Lan-
guages, Special Forces, and other specialties
who may qualify without a college degree.
For further information write, enclosing
resume, to: Director of Personnel, Central In-
telligence Agency, Washington, D. C. 20505.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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While the CIA was "inspiring" university African Affairs programs, it
was also getting its own African intelligence division organized. In
August, 1958, the Committee of Africanists selected by the Ford Foundation
to "survey the present condition and future prospects of African Studies',
had a rare direct interview with the CIA to assess its need for personnel.
According to their report, the Agency said it would need "a constant staff
level of something like 70 people specializing in the African area; they
particularly desire those who have training in economics, geography, or-
political science. They are, however, prepared to train a man if they can-
get a person whom they feel is suitable for their type of work." Their
type of work, indeed! The CIA still recruits for new personnel-on the
campuses (see the enclosed ad if you are looking for a job!). The State
Department, interestingly, only projected a need for fifty officers over
the next 10 years. By 1961, according to State Department Advisor Vernon
McKay, "the professional staff of the Africa office declined from twenty
three to fifteen when certain long range research activities were trans-
ferred to the Central Intelligence Agency" (Africa in or Politics p. 296).
The CIA continues to shape and monitor all government sponsored research on
Africa through its participation in the Foreign Area Coordination Group and its
close links with the State Department Intelligence Agency. It has access to
all other academic output through the willing cooperation of many scholars who register their work with the State Department--or through close and over-
lapping ties with such agencies as the Ford Foundation and its academic front
committees. As well, many individual scholars have ties with the CIA or its
front groups. L. Gray Cowan, for example, the 1969-1970 President of the
African Studies Association was known to have liaisons with one Willard
Mathias, a high-level CIA funtionary. Mathias was a visiting fellow in 1958-
1959 at Harvard!s Center of International Affairs. His topic of study: Africa,
of course. Cowan has also been a long time member of the African-American
Institute's Board of Directors. And on and on.
The close ties between the CIA and so many African Studies programs suggests
more than the insidiousness of the former or the submissiveness of the latter,
What emerges.is more of a symbiotic relationship; a game in which the players
wear different uniforms but play by the same rules. LOOK editor William
Attwood, the one time ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, inadvertently offered.
some clues about the CIA's attractiveness to many scholars in his memoirs,
The Reds and Blacks. On his return to the U.S., Attwood recalls, "I put
in long hours answering questions for roomfuls of people at CIA (pipes,
casual sports jackets and yellow pads) and State (cigarettes, dark suits and.
white notebooks)". jackets and
pref.t those pipes and yellow pads every time.
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 SAWRnnv Pi VIEl W ti
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THE', IN E' LICLNCE ISOvcrcign nations, and that it over- that, in tile words of Allen Dulles. "it
ESTAL'LISI?IMEN'f ttu?ows anti-Americatl governments, gives our Government's top policy
even democratically elected ones, to makers exactly the information they
by Harry Ilow'c Ransoni install anti-communist governments- need, no more and no less, in order to
Harvard UnivIcrsity Press, 309 pp., $9.95 'with a special preference for non. make the right decisions."
clelnocratic anti-conllnullist . govern- "Information" - or "raw inforina
--- ulents. tion," as intelligence analysts call it--
Revielved by Miles Copeland Fortunately, such books have been may be good or bad, accurate or in
weak in logic and unclear in rhetoric, accu ate, relevant or irrelevant, tiriieIy,
f:3 "The intelligence operation," a Cen- and the more fact that they have cline or out of date; "intelligence," on the
tral Intelligence Agency instructor under the heading of sensational jour- other hand, is information that has
tells his pupils, "is in two parts: first, llalislll has tended to rob them of crecii- been evaluated, correlated, boiled
attaining the objective; second, con- bility. But one wonders. A Washington down to manageable dinicnsions,'and
ceasing the fact that the objective has -Post editorial writer spoke for many put into reports which can be quickly
beds attained. Usually we must also 1of 'is: when lie said, "It is obviously and easily react. CIA's main function
conceal the fact that we have made impossible for anyone who is not him- 4 is to supervise the process. No one who
any efforts to attain the objective." In self deep inside the intelligence tom. understainds management can question
other words, when an espionage opera- mtulity to write a comprehensive book, the assertion that some one agency
Lion is. Successful tile victim goes Oil about it, but w1'OIl't someone please at must have this function; few question
about his business in happy ignorance least give its a basis for using common , that it should be the CIA. /
of the fact that his secrets are known sense to judge what lie hears?" "A 'pure' doctrine of intelligence,"
to the CIA. When a "political action" Harry Howe Ransom has provided says Mr. Ransom, "demands that in-
operation is successful the goverin- -telligence officers 'present the facts'
rnent against which it was conducted such a basis. The I:ztelligemice Estab slut play no role in policy choice." But
seems to have disintegrated or cone lisinnc t supplies exactly the back-
ground we need to understand why we lie goes on to show how those who
to an end solely through natural rntist have all "intelligence conlinuni? decide what facts to present are in a
causes. special position of influence. Indeed,
tY " what Nve can expect of it, and 11 ,
"And
"And if there is any clanger at all of where its real dangers and weaknesses a pure' theory of decision making in-
the CIA instructor continues, are. The late Allen Dulles, while lie sists that if 'all the facts' are known,
` It'is almost always better to leave the the optimum choice becomes appar-
Probler1i unsolved rather than risk was director of CIA, used to keep a
copy of Mr. Ransom's Central Intelli- est." (President Liscnhotvcr, used to
failure or discovery." Theoretically insist that all the facts" pertinent to
there should "almost always" be no Vence and National Security, on a shelf
behind his desk. Richard Ilelnls, the a particular prablem be presented
failures. to him in a report no longer than one
present director, Would be well ad-
But there have been failures: the vised to do the same with The Intelli- page; he would then make his deci-
Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, and one o sion. A wagon his staff used to say,
or two others. Taking into account the aence Fstablislur.ellt, which has been
revised and enlarged from the earlier
CIA's policy towards caution, it would book. Although it is far from compli- these one-page reports I could run the
seem reasonable to assume that for nlentar country.") It is .tilts position of influ-
every failure there have been, say, ten y, at least the book sets forth
the faults with which Mr. Helms is once, rather than the occasional em-
or more successes. Reasonable people barrassnlents we suffer from exploded
may be forgiven for suspecting the CIA tr in-a to grapple rather titan the non-
existent ones of which the Agency is clandestine operations, which draws
of having brought about the downfall
M
R
'
r.
ansom
s attention. I Espionage and
accused. The Intelligence Establish-
of Nkrumah and Sukarno, of having mnent is, in fact, the only up-to-date seri- "special operations" services can cause
installed the military junta in Greece, Otis study of the organization and effec- occasional embarrassment, but they
of having thrown out Sihanouk. And, tiveness of our country's intelligence are dangerous only when under the
since the CIA--not only because of its. system. direct control of an agency which can
bloopers but because of official posits- - influence, if not actually make, policy.
sions by its senior members--is known
to have a ca nabilit ' for Thy have an intelligence commu- r
} "political ac- nitv" of a117 Thic nnnctinn A ith the eve of a ma11aeement pc_
th
e public be blamed 101. be- which seems so absurd to those who are Pert, as well as of a political ?"-
]ieving that th
bili
e capa
ty is activated members of it, has in fact been asked enlist, Mr. Ransom sees a vast inteIli-
now and again? by Congressmen and journalists to z, Bence bureaucracy, topped by the CIA,
Reasonable or not, the
public does whom "intelligence" connotes spies" which has grown up in great confusion
so believe; the public's thirst for saboteurs and political activists, and over its purpose and functions, with
stories about international political it deserves an answer in depth; evcri the effect that "the government does
intrigue being what it is, there has in- those who understand "intelligence" not always know what it is doing in
evitably been a flood of trashy specu- , in its proper light do not often appre- the intelligence field." He gives us the
lations purporting to reveal the true date exactly why it is indispensable. historical development of intelligence,
inside story. One of them, an encyclo- Whether he gets it from the necvspa. including a chapter on British intelli-
peclia of misinformation called The pegs, from briefings by his suborcli. Bence and our use of it as a model (the
Invisible GovernlWll?, stayed on the . Hates or reports from consultants, any author spent a whole year in Britain
best-seller lists for several weeks. OtI1- chief-of-state or president of a. large gathering material), and then lie gets
ers, notably some three or four books corporation or head. of any other kind - down to how intelligence relates to dc-
by ~~1 ashington columnist Andrew Tul- of organization must have intelligence cision making at top levels of our
ly, have been less successful in sales in order to fulfill his responsibilities. government, how the breakdown of
but have made substantial contribu- 'file primary function of the CIA has decision-making responsibility at these
Lions to the popular notion that the been to coordinate theii~~whole ii~ntelLou- li- levels i-esul}tys~ iinn~} the proliferation of
interferes iI lF a1ReN~eas 8
CIA is a latiJ unto itself, rbVtidll L freely e?20Otllll' cQel 11:1, . 1-Ldl 4.4 4000#319i~11~t~tiY~' 4004 `t, icon
 Petition cA} p wedrPdre(R& se 2001/03/06 CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000080002-6
and how solving the problem of co..
fusion can produce an overly powerful
central intelligence authority-and, of
course, how any overly powerful cen-
tral authori.y, by the nature of tliings,
becomes i, efficient and sometimes
counterproductive while putting itself.
beyond the reach of effective govern-
mental controls.
Because of their demonstrable in-
accuracies, such books as The Invis-
ible Gove)-uruent scare only the inno-
cent and uninformed. Mr. Ransom's.
book will enlighten anyone, from the
reader with a 'sophisticated under
standing, of how governments work to
an intelligent innocent who knows
only what he reads in the newspapers.
Miles Copeland, who helped organize
the CIA disclosed in "The Game of
Nations" how it has operated iu the
United Arab Republic.
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VANDALIA, OHIO
CHRONICLE
SIP 31970
WEEKLY _. 5,398
IA stays
U.
er.co.ver
By CHARLES W. WHALEN,
JR.
U.S. Congress,
Third Ixistrict
The activities attributed to
America's intelligence
agencies - most notably the
Central Intelligence Agency
have generated much heat
during the last several years
but very little light.
There have been fears that
this Nation's intelligence
organizations may have
tended to exceed their
authority in performing their
missions as information-
gathering security
instruments.
As we all know, there has
been considerable speculation
that unauthorized foreign
adventures have been
undertaken which have gone
beyond the objectives desired
by our government.
The fact that these reports
or rumors are neither
confirmed nor denied merely
adds fuel to the fire. Further,
I must say, even as a Member
of Congress, that I do not
know whether these reports
are true.
An overview of the Nation's
intelligence operations by the
Congress certainly is in
order. There is, at present,
only a limited provision made
for this requirement,
however. Two armed
services subcommittees -
one in the Senate and one in
the House of Representatives
exercise limited intelligence
oversight.
In view of the questions that
persist about our national
intelligence effort, this
oversight should be
broadened. 1
The Constitution empowers
and directs the legislative
branch, the Congress, to
To insure that questions
concerning the actions of our
intelligence agencies are
answered, I believe that an
annual accountability to the
Congress should be
established. To achieve this
goal, I have introduced a
resolution to establish a Joint
Committee on Intelligence.
Joining with me in this
bipartisan effort are Senators
Eugene McCarthy and Mark
Hatfield and Congressman
Donald Fraser.
The Committee would be
composed of seven Senators,
appointed by the President of
the Senate, and seven
Representatives, appointed
by the Speaker of the House.
Two of the House Members
would be from the House
Foreign Affairs Committee
and two of the Senators from
the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee: Similarly, two
members from each body
would be from their
respective Armed Services
Committees.
't'his joint committee would
have the authority to
coordinate and review the
function of the nation's big
intelligence agencies. These
include the Central
Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency,
the State Department's'
Bureau of Intelligence and
Research and the intelligence
departments of the military
services.
The Joint Committee would
conduct hearings and
assemble information with
the intent of assisting as well
as monitoring intelligence
operations. One of the key
objectives, as stated in the.
resolution, would be to
"insure that a minimum
oversee the formulation and number of covert activities
regulation of our foreign are in process and that they
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~~ r f
GD, W11 C, 3
PATRICK J. McGARVEY
Associate Editor
1-America's spy apparatus involves no less than 10 Federal agencies.
2-Their functions are reviewed with an eye toward uncovering problem
areas.
3-The duplication of effort, while necessary to a degree, seems to have
outgrown its rationality.
4-The impact of sophisticated intelligence collection systems such as
satellites is far-reaching and worrisome.
5-An impartial review of the national intelligence structure might im-
prove this vital segment of Government.
INTELLIGENCE, when used in the
context of espionage, seems to be
a virility symbol for most Americans-
one that immediately equates the pro-
fession to such allegedly masculine ven-
tures as murder, coup-plotting, intrigue
and a dash of illicit lovemaking.
Their minds somehow entangle the
violence of pro football, the screen an-
tics of James Bond and lingering WWII
memories of parachuting behind enemy
lines ' with an exaggerated sense of
"duty, honor, country."
The contrast between the Hollywood
version and the actual profession of
intelligence is stark. In a word a career
in intelligence is "dull." "Bureaucracy,"
"conformity." and "paper-mill" are
more meaningful power phrases to an
intelligence professional than "power-
play," "clandestine operations" or even
spY.,,
The sole reason behind all U.S. intel-
ligence efforts is what comes out as the
finished product-the report that in-
forms the President of developments
abroad vital to U.S. interests. And
there are today considerably more peo-
pie engaged in the complex intelligence
community processing, analyzing and
reporting on the flow of paper than there
are collecting it.
Additionally, the remarkable advances
in technology which have~afforded the
U.S. Government the use-oT such devices
as satellite-borne camer k electronic
impulse sensors and infrared and micro-
wave receivers have injected the neces-
sity for having a wide variety of
technical specialists operating in terrain
once occupied by the lone wolf spy.
In this article on U.S. intelligence,
it is hoped that an understanding of
what the "community" is can be con-
veyed. Who, in other words, is in the
spy business in the U.S. Government
and why. What they produce in the
form of finished reports may also help
stied some light on basic yet largely
ignored problems within the com-
munity, such as the enormous duplica-
tion of effort and the cumbersome
bureaucracy.
At the top of the pyramid sits the
President. Directly beneath him is his
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board-
a group of men from outside Govern-
ment set up by President Kennedy on
May 4, 1961 in an attempt to avoid
getting railroaded into another Bay of
Pigs fiasco. Their charter says they are
to "conduct a continuing review and
assessment of all functions of the CIA
and other executive departments or
agencies in the foreign intelligence
THE INTELLIGENCE COMILMITY
PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD
CIA DIA NSA STATE AEC FBI
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Army Intelligence Navy Intelligence Marine Corps Into igence Air arce Intelligence
 fields."h 'A tplJo tPbr, Nation- 1e sq ZPQ0J1PAQQ?gh tCt j rQ?t 470044 ROO110eve 010080002-6el~orts on
Staff to the director. only the "hot" items. This is also a
Security Council (NSC) which preys an The DIA controls DOD intelligence coordinated report requiring agreement
important overseer role in intelligence resources and reviews and coordinates by all other agencies.
matters. They are privy to CIA and b
other agency programs and activities those intelligence functions assigned to DIA, NSA and State also put out
and theoretically, insure that these blend the military departments. They also daily summaries for their worldwide
with broad foreign policy objectives, service the intelligence requirements of customers in embassies and military
Under the NSC and directly objectives. respon- the major components of the Depart- bases abroad., They are not coordinated
sive to it is the United States Intelligence ment of Defense. with other agencies and generally go
Board (USIB), which is chaired by the The National Security Agency 'into more detail than CIA's daily.
Director of Central 'Intelligence, Rich- (NSA), the codebreaking arm of the On a weekly basis CIA produces for
and Ilelrns. You will note that his title Intelligence structure, was established the President and his Cabinet what
is not the Director of Central Intelli- by Presidential directive in 1952 as a amounts to a top secret Time magazine
gence Agency. separately organized agency within the exploring the past week's developments
Known in town as "the DCI," Helm's Defense Department. NSA has two more analytically and placing them into
responsi n ies are "t broader than primary functions, a security mission of the broader context of political, eco-
merely running the CIA, monitoring secure U.S, communications nomic, social, military and diplomatic
A?CIA booklet sent to curious inquir- and an intelligence information mission reality.
ers describes Helm's duties this way: which involves manning listening posts The economic and scientific re-'
"The DCI is responsible for coordi- the world over for monitoring the com- search areas of CIA, DIA and NSA
nating the foreign intelligence activ- munications of other nations and proc- produce daily weekly and special reports
itics of the United States. I is chair- essing this into usable intelligence for of a more detailed technical nature for
man of USIB which advises and assists other components of the community. the use of the variety of experts work-
him in this coordinating role. The The State Department's intelligence ing within the community. These saute
deputy director of CIA is a member activities are carried on in the Bureau elements also put out quarterly, semi-
de the board representing CIA. The of Intelligence and Research (INR). annual and annual wrap-up studies on
other board members are heads of the The bureau conducts a coordinated pro- such diverse topics as Soviet foreign
intelligence organizations of the State `ram of intelligence research and analy- aid, prospects for the Chinese rice crop,
De lgence 's Bureau of Intelli cute tale sis for the Department. They produce Soviet missile and radar defenses,
p` g and Intetlrgence stuares and spot reports French aircraft production---you name
Research, the Pentagon's Defense In- ,essential to foreign policy determination
telligence Agency and the National Sc- and execution for the secretary of State. it.
curity Agency, plus representatives of The community also produces bed-
the Atomic Energy Commission and Who Produces Intelligence? rock studies on a continuing basis on
the FBI." The four service intelligence The Atomic Energy Commission is a every conceivable aspect of basic into]-
liPCIlCe
tudies such as geography with detailed
chiefs, it should be added, sit in as consumer and producer of intelligence s
observers on these meetings and are in the critical national- security field of studies on ports, landing beaches and
not without a great deal of influence. nuclear energy. Accordingly it is repre- urban areas the world over. Other areas
Acting in consultation with USIB the sented on the USIB by an intelligence such as a nation's industry, receive
DCI makes recommendations to the division expert. They provide techni- close scrutiny and basic political, demo-
NSC concerning the intelligence strut- cal guidance to CIA and other mem_ graphic, social, economic and military
ture of the Government as a whole, to bers in collecting nuclear intelligence pota are also closely followed and re
insure that each element is functioning information. The AEC, in turn, be- poThd on regularly.
properly. in the national intelligence conics a producer of intelligence when serving This greaa outpouring repo
effort. it processes information on nuclear has created various users e intelligence hi
energy and develops esti0ates on the, an atmosphere Wherein
Primary Duties of The CIA atomic weapons capabili of foreign customer demands require that agen-
With equal status the six USIB mem- powers. ties duplicate the work of others. For
bers and the four service observers. The FBI is a major member of the example, a military commander in Ilon-
then, operate under the chairmanship of national intelligence community, yet its orals serviced by DIA n~irst be ap-
the DCI as a corporate body. Each of direct role in the production of. positive praised not only of the military facts of
these agencies has slightly different in- foreign intelligence is limited. Their life in Asia but also the political and,
telligence functions to perform. counter intelligence operations often economic facts.
The responsibilities of the CIA are: turn up information of value to positive The result has been that DIA, of
necessity, broa
? To advise the NSC in matters con- intelligence. th
ese areas, des espited its expertise into
cerning intelligence activities of the The community as a whole puts out CIA nd St pite the fact that both
Government departments and agencies a wide variety of reports daily, weekly CIA and State had expolit watt dg and
that relate to national security. and nn an ad hoc basis. Most important reporting Asian political and eco
? To stake recommendations to the are the National Intelligence Estimates nomic developments.
NSC for the coordination of such in- which project the thinking of the corn- The State Department, to further
telligence activities. munity's experts into the future on illustrate. the point, finds that to realis-
e To correlate and evaluate intelligence specific foreign situations of national tically discuss the arms limitation talks
relating to the national security and security concern. They are thoroughly and Vietnam it must cultivate its own
provide for the appropriate dissemina- coordinated throughout the community anderts in Comet nsitary arya intelli-
tion of such intelligence within the before going to the President or NSC. and Asian Communist military ntelli
Government. They may, and frequently do, embody gence.
The Defense Intelligence Agency dissenting views. CIA, too, which has no real charter
(DIA) was established on August 1, to get deeply involved in military intc1li-
1961 by Secretary McNamara. The CIA's Daily Word gence fount} itself required to divert
chain of command runs from the secre- Each day the CIA several hundred people into this subject
Lary of Dqf ItH prints a top secret
secretary o~+171 cnose? I ~o`r' d`n' it sk Vtt #J!C2t President. the cream of Veal 'p, lit es ndBintODti ~sina en-
 Unequa 5liciu of I It lige e -
The 4, PKIRvt!d e9 Ig lq
of duplication of effort is "necessary to
generate sufficient diversity of opinion"
is offered as the first salvo in rebuttal to
this criticism. And, it is a sound argu-
ment-diversity on many of these issues
is needed to get a balanced appraisal.
But, the argument doesn't seem to stand
up too well under a detailed exami-
nation of how the intelligence pie is
shared. Professionals call the constant
interagency disputes "professional in-
cest," wherein intelligence officers pro-
duce finished intelligence for other in-
telligence officers to rebut.
Aside from the formal organization
of each of the agencies there is a cor-
porate phalanx of intelligence officers
working on several dozen intelligence
committees in Washington.
This has conic about over the past
.20 years because of the enormous tech-
nical strides this country has made
in sophisticated intelligence collection
techniques.
The natural result was the estab-
lishment of a series of committees
manned by specialists to oversee the
collection and requirements and priori-
ties of usage of these systems.
Perhaps the one collective fault of the
committee approach--which, by the
way, is used extensively in the daily
the community has served ,,h Nzt', ~{ ~j e~ e of a mili-
2Q01/A13FQ6naal/4ri~Q+xt4f$~~Pd~oicr wants to
heralded while only its failures receive wage war well must look for good in
This is not to say, however, that its
skirts are entirely clean. We all, for
example; are well aware of the Israeli
attack on the USS Liberty, the Pueblo
seizure and the shootdown of the US
EC-121 reconnaissance plane off the
coast of North Korea. And, while each
of these incidents can be "rationalized
and explained," perhaps, collectively,
they are symptomatic of some basic
problems of management within the in-
telligence community.
There is room for improvement.
There is, for example, a seeming need
for the professionals to step back from
the firing line and take a look at the
community as it now exists as it nears
its 25th birthday. Perhaps some stream-
lining or realigning of functions is in
order. Perhaps the management skills
available in. industry could help. Con-
sidering the diversity of talents and
functions in the intelligence community
to clay, it approaches conglomerate
stature. Perhaps the Congressional
committees which maintain a frag-
mented and seemingly disjointed sur-
veillance
activities
selves to
role.
of the Nation's intelligence
could better realign them-
play a more effective
coordination required for the pioduc- _-Y__M._..-.
tion of reports going to the administra-
tion's operating officials---is that it dif-
fuses responsibility to a point where it
is difficult for the individuals involved
in such work to feel a vital involvement
in their craft. Moreover, it has a tend-
ency to blunt initiative and results,
in what is called "intelligence to the least
common denominator."
In the Pueblo case, for example, it
would be extremely difficult today to
point to any particular person in the
Washington intelligence community and
state that he made the final "go" de-
cision, yet several committees passed on
the mission.
The committees seem to get caught,
in the tremendous swirl of paper that;
surrounds the management of say, a
satellite recon program or the produc-
tion of a National Intelligence Estimate.
Almost imperceptibly they can be-
conic impersonal paper mills, at tinges
seeming more interested in getting the
paper on to its next destination than
with the fundamental issue at stake such
as the risk for the Pueblo or an esti-
mate concerning Soviet intentions in the
missile field.
The entire Co111n1LInity has been in a
constant state of flux during the past
20 years, reorganizing and adapting to
new problems as they arose with.
frankly, remarkable agility. On balance;
The "Second-Oldest"
Profession
The craft of intelligence, an ancient
activity, has been with man since the
dawn of time. The Bible records that
Moses was instructed to send intelli-
gence agents "to spy out the land of
Canaan."
In the sixth Century B.C. Sun Tzu,
a Chinese military theorist, wrote in
On the Art of War: ".... what enables
the wise sovereign and the good gen-
eral to strike and conquer, and achieve
things beyond the reach of ordinary
men is foreknowledge."
The Mongols of the 13th Century
had a well organized intelligence sys-
tem which prompted one authority on
the period to write: ". . . whereas
Europe knew nothing of the Mongols
the latter were fully acquainted with
European conditions down to every
detail not excepting the family con-
nexions of the rulers."
The history of intelligence is filled
with descriptions of its shortcomings.
Shakespeare put a plaintive query into
King John's mouth when he wrote:
"0, where hath our intelligence been
drunk? Where hath it slept?"
Spies themselves have always been
suspect. In 142$ a Bavarian Duke in-
telligence. but you must not trust them
(the spies) and not tell them what
you intend to do on the strength of
their findings."
In l6th Century England Queen
Elizabeth had a well-maintained intel-
ligence apparatus. It was the personal
domain of her State Secretary Sir
Francis Walsingham. Ile developed
the art of using his personal fortune to
maintain agents in all European capi-
tals. His motto was: "Knowledge is
never too dear."
The creation of an institutionalized
and systematically organized intelli-
gence service is credited to Frederick
the Great. Under him the Prussians
carefully developed an intelligence sys-
tem as a vital general staff function.
Late in the 19th Century, Europe
had become a vast network of spies
and counterspies. Few hotels and
restaurants did not have secret agents
operating in disguise. "The whole
continent began to look like the stage
of a comic opera," one historian
wrote.
An accelerating military technology
and the competitive war plans of Coil-,
tinental powers required an increasing
amount of information. Much of it
was of a technical nature. Captain
Dreyfus was wrongfully accused of
transmitting to the Germans the design
of a new artillery recoil mechanism,
for example.
By the dawn of the 20th Century
all the great powers, with the notable
exception of the United States, began
to develop elaborate intelligence sys-
tems.
U.S. Intelligence . . .
You've Calve A Long Way I3caby
Although the Confederacy supported
many spies its intelligence service was
even less well organized and poorly
coordinated than that of the Union.
When the U.S. entered WWI Army
intelligence was a tiny section buried
within a division of the general staff,
consisting of two officers and two
clerks.
Intelligence was clearly neglected in
the decades between the two world
wars. Army and Navy intelligence
hobbled along in those years, rarely
attracting the most promising officers
and receiving only meager Congres-
sional appropriations. -
In the military the intelligence sec-
tion became a dumping ground for
officers unsuited for command assign-
ments. an attitude which lingers in
todav's military.
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With a more aloof and independent
foreign policy the U.S. relied chiefly
on its diplomatic agencies and military
attache system for intelligence in the
118th and 19th Centuries.
According to its own official history
the U.S. Army was "slow to recognize
the importance of military intelligence
and backward in its use in the solution
of military problems."
During the Civil War, Allan Pink-
erton, a famous detective, was hired
as chief of intelligence for McClellan's
Union Army. Pinkerton and his men,
adept at snaring bank robbers. pos-
sessed little competence in military
intelligence. His estimates of Confed-
crate troop strength were greatly ex-
aggerated, a fact which bolstered
McClellan's excessive caution in the
Peninsula Campaign.
Eisenhower described the War De-
tpartment's intelligence at the outbreak
of WWII as "a shocking 'deficiency ,
that impeded all constructive plan-
ning."
The State Department, too, was
poorly equipped to gather intelligence
in 1941. Dean Acheson testifying to
Congress in 1945 described their tech-
niques as "similar to those used by
Ben Franklin in Paris." In 1909 State
had four persons. working in intelli-
gence; by 1922 it had risen to five;
and, by 1943 to no more than 18.
.1'carl harbor provided the impetus
for the development of a centralized
intelligence community. There was no
joint intelligence mechanism at the
national level to evaluate, analyze and
disseminate the available information.
In February 1942 with the forma-
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint
Intelligence Committee was set up with
representatives from the services, the
State Department and Bill Donovan's
recent creation, the OSS.
The wartime intelligence services
amidst much confusion, duplication I
and interagency conflict sometimes
measured up to the high standards set
by combat forces, such as the Navy's
codebreaking at Midway which led to
the location and defeat of Japan's car-
rier force, the identification of the
German missile center at Peenemunde,
and Allan Dulles' political apparatus
in Eastern Europe.
At the end of WWII it was evident
to the President and Congress that
permanent changes were required in
national intelligence organization. This
resulted in, first, the creation of the
Central Intelligence Group in 1946 by
Executive Order, and, finally, the
establishment of the CIA in 1947 un-
der the National Security Act.
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 ~P~XtiIl Pv
Approved - For Rise 2001/O e6' IR7kP84-0W9ROOl OOO080002-6
CIA Spooks Req~fre F~ItW
By Robert Hunter
-A Washington free-lance writer,
Hunter has been teaching at the Lon-
don School of Economics. The follow-
Ing is excerpted by permission from
the British Broadcasting Corp. maga-
zine The Listener.
IN THE Ashenden stories, Somer-
. set Maugham put a human face on
the British Secret Service. No matter
that the Hairless Mexican killed the
wrong man; this bumbling helped
soften the image of a ruthless and ever-
competent machine dedicated to doing
His Majesty's dirty business, and made
everything right.
Not so with the Central Intelligence
Agency. No humor here; just the sense
of a sinister and heartless manipula-
tion of the democrats of a hundred
countries, designed to support the new,
Imperialism of those sons-of-Britain,
the Americans.
? What is myth and what reality?
Since it was organized from the post-
war, remnants of the old Office of
Strategic Services, the CIA has cer-
tainly had its fingers in many political
`pies, and has been accused of myriads
more. Mossadegh fell in Iran; a Guate-
malan coup replaced a left-wing re-
gime; America was humiliated at the
Bay of Pigs; a private American air
force has fought the Laotian war, and
Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia.
These events, which have all, rightly
or wrongly, been attributed to the
CIA, are the glamorous side of the
business. But most of what the agency
does is far more prosaic. It is basically
an organization of fact-gatherers: aca-
demics who never teach a class; pe-
dants who rarely parade their nuances
in learned journals-and never with
the CIA's imprimatur.
It has many of the world's most
skilled linguists, the most patient ar-
chivists, the cleverest analysts of iso-
lated data and, surprisingly, some of
the most liberal people, politically, in
Washington. Indeed, if the American
government ever does come to accept
that the Soviet Union is not preparing
to launch a nuclear attack and that
China is not populated with madmen,
It will probably be because the CIA
has succeeded In putting across its es-
timate of the situation.
The Iceberg's Tip
THIS, OF COURSE, is a rosy view
Like any great, sprawling institu-
tion, the CIA does suffer from a great
deal, of intellectual myopia, the com-
promises oA
litical~philoso
try at any moment. And if anything, Its
reporting is usually dull, tedious, banal
and sometimes dead wrong, as anyone
will testify who has been privileged-
or compelled-to read the Daily Digest
and other classified reports that circu-
late about the government.
This part of the CIA-the part that is
styled "overt"-is quartered in a large
building across the Potomac from
Washington, unmarked and unob-
served. But the 8,000 or so particularly
gray-faced men and women who work
there are only the tip of the intelli-
gence iceberg. It has been estimated,
By Bob Burchette-TheWashinston Post
Richard Helms, the ebulient di-
rector of the gray-faced CIA.
receptions;. the agency has a listed
phone number, and the day has long
passed when junior employees went
through the absurd ritual of telling
people whom they met at Washington
cocktail parties simply that they,
worked for "the government."
Another Department
A LL THIS is straightforward enough;
and is hard to fault in any
government. It is true that Francis
Gary Powers did help disrupt the sum-
mit conference in 1960 by having the
ill-luck to be shot down over Russia in
his U-2 aircraft. But those reconnais-
sance flights, and the reconnaissance.
satellites later sent aloft by both-,
Russia and America, have helped{
to slow down the arms race and to in-
spire mutual confidence that the other;
side is not building some new super..
weapon in secret.
Few people who take seriously the
problems of running a government and
a 'reasonably enlightened foreign pol-
icy would question the role that the
CIA shares with other agencies inn
gathering and interpreting Informa-
tion; but they do argue against the op-
erational responsibilities that shelter
-under the same roof-what is popu-
larly called the "department of dirty
tricks." - -
There is considerable justice in the
view that the same bureaucrats who,
carry through policy should not have
the right to gather the information
needed to judge their actions. And
since the ill-starred adventure at the
for example, that more than 100,0001 Bay of Pigs, there has been a much
people are actively engaged in the one., greater effort throughout the Asneri-
function of gathering and interpreting, can government to end this overlap of
information about Soviet military- authority. President Kennedy reacti-
capabilities. vated his Foreign Intelligence Advi-
The CIA budget, too, is- immense, al- gory Board and all the bureaucratic;
though not one item appears anywhere strings were pulled much tighter.
in the compendia of federal expendi- Ironically, however, the test of intel" .
tures, there is no congressional debate .=t lectual purity has not been applied as
and few people know its true magni-- rigorously to the CIA's competitors.-
tude. By conservative estimates, more
than $1 billion of CIA money is hidden.
under other categories and another $2
billion is spent on similar activities by
other agencies-such as the National ;
Security Agency-whose existence is
never formally acknowledged.
The Defense Department and its many-;
military offshoots also devote large re-
sources to knowing the enemy, and
there is far less concern to see that re-
sponsibility for information and action
are kept separate. The Vietnam war is
an excellent example of this. The blun-
Yet despite the secretive nature of ders that have occurred in that wqr
the "intelligence community," many from bad espionage involve the mili:
CIA officials lead surprisingly public! - : tary more than they do their civilian;
lives. Unlike the heads of MI5 and counterparts at the CIA.
ved P drt eteas6I'O@4/O Pa RDP84400499ROO10000800021-
13oI1'~1Tiu' c$
 i001 a v Foe' Reiea'`~s 2aQ,Idg~d0 , z ~ :004 001000080002-6
UT IN ALL, it is fair to say that tions that an order from the CIA-or one. At heart, it is a question of
very little if anything that is done whatever-could indeed produce what mans striving to secure the right to
BUT
the CIA today goes contrary to the we see In Athens today? know what forces are shaping his life,
wishes of the e President and his imme to know how far he is a free agent.
..-
Deliciously y Sinister
diate advisers. Many people think that y A Guidepost Warped
it is bad enough that the President can.. THE EFFORT by many Greeks T was ANGER directed at the CIA
.sometimes act in secret and with con- today to pin most if not all of ,j~ was not eased by the irony of the
siderable impact, but it is necessary to. ;their troubles on the Americans is only CIA's choice of what is considered at
Separate this concern about American one example of the force exerted by least by Americans to be a left-of-cen.
behavior in general from perennial the conspiracy theory of history. In. ter publication. If anything, it intensi-
worries that the CIA, as the estab- deed, there is a certain appeal in the fied this anger, particularly on the
dished villain, will run amok. truly sinister and secret operation that part of those who needed to measure
Again, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it is lacking in the more obvious one. their own radical progress against
,suited President Kennedy and his hag- Everyone knows that Air America, their image of CIA activities.
uited Pre to emphasize the bad ad- which forms the backbone of the anti- There was also a sense that the bar-
s
iographers
c
m
i
,
o
mun
st air war in Laos, is directly gain with the devil had been unfairly
vice given by the CIA. Here was a rec-
fi
nanced by the CIA Yet this kn 1 struck. It i thm
ognized scapegoat whose involvement
ow _ is one
'
softened criticism of executive deci- edge has never produced an outcry, or willingly; it is quite another to do so
,
sions. Surely, the argument ran, even even much interest, largely because even if the temporal payment is made,
the President could not be expected to the whole affair is conducted with min- without being able to share in the
be proof against the agency's machina- imum secrecy and maximum routine awareness of complicity with evil. To be
tions? and boredom, used by a capricious god maybe toler-
This incident illustrates what may Compared to the killing of Che Gue- able if everyone is in on the secret, but
be the most Important fact to bear in vara-widely believed to be the work What could es worse than to be denied
~cnind about the CIA: What it actually of the CIA-the fighting in Laos is far the sweetness that comes from the
does or does not do is far less impor- 'more important in terms of current Perhaps this sin? is the
tant than what it is believed to do. Politics and lives lost, but it is totally like this way an agency
Like a belief in religion or witchcraft lacking in those elements that make ake the this must nceao of dupeli and cit
In other times, belief in the potency of for a basic confrontation between good only einf rc fresh evidence ref
a.e CIA provides a point of stability in and evil. For the purposes of theater that only reinforced the comforting abound.
disorganized world_ and the politics that depend on it, Gue. conspiracy does, indeed, boud
As such, the CIA has a value in the
vara's death symbolizes this kind of
It is far easier to accept that evil is realm of drama, in the realm of the
being done consciously than to under-confrontation. perfectly. Indeed, his
stand it as the simple morality play, whatever its impact on
product of life and work would be incomplete un-
the world's policies
human failings. Good intentions gone less he had been killed in t ,
his or
some
awry are far harder to tolerate than similar way.
the knowledge that a conspiracy is This sense of the conflict between
truly afoot. One doesn't have to be par- good and evil was also present in the
anoid to gain a certain comfort from most celebrated instance of CIA in-
suspicions of conspiracy; and the few volvement in Great Britain: the funnel-
times that the CIA actually does gain ing of money through the Congress for
direct publicity-almost always when a Cultural Freedom to the magazine En-
job has been bungled-merely confirm counter. The hue and cry from that af?
them, fair have subsided, but the moral is-
The political impact of this desire to -sues that were raised have still not
believe in the CIA's skulduggeries is-been adequately settled.
considerable-however many thou A number of authors, and some indi.
sands or millions of conscious agents viduals who had helped with the edit-
one must assume to exist for the ing, in entire innocence of the secret
agency to be involved in all the actions source of funds, were horrified to dis.
attributed to it. This was made quite cover who had actually been making
clear recently on BBC Television's possible the
"Line-Up," when Michael Dean inter- T publication of their views.
viewed Andreas Papandreou, the most hate men and lid women had written
no
publicized leader of the Greek resist- what they believed, and were in no
ance-in-exile. way t way influenced by the character bf,
their ultimate benefactor. Can it be
Papandreou recounted in some said that they were suborned?
detail the nature of the CIA plot Likewise, do articles written for a
to overthrow the democratic govern- magazine that has been compromised
ment in Athens and install the cola- by the CIA have no value? Do they
nels, and completed his narrative with lose the significance which the authors
quotations from a top-secret meeting: thought they were imparting to their
of the American National Security work when the
Council. they produced it?
Perhaps this is all true. But even if This is not really a question about
it is, what does it say for the strength the nature of the -sponsoring institu-
of Greek political life and institutions? tion-whether one that serves the ends
Must we believe that every, Greek of of a government, or one like the great
foundations that give out money
political influence is employed by the
g to sell one's soul
amassed b devious means n at 1.
Americans "DM 01W (Fr0*e> s1?1it20QU=Q* MWIr -00499R001000080002-6
 t I'
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"There . he is again."
Wright in the Dayton Daily News
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 ..........-,i... MrA
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,The secret Team
and the.
Games It P1as
L. FLETCIIER PROUTY secret, whose very identities as of- gion, and, quite importantly, alumni
ten as not are -in short a Se, of -a servic.
"The hill costumes of the Meo c
et Team who eeactions only those f omewh chgthe esare no uncondi
tribesmen contrasted with the civili- ,implicated in them are in a position tional resignations.
an clothes of United States military to monitor. - ? Thus the Secret Team is not a
men riding in open jeeps and car- How clandestine super-planning board or
rying M-16 rifles and pistols. These determinedly this secrecy is
young Americans are mostly ex- preserved, even when preserving it super-general staff but, even more
Green Berets, hired on CIA contract means denying the U.S. Army the damaging to the coherent conduct of.
oreign affairs, a bewildering collec-
to advise and train Laotian troops ." right to discipline Its own personnel, foreig'n'
Thoe matter-of-fact, almost wea not to say the opportunity to do jus- tion of temporarily assembled action
ry flee, was strikingly.' illustrated not ;committees that respond pretty
long ago by the refusal of the Cen- much ad hoc to specific troubles in
L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air tral Intelligence' Agency to provide various part of the world, sometimes
Force colonel, is now vice president witnesses for the court-martial that in ways that duplicate the actin !ties
of a Washington, D.C., bank. ir/hilo was to try eight Green Beret officers 'ot regular American missions, some-
..,..... .,.:.., ro 1 cam. uns arrr? .., . e
Army to drop th charges. that interfere with and muddle
cle is from The Washington Monthly. The Secret Team consists of se- them.
curity-cleared individuals in and out the speed source with of which cich it can team's power is
sentences, written late in February government who receive secret an act. The
of CIA's communications system is so
o
by T. D. Allman of the Washington, intelligence data gathered by the extraordinarily efficient, especially
Post after he and two other enter- CIA and the National Security by contrast with State's,. that the
prising correspondents left a guided Agency and who react to those data team can, in a phrase that often gets
tour and walked 12 miles over some when it seems appropriate to them used at such times, "have a plane in
hills in Laos to a secret base at Long with paramilitary plans and activi- the air" responding to some situation
Cheng, describe a situation that to- ties, e.g., training and "advising"-a overseas while State is still decoding
day may seem commonplace to any- not exactly impenetrable euphe- the cable informing it of that situ
one familiar with American opera- mism for "leading into battle"-Lao- tion.
tions overseas, but that no more tian troops. Membership in the
than 10 years ago would have been team, granted on a "need to know" A few years ago, for exampln
unthinkable.. basis, varies with the nature and the while the government strongest that th that the n an
To take a detachment of regular location of the problems that come States was strenu e anted
troops, put its members Into dis- to its- attention. . aously supporting
guise, smuggle them out of the coun- At the heart of the team, of course, in a (call him Tokyo hospital, Maospwword as came shat
try so that neither the public nor are a handful of top executives of a in
group of discontented young oh
Congress
Congress knows they ,have left, and the CIA and of the Ntional Security cent was i a coup young offi-
assign
them to clandestine duties on Council, most notably the chief planning a coup in his ab-
soil under the command of a White House adviser on foreign oli- to the e. Ina mattter of hours, thanks'
nonmilitary agency-it is doubtful cy. Around them revolves a sort of way home in~a rU.SI AiX s -on his
r Force jet
that anyone would have dared to inner ring of presidential staff mem- fighter; he arrived at his office in,
suggest taking such liberties with bers, State Department officials, ci- plenty of time to frustrate-the plot-'
the armed forces and foreign rela- vilians and military men from the -ter&
tions of the United States, not to say Pentagon, and career professionals The power to pull off feats -like!
with the Constitution, to any Pres- in the intelligence services.
ident up to and especially including And out beyond them is an exten- that is more than operational power;
Dwight D. Eisenhower. sive a n d - i n t r i c a t e network of it is in'a real sense policyemaking
Indeed, the most remarkable de- government officials with responsi- power, In this particular case it was
velopment in the management of bility for or expertise in some specI- the power to commit the United
5L1t
America's relations with other coup- fic field that touches on national se- of Rhes to the protection and support
tries during the nine othe 1 X.
years since curity, think-tank analysts, bus(- Another source of the Lcrirn'S po-v-
Gen. Eisenhower left. office has been nessmen who travel a lot or whose er is its ability to manipulato "need
the assumption of more and more businesses (e.g., import-export or to kirow" classifications, 'On(,% way to
control over military and diplomatic operating a cargo airline) are useful, make sure that there Jr, little opposi-
operations abroad by men whose ac- academic experts in this or. that i ties is to
gV0M@1 W01AVRW*i19 4VIi ~~e~i~
t oppose.....
c oat cue '
 them tv a~ ]~i ~ ~tCtiFvIQI~s'r ~e a 001 /icr 03/06s,'wfien~v~cr~1P A0 9'9R0010Q0080002-6
men with high-ranking policy- guerrilla operations. After a visit to
1? wanted to do anything on a large the training center, Air. Kennedy,
ing jobs and the appropriate top Sc- scale it had to secure assistance over opposition from the Army bu-
cret clearances often are kept in the from and therefore share authority; reaucracy, revivified the Special
dark about team plans. Thus Adlal with, other agencies, chiefly the De- Forces, and training centers we r e,
Stevenson, ambassador to the Unit- partments of State and Defense. organized in Panama, Okinawa, Viet-
ed Nations, was not informed about Slowly Dulles changed these condi- nam, and West Germany.
the Bay of Pigs invasion plans until tions. One way he did it was to give The CIA is most adept at working
the very last minute when rumors
about. it began to appear in the natelligence . activities intellectual in and around and through all levels
; and even then Tracy 'Barnes, nd social credibility by surround- of the U.S. government. No one, not
pruse Y ing himself with men from industry, even the majority of agency person-
the CIA man sent to brief Steven- finance, and academia. ' nel, knows the full extent of agency
son, -gave him a vague and incom- Of course Dulles did not increase manipulations w i t It i n the govern-
plete picture of the operation, the CIA's influence as much as lie mental structure. The agency can
"Need to know" also can be bent in (lid just by image building. He was 'obtain what it,desires in any quanti-
the other direction in order to secure .in organizer and a clandestine open-,ty, and often for no cost.
the support of potential allies and ator of great ability, and between the During the depression years of the
further those allies' careers. 1Vicm- end of the Korean war and the clue-, 1930s, Congress passed a Jaw which
hers of the Secret Team who favored tion of John Kennedy, he had begun was known as the Economy Act of
the election of John F. Kennedy over building the team-with the CIA 1932 and, as amended, is still on the
Richard Nixon played a very special usually calling its signals, of course books. This act, whose purpose is to
role in the 1960 election campaign. -and it had had a number of sub- save money and discourage needless
Vice President Nixon presided stantial successes. spending, permits an agency that
over the National Security Council Overthrowing t h e Mossadegh needs material to purchase it at an
and therefore knew in detail the government in Iran was one; over- agreed price from another agency
plans fen the Bay of Pigs operation. throwing the Arbenz government in by an accounting ? off-set without. Sen. Ke
s
For, presumed not~ as know these he id from was
connoisseur'slapoint ample,nthe"D Department -of Agri ul-
classified details. However, he did Perhaps
know. In his book, 'Six Crises," Mr. of vices. the latter operation was a bit Lure can buy surplus tractors from
wrote that Sen. Kennedy was on the blatant side. Perhaps the the Army at a price agreed upon by
Nixon Nix about the invasion n Allen most brilliant of all was the specta-. both parties, even if it is only a dol-
told during the traditional CIA cular building up of ]tamon Magsay- har each. (Since most such equip-
Dulle
Dulle but there say from obscure army captain to ment is declared surplus, whether it
briefing for candidates;, president and national hero of the is or not, by the selling agency, the
was more than that to the story. Philippines. This latter feat was price usually is low.)
. A former staff member from the mostly organized by Col. Edward G. - By means of authority of'this kind,
office of the secretary of defense re-Lansdale of the CIA, via the Air the CIA has learned how to "buy"
c
1960 lie ollects that during the summer of topic to the Senate Office Force, a public relations genius of from all agencies of the government,
Buildin ng to pick up and escort to the the old selling-iceboxes-to-Eskimos Defenserimaril,Y from a the Detremendous)amount of
Building of
Pentagon four Cuban exile leaders, school. new"
nd sur lus equi ment-and to
among them the future commander Lansdale conceived the idea of take eve} bases at home and abroad
of the Bay of Pigs invasion team, making Magsaysay into the savior of for its own use without appearing to
who had been meeting with Mr. Ken- his country from the Communist have spent substantial funds and
nedy. Those men were supposed to 1-Iuks by recruiting, and paying with many times without the selling par-
be under special security wraps, but CIA funds a few bands of b ilipinaty knowing the true identity of the
certain CIA officials had introduced soldiers who, every night or soy buyer. '
them to the senator, thus making would put on peasant clothes, in With these hidden sources of sup-
sure that he knew as much about the vade some villages with much ado, ply, the CIA often can build' an ar-
invasion as Mr. Nixon-if not more and then allow themselves to besenal and support clandestine opera.,
as the result of a. personal relation- driven out again by the intrepid for. tions in some foreign country with-
ship that the Vice President did not ces under Magsaysay's command. out the Department of D e f.e n s q,
have with the Cuban refugee front All of which, perhaps it need be much less the Department of State,
and the Americans.who were. secret- emphasized, is not to say that Mag- ever knowing it - though presuma-
ly helping it. ' saysay was a faker or a figurehead; bly Defense could find out if it took
When the candidates appeared on, on the contrary, it is a mark of Lans- the trouble.
television together during the cru- dale's skill he chose as the central It was the CIA's power and free-
al campaign debates, Mr. Nixon, figure in his hero-making exercise a Join to move forces and equipment
abiding by security restrictions, dim- man with the attributes of a genuine quickly without the usual review by
il.eci himself in his diselission of the hero. proper authority that made possible
government's plans for Cuba. This, The Army Special Forces had been:the first entry of troops and equip-
official control did not apply to Mr. formed after World War II. In event ment into South Vietnam In the
Kennedy, lie could and (lid advocate of a Russian invasion, the 10th Spc- early 1900s In order to mount a cer-
overthrowing the Castro govern- cial Forces in Germany were to be tain peration it'considered import-?
sent into Eastern Europe to create
Mr.
m and sustain artisan movements be- ant, the CIA needed 24 helicopters,
Mr. Kennedys election was a big partisan it obtained White House permis-
boost for Secret Teamwork, but an hind the lines. With a small head- ion over strenuous objections from
earlier and bigger one had been the quarters and reserve unit main- the Pentagon
tr to have o them sent m'
appointment of Allen Dulles as di- tamed at Fort Bragg, N.C., the Spe- the rector of the CIA in 1953, after two cial Forces in 1960 consisted of only
years as deputy director. At that 1,800 men, poorly equipped and in- Sending 24 helicopters a y Vhere
time the. -agency was not permitted adequately trained, automatically g 40
by the National. Security Council to The President read Mao and Che men as well, counting only pilots
build up a big.enough force of .men Guevara rind told the Army to do and gunners and mechanics and
an((~~,~ tg red t rm i it to carry likewise. Then be i n 4 L r u c t e d the cooks and clerks and bakers and the
out ld i 6~rt 9 seleaSe 200= W0 Itt' 6 ItPIMR6Pi114a* 4ybo 6615 b t hment.
0XIt1nu.ed
 Approved For Re se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0a '9R001000080002-6
If the intention is-and the inten-
tion always is=to give those 24 heli-
copters real support, then it involves
sending 1,200 men. Moreover, the
statistics are that, in any helicopter
squadron, because of maintenance
servicing requirements, only half the
machines will be operational at any
one time. So if 24 operational heli-
copters are needed, 43 will have to
be sent, which means 2,400 men.
But if you're sending a supporting
force involving 2,400 men, then the
support for them-PXs, movies, mo-
tor pools, officers', and enlisted
men's clubs, perimeter guards to
protect all this, and so on and so on
-becomes really extensive, and
thousands more men get attached to
it. And so it goes. "Twenty-four heli-
copters" can, in fact did, ultimately
mean a full-scale military involve.
ment.
In sum, during the last decade the
White House's National Security
Council apparatus and the CIA-
particularly its operational side
which now has nine overseas em-
ployes to every one on the intel-
ligence-gathering side-have grown
enormously both in size and in in-
fluence. More and more foreign-poli-
cy decisions are 'being made In se-
cret, in response only to immediate
crises rather than in accordance
with long-range plans, and all too of-
ten with very little consultation
with professional foreign policy or
military planners.
More and more overseas opera-
tions are being conducted in secret,
and ad hoc, and with very little con-
trol by professional diplomats or sol-
diers. And the one organ of the
government that, on behalf of the
people that elected it, should be mo-
nitoring these goings-on, is today as
ignorant as the public-because
Congress submitted to secrecy on a
grand scale- years ago when it au-.
thorized the CIA.
It is hard to imagine how or when
the Secret Team can be brought into,
the open and made publicly accour -.
-table for its actiolrs:
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 Approved For ReM!(" ~g2jfi M: -ZDP84-OO JR001000080002-6
23 June 3 July 70
Pss st !
e Central Intelligence Agency
Th
(CIA), created in 1948 to improve . Nkwo V"10 !:. `4M0
and coordinate Amerikan intelligence. D3.xectly behind the M Street institutional complicity, this art-
operations, now involves hundreds 6uildiilg'rests - an old red warehouse icle should serve as a lesson for
of thousands of people and hundreds ' on Grace Street. This building has those people who would deny that
of millions of dollars--all undis- I just recently been purchased by the Amorika has in fact an existing
closed. Primarily established to network of fascism which permeates
counter the emergence, of the Soviet I Government Services Administration, of life i tn both public
Union as a threat to U.S. world acting as a front, and quietly turne all mer domination, .
the "Agency" has been over to the C.I.A. for use as an and of f A private institutions
extension of the training center. So, the next time you're visiting
caught actively involved in clan- I Geor erha s you will want
destine operations throughout the Sure nice to see at least one busi- 8etownP p s
world and, indeed, within the bor- ness booming during the recession. to visit some of our public servants
ders of the United States itself. About four doors to the east of I at the. C.I.A. training center--or
Infiltrating student, labor, protest; the 3222 address on M Street is an maybe use their parking lot. After. ears
of s and professional groups in and out enclosed parking lot, painted to ome
wel
very
Payroll accounting for the C.I.A.I all the attention the public can
as a secret arm of U.S. imperialism, foe is done every other week on a five- give them. They're lonely people.
has become the staunchest foe of
all liberation movements. state area basis. The payroll for
lvannia
P
, I
ennsy
Unlike the handful of books and the District plus
articles exposing the C.I.A. in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, i
the past, this article is not an and North Carolina amounts to
attempt to show C.I.A. fallibility roughly $800,000, with occassional
or to level a broadside attack on "special deposits" upping the total.I
its many activities. Instead, the Computed in a special accounting
topic here is the secrecy and com- office in Arlington. Virginia, the
plicity used locally in Washington payroll then travels a curious
D.C. to support C.I.A. operations. route before entering the pockets of,
Across M Street from some of our dedicated public servants.
Georgetown's most chic shops,-and Specifically, in Washington, the
only a couple doors away from Wash- C.I.A. payroll travels from the
ington's most famous French res- accounting office to the Arlington
taurant lies a major C.I.A. train- Trust Company. At this point, the
ing center. Located at,,-,.3U2 M Street. payroll is "re-deposited" by the
NW, the training center receives bank into the account of American
ersities are
i
v
dozens of trainees and instructors ;University(other un
daily. With casual observation, you. used in other areas).
can watch the numerous 'out-of-state In the meantime, using blank
cars enter the training center's. American University checks,'the
fills out and sends payroll
P
I
lot around the C
ki
. I
.
.
ng
open air par
corner on Wisconsin Avenue, just checks to their employees, thus using
south of M Street; it's marked American University as a cover for
"private property" despite the fact at least a sizeable portion of their
that the property is government fi- payroll system. Special deposits,
nanced. Or, if you're more patient, mentioned earlier, involve people
you can catch a glimpse of.these who receive payment under different
public servants leaving the, front `names each time, thus avoiding W-2's,
door still wearing their identifica-taxes, and other official records.
Lion cards i d to b ly ouchin the sur-
their 'chost ~ 6 sr eleas~e4 3d `ova ~A++R 84.004998001000080002-6
 Approved For Rese 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-009ROO1000080002-6
0
SANTA ANA, CAL.
REGISTEAN 17 1970
- 90,087
- 129,439
Trust Can't -Be Bought
"For the world as a whole, Dr. Toynbee asks what Amer-
the CIA has now become the
bogey that communism has
been for America," writes Eng-
.land's historian, Dr. Arnold
Toynbee, in the New York
Times. "Wherever there is trou-
ble, violence, suffering, trage-
dy, the rest of us are now quick
to suspect the C hand in
Let's pursue this and see our-
selves as others see us. Dr.
Toynbee is author of "The His-
tory of Civilization." He has
lectured at Stanford University
on several occasions as a visit-
ing professor from England.
Dr. Toynbee observes: "Our
t phobia about CIA is, no doubt,
as fantastically excessive as
America's phobia about world
communism; but, in this case,
. 44 too, there is just. enough con-
vincing evidence to make the
ica is doing about her problems.
"As we see it, she is failing to
deal with them and this is the
most terrifying feature of
American life today," he says.
He says the outside world
watched "with growing anxie-
ty" as America gets involved in
entangling alliances, and also
asks the question: "Is there no
hope of reconciliation on Ameri-
ca's home front?" He answers
that an American officer two
years ago said "mothers of
America won't like" more Viet-
nams, and concludes:
"The mothers of America,
have still to go into action. ..I
believe this is a battle the Pen-
tagon cannot win. In the moth
ers of America I -do still see-
some hope for the world."
Experienced American travel-
ers, particularly those who have
the knack of talking to some of
the common people in the con-
tries they visit, recognize some
truth in what Dr. Toynbee is
phobia genuine. In fact, the
roles of America and Russia
have been reversed in the
world's. eyes. Today America
has become the world's night-
mare.
"Like communist R u s s i a,
.America has committed atroci-
ties in the cause of truth and
justice as she sees them. We
believe that American fanati-
cism, too, is sincere. This
m a k c s it all the more
alarming..
"Would I rather be a Viet-
namese who is being `saved' by
the American Army, or be a
Czech who was being `saved' by
the Russian army?"
"Of course, I would rather be
the Czech: The number of lives
taken and the amount of devas-
tation caused by the 1968 Rus-
sian military intervention in
Czechoslovakia were s m a 11,
measured by the standard of
trying to tell us. We've sta-
tioned armies around the world
to assure us that the world will
be' the kind of a world we want.
We have spent billions upon
billions of dollars to "help" the
underprivileged, if they would
hold elections and choose theirsi
officials in the American way.i
Only they most often don't know!
winnt freedom means, and off
cials are willing to "put on the
America show" in order to get
the money.
Buying the world's friendship;
just doesn't work. We've got to'
earn the trust and friendship of
the world, rather than try to`
buy it. We talk to ourselves
about our noble hopes and aspi-s
rations, but we've got to solvei
our own problems before the;
world will respect t and be our!
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 Approved For RR1ease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-ad'499R001000080002-6
1110?,"D0, 01110
BLADE
JUN 1 6 1970
F 170,683
S -- 20(!,'02
AID And The CIA
FINALLY, the American people have a But the CIA, as hd~s?been documented by crit-')
government of-,ics of American foreign policy, has not been
-t frank admission from Americo 'an
licial that the Central Intelligence Agency content to confine its role to that of informa-t"
(CIA) does, indeed, wear the cloak of at least tion-gathering. It has heen accused of in-
one other federal agency in at least one coun- itiating, directing, and engaging in political or
try to wage undercover guerrilla war -re. 'military coups in numerous trouble spots of the
John A. Hannah, director of the At; ney for world. And, done sa without the it has week International Development (AID), last. ha 7 consent of others who bear final responsibility.
publicly ly acknowledged d that CIA agents have consent
continued to use the U.S. foreign aid mission in (Ire some instances it has been accused of count-
overnment directives through
hest
hi
?
g
g
ng
use of its own hidden funds.
This assumption of independence that at
times appears to surmount rather than follow'
policies of administrations present and past
has raised serious questions about the unre-
vealed power of the CIA.
An open society such as America is, at best,
uneasy with the existence of an agency engaged
in clandestine work. The necessity of a CIA is
beyond challenge. But if its revealed involve-
ment In the AID program is any measure, of its.
conduct, not only will it cloud the integrity'of'
other American agencies and organizations;
,it will discredit the legitimacy of the CIA itself.
role in Laos, plus its war-related activities in.
Vietnam, "might" have an adverse effect on
AID programs to other nations. "It certainly
has not helped ... It distorts the role of AID,"
he said in expressing hope that his agency
could "get rid of this kind of operation."
We should think so. The American foreign
aid program has been under fire for years
from critics in and out of Congress - but for
quite different reasons. But to use an aid mis-
sion as a covert means of engaging in para-
military actions assuredly discredits the agen-
cy and could likely plant seeds of widespread
mistrust in American intentions elsewhere.
As for the CIA - in this modernday world
every major power must maintain an in-
telligence-gathering agency. Only through such
far-flung and diverse listening posts. can a gov-
ernment protect against surprise, or use such
information for direction through other official
channels to head off events deemed contrary to
our national interest.
Laos since 1962 as a cover for recruiting and
traitling guerrilla fighters, in that formally
"neutral" country.
The former Michigan State University presi-
dent said that CIA operatives have masque-
raded as field workers of AID - posing as ru-
ral development' workers. In addition to guer-
rilla actions, they also have monitored enemy
movements and have acted as ground con-
trollers for U.S. air strikes on Laos from Thai-
land and other bases.
Mr. Hannah is a 1969 appointee to the office,
but he is not innocent of federal operations in
this connection. He was president of MSU when
it agreed to train South Vietnamese police offi-
cers for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime - and that
program turned.out to be run by the CIA.
But now Mr. Hannah concedes that the AID
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 Approved For Rel a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004WR001000080002-6
1) F.Tf0IT, MT CIi.
NEWS
E - 5x)2,(,16
S ,7,0136
ork of CB
hamper e`d,"
e 1r0% el. r
j
By COL. R. D. HEINL JR. THE ATTITUDE taken by
Newe Military Aealsel Hannah, as well as by two
WASHINGTON - Thed former Peace Corps director.,
Agency for International. De- Sargent' Shrivor and .lack
velo meet (AID) is a cover Hood Vaughan, and the pres-
P ent director, Joseph H.
for the' CIA in Laos` and Blatcliford, is that their agen-
wishes it weren't. . Gies are or ought to be too
Since 1962, according to it, pure to dirty their hands with
'admiliistrator, John A. Han intelligence matters. It infers
nah, the mission in Vientiane that such work should be kit
has maintained a "rural de- tortheeC A which, the -
ent" division which Is a
in fact of amoral tricksters and
in fact a CIA front for train-,ccrrew ew ongers.
ing individuals and units in
counter insurgency and other + The increasing desire of
military skills. various agencies of the gov-
Expressing the hope that ernment to turn their back on
the relationship between AID the CIA -(AID and the Peace
and CIA could be severed by Cods are u totthalone) hinders per-
per-
legislatinnow pending, for Han-
for forming , crucially important
nah expressed distaste functions on which the sur-
working with the CIA. "Our vival of i the United States
preference is to get out of this literally depends.
kind of operation," he said. di- Like Hannah's AID and
vorcing Hannah sand eCIAn his iBlatchforTs Peace Corps,
agency will then make corn-,Richard Helm's CIA is a
men cause with the Peace statutory a g e n c y of the
Corps, which has always held United e Sstates,, provided for
from mind
dfor itself , off-limits to the murky l
-but ?vitally necessary-game ! the public treasury. Whether
l of, intelligence..,-.,, ! or not given individuals.. or
-:. --j even other government agen-
cies, apploud the kind of work
-CIA sometimes does, the fact
remains that CIA business is
government business-no less
than AID business - and usu-
ally a good bit more import-
ant.
Yet the stance of AID and
the Peace Corps suggests that
there is a kind of pousse-cafe
!stratification of government
.,'functions: some at the top
above -board, pure, disinter-
s .eted, moral in the Wilsonian
view of international rela- needs an answer badly, the
tions being suitable and "re- CIA may not be able to pro-
spectable." Others in the dark duce.
depths disingenuous, amoral Such a situation would be.
if not immoral, covert, and pleasing in Moscow, Peking,
selfishly' pro-American, being Cairo, Damascus, and very
"disrespectable, lil:aly in Berkeley or Cam-
Obviously, AID would notj bridge, but perhaps not so,
want its acronym tarnished much. so to high-minded, de-
)., by disrespectable assnriationsi cent men like Hannah- who
that is why Hannah withdraws secretary of d e f e n s e and
the hem of his garment. I should know better.
IN ITS EARLY DAYS as Before he disdains the CIA
to k, o Hannah might
Col. Donovan's Office of Stra-' look its worl
tegic Services (OSS), during , who, World War If, our pre-CIA scconban,aaNat thaan Hale, whwhen
when
reproached in 1775 by a friend
i n t e l l i g e n c e organiza- for "dirtying himself" by spy-
tion planted representatives ing within the British lines,
at any point in the govern-i replied: "Every kind of ser-
mental structure where re-, vice, necessary to the public
suits could best be attained. good,.,, becomes honorable by
Since World ' War II was a !I being necessary:''
patriotic, ""moral" war, no
jections were raised. Nor, for
the same reason, during the
Korean War, was there any
tendency on the part of U.S.
government agencies,to shun
CIA,
It is only because of the
domestic unpopularity of Viet-
nam and a simplistic view of
government and its interests
and their defense, that organi-
zations like 'AID and the
P e a c e. Corps conclude that
,thcy',should be allowed to re.
f u s e government business
that some internal opinion 1i
disapproves.
This notion - that govern-
ment agencies paid for by the
taxpayer can pick and choose'
the kind of work they take in
-is a philosophical sibling lo'
the doctrine so popular in in
tellectual and even some ju-
dicial circles: that people
enjoy the "right" to choose
which wars they will fight and
which they will sit out.
As a practical matter, it
hardly requires n manpower,
expert to recognize that the'
"right" of selective service'
(in which the individual se-,
lects his own wars), means
that the day the bugle blows
will never be the day for a' "I j
lot of high-minded young men:
to go to that particular war..
Strictly on principle, you un
IN THE SAME WAY, if
various government agenciesi
acquire the discretion to cold
shoulder the CIA for the sake,
venience, or because agency P
of image, administrative con
officials are lukewarm on, a
particular tenet of defense or:
foreign policy, then some fine
L morninhwhen the. President
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DOTHAN, ALA.
EAGI E
28,355
JUN 10 1970
11i Level Decision"
That the American people aren't national interest.
always fully informed of what their Whether the government should
government is doing to and for them act in this fashion brings to mind
has been underscored twice in re- an article by the United Press Inter-
cent days. Whether the government national of several months ago. The
should maintain such secrecy is an- article dealt with a book by William
other question. J. Bads, a.former official of CIA.
A heavily censored summary of a In the book, Bards said that the peo-
Nov. 9, 1967 agreement between the ple's right to know is a basic ele-
United States and Thailand-,made ment of a free and self - governing
public in a 310-page transcript of society. "If a people are to r u 1 e
hearings conducted by a Senate For- themselves," he went on, "they must
eign Relations Subcommittee -- re- be adequately Informed to know,
vealed that the United States has what they are doing but "in a
secretly paid Thailand more than world such as this, complete open-
$200,000,000 to send 12,000 troops ness and candor on the part of any
to fight in Vietnam. government, is impossible."
Under the agreement, the United Bards agreed that "the govern-
States absorbed the costs for send- ment must as a general practice
Ing a Thai combat division to Viet- conduct an honest dialogue with its
nam and maintained and improved citizens" and argued that "there are
the defense capability of Thai forces situations when it seems to even the
remaining at home. Absorbing the most intelligent and conscientious'
costs for the combat division in- statesmen that the price of telling
cluded equipping the division,. pro- the truth, or not lying, is greater
viding logistic support, paying over- than can be borne.".
seas allowances, assuming the ex-
penses of preparing and training, Situations in which government
and distributing a muster-out bon- officials may have "not only the
us. Improving the capability of right but the obligation" to lie, ac-
forces on duty at home came cording to Bards, are:
through a modernization program 1. To" mislead an enemy about
which involved an increase in the wartime operations.
military assistance program by $30,- 2.'To protect covert intelligence
000,000 for the years 1968 and 1969. activities in peacetime.
At almost the same time this 3. To avoid a financial panic when
agreement was disclosed, John A. currency devaluation is pending.
Hannah, head of the United States' 4. At times such as the Cuba mis-
foreign aid program, revealed under sile crisis, when officials fear that
questioning on a news program that telling the, truth might lead to the
the program Is being used as a cover danger of nuclear war.
for Central Intelligence Agency ac- The sad part of the foregoing, of
tivities In Laos. Hannah emphasiz-, course, is that public officials are
ed that he disapproved of the CIA's only human and could, be hard put
use of his organization and added not to use the obligation to lie for
that Laos was the only place where reasons 'other than security. And,
this is being done and that such ac- too, there's always room for honest
tivity was deemed in 1962 as in the . error, but error nevertheless.
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0
,.The World's Nightmare'
There were never more than suspicions, gen-
orated by patterns of the past, that the United
states Central Intelligence Agency had any-
thing to do with the deposing of Prince No-
rodom Sihanouk of ? Cambodia last March 18.
rlie possibility of CIA participation was
prompt- 1o discounted 1 Amerlcafi and neutral sources,
and now it is reported from Phnom Penh that
Communist East Bloc intelligence agents have
concluded the CIA played no part In the coup.
This is gratifying, but why should the CIA STATOTHR
be so automatically suspect throughout t h e
world? A recent commentary by the eminent
British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, bears on
ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-MAYP 24H 1970
E - 333,224
S - 558,018
the subject:
For the world as a whole, the CIA has now
r become the bogey that Communism has been
for America. Wherever there is trouble, vio-
lence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are
now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in
it. Our phobia about the CIA is, no doubt, as
fantastically excessive as America's phobia
about world Communism; but; in this case,
too, there is just enough convincing evidence,
to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles
of Russia and America have been reversed
in the world's eyes. Today America has be-
come the world's nightmare.
Is that what has happened to the American
dream? This may be only one man's opinion
but it is the opinion of a leading world citizen
N whose profession is the evaluation and analy-
sis of historic events. Professor Toynbee, who
has lived in America, in the Middle West, and
0,1y thinks the fate of the world will be pro-
Ioundly affected by whether America manages
who_has a good understanding of America, e-
lieves that "the most terrifying feature" of
American life today is America's failure to
deal with its domestic problems, and he right-
the responsibilities that go with pre-eminent
world power, and start exercising the construc-
!SMtive leadership of which lhi `are'capable?
F Isn't it about time that Americans assumed
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 Approved For" WWM1( fp8U0WJ)2M;g048`9R001000080002-6
21 May 1970
Robert Hunter on the CIA
--Is. it a department of dirty tricks,
or an organisation of f act-gatherers ?
id it underwrite the seizure of power
by the Greek Colonels?
`
In the Ashenden stories, Somerset Maug-
ham put a human face on the British Secret
Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexi-
can killed the wrong man: this bumbling
helped soften the image of a rpthless and
ever?conmpetent machine dedicated to doing
His Majesty's dirty business, and made
Richard Ilelins, Director of the CIA
everything right. Not so with the Central
Intelligence Agency-or the CIA as it is
everywhere known. No humour here; just'
the sense of a sinister and heartless manipu--
lation of the democrats of a hundred count
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loontirtuedf
 'tries, designed to support the new i' c'riai-;1 whom they met at Washington r?ocktall
I'll of thosA rte~fibla noYt-R~er"g'"s. ~'tyG~Pk kbT)8 '664.WF 1000080002-6
1V'hat is mind %ch:rt reality? ?,ilia' r
was organised from the post-war rerrurants All this is straightforward enough, and
of the old 0111ce of Strategic Services, the Is hard to fault in any government. It is true
CIA has certainly had its fingers in m;~np that Francis Gary Powers did help disrupt
political pies, and has been accused +;f the Summit Conference in 1960 by having
~--" myriads more. Mossadeq fell in Iran* a the ill-luck to be shot down over Russia in
Guatemalan coup replaeed a left-wing re- his U-2 aircraft. But those reconnaissance
gime; America was humiliated at the Bay flights, and the reconnaissance satellites
of Pigs: a private American air force has later sent aloft by both Russia and America,
fought. the Laotian war; and Che t;ue~ar;, have helped to slow down the arms race
was killed in Boltvia. These events, which and to inspire mutual confidence that the
have all. rightly or wrongly, been attributed other side is not building some new super.
to the CIA, are the glamorous side of the weapon in secret.
business. But most of what the agency dues Few people who take seriously the prob-
is far more prosaic. It is basically an lems of running a government and a reason-
organisation of fact-gatherers: academics ably enlightened foreign policy would ques-
who never teach a class; pedants who rarely tion the role that the CIA shares with other
parade their nuances in learned journals- agencies in gathering and interpreting in
and never with the CIA's imprimatur. It formation; but they do argue against the
has many of the world's most skilled operational responsibUltics that shelter
linguists: the most patient. archivists; the under the same roof-what is popularly
cleverest analysts of isolated data; and, called the 'department of dirty tricks'.
surprisingly, some of the most liberal There i~ considerable justice in the view
people, politically, in Washington. Indeed, !that the same bureaucrats who carry
if the American government ever does come !, through policy should not have the right to
to accept that the Soviet Union is not pro- gather the information needed to judge
paring to launch a nuclear attack and that their actions. And since the ill-starred
China is not populated with madmen, it adventure at the Bay of Pigs, there has
will probably be because the CIA has sue- ,been a much greater effort throughout the
ceeded in putting across its estimate of the American government to end this overlap
situation. of authority. President Kennedy re-acti-
This, of course, is a rosy view. Like any f vated his Foreign Intelligence Advisory
great, sprawling institution, the CIA does Board, and all the bureaucratic strings were
suffer from a great deal of intellectuA. pulled much tighter.
myopia, the compromises of bureaucr.ru}?, Ironically, however, the test of intellec-
and the political philosophy dominating t; tual purity has not been applied as rigor
country at any moment. And if anythin;, its ously'to the CIA's competitors. The Defence
reporting is usually dull, tedious, banal. and Department and its many military offshoots
sometimes dead wrong. as anyone will tv.,t i- , also devote large resources to knowing the'
fy who has been privileged-or compelled enemy, and there is far less concern to see
-to read the Daily Digest and other that responsibility for information and
classified reports that circulate about the, action are kept separate. The Vietnam Ware
government. 'Is an excellent example of this; but If any-
This part of the CIA-the part that is, thing, the blunders that have occurred In
styled 'overt'-is quartered in a large that war from bad espionage-including
building across the Potomac from Washing- President Nixon's current venture in Cam?
ton, unmarked and unobserved. But the 'I bodia-Involve the military more Omni'
eight thousand or so particularly grey-faced they do- their civilian counterparts at the
men and women who -work there are onlyI.M.
the tip of the Intelligence ice-berg: it has But in all, it Is fair to sa.t that very little
been estimated, for example, that more ,if anything that Is done by the CIA today
thana hundred thousand people are actively goes contrary to the wishes of the President
engaged in the one function of gathering, and his immediate advisers. 'Many people
and interpreting information about Soviet' think that it is bad enough that the Presi-
military capabilities. The CIA budget, too, dent can sometimes act in secret and with
is immense, although not one item appears ;'J considerable impact; but it is necessary to
anywhere in the compendia of Federal separate this concern about American be-
expenditures; there is no Congressional haviour in general from perennial worries
debate; and few people know its true -lag- ':that the CIA, as the established villain, will
nitude. By conservative estimates, more run amok. Again, after the Bay of Pigs
than $1,000 million of CIA money is hidden fiasco, it suited President Kennedy and his
under other categories, and another $2,000 hagiographers to emphasise the bad advice
million is spent on similar activities by, given by the CIA: at least here was a recog-
other agencies-such as the National nised scapegoat whose Involvement soft-
Security Agency-whose existence is never tined criticism of executive decisions.
formally acknowledged. Surely, the argument ran, even the Presi-
Yet despite the secretive nature of the' dent could not he expected to' be proof
intelligence community', many CIA olli- against the Agency's machinations?
icials. lead surprisingly public lives. Unlike This incident illustrates what may be the
.the heads of M15 and 'IIG, the Director of most important fact to bear in mind about
Central Intelligence is a familiar figure at the CIA: what it actually does or does not
diplomatic ~receptions; the A n y h: ?,,ct (~At ss,,~c;rairy,~v}~1000080002-6
listed pho lIf~r41~M$d I A olo ,.. -1i . MW Ct
passed when junior employees ttient `witchcraft In other times, belief in the aontirtuei>?
through the absurd ritual of telling people 'potency of the CIA provides a point of
 stability In a disorganised world. It Is far less he had been killed in this or some
easier to accept that v' is b n ne (wt. i 1 r v y.
sciously U NUMPAt"i I [~I if~ di ' seC~l/41+RE R84-At( ~F E 1000080002-6
product of human failings. Good intentions and evil was also present in the most cele-
gone awry are far harder to tolerate than braced instance of CIA involvement in this
the knowledge that a conspiracy is truly country: the funnelling of money through
afoot. One doesn't have to be paranoid to the Congress for Cultural Freedom to the
gain a certain comfort from suspicions of magazine Encounter. The hue and cry from
conspiracy; and the few times that the 'that affair has subsided, but the moral
CIA actually does gain direct publicity- issues that were raised have still' not been
almost always when a job has been bungled adequately settled. A number of authors,
-merely confirm them. and some individuals who had helped with,
The political impact of this' desire to the editing in entire innocence of the
believe in the CIA's skulduggeries is secret source of funds, were horrified to
considerable-however many thousands or discover who had actually been making.
millions of conscious agents one must possible the publication of their views.
assume to exist for the agency to be These men and women had written what
involved in all the actions attributed to it. they believed, and were in no way influ-
This was made quite clear recently on enced by the character of their ultimate'
BBC Television's Line-Up, when Michael benefactor. Can it be said that they were
Dean interviewed Andreas Papandreou, the . suborned?
iJ most publicised leader of the Greek resist- This is an old dilemma, put recently in a
ance-in-exile. Mr Papandreou recounted in new guise by Kurt Vonnegut. In his novel
some detail the nature of the CIA plot to Sirens of Titan, he reveals that the whole
overthrow the democratic government in of human history has been engineered by
Athens and install the Colonels, and com- the planet Tralfamadore in order to flash
pleted his narrative with quotations from a signals of comfort and hope to a messenger-
top-secret meeting of the American stranded on a moon of Jupiter many eons
National Security Council. ; ago, The architectural marvels of each
Perhaps this is all true. But even if it is, civilisation have spelt out simple sentences
what does it say for the strength of Greek in an alien sign language. But does this
political life and institutions? 'Must we be- negate all of human effort? Likewise, do';
livve that every Greek of political influence
is employed by the Americans? Or were
the Greeks so lax in developing their politi-
cal institutions that an order from the CIA
-or wherever-could indeed produce what
we see in Athens today?
Mr Papandreou is an astute politician of
a sort. He knows that, as in the case of
'Who killed Kennedy? ', it Is impossible to
prove a negative:, to show that Oswald did
it alone, or that the Americans were not
rigging everything in Athens. And he knows
that nothing is easier to believe in than the
existence of the organised plot. But it seems
a bit narrow to look no further, and to deny
that the Greek Left bore any responsibility
for what happened in April 1967, whatever
the role of the CIA, or of Mr Walt Rostow'
in the White House, or of the Nato military
articles written for a magazine that has
been compromised by the CIA have no
value? Do they lose the significance which
the authors thought they were imparting to
their work when they produced it? This is
not really a question about the nature of
the sponsoring institution-whether one
that serves the ends of a government, or
one like the great foundations that give
out money amassed by devious means in
the past-but of the secrecy with which it
is done. At heart, it is a question of man's
striving to secure the right to know what
forces are shaping his life, to know how
far he is a free agent.
The anger directed at the CIA was not
eased by the irony of the CIA's choice of
.what is considered at least by Americans
to be a left-of-centre publication. If any-j
thing, it intensified this anger, particu-I
larly on the part of those who needed to
measure ther own radical progress against
,their image of CIA activities.
There was also a sense in which the'
bargain with the devil had been unfairly,
struck. It is one thing to sell one's soul
g
in the more obvious one. Everyone knows ' willingly: it is quite another to do so, even!
that Air America, which forms the back. ? if the temporal payment is made, without
bone of the anti-communist air war in Laos, 'being able to share in the awareness of
is directly financed by the CIA. Yet this . complicity with evil. To be used by a capri-
knowledge, has never produced an outcry, cious god may be tolerable if everyone is in
or even much interest, largely because the on the secret; but what could be worse than
whole affair is conducted with minimum to be denied the sweetness that comes from !.
secrecy, and maximum routine hnd bore- the knowledge of sin?
dom. Compared to the killing. of the Perhaps this 'is the way an agency like
Guevara-widely believed to be The work the CIA must operate; and certainly this
of the CIA-the fighting In Laos is far more fresh evidence of duplicity only reinforced
Important in terms of current politics and the comforting belief that conspiracy does,
lives lost, but it is totally lacking in those indeed, abound. As such, the CIA has a
elements that make for a basic confronta. value in the realm of drama, in the realm
tion between good and evil. For the per- of the morality play, whatever its impact
oses of the?ctre and th 1't' tI t d on the world's politics.
p
e
o
i command.
The effort by many Greeks today to pin
most if not all of their troubles on the
Americans is, only one example of the force
exertsA by the conspiracy theory of history.
Indeed, there is a certain appeal in the truly
sinister and secret operation that is lackin
.
p
tcs a 1:1 s n School of
pend on 1APPIMMedi oir'sRAIMO S e i r > D01FD3ffl 6 clrt
i i at ?rd1000080 d@ School
kind of confrontation perfectly. Indeed, his life and work would be incomplete un is now based in Washington.
 Approved For Rele se 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004 R001000080002-6
PUBLIC IMAGE OF CIA DISTORTED, WRITER SAYS
Krticle by M.L.s "What the CIA Is"; Florence, Il Mondo, Italian, 17 May
rq.,
1970, p J nrox}
Washington -- A few evenings before he was named director of the CIA
(Central Intelligence Agency) in 1966, Richard McGarrah Helms, one of the
most outstanding career officers of the American espionage service, was in-
vited to dinner by the President of the United States. Democratic Senator
Eugene McCarthy was among those invited'. During dessert, McCarthy, who had
heard of the imminent appointment of Helms, asked him about the French wine
being served: "Do you think 1953 was a good year for this Chateau d'Yquem?"
Helms said he knew nothing about it. Then the Senator pointed to some yel-
low roses on the table and asked Helms if he could identify the variety.
Helms said he knew nothing about roses.
"Well, then," 'McCarthy said sarcastically turning to President John-
son, "James Bond would have been able to give better answers."
The episode was recalled several days later by Johnson himself when
he nominated Helms as Chief of the American intelligence service. Johnson
added that the anecdote did not decrease the esteem in which Helms was held
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but served only to demonstrate how widespread, even among senators, was the
absurd concept of directors of the intelligence service as cloak and dagger
men, equally at ease among the most refined social affairs and bloody in-
trigue.
Johnson added, "I only know diligent officials at the CIA, So far,,
I have never met a person like 007,"
The official position of the American.government is to consider those
in the intelligence service as bureaucrats liRW any others, and the CIA as
just another government agency. When one talks about the CIA's tasks with
Washington executives, they inevitably point out that the activities of the
intelligence service consists to a very large degree of the simple collection
and analysis of information data which are then put, into reports in the form
of National Intelligence Estimates (periodical) or Special National Intelli-
gence Estimates (special reports), for the use of the-President of the
United States.
Washington officials do not deny that the CIA sometimes is Involved
in "special" operations abroad -- those known as "black operations" in espi-
onage jargon -- but they deny that they represent an important part of the
CIA's work. They deny flatly -- and this is the polemical reply -- that
there are cases in which these operations may take place without the know-
ledge of the American government itself. They point out that any operation
involving the CIA abroad beyond the simple collection of information must be
authorized by a special committee of the National Security Council, which is
the organ that brings together the civilian and military leaders of the
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f ` ~
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nation under the chairmanship of the Chief Executive.
This view of the CIA as a simple organization of disciplined offi-
cials at work on the detached investigation of political situations and the
decoding of cryptograms is certainly sweetened and onesided. Equally exag-
gerated, however, is the view that the CIA is always involved in and respon-
sible for any important political change taking place in any nation in the
world. If the CIA really possessed these attributes, it would be an organi-
zation of unheard of efficiency and unlimited means. In truth, it is not
the first and does not possess the others. ;TH
rrrot+
This does not mean that the image of the CIA in its function as an
omnipresent, omnipotent agency for evil is not the most widespread both in
the United States and abroad. It is so deeprooted that nothing can change
it. An example of this was seen in the removal of Sihanouk from Cambodia.
When Counsellor Henry Kissinger gave Richard Nixon the story of the
coup d+etat, the first person the President wanted to see was Richard Helms.
Nixon asked whether the CIA had had any hint of what was about to happen in
Cambodia. Had it, perhaps, contributed in some way?
As in other circumstances of the same kind, Helms replied that the
CIA was taken completely by surprise by the events. Naturally, it had been
in contact with clandestine Cambodian groups opposing Sihanouk but had no
ties with army circles that had organized the coup. Senator Mike Mansfield,
head of the democratic opposition in the senate, who went to the White House
that same evening to get a report from the President on the situation, was
able to assure newspapermen the next days "I can tell you that this time
the CIA played no part in the event." Such a precise statement, coming not
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from an administration spokesman but from an authoritative member of the
opposition, should have nipped in the bud the hypothesis concerning the
CIA+s co-responsibility. This was all the more true since the Cambodian
events did not seem to have resulted in any visible advantage for the CIA
or for American policy.
In the days following, Jack Anderson, colleague of the deceased Drew
Pearson, a "columnist" who specialized in unveiling behind-the-scenes sto-
ries, investigated the matter and arrived at the same conclusion:'. the CIA
had not been involved.
rq.
^'YO?
All this did not serve to wipe out the very widespread conviction
that the CIA was responsible for Sihanouk's overthrow. The American press
of the new and old left continued in fact to present it as the only incon-
trovertible act in the Cambodian situation.
Abroad, the conviction that the CIA is always present everywhere is
still more widespread. In Bolivia, an anti-American leftist newspaper
Jornada, went so far as to distribute to its readers -- mostly semi-literate
and superstitious Indians -- an amulet "for protection against the CIA mach-
inations." In France, on a more sophisticated level, the newspaperman Jean-
Jacques Servan-Sohreiber gave his word that the CIA today is capable of con-
trolling without exception all the levers of the Greek government. A few
days after the statement by Servan-Schreiber, one of the deans of world
journalism, Cyrus Sultzberger of The New York Times noted at Paris that the
CIA to which his French colleague referred must really be the Greek Military
Intelligence Service, KYP, which in its English version is called, even in
Greece itself, Central Intelligence Agency or CIA. Members of this CIA are
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almost all the Colonels who govern Greece and this was known from the be-
ginning. This explanation was not accepted by Servan-Schreiber, nor was it
reported by all the European newspapers.
The CIA has its own agents in almost all American embassies abroad --
exactly like the Soviet KGB and the GRU or the British M15 or the French
SDECE, or the intelligence services of all the other nations which can af-
ford them. Their job is to collect information from as many groups as pos-
sible and to keep in contact with as many forces as possible, including those
which are clandestine. For these reasons itrgcan be said that the CIA has
some influence on political life in all these nations. Instead, if we speak
only of the "intervention of the CIA" only in those cases .in which, after a
deliberate activity intended to provoke a certain political change, that
change is actually carried out, it must be asserted that "CIA intervention"
takes place in certain countries and in certain situations. They do not
take place in other nations and in other situations.
From Persia to Laos
Examples of intervention expressly authorized by the American execu-
tive were the overthrow of Mosadeq in Iran in 1953, the overthrow of Arbenz
in Guatemala in 1954, the catastrophic Cuban expedition of 1961, decisive
intervention for the settlement of the Congolese civil war in 19611 and the
arming of Meo guerrillas in Laos beginning in 1968.
Examples of important foreign changes in which the CIA, even though
it was naturally present on the scene, did not have a determining part were
the installation of dictatorship in Pakistan, the seizure of power by the
Colonels in Greece, the rightist coup d'etat in Brazil. An extreme case is
t Q 0 0800,02 6 ;
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represented by Indonesia, The CIA (which unsuccessfully organized a revolt
against Sukarno in 1958) was neither the promoter nor the organizer of the
bloody anti-communist repression of 1969 following the ouster of Sukarno
but despite this it supported him with ample means. In a reverse situation,
this same thing obviously would have been done by the Soviet KGB or the
Chinese news agency Hsinhua which notoriously is a screen for the intelli-
gence activities of Mao's China.
What means does the CIA really possess? How does it function? Who
are its officers? It is impossible to get jigformation on these points from
official sources. In brief, this is the substance of an interview we had
with Joseph Goodman, Assistant Director of the CIAs
Questions How many men does the CIA have in the United States and
abroad?
Answers I'm sorry, but I cannot answer that question.
Q.: Roughly, what is your annual budget?
A.: Given the nature of our work, we do not give out information.of
that kind.
Q.s How many positions does the CIA have abroad?
A.: No comment.
Q.: Who is presently head of the Planning Division?
A.s We give no details either about the, offices of the CIA, nor who
heads them. However, I can tell you that the Director of the CIA is Richard
Helms.
The Planning Division is the moat notorious of the CIA departments,
because it is concerned with "black operations,", Only a colossal mistake
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by the White House some time ago made it possible to learn that it was
directed by Desmond FitzGerald well-known New England gentleman and scholar.
He was the first husband of Marietta Tree who was a close collaborator of
Adlai Stevenson and is the mother of the famous model Penelope Tree. Fitz-
Gerald, Helms and all the other executives of the CIA were invited to the
White House for a ceremony. The protocol office published and ingenously
released to the press, including the Soviet press, the list of those invited
along with their titles. In addition to Helms and FitzGerald, they were:
Albert Wheelon, Director of Research; Laurence Houston, General Counsel;
Jack Smith, head of Cryptography; Cord Meyer, Chief of the Office for rela-
tions with trade unions and student organizations; William Colby, Chief of
the Asia Department; J. C. King, Chief of the Latin American Department and
Bronson Tweedy, Chief of the European Department.
Cigars Loaded with Dynamite
FitzGerald died shortly afterward in 196? of a heart attack. Who
replaced him? And are all the others still at the same jobs? Perhaps there
will be no way of knowing this until the CIA officials again go to a ceremony
at the White House.
Information on what is happening in the CIA occasionally is leaked to
the press through some anonymous official of the department of State because
of the ferocious antipathy between the two organizations, or through the ini-
tiative of some internal faction of the CIA itself which seeks to damage an-
other faction. It is obvious that information of this kind, disclosed for
purposes of denigration, point up the failings of the CIA rather than its
successes. Thus, it is difficult to get an impartial picture from them,
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It was information of this kind, for example, that made it possible
to learn that a CIA official had seriously submitted to his superiors a plan
to blow Fidel Castro's head off by giving him cigars loaded with dynamite
while he was in New York in 1960 for the United Nations Assembly. Other de-
liberate leaks, circulated by the faction of CIA carreer officials who are in
permanent conflict with the "political" appointees in the government, made
it possible for the public to learn that Admiral Raborn, Director of the CIA
until he was succeeded by Helms, had asked in a meeting of his employees what
the meaning of the word "oligarchy" was.
rat
nynt:
According to sufficiently reliable information on the number of per-
sons who work for CIA, the figure is 15,000 employees, of whom 10,000 are
in the American headquarters. (It,is a gigantic building which looks like a
hospital hidden among the fields and forests of Langley, Virginia). The re-
mainder are in foreign countries. Administrative funds hidden in various
ways in the Defense Budget amount to $1.5 billion per year. This is equal
to at least five times what the CIA, founded in 19117, had available in the
first years of its life when because of the hostility of Congress its re-
sources were so impoverished that in order to carry out certain operations
its officials were obliged to resort to private charity.
Among the cases of this kind is that of a substantial contribution
collected one evening in March 19118 by some CIA officials who were members
of the prestigous Brook Club of New York. The money was to be used for a
CIA campaign in Italy to influence the elections of that year in an anti-
communist direction. The episode, reported at that time by two American
newspapermen Thomas Ross and David Wise, has never been denied.
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CSO: o2415/D
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 The Washington Monthly
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The Secret Team
and the
Games
They Play
was strikingly illustrated not long ago b I
by L. Fletcher Prouty, the refusal of the Central Intelligence'
Agency to provide witnesses for the
"The hill costumes of the Meo tribes- court-martial that was to try eight Green
men contrasted with the civilian clothes Beret officers for murdering a suspected
of United States military men riding in North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the
open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and (Army to drop the charges.
istols. These The Secret Team consists of security-
pistols. young Americans are cleared individuals in and out of govern-
mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA ment who receive secret intelligence data
contract to advise and train Laotian gathered by the CIA and the National
troops. Those matter-of-fact, almost Security Agency and who react to those
weary sentences, written late in Feb-
ruary by T.D. Allman of The Washington data when it seems appropriate to them
Post after he and two other enterprising with paramilitary plans and activities,-
correspondents left a guided tour and e.g., training and "advising"-a not ex-'
walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos actly impenetrable euphemism for "lead-'
to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe mg into battle -Laotian troops. Mein
a situation that today may seem com- bership in the Team, granted on a "need
monplace to anyone familiar with to know" basis, varies with the nature
American operations overseas, but that 1and the location of the problems that
no more than 10 years ago would have come to its attention. At the heart of the
been unthinkable. Team,of course, are a handful of top ex-
To take a detachment of regular 1ecutives of the CIA and of the National
troops, put its members into disguise, Security Council, most notably the chief
smuggle them out of the country so that White House adviser on foreign policy.
neither the public nor the Congress Around them revolves a sort of inner
knows they have left, and assign them to ring of Presidential staff members, State
clandestine duties on foreign soil under Department officials, civilians and mili-
the command of a non-military agency tary men from the Pentagon, and career
-it is doubtful that anyone would have professionals in the intelligence services.
dared to suggest taking such liberties And out beyond then-is an extensive:
tions of the United States, not to say
with the Constitution, to any President
up to and especially including Dwight D.
ficials with responsibility for or expertise
in some specific field that touches on
national security: think-tank analysts,.
Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remark- buss 1ess111en who travel a lot or wnose
able development in the management of businesses (e.g., import-export or operat-
America's relations with other countries Ing a cargo airline) are useful, academic
during the nine years since Mr. Eisen experts in this or that technical subject
bower left office has been the assum or geographic region, and, quite impor
p-! tantly, alumni of the intelligence ser
lion of more and more control over mili vice-a service from which there are no'
tary and diplomatic operations abroad unconditional resignations.
by men whose activities are secret,
whose budget is secret, whose very iden Thus the Secret Team is not a clan-
tities as often as not are secret-in short destine super-planning board or super-
a Secret Team whose actions only those general staff but, even more damaging to
implicated in them are in a position to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a
monitor. How determinedly this secrecy; bewildering collection of temporarily
is preserved, even when preserving it assembled action committees that
means denying the United States Army] respond pretty much ad hoc to specific
the right to discipline its own personnel, troubles in various parts of the world,
not to say the opportunity to do Justice,{;sometimes in ways that duplicate the
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0
activities of regular American missions, appropriate lop Secret clearances often
sometimes in ways that undermine those are kept in the dark about Team plans.
activities, and very often in ways that Thus Adlai Stevenson, ambassador to the
interfere with and muddle them. For United Nations, was not informed about
example, when serious border troubles the Bay of Pigs invasion plans until thei
broke out along the northern frontiers of: very last minute when rumors about it
India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Ilhutan in began to appear in the press; and even
1902. the ('IA brought in U.S. military then Tracy Barnes, the CIA man sent to
equipment and manpower, including brief Stevenson, gave him a vague and,
Special Forces (Green Beret) troops, to incomplete picture of the operation.
train Indian police, despite the fact that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already sent "Need to know" also can be bent in
to New Delhi for the same purpose a spe- the other direction in order to secure the
cial team, headed by General Paul support of potential allies and further
Adams, founder and commanding gen- those allies careers. Members of the
eral of the U.S. Strike Command. The Secret Team who favored the election of
CIA operators practically ignored Gen- John F. Kennedy over Richard Nixon
oral Adams and Ambassador John Ken- played a very special role in the 1960
neth Galbraith in proceeding with their election campaign. Nixon presided over
plans, and there is no evidence that the the National Security Council and there-
U.S. Congress ever knew the CIA was in fore knew in detail the plans for the'Bay
the picture at all. " ' . of Pigs operation. Senator Kennedy, as
an outsider, was presumed not to know
One source of the Teams power is those highly classified details. However,
the speed with which it can act. The he did know. In his book, Six Crises,
CIA's communications system is so ex- Nixon wrote that Kennedy was told
traordinarily efficient,, especially by con- about the invasion by Allen Dulles dur-
trast with State's, that the Team can, in ing the traditional CIA briefing for can-'
a phrase that often gets used at such dilates; but there was more than that to
times, have a plane in the air" respond-
ing to some situation overseas while the story, it appears.
State is still decoding the cable inform- A former staff' member from the
ing it of that situation. A few yeah ago, Office that the
during Secretary tile summDefon I rc hl-
for example, while the strongest member went to the Senate Office Building to
of an Asian government that the United
States was strenuously supporting (call pick up and escort to the Pentagon four
him Marshal X) was lying sick in a Cuban exile leaders, among them the fu
Tokyo hospital, word came that a group sion tore commander of the Bay of Pigs inva-
of discontented young officers was team, who had been meeting with
planning a coup in his absence. In a, Senator Kennedy. Those men were sup-
matter of hours, thanks to the Team,' posed to be under special security wraps,'
Marshal X was on his way home in a U.S. but certain CIA officials had introduced
Air Force jet fighter; he arrived at his' them to Kennedy, thus making sure that
office in plenty of time to frustrate the he knew as much about the invasion as
plotters. The power to pull off feats like Nixon-if not more, as the result of a
that is more than operational power; it personal relationship that Nixon did not
is in a real sense policy-making power. In have with the Cuban refugee front and
this particular case it was the power to, the Americans who were secretly he'Yping
commit the United States to the protec- it. When the candidates appeared on tele-
tion and support of Marshal X, even vision together during the crucial cam-
though many officials who dealt with paign debates, Nixon, abiding by
Marshal X's government on a workaday security restrictions, limited himself in
basis regarded him as the most obnox- his discussion of the government's plans
ious member of it. Calling back "a plane for Cuba. This official control did not
in the air" is not an easy thing to do, and apply to Kennedy. He could and did ad-
the Team knows and benefits from this vocate overthrowing the Castro govern-
fact. ment. Nixon's frustration and anger at
Another source of the Team's power Kennedy's tactics were evident on the
is its ability to manipulate "need to TV screen. Many observers believe that
know"classifications. One way to make that confrontation over Cuba was one of
sure that there is little opposition to the moments during the debates when
your proposed activities Is to fail to tell Kennedy scored most heavily -land of
those who might oppose them what course most observers credit Kennedy's'
those ac i ~ 1 1- ` p V1I~ ! RF c` ff.a g b~600080002-6
rankiing
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That Kennedy's connection with the old man." The fact that a number of
Cuban refugee's before his 'election was such volunteers ended up serving time in
O anything but casual or fortuitous was' communist prisons never seemed to de-'
demonstrated more than two years later ter new ones. In Dulles's view the infor-'
in the Orange Bowl in Miami, before a mation these people provided, although
national television audience, at a often helpful, was the least of their
welcome-back celebration for the ran-'value; they were influential men who,
soured prisoners from the Bay of Pigs. At because they had put in some time as
one point during the ceremonies, the "Agents," would always have a soft spot
President walked over to the group of in their hearts for the Agency.
returnees and threw his arm around the Of course Dulles did not increase the
shoulders of one of them. If those. CIA's influence as much as he did just by
,watching thought he had chosen his man image building. He was an organizer and
at random, they were mistaken. The a clandestine operator of great ability,,
Cuban he embraced was his old friend and between the end of the Korean war
from the summer of 1960, Manuel and the election of John Kennedy, he
Artime, the commander of'the invasion had begun building the Team-with the
brigade. CIA usually calling its signals, of course-
and it had had a number of substantial
successes. Overthrowing the Mossadegh.
Kennedy's election was a big boost government in Iran was one; overthrow-
for Secret Teamwork, but an earlier and ing the Arbenz government in Guatemala
bigger one had been the appointment of was another- although perhaps from a
Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA in connoisseur's point of view the latter op-
1953, after two years as Deputy Direc- eration was a bit.on the blatant side. Per-
tor. At that time the agency was not per- haps the most brilliant of all was the
mitted by the National Security Council spectacular building up of Ramon
to build up a big enough force of men Magsaysay from an obscure army captain
and materiel Jo permit it to carry out to the President and national hero of the i
operations on its own. In other words, Philippines. This latter feat was mostly;
whenever the CIA wanted to do any-organized by Colonel Edward G.
thing on a large scale, it had to secured Lansdale of the CIA. via the Air Force, a
i
t
f
ass
s
ance
rom, and therefore share public relations genius of the old selling;
authority with, other agencies, chiefly iceboxes- to-Eskimos school.
the Departments of State and Defense. Lansdale conceived the idea of
Slowly Dulles changed these conditions. making Magsaysay into the savior of his'
One way he did it was to give intel- country from the communist "Iluks" by
ligence activities intellectual and social recruiting, and paying with CIA funds, a
credibility by surrounding himself with few bands of Filipino soldiers who, every
men from industry, finance, and aca- night or so, would put on peasant'
demia. ; clothes, invade some villages with much
The CIA always had been a haven for' ado, and then allow themselves to be,
Ivy League people and Dulles made it. driven out again by the intrepid forces
even more so. It was not unusual to find under Magsaysay's command. Not infre-
the Director, perched on a hassock in his quently after such an episode, the stage
living room, wearing a V-neck sweater 1"Huks" and the loyalists would rendez-'
and tennis shoes, with a racquet on the vous in a nearby grove or field and re
floor beside him, discoursing on the lit- enact the evening's performance to the
est cables from his agents around the' accompaniment of much hilarity and
world to a similarly clad group of disci- beer. All of which, perhaps it need be
ples, many of whom may not have emphasized, is not to say that Magsaysay
known that meanwhile back at the office was a faker or a figurehead; on the con-
workaday CIA officials were wrestling trary, it is a mark of Lansdale's skill that
with such mundane problems as how to lie chose as the central figure in his.
introduce Special Forces men into Boli- hero-making exercise, a man with the
via and Colombia, or whether it would attributes of a genuine hero.
better serve the interests of the United Dulles was as adept at domestic, as at
States to dispose of a certain counterspy overseas manipulation, and, during the
with poison or a garrote. Eisenhower years, when the CIA was
Particularluseful to Dulles in his'
i
ll
.7 e ng part
a
y restrained, he recruited to
empire building were businessmen and the Team a number of frustrated young
educators who traveled frequently, and Army officers who were chafing against
therefore were well qualified to assist in?v r
the colle pr~tVet7oFrear'tia~lt?lcets I ~ t!d$%M1000080002-6
 Pi
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cans had vowed "never again" when it Arthur Schlesinger, in his book A
came to committing American troops to Thousand Days, recounts that President
battle in "brushfire " wars, especially on Kennedy "made anti-guerrilla instruction
Asian soil, and turned to reliance on nu- a personal project;" After reading
clear weapons as the core of American Colonel Lansdale's report on guerrilla'
defense policy. This meant to the CIA operations in Vietnam (where Lansdale,
that it could not get the troops it often had been busily and quite successfully.
would have liked to have to further its helping Ngo Dinh Diem become a savior
plans. It meant to the Army that the Air of his country it la Magsaysay), Kennedy
'
asked his special assistant Walt Rostow,
fresh from the CIA-run Center for
International Studies at MIT, to check
valries, that by declining to fight any l into what the Army was doing about
battles smaller than nuclear ones, counter-guerrilla training. The President
s share of
Force would receive the lion
professional opportunities and glory and,
beyond the eternal matter of service ri-
America was giving up its capacity to
influence any events smaller than apoca-
lyptic ones. Such bright and eloquent
generals as Matthew Ridgeway, James
Gavin, and particularly Maxwell Taylor
argued this case vigorously. Their notion
as that it was essential for. the United
read Mao and Che Guevara and told the
Army to do likewise. Kennedy
instructed the Special Forces to expand
its anti-guerrilla operations. Lansdale and
his associate, Samuel Wilson, wrote new
texts on counter-insurgency for Fort
Bragg. After a visit to the training center,
States to have a special counter- Kennedy, over opposition from .the
insurgency force prepared to put out Army bureaucracy, revivified the Special
brushfires around the world. Obviously, Forces, and training centers were or-
Dulles shared this view, if indeed he ganized in Panama, Okinawa, Vietnam,
hadn't been one of the first to advance and West Germany. "In Washington,"
it. Kennedy, the activist, also agreed, and. writes Schlesinger, "Robert Kennedy,
:so it is no wonder that many leading Maxwell Taylor, and Richard Bissell
members of the Secret Team favored ' pushed the course. Roger Hilsman, draw.,
him over Nixon, the Vice President in a ing on his wartime experience in the hills
non-activist administration-though of Burma, and Walt Rostow, analyzing
probably himself less of a non-activist the guerrilla problem as part of the path-
than his boss. By the same token, it also, ology of economic development, carried
is no wonder that the. Secret Team, the gospel to the State Department."
.especially by gaining control over the Fort Bragg and the regional centers.
Special Forces, fared well after were opened to foreign trainees. Osten-
Kennedy's election. For when the action ;sibly, the foreign officers represented the-
came, under Kennedy, it was the Special, uniformed services of their countries,
Forces which got the first call. but actually some of them were hand-
The Army Special Forces had been ; p icked by their nations' intelligence
formed after World War 11. In event?of a organizations and then had to be ap-
Russian invasion, the 10th Special) proved by the CIA. Under the guise of
Forces in Germany were to be sent into military aid programs, these men at-
Eastern Europe to create and sustain par-.
tisan movements behind the lines. With a
small headquarters and reserve unit
maintained at Fort Bragg, North Car-
olina, the Special Forces in 1960 con-
sisted of only 1,800 men, poorly
equipped and inadequately trained. Wil-
liam Pfaff, a consultant to the Hudson
Institute and a member of the Special
Forces reserves, described them as being
"composed of self-consciously uprooted
men, emotionally and intellectually de-
tached from the mainstream of civilian
society but also from that securely bland
and sentimental Southern institution,
the American Army itself." Under the
rubric of counter-insurgency and nation-,
building, these men soon became CIA
mercenaries.
tended the Special Forces School at Fort
Bragg. Officers came from over 60 coun-
tries, representing, among others, such
surprising nations as South Africa, Saudi
Arabia, Portugal, the Netherlands, Jor-
dan, Bolivia, Sierra Leone, and Haiti.
A Green Beret-CIA team trained the
Bolivians who captured Che Guevara.
They have trained Iranian police,
Chinese forces on Taiwan, King Hus-
sein's Elite paratroops in Jordan, and
troops in South Korea. The CIA-Green
Beret team has undertaken special train-,
ing missions in Liberia and in the Congo.
And currently Green Berets are advising
the troops of'Haile Selassie in the Ethio-
pian .province of Eritrea. Under some-
what :similar Army-sponsored programs.
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the CIA provided for the training of a' the build-up, and the build-up led to
number of Tibetans. A Washington Post more power for the Secret Team. Be-
reporter who visited Fort Bragg in tile' cause of the favored' position of the
summer of 1969 wrote that the Special Army's Green Berets, the other services
Forces "anticipate endless `insurgencies' thought it would be wise for them to have
in the underdeveloped countries of the Special Forces of their own in Vietnam.
world-from Africa to Latin ? America. The Air Force had a number of special-
And they are counting on American ized aircraft and crews left over from the
intervention in many of these situa- Bay of Pigs operation; these were or-
tions." "In a way, we're a kind of Peace ganized into the nucleus of Special Air
Corps," the training director of the Warfare units and hurried to Vietnam to
Green Beret center explained. work with the CIA.
Not to be outdone by the Army and
the Air Force, the Navy created special
After the Day of Pigs, which some units known as SEAL ,(Sea-Air-Land)
people vainly hoped would end large- teams and sent them to Vietnam to work
scale,paramilitary CIA clandestine opera- with the Agency. Since the Navy did not
tions, President Kennedy appointed a have the kind of small boats required for
board of inquiry to review the fiasco. Its some of the action there (and perhaps
members were Admiral Arleigh Burke, because President Kennedy had been a
Allen Dulles, Attorney General Robert PT-boat man), the Navy ordered a flo-
Kennedy, and General Maxwell Taylor. tilla of PT-boats from Norwegian, ship-
General Taylor, dissatisfied with the role builders and had them delivered directly
the Eisenhower Administration had a~ to Vietnam to join other small boats
signed to the Army, had retired from, the, which were transferred from the U.S.
service after his tour as Army Chief of Coast Guard-all to support potential ;
Staff to write The Uncertain Trumpet. clandestine naval activities and to keep
While serving on the board of inquiryken-, he up with the other services in the favor
became close friends with Robert of the Agency.
nedy. Dulles and Bobby Kennedy recom- Such actions resulted in a consider-
mended him for the post of Special Mili- able clandestine build-up of forces in
tary Advisor to the President, and the Vietnam long before the official escala-
President later named him Chairman of tion took place. And of course, once
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In those posts, those forces were there something had to
by playing the game with the CIA, espe- be done with them.
cially with respect to Vietnam, Taylor For example, the Air Force contribu-,
was able to preside over a major rebirth tion consisted of units of C-123 medium
of the Army. The Vietnam build-up, transport aircraft. However, there 'al-
whose beginning was engineered by the ready were plenty of medium transports
CIA, ultimately meant the abandonment in Vietnam-Caribous, under Army con-
of Eisenhower's exclusive reliance on trol, that had been flown there via the
Strategic Air Command and missile stra- Atlantic, not having enough range to
tegy in favor of the policy Taylor cross the Pacific. Consequently, Defense
wanted-of developing a capacity to Secretary Robert McNamara had a
meet brushfire situations with conven- squadron of C-123's converted at con-
tional ground forces, Army forces natu- siderable cost to become defoliant spray-,
rally. er aircraft. It may be too much to, say,
The most important respect in which that the defoliation program would
Taylor played the Secret Team game was never have been undertaken if those
Viet-
C-1 23's hadn't been sitting idly in Viet-
to acquiesce in giving the CIA opera- nam, but there is no doubt that their
tional control of the Green Beret forces presence gave the program considerable
in Vietnam and Laos. The CIA took full stimulation.
advantage of this unprecedented situa-
tion, which saw the agency in control of The CIA is most adept at working
those forces at least through 1963, by in and around and through all levels of
using it to stimulate inter.-service rival- the U.S. government. No one, not even
rise. The rivalries led to an increase in the majority. of Agency personnel,
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knows the full extent of Agency manipu- for the CIA to requisition Air Force
lations within the governmental strut- items using an Army or Navy unit than
ture. The Agency can obtain what it an Air Force unit, because the services
desires in any quantity, and often for no monitor their own units more carefully
c cost. During the depression years of the than those of another service. Therefore,
1930's, Congress passed a law which was the CIA keeps a number of service units
known as the Economy Act of 1932 on tap at all times. With these hidden
and, as amended, it is still on the books. sources of supply, the CIA often can
This act, whose purpose is to save money build an arsenal and support clandestine,
and discourage needless spending, per- operations in some foreign country with-
mits an agency that needs material to out the Department of Defense, much
purchase it at an agreed price from less the Department of State, ever know,
another agency by an accounting off-set `ing it-though presumably Defense could
without spending "new money." For find out if it took the trouble to scrutin-
example, the Department of Ag~Aculture size carefully the activities of its various
can buy surplus tractors from the Army l 234's.
at a price agreed upon by both parties, It was this power aid freedom to
even if it is only a dollar each. (Since move forces and equipment quickly
most such equipment is declared surplus, without the usual review by proper au-
whether it is or not, by the selling thority that made possible the first entry
agency, the price usually is low.) By of troops and equipment into South
means of authority of this kind, the CIA Vietnam in the early Sixties. In order to
has learned how to "buy" from all agen- mount a particular operation it con-'
cies of the government, primarily from sidered important, the CIA needed 24
the Department of Defense, a tremen- helicopters and it obtained White House
dous amount of new and surplus equip- permission over strenuous objections
ment-and to take over bases at home from the Pentagon to have them sent to
and abroad for its own use without Vietnam. Sending 24 helicopters any-
appearing to have spent substantial funds i, where automatically means sending 400
and many times without the selling party men as well, counting only pilots and
knowing the true identity of the buyer. gunners and mechanics and cooks and
This method cif budgetary by-passing clerks and bakers and the rest of the im-
`~ works something like this: The Agency mediate establishment. If the intention
creates an Army unit. for some minor is-and the intention always is-to give
purpose which the Army and the De-'those 24 helicopters real support, then it
fense Department are willing to agree to. involves sending 1,200 men. Moreover,
The unit is listed on the Army roster as, the statistics are that, in any helicopter
say, the 1234 Special Supply Company, squadron, because of maintenance ser-
Fort Wyman (fictional name), New Jer-'vieing requirements, only half the
sey. This small and inconspicuous unit is machines will be operational at any one
mostly manned by regular Army per- time. So if' 24 operational helicopters are
sonnel but will have a few Army per- needed, 48 will have to be sent, which
sonnel who are actually CIA employees means 2,400 men. But if you're sending
with reserve status, and a few CIA career a supporting force involving 2,400 men,
employees. It can serve as a supply re- then the support for them-PX's, movies,
ceiving point for holding Agency materi- motor pools, officers' and enlisted men's
al prior to overseas shipment. After 1234 clubs, perimeter guards to protect all
has been operating for a time and ap- this, and so on and so on-becomes
pears to he a bona-fide Army unit, not really extensive, and thousands more
only to the rest of the Army personnel men get attached to it. And so it goes.
at Fort Wyman but also to (lie real Army, "Twenty-four Helicopters" can, in fact
people who are serving with it, it will did, ultimately mean a full-scale military
begin to requisition supplies of all kinds involvement.
and amounts from the Army. This pro The CIA also knows how to get re-
.cedure continues for a time, then the search and development contracts it ini-
unit will begin to requisition in a normal tiates transferred to the Department of
manner items from the Navy and the Air Defense when it comes time to make
Force. Cross requisitioning is acceptible quantity purchases of the new equip-
practice in all services today. The Navy
and Air Force will charge the Army for ment, and then, once DOD has spent the
money, requisition that equipment back
the items transferred and the Army, through outfits like 1234. Something
having records on the validity of the very much like this happened with the
unit, will honor the charges. It is easier. M-16 rifle, which, as the result of the
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oontinueff
 0
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Team's machinations, is now a standard veal their existence. These people are in
infantry weapon. The reasons the CIA addition to the large number of military
first wanted the M-16 developed are personnel carried on its budget for the
obscure, though perhaps one of them is ostensible purpose of cross-training; and
that it is a "NATO caliber" piece and this does not count the Special Forces
therefore does not rely on American- troops that may be attached to the
made ammunition, and perhaps another Agency in certain countries. Sometimes
is that it is small and light and therefore the official military may be unaware of
suitable for use by guerrillas and coun- the activities,of supposed members of its
ter-guerrillas. In any case, a decision was own MAAG groups or other military or-'
made that the M-16 was needed in ganizations. In similar fashion, as re-
quantity by the CIA for certain opera- vealed by Los Angeles Times reporter
tions in Asia, and Fairchild, the aircraft Jack Foisic, the CIA is using the State
company, was given a research and de- Department's AID program as a cover
velopment contract. At the time, the for clandestine operations. In Laos, the
CIA was unable to elicit any interest at number of agents posing as civilian AID
all in the project from the Army, which workers totals several hundred. They are,
was fighting a rear-guard action against listed as members of the AID mission's
Secretary McNamara's decision to close Rural Development Annex. There is also
its venerated Springfield Arsenal; it re- a Special Requirements Office in the
fused to look at a weapon that had not AID compound which provides supplies
gone the Army Ordnance route, How- for CIA clandestine operations.
ever, the CIA was able to push the M-16 The military aid' given to a foreign
through the office of the Secretary of country is carefully- tailored by military
Defense, over the head of the Army, and planners and is related to what is given
then induce the Air Force to put in a to other countries in the region. How-
procurement order for 60,000 of the ever, a foreign air force chief of staff, for
M-16 s. Not long after the Air Force re- example, may wish to have a squadron
ceived delivery of the 60,000 rifles, they of modern reconnaissance aircraft for his
vanished mysteriously somewhere over- country's use. He contacts the local CIA
seas. station chief and explains that he would
The CIA is careful to maintain close employ these aircraft on missions of
relations with industry. It has been es- interest to the Agency. The Department
pecially friendly for many years with of Defense might have turned down the
Lockheed Aircraft, which developed the request, but the local commander will
U-2 spy plane, and many other military press his claim with the CIA. The A-
contractors. The CIA was involved with gency might want to have the added ser-
the support of the Hclio Corporation of vices and will take the request to the
Bedford, Massachusetts- a firth that pro- Agency headquarters in Washingtorr?-,and
duces a Short Take-off and Landing the country will get the squadron of
plane that has been very important to modern reconnaissance fighters. Such a
CIA-Green Beret operations over the scenario is not unlike very recent trans
years in Laos. (The founders of the firm ,,actions that have taken place between
are two former professors, Arthur Kop-
pen, who used to head the aeronautics
laboratory at MIT, and Lynn Bollinger
the U.S. and Taiwan.
In sum, during the last decade the
White House's National Security Council
of the Harvard Business School. 1301- 1; apparatus and the CIA - particularly its
linger flew into Laos with early Green operational side which now has nine
Beret teams which had established con- overseas employees to every one on the
tacts with the Meo tribes.) Some plants intelligence-gathering side-have grown
manufacture equipment solely for the enormously both in size and in influ-
Agency; they are, of course, provided ence. More and more foreign- policy de-
with elaborate covers. I cisions are being made in secret, in
The Agency's operatives appear in the response only to immediate crises rather
organizations of many other government than in accordance with long- range
agencies. A visitor to the overseas office plans, and all too often with very little
of a Military Advisory Group that pre-'consultation with professional foreign-
sumably has a staff of 40 might find a policy or military planners. More and
hundred men working in the MAAG more overseas operations are being con-
compound; these are CIA people whose ducted in secret, and ad hoc, and with
salaries are paid by the Agency so that very little control by professional diplo-,
budget reviews in Washington will not re-:,,mats or soldiers. And the one organ of
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 Approved For Rele 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0049t001000080002-6
government that, on behalf of the people
that elected it, should be monitoring
these goings-on, is today as ignorant as
the public-because Congress submitted
to secrecy on a grand scale years ago
when it authorized the CIA. It is hard to
imagine how or when the Secret Team
can be brought into the open and made
publicly accountable for its
actions. ?
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 Approved For Rel a 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0042 R001000080002-6
WINSTON SALEM, N.C.
JOURNAL
M - 77 , 944
JOURNAL SENTINEL
S - 93,770
APR 2 7 1970
The Transparent bask
SECRECY has always been an obses-
sion with government agencies;
and rarely has it been practiced with
such vigor as in Washington. But the
larger federal agencies and departments,
under pressure from the press and Con-
gress, have relaxed the secrecy vigil in
recent years. It only remains to inform
some of the smaller "attached" services
about the new rules.
The Federal Broadcast Information
Service is a case in point. The FBIS has
the job of monitoring foreign broadcasts.
It makes translations of these broadcasts
available to the press corps. Any news-
paperman, including reporters from
the Soviet Union, can have these transla-
tions, since they are little more than
handouts.
In the past, the FBIS - which is ad-
ministered by the Central Intelligence
Agency - has required that correspon-
dents not publish the name of the
monitoring service. Since the handouts
carry the BIS initials, the CIA, as the
parent agency, must have thought it
absurd to continue with this secrecy; and
recently, the warning against use of the
service's name was dropped. A CIA
spokesman said "it's no secret we
monitor everything that falls freely in
the air," so why pretend otherwise?
Apparently, the CIA underestimated
the paranoia of its monitoring service. An
FBIS official declared last week that
there was no change in the policy of for-
bidding identification of the service in
connection with the translations. He add-
ed that the ban would be re-imposed
just as soon as the FBIS could convince
the IA that such secrecy is necessary.
It is just this sort of ridiculous
"secrecy" that makes a laughing stock of.
the entire federal establishment. Ob-
viously, there must be a restriction on
certain kinds of government information.
This goes for the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice as well as the intelligence and
regulatory agencies. But when a small
bureaucratic enclave such as the FBIS
behaves so childishly, the whole pattern
and practice of restricting information is
demeaned, causing the average citizen to
suspect that the entire federal system is
engaged in lies and evasions and decep-
tion at his expense.
who allow such absurdities to continue
wonder why millions of Americans epn-
sider them, the 'foe.
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 Approved For Release 2001/9J(Q DP84-O K99R001000080002-6
12 April 1970
?lCharter ,airline Resents C. I.
By ARNOLD ABRAMS The repair facility, which employs
3,700 workers, is on property owned
TAIPEI, Taiwan - Having their, by Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air Lat
m
c
o
pany dubbed th "C I A
e... Air- America. The property adjoins Tain-. ;,...
line" riles some executives of Air an airbase
a center of American in. g Tigers, supplied the National-'l,_
A
,
merica thi
,e prvate charter firm telligence activities on Taiwan. fists during the Chinese civil war.
whose bases ha {
ppen to be in South- Not surprisingly, the nature of When Chiang fled the mainland in
east Asia's better war zones.
They insist their firm is no differ- many Air America missions often 1949, CAT, followed him to Taiwan.
ent from any other charter airline, leads to bizarre incidents. This firm, Air America was established 10 years
We are willing to carry cargo any- for example, may be the only private later.
where in this region for any customer charter company in the world.to have. _ United States withdrawal from
has cut back Air
Vietnam alread
y
downed an enemy plane.
who can pay," says one executive.
America operations there, but com-11 . It happened somewhere over
But Air America has just one cus Northern Laos in January, 1968. The pany officials do not seem unduly
d when on Air America worried.
it e d States govern- ?
t
U
n
e
battle star
toner: the
ment. And it primarily services the crewman looked out the open door of (~ THERE'LL STILL BE plenty of
elop
n
t
-
De
d
v
fQ
jQj
saw a
Agencyj?-
his helicopter an
vence_ business in Southeast Asia," says one
nd Central I te1ligen- smade Antonov 2 - an obsolete, sin- ;
t
a
men
executive
.
cy. gle engined aircraft - cruising by. The C. I. A. label will continue tn,
NEVERTHELESS, executives at THE CREWMAN grabbed a car- rankle, however.
the firm's subsidiary offices here em bine and fired a full clip at the Com=) `"Air America does not engage in.
lcall deny that Air America is munist craft, presumably part of the ,, espionage and is not part of the C. I:;
diminutive North Vietnamese air ,. A,, says John A. Bottorff, regional'
plane plummeted I % director of Air Asia, "and I frankly
m
h
u
y
e ene
T
farc4
. to earth. resent being considered some kind of
t, i
"
Company officials in Taipei do not secret agent or spy.
AinoId
?Abrams Is The confirm or deny the "kill"; they just; Bottorff, 47, handles public role-
ou factual sto tions as part of his Air Asia duties.-
2 "I
ive
ld
y
g
cou
Timea' eorre-wink. spondent Iii s s vies a lot more implausible than He is a veteran hand who came toy
that" says one. this region in 1944 as a United States'
Southeast Asia.) r y} Many of Air America's approxi-government employe with a special-!
' United States ^Air Force per- That function? He was an intelli.=_
former
w.5~. u~=?w?. - `or *'.,.,.,;,,o: genre agent - with the 0. C. 5 fore.'
iigtlgieil!~p~pppi~I;1~Iplpl;,m;iPJaiili0liulimimimimmitinl from purely mercenary to wildly ro- ''.runner of the,C I. A_az.._~_
mantle.
an "arm" of the C. I. A. Both needs can be satisfied with
"Our customer gives us an order Air America: the money is good
;and we fill it," says a spokesman. (some pilots earn over $25,000 a
"That's all there is to it.-We carry
year) and adventure is plentiful.
cargo. We don't ask questions. t, E Air America is owned by a hold-
Those cargoes can be quite exot- . ing company, the Pacific Corp.,, with]
le: ranging from arms and ammuni- offices in Washington, D. C.
tion to rice bags, live pigs, special
agents, troops, refugees and opium, THE BOARD chairman is Felix B.
the chief cash crop of Meo hill tribes- Stomp, a retired admiral who was,
men in Laos. commander-in-chief of United States,,
One recent order involved, ferry- Pacific forces before retiring from
ling several hundred Thai "volun- military service in 1958.
teers" into Laos to help defend the The airline's origins go back to
,besieged C. I. A. stronghold at Long 1941, when the late Gen. Claire Chen-
'Cheng, about 100 miles north of the nault organized the Flying Tigers, a
Lcapital. paramilitary group supporting
t r . Chiang Kai-shek's forces against the, .
A VARIED Air America fleet of. Japanese.
about 170 planes carries cargo from Ilse Flying Tigers gained fame,
bases in South Vietnam, Laos, Thai- and some fortune during World War ;
land, the Philippines and Japan. II, when they flew supplies Into China,
In Taiwan, the firm owns the larg- over the Burma "hump."
est aircraft maintenance and repair After the war, Chennault founded
:facility in Southeast Asia. It did $8 Civil Air Transport, forerunner of Air.,
`million worth of repair work last America and still operating-as a car-',
year on United States aircraft operat go carrier in Asia.
er
lu inVie am, a.? 'Io
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71
""
 RAMPARTS
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respect are: (1) Trends in power poten-
tial rating; (2) Trends producing or en-
couraging mass participation; (3)
Trends in elite relationships, public,
political and bureaucratic; (4) Trends in
relevant sections of elite and mass value
systems, perceptions and attitudes.
These are the categories of informa-
tion needed by policymakers in order to
successfully influence developments in
any given country or area.
has come up with a theoretical model OTTAM BELIEVES THAT the sig-
in order, Cottam would have it make
intended to help the U.S. government use of systematically developed "situa- r7l nificance of U.S. power must be
manipulate ore effective) the politics L evaluated in terms of its leverage
p }n y P tional analyses" to guide the shaping of
over specific issues or areas. Effective
of foreign countries. strategy. Present bureaucracies, he says '
With what appears to be a combina- are unable to produce usable objective diplomatic strategy can have many
tion of personal bitterness and academ- studies; as a result, strategists are crip- faces: a passive lever might be a threat; a
ctive
is arrogance, Cottam's study argues that pled by reliance on distorted intelli- more a one could range from the
the thrust of U.S. competition with gence and simplistic policy options. withdrawal of aid or, failing everything
other powers "whether recognized as Cottam proposes to remedy this by else, to direct military intervention.
such or not, is to be found primarily on making greater use of academic and This type of approach provides a precise
the levels of political warfare, economic non-academic specialists who "need not way of estimating the target country's
warfare, and psychological warfare." necessarily understand the manipula- "tolerance for interference," as well as
His central complaint is that the govern- tion potential of their work." helping to'measure U.S. impact. Such a
ment, particularly the CIA, is not More specifically, he states: "The sug- leverage system allows policymakers
sophisticated enough to successfully gestion here is that the academic area more control over their own machinery
use these tools to influence global polit- specialist can play a significant role in and minimizes the 'possibility of work-
ical trends in "a direction favorable to the policy formulation process without ing at cross purposes with other agen-
Western objectives." Obsessed with the departing from his scholarly standards cies or policy objectives.
need to insure America's long-run he- and without becoming involved in spe- It is this thinking which leads Cottam
gemony in the world, Cottam offers his cific policy recommendations. The role to criticize the war in Vietnam. He be-
solution to what he regards as the dan- he can play is that of constructing situa- ' lieves in the need for intervention but
gerous lack of a focused long-range tional analyses that have operational thinks that in this case the government
strategy for American foreign policy. relevance. But in most cases that rele- has made a mess of it. In his view, the
Radicals should treat his book as a vance will not be apparent to the lay correctness of 'any one intervention
captured enemy document, offering, as reader. must be determined in the context of it does, a glimpse into the tactical arse- The "situational analysis," which our global objectives. "The impact of
.nal of covert action strategies and big avoids the sterility of most ideologically American policy in Vietnam on every
power political engineering. Although loaded, cold war-infected area studies, other aspect of American foreign poli-
his concepts are camouflaged by the aims at diagnosing strategic institutions cY," he writes, "has been so great as to
elusive and dense jargon that typifies and members of the political elite in the threaten a systemic change." And that
political science, the academic "cover" "target" country. In ti,e dry language of is frightening to one whose basic objec-
for this scholarly policy memorandum political science: "The type of opera- tive is to defend and rationalize an inter-
is thin and t t' national status quo.
5tt ed For Release MiY0~10'8 C1A-' Pt.y -6b499R001000080002-6 cont.
CIA Capers
COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE AND
20TH CENTURY DIPLOMACY. By Rich-
ard IN. Cottmn. University of Pitts-
burgh,1967.
THE CIA HAS BEEN back on the
front pages lately with tales of its
full-scale "secret army" in Laos
and its role in the assassination of a sus-
pected Vietnamese double-agent. These
are the exploits which capture the head-
lines while at the same time tending to
mystify and obscure the critical and in-
tegrated role which covert action has
come to play in the formulation and ex-
ecution of American foreign policy.
Now, a recent and relatively unknown
book by a political scientist who ap-
pears to have had some intimate associa-
tions with the CIA allows us to detect
more clearly than ever before some of
the overall strategic notions which in-
form these CIA maneuvers. From in-
sights developed during two years of
service at the American Embassy in
Iran-and most likely, therefore, with
the CIA-Richard Cottam, now a pro-
fessor at the University of Pittsburgh
I'^JOTTAM'S ARGUMENT centers
around the need for continuing:
U.S. interference in the internal
affairs of countries around the globe.
He slakes short work of those fuzzy-,
headed politicians who use "ethical"
arguments to avoid the realization that
the protection of U.S. interests requires
more than simply a policy of interven-
tion in moments of crisis. "Overturning
a regime is the easy part of political en-
gineering," he writes. "Creating a sta-
ble, popular, and ideologically compat-
ible regime is infinitely more complex
and seems at this stage to be beyond the
theoretical com etence of the Unites
proposed here calls for a tightly con-
structed frame within which attitudinal
and perceptual trends can be categor-
ized and evaluated." Cottam's hone, of
course, is to introduce techniques to im-
prove the administration and control of
the American empire.
Cottam argues that the long-range
goal of preserving American hegemony
requires a well-balanced strategy, ori-
ented primarily towards "the greatest
possible effect in altering long-term
trends in a direction consistent with
policy objectives." This notion of trend
alteration is paramount; it involves "re-
inforcing some trends, redirecting
States. Yet the probability remains ti t others, and reversing some." The trends
the United States will be increasingly; in- which Cottam sees as'significant in this
volved in operations that can be de-
scribed as competitive interference and
that a failure to perform well in these
operations could be decisive."
Developing the competence necessary
for such a task, says Cottam, requires a
new and more systematic approach to
policymaking. First, he calls for institu-
tional changes to allow a more effective
integration of covert and overt diploma-
cy. Once the institutional apparatus is
 Cot tam's 1? AP1X9vtedt Fr ,6ii 'ase 22G01GIO6r(? c~lALROP ~ ~Oe ,l '4 e `
makes more sense when viewed against "audacious" interventions, r, i~liorce Ca e
the backdrop of the intense interdcpart_ placing them with more sophist development in favorable directions.
mental feud which has raged in Vietnam cated political engineering. Rather th:, The foundations on which this system
rstsr, ;ire beginning to crack.
ever since the military replaced the CIA inextricably tying ourselves to ;; ?, sts, hour howev.? re to crack.
as the dominant force on the scene. Cot- Sh;:.' he believes the U.S. should p~ ? gghout world, the
tam's views on the war echo the sophis- tcct its long-range options through i grelites" 1 h groom strategists
are eithes
ticated corporate liberal argument that policy of "more critical" support, ~~ ?Quinunah;; t mgroo the contra
the political costs of the war-particu- could support the Shah, for instanc. g
~.~ies, or are
larly the increasing polarization at without wholeheartedly backing ,fict ict fions or in in .: . ~ urn own n repression societies, are
home and abroad-now require its liqui- hated secret police. We could pro'- ,engif tee. ue of controas t
dation. Predictably, those views moti- more covert help to acceptable .,rit l . ueof l. They are
are
vated Cottam to an active and pronhi_ ments within the opposition, particu?.^- caught ht nin tc tre;ld, to z towards between ro more inequal-
McCarthy position in the Pittsburgh area ly to Iranian students who might other- ti between rich and poor e nequal-
McCarthy campaign in 1968. wise be radicalized. To implement such. ity the rends c their own people. As
One of his complaints, bout Vietnam a policy change, Cottam suggests several and movements develop
is that the political engineering job has types of diplomatic probes which could revolutionary
been so half-hearted: Rather than the tip the Shah off to U.S. intentions with- throughout the Third World, the U.S. is
U.S. controlling Saigon, as is widely be- out completely alienating him. This forced to reinforce those repressive re-
lieved, the corrupt generals actually scheme, similar to some of the back- gimes in order to maintain its control.
control us; despite the major invest- stage maneuvers in the Vietnam negoti- These trends, accompanied by the
ment of men and material, the U.S. ations game, offers insights into the military defeat being suffered by the
lacks complete decisive leverage on the common techniques of U.S. policy- U.S. in Vietnam, suggest that political
polarization between the U.S. and the
Saigon government. Cottam does not makers. of the Third World will con-
Vietnam his illustration of this point to Speaking of the "second phase" of a people
Vietnam but fills it out most complete- much more complicated scenario, in- tinue. This may mean that policy-
ly in the case of Iran, the country that tended to mystify public understand- makers will be forced to rely even more
served as his operational and intellec- ing, Cottam explains: "The second on Cottam's nifty bag of covert
tual stomping ground. (In addition to phase could take advantage of the sepa- "tricks." On the other hand, his pro-
his "foreign service" work there, he has ration of powers in the United States. In posals may have been rejected because
also written a historical account of this action, a junior Democratic Senator they are too threatening to existing
Iranian nationalism. He is dismayed by who had criticized the government poli- bureaucratic
that concrete with unworkable which
U.S. policy there-not because, as the cy of supporting right-wing dictator- given van U.S. must now te forces wit wit Perhaps
his Perhaps
radicals think, U.S. imperialism has too ships could be utilized. He could be in- published contend.
much control in Iran, but because we formed by a State Department repre- that than submitting
sub
don't have enough!) sentative that the government would in i~ book wh form Cottam rather o
While all appearances and statistical not only not resent his airing his views them as an internal memorandum. In
data would argue that Iran is practically but would even welcome a public state- either case, Cottam's candid' call for
a dependency of the U.S., Cottam con- ment from him evaluating his support more refined techniques of internation-
tends that, in actual fact, this country's of the Shah's regime. There is no reason al manipulation by the U.S. offers valu-
allegiance to the Shah's despotic regime whatever for the Senator to say any- able insights into imperialist political
has actually decreased U.S. leverage thing he did not believe. The optimum thinking.
-DANIEL SCHECHTER
there. "Since August 1953," he writes, hope would be for the Senator to accept AFRICA RESEARCH GROUP
alluding to the CIA-engineered coup the necessity of working with the Shah,
which toppled Mossadegh, "the impact but to argue that unless the Shah en-
of American policy has been quite sub- gages in basic political reform any sup-
stantial in influencing trends in a direc- port of his regime would be useless. This
tion viewed unfavorable." As a result, is a much stronger probe and reactions'
the U.S. has over-identified itself with a from official and non-official groups
regime which uses the U.S. as much as could be_anticinated." .
the U.S. uses it. In the long run, Cottam ED-COLONIALISM is the fragile
fears, this policy will threaten U.S. strategy underlying the Ameri-
hegemony because it ties us too tightly can empire. By centralizing the
to a regime against which pressures for intelligence about nations and peoples
change are beginning to mount. Already who are little-known to most Ameri-
the growing movement of opposition to cans, the CIA has managed to coordi-
the Shah is characterized by a deeply- nate the multi-level penetration of the
based anti-Americanism and an "attrac. Third World on behalf of American cor-
tion" to revolutionary communist ide- porate interests. Through a variety of
ologies. If these trends continue, the covert instruments, the CIA has provid-
U.S. might be confronted with "overt ed the institutional network through
political rebellion" which would re- which the Empire is administered.
quire "interference on the most auda- Throughout the Third World, CIA strat-
cious level as in Guatemala, Lebanon, egists seek to forge a "strategy of cunhu-
the Dominican Republic and South, lative impact"; one in which many dif-
++ e e ov rt and covert,
Vietnam."Approved For Release 1~0~i t oIA-RDP84-00499 R001000080002-6
 Approved For Ruse 2001&I :.$4-00O9R001000080002-6
15 Mar 1970
By WWILL1A3r TIEIS
Chief, Sunday Advertiser
lVaahington Bureau.
WASHINGTON, - Is t h e
public. debate over the Central
Intelligence Agency's military
role in Laos jeopardizing its
primary information-gathering
assignment in this big - still
bad - world?
Has the time been reached
when Senate and other critics
of the Laotian involvement
should more carefully define
their terms and targets?
y
c
on
Should somebody, p e r h a p of ~ government, should not be
carelessly, p e r,h a p s inadvcr-
tenily damaged.
CIA director Richard
helms, a career official, has
made staunch friends on Capitol
hill by his candor and coopcra
tier. Most lawmakers recognize
that some clandestine opera-
tions are necessary and that
such operations don't remain
secret if talked about.
I1ut, remembering the CIA.
run Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba,
those most concerned a r e
determined to make sure the
agency is not misused.
some feeling that format or?in~ ~ what some senators do not
formal limits or guidelines' say, but what 1s generally ac-
should be adopted in the :CIA- cepted as fact, Is that. a small
Mike Mansfield, an Asian ex-
pertlong concerned about U. S.
involvement in Laos, Is one who
thinks "some terms ought to be
defined."
Jnvils also said he felt that
the ground rules affecting CIA
activities should be disclosed
except when the "paramount
national Interest" Is Involved.
Mansfield points out that the
North Vietnamese have long
had forces in the northeastern
areas of Laos, along the Ho Chi
Minh trail, along which the
Cwnmmilsts move troops and
material Into South Vietnam.
And he notes that because the
U. S, has been bombing that
area, both countries have in ef-
fect been Ignoring the 1962
group of their colleagues who
constitute a CIA "watchdog"
subcommittee have 'been in-
formed all along about the
agency's Laotian role.
And the CIA's training ac-
tivity in the struggle to keep
Laos from being overrun by the
Communists has been widely
The Foreign Relations com- I, reported in news dispatches.,
mitteeman 1s quick to defend
the fundamental role of the
CIA, while regretting its ap-
parent m 11I t a r y operational
assignment in Laos.
"T have grefrt faith In Dick
Helms," Mansfield said. "Not to
criticize clandestine operations
as such, it Is too bad they are
being undertaken in Laos. They
r e p r e s e n t a counter-effort
against counter-forces w h I c h
have stayed in: Laos regardless
of the Geneva Agreement."
Sen. Albert Gore ),
also a Senate Foreign, Relation,Commlltee member, said he
had found helms and the CIA
"completely candid."
He reflected an understanding.
In the Senate that the civilian
agency has been performing
essentially a military task on
orders of the National Security
Council.
Hclnns briefed members ct
the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee Friday in a dosed session
on CIA activities In Laos. Choir-
man J. W i i 11 a m Fulbright
(D-Ark.) told reporters that the
use of CIA members In the
U. S. foreign aid program in
Laos was a long-standing policy
established by the National Se-
curity Council.
Fulhritht, spcalcing for hint-
self, said the policy was laid
down before helms took office..
Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.):'
said that the Foreign.Relations~
committee has been "having
trouble gcuLting certain in-
formation," One thing that is
.not acceptable," said the ? for-
mer World- War TI officer, is
even the President, help clear
confusion in the public mind
about CIA operations, without
compromising its vital tasks?
The feeling In the Senate to-
day is that the big intelligence
agency, created after World
War TI to Improve this import-
ant and largel
secret fun
ti
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 The Progressive
February 1970
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by ERWIN KNOLL
.A. DOCUMENT filed with the U.S.
District Court in Baltimore in be-
half of a young Army lieutenant seek-
ing release from the service as a con-
scientious objector. . . . ,r
An unusual press conference cony,
ducted by the commandant of the
Army's intelligence school. . . .
A startling speech delivered by a
self-styled "country lawyer" who visited
Vietnam last summer. . . .
These are among the fragments that
are suddenly drawing attention to
Project Phoenix, a mysterious "advi-
sory program" jointly operated by the
U.S. Army and the Central Intelligence
A.~c~ ncy to help the Saigon govern-
ment attack the Vietcong "infrastruc-
ture" in South Vietnam.
Established in 1967, Project Phoenix
has been officially described-on those
rare occasions when it has been offi-
cially described at all-as a scientific,
computerized, intelligence operation
designed to identify, isolate, capture,
or convert important Vietcong agents.
In one of the few public accounts of
Phoenix issued by the American mis-
sion in Saigon, it was claimed a year
ago that 8,600 blacklisted suspects had
been "captured, killed, or, welcomed
as defectors" in a nine-month peri-
od. More recently the Pentagon has
claimed a total "bag" of 30,000 Viet-
cong suspects.
Among the strong supporters of
Project Phoenix in the Nixon Admin-
istration is Henry A. Kissinger, the
President's special assistant for national
security affairs, who is known to be-
lieve the program can play a crucial
role in destroying the Vietcong oppo-
nam. Emissaries from Kissinger's White
House office have carried encouraging
reports on Phoenix to Capitol 11111.
Despite the pervasiveness of the
Phoenix operation-?--American "l'lroe-
nix advisers" are assigned to the forty-
four provinces, most of the 212 dis-
tricts, and all the major cities of South
Vietnam-American news dispatches
'have made only scant mention of the
program. Two articles in The Wall
Street Journal-in September, 1968,
and March, 1969-indicated that Phoe-
nix teams occasionally step outside the
bounds of due process and conven-
tional warfare to achieve their results.
Reporting from Saigon last summer
on the "semipolice state" maintained
by President Nguyen Van Thieu,
Richard Dudman wrote in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch:
"Critics say the Phoenix system often
is abused. Huong Ho, a member of
the National Assembly from Kien
Phong Province, says police often pick
up someone on the street, order him-have described Songmy as a "deplor-
to denounce a wealthy citizen as a
Vietcong agent, arrest the rich man,
and then release him on payment of
25,000 or 50,000 piastres in ransom.
"Ngo Cong Due, a deputy from
Vinh Binh Province in the Mekong
Delta, says that malicious informants
and sometimes actual Vietcong agents
supply names to the Phoenix blacklist,
getting around the Phoenix system of
cross-checks by reporting a person
through several different agencies.
"U.S. officials contend that necessary
flexibility makes some abuses incvita-
sition during the period of American ERWIN KNOLL Is the Washington editor
military withdrawals from South Viet- of The Progressive.
ble. The mission's report says that a
person arrested is taken before a mil-
itary field court 'if the evidence and
the testimony add up to a legal case.'
But it notes that 'such legally admis-
sible evidence may be impossible to oh-
tain if most of the witnesses and the
evidence are beyond the court's reach
in enemy territory,'
"'If the case against the suspect is
nevertheless conclusive, he is detained,'
says the report. 'Under Vietnamese
law, such a man may be detained
without judicial charge up to two
years, and that detention period may
be extended if the detainee's freedom
would constitute a threat to the secu-
rity of the nation.' "
When Dudman filed his report last
July, he wrote that the Phoenix black-
list of Vietcong . suspects had been re-
fined "to eliminate mere rank-and-file
and leave only the Vietcong leaders
members of the newly elected village
and hamlet 'liberation committees' and
such officials as political, finance and
security chiefs in the shadow govern-
ment." The new, refined list totaled
70,000 names.
That American military advisers are
lending their good offices to a system
susceptible to such abuses as blackmail,
false arrest, and detention without trial
can hardly he expected to arouse mas-
sive indignation at this stage of the
sordid Vietnam adventure. But the
most recent allegations about Project
Phoenix raise a much larger question
-particularly in view of the disclo-
sures about the massacre of Vietnam-
ese civilians at Songmy. American
officials, from President Nixon down,
able but isolated incident." How iso-
lated and to what extent deplored?
Project Phoenix, it has been charged,
is a concerted, deliberate program of
torture and assassination.
Francis T. Reitemeyer, twenty-four
years old, of Clark, New Jersey, had a
degree in classical languages and phi-
losophy from Seton Hall University
and was studying for the priesthood
at Immaculate Conception Seminary
when he enlisted in the Army in 1967.
He' was commissioned a second lieu-
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tenant, and was assigned from October
18, 1968, to December 6, 1968, to the
Army Intelligence School at Fort Ilola-
bird, Maryland, where he was trained
to be a "Phoenix adviser." When he
received orders for Vietnam, he ap-
plied for discharge as a conscientious
objector and retained a Baltimore
ACLU attorney, William It. Zinnian,
to carry his appeal through the courts.
On February 14, 1969, Zinnian filed in
Reitcmcyer's behalf a "proffer," or
offer to prove certain facts in connec-
tion with the appeal. The proffer
stated in part:
"Your petitioner was informed that
he would be one of many Army offi-
cers assigned as an adviser whose func-
tion it was to supervise and to
pay with funds from an undisclosed
source eighteen mercenaries (probably
Chinese, none of whore would be of-
ficers or enlisted men of the U.S. nill-
itary) who would be explicitly directed,
by hire and other advisers to find, cap=
ture, and/or kill as many Vietcong and
Vietcong sympathizers within a given
number of small villages as was possi-
ble under the circumstances.
"Vietcong sympathizers were meant
to include any male or female civilians
of any age in a position of authority
or influence in the village who were
politically loyal or simply in agree-
ment with the Vietcong or their ob-
jectives. The petitioner was officially
advised by the lecturing U.S. Army
officers, who actually recounted from
their own experiences in the field,
that the petitioner as an American ad-
viser might actually be required to
maintain a 'kill quota' of fifty bodies
a month.
"Your petitioner was further in-
formed at this Intelligence School that
he was authorized to adopt any tech-
nique or employ any means through
his mercenaries, which was calculated
to find and ferret out the Vietcong or
the Vietcong sympathizers.
"Frequently, as related by the lectur-
ing officers, resort to the most extreme
forms of torture was necessary. On one
occasion, a civilian suspected of being
a sympathizer was killed by the paid
mercenaries, and thereafter decapitated
and dismembered, so that the eyes)
head, cars, and other parts of the dece-
dent's body could be and in fact were
prominently displayed on his front
lawn as a warning and an inducement
"Project Phoenix,
i' has been charged, is a concerted, deliberate
program of torture and
assassination."
to other Vietcong sympathizers, to dis-
close their identity and turn themselves
in to the adviser and the mercenaries.
"Another field technique designed to
glean information from a captured
Vietcong soldier, who was wounded
and bleeding, was to promise medical
assistance only after the soldier dis-
closed the information sought by the
interrogators. After the interrogation
had terminated, and the mercenaries
and advisers were satisfied that no fur-
ther information could be obtained
from the prisoner, he was left to die
in the middle of the village, still bleed-
ing and without any medical atten-
tion whatsoever. On the following
morning, when his screams for med-
ical attention reminded the interroga-
tors of his presence, he was unsuccess-
fully poisoned and finally killed by
decapitation with a rusty bayonet. The
American advisers, who were having
breakfast forty feet away, acquiesced in
these actions, and the death of this
soldier was officially reported 'shot
while trying to escape.'
"Another field instructor suggested
that the advisers would not always be
engaged in such macabre ventures, and
cited an incident on the 'lighter side.'
The instructor recounted the occasion
when a group of advisers together
with South Vietnamese soldiers sur-
rounded a small pool where a number
of Vietcong soldiers were attempting to
hide themselves by submerging under
water, and breathing through reeds.
The advisers joined the South Viet-
namcse soldiers in saturating this pond
with hand grenades; at this juncture,
the instructor remarked to his stu-
dents, which included your petitioner,
'that, although this incident might ap-
pear somewhat gory, while you listen
to it in this classroom it was actually
tor as 'one who no
whether we win or lose,
have a war to fight.'
"The petitioner was officially in-
structed that the purpose of the 'Phoe-
nix Program' to which he was assigned
was not aimed primarily at the ene-
my's military forces, but was essentially
designed to eliminate civilians, political
enemies, and 'South Vietcong sympa-
thizers.' Your petitioner was further in-
formed that the program sought to ac-
complish, through capture, intimida-
tion, elimination, and assassination,
what the United States up to this time
was unable to accomplish through the
conventional use of military power....
"Your petitioner was warned that
loss of the war and/or his personal
capture by the enemy could subject
him personally to trial and punish-
ment as a war criminal under the
precedents established by the Nurem-
berg Trials as well as other precedents
such as the Geneva Convention.
"Your petitioner sincerely urges that
this kind of activity was never envi-
sioned by him, whether concretely or
abstractly, as a function and purpose
of the United States Army, before and
even after he entered the service. . . ."
Lieutenant Reitemeyer was never
called to testify on the allegations in
his proffer. His case-and a parallel
appeal for conscientious objector sta-
tus from another student at the Army
Intelligence School, Lieutenant Mi-
chael J. Cohn-were heard by Fed-
eral Judge Frank A. Kaufman, who
ruled on July 14 that the two men
had demonstrated they were entitled to
discharge as conscientious objectors.
The Army filed notice of appeal, but
withdrew it last October. The case is
closed.
longer cared
as long as we
a lot of fun, to watch the bodies of Lieutenant Reitemeycr's allegations
the Cong soldiers fly into the air like received only brief and cursory notice
fish,' as the hand grenades exploded in the media when his proffer was
in the pond. This instructor was sub- filed with the court a year ago. Press
sequently described by another instruc- interest was revived after the Songmy
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affair erupted into headlines. I he first
de(ailcd account of the Rs,ilrm yrr
case appcarcd on December 11 in in
article in The i'illagr Voir.r by Jndith
Coburn and Geoffrey Cowan, who dsn
reported on a visit they had paid to
Fort I ioward, a rugged, isolated tract
on the grounds of a Veterans Admin-
istration hospital near Baltimore. Fort
Howard has a mock Vietnamese village
that serves as a training adjunct to
Fort Ilolabird's intelligence school.
"As we walked around the edge of
the, fence toward the concrete bunker
we could hear the sound of voices,"
Miss Coburn and Cowan wrote. "There
were brutal shouts a few dozen yards
away: You get his arm, I'll get his
leg. You get the, other one.' Then,
there were anguished, indistinguishable
shouts, then the sound of a wornanis
voice, and a child's. It wasn't a veter'-
ans' hospital, we decided, and quickly,
headed back down the road." The two
reporters said they "got the runaround"
when they attempted to ask questions
at Fort IIolabird about the Phoenix
training program.
On December 12, however-the day
after The Village Voice article ap-
peared-Colonel Marshall Faliweli, the
commandant of the intelligence school,
opened the closely guarded gates of
Fort Ilolabird to the press. His pur-
pose, he said, was to deny Reitemey-
er's "wild allegations" and "bring some
reason" into the public discussion of
Project Phoenix.
The intelligence school graduates
9,000 Army men a year, of whom only
"a small percentage" are assigned to
Project Phoenix, Colonel Faliwell said,
although almost the entire class of
forty-nine second lieutenants to which
Reitemeyer ? and Colin belonged was
destined for the Phoenix program.
The commandant said he had con-
ducted an "informal review" of Rcite-
nicyer's charges that terror tactics and
assassination were taught at Fort IIola-
bird. "It just isn't done," he said. "We
know precisely what the individual in-
structor is supposed to get across and
how he is supposed to get it across.
He is supposed to follow that script."
Some instructors may stray from
their carefully prepared material to
tell "war stories" to their students,
Colonel Fallwell acknowledged, but the
kind of instruction described by Reite-
meyer would be "completely against
the Geneva Convention, the Universal
Code of Militaiy Justice, and Depart-
ment of the Army regulations."
As for the training exercises at Fort
Iloward, "almost every Army post has
a Vietnam village," Fallwell said. In-
structors at the intelligence school
"draw up lists of individuals with
known or suspected Vietcong syrnpa-
thics in that village," lie continued,
and students "plan and mount an op-
eration for seizure of that village" and
interrogation of its occupants. Mem-
bers of the school's staff play the role
of villagers.
A Pentagon spokesman also offered
sonic comments on December 12, Both
Reitemeyer and Cohn, he told rcport-
crs, were dismissed from the intelli-
gence school for academic failure.
What's more, Reitemeyer had given
the Army a sworn statement on Dc-
ccrnber 6, 1968-three months before
his proffer was filed in the Baltimore
court-in which he had denied that
he was receiving training in assassina-
tion techniques. The statement had
been requested, according to the Pen-
tagon spokesman, after reports were re-
ceived that Reitemeyer had told a girl-
friend he was being trained in murder.
"I am not being trained in any p0.
it
T -,~au~A rr..
Mauldin in Chicago Sun-Tames
"There's a tough bunch. Under
the VC they survived liberation, orien-
tation, and taxation. From us
they took defoliation, interrogation,
and pacification."
]itical assassination," said the statement
attributed to Reitenuyer by the spok, -
man. "I never told [her] that I was
being trained to he an assassin, nor
that I was to be in charge of a group
of assassins."
Students at the intelligence school
are required to execute a pledge that
they will not disclose details of their
training. Reitemeyer is reported to be
traveling in the West, and I could not
reach him for comment.
George W. Gregory, who practices
law in Cheraw, South Carolina, knows
nothing about the intelligence school
at Fort Ilolabird. lie knows a little
bit about Victnarn, which he visited
last August as the attorney for Major
Thomas E. Middleton Jr. of Jefferson,
South Carolina, one of the eight
Green Berets charged with the murder
of a suspected South Vietnamese
double-agent. The charges against all
eight were abruptly dropped for the
official reason that their trials would
compromise American intelligence op-
erations in Vietnam. While represcnt-
.ing Major Middleton, Gregory learned
a few things about Project Phoenix,
and on December 19 he discussed some
of his findings at a luncheon of the
Atlanta Press Club.
Phoenix, Gregory told the Atlanta
newsmen, is a program "where you in-
filtrate the Vietcong and exterminate"
those in the "infrastructure." Quite
often, Americans must do their own
killing because the Vietnamese, he
said, are "half-hearted" about the Phoe-
nix work. When he was in Saigon,
Gregory observed, "the smart money
was going Uncle Ho so the Americans
had to do their own dirty work."
When the Green Berets were
charged with murder, Gregory recount-
ed, Americans in the Phoenix program
sought out military lawyers in Saigon
"in droves" to inquire about their pos-
sible vulnerability to similar charges.
I called Gregory in Cheraw to con-
firm press reports of his Atlanta
speech and ask for more details. He
said he heard about the assassination
phase of Project Phoenix both from
,"people who were in on the deal" and
from Army lawyers whose advice had
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been solicite . "I said to myself, 'My
God, this is quite relevant to my sit-
uation,' " Gregory told me. "'llow can
they charge my people [the Green
Berets] when they are ordering other
people to do these things?"'
Gregory said he had questioned a
CIA agent whose name he recalls as
Chipman about the assassinations car-
riec on under Project Phoenix, and
the agent replied, "Certainly I know
all about it." But on the stand', the
agent added, "I would have to claim
executive privilege."
Gregory professed to be surprised at
press interest in his Atlanta speech.
"I'm just a country lawyer," he told
me, "but everybody knows about Phoe-
nix in Saigon, and I just figured you
all knew about it in Washington."
Well, we don't know, but there is a`
chance we may find out. In responsF
to urgings from William Zinnian, the
ACLU lawyer in Baltimore, and que-
ries from the press, several Senators
have begun looking into Project Phoe-
nix. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which is preparing for a
new round of hearings on the Vietnam
war, is known to be giving active con-
sideration to the possibility of taking
public testimony on Project Phoenix.
Meanwhile, those who still have
faith can draw comfort from the as-
surances offered by Dennis J. Doolin,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for East Asian Affairs, who says
Phoenix makes every effort "to capture
and reorient former members of the
VCI [Vietcong infrastructure] toward
support of the government of Vietnam
and to obtain information from them
about the VCI." A counter-terror cam-
paign, he adds, "obviously would sub-
vert and be counterproductive to the
basic purpose of pacification in reor-
ienting the allegiance of all the South
Vietnamese people toward support of
the government of Vietnam."
How is this "basic purpose of paci
fication" served by the indiscriminate
bombing of civilians, the burning of
villages, and the forced relocation of
their occupants? Doolin is right, of
course, in suggesting that tactics of
counter-terror would be "counterpro-
ductive." The dark allegations about
Project Phoenix make no sense. Is there
any aspect of the American effort in
Vietnam that does?
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 CLR-ISTI11ii SCIn MONITOR
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Intelligence gathering only
By Daniel Southerland
Special correspondent of
C
armsorandsma' id role
The chief American adviser in' the pro.
Saigon : gram remains a CIA man, but the CIA
has in most places withdrawn its men from
The United 'States Central Intelligence
A (CIA) has been gradually cutting, of the effort in the 44 provinces. It has
back its involvement in a number of para. turned over the financing of Phoenix opera-
, military and pacification operations In Viet- tions to the U.S. Army.
;earn, The agency is concentrating more
and more of its efforts here on its tradition- The CIA has also been yielding its con-
al role of intelligence gathering. "trol over the provincial reconnaissance.;
units (PRUs), one of the main arms of
The U.S. Embassy, the U.S. military com- the Phoenix program. The PRUs special.
mand, and the agency itself appear 'to ize In night raids into enemy territory'
agree that the shift is in the right direction aimed at capturing Viet Cong agents. Un-
and will permit the CIA to do a more effec- der the CIA, they, have been. paid better',
tive job in the intelligence field. than most regular troops.
In the early stages of U.S. involvement' : , ?
In Vietnam, the CIA was used to carry out Denland8 exceeded capacity
a number of tasks which required great The CIA still, advises agencies involved
flexibility, and a capacity for swift funding. '. in the Phoenix program, but its involve-:
.and action .which neither the State Depart- ment has noticeably diminished and is more
.ment nor' the Defense Department appeared indirect, ?
to possess. Informed sources say the CIA will also
:It is no secret that the CIA controlled . give up control over,its "census grievance"
the operations of U.S. Special Forces troops? network in the villages and hamlets, which
working with montagnards watching the ?? provides a flow of information to the prov
iniilt' ation routes in the central highlands .ince level that circumvents the Vietnam-
of South Vietnam in the early 1960's, funded ese chain of command,
and helped train the Vietnamese Special ;,
Forces in their early years, and later did ;. When we came into Vietnam in a . big.??
the same for the black-paj am a clad Viet- 'Way, there' were a number of revolutionary
namese Rural Development (RD)' cadre, .concepts involved in fighting this.. kind. of
`who now are more than 40,000 strong in war.which our conventional government
and army machinery were unable ? to
the countryside. handle," said ?a well-informed source.
Phaseout gradual "When the PRUs were set up for in-,,`
Several years ago, the agency started' stance,: there was a need for mobile recon-,
giving up whatever control it had over- the . naissance units not subject to all the Ares
Special Forces. Last year, it got out,of the;sures. of- the Vietnamese apparatushe
training program for RD cadre at Vung said. "The U.S. Army was not in a position,,
Tau and stopped being their paymaster , in ito issue them weapons. The agency was.
more flexible.
the provinces.
recently, the CIA has started cut-' "But the larger these programs became;
More
recently, ice fitly, the e the more they came under people's control,`
ling its involvement in other has rat
develop in Vietnam. and the more the Vietnamese became .capa
which back it helped i
ble of running them," the source said..
Among them is the Phoenix program, a ' ? "As these programs became .'less novel,,.
two-year-old, nationwide effort which pools and more routine, the CIA became less.sult-s
information from half a dozen U.S. ' and able to run them,"
South Vietnamese intelligence agencies with ??, ;. 'r .,
.''the object of identifying and capturing Viet 'Dad experience' charged ?
Cong political agents.
According to American advisers, the pro- After, the CIA had ' gotten such programs
gram is not doing so well as it should. be moving, the U:S. mission and the?US . 'mill
for a variety of reasons,' including a,.Iack' Lary command wanted more control, over,;
of leadership. and interest on the part of -. them, the source said. 'It appears the CIA
the Vietnamese, was more 'than happy to relinquish come
? Phoenix operations, which range from a mend.
single policeman going after a single agent "This has been a bad experience fbr
to hundreds of troops surrounding whole ahem," the source said. "In some 'cases,.
villages, are aimed at destroying the' Viet their reputation has suffered. The' CIA, likes
,Cong infrastructure, or "phantom govern,
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uontinuod
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completely control.
"With programs reaching into each
province, they were forced to recruit peo-.
ple from outside the agency to do some of.
the-jobs for them, and this diluted the pro-
fessionalism of their own people. Many
of the outsiders were a lot less dedicated'
to their jobs than the professional CIA men.
And a lot of the professional people resent-
ed being taken away from their traditional
?; 'intelligence-gathering role to do other jobs.'
"The. agency has gone through 'a large
personnel and budget cutback," he said.
"It would prefer to preserve most of its
resources for its classical intelligence
role."
Data reputation solid
Despite its dispersal of talent and re.
sources, the CIA has enjoyed the reputation
here of frequently providing Washington
with more-realistic , reports on,, political,
military, and economic developments than
do the political section of tlie'U.S. embassy,
;`,; the U.S. military command, and.the U.S.
aid mission. In some cases where other
agencies appeared to have, been unduly op.
timistic, CIA analysts came up,.with, cau.
tious and pessimistic assessment which
later proved more accurate.
'There were times several years ago when
.the CIA appeared on some levels to be
...working at cross purposes ?with the U.S.
ambassador. and, the U.S. military ' com-
' mand. 'Today, however, these relationships.
appear for. the most part to work rather
smoothly..
Although there seems to be general agree-
ment on. the. wisdom of the shift in CIA
activities, not everyone is happy with the
cutback.
A U.S. Army officer complained to'a re=
porter that. it was, going to'. be larder to-
get good and 'fast material support in the
Phoenix program now .that the Arrhy' is in
' ,, charge of the ? logistical 'side of .' Phoenix
operations.
Flexibility praised
And a civilian-pacification official-he isl
not a CIA man-said:
"It is unfortunate that the CIA Is the only.
organization in Vietnam with the flexibility,
and' imaginatjon needed to sustain special
operations where' we have had to bring a,
lot,of people in quickly. The only reason they
got involved was that they were the only`
. ones with the flexibility to respond." ,
The CIA does continue to offer advice. to,
the Vietnamese police, and the police agent'
ties are the backbone of the Phoenix pro.
gram.,
Although Saigon government officials have'
'denied it, there is good reason to believe the'
CIA last year helped the police uncover an.
espionage ring that reached all the way,
into, the Presidential Palace. The subsea,
quent', trial , in November resulted, ip 'the. .
conviction of 41 persons; Including a Yormer
special'assistant' to? President-ThieU,?
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6
 SECRET (When Filled In)
AREA OR
HQ
Congress
Public image
Security
Public relations
History
IOENTIYICATION OF OOCUM4NY (aufhar, farm, addreeeee, fief A ten/eh)
File of unclassified press clippings about CIA arranged in
chronological order.
DOCUMENT
DATE:197D1 fq7~?
CLASS. i None
NO.1
HS/HC-950?;
ABSTRACT
The source of this material is the clipping service maintained by the;
Assisttant to the Director for Public Relations. These items included,
editorial comment about CIA as well as reports o events -- not the-
subject of individual files in the Historical Staff.
,o - ... ;. , a ,' ~. i t. t ~. I t ? ~: ti F~ i !~`I ~-i , i it,~ r4~~:64 ti
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 CIA-RDP84-00499R06,1060080002-6 '
1 05 2628 eairieMi PUVIOU5
HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET
 Place card upright in place of charged out folder.
1 i KAW* file folder.
C ARGE TO
DATE
C, RGE TO
DATE
Approved For Releasi 01FdAP ArR-'R- T848%9R001000080002-6
FORM NO. 119 REPLACES FORM.3i5.152 (7)
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.