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December 14, 2016
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August 7, 2001
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November 21, 1971
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READVIG, PA. EAGLE": NOV 2 Approved Fosawlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004941W01000090001-6 1 1971 E - 48,419 S - 85,704 111111111:1111111111111H111111111111111111! Gen, Iker: ltilitary Affairs IT! 7:,711 7700 A. TY) (t: 7 71 ii LI .L_J'(;:,_.,--' J11 O. ir l) et,L,/ CV\ c'_.)U(1 `i7;11,.? 71,4 / Itara By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Ret.) intuit in the intellie'ence community ? b are and make intelligence less responsive to the ? ? .A release from the White Home Nov. Richard Helms and Henry Icissin i I h decision make.rs. 5 announced a drastic reorganization of the former wears three hats in the ncw setup Rather than streamlining theaP- and ' the hitter two hats plus. the all- in 'tug the new organizeition, further frag- whole U.S. intelligence community. important responsibility of per sonall The reasons given determining what the President sees. ments the intelligence community by add- 71 for the big shake-up No defense! leader, civilian or military, ing- the four additional advisory or ad - were "to improve the active -or retired, so far as I know, ques- mi efficiency he- and effective- nistrative. echelons. ness of t U.S. foreign The new system also increases the. tions the ability or loyalty of either Helms intelligence c m u - or Kissinger, but sound organization should -possibility that intelligence estimates and ,! ? , not be based on personalities since they are foreign zissessinents can be doctored to nity. Etde rath ilways transient and sometimes fallible. Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff th , who. support decisions previously Iller T h e reorganizttion by law are designated as the nrincipal an the other way around. boards or committees .A provides ,four new tary advisers to the President, are elim- It would be safer and soimder for central intelligence. 'file inated, for all practical purposes, from times, the daily intelligence summaries presidents to get, ? as they did in earlier including a direCtOr of ; Centr a I Intelligence intelligence evaluation. from the defense department, the state ?-? Agency ? "rector, Rich- The 'Whole purpose of foreign in- department and the ClA uncensored by any Gen. Eaket ard Helms, takes on tins telligence is ? to observe adequately zind intermediary. The President's principal job in addition to his assess accurately the military strength of national security adviser might well digest duties as CIA director. these estimates arid assessments but he There is a National Security Council other nations and thus evaluate the hazards never should delay their presentation net Department, including trill:le e-1 Joint Chiefs Defensechiefsof alter their . meaning to our own security. intelligence committee with Henry Kis- singer, the President's principal national Staff and the intelligence agencies of the security advise'r, as, chairman. -There is a armed services are best qualified by net assessment group within the National education and experience for sound advice Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an in these areas. intelligence resources advisory board which The intelligence apparatus Ins not been Helms also heads. streamlined and reduced in size and cost. The U.S. intelligence board is ,,re_ Instead, all the new layers', boards and constituted," according to the White House committees now will have to be manned. A. release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is ? minimum .of 500 top-level intelligence pea- chairman. ? pie eventually will be. found in or serving It is generally believed that the White these new echelons, considerably increasing House was unhappy with the ? sometimes the overall cost of intelligence. These. new -conflicting estimates of enemy Military agencies. if used. also will .create delays strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence. community. There were also charges that the military deliberately overestimated enemy strength to get increased' defense appropriations, and that intelligence was - costing too much, about $5 to $6 billion an- nually. The intelligence apparatus needed .therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size. and cost and military influence curtailed, according to this view. There is no doubt but that the reorganization does greatly reduce military influence jn the- intelligence apparatus. Of the 30-odd members of the four new layers, boards or committees at the -highest levels on the .intelligence totem, pole, only three are military men. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 The two men who now are clearly dom- THE ECONOMIST Approved FolklaeleasgCka61411081-9NA-RDP84-00494iilik001000090001-6 Spies get together There is one secret that the intelligence fraternity in Washington has not been able to keep under cover : its own lines of communication have become badly scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of the worst discrepancies and overlaps President Nixon . has announced a reorganisation of the, multiple branches of the secret service under the direction of Mr Richard Helms, the present and very -able head of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. Mr Helms will now head the new United States Intelligence -Board and will co-ordinate the activi- ties and the budgets of the various ? intelligence networks?the first time that anyone has had power. to do this. The board will, be directly responsible to ? the National Security Council. At the same time two new panels will be set up within the NSC. One, under the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger, the chief of the council, will analyse all the intelligence reports. (In the rush to collect raw facts their interpretation has often been, neglected.) The other will compare ?the strength of the Soviet forces as a whole with those of the United States. . . The tangles within the intelligence world go back beyond the crisis over missiles in Cuba. On numerous Occa- sions the many military spies?the three services have their own intelligence net- works and then the Department of Defence has still another?have Come UI) with assessments that differ from those .of the civilian agencies such as the CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department. Although the CIA has a hawkish image in foreign eyes, it is generally the military men who have over-estimated the resources available to the other side, partly in an effort to boost support in Congress for their own defence budget. Further- more, relations have been strained recently between the CIA, which gathers information from abroad, and 4he Federal Bureau of Investigation, which manages surveillance at home? This year the confusion has been more noticeable, than most. The abbr.. tive commando raid a year ago to free prisoners of war from the deserted camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam caused acute embarrassment. Then the Pentagon papers revealed that there had earlier been some. serious discrepan-' cies between ?military and civilian Richard Helms: master-spy information on the war .in Vietnam. And now there is a struggle brewing over the extent of the reported ' build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union at a time when the negotiations on the limitation , of strategic arms are. reaching a crucial stage. Congress, which has always been suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the intelligence world, has also been prodding the President. The conserva- tives in -the Senate, led, rather surpris- ,ingly, by Senator Ellender, Who used Ito be the spies' best friend, want_ to cut the money that goes on military intelligence ; in the age of expensive satellite spies about $5 billion a year is spent on this out of an annual intel- ligence -budget of around $6 .billion. The liberals, on the other hand, claim that Congress has too little .control over the intelligence networks in particular they feel that the CIA has too great an influence on foreign policy. What, they ask, is ihe CIA doing in Laos? It will be no consolation to these critics that Mr Kissinger will now have greater authority over spying. As a presidential aide he is not responsible to Congress. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 r' r%)777yor-fr THE tram halm Approved Fokaalease 201 MIU819r11A-RDP84-0049100b 10.00090001-6 HONOLULU 7-- (AP) ? ,Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said Saturday that. the; Pentagon is 'ready to carry but quickly President Nixon's new orders to consolidate federal intelligence-gathering operations. ? . . "I believe the Department of Defense will be able ulti- rnate4y to reduce costs be- cause of these actions," Laird said in Honolulu for a stop- over while he was flying from Saigon to Washington after surveying the Vietnam situation for Nixon. D1F,FEN.SE officials said the consolidations should save millions of dollars through elimination of dupli- cations and reductions in staff .but they said it is too early to estimate accurately how much costs will be cut. ? The full extent o defense intelligence operations in their various forms never has been disclosed publicly, but a hint of their magnitude can be gleaned from an estimate that they involve about 150,- 000 people and about $3 mil- lion a year. ? ? -? - Laird's ? statement- came a day after the White House announced a reorganization of .the wide-ranging intelli- gence apparatus of the gov- ernment, giving Central In- telligence A ge a cy Director Richard Helms "an enhanced leadership role" and coordi- nating authority. IN HIS statement, Laird appeared to be backing up the generals' and admirals' view that each armed force must have its own intelii- 1 11 [117(11 P-L, t.: ; - , J.) ? ? trN \\,kte-rrocEm) i (fence arms. Recalling streamlining pro-". posals by his own blue-rib- bon defense panel, Laird said "we have paid particular at- tention to intelligence, eluding the need to maintain the intelligence capabilities .of the four armed services." Even befOre the White House acted, Laird had creat- ed a new assistant secretary. of defense slot which he said "will increase civilian super- vision of intelligence matters in my office." The new post is held by Dr. Albert C. Hall, until re- cently a vice president of an aerospace company. ? ? . BUT LAIRD never has fol,? lowed through on a recom-. mendation by the blue-ribbon panel that would have strip- ped command of foreign in- telligence from the Joint? Chiefs of Staff. Pentagon authorities said that Lt. Gen.. Donald V. Ben- nett, head of the Defense In- telligence ,Agency; and Hall rank as co-equals. - - The Defense chief said that establishment of a National Cryptologic Command, to handle all code-cracking and communications intelligence, "will proceed in an orderly _ . manner." Ai-id he said .his staff is working on estailish- nient of a Defense Map Agency and an OffiCe of De- fense Investigation: Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 CARBONDALI' Thtflproved ForViefetse 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-00499Q(411,000090001-6 SO ILLINOISAN E 20c4-63 4 1971 S - 28,219 uld to kPea J1,30 [i By Rtk meWethy Con:,-,,liss$rial. Quarterly Since Congress created the ultra-matt Central Intelligence Agency in e47, a growing number of members have beau. - Itching to find out more about what their creation does. The. push is On agaii this year, with impetus being providod. by - disclosures that the United States is involved in a clan- destine war hi Loos that Cmraess didn't .know alxot. Mtore than a dozen bills have bneui intivduced this *ring mad. pummetr aimed at removing -some of tho legal blinders Congress put on it,..7E.11 with respect to the CIA. Some would slim the legislative branch to share more fully in the agency's . hitellignee information, . In the last ti:'49 decades, nearly Me bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an .uninformative ? CIA. Not ens bill has passed and only two have been - put to.. vete. As a' result, the CIA re- mains a mystery 'even to the body that voted it into ex,' --- istenoe. - The agency is so 'secret that some members of Congress who are EaippoSed to know .AIINA, CIA activities ? nuembam of the four highly select ? intelligence oversight subcommittees ? did not know 'how deeply the CIA figures in the coutinued ex- istence of the 'Royal Lao goveniment. CIA oversight is auPposed to be conducted ? by subcommittees of the Senate and HouSe Armed Services, and Appropriations Corernitte,o5. ? .Much to the irritation of some member, the CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Ap- propriations Committee not only Veeps - its business with the agency a. secret, .1n:4 also keeps the subcommittee's membership a secret from other members of Congress. .. . lixplenation of P.,tracy .raul Wilma, staff director of he Ticuse cormnittes, told Congressional Quarterly the t The late Allen Dulles, former CIA qireclor .Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the G?Mr4.t.e. Aimed Services CIA 'oversight subcornanittEo and chairman of the Foreign Rola- tiOns sul_lcommittee on U.S. oonainitmerits abroad, had to send to staff members to the, jungles of Laos to find out haw extensive the CIA program was in .that cuppoly nellttal country. "In ell ray committee's there is no real knowle$ge of what going, on in Laos," Symington told, a closed ;.-..e!,,sloa of the Calrte June 7. NiT11 senators, including Symington, nit on on,..t of the two Senate subcommittees designed to provide legislative oversight tleinhership was a r....vrd of the CIA. occeim. that's the? Wiel. -1"1311e TA bild-q,'.1 mf-/Pluvel9e9E IW-gez iirbf/Mfo `alwajts hma." by Congress," said T. Edward kPraswell chief couri?e1 foi- the Senate Armed' Services Com- mittee. . Desvite Symington's claims to the contrary, Braswell told Congressional Quarterly; "The budget is gone into more thoroughly than people (on the committee) would admit. It's just reviewed in a different way than, ? say, ?? the - - St a to Department's budget . Braswell said the budget review was at times conducted? by a "very select group , More, f,elect than the five-1114P mhcornmittee." CfAc Ni41410 AVVieTily ? Although the cf.A was cateblished in 1947, it was miot- for ? another two years that C..engres1 ? granted the agency carte blanche to operate without : fitierADP84400499$001000 The ic,.59 law exempted the ?from R-dcral statutes . . ... ... requiring - disclosure - of ? the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of p..rson- nel" employed by the agency. To the CIA edrector, the law granted the authority to spend Money "without regard to the .. pro ions of - law and mills- ' ,tions relating to the.- evpolditm- -,e- t-:of government funds,' Senate Appropriations .. - Committee hali a five-man sub.. .- CoMmittee ? with the Winery . .responsibility of reviewing ? the ' .CIA. budget, a figure which later is ? hidden in the accounts of 'other government egenci&a. According to William W. ;Woodruff, the one-man staff of .: . . the Appropietions oversight subcommittee, the senators ' - discuss more than just the CIA' ' when . its director, Richard Helms, Uatifi-M "We lo-A- to the CIA for the; -. best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can .. get," -Woodruff said. He said Helms also . provided the ant). committee with budget - estimates for all .government ,lintelligence P,parotion3, in- ' eluding those not specifically '. under the jurizdiction or. the , While . the ..}Totr;?z! . Arin , propriatians Committee veils-its - oversight operation in secrecy, ' the House Armed Services Committee just formed a now . subcommittee to deal with nit , aspects of intellizznee, E For the last seven - months . Rep. F. L'fiward liebE;rt, D-La.,1 . r, chairman of ? Armed. Services, ,used the full com.raitte. to Voight CIA testimony. "To pay the committee Was ' performing any real aversig,ht - function was a fiction," raid freshman committee member Michael Harrington, a- M. assachusetts. Democrats. The new subcommittee will be under . the direction of -Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich; No Quilling Solely - ? "I find it very difficult to believe the oversight coin- inittees could not obtain some pretty' accurate information on -bow much Of that CIA money was going into Laos," com- mented Sen. Jack Miller, R Iowa, during the Senate's June: 7 . closed session. Sen. J. W. Fulbright D Ark., chairman of the Foram Rola- 09041,committee, retorted: "It as be said that we, all know _ . ,., _ . ?eoit intio 6 Approved Fdonntease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499001000090001-6 about what the CIA is doing. I have been on the CIA oversight committee and I have never s7en ariy &tailed figures (en Laos) whatever." ' . Even Sen, John C. Stennis (D. Miss.), chairman of the Armed ?Sm.-vices Committee - and its omrsight subcommittet,? ad. witted during the closed F.aa&im that tome of the information- ? contained in Symington' 3 'Classified staff vaport 14,,as new to him. . . Stennis added, however: ' ? "If ? we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we ea- not run it as a quilting society or something like that." _? . Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 ST. LOUIS, tieftpproved Forease 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-0049941,1101000090001-6 POST-DISPATN - 326,376 S - 511,863 8FPG 57 0 re) *..1/--) d .. By RTCHARD DUDNIAN Met- Secrettiry of the TreasurY. been used to finance in part - .. ? Chief Washington - Doi.eslas Dillon was ?cheilernan. I, certativinternational laloor pro- Bissell Wa's reported to have. Correspondent of the s, ilse.,..'iliociernent, re.porting. Bis- ? graMS.)-iTindled through .?. . the suggested that the? : CIA could- :? ? Post Dispatch ' 51 ii revieW and apprMsal of I AFT_,700.- . t e 'I use foreign nationals increas- e tnie CIA's covert operations .0., , i?e ..-.. ? WASIIING'FON, Sept. 25 ? A e '. ? .,,member of the ins i ingly as '''career agents," with -T. said: If the agency is to .be , panel, ?snot identified but ap- As a result?MD funds have - 'confidential report being i a status midway between a cir- :is effective, it will have to majte - ? patently. Bernstein, the Steel- ciliated in Washington and Bos- ' ?rkers -oficer, I , was quoted as use of private institutions on an Di classical' agent in a: single op- ef ' ,ton urges that the Central In- 'expanding scale, though those eration and that of a staff saying that it . was common ? , member involved through his ' relations which, ' knowledge even before the ex- cannot be resurrected. .? poseS'7 of la67 that there had "We need to operate under . labor:Programs. deeper cover, with increased ' - Persons in international labor attention to the use of 'cut-outs.' ! affairs were dismayed, he said, CIA's interface with the rest of over public disclosure of this the world needs to be better : ClA mport. He said that ."cer. protected." . tam n ?It e w a p a p e mien chin- Bissells presentation, as re- ' pounded , their difficulties by ported in the summary, referred , confusing AID with CIA." The report is a summary of ? . frequently to exposes in tie, - -I di- eein i n inte'li- , The -summary continued, itelligence Agency improve its secrecy M. peneterating private institutions at home and abroad. The document proposes also that the CIA direct its covert operations particularly at Af- rica, Asia and Latin America and make wide use of agents other than Americans. : - mus year of the CIA's pene- - g,enee and -foreign policy con n? e- , - r , ? , f quoting] the same speaker.? , with good reason," the sum-,. tration and financing of .t.lie,s - ducted by the Council on For- ",Since i these disclosures, the mary said: . National - Student Association i - eign Relatiores in New York - -- s turn ,01,i, ' events has been unex- "If these- OVerfliPhts had , , and other p1 is org,anizations,, 1.. including trade union organiza-? pectecia ferst, there hasn't been ?; , . ,eaited' to the,- American press,' Ja.n. 8. 196S. , clans ove,.eeas, any real trouble with interne.- the USSR would have been Copies of the 'document are e s? - ?-? ? being 'elm-Elated in this country' - -. 'IC various groups hadn't ? della) ilabor programs. Indeed, forced to take action. ... . ,. -. - - . and Europe by a group of rant- - -.:been-,:a.ware of the source of there i has. been an increase , in ? On a less severe level, the 7.theix.I. 'funding, the damage sub- ... detn4ndei for U.S. -labor pro- same problem applies to satel- cal schola?rs in Cambridge, .. Mass, as "a still-relevant prim- et% . - . . k,ian-1- and the strain on our caree.r in many operations. At another point, the account. of Bissell's presentation asked ? the question "From whom is a covert operaticin to be kept. secret?" 'After five days, for exemple, the U-2 flights were not secret I from the Russians, hut these ; operations remained highly se- cret in the United States and .. .., . , . .ins, m., i or .on the theory and practice 'efiave.;;have been far less tfian capacity' has been embarras- ef .the C e n t r al ITII?elliUnce ?-'iii....eeon.rred," the summary said. s sing.Forrnerly these common Agency" and "a fair warning e....,,,,,e. -.7. . labor unions knew we were ine tel..). interface with vari- es to the direction of the agen- eottstepriyate groups, including short of funds, but now they cy's interests and efforts." b. groups, all assnme we have secret CIA Leader usiness and student of the 1965 discussion,'money, and they ask for more ..: " . was Richard lvi. B must be. remedied. Bissell Jr., a help." former CIA deputy director Who was in charge of the U-2 spy plane program in the late 19.50s ' and the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1911. Ile left the Government in 1912 and is a vice president at United Aircraft Corp. . Others in the group were the , late Allen W. Dulles', who had been the CIA director; Robert. Amory Jr., who had been ,the deputy CTA director for hitt:Hie if genre.; Thomas L. Hughes, then director of intelligence and re- search at the Department of - State and now president of the Carnegie Endowment for finer.: national Peace, and Meyer Bernstein, director of interna- tional affair S for, the United Steel Workers of Am erica. For-; -Approved Other documents, obtained in early Itki9 by the PostsDispatch Citing: labor union in British , of private organizations over- showed that the U.S. Guiana as an example, he said I seas, Bissell said that such pro- Agency, for International Developme.nt they were "supported through .- had picked up the tab for cer- CIA conduits, but now they ask tam n overseas programs that - for more assistance than be- had been financed secretly by fore' the CIA. These became known .. Ine-thsumma,ry of Bissell's as "CIA orphans" after the Presentation, the report said the secret finaacing, was disclosed. ,United ?States should make in- The change apparently grew ! ici:eaeitsge use persons Other out of a 1967 order by President : than American citizens who Lyndon B. Johnson prohibiting "should be -encouraged to de- any ,further hidden subsidies to .- velop a second loyalty, more private 'volu.ntary organizations. : or less :comparable to that of He promised to consider a pro- the I eaerican staff, , posal; that the -Federal Govern- . "TI.,, desirability of more ef- ment establi,sh "a public-private -. fectiv,-.use of foreign nationals mechanism to provide public inerca'S'es as we shift obr at- funds openly for overseas activ- : tention to Latin America, Asia itiefi:ioForganizations which arc i and :Africa, where the conduct adjudged deserving, in the na- of United States nationals is tional. interest, of . public sup easily subject to scrutiny and FprRqjpase 2001/11/08 : CtAtiktfrE14E01q99tWX9 rim:Seri ,et 1 e s 1 090001-6 lite reconnaistianc.e. These are examples of two hostile govern- ments collaborating to keep. operations secret from the gen- oral public of both. sides. 'Un- fortunately, there aren't enough of these situations'." - Returning to covert financing - Oflnued Approved For R9104ee 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 2 grams as arranging visits by have been financed covertly by CIA. potential political leaders to the In his toscussioa of covert op- the United States were more ? crations, Biss411 was quoted as effective if carried on under sawing that in some countries private auspices than if sup- the CIA representative "has ported officially by the U.S. served as a close counselor Government. (and in at least one case a "They do not need to be drinking companion) of the '-covert, 'but if legitimate pri- chief of state. .vate entitles such as the faun- "These are ? .situations, of dations do not initiate them, course, in which the tasks of in- there mey be no way to get. telligence collection and politi- them done except by covert cal action overlap to. the point support to 'front' organizations, of being almost indistinguish- "Many propaganda ()Pero- able," the account said. tions are of declining cfective.-1- ness. Some can be continued at slight cost, but some of. the larger ones (radio, etc.) arc pretty well 'blown' and not in- expensive, USIA (United States Information Agency) doesn't like them, although they did have a real justification some 10 to 15 years ago as the voice .of refugees and emigres, groups which also have declined in value and in the view of sonic professionals are likely to con-' thine declining in value." Bissell told the Post-Dispatch by telephone that he did not recall details of the 196.8 panel discussion but assumed that the reference to radio propaganda ? operations was to Radio Free Europe and similar broadcast- ing and other enterprises that _ Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 THE 1.$NCHESTER GUARDIAN lo Nov 1971 Approved Forgease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004991a101000090001-6 The CIA and the clumsy crainteman New York, November 15 ? The weekly magazine "News- week" claimed today that the American Central Intelligence Agency had played an important part in bringing about the downfall 10 years ago of Antoine Gizenga's Stanley- ville Government in the Congo ? now the Zaire Republic. The CIA's role in the affair involved the exposure of Soviet smuggling of arms disguised as Red Cross packages, and the theft of Soviet funds destined to pay Gizenga's army, the magazine said. The account which "Newsweek" said was previously unpublishe d, recounted how Gizenga made a bid for leadership of the former Belgian Congo in 1961. He had ,nttended the Prague Institute tor African Affairs and spent six weeks in Russia, and was seen by Washington as "Moscow's new man i in the Congo," the magazine said. He broke away from the Congolese Government. which had the backing of the United Nations, set up a regime of his own in Orientalc Province; armed 6,000 troops with smuggled Russian guns and paid them with Soviet funds. - The White House authorised covert operations to stop him, and the CIA was informed by friendly European agents that a Czech ship was bound for Port Sudan with a cargo of guns dis- guised as Red Cross packages for the relief of refugees in the Congo.. "Newsweek" went on : "A direct appeal to the port authorities to inspect the crates would never work, the CIA's man in Khartum realised. The Sudanese would have to be faced with public exposure of the contraband. "Appropriate arrangements were made on, the wharfs before the Czech ship docked. 'If my memory serves me right,' a former CIA man says, it was the second crane load. The clumsy winch operator let the crates drop and the dock- side was suddenly covered with new Soviet Kalashnikov rifles.'" On the incident involving the soldiers' pay, "Newsweek" recalled that by late in 1961 Gizenga's troops were growing restive as their arrears mounted. An appeal was made to Moscow, and Soviet intel- ligence delivered $1 million in US currency to Gizenga's dele- gation in Cairo. The CIA learned that one third of the, money was to be delivered by a courier who would take a commercial flight to Khartum,. wait in the transit' lounge to avoid a Customs search, and then take another plane to the Congolese border. "When the Congolese courier arrived in Khartum and settled. into the transit lounge, his suit- case between his knees, he was startled to hear himself being paged and ordered to proceed immediately to the Customs area," the magazine went on. "After a moment of flus- tered indecision, he took the bag over to a courier and left it unobtrusively near sonic lockers before leaving for Cus- toms: At that point a CIA man sauntered out of the men's room, picked up the suitcase, and beaded out the back door where two cars were waiting with -motor's running." " Newsweek " concluded: "Not long afterward, Gizenga's Government fell. It was said that his troops suffered from shortages of arms and were upset because they hadn't been paid." ? Reuter. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R840000090001-6 MONESSEN, PA. VALLEY IIIDEPENDENT DEL 28 1971. E ? 18,086 Review of YEARS AGO, then Sen. Eugene Mc- Carthy used to come down hard once in awhile on what he viewed as ex- cessive secrecy about the Central In- telligence Agency's budget and oper- ations:Though there was considerable sentiment favoring closer surveillance of the Cjilf.and a greater degree of accountability to Congress, nothing much came of McCarthy's efforts. Despite his attempt to shed some light on how much money the CIA spends, and to force disclosure of such Information as could be revealed with- out hurting the national security, the agency remained essentially hidden from the public. The size of its budget continued to be concealed in appro- priations for other governmental func- tions. Watchdog committees set up by both House and Senate presumably were privy to quite a bit of informa- tion, but most of Congress as well as the general public was kept in the dark. - ? That period is recalled by the cur- rent effort of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, to extract more public information about the CIA and other intelligence groups. The situation is basically unchanged today: no one who is telling seems to have any clear notion of what the CIA budget amounts to, though estimates range from four to six billion dollars annually. . . intelligence The approximate size and extent,of CIA operations remain hidden from the public, which also gets only frag- mentary (and often disquieting) hints as to the CIA's role in foreign policy decisions and implementation. For the past several months Nedzi has been chairman of a group set up by the House Armed Services Com- mittee to oversee intelligence opera- tions. Inquiries thus far, he said the other . day, have led him to conclude that from the standpoint of national security "more can be made public than is being made public." This is the heart of the matter. No responsible person suggests that the operations of the CIA or other intelli- gence agencies ought to be made an open book to the public ? and, by ex- tension, to other governments. Intel- ligence work is by its nature secret, and would quickly be undermined by excessive disclosures. The public which is served by intel- ligence agencies and which foots the bill for them, however, has the right to general information about how big they are and how much they spend ? and above all, about how well they stay within carefully defined limits of their proper function. Congressional review of the situa- tion with this in mind would be a sound step in the public interest. Approved For Release 20Ci1/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 NEW YON ,11.03 Approved Fortigkilease 201010107069.7t1A-RDP84-0049W101000090001-6 1300k .onW ?rid War Ii Spi;s Draws E?Iritishinquiry . . i By HENRY BAYMONT wartime deputy chicf of;army ht et cave in the Thurin- NLI.5 Britain's counterespiorigian forest. One recent crisp fall morn- I He is known to have worked inage ag,ency. ing a. lean, youngish man with -,--- a, . closely with Sir John, who im- an Oxford accent walked into He also knew that tli.e .r-rt- mediately after the war wrote the offices of the David McKay ish authorities had been toId 1-n, exhaustive secret report Thirdthat the British edition would ar.alyzing the effectiveness of Co., a publishing house at Avenue and 47th Street, and be reproduced precisely ft-con M.1.5 in Opration Double-Cross. asked to see the company s to be published here next Jar? some material from this re- University Press publish the president, Kenneth L. Lawson. He was shown into Mr. Raw- "arY? port might have found its way full report. I . _ . son's office,. a spacious wood- " understand your Govern- paneled room with floor-to- ment's position," Mr. Rawson - ceiling bokshelves and an told his caller. "But having imposing grandfather's clock, read the manuscript I dont and identified himself as the feel there are any real sacu- deputy director general of the rity issues and, quite frankly, I believe that 27 years after the war the public is entitled to get to read this fascinating story." The story referred to he Mr. Rawson is how the British' intelligence service " turmat around" the top 12 Germ;: a. agents in Britain in order to' feed false information to the. German. High Command, an c fort that ended by leading the Germans into assuming that main thrust of the Allied in- vasion of June, 1944, would concentrate on Belgium rathc.r. than Normandy. Farago Names Agents This deception, celebrated as one of the most successful in- telligence coups of the war hut. never told in 'its full detail, bc- came known as Operation Double-Cross, or, as the intel- ligence community prefers to call it, XX. Mr. Farago, a Hungarian- born writer who became an ex- , the original McKay edition, dne it was the assumption that into "The Game of the Foxes" that sent the British Govern- ment seeking the 5- content of the book. The ISSUC inside the Government. was set off by a decision of the former security. chief, now a respected 80-year- old Oxford don, to let the Yale British Information Service. "I am here at the instruction of the Foreign Secretary," the visitor told the publishing ex- ecutive across a large mahog- any desk stacked with manu- scripts and papers. "We under- stand that one of your forthcoming boks may violate Crown copyright. That is, we feel it contains material that is confidential and rightly be- longs to Her Majesty's Gov- ernment." Mr. 'Rawson, a cheerful, gray- ing man of 60, was unperr turbed as he crushed a ciga- rette in a heavy pewter ash- tray. He had been expecting the call.' Within the vistor's reach, but concealed by an overflow of paper, were the galley profs of the book in questi on?Ladislas Farago's "The 'Game of the Foxes," a detailed account of German es- pionage. in Britain and the United States during World War IL The veteran publisher ? he pert in .German and Japanese has headed McKay for 21 years codes during the war when he ?knew that the Home Office was chief of research and plan. had already asked the book's fling in the Office of Naval in- English publisher whether it telligence, has reconstructed contained any material from the the operation by cross-refer- records of Sir John Master- ening British security informa- man, the provost of Worcester tion with the Abwehr archives College, Oxford, who was the found by the United States Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 ApprovedFoNWeleasel0q41:31f'(''26A-RDP84-0049141a001000090001-6 , 2 ,71 By W. W. ItCSTOW AUSTIN, Tex.?What's wrong with the United States? If the possibilities of movement toward stable peace are real, and the risks of chaos and increased violence also real, why is American political life fixated not on these great hopes and dangers but on just how rapidly we can pull back or pull out from Asia and Europe? ? I believe there are two major reasons. The first I call the Tocqueville Oscillation, to recall his famous ex- planation of why democracies have such difficulty in conducting a steady foreign policy. Historically, in this century, we have only acted abroad with unity and purpose in the face of a clear and present danger to the balance of power in Europe or Asia or to the effort of a major power to emplace itself to the south of us in. this Hemisphere. Between times we tended to lapse into a moralistic isolationism. For a half ?century we have first tempted a sequence of ambitious aggressors, then, when they had succumbed, we took up arms, against them. We are in danger of doing it again, as some -American leaders are bowing their heads to the neo-isolationist onslaught. The grand question, then, is: Can America for the first time make the responsible, steady, and energetic pur- suit of stable peace the focus of its foreign policy rather than await situa- tions of mortal danger before we react convulsively, as in the past? The answer is now inextricably linked to how we handle our economic policy at home and abroad.- Until President Nixon's wage-price freeze, we had been living with a corrosive combination of inflation and unem- ployment. It weakened every private and public institution, undermined our balance of payments position, and put in question our capacity to Carry our responsibilities in the world. The ac- tions taken thus far merely recognize the situation and buy a little time. They have plunged our society and the world community into a crisis from which we must now extricate ourselves. Most ecOnomists agree what we ought to negotiate with our partners as we reconstruct the international monetary and trade system: 0 -An upward revaluation of the yen and the Common Market currencies; he Principal Question 117hz.!t's Wrong With the U.S.A.? ? A definitive' shin: rrorn me costar as a reserve currency to greater reliance on the Special Drawing Rights, or, "paper gold," created by the Inter- national Monetary Fund; e Greater flexibility in exchange rates, over a narrow range, accompanied by, more explicit international rules of the game for deficit and surplus nations; e, A sharp movement toward more. liberal trade, including a revision of agricultural policies in japan, the Common Market, and the United States; ? A concerted effort by the rich na- tions of the world to enlarge the flows available for the development of Ash, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. This is the kind of result we ought to seek in the international economic conference that: must surely come. But it is a pipe dream unless we convert the wage-price freeze into what I have called a social contract. Unless we demonstrate a capacity to organize ourselves for the long pull to relate wage to productivity in- creases, our negotiators will be met with well - deserved skepticism. This means that labor leaders must find ways of assuring that the wage- productivity link will not operate inequitably. Then the labor leaders require guarantees that labor restraint will not be exploited to permit ex- cessive profits. To make this kind of social contract?and make it stick-- requires that we put aside conventional political slogans and work together. Our greatest asset is that, in his heart, every serious labor leader and every serious business leader knows this is required to deal with the wage-price problem; and that to deal with it is in the interest of his constituency. But the highest order of statesmanship will also be required in Washington. I do not believe we can come to this kind of responsible consensus while behaving irresponsibly abroad. I do not believe we can act steadily and responsibly abroad if we fail to recon- cile steady growth and price stability. We must find our way to common cause in foreign as well as in domestic The key to that reconciliation is the perception that the great things to do abroad; consist in working steadily, patiently and actively toward a stable peace men have not known since 1914. That is the victory potentially within our grasp. That is -the ..goal that could and should reunite us. In a nuclear age we have no right-to wait-for an- other Pearl Harbor or a Cuba missile crisis in reverse: irnan age of a trillion- dollar gross national product we have .no right to stumble about like a help- less giant. I do not believe it is America's destiny to collapse in a heap, to drop by the wayside when the nearly visible next sta.fe of the journey could be so much more hopeful for us and for all mankind. . This is the /ast of three article.s by W. W. Rostow, adviser to President Johnson. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For lease 2001NIAVr''CiA-WP84-004994R001000090001-6 21 SEP 1071 By W. W. ROSTOV/ AUSTIN, Tex.---A great question evidently still exists in Moscow which we should understand and discuss candidly: Should the Soviet Union complete the SALT negotiations and bring the .strategic arms race in offensive as well as defensive missiles to a formal close on the ?basis of parity, somehow acceptably defined to both parties? Or should it go forward on the basis of current momentum and. try to achieve strategic superiority over the . United States in some meaningful sense? There are, technically, two ways in 'Nvhich the Soviet Union might achieve superiority. First, a sufficiently masa sive build-up of strategic forces, cf-: fensive and defensive, so that: a Soviet first strike might be undertaken against -the United States .so powerful that we could only inflict in a second strike a level of destruction which the Soviet leaders judged acceptable; that is, the United States would be destroyed as a viable power, whereas a viable Soviet State would survive. Such. an insane enterprise is most un- likely; but it is conceivable.' The second sense in which Soviet superiority might be achieved waild be 'what might be called a reverse Cuba missile crisis; that is, against the background of a substantial Soviet strategic advantage over the United States, Moscow might try to force Washington to back .down in a major confrontation in a particular area; for example, the Middle East. The likelihood of such a dangerous adventure is increased somewhat by belief- that our statistical strategic ad.- vantage played a large role in Presi- dent Kennedy's stand at Berlin and in .the Caribbean in 1961-62. I do not be- lieve it did. It gave President Kennedy small comfort, if any, to ?know that more of America than Russia would survive a nuclear exchange. He ac- cepted some risk of nuclear conflict because there Was a good chance that MoscoW would not risk nuclear war to expand its. power if it found the United States redoubtable in defense of a vital interest. Nevertheless, some Soviet leaders May believe?and some Americans do believe?that the numbers mattered greatly in 1961-62. But the critical question, in, my view, is not merely the estimate in Moscow of the strategic numbers, but ? the image or American will: I know what it took to bring about the Test Ban Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the beginning of the SALT talks. They happened because we com- bined strength with a candid recog- nition of legitimate Russian security interests. ? I believe the greatest danger to the SALT talks lies in our projecting to Moscow the image of a nation en- gaged in unilateral disarmament,, or a nation so confused about its role and purposes that a reverse Cuba mis- sile crisis might be-worth the try. . Much the same kind of balance be- tween hope and danger exists in the Middle East. After many years of frustration the balance of feeling in the Arab world has begun to shift marginally toward moderation: the fcdoyeen made their bid last year but were defeated in Jordan; a new, more temperate Gov- ernment emerged In Damascus; and President Sadat of Egypt has talked to his people about the primacy of education and other tasks. And he is apparently trying to assure that Egypt can be truly independent, rather than the pawn in the imperial game of a great power. ? But all these events, as we know, were framed by a Massive expansion in the Soviet navy and a kind of latter- day Mahanist effort to expand Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean area as. far to the East as Singapore. There must be great temptation. in , Cairo and Moscow to try again, to succeed against Israel in the 1970's after the failures of the 1940's, 1950'a and 1960's. The balance is close be- tween another bloody crusade, on the one hand, and, on the other, an ac- ceptance of Israel and a turning to the modernization of Arab societies. And we are the critical margin. If American military strength in the Mediterranean (and capable of projec- ti...)n into the Mediterranean) weakens if American political life projects an 'image of hasty, irresponsibb with- drawal from responsibility iii Europe and Asia?the balance "could tip, in .Moscow and Cairo,- away from pur- suit of a firm Middle East settlement toward another desperate try to re- verse the course or history. The policy and posture of America bear also on policy in Jerusalem. Any likely Middle East settlement will in- volve much more explicit American guarantees and a larger American role in the Middle East ? than the fragile settlement of 1957. Israel must clearly withdraw, in such a settlement, from the bulk of the territory it now ?eerie. pies. Its willingness- and ability to do so depends greatly on. the credibility! of American strength and will. It is not surprising, therefore, that Israelis follow with great attention the Ameri- can performance in Asia and Europe ?and the temper of our political life-- aa they study the peace proposals laid before them by the American Gov- ernment. There are, then, three great possi- bilities before ns, none certain, all endangered by the isolationist slide in American political life: a settlement in Asia; a SALT agreement: and a settlement in the Middle East,. This is the second of three articles by, W. W. Rostow, - adviser to President Johnson. ? Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 ? RADIO '14/praiiirFbewEiee Iht4.1.11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049%1801000090001-6 FOR PROGRAM DATE. 4435 WISCONSIN AVE. NAV., WASHINGTON, O. C. 20016, 244-3540 PUBLIC AFFAIRS- STAFF Today Show September 21, 1971 7:00 AM STATION WRC TV NBC Network CITY AN INTERVIEW WITH PHILIP J. KLASS Washington, D.C. HUGH DOWNS: In May of 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, then head of Russia, was discussing United States photo-reconnaissance flights over Cuba with former Senator William Benton. Khrushchev offered to trade scret pictures with the United States, saying, "I can show you photos of your military bases taken from outersp- ace. I'll show them to President Johnson, if he wishes.? And then he added, "Why don't we exchange such photos?" The Soviet leader's remarks about aerial observation by the Soviet Union and the United States is reported now in. a book called "Secret Sentries In Space," which is the first detailed report on the extent and sophistication of such spies in the skies as they are called. It author is Philip J. Klass who's Senior Aviatics Editor for Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine. We want to Welcome Mr. Klass to "Today". \ PHILIP J. KLASS,: Thank you. DOWNS: I've mentioned that Cuban overflights there, because this was one of the two incidents that you suggested Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON. D. C. ? LOS ANGELES ? NEW YORK ? DETROIT ? NEW ENGLAND ? CHICAGO Approved For A:lease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 2 aerial observation may have prevented a war in these cases. KLASS: Yes. DOWNS: Could you tell us a little bit about the two? KLASS: May I begin a year earlier -- actually just ten years ago this month? There was a very severe war crisis over Berlin, because Khrushchev had issued an ultimatum that he would sign a peace treaty with the East Germans by the end of 1961. At that point in June of '61, when we met with President Kennedy in Vienna, or prior to that time -- there had been the feeling in the highest councils of government that there was a severe missile gap, that the Russians might have up to 400 ICBM's, which would be capable of striking and devastating the US. Fortunately, on January 31st of 1961, just after PreSi- dent Kennedy had taken office, we launched the first of our "search and find" reconnaissance satellites. This is a satellite that's designed to make a complete survey of the Soviet Union, taking photographs from an altitude of about 100 miles and trans- mitting those pictures down by radio so that we can quickly recover them and analyze them. And so, by the summer of 1961, as the Berlin crisis grew hotter and as Khrushchev thought that he could threaten the US, President Kennedy began to get intelligence from these satellite photos that the Russians instead of having several hundred ICBM's, actually had -- well, at that; time in the summer of '61, we thought they had maybe as many as 50. And by September, Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For?kelease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049901000090001-6 3 just ten years ago, by September of '61, President Kennedy knew that the Russians only had 14 ballistic missiles -- 14 ballistic missles, and so he was able to stand firm. And in fact, I believe that in early October, President Kennedy in a meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gromyko -- that he actually showed Gromyko photographs taken by our satellites and said, "We not only know how few missiles you have, but we know whore they are located in case war breaks out and we have to destroy them." And so, I believe that just ten years ago, theses satel- litesplayed a very influential role. DOWNS: I ,wonder why Khrushchev was anxious or willing to trade such photos? KLASS: Well, this happened several years later, and as we know, Khru.shchev was a very curious and interesting man. He had a great sense of humor. And by 1963, the Soviets themselves had developed the same sort of capability as the US had. And for example, in the first, oh, starting about 1961, the Russians opposed what they called the American spies in the sky. But by 1963 they had begun to develop -- they had launched their satellites -- reconnaissance satellites. They'd recover the whole satellite to get the film. DOWNS: Oh, now in your opinion, is their system of doing the same thing, watching things by surveillance, by satel- Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Amok Approved For Ottease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 4 lite as sophisticated as ours? KLASS: I don't believe that it is. It's hard to know, but the US was more advanced in terms of high altitude reconnaissance for aircraft., so we had a head start on them. I don't mean to suggest the Russians are not as smart as we are. DOWNS: Is this phot.ographically or in the aerospace... KLASS: Well, I would say photographically that we are probably ahead of them. So they rely primarily on satellites that stay up for eight to twelve days and take photographs; and then they return the whole satellite. We have two types. We have the radio type -- which I called the search and find -- which takes pictures, transmits them down by radio. They are not high resolution, they are sufficiently good, we can sort out the... DOWNS: By the number of lines in it... KLASS: We can see objects, perhaps a foot or two feet or three feet. We can resolve that small. And then when we find something that arouses our curiousity, we send up another type of satellite. DOWNS: What -- to get more detail on it? . KLASS: To get with a longer focal-length lens that takes photographs and actually returns the 'film via capsule. And in fact -- may I use this model here? DOWNS: Sure. KLASS: This is a model of the Agana spacecraft, built Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved Folftelease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049SR001000090001-6 5 by Lockheed, which is used for both types of satellite functions that is, the radio transmission and the recoverable type. DOWNS: What the size of that, approximately? KLASS: Well, this is roughly 30 to 40 feel long. DOWNS: I see. KLASS: Now, a new generation was just launched on June 15th, which is called "Big Bird" -- is actually 50 feet long. But in the recoverable version, this capsule, after it has taken -- used up its film, photographed all of the curious sights that have been discovered earlier, this capsule is in effect kicked out of orbit and comes down with its own parachute, which I don't have here in the model -- parachutes down and is recovered near Hawaii by aircraft as they -- as it's parachut- ing down, the aircraft fly by and snag the capsule and haul . it in. Or if they fail to do that and it falls in the ocean, then it has some flashing lights and radio beacons and then they drop frognet. But the record is very good. They're now catching and have for some years caught most of them. DOWNS: Right. Arc these solar energy cells or something like that? KLASS: indeed, you are correct. That's exactly the spacecraft carries its own batteries, but these are used to recharge it. And this is one of the things that limits the life -- the consumable; that is, how much film it can carry and how much electric power. DOWNS: All .right. Now, it is your belief, and ,of Approved For Release 2001111/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For dlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 course, the thesis of your book, that the great powers being able to do this surveillance, that it reduces the kind of suspicion that you think might trigger a big war? KLASS: Indeed. I think that these are the most stabi- lizing -- one of the most hopeful developments on the horizon. I think that they have indeed stahilized relations between the US and the Soviet Union because it enables each to know what the other is doing in strategic weapons. DOWNS: Now, obviously, this technique can't photograph the surface of the earth in great detail over... KLASS: Yes. DOWNS: ...'any country. Wouldn't that stimulate the development of techniques for hiding things? I am thinking now of the underground silos and things of that sort. Will its usefulness be limited eventually, or is it impossible to mount a large missile campaign that won't show from the surface? KLASS: Well, the fact of the matter is, Hugh, that to dig -- while a missile solo could be camouflaged, as you suggest, once it was dug, still the digging and construction of it is something that takes many weeks and months, and so what you first detect is roads being built in the wilderness of Siberia, let's say. DOWNS: Oh,.yes. KLASS: And then construction crews and... DOWNS: So the work going on would be... KLASS: So the work going on gives it away. It's Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved FoNeelease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049961001000090001-6 7 really much more difficult, though, to discover submarines. Again, we can see them as they are being built, as they are being launched. Where they are after they take off with their load of missiles and they are submerged that we cannot detect at the present time. DOWNS: Yes, yes. Yes. What do you see as the future of it, now with China gaining in the sophistication of these techniques? And in effect, three powers of major size, all with surveillance of each other. Do you think that large-scale war. can be staved off? KLASS: Indeed I do, and although.-- China, as you know, has launched two small satellites, neither one of them large enough to do the reconnaissance job. But in my book, I predict that by 1c.;75, and certainly, by the end of the decade, that China will have the same sort of reconnaissance capability. DOWNS: It's a fascinating idea. "Secret Sentries In Space." That's the name of this by Philip Klass. The story of satellites that have been and that are being deployed and that will be in the future, and it details it very well. Thank you so much, Mr. Klass. KLASS: Thank you, Hugh. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved FdlialkeleaseLidOiiiht/iii: CaL1t P84-00494451001000090001-6 21 SEP 1971 A 17? ;?1 t 'r5f Ti I) '7 '72.1 - ;--ie Personally V./..v,ict.111;-Ans of Missions and ,S,,inctioncd ? NEW YORK (UP1)---- President. Dwight D. Eisenhower personally re-- viewed the flight: plan of all U-2 spy missions over the _Soviet Union and it'. was he who decided .the ill-fated flight of Frailcis Gary Powers was "worth the risk," Daniel Ellsberg said Monday. Ellsberg, the former De- fense Department analyst who leaked the Pentagon papers ? on the 'Vietnam war to the press, said in an interview in Look maga- zine that he learned of Con. Eisenhower's person- al involvement in the U-2 flights when preparing an early study of the deci- sion- making process in crises. The shooting down of Powers' U - 2 reconnais- sance 'plane by the Rus- slang in :19C0 shortly be. fore a planned. summit conference between Gen. Eisenhower and then So-. ?viet Premier Nikita 5, Khrushchev strained U.S.-- Soviet relations and prompted Mr. IThrushchev to cancel. the conference, "M o s t Americans qs- sinned that Eisenhower had not known of tho fliE.,,ht, certainly in detail," -Ellsberg said. Ent, Ellsberg said, in the course of his study ha learned differently from "the man who was in charge of the U-2 program from beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point." "lie said that Pres:ident Eisenhower went over the flight plan Of every U-2 flight over Russia in the greatest detail, which usually occupied no less than four or five hours. ' "He said the questions that 'President. Eisenhow- er asked forced him to jus- tify every reconnaissanee objective assigned to the flight and to weigh it T-Q.Thill;f: the precise ma N. ginal risks on each leg of the flight. "In fact, he said that on the specific flight where Powers was shot down, they were well aware that there were SAMs (surface- to-air missiles) in that area that were becoming operational. "-There was already a risk, and. they had to ba? lance that leg of the flight against, the desirability of covering those objectives," Nllsberg said. 'President Eisenhower made. the de- cision that it was worth the risk." Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 ? Approved For*lease 200UV1OBRO1U1IDP84-00499,1p01000090001-6 20 SEP 1971 Toward a:Stable Peace: I By W. W. ROSTOW ? AUSTIN, Tex. ? The only victory worth seeking is a stable peace root- ed in the principles of the United Na- tions Charter. In the name of peace, the questions posed in the current debate on foreign policy are: How fast and how much should the United States pull back from responsibility in the world? How many troops can we pull out of Asia or Europe? How far can we cut the military budget, or the foreign aid budget? I believe we are debating the wrong questions. The right question is: What must America do to play its part in moving from where we are to reasonably stable peace? I believe this is the right question, because underlying forces offer more chance than at any time since 1945 ? and, perhaps, since 1914 ? for the attainment of reasonably stable peace. ,But the movement is not cer- tain. There are also powerful forces at work making for disruption and violence, of which the most danger- ous are those pushing the United 'States toward excessive withdrawal . from responsibility. What, then, are the bases for hope? First, there is the diffusion of pewer away from Moscow and Wash- ington. This diffusion has continued over the 'past generation, gathering mo- .mentum, in particular, after the Cuba missile .crisis. That crisis persuaded men in many. Parts of the world that the Soviet Union was not as dangerous as it had been over the previous fifteen years and, therefore, they could act with greater independence of Wash- ington, as well as of Moscow. The missile crisis also brought Moscow's split with Peking into eie open and intensified it. American policy did not oppose.the diffusion of power. We Vied to help organize it in constructive ways. Since the Marshall Plan, we threw our po- litical influence, as well as our eco- nomic resources, behind the desire of nations to fashion their own destinies. And, we have moVed in recent years -- under President Johnson's leader- ship and now President Nixon's to the active support of .regionalism In Latin America, Africl., .Asia, and Western Europe. For Moscow the diffusion of power has meant that the Communist vision of a world led by the Soviet Union has receded. Along its Chinese frontier and in Eastern Europe grandiose hopes have changed to anxieties. In the de, veloping continent5, naVorls_inEkgsn ingly march to thefARIPAiet1,SMe policy has moved in the direction of a conventional concern for Russian American policy did not oppose the diffusion of power. We tried to help organize it in constructive ways. Since the Marshall Plan, we threw our political influence, as well as our economic resources, behind the desire of nations to fashion their own destinies. security. That is what the -nonpro- liferation treaty Is about. But other events raise warning flags: the Middle East'since 1967 and the Soviet failure to honor its commitment to the Laos accords of 1962 should remind us that this doctrine has not been accepted fully. A second major force which could lead us in the direction of stable peace is the decline of the aggressive revo- lutionary romantics. In Asia this ros- ter included Mao, Ho; Kim, Sukarno; in the Middle East, Nasser; in Africa, Nkrilmah and Ben Bella; in Latin America, Castro. Some of these are gone and the fate of others ? and their policies ? is still to be determined. In general, how- ever, they encountered three forces which have tended to frustrate them. First, they encountered that nemesis of all expansionists: other people's nationalism. ? Second, they encountered the resist- ance of those 'who have not wished to see the regional balances of power upset. Third, their relative neglect of do- mestic welfare gradually reduced po- litical support at home for policies of expansion. , The most dramatic example is the trend of events and p6licy in Peking. We have ,observed a truly extraor- dinary passage of history since Mao, a few weeks after the first Sputnik was launched in the autumn of 1957, proclaimed in Moscow that the East Wind was prevailing over the West and that the Communist party of the Soviet Union should lead the Com- munist world in a great offensive. Since.that moment of euphoria, we have seen the failure of the Great Leap Forward; the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split and the build-up on both sides' of the Russian-Chinese border; the failure of the Peking- Jakarta movement against Southeast Asia of 1965, and the failure of the Cultural Revolution. e I Pr#keeM ittPlaccq& tide began to turn in Peking more rational domestic and ? ? policies. Behind Ping-Pong diplomacy and the Nixon visit lay several years of slow economic recovery, the grad- ual political triumph of the Chinese military and technocrats, and the quiet resumption of normal diplomacy with other nations in the non-Communist world. As Peking now looks at the world around it, including the Soviet divi- sions on its frontiers and the economic momentum of Japan and much of non-Communist Asia, it is inclined to regard the United States less RS a mortal enemy than a force capable of ?maintaining a livable balance in its region, as it turns to its long- neglected tasks of economic and social development. Taken all together, then, it is not beyond the range of possibility that we might see in the years ahead: o A Soviet Union which has ac- cepted its role as a great nation state among many and is prepared, while advancing its interests, to work to- ward stabilizing a world environment as potentially dangerous to Russians as to others. O A transition to moderation in Pyongyang, Hanoi, Cairo, and Havana equivalent to that which has already occurred in Jakarta, Algiers, and Accra. O The emergence of a Peking on the Asian and world scenes prepared to concentrate China's energies on modernization, while leaving its neighbors alone. Under those circumstances, the world community would still be a lively place, for the forces at work on the planet are inherently volatile; but it might begin to approximate the rel- ative order and balance envisaged when the United Nations Charter was drafted. ' This is the hopeful possibility which the performance of American society will either help bring to pass or des- troy in the time ahead. E00.4'?p V OiNfietf(11jlia6 articles by # t . . ostow, ute House adviser toward to President Johnson, and author of foreign "Politics and Stages of Growth." INTERNATIOITAL AFFAIRS Approved Haw Release 200.MkPaA-RDP84-004W001000090001-6 . VLADIMIROV Imperialist? Intelligence and Propaganda IN OUR DAYS, the role of ? propaganda and in- telligence as major foreign policy instruments of the imperialist states is growing all the time. 13. Murty, an American professor, emphasises that the functions of camouflaged ideological coercion and subversion of world law and order are being carried out by means of propaganda.' In effect, Murty recognises the close connection between propaganda and intelligence. The intelligence agencies do not, of course, conduct their propaganda activity openly, but they possess the necessary means to promote ideological subversion abroad and render it more effective. A network of secret agents and paid informers, bribed newspaper and 'magazine publishers, corrupt politicians and adventurers, to whom the intelligence ,service assigns the role of "charity workers" and "educationalists"? all this makes it possible for the intelligence service to exercise anonymous control in spread- ing propaganda and disinformation. Richard Helms, the head of the CIA, stated in a memorandum to the government, that the psychological warfare must be placed fully under the control of the US intelligence service. Psy- chological warfare, he 'stressed, is a sphere of government activity which must be dealt with only by professionals acting in secret. An. Ame- rican professor, Ransom, who for a long time took part in the military research programme of ? Harvard University, holds that the role of the CIA in undertaking politica.' and psychological subversive acts has increased so much that it has become a major. instrument of political war, and has far exceeded the functions determined by the law,on the establishment of the ,CI.A.2 Some bourgeois scholars call this process "politicising" the intelligence service. "The ? ? 3 See 13. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order. .The Legal Regulation of Me Ideological Instrument of Coercion, New 1-laven?London, 1968, p. 11. 2 See 14.? Ranporn, The Intelligence E?tablishment, Cambridge (Mas.), .1970, pp. 94, 239. agent influencing political affairs abroad is be- coming a central figure," wrote Bergh, a West German expert on intelligence.3 In this way, a kind Of an organisationally independent sphere of so-called unofficial propaganda is forming. In the. opinion of West- ern specialists and politicians, this type of pro- paganda has a number of advantages over the official one. A report "The American Image Abroad", submitted to the American Senate in 1968 by the Republican Coordinating Com- mittee, stresses that the material being spread by non-governmental agencies is accepted in foreign countries with greater trust than that put out by the government. In view of this, the com- mittee recommended the government to en- courage by every possible means the American organisations issuing information and pro- paganda material for foreign countries. A vivid example of the kind of unofficial pro- paganda directed against the 'USSR and other socialist countries is the activity of Radio Free Europe, officially an independent organisation, but virtually controlled by the US authorities. Speaking in the US Senate in January 1971, Senator C. Case said that 1,642 employees .of Free Europe and about 1,500 professional work- ers of the Liberty radio station were maintain- ed by the CIA. These subversive centres make use of 49 transmitters bought with CIA money.. The American intelligence service expends an- nually over $30 million on these radio saboteurs. Hundreds of millions of dollars have travelled from the .US state treasury to the accounts of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for over 20 years. As for the assertions that. they are financed from "private .donations", it transpires that these donations do not even cover advertis- ing expenses on. appeals to the American public for money. . . The US intelligence agencies secretly subsi- 3 H. gergh, ABC der .Spione, Pfaffenhofen, 1965, p. 83. cont I rue Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RIDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For Rtease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049914M000090001-6 disc many newspapers, magazines and publish- ers at home and in other capitalist countries. The American press has reported that the CIA finances the Frederick Praeger publishing eon- cern, the. Newsgaper Guild, an association re- presenting the American newspaper owners, the Houston Post, Soviet Survey ? and also other publishing groups arid publications. To carry out acts of sabotage and. ideologi- cal subversion, the US intelligence agencies are trying to enlist the services of citizens from other countries. The above-mentioned report to the Senate recommends using them on a wider scale in foreign policy propaganda in favour of the USA . The same? methods are also? applied by Is- rael, Which widely employs, the services of Zio- 'nist organisations in many. countries for Ko- pagandist undertakings: We can cite, as an ex-. ample, the so-called centre on documentation in Austria. The centre was officially registered as an organisation for the collection and dissemi- nation of information about Nazi crimes against the Jews. But, in actual fact, as an instrument in the hands of the Israeli and other imperialist intelligence services, it has conducted propagan- da against the USSR. and other socialist cowl- -tries. It organised a provocative broadcast over the West German TV netiVork; in which defec- tors from Poland took part. It is clear from the American press that the CIA uses various charitable and scientific-funds to secretly finance many national .and foreign organisations and. to direct subversive activity abroad, ? including anti-communist propaganda. There were about 40 such 'mediatory funds in 1967 and 1968, including the Ford Foundation, .which has enormous financial resources and widespread international contacts. Moreover, the CIA also sets up fictitious funds, some of them having a semijegal status. When Amer- ,correspondents wanted to know for what purpose these funds are used, it emerged that some of them were never actually where they were supposed .to be according te the official documents. These fictitious funds were receiv- ing money from the CIA and transferring it to the accounts ofOther funds, which in their own. name were -supplying certain organisations with money Linder the guise of assistance. These ope. :rations were frequently described by them as subsidising charitable work. The.American .intelligencp service finances a number, of .cultural, youth and other public or- ganisations of various political orientation, most of which advertise themselves as politically -rieutral. Their international contacts are useful to the intelligence agencies for carrying out dis- guised disruptive activities in international and foreign progressive organiSations. The National Student Association, with affiliations in 300 American universities, can be cited as one of them. According to its president, Eugene Groves, over 90 per cent of this organisation's bud- get was supported by the CIA between 1952 and February 1967. Groves stated that the CIA sent its agents to educational establishments of the socialist countries through this organisation. Under the guise of probationers, they went to youth forums and festivals where they carried on anti-communist propaganda and committed other subversive acts. On realising that the NSA had been used as a screen for CIA activity for 13 years, the overwhelming majority of its mem- ber condemned the NSA leadership and de- manded an immediate break with the CIA. ? The CIA also .finances a number of trade- union organisation S which are assigned to car- ry On disruptive activity in the international working-class movement.- The closest contacts with the CIA are maintained by the leadership of the AFL-CIO. Denouncing these contacts, an American trade-union leader, V. Reuther, said that Meany, Lovestone and certain other frade- union bosses had been allowing the CIA to use tbis organisation as a screen for its under- ground operations. In his bOok CIA and American Labor, published in New York in 1967, G. Mor- ris shows that annual allocations to the Amer- ican trade unions reach $100 million.4 A con- siderable part of them goes to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions whose main task is to exercise political influence in other countries and 'carry on subversive activity against the World Federation of Trade Unions. The intelligence agencies supply funds to some scientific establishments and information centres dealing with the selection, preparation and dissemination of propaganda materials. They include above all the universities and col- leges which study the USSR and other socialist countries in Europe. For example, a number of professional employees of the Russian Institute at Columbia University in the USA are working hand in hand with 'the CIA. The Institute on Studying the USSR, set up in Munich in 1950 with the help of the CIA, is actively cooperating with the intelligence service in working out pro- paganda hostile to the USSR and European so- cialist countries. 4 See George Morris, CIA and American Labor. The Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy. New York, 1967, p. 158. ' Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved Fo`rOelease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00490001000090001-6 "Sovietologistr and "Kremlinologists" are supplied by the intelligence service with espion- age material and other special information for , books and propaganda articles. Thus, in pre- paring one such work, 20 employees of the Rus- sian Research Centre. at Harvard University went to Munich, where they spent a year in- terviewing former Soviet citizens and trying to wrest from them information of the .required political character. The exposure of certain Of the CIA's back-. 'stag O financial operations caused such a violent reaction in the USA, that President Johnson had to appoint in 1967, a special commission, headed by N. Katzenbach, Under-Secretary of State, to investigate the CIA's .ties with American public organisations. Director of the CIA, R. Helms, was also included in its membership. The com- mission was forced to admit the existence of a system involving American public organisations in subversive ? activity on an unprecedented scale. It confirmed that this system was built up on US government instructions. A great role in the activity of the imperialist intelligence agencies is assigned to the ideolog- ical infiltration of the socialist countries, the aim being, as Western bourgeois specialists assert, the gradual and imperceptible ousting of social- ist ideology by the imposition and inculcation of bourgeois views. In order to 'achieve this, the Propaganda and intelligence services are trying, :in addition to widespread radio broadcasts on the socialist countries, to derive benefit from personal contacts between foreigners and citizens of the socialist countrieS. These tactics were used by them during the events in Czecho- slovakia in 1968. In particular, -special groups for conducting propaganda during their trips . across Czechoslovakia were formed out of stud- ents from Heidelburg, Stuttgart and other uni- versities. As admitted by the West German Wir- schaftsmagazin,lourist groups visiting the so- cialist countries include persons who have been specially trained to carry out -subversive anti- communist activities: ? For the purposes of propaganda and .ideol- ogical subversion', the intelligence service scrapes together and subsidises its own subver- sive groups from those hostile to socialism. These groups include such iemigre organisations the People's Labour Union, and organisations of Ukrainian, Baltic and other nationalists. In- ternational anti-conmunist subversive centres such as, the Assembly of the Ca'ptive Nations and others are maintained by the CIA. In 1968, the American, British and West Ger. man intelligence services -sent their .agents to Czechoslovakia,-including those who had been earlier exposed in espionage activity. Radio Free Europe alsb established direct contacts with counter-revolutionary and revisionist elements operating at that time in the mass media. ? The employment of revisionist and anti--So- viet conceptions in order- to undermine the so- cialist countries and the international commun- ist and,working-class.thovements has become a ? major elernent in, the contemporary political strategy of imperialism:?'The .bourgeois press willingly -propagandises works by modern revi- sionists. Moreover, Western ideological centres put into circulation. a reat deal of their own 'stylised" products, -Which in form and ,content are close to those of the Right and "Left" oppor- tunists. '? In this context, the recommendations given as early as 1058. by.W. Daugherty and M. Ja- nowitz, US experts on q0.,:stions of "psychologi- cal warfare" are of interest. They believe that "the propagandist must feel himself into the mind of enemy our 'propaganda to Russia should be done on the supposition that we are talking to conimunists."6 Exposing the disruptive activity of foreign centres engaged in ideological subversion and espionage, Pravda, the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, wrote in January 1970: "The commentators of Radio Free Europe have replaced their anti-so- cialist vocabulary with a terminology hitherto employed only in communist propaganda. The fact that they have begun to speak allegedly from the positions of the communist parties and. of patriotically-minded citizens cannot conceal the real essence of their schemes?to do away with the socialist system in this or that country of Eastern Europe." Intensive ideological penetration is also being carried out by.imperialists in the develop- ing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. A USIA employee in India, A. Goodfriend, wrote that Americans do their best in the developing countries to rear social strata, the representat- ives of which would be indigenous "in blood and colour, but American in taste, in opinion, in mo- rals and intellect".6 Imperialist propagandists are trying to in- fluence the army officer corps, state employees, and the intelligentsia of the developing coun- tries, since these strata -play an active part in the political and ideological life of their coun- . 5 See W. Daugherty, M. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, Baltimore, 1958, p. 41. . 6 A. Gooclfriend, The Twisted Image, New York, 1963, p. 94. cont'i'nued Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved For Rase 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499"000090001-6 tries. Such, in particular, is the. background of the US programme of leaders. and programme of specialists, envisaging a systematic impact on political and public figures, the intelligentsia,' and students in the developing countries. The intelligence services do not confine them-- selves to "unofficial" propaganda. They directly influence state propaganda agencies by supply- ing them with provocative and .disinformational. material for dissemination and publication. - The elaboration of the concepts and prin- ciples of foreign policy propaganda, the prepa- ration of propaganda material; and the evalua- tion of its effectiveness are also carried .out with the help of the political intelligence service. . In his book The Strategy of Persuasion, Ar- thur Meyerhoff, an American specialist, writes that in order to ,start a propaganda campaign, one should possess a vast .quantity of informa- tion, including that collected by the intelligence service. He recommends thorough study of the psychological and ideological requirements and ,inclinations of the population, and also of the factors obstructing the West in its propaganda ?activities.7 Under .the pretext of carrying out sociologi- cal research the American intelligence service collects copious data on the political situation in the Latin American, African and Asian coun- tries. The materials obtained by the intelligence agencies .are used to plan and wage a "psycho- logical warfare" On these countries.' These were the aims pursued by Project Camelot, which was carried out by US intelligence service in the ?1960s for "studying the revolutionary potential" in Chile. Similar operations (Simpatico and Job-430) were ,also carried out in other Latin American countries. The American intelligence service planned to carry out mass polls among different strata of the population in the Latin American countries to estimate the strength of anti-imperialist sentiments there. Acting on the ? instructions of the intelligence service, sociolo- gists, politicologists and other specialists who had come from the USA to Latin American coun- tries under the guise of rendering "aid", were to distribute questionnaires ,and assess public opinion. In the Socialist countries, the intelligence and propaganda services are trying to make 'secret ? 7 Sec A. MeyerholT, The SO-elegy of Persuasion, New York, 1965, 'pp. 149-152. ' ?8'Sce Congressional Record, Aug. 25, 1965, pp. 20921- 20927. contacts with hostile elements ready, for a mis- erable fee, to supply them with "raw material" for ideological subversion. These people pick up various kinds Of rumours and juggle with facts. Sometimes they are themselves the authors of malicious and slanderous lampoons on the so- cialist 'system, and these are secretly forwarded to the West and 'published in the bourgeois press. ? Very frequently the intelligence agencies of the imperialist states applythe formula: "If the facts .and events necessary for anti-coMmunist propaganda .do not exist, they should be orga- nised. For this 'purpose, fictitious tourists are sent to the -socialist countries with an assign- ment' to 'scatter instigating leaflets and shout provocative slogans?with the aim of attracting the attention of people :Irby and causing as much of a -disturbance as possible. As a rule, bourgeois newspaper, radio and ,TV correspon- dents "happen" to be on the scene of the provo- cation, taking notes, photographing and filming -so that an' act of hooliganism can be presented as a "move in defence of freedom and democra- cy". Sometimes, a private talk with a writer or a public figure from a socialist country is set forth as an "evidence" from communist countries. Questions are put in such a way as to prompt the 'interlocutor to utter views which suit the im- perialists, and then, after being "slightly edited" the talk is used for subversive propaganda pur- poses. For instance, F. Hardy, an Australian writer who visited the USSR in .1968, was en- gaged in this kind of activity. The sequel to his talks with some writers was the publication of anti-Soviet articles in the Sunday Times and other .newspapers. Subversive propaganda, carried on with the .active participation and often under the control of the intelligence agencies, is in the service of imperialism's aggressive foreign policy. The merging of foreign policy propaganda with the intelligence service and the spread of subversive ideological activity by the imperialist states, carried out with the application' of the means ...and methods of secret warfare, are instrumental in aggravating-international tension. However, the very fact that, in its propagan- da campaign .against socialism and the national liberation movement, imperialism is forced ever more frequently to resort to the services of in- telligence and its secret agents, is eloquent tes- timony tb the weakening of its ideological posi- tions. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 CONORP,Sr4IONAL QUARTERLY . Approved Fonaalease 2001/1 '4 84PelAMP84-004991a801000090001-6 On the Issues CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, .SPL'iNDI.NG Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un- informed Congress and an uninformative CIA. In the -last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted. The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus. Sen. -Stuart Symington (I) Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on ,a staff report. (Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268) Ile told the Senate in that closeil session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We 'do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war." As a member oftwo key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Sen- ate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing. - If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785) A Congressional Quarterly examination of the over- sight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Con- gress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about. CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key memb.ers of their committees--Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The extent to which these men exerciso their power in ferreting out the' details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago. The CIA Answers to... As established by the National Security Act of 1917 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was ac- countable to the President and the National Security Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination. To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intel- ligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers o.f personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of govern- ment funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organi- zation in 1949, its budgeted funds .have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a se- lect group of ranking members of Congress. (Congress and the Nation Vol. I, p. 306, 249) THE SENATE In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straight- forward. Nine men?on two committees?hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis. Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee' and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that , when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget. "We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations. Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA bud- ? get, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations. No tranScripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Wood- ruff said the material. covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour.' Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally -require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelli- gence Operations Subcommittee. Approved For Release 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 em-tjraleci Approved For Cease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004991e01000090001-6 CIA Oversight Subcommittees Four subcommittees have the official function of monitoring Central intelligence Agency programs and. passing judgment on the agency's budget before the figures are submerged in the general budget. Senate. Armed Services Committee, Central intelligence Subcommittee (reviews CIA programs, not the budget)?John C. Stennis (I) Miss.), *Stuart Symington (D Mo.), Henry M. Jackson (I) Wash.), Peter H. -Dominick (R Colo.) and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.); ? Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Opera- tions Subcommittee comprised of the five ranking members on the Defense Subcommittee---Allen J. Ellender (D Lai,* John L. McClellan (D Ark.), Sten- nis, Milton R. Young (R N.D.), Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine); Foreign Relations Committee in 1.967 was invited' by Stennis and Mender to send three members :to any joint briefings of the Appropriations and Armed Services oversight subcommittees. The three mem- bers were J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.), George D. Aiken (R Vt.) and Mike Mansfield (I) Mont.). There have been no joint meetings in' at least the last year. However, CIA Director Richard Helms did appear once in March before a Foreign Relations subcom- mittee. . House. Armed Services Committee, Intel- ligence Operations Subcommittee (created in July)---- Lucien N. Nedzi (D ich.),* G: Bray (R Id.), Alvin E. O'Konski (R Wis.), 0. C. Fisher (D TCxas), Melvin Price (D III.), with ex officio members F. Edward Hebert (D La.) and Leslie C. Arends (R Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Opera- tions Subcommitt ee?Illembe.rship undisclosed. Believed to be the five ranking members of the Defense Subcommittee headed by committee chair- man George Mahon (D Texas). Also would include Robert L. F. Sikes (D Fla.), Jamie L. Whitten (D Miss.), William E. Minshall (R Ohio), John J. Rhodes (R. Ariz.). ? Indicates subcommittee chairman. The role of the Armed Services Committee is not to examine the CIA's budget, Braswell said, but rather to review the programs for which the appropriated funds pay. "The budget is gone into more thoroughly than people (on the committee) would admit," Braswell ex- plained. "It's just reviewed in a different way than, say, ,the State Department's budget is." The committee's chief counsel said the budget review was conducted by a "very select group... more select than the five-man subcommittee." In the June 7 closed session of the Senate, Jack Miller (R Iowa) said, "I find it very difficult to believe that the oversight committee could not obtain some pretty ac- curate information on how much of that CIA money was going to Laos." Symington's reply: "There is a war going on in Laos and money is being spent in heavy quantities about which the Senate knows nothing. I am a meiriber. of literally all the committees involved. Each time we go into Laos. and believe we have uncovered the last leaf of what has been and is going on, we find later that it is not true." Foreign Relations. Since the CIA never has been recognized officially as an agency involved in making foreign policy, the operations of the agency have not regularly been scrutinized by the Foreign Relations Com- mittee. The Armed Services Committee reviews the agency's program annually because threats to the United States, against which the CIA guards, traditionally have been military in nature. The Appropriations Committee checks on the CIA's budget because the committee ex- amines all money requests of government agencies; the CIA provides valuable intelligence on Pentagon programs about which the committee has an interest. The Foreign Relations Committee was a newcomer into the circle of CIA-knowledgeable committees. ? In the spring of 1967, secret CIA aid for student activ- ities became the cover story for Ramparts magazine. The national press picked up the story and soon it became widely. known that the CIA had been contributing money to the National Student Association (NSA) and other tax-exempt foundations and was playing more than a casual role in jockeying CIA personnel into leadership positions in the various organizations. The response in Congress to the NSA story was the introduction of seven bills in one month.?all aimed at allowing Congress a closer look at the CIA. One pro- posal, sponsored by former Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn. 1959-71), would have involved an investigation of the CIA by a select committee armed with subpoena . power. A proposal to set up a similar oversight and investi- gating committee had been killed in: 1966 on a procedural ruling regarding Committee jurisdiction. With the new series of embarrassing CIA revelations, the McCarthy proposal posed a threat to the long-standing oversight system. Don Henderson, a Foreign Relations Committee staff member, said that in an effort to undermine support for the McCarthy bill, the Foreign Relations Committee was invited to send three members to all CIA joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The original members were J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.), Mike Mansfield (I) Mont.) and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R Iowa), who was replaced by George Aiken (R Vt.) when Hickenlooper retired in 1968. ? Woodruff, counsel for the Armed Services Committee, said that the committee had not ?met jointly on CIA busi- ness with the Appropriations Committee for at least one year. "Maybe it's been two years," he said, "I'm not sure." CIA Director Helms, however, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee for a special briefing on Laos in March. "I have known," Ful bright told the Senate during the June 7 closed session, "and several (other) Senators have known about this secret army (in Laos). Mr. Helms testi- fied about it. He gave the impression of being more can- did than most of the people we have had before the committee in this whole operation. I did not know enough to ask him everything I should have...... THE HOUSE Two committees in the House acknowledge that they participate in oversight of the CIA?Armed Services and Appropriations. The Armed Services Committee has Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090941fqnued . Approved Fort&lease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499Q)01000090001-6 a five-man subcommittee reviewing the programs of all intelligence organizations. The Appropriations Committee refused to say who on the committee reviews the CIA budget. Armed Services. A new subcommittee formed in July has filled a hole on the committee that has been left since F. Edward Hebert (D La.) reorganized the Armed Services Committee and abolished the CIA Over- sight. Subcommittee that had been run by the late L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the committee until his death Dee. 28, 1970. ? Hebert's plan was to democratize the committee by allowing all to hear what the CIA was doing instead of just a select group of senior Members. Freshman commit- tee member Michael Harrington (D Mass.) said that 'Hebert was making an honest attempt to spread the authority, but the full committee CIA briefings were still superficial. "To say that the committee was per- forming any real: oversight futiction was a fiction," Harrington When Helms came before the full committee, Har- rington asked what the CIA budget was. Helms said that , George Mahon (1) Texas), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had instructed him not to reveal any bud- get figures unless Armed Services Chairman Hebert requested the information. Hebert said "no" according to Harrington and the budget figures remained a mystery. As in the Senate, the House Armed Services Commit- tee is responsible more for what the CIA does than how much it spends, according to the committee's chief counsel, John R. Blandford. The ii?rmed Services Com- mittee does not meet jointly for CIA briefings with the Appropriations Committee or with the Foreign Affairs Committee; Bl andford The new subcommittee, responsible for reviewing all aspects of intelligence operations, was put under the leadership of Lucien N. Nedzi Mich.)?a leading House opponent of the Indochina war and critic of Penta- gon spending. lieert said he chose Nedzi "because he's a good man; even though we're opposed philosophically." Hebert's predecessor as committee chairman, Mendel Rivers, regarded the oversight subcommittee as so im- portant he named himself as subcommittee chairman. Nedzi said that Hebert had placed no restrictions on how the subcommittee should be run or.what it should cover. When Hebert took over as chairman of the full committee and abolished the CIA Oversight Subcommit- tee, there were 10 members of the subcommittee. One of the original 10 left Congress in January, one died, Hebert and Leslie. C. Arends (R Ill.) currently serve as ex officio members, four have been renamed to the sub- committee and two memb6rs have been bumped?Charles E. Bennett (D Fla.) and Bob Wilson (R Calif.). Both Blandford, the subcommittee's new staff roan, and Earrington said that the new subcommittee was formed because the full committee hearings were too unwieldy, not because Hebert wanted Bennett and Wilson off the subcommittee: Appropriations. In interviews with two staff members of the House Appropriations Committee, Con- gressional Quarterly learned that the ?membership of the committee's intelligence oversight subcommittee. was confidential. When asked why the membership Was a secret, Paul Wilson, staff director, said: "Because that's Intelligence Reorganization The Central Intelligence Agency was created as the clearinghouse of intelligence information gather- ed by the various government agencies responsible for espionage, .code-cracking and other forms of intelligence work. The CIA was intended to loosely coordinate operations of all the different intelligence- gathering groups. The plan as originally conceived has not worked . to total satisfaction. The Washington Post reported .Aug. 16 that the White House, which ordered a study of ways to consolidate the far-flung intelligence- gathering operations of all branches of government, was looking for ways to cut at least $500-million and 50,000 employees from the: estimated $5-billion and 200,000 employees currently representing what is believed to be the total intelligence program. The Post reported that Allen J. Ellender (D La.), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, has forced the Administration to look into budget- cutting plans by threatening to slice a piece of the appropriation from the White House request. the way it's always been." Ralph Preston, a staff man for the Defense Subcommittee, said the information was a secret, but admitted that more members than just Chairman Mahon were responsible for reviewing the agency's budget. Rep. Harrington said he has requested the compo- sition of the subcOmmittee and has been refused the in- formation. "I'm just sure the CIA committee consists of the five ranking members of Mahon's subcommittee on defense," Harrington said. Other sources indicated that Harrington's conclusion was correct. Quality of Congress' Oversight Because most members of. Congress have not been aware of what the CIA was planning until long after the agency, had already acted, more than one. Senator or House member has made embarrassing statements out of line withlact. Former Sen. Wayne Morse (D Ore. 1915-69), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, took the Senate floor April 20, 1961--five clays after the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion--and said: "There is not a scintilla of evidence that the U.S. government has intervened in the sporadic rebellion which has occurred inside Cuba. That rebellion has been aided from outside by Cuban rebel refugees who have sought to overthrow the Castro regime." Four clays later Morse admitted: "We now know that there has been a .covert program under way to be of assistance to the Cuban exiles in an invasion of Cuba and that assistance was given by the United States govern- ment. We did not know at the legislative level, through the responsible committees of the Senate, what the pro- gram and the policies of the CIA really were." The Morse speech, delivered nine days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, was the first mention in either the House or Senate of U.S. involvement in the invasion at- tempt. (Congrm and the Nation Vol. 1, p. 127) Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 owtinued Approved Forint lease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049901101000090001-6 Four Approaches to Change Although more than a dozen bills and amend- ments relating to greater legislative control of the CIA were introduced in the Senate and House prior to Aug. 6 (summer recess), four basic approaches to altering the present system of oversight have emerged. O In every Congress .since 1953, a resolution has been introduced which sought ,to establish a joint committee on intelligence operations and information which Would include members of key committees from both the Senate and House. From the 83rd to the 92nd Congress this type of resolution has been intro- duced, referred to committee and killed by lack of action. O The approach adopted by Sen. George McGov- ern (I) S.D.) in S 2231 was aimed at gaining a single- sum disclosure of the CIA budget to be voted on by the !Louse and Senate as a line-budget item annually. O A proposal which sought to provide Congress with more intelligence information without either limiting CIA activities or disclosing the agency's ex- penditures was introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.). The bill (S 2224) requested that the two Armed Services Committees. the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Com- mittee be provided with regular and thorough CIA briefings with information and details included in the briefing which Would be similar to the data provided the White House. O The approach adopted by Senators Frank Church (I) Idaho) and Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Rep. Herman Badillo (H N.Y.), among others, has been to sponsor proposals aimed not at learning more of what the CIA knows, but at limiting the agency to informa- tion gathering rather than military and para-military operations. (Radio Free Europe, p. 1850) While explaining the details of the Central Int elli-. VIICO Act of 1919,- former. Sen. Millard E. Tydings (I) Md. 1927-51) said in a May 27, 1949, floor speech: "The bill relates entirely to matters external to the United States; it has nothing to do with internal America. It relates to the gathering of facts and information beyond the borders of the United States. It has no application to the domestic scene in any manner, shape or form." Committee investigations into tax-exempt founda- tions in 1964 produced an informal report issued by Rep. Wright Patman (D Texas) labeling the Kaplan Fund as a conduit for CIA money. The fund described its purposes in its. charter as to "strengthen democracy at home." Patman later agreed to drop the committee investigation saying, "No matter of interest to the subcommittee re- lating to the CIA existed." (Congress and the Nation Vol. 1, p. 1780) In the spring of 1967, another example of domestic CIA programming emerged as it became known that the National Student Association was receiving money from the CIA and that the agency had been involved in manip- ulating the leadership of the student organization. - Laos. The most recent case study of Congress lacking knowledge about CIA activities has been in the series of revelations which came from the June 7 closed Senate session briefing on Laos requested by Symington. (Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268) Three times during the two-hour session, Symington, a member of the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA oversight, said that although he knew the CIA was con- ducting operations in Laos, he did not know how exten- sive the program was. "Nobody knows,"" Symington said, "the amounts the CIA is spending while under orders from the executive branch to continue to supervise and direct this long and ravaging war (in Laos)." Minutes after Symington said that in all of Ids sub- committees?which included the Armed Services Intel- ligence Subcommittee under the chairmanship of John C. Stennis (I) Miss.)?there was ".no real knowledge about what is going on in Laos." Stennis took the floor and said: "The CIA has justified its budget to our subcommittee and as always they have come with expenditures right in line with what they were authorized expressly to do....They (CIA) have told us from time to time about their activities in Laos." "It has been said that we all know about what the ? CIA is doing," Fulbright retorted. "I have been on the CIA oversight committee and I have never seen any de- tailed figures (on Laos) whatever. Often the briefings are about how many missiles the Russians have. When we ask about specific operations, they say they are too secret; they Can only report to the ? National Security Council, which means to the President. There is a lot I did not know about, specifically in Laos." Stennis said that the secret report on CIA activity in Laos, compiled by Foreign Relations Committee staff members, contained some information he was not familiar with, information he had not been told in his capacity as chairman of the Armed Services ? Intelligence Opera- tions Subcommittee. - ? "I think we all know," Stennis said, "that if we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we cannot run it as a quilting society or 'something like that. But their money is in the clear .and their forthright- ness, I think, is in the clear." Sen. Miller criticized Symington for saying the Congress was appropriating money blindly: "We should not leave the impression that the Senate somehow or other has been helpless in this matter. We are all mature individuals and we know what we are doing. We have. appropriated a lot of money for the CIA. If we have done so, knowing the CIA is an executive privilege agency, I think we have done so with ow eyes wide open. Maybe we should change that. That is something else. "But let us not say the Senate has been hoodwinked or leave the impression we have been mislead and have not known what is going on. I think we may have lacked information on the specifics, and the Senator (Symington) is pulling out information on specifics, but the Senators who voted on these appropriations for the CIA voted for them with our eyes wide open, knowing what we were doing. Maybe we should change it. It is something for future debate." "I would be the last to say he (Miller) had been hoodwinked," Symington commented, "or that any other member .of the Senate had been hoodwinked. But I have been hoodwinked, and I want the Senate to know this afternoon that that is the case." Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved Fosaelease 2002181/U1 CIRIRDP84-0049161001000090001-6 Washington Couple iriedman Ci.y]Dtotiog Collection Given To:Virginia Research Library Lexington, Va. ? An important and extensive private collection of cryptolog- ic material has been given to the George C. Marshall Research Library in Lexing- ton. The gift was made by the late Lt. Col. William F. Friedman, who died in 1969, and Mrs. Friedman, of Washington.- Colo- nel- Friedman and his wife have been widely acclaimed in the field of cryptolo- gy since World War I. .The Friedman Collection "will be a tremendous addition to the library's hold- ings," said Lt. Gen, Marshall S. Carter, foundation president and former director of the National Security Agency from 1965 to 1969. Dedicated in 1964, the Marshall Re- search Library is closely associated with nearby Washington and Lee University and the Virginia Military Institute and has become the national memorial to the World War H. Army chief of staff and author of the Marshall Plan of aid to Postwar Europe. The library's museum has been open to the public since the dedication. ? One of the library's primary projects is the -publication of a multivolume biogra- phy of General Marshall being written by the library's director, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue. 3,000 lions Approximately 3,000 items are in the Friedman Collection now being prepared for use by future researchers in the field. The material ranges from Colonel Fried- man's first publications on cryptography in 1916 and research papers allied with their assignments for the U.S. govern- ment to books in various languages, pam- phlets, technical papers, periodicals, mi- crofilm, slides and newspaper clippings. ? For almost . half a century, Colonel Friedman was regarded as this country's most eminent cryptologist. In congres- sional hearings on the Pearl Harbor at- tack, he was identified as leader of the group of U.S. Army cryptologists who solved the Japanese diplomatic cipher . and built a machine which automatically deciphered these important communica- tions. For his wartime work, he was awarded the highest civilian honors given by. the government. In 1944, he received the War Depart- ment's Commendation for Exceptional Civilian Service; in 1946, the Medal for Merit; and in 1955, the National Security Medal for "distinguished achievements in national intelligence work." In a rare action, the U . Con,,..e?res,s i 195 woled him $100,00 lilEliYaC'do REns Rke the commercial rights of his inventions held secret by the government. Born in Kishinev, Russia, September, 24, 1893, William Frederick Friedman was brought to Pittsburgh in 1893, where lie became a naturalized citizen. After graduating from Cornell University with a degree in genetics, Colonel Friedman served as director of genetics research at Riverbank Laboratories in Geneva, While there, he met Miss Elizabeth Smith, who became Mrs. Friedman. Miss Smith was at that time conducting re- search on the claim that Sir Francis Bacon had written the works of Shake- speare. Mr. Friedman also became inter- ested in this controversy and his talents were diverted from genetics to cryptolo- gY? Before the war broke out in 1917, Riv- erbank Laboratories volunteered the services of its unique group of crypto- graphic personnel, including Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, who trained the first class of Army cryptographers, to the U.S. government. During World War I, Lieutenant Friedman served in Army In- telligence. In 1921, his long government career began with the Signal Corps. He was chief cryptanalyst with the War De- partment from 1921 to 1947 when he be- came chief cryptologist for the Depart- ment of Defense. In the 1930s, he was also a special assistant to the director of the National Security Agency and from 1955 until his death in 1969, he served as a consultant for the Defense Department. While her husband was working for the War Department, Mrs. Friedman was employed by the Treasury Department unscrambling the codes and ciphers used by rum-runners during Prohibition. Her skills led to the capture of smugglers and the breakup of opium smuggling rings. She was selected to establish crypto- graphic communications for the Internae tional Monetary Fund and served the IMF as a consultant. From 1924 to 1942, she was chief of the 'Treasury Depart- ment's cryptographic section and a re- search analyst with the Navy Depart- ment from 1912 to 1946. Shakespeare Questions The Friedmans' interest were not limit- ed to their government work. They con- tinued their study of the Bacon-Shake- speare question and after several years concluded that there 'exists no proof that the author was other than Shakespeare. Their article, 'The Cryptologist Looks at Shakespeare," Was awarded the In their collection, the Friedmans have included books and essays .of the other major points of view on the Bacon-Shake- speare controversy, as well as those who. support Shakespeare. Also of great interest to the Friedmans was the science of archaeology. Many aspects of this study are represented in the collection. Among these are: the ru- ins of Europe and Scandinavia. Linear A and 13 of Crete, Stonehenge and Easter Island. The development of Western civi- lization is studied through the Aztecs, Incas and some North American Indians; however, the largest amount of material is about Mayan culture. - In the Friedman .Collection, there. are several hundred items relating to cryp- tography, cryptanalysis, secret writing and signalling, radar, telephony and te- legraphy. To supplement the technical side of cryptography, the collection con- tains dictional works whose plots involve spies and codes, as well as popular books on cryptographic games for children and a set of the official publications of the American Cryptogram Association. The Friedmans also gave the library valuable code books used in the Union Army during the Civil War and rare books on the subject of cryptography dating from the 1500's. " There is a large amount- of material concerning Pearl Harbor and the contro- versy over who was to blame for the "Day of Infamy." Roger Bacon Of particular interest is a copy of the Voynich Manuscript which has been the subject of intense research for some years. Thought by some to be the work of Roger Bacon, the medieval monk and scientist, the manuscript has never been deciphered. Colonel Friedman and many others have attempted solution, including the late Rev. Theodore C. Petersen of. -Catholic University, Washington. Father Petersen bequeathed to the Friedman Collection his workbooks and color copies ? of the manuscript. The third section of the collection is. devoted to literature, particularly the works of James 'Joyce and Gertrude Stein. Colonel Friedman believed that the works of the authors composing the "cult. of unintelligibility," were really of a cryptographic nature, since the authorss, deliberately attempted to conceal their true meanings. -4' 1 er Shakespeare Library award Once the material has been integrated 'agAbIREIR84-00499R004OOO9EMOSA3 Library's holdings, it bridge University Press as "The Shakes- will become an important addition to the pearean Ciphers Examined" in pig. Lexington research facility. NEWSWEEK Approved For4aplease 2001/11/A08? 191_ CIA-RDP84-0049944101000090001-6 2 uG' HOAXES: The Buckley Papers They read like a conservative's an- swer to the Pentagon papers?fourteen pages of top-secret government docu- ments urging, among other propositions, a bellicose "sharp knock" strategy for winning the Vietnam war fast and an 'exemplary nuclear drop Off Haiphong harbor. Enticingly labeled "The Secret Papers They Didn't Publish," this latest glimpse into the Washington policymak- ing process was served up last week in William F. Buckley Jr.'s National Review, accepted as fact?at least briefly?at the highest levels of government and repub- lished by newspapers and wire services all across the country. The only trouble was it wasn't so. The day after the pa- pers appeared, Buckley himself pro- claimed the whole thing an .elaborate hoax that he and his jolly staffers had fashioned "ex nillilo"--!out of absolutely .lielcar proposal was the biggest '- Buckley papers, but not the . he "documents," variously at- tributed to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and re- tired Adm. Arthur Radford, among oth- ers, also proposed closing Haiphong and Sihanoukville harbors, destroying North Vietnam's dikes, thermal power plants and rail links to China and "neutralizing". ' China's Hainan Island. All of which, Buckley insisted, was kidding on the square?a hoax designed to show "that the Pentagon and the CIA are not com- posed of incompetents . . . [and] that forged documents would be widely ac- cepted as genuine provided their con- tent was inherently plausible." Blandly Buckley added: "We admit that we Proceeded in something of an ethical vacuum." Denial: What not even Buckley reck- oned on was the credulity of his audi- ence?including principal characters in his "papers." Of the authors named in the series; only Daniel J. Boorstin, now director of Washington's National Muse- um of History and Technology, flatly denied he had authored the paper attrib- uted to him. "I can't verify that I wrote L. WILLIAM F. (3U(KLEYJR Gag: The mileage was considerable for a gag batched only two weeks be- fore, at a Review dinner at Buckley's el- egant New York apartment. Accordin to his sister Priscilla, National Review's ? managing editor, Buckley broke into a discussion of the Pentagon papers with a puckish, "Hey, gang, what if ..." Within 24 hours the project was under way. Five staffers, including Buckley, did the writing. A decoy cover went to press; the real cover, bannering the papers, was substituted only at the last moment. 'Buckley himself did the final pencil edit- ing, and, after letters of warning had been sent out to 6,000 friends of the magazine, flew off to California to wait for the fun to begin. He chanced to be on the telephone to his office when The New York Times's managing editor, A.M. Rosenthal, called him to .ask about the . National Review pseudo-secrets. "Tell Mr. Rosenthal that I'm hiding with Dan- iel Ellsberg," Buckley instructed his secretary gleefully. "I'm sure he knows where to find me." To be sure, not everyone: was laugh- ing. A number of critics sharply ques- tioned the propriety of telling the world that the U.S. had contemplated the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam?or, for that matter, of joking about nuclear weapons at all. But Buckley, as usual, had a ready .answer. "Any intelligent person who reads this," he told NEWS- WEEK'S Tom Mathews, "is going to say to himself, 'II Dean Rusk didn't disavow these papers, if Admiral Radford didn't, and if the Defense Department didn't, there must be something in them that's serious'." Conrad ? 1071, Los Ar400e5 Times 'We admit that we proceeded in something of an ethical vacuum' any such memorandum," Rusk told newsmen. "It's entirely possible that I did." Fumbled former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow: "All I can say is that the memo expresses -my views. I don't know for sure if and when I wrote it." The authenticity of the papers was hardly questioned?by the government or the press. Forewarned by Boorstin's denial, The New York Times ran a cau- tiously worded report on page 4. But several newspapers front-paged the sto- ry, the TV networks played it straight, the Voice of America broadcast it over- seas and both United Press international and Associated Press moved it nation- wide?with AP later finding itself forced to break in on its own straight-faced follow-up story on the papers to move a bulletin on Buckley's confession. The Justice Department, battle-weary after its vain attempt to suppress the first batches of Pentagon papers, said it would investigate this set, too. But at least one high-ranking Pentagon official declared the documents authentic ("There must be some counter-leak- ors"), another conscientiously wrote the comment "Good!" beside the nuclear "drop" proposal. The gist of Buckley's "secret" even reached all the way to the President, as part of his daily White House news digest. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved Nur.,Release 200114,1708R d6e44DP84-00496R001000090001-6 A7 liar? ? - Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired for his good common sense, has offered a good common- sense proposal to the Congress, namely, that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central Intelligence-Agency to keep the "germane" committees of the Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of "analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the intelligence gathered by that agency. The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Con- gress is entitled to the same information that the executive receives in order to pass considered judgments on matters pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surpris- ingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dis- semination of CIA-gathered intelligence to Congress, but neither does it require that Congress be informed. So, by a familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Con- gress out in the cold to scrounge around and get what intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of the exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to start wars and when to end them. Of course it retains the power of the purse, but few members of either House are courageous enough to stop a war by withholding .funds-- it leaves them open to the accusation that they are letting down "our boys," which can prove fatal at election time. Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would have limited Congressional circulation, It would be made available to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, whose members could pass along pertinent portions to other legislators and staff mem- bers working on national security matters, subject to the normal security requirements. Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under the present arrangoinent. The President, for his purposen leaks a CIA report to, say, The New York Times on, say, the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government. 'Does the Presider' ea:1 in the reporters and tell them candidly that here -rA report of general interest which I am divulging to at on? He does nothing of the kind ,--he would rather the leaking game. That is one reason why the ekecattve prefers to hoard the information and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able to leak it when it serves his purpose to do so. The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The Congress and the public are denied information on which vital decisions are based. The denial appLes not only to military information but substantially to all data except what the executive chooses to share, which is always what will benefit him politically by enhancing his image and making him look, if not infallible, at least pretty close to it. The effect is to multiply errors as well as to hide them. The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from the public and the press. Senator Cooper has taken an important first steo- to limit the secrecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations. His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy alai' .save us, from involvement in another Indochina mess. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 BALTIDOR3 IIEWS MIMIC Approved Fotillielease 2001/11?15841da-M60184-004410001000090001-6 Rif .11:11-L' 1.1 ir1 Li ,*-in re3s" 1 61- rq 51 CIA C CIA officials are very concerned about. a DM Senate_ move to require their secretive agency to give detailed global intelligence to congressional committees on a regular_ basis. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings this :September on a con- troversial measure that would greatly expand the number of senators who have access to classified CIA evabiations.and information. The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, would require the CIA to brief the full Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a routine schedule, similar to the system under which the agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the executive branch. ALAR:)IED CIA OPFICIALS view the proposal potentially jeopardizing their clandestine operations around the world. There are 110 con- gressmen on those four committees, and that's a lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying quietly to have the measure killed, - The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its influence over Presidential foreign policy-making, and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that goal. The measure already has considerable sup- porters, including Majority Leader Mike Mans- field, Foreign Relations Committee Chairriiiin J. William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the only senator on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. The CIA now reports only to five special sub- committees of the I louse and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Ap- propriations Committees. Those groups are con- 'corned-primarily with the CIA budget and opera- tions. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright Approved For Release 2 birilellTPLYS Or other congressmen whose major interest is in the field of foreign policy. SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are askedlo authorize and fund Presidential decisions that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat but are told little more than the generill public about the information and analyses that prompted those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to. discover from the papers that the CIA had warned : President Johnson full-scale bombing of North . Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up. CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the temptation of. leaking ? and perhaps misinter- preting ? snatches of information that serve their own political purposes or can get them publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee in particular has long had a reputation for being a sieve. . But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no worse at keeping secrets than the \t'hile house itself. it is common practice for White House and State Department officials to-leak classified docty meals and secret foreign intelligence when it: suits their purpose. Fon instance, the administration recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new Soviet missile sites to help generate support for military budget items. Even so, the administration keeps 'reasonably tight control over the number of officials who have access to CIA intelligence and who have per- Mission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate moments. Congress has no such control Oyer its members, and the odds that an individual con- gressman might make a grievous error hi judg- ment about what is safe to make public are not inconsiderable, 1 DP84-00499R001000090001- *.tIATIC"..t1;ii! Approved Fohlklease 2001/X1i/0NRC1187PRDP84-0049t0601000090001-6 The is sing DAfemor anti a 19624966 II I.C rIkri 1.1. 1 t fl}r ,r1 Ltiu'.fJ_) rirrii1(0 r.t"f"-1r (m. II? 9 ?LLIQPI.ogi.1:1Egl Strategy and counterstrategy from highly classified documents not published by the New York Times and the Washington Post, leaked to NATIONAL REVIEW c (6 /nri'C i1!1 3E-pfc3 A r) In early September, 1964, President Johnson appointed a special inter-departmen- tal, inter-agency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (the date of US recogni- tion of Boo Dal, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The com- mittee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion and due for decision in the first week of October. "(was the normal practice of such committees, special or standing, as it was of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach final agreement on a single report through discussion and, when. necessary, com- promise of. any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however, tWo members----not named, but 'identified as from the Air Force and-CIA?de- clined to endorse the report, and insisted on submitting a "minority" document, not so much disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is not clear whether this -appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen by the President. .1. As in numerous other reports, mem- oranda and recommendations drawn up since 1951 for.JCS, NSC, SD, the:Pres- ident, various ad hoc committees, etc., .the report of OVERLOOK fails to ac- cept the implications of its own data and analysis, and therefore cannot servo as a correct guide for policy and plans. 2. From 1950 on, the nature and sig- nificance of US interest in Southeast Asia have been repeatedly stated, with.. out essential dispute. E.g.: illemorcaulum from Secretary of De- fense McNamara to President Ken- nedy, 8 Nov 1961: ". . . The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatrick and 1 . . . are inclined to recommend that we do com- mit the United States to the clear ob- jective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the neces- sary military action. . . . If we act in -this way, the ultimate possible extent? of our military -commitment must be faced. . . ."- Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to .President Kennedy, 11 Nov 1961: a) UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTER? ESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. The loss of South Vietnam to Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 E;t D ro v e d For ne ar 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049901000090001-6 Communism would iN3tve?tne trans er ? an harass the Administration. . A memorandum from Secretary of f of a nation of 20 million people from the. free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any further disafssion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would: have to face the near certainty that the remainder- of Southeast Asia. and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incor- poration with the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South October 1964: "The US ac- cepted the commitment to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. To make good on that commitment, the JCS (and other, relevant agen- cies) have periodically pro- posed military, pa-ea-military, political, psychological, etc.. measures. "Invariably the measures ac- tually approved have been drastically sealed down, in both quantity and quality, from those proposed. In every case the reduced measures have failed to achieve the assigned objectives. This failure was predictable, and was in fact in a number of instances pre- dicted, but no conclusion was ever drawn for future opera- tions. On the contrary, the failures were rationalized, and the same process repeated at the next stage." Vietnam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. . . . The loss of South Vietnam would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Vietnam would stimulate bit- ter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by ex- treme elements to divide the country b) TIM UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN sourti VIETNAM. The United States should commit it- self to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communist [sic]. ? Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs - of Stall to Secretary of Defense McNa- mara, 13 Jan. 1962; transmitted to Pres- ident Kennedy 27 Jan without endorse- . . . MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. a. Early Eventualities?Loss of. the Southeast Asian mainland would have an adverse impact on our military strat- egy and would markedly reduce our ability in limited war by denying us air, land and sea bases, by forcing greater intelligence effort With lesser results, by complicating' military lines of commu- nications and by the introduction of more formidable enemy forces in the area. Air access and access to 5,300 miles of mainland coastline would be outflanked, the last significant United Kingdom Military strength in Asia would be eliminated with the loss of Singapore and Malaya and United States military influence in that, area, short of war, would be difficult to exert. b. Possible Eventualities?Of equal importance to the immediate losses are the eventualities which could follow the loss of the Southeast Asian mainland. All of the Indonesian archipelago could come under the domination and control of the USSR. and would become a Communist base posing a threat to Australia and New Zealand. The Sino- Soviet bloc would have control of the eastern access to the Indian Ocean. The Philippines and Japan could be pres- sured to assume, at best, a neutralist role, thus eliminating two of our major bases in the Western Pacific. Our lines of defense then would be pulled north to Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan, result- ing in the subsequent overtaking of our lines of communications in a limited war. India's ability to remain neutral would be jeopardized and, as the bloc meets success, its concurrent stepped-up activities to move- into and control Af- rica can be expected. . . Defense McNamara to President John- son on "South Vietnam," 16 Mar 1964, and an NSC Action Memorandum (22) on. "United. States Objectives in South. Vietnam," 17 Mar 1964, restate_ the analysis- and objectives,. and- stress the added. fact that the. United States commitment .to date "accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam "The enemy will be able to ad- just and adapt to owf.i-oexe- mental escalation, no matter how high an absolute level it reached, so long as the pressure is increased only by slow and gradual 'steps. ..." - not only in Asia but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam con- flict is regarded as a test case of United States capacity to help a nation. to meet the Communist `war of liberation.' " 3. Based on these premises, the US accepted the commitment to prevent a. Communist takeover of South Vietnam. To make good on that commitment, the JCS (and other relevant agencies) has periodically proposed military, para? military, political, psychological,. etc.. measures. 4. Invariably the measures actually approved have been drastically scaled down, in both quantity and quality, from those proposed. In every case the reduced measures have failed to achieve. the assigned objectives. This failure was predictable, and was in fact in a num- ber of instances predicted; but no con-, elusion was ever drawn for future op- erations. On the. contrary,_ the failures were rationalized, and the same process . repeated at the next stage. 5. What has been at issue here has ? been, at bottom, a basic conflict be- tween two strategic concepts: a) the strategy of what the Secretary of De- fense has termed "graduated response," or what might be designated "incre- mental escalation"; b) the strategy of CLOSSARY (3i: TERMS CIYI---Covernment of (North) Vietnam (in South Vietnam) Cli.'N---Covernment of (South) Vietnam M.?Patrol 'Boat, Fast ' AFTI2--Technical Research Vessel JCS--Joint Chiefs- of Staff P3-A---Patrol Aircraft !t'0--Army - of (South) Vic:foam IST?Landing Ship, Transport SO---Secretary of Defense ellicorn---Communist China NSF?Mine-Sweeper, Fast SEA--South East Asia ClfiC.IY,C---Commander in Chief, Pacific IiiIF?National Liberation Front' 55?Submarine Cl-iC--Cornrnunist Party of China On Southl ii etn a rn) SO..?Soviet Union .1..--- ...S tof,r FSC?National Se.ourity Council S'4:1--South Vietnam W.1?Dernocranc Republic of (North) Vietnam BVI!--North Vietnam S2--Anti Subma rine EIXIT---Electronic Interceptor001C-? ef, West Pacific Approved For Release Pc6'-r-Pc?P'001/71111708Y: taK-RDP84-004813R001c000000 Approved ForWlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004941401000090001-6 what. the JCS has termed "the sharp knock," or what might be designated "quantum escalation." 6. The strategy of graduated re- spcmse has been folloWed, in practice, to date. It has failed, at each stage to achieve its immediate ,or promote its longer-term objective, and is thus .proved deficient by experience. Its in- adequacy can readily be demonstrated by general considerations. As the JCS has pointed out, the slowly increasing pressures of the "graduated response" strategy deprive the US of the military effects on the enemy of surprise and .shock, and enable him to adjust to the slow quantitative and qualitative in- crease of pressure. There is no reason to predictthat this situation could -"The internal conflict cannot be resolved without knocking NVN out of the war." change in the foreseeable future. The enemy will be able to adjust and adapt , to our incremental escalation, no mat- ter how high an absolute level is reached, so long as the pressure is in- creased only by slow and gradual steps. 7. The liquidation of internal con- flict in SVN, and the consolidation of a -viable, self-sufficient non-Communist regime able to . stand on its own feet politically, militarily, and economically is necessarily a long-term process (cf. Malaya). it does not, however, require a major American military presence. I3ut the internal conflict cannot be re- solved without knocking NVN out of the war, since it is NVN (with the backing and support of the USSR and the Chicoms) that commands and con- trols the internal SVN struggle, and is the primary source of arms, supplies, training; rcgroupment, and, to an in- creasing -extent, personnel. To succeed in the long-term task of the liquidation of the internal subversion, NVN must be compelled to stop, or reduce to a minimum level, its intervention in the south. This can be done only by a "sharp knock'' or succession of knocks delivered with a form and suddenness to which NVN cannot adjust and adapt, and which, will present the GNVN with "Demonstration- drop of nuclear device . . . followed by use of ? nuclear bombs and devices where militarily suitable." a prospect in face of which it will choose to give up its objective of taking over SVN, in preference to risking its Own destruction. 8. The conclusion follows that the US must abandon the strategy of grad- uated response and shift ,to the "sharp knock" (quantum escalation) strategy in relation to NVN. This will mean adoption of one or more, as necessary and in rapid succession, of the sharply escalated measures that have been pro- posed and studied, and for which con- tingency plans have long existed. E.g.: a) Closing- of Haiphong and Siha- noukvil le harbors, and blockade of NVN and Cambodian coast. b) _Rapid destruction of all. NVN thermal power installations. c) Destruction .of rail lines linking NVN and China. d) Destruction of Red. River dikes and irrigation systems, thus of primary NVN food source. e) Neutralization of Hainan. f) Demonstration drop of nuclear device, as projected (cf. memorandum from Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman JCS, to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 26 May 1954, and supporting exhibits), followed by use of nuclear bombs and devices where militarily suitable, if GNVN does not respond. . . . 9. It is of the essence of the proposed strategic shift that each operation should be massive and concentrated, to ensure a III aXi mum psychological as well as physical effect. 10. The objective with respect to NVN would be constantly and publicly reiterated: that NVN end its interven- tion in SVN. It would be made clear that US operations against NVN (and NVN personnel in SVN) 'would cease as soon as the GNVN agreed to end the intervention, or showed in action that it was bringing the intervention to an end. There is every reason to assume that this objective so stated will present US policy in the most favorable form from the point of view.' of most other nations. 11. The course and nature of the conflict demonstrate that the - US can achieve its declared objective only by adoption of a strategic approach along the lines herein proposed, which are moreover in keeping with US combat tradition. This has been recognized by many for some while, especially within "If, for whatever reason, it is decided to be paramountly un- desirable to adopt such a strategy the US should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible." .Y1 the military and intelligence structures. There remains to draw the final, and logically inescapable, conclusion: that if, for whatever reason, it is decided to be,paramountly undesirable to adopt such a strategy?and therefore as a consequence impossible to achieve our objective?the US should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible. . .1j3irirdroo.:1._g9(341,r, rrrii.c6 ? lin .r.30 O i ,..4::IligraF.A N V.r/1111-{1 L:2c,;:jec:.'(.1:6:kiy(")?oa.niiilico-., This planning memorandum, originating in the office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security, was circulated by the Secretary of Defense to a num- ber of high-ranking officials in. rhe Pentagon, in the last week of December, 1964. TO: OSI) FROM: ISA RE: International repercussions of pro- jected overt armed intervention in SVN 1. The public meaning of US armed intervention in VN can be established only in a global rather than a merely regional context. Whatever we say or do will be interpreted by the world either as a US betrayal of one of its Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 'PA'rvt!ityrinA allies, or as a US act of agg"ressm,4111,. alternatively, as artVRIV'lki}si e -APT4-1.1 :eae 2001/11/08 : since .1.9o3 treaty obligations and a justified len- tion to Communist aggression. . 2. The global context is established by two historical facts: the global na- ture of the Communist threat, and the global system of Free World defenses against it. The Communist threat is global because the Communists speak and think_ of their ultimate goal in terms of all mankind; also because each na- tion falling victim to Communist ex- pansion is seen by other nations not as having been brought into this or that sphere of regional influence but rather as having been subjected. to totalitarian dictatorship. This fate. is understood by all other still free nations as one poten- tially threatening them, too, so that any particular Communist takeover is ex- perienced by all free, nations as a bell that tolls also for them. 3. In response to Communist aggres- sion, the US and it allies have created a system of treaties, both collective and bilateral, of which SEATO is an in- tegral part. While the treaties are not made legally dependent on each other, they are linked by the common factor of political stamina that results from the US commitment to the defense of nations exposed to Communist invasion. and subversion. The prospect of US help enables each 61 these exposed countries. to sustain its will to be free rather than to hop on the Cornmunist bandwagon "while there is still time." If any of the exposed nations felt it necessary to look on future Communist rule as a foregone conclusion and re- minded itself, either from observation or past experience, how hopeless is any internal opposition to an established totalitarian regime, a rapidly increasing number would hasten to join up today rather than tomorrow. In this interde- pendence of US commitment and the political stamina of exposed nations, the obligation of the US under the various defense treaties is like an in- ternational litmus paper: so long as the US stands by its obligations, the ex- posed countries will dare to feel secure; once the US fails an ally, the coloring: of the paper will change, and every one of our allies will. come to feel exposed, alone and ultimately doomed. 4. US global resistance to Communist expansion stems not from an arrogant desire to play policeman all over the v-a-dd but from the simple caleul, tnat not only our national security but A-RDP84-00499153145009000110Thern tier of the iollowed a policy of accommouaz.fort with the Soviet Unio:9, aud have in fae 1.-,a ejected a signifi- cold disinetio,k bet\ ,Tee,1 Asian Co,nnurisin p;td_ Russ;prt COM:P11/14Sill. llf ye, Were to COriiiITUe thiS 11110; We would bcr ourselves from prescilling the conriet in Vietnam as part of a global env-at of Commu- nism and our own action as an integral element in a global system of resistance to Con:- munist expansion. To engage in militaly action in what would then appear as a purely 'Asian' war would mean to risk not only the loss of the only justification for our action, but also the rise of a ho'Aile `Asianisin' resenting our 'white presence there." also world peace are bound up with the resistance of the exposed nations to Communism. Each new nation to fall under Communist rule swells the total resources at the disposal of that enterprise. Czechoslovakia is today So- viet-occupied, which means ti ml its arms and machines go wherever Moscow de- sires them to go. 1.f Europe and South- east Asia should fall under Communist control, the Communist bloc's power resources would so overbalance ours that our hope for survival would come to rest wholly in the potential use of our nuclear weapons. 5. If SVN should be allowed to fall to Communist insurgency while we are present but merely looking on, the first countries to draw obvious conclusions for themselves would be the divided ones, Germany and Korea. The effect of that event in SEA has been desig- nated the "domino theory." That term suggests something like an automatic or mechanical effect of the fall of SVN on its neighbors. Actually, the effect would consist of a radical re-assessment of the world situation and of the chance of anti-Communist resistance in areas contiguous to Communist-dominated territory, setting in motion strag psy- chological and political forces favoring a yielding to Communism as the "wave of the ruffire." This effect would not be confined to SEA but would also occur. Ivlicklie East., and even in parts of LA. One could expect NATO's seams to loosen or even burst; all other parts of our alliance system would be critically examined by our allies, with a stront, disposition to pull out and look for alternative shelters. 6. If, on the other handl, we inter- vene massively in Vietnam, given the global context of our commitments, repercussions may result from the geo- political character of this particular theater which might be looked upon as the wrong place. One could expect that some of our NATO allies, who rallied strongly in view of the fall of Czecho- slovakia, would not. consider the fell of SVN as a.direct threat and would take a dim view of our action there. They might even conclude, that our commit- ment in SEA takes away from the atten- tion we can give to European security. 7. The same considerations would have applied!. to Korea. In that case, we obtained not only the consent but the active participation of a goodly part of our allies. We succeeded in this because we based our intervention in Korea not on regional strategic motivations but on global ones: both the global threat of Communism, and also the desire, with- in the UN framework of collective se- curity, to punish "aggression" in the abstract. The Korean experience should warn us not to present the conflict in Vietnam in a mere regional context but continuously to emphasize its global significance. In a merely regional con- text, our intervention there would also look to many as if it were an act of imperialism. 8. It follows that the most important "In this interdependence of US commitment and the politi- cal stamina of 0,-posed nations, the obligation of the US under the various defense treaties is like an international litmus paper: so long as the US stands by its obligations, the exposed countries will dare to feel Secure; once the US fails an ally, the coloring of the paper will change, and every one of our allies will come to feel exposed, alone and uliimately , Goomou.? Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 .POit tailed repercussion of' APPir9eYWo9ir -Vietnam is bound to occur in our own relations with the Soviet Union. Since 1963 we have followed a policy of ac- commodation with the ?Soviet Union, and have in fact projected a significant . distinction between Asian Communism lease 2001/11/A8 : CIA-RDP84-0049 ano misstan uommurnsm, it we were ?to Qontinue this line, we would bar ourselves from presenting the conflict in Vietnam as part of a global threat of Communism and our Own action as an integral element in a global system of resistance to Communist expansion. *01000090001,8 - .o engage in military action in what, would then appear as a purely "Asian" war would mean to risk not only the loss of the only justification for our action, but also the rise of a hostile "Asianism" resenting our "white". pres- ence there. ? [1:DC:7,?C:701.iiii;reCir 11,13 Veaur IF,VOL7 011 IYJ Private Communication to the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, signed "DA" (Dean Acheson?). December 14, 1964 The honor of bring asked for my opin- ion on an overt military intervention in Vietnam with combat Units is highly appreciated. I am returning the classi- fied documents ? and other materials which you so kindly put at my disposal. You could not expect me. to pass on the military aspects of the projected policy. I shall confine my remarks to a few ideas about the political aspects. 1. The military potential of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces is bound to remain small except for out- side aid. The. Chicoms can supply light weapons, food and some fuel. Most substantial aid would come from the So- viet Union. Without Soviet help our op- erations could be kept in a very low key. 2. Soviet aid alone could raise the level of warfare to the point where both its scope and duration would turn into a problem of first magnitude, both internationally and on the homefront. Our relations with the Soviet Union and our chances of minimizing Soviet aid to North Vietnam are therefore of vital importance in the entire picture. . 3. Since 1 963 we have been engaged on a?course of accommodation with the Soviet Union, to the point where we have accorded quite differential treat- ment to Communism' in Russia as dis- tinct from Communism in China. We have publicly stated that the Cold War is ended and that we consider the So- viet Union a power wholly committed to the cause of peace. 4. If we were to engage our military . forces in Vietnam and at the same time to cling to this line of accommodation With the SU, we would find ourselves in an extremely weak diplomatic position vis-a-vis Soviet aid to Vietnam. We would be compelled practically to ig- nore that aid and would be deprived of diplomatic leverage for its reduction. 5. Even more serious consequences could result on the homefront, and in relations with our European and Asian allies. If we make a significant distinc- tion between Communism of Moscow and Communism of Peiping, .and call the first one our friend and the second our enemy, the impression must result "My considered opinion is that as long as we are unwilling to discontinue the policy of ac- commodation with the Soviet Union, we should not involve our forces in overt fighting in Vietnam... . We should put the blame for a breal:down of the pattern of agreements and cooperation on the shoulder of the Soviet Union and hold out the prospect of returning to that pattern hi the same measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam will he reduced." that in Vietnam we are not fighting Communism. but rather China, or, what is even WOrSe, the Liberation forces of Vietnam. It will be impossible :then to make sense of this war, for we have no urgent direct national interests that would ,bid us go to war against Viet- nam, or even China. Vietnam, like Ko- )Tea, is a far-away place, and the only way in which US armed intervention there can be justified is in terms of the global threat of Communism. 6. if we continue the Course of ac- commodation with the Soviet Union, we would also feel ourselves inhibited from taking military steps that would keep Soviet aid from reaching North 'Vietnamese forces, e.g. closing ports of entry to Soviet ships. 7. My considered opinion is that as long as we are unwilling to discontinue the policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we should not involve our forces in overt fighting in -Vietnam. 8. If the decision, however, should be made in favor of overt intervention in Vietnam, I urge very strongly that we make it clear to the Soviet Union that we are doing so in response to a Com- munist violation of the status quo in SEA, that we would react with equal determination to a violation of the sta- tus quo in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, and that wecannot have one policy in Europe and another in Asia. We should. put the blame for a break- down of the pattern of agreements and cooperation on the shoulder of the So- viet Union and hold out the prospect of returning to that pattern in the same. measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam will be reduced. As programs and pol- icies adopted since 1962/3 are being dismantled one after the other, we should do this in close consultation with our NATO allies and with flank- ing operations in the 9. The overriding purpose of this shift in our policy to the Soviet Union. .should be a double one: a) to minimize Soviet aid to Vietnam, and b) to keep before the eyes of the world and of our people the meaning of this war, which is the containment of Communist Im- perialism. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved Foriftease 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-0049"1000090001-6 e",1 71 1K17,)? Excerpt from Confidential Memorandum .prepared by 'Douglas Pike and Frank Trager at the request of Assistant Secretary of State William I'. Bundy, July, 1964. 1. The widespread- impression exists that the conflict-process in Vietnam is a civil war on the traditional model among and/or between contending lo- cal factions. This is an illusion. Unless the fundamental novelty of the Viet- namese situation is understood, no gen-. cral support for the war on the. part of the American public can be anticipated. The authors of this memorandum would like to put particular stress on the factor of novelty, 2. The familiar term Viet Cong, a contraction of Viet Nam Cong San, ine.aning Vietnamese Communist, is im- precise. In itself, the term Viet Cong is a barrier to the understanding. 3. The so-called Viet Cong actually consists of three interlocking but dis- tinct elements: 1) the People's Revolu- tionary Party, or Communist Party of Vietnam, 2) the Liberation Army and 3) the National Liberation Front, corn- prised of some twenty or more socio- political entities. 4. One aspect of the `Inovelly factor" concerns the history of the National 1 ilv.ration Front, or NLF. Unlike pre- "fronts," such as the Popular Front of the 1930s and '40s, the NUT? structure came into being in 1960 be- fore there were any entities for the ?"front" to, so to speak, front for. When it was founded. on December 20, 1960 --incidentally, in Hanoi pursuant to a decision taken at the 15th meeting of the Lao Doug (Communist Party) Central Committee in May, 1959?it was correctly considered a phantom entity, 'existing only on paper. Grad- ually,, however, the paper design was fleshed out. 5. A key fact& in the fleshing out of the paper skeleton. of tile NLF was the announcement, early in 1960, of Soviet support for so-called "national wars of liberation." 'Phis meant that dissident factions within any underdeveloped na- tion would have maximum Soviet sup- port when they could mount an insur- gency. In effect, the policy of support- US, in the sense' that the Soviet Union was saying that it would employ its full military and political resources to upset the balance of power in 'vitalsectors of the world. 6. Returning to Vietnam, the military- political thrust there must be fully un- derstood. Let us take each of the tln-r -e interlocking elements separately. 7. The Natibnal Liberation Front, or NIX, consists of administrative and functional elements. a) The administrative st7ructure is in essence an alternative government. It is hierarchical in nature, with the. NIX Central Committee at the apex. Lines of command run down through inter- vening administrative committees to ad- ministrative groups operative at the vii- "A key facor in the fleshing out of the paper skeleton of the NLF was the an.uounecinent, early in 1930, of Soviet stipport for so-called 'national wars of liberation.' ... effect, the policy of supporting 'D at i on al wars of liberation' was a Soviet declaration of war . against the US." lage level. This is the administrative central nervous system of the National Liberation Front. b) The functional units comprise such groups as the Workers' Liberation Association, the Women's Liberation Association, the Youth Liberation As- sociation, the Student Liberation Asso- ciation, the Cultural Liberation Associ- lion (school teachers, librarians, etc.), the Patriotic and Democratic .T.ournal- ists' Association, as well as externally- oriented groups such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee. This structure is disciplined and subject to tight control by the NLF Central Com- mittee. the Southern Branch of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Hang, Lao Dong). At that time it changed its name to the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, with tighter organizational control by the DRV Communist hier- archy in Hanoi. The PRP is not the .only political clement in the NU:, but it is the domir one. The PRP is de- scribed as "ti. of the NL1.?, the "engine of the ?.,lution," the "van- guard." It ? has "fraternal ties" with Communist parties elsewhere.: 9. The NLF, dominated by the PRP, thus constitutes 'a partly indigenous ' southern structure, an alternative gOV- ernment, with chain-of-command rela- tions to the DRV hierarchy in the North. 10. The Liberation Army of the Nil? consists of two elements, a Full Mili- tary Force and a Paramilitary Force. The former is usually referred to as the Main Force, sometimes as the "hard hatsv (because of the fibre-board Viet Minh helmets wor)), and consists of some 75-80,000 regular troops. The Paramilitary Force, or guerrillas, about three times that number, is comprised of both men and women. The Paramili- tary Force itself consists of two types of guerrilla: a) the .classic guerrilla band, operating in a remote area, and b) the Local Guerrilla, a part-time fighter who may work by day and carry out guerrilla actions at night. 11. The objective of all three elements described above is political power. The political goals are identical to those of Communist parties elsewhere. The Nil? is most accurately understood not as an indigenous South Vietnamese phenome- non but as an administrative arm of the DRV extending itself South through political-military pressure and organiza- tion, 12. NLF popularity was at its pinnacle in 1962-63, but since that time has dropped precipitously. NLF village cadres have increasingly exhibited para- noiac behavior with regard to the pos- sible prese.nce of "spies." Prisoners freed by allied troops from NIX jails have told harrowing stories of "jus- ing "national wars erat tice" in the villages. Villarrers can now Soviet declaration c4hri9va0 " was a 8. Until January, 1962 the Commumst i,FRrigPlelaPPy2,40411tilaactiCtA4RDP844:10499RDOIDOD0910001Aacc?R-ling to 1\11:F .a0;r1f. rrti ?directives. The, yil "thought reform sessions," the increas- ing tax levies and the conscripting of young men into the Liberation Army. Of local supporters of the NLF, :it is certain that . a very high proportion. should be classified ,as -unwilling sup- porters. The secret of .continuing NLF -strength in the countryside is efficient organization, plus the poor communica- tions with the central government char- acteristic of Vietnamese society at its present stage of -development. 13. No certainty exists as to how the NIX would behave if it succeeded in wresting power from the Saigon gov- ernment. Based on its current adminis- trative structure, it would be expected to establish a totalitarian structure closely linked with that of DRV. Based on experience elsewhere, a struggle might be anticipated within the emerg- ing NEE regime- between guerrilla ele- ments, or sonic of them, and the central apparatus. Given the disposition of power within the PRP, dissident guer- woyx41Fc*Itelease200,14-11/Z8 CIA-RDP844104M1Vompppl-g plain. '1 lie CS 0.1)- "NE;jr.i' cadres have in- creasingly cAsthitcd paranoiac behavior wila regard to the possible prese!ce of `viies.' Prisoners freed by allied troops fron, PLC, jails Lave told borrowing sta.ies of 'justice' in the villages. Villagers can now be shot on the spot according to di,:ectives." fLI rillas and other dissident elements might be expected to lose this struggle. The central apparatus would have the poli- tical and military backing of the DRV government in Hanoi. 14. 'Hie -authors of this memorandum would now like to move beyond the de- scriptive into the projective. a) Clearly, the first question must be: What will be the fate of the non- Communist government of South Viet- nam if the United States does nothing? lished NET organization, controlled by the Communist North and backed by the ?Soviet 'Union and Communist China, will make the country ungov- ernable. The techniques for accomplish- ing this 'are well-known. b) Suppose the United States pur .sues the course of protracted conflict, shoring up the Saigon regime, but at the same time providing enough muscle -for the Saigon regime to make -signifi- cant progress against the NI-13? it must be clear here that the DRV can match US input in such a way as to neutralize it. Diversionary attacks will be carried out at various points to tie down the US forces. Meanwhile, the protracted conflict will be incon- clusive. 15. From the above, One :conclusion seems inescapable.- The _conflict in the South cannot be successfully- concluded unless the North is definitively pre- vented from -sustaining its political and/ or military structure in the South. ? " t II 11 i ik-D iJ 'C'_,;J r..:!"2 (3 11?0 L `-7]1?J-If S'El''-j:0 ? cpr(E cAP N el] 11 Private letter from Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to "Vietnam 1957- 1961, to Secretary of State Dean Ru.s.k, dated August 10: 1966. .Dear Mr.- Secretary, Our presence in Vietnam and our commitment to the objective of keeping South Vietnam from falling to the Com- munists are continuously assailed by the charge that we are in fact preventing a 'people from achieving its unity and the -National Liberation Front from carry- ing out an essentially patriotic job. Is there no way of making clear to the ? world that -national liberation is a cause that Communists have exploited re- peatedly to establish their rule? You know that in Vietnam two movements for gaining national liberty ? have existed since the early Thirties: one Communist and the other national- ist:You remember, of course, that dur- ing the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia there also emerged Mibailovich and Tito, a genuinely nationalist and a Corn- - mrmist liberation movement; in that case, the British and we backed the ? wrong horse, as it turned out later. At present, the Communists still maintain sleeper liberation movements in Malay- sia and the Philippines, after the nation- alistic forces beat them in the struggles of the Fifties, Incidentally, a specially instructive case is Byelorussia, where the Communists first created a national liberation movement, then got into .power with the help of it, and finally crushed it with 'much bloodshed. It seems that national liberation is a game in which many players can participate, .and with different motives. The actual term "National Liberation Front" seems to have been_ the exclusive property of "A specially instructive case is Byelorussia, where the Com- munists first created a natiohal liberation mOVCIlleilt, then got into power with the help of it, and finally crushed it with much :bloodshed." Communist' organizations in Greece, Yemen, Venezuela and other places. The Communists have long ago em- braced the principle that there are cer- tain "holy" causes to which people will flock, and that these causes can and must be put at the service of the Com- munist strategy. Since _1949, they have skillfully exploited the "peace" move- ment. Even . earlier, they put the strong _pulling power of "anti-fascism" before their wagon, and "national liberation" as well as the peasants' hunger for land have been their special mounts ever since Lenin's days. A Communist-run National Libera- tion Front is nothing but a special branch of Cominunist military, para- military and_ administrative machinery that uses- and misuses the patriotism of honest people for its ultimate partisan purposes. In this day of "accommodation" with the Soviet Union, has it become diplo- matically impossible to remind the -world of these truths? . Sincerely yours, Elbridge Dnirbrow Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Cohttoned Memorandum of Special CIA Task Force on Soviet Posture in the event. of US Armed Intervention in Sfl.N. (Requested by White House in May, 1964. DeliVered and. filed June 12.) SUMMARY Probable reaction of SU to open mili- tary intervention by US armed forces in SVN: 1. The Soviet Union presently oper- ates under the strategy formulated by various Party documents publishe,d in November, 1957, December, 1960, and November, 1961 (Tab. 0. These docu- ments contain the Party's official ap- praisal of the world situation and stra- tegic directives for?the present. period. They resemble similar documents pre- viously adopted. in 1920, 1928, 1935, each of which was held .binding until the adoption of its successor. 2. The present strategy commits the SU to avoiding an all-out nuclear con- flict with the West, also to avoiding "local wars" which might lead to a general conflict, but on the other hand to taking "a most positive attitude" toward "national liberation, wars" and "popular uprisings." (Khrushchev's speech, Ian. 6, 1961, Tab. II.) This pat- tern, called "peaceful cb-existencc," is meant to be accompanied by sharply intensified "ideological struggle." It en- visages great internal tensions and pres- sures occasioned in Western countries ongoing "national liberation wars" and looks on them as opportunities for Communists to enter into coalitions with Social Democrats, pacifists, pro- gressive and liberal forces, and others generally opposed to present Western policies, and through such coalitions to obtain control of this or that Western government. 3. The strategy thus has a military and a political dimension, the latter being a design to help Communists achieve what they call "peaceful transi- tion from capitalism to socialism," which in turn, depends on. Communist governmental control attained without the cost of war. The takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 has convinced Soviet leadership that the way into governmental power with 'die help of a general leftist coalition is feasible and in general the surest- way to a Com- munist triumph. They arc not likely to jeopardize their great expectations in this regard for anything less than an international emergency. 4. The Soviet Union mif,ht break this entire policy pattern if it were faced by a direct military or political threat to its home base. Overt US inter- vention in Vietnam, however, will rath- er confirm the Soviet adherence to the present strategy. Not even a US military victory in SEA is likely to provoke the Soviet Union to a direct nuclear threat against the US, or to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Vietnam theater. 5. The resort to serious diversions (Berlin? Middle East? LA?) would lie athwart the main line of the new stra- tegy which aims to ill ak e Communists acceptable to potential coalition part- tiers. One may assume, -therefore, that. even in the presence of overt. US mili- tary action in VN, the Soviets will be. disposed to play the game of "accom- modation" as they have done since 1962/3. 6. One should assume that for rca- sons of political exploitation Moscow is interested in the longest possible dur- ation cif a war in VN, The SU is likely to furnish IL:, with substantial arms, escalating its Hartionately to the : rise of our n, -..1.11reS, and. en- abling Hanoi to ly..yond guerrilla warfare to "stage )ii"---conventional warfare---which according to Maoist principles is alone suitable for bringing a war to a victorious conclusion. 7. Only a war of long duration will enable Soviet propaganda to exploit the situation fully with a view to the eventual developments of domestic politics mentioned under (2). The goal of a Soviet propaganda campaign of long duration would be to identify the US government and its allies in SVN with imperialism, racism, militarism, fascism and aggression, and to alienate the US government from the people. 8. The Sino-Soviet' conflict will con.- tribute to keeping Soviet aid to the DRV vigorous but inconclusive. A DRY victory attributable mainly to Chinese help can be as little in Moscow's in- 'crest as a DRV. defeat attributable to insufficient Soviet aid. Moscow is pres- ently in no position to deny Peiping strong influence in the area and, for ideological reasons, will not withhold a certain amount. of practical cooperation with China, in regard to the DRY. nri,-.rdnilaini o UE.m4c, `ireLIc N, Vravini Cora tcri' CC) Me11701011C11/111 of Special CIA Task Force on Chicom Posture in event of US Armed Intervention in SVN. (Requested by White House in May, 1964. Delivered and filed June 7.) S'UAIMA RY J.. China intervened in the second phase of the Korean war when the North Korean army was on the point of being annihilated; her intervention eventually served to save North Korea and estab- lish the cease-fire line near the 38th parallel, it should be assumed that China is likely to intervene directly in the Vietnam war only if. and when the forces of the DRV are on the point of total defeat. 2. Even then, the situation HOW is Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved Arklease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004M001000090001-6 not what it was in 1951. Internal events in China have put severe limitations on the regime's ability for external action: a) The CPC is deeply split between the adherents of Mao and the regular Party apparatus; Mao, ' who still has charismatic leadership, has nevertheless been put OD a siding. b) Widespread disaffection prevails in the countryside as evidenced by the 29 issues of Kung-tso Tung hsiin (the Red Army Bulletin) which recently fell into our hands (Tab. I) c) The Sino-Soviet split compels the Peiping regime to count on the possibil- ity of a military conflict with the Soviet Union, which automatically puts a two- :front prospect on any military venture 17'41. [ a'',; r 11 11 ri I 11 December ? 1963 TO: Secretary of Defense; Pentagon FROM: head, Division of Psychological Assessment CIA Psychological Evaluation of War- fare Involvement in Southeast Asia BACKGROUND: The US has a treaty obligation in Indo- china. The wisdom of the commitment rests on the belief that US security in- terests, global and in the Pacific, will be gravely threatened if the US does not maintain a policy of containment. If the .Administration holds this is no longer true, we recommend all troops and ad- visOrs be withdrawn from Vietnam?If this belief is still held, we emphatically recommend immediate massive cscala- thin of the war effort. While it is not our function to 'prepare the form this will take militarily, it is our duty to ad- vise on the psychological consequences of war on both the Vietnamese people as well as on the American public. These we feel will, prove critical. RECOMMENDATIONS: The psychological warfare division roe- omniends Short Term 'Warfare (STV1) in: the South. d) Chinese production has been dis-. torted and severely set back by the "great leap forward." e) Peiping has reflected its awareness of -all of these limitations in a stance of great. caution, as evidenced by her -reti- cence in the Indian war, and Vis-h-vis Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 3. The Chicoms are obviously inter- ested in a protracted' duration of any war in Vietnam in which the US would be involved. China will seek_ to keep this war going by a steady flow of sub- stantial supplies, short of committing her own forces to a potential clash with US armed forces. China would draw advantages from a long war not only as she exploited the war in a propaganda campaign against the US, but also in the weakening of Hanoi and Hanoi's increasing dependence on China. The dependence could -not be greater if Chinese. troops were dispatched to the DRV 'since these troops would rather awaken the Vietnamese memory of past Chinese domination. 4. The likelihood of a Chinese com- mitment of troops to the SVN theater is further reduced because of the flank- ing threat from Taiwan, to which Chi- con's comrnuoieations and transport lines would be exposed, especially when. the US Seventh Fleet and Okinawa- based aircraft and -installations are taken into account. cif, 2' I I Li ;+'4. t?L2' 10,22(.2, CJ riti 11 - A 111 I d)e the US, the. ARVN, the Viet Gong and the North Vietnamese. long Term Warfare (LTW) will yield a no-win posture, thousands of deaths, and will have serious effects on our, as well as Saigon's, political institutions, DISCUSSION: ? A. Effects on Vietnamese Long Term Warfare (1...TW): ? The Vietnamese have already been subjected to a prolonged conflict. Killing, pillage and all the rest is already a common- place occurrence. Yet, the conflicts to date are small in size and specific in damage. They have in a. sense adapted to this continuing nuisance. LTW with continual American troop "Long Term Warr El ( TATW will yield a no-win posture, thousands of deaths, and will ? have serious effects on our, as well as Saigon's, political insti- tutions.. . .Gradual, slow escalation of the war over a period of years does not create in the Vietnamese people a sense of purpose or destiny. it ? will only create horror and depression. . . The Administra- tion should not start the Viet- namese operations if they see the war as an L'INV affair." and armory movements, bombing, search and destroy missions will have a disastrous effect on the Vietnamese population. At the present the alterna- tives for allegiance for the Vietnamese farmers are not compelling. The Viet Conk demands are contrary to their traditional values, and the Saigon gov- ernment has not been convincing in its agrarian programs. Tnr the long run troop movements criss-crossing this population will only find the Viet Cong ahead, if not by assent then by terror. Additionally, of course, there will be a great toll on the landscape and environ- mental resources of the country if LTW takes place. More specifically, the threat or pres- ence of war has obvious ill effects on a population. For those who understand the ideological issues and are commit- ted to them, the war is viewed as a necessary evil and the concomitant tragedies are endured with relatively little psychological harm. Clearly, this is a relatively small part of the Vietna- mese population. The majority live with a day-to-day philosophy and passively accept and prefer peace and quiet as a way of life over freedom, Prolonged -war will alienate this population and tend to make them incorrigible. Also the ravages of war will tend to disrupt this segment of the population more than any other. Short Term Warfare (12-24 months) .The objective of war is to win and to which will redupOtovidido so as wickly and with as little loss ioft)RWase:20011-1-1/08't CIAIRDP8-21:40-49914001 000090 01-6 coat .tnue4 Approved For Rerhse 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-00499R000090001-6 of life, property and societal stability as possible. This objective can only be achieved by a quick "In and Out" move. Gradual, -slow escalation of the war over a period of years does not create in the Vietnamese People a sense of purpose or destiny. It will only create horror and depression. With a quick and purposeful strike involving bomb- ?ing and possible invasion of the North, .the Vietnamese will respond with elm:- ity and determination. B. American Public Opinion UM: It would be an error to as- sume a protracted conflict in Southeast Asia would be supported by the Ameri- can people. Any move on the part of the US will be criticized by a large vocal minority. This minority will grow with time, for it is in the nature of the American people to wish not to be or seem to- be belligerent: When it appears there arc ambiguities in our purpose (and this state of affairs wilt surely emerge in -a war effort only abstractly involving American interests), public opinion will disengage their support gradually and completely. It is the attitude of those about to go .into the armed forces or of normally ,liberally minded youth which will turn aggressive. As their anxiety -about the faceless war grows, their hostility towards the American government and its institutions will become more in- tense. They will observe they are acting aggressively towards their own govern- ment and its policies --an attitude that they are not historically comfortable -0 (3 ir s) C,1.7.; The following 111C117011111d1M1 ('Some ObSerVOliGliS Olt the Psycho-Political Dimen- sion of the Vietnam Conflict: Enemy Operations and Internal Dissidence"), dated 12 Sep 1962 and routed pro forma to the Director, CIA, was presumably pre- pared by a covert CIA consultant (not identified except through the designator 02./34 1. Communist dodrine understands psycho-political operations to be a major weapons system, and potentially, -at least in certain instances, the decisive weapons system. In the Vietnam con- flict, the US has the capability of bring- ing to bear in the local theater an over- Nvhelining preponderance of conven- tional?not to speak of nuclear----weap- ons. This fact dictates, for the Com- munists, a high priority for the psycho- political system, since in this capability the Communists possess superiority. In terms of total strategy, psycho-political operations offer the potential of out- flanking the enemy, that is, the US. 2. It is with respect to psycho-politi- cal operations that the essentially global nature of the Conflict is most unmis- takably apparent. In routine day-by-day activities of the Communist-ruled na- tions and Communist organizations, there are divergences and disputes: cf., . most conspicuously, the Si no-Soviet ? disputes, as well as the factional and ideological fissions between and in local Communist parties and front organiza- tions. But in a struggle defined as Within their global framework-, Judo- political initiatives. against the leader4P6911401FACRPII,eaVI Q U080:rOARDP844)0499R004000139000V6 a united front of all Communist ele- ments, governments as , well as non- governmental organizations, automati- cally tends to sharpen up. The psycho- political campaign is, in sum, both global and unified. (A tight command structure and continuous liaisdn are not required, since the shared ideological foundations and historical goals assure, for the most part, a sufficient coordina- tion.) The psycho-political campaign is carried forward by and from Moscow, Peiping, Warsaw, Havana, Hanoi and even Belgrade, together with all Com- munist parties and satellite organiza- tions, Moscow-oriented, Trotskyite, Maoist, revisionist, adventurist, etc. This has been demonstrated throughout the past decade of comparatively low- profile struggle in Indochina, and will become more strikingly apparent when ?as has become probable--the strug- gle is escalated. 3. Frorn the point of view of Com- munist conflict management, psycho- political operations constitute one .di- mension or mode of their total war. with-----and to explain these actions they will conclude that all government policy is bad and its officers corrupt and im.- ? -moral. This kind of attitude develop- ment process is well .understood, and it works like clockwork: . As a result the Administration should not start the Vietnamese operations if they see the war as an LTV,' affair. STW: If the American public were .prepared for the events in and around an STW operation they would over- whelmingly support the effort. Opinion would have to be shaped as carefully as it has been done in the past (See TOP SECRET-Sens. 1987/139-- BOSEVLT--WW2). There would still he seriouscriticism of the policy but it would remain- minor if the entire event, was over within 12 to 24 months. active local theaters or fronts. The US thus should consider itself engaged in a two-front (in the larger and long-term sense, global) war. It is probable that the enemy regards territorial US as the main front. 4. Among primary objectives of Communist psycho-political operations are, and will be, the following: a) Global, long-term: Weakening of the relative power position of the US; promotion of discords between US and other nations, especially allied nations; promotion of anti-US attitude in less developed nations; all as subordinate to long-term objective of defeat of US and thereby achievement, of Communist global hegemony. b) -Indochinese theater, specific: Pop- ularization of image of US as invading imperialist aggressor, anti-masses, anti- Asian, white racist, fascist, protector of local landlords, grafters and exploiters, etc.; presentation of Saigon govern- ment (so long as under.anti-Communist leadership) as tool of US imperialism, corrupt, murderous, etc. (cf. current operation re President Diem); use of all opportune means to drive wedge be- tween Saigon government and US; utilization of US personnel (civilian and military) as carriers, conscibus or unconscious, of Communist psycho- long-teral: 10 )7?,PRTypd 4,011111981 ql.A-RDPg047-011A9 tion Indoaina conui uat o as "in the present situation the `alitiviar moveme,ae----as,orning that tho Viet-,!a,n coPr_:CC is if) be protracted and ex.panded? extends potcrtially far beyond the circles the COLO^ and/or fellow travelers have in the past been able to establish Peave contact. if the congict is 1.org, prol,racted and frustrating, it is safe to predict that an i;Iliiwar moven:en:: formidable in size and in:eusity will develop frrml. many sectors of the population.... :Cf the anii)vai moveinent reached a surf/ CI), broad tnt-1 devel- oped level--as it would prob- ably do if the conffict is sufg- ciontly drawn out?this would mean that the Communists would be in a position of psycho-political leverage from which they could exercise a considerable degree of control over the -US political process, at least with respect to Ncioehina." opportunity to advance in long-term campaign to maximize potential fissions Mid splits within US social structure, and to promote division between gov- ernment and people. d) US theater, specfic: Maximum exploitation of antiwar sentiment, spon- taneously present under the prevailing climate of opinion, in relation to a con- flict of this nature (far-off, not ob- viously related to direct national inter- est, drawn-out and frustrating, etc.); _ transformation of antiwar sentiment into a dissident, to the extent possible a subversive, movement against the US government and social order; atrocity propaganda; sympathetic stories and re- ports of VC and NVN; continuous anti-Saigon government propaganda. 5. Within the US theater (as global) the. longtime fellow-travelers, sympa- thizers and dupes of the Communists --including those who have. remained covert.----have automatically lined up in a de facto united front. Some of them are already finding their way to Hanoi, .forming committees, etc., and ? establish- ing active contact with their similars in other countries---in many cases reviv- ing old acquaintances from numer- ous Communist-controlled conferences sponsored by the World Peace Council and other international fronts. How- ever, in the present situation the "anti- war movement"--assuming that the Vietnam conflict is to be protracted and expanded?extends potentially far be- yond the circles with which the Com- munists and/or fellow travelers have in the past been able to establish active contact. If the conflict is long, pro- tracted and frustratinP:, it is safe to predict that . 'an antiwar movement formidable in size and intensity will de- velop from many sectors of the popula- tion: the youth (with the additional motivation of fear_ or hatred of the ri Co-.- L24P01-1 An early memorandum dated 26 May 1954 from Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, entitled "Studies with Respect to Possible US Action Regarding Indochina," had included the recommendation (3.a), "Employing atomic weapons, whenever ad- vantageous. . . ." The text of the following cable from Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp,. then Commander. in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?though carefully obscured iii spite of its ultra-secret designation?indicates that the pro- posal to make one or another use of nuclear weapons remained alive within time military as well as at least one section of the- intelligence communities. 12 Feb. 1965 ?FROM: CINCPAC TO: JCS SUBJ: LIGHTNING A. 'YOUR 210114Z B. CINCPAC 211002Z (GENSER) C.. OPPLAN 65-34K. REF A REQUESTED STATUS OF CTNCPAC COMMENTS ON REP C. REF B FURNISHED t.j!gal?t19K0?-19.9Pclttils ; the clergy; the media; the left wings of the major par- ties; in due course, political figures either influenced by ideological consid- erations or feeling that antiwar is the? wave of the electoral future. 6. This antiwar sentiment and the mass antiwar movement into which it has already begun to - develop. has his- torical, psychological and moral roots not overtly related to Communism or the Communists. The Communists and their allies, in the US and globally, will not exercise direct control over its de- velopment and all of its Itctivities,_ though they will over some. But, ob- jectively considered, the antiwar move- ment will constitute a receptor for the Communist psycho-political operations; it will be, in a general way,: in. reso- nance. This means that Hanoi, the Com- munist apparatus in the US, and global Communism will be able to use the antiwar movement as a transmitting mechanism through which their ideas, slogans and proposals of the moment can reach and influence the broad US public in a "denatured" form, stripped of time taint of a too obviously Com- munist or enemy (Hanoi) origin. If the antiwar movement reached a suffi- ciently broad and developed level?as it would probably do if the conflict is; sufficiently drawn out.--this would mean that the Communists Would be in a position of psycho-political leverage from which they could exercise a con- siderable degree of control over the US political process, at least with respect to Indochina. COMMENTS ON . ALL ASPECTS OF REF C WITH EXCEPTION OF ANNEX NOVEMBER AND CINCPAC'S OVERALL ESTIMATE OF EASMILITY ANT) IMPACT OF SUCCESS- FUL COMPLETION OF REP C ON DRV. THIS MESSAGE COMPLETES CINCP AC'S VIEWS ON PROPOSED OPERATION. CONCUR IN GENERAL APPROACH CON- TAINED IN ANNEX NOVEMI3ER wind EX- CEPTION OF POSTDROP AIRBORNE MONI- TORING' ' REQUIREMENTS. GIVEN PROB- ABLE PRESENCE OF GN UNITS OPERAT- ING IN GULF NORTH 01' 17TH PARALLEL AT DR01"11 ME, AND HIGHLY VARIABLE UPPER ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS PRE- Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 11 eont. .1.4,4 VATTING THIS flME Approv,edyfo1'iffltease-20151/4.4108);IA-RDP844049908%400900001-6nic0ms AND USSI: Al' LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL PLATFORMS REQUIRED. PLATFORMS SHOULD HAVE CA- PABILITY OF INITIATING COMMUNICA- TIONS 'WITH GVN UNITS AFTER DI:or TO ADVISE OF PREDICTED FALLOUT PAT- TERNS, IF ANY. CURRENT -INTELLIGENCE ON TWO PROPOSED SITES FOR DEMON- STRATJON DROP SKETCHY AT BEST. HOW- EVER, BELIEVE AU] ERNATIVE SITE A PREFERABLE. WHILE VISUAL IMPACT OF .DROP WILL BE SINGLE MOST - DRAMATIC DIMENSION, SITE A OFFERS PROBABLE SUBSTANTIAL AUDIO DIMENSION AS WEI,L, GIVEN REDUCED DISTANCE FROM HAI- )'HONG. TOTAL POPULATION AND CIVIL- IAN/MILITARY RATIOS AT BOTH SITES BELIEVED ROUGHLY EQUAL. OINCPAC BELIEVES THAT REF C OFFERS SINGLE BEST POSSIBLE SOLE) ION TO A FAVORABLE, DIXIS1VE AND SPEEDY END TO PRESENT CONFLICT. POLICY OF GRAD- UATED MILITARY PRESSURE HAS NOT YIELDED ANY DISCERNIBLE RESULTS TO DATE, NOR . IS THERE GROUND FOR BE- a=r,1 (t1'%L. Ve5' F c tcf, C,4 SINCE EACH US STEP IN PRoot;A?-1-. OF GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE CAN BE ANTICIPATED BY ENEMY, WHO CAN TAKE ALL- NECESSARY MEASURES IN ADVANCE TO MINIMIZE EFFECTS OF THESE .STEPS. GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE SCE- NARIO GUARANTEES DRY ABILITY '10 PRE- PARE ITSELF MILITARILY, ECONOMICAL- LY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FOR EACH SU13SEQUENT STEP. BY ITS VERY NA- TURE, THIS POLICY GIVES THE ENEMY OUR WAR PLANS IN ADVANCE. CINCPAC BELIEVES ENEMY STAYING POW- ER IN VN CONFLICT CONSISTENTLY UN- DERESTI MATED. GIVEN POLITICAL DICTA- TORSHIP IN DRY, ENEMY STAYING POWER PROBABLY SUN Ut.1032 TO US, A LONG DRAWN OUT CONFLICT WILL Vv'OAR: TO ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE, NOT OURS, AND POLICY OR GRADUATED 1,1 ILITARY RE- SPONSE PRACTICALLY GUARANTEES AN EXTENDED CONFLICT. CINCPAC CONCURS THAT INCREASED RISK WILL RESULT FROM SUCCESSFUL COM- PLETION OF DEMONSTRATION DROP. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS PRIMARY ClIli ERI- ON FOR DETERMINING SCOPE AND NA- TURE OF 'MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA, IT IS CLEAR TO LIE THAT WITH- DRAWAL IS PREFERRED COURSE OF AC- TION, I BELIEVE OUR CURRENT STRATE- GIC P05 LURE SUFFICJEN1"10 DETER ANY RASH. ACT BY EITHER CIIICOMS OR USS ALTHOUGH THIS MAY NOT BE CASE FIVE YEARS FROM NOW. TOTS). IMPACT or A SUCCESSFUL HIGH ALTITUDE DROP OFF HAIPHONG HARBOR. ON DRY LEADERSHIP IMPOSSIBLE 'TO ES- TIM ATE DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, CINCTAC FINDS IT DIE rucul.T TO 'VISUALIZE ANY OTHER COURSE OP ACTION FOR US IN PRESENT- -CONFLICT WHICH WOULD BE MORE LIKELY '1'0 (A) BRING DRY TO CONFERENCE, TABLE, (II) ENABLE US TO SETTLE CONFLICT ON FAVORABLE TERMS FOR OURSELVES AND CIVN, AND (C) SAVE LIVES OF . AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN. In the slimmer of 1966, apparently in response to a request by the Secretory of Defense or Assistant .Secretary McNaughion, the joint Chiefs. of .S'tal1 analyzed the requirements of a "full-blown" blockade of North Tiietnan7 and Cambodia. Up to this point, only a blockade of the South Vietnamese coastline had been at- tempted, nuclei' the fairly successful Market, Tillie program, and a ?blacklist of -merchant ships which traded with North Vietnam had been established in order to reduce the availability of transport to the North Vietnamese. The joint Chiefs have reviewed the force requirements, possible command structures,' and probable impact and ef- fectiveness of .alternative DRY block- ade options. We find that, to be effec- -live, any blockade will. have to. include the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville .and any ,other potential deep- or medi- .urn-draft .Cambodian offioading points. The following discussion is predicated on the assumption that. Cambodia will be included in any blockade effort.. .We further assume that it will be desirable to retain the option' in blockade of per- 'milting certain selected ships to pass -through (for example, those carrying, foodstuffs for domestic NVN consump- lion). We wish to make clear that while We believe a full-blown blockade to be a necessary condition if DRY support of forces in SYN is to be terminated, a blockade, by itself, will not be Sul!-- dent to do the job alone. Two basic options, or some combina- tion, are open to blockade planners: 1. Passive blockade. A passive block- ade would be confined .to measures which avoid any face-to-face US/DRY 'No blockade will be 109% effective in denying outside intOrarial support to ene,ray .forces in SVN.. . .-Road trans- port of -material from China through D1.-tv to SVP:T can probably b2 reduced to 50 tqnS a month, considering cx-pcted, losses in fray-is:it.- Given .minimal 'Soviet ,and Cniconi..sustained ? airl:ft .capability, air leakage .stould'he ineunsequential." Li':u'iiV j CIA or US/Communist bloc confrontation on the high seas or in DRV territorial waters. Measures to be taken in such a blockade would include (but not be limited to) aerial, surface and sub- surface mining of all DRY and Cam- bodian ports and approaches thereto, placement of obstacles such as sunken -concrete-laden barges and LSTs in har- bors and approaches, utilizing SVIq naval forces to intercept, board and in- spect any ships which request permis- sion to pass through blockade (or at- tempt to run it), and a greatly expand-' ?ed U.S. intelligence effort to detec1 po- tential blockade runners and discrim- inate between ships carrying permissibk-, (if any) cargos from those carrying contraband. 2. Active blockade. An active block- ade would -involve the overt participa- tion df US -:naval and air forces in the interception, boarding, inspection and engagement (if necessary) of any ships which attempted to run the blockade. An active blockade would include most of the elements of the passive blockade option as well. ,Leakages.-No?blockade will be 100% effective in denying outside material Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 support to enemy ages can be expected consisting- of Ma- terial produced in DRV and shipped overland to SVN as well as supplies which enter into DRV overland from Chinese border. However, sustained and concentrated aerial bombardment of Lao Kay and Lang Son rail links to China can reduce rail leakage to mini- mal amounts. Road transport of material. from China through DRV to SVN can probably be reduced to 50 tons a month, considering expected losses in transit. Given minimal Soviet and Chicom sus- tained airlift capability, air leakage should be inconsequential. Force requirements 1. Passive blockade. Considerable re- inforcement of mine warfare forces in WESTPA.0 would be required: a) a minimum of two additiOnal MSF divi- sions; b) additional .surveillance capa- bility; c) one squadron of P3-As or two squadrons of S2s, with land-based. sup- port requirements; d) augmentation of intelligence assets, in..luding one addi- tional AFTR and two airborne EL1NT platforms, One on-station and One re- Approved Folkilitlea e,2001/11/08 ? CIA RDp84, ,00494b01000090001, forces lit 1 eaK- serveS wothd ' eT/JISIC "rajle Yee y sunoroinate to c7INCPAC. value. .MSFs will need surface com- batant support when carrying out oper- ations.in hostile environment. At least one DD division will be necessary for this mission. Further material and logistic support will need to be fur- nished to SVN navy units engaged in intercept and inspection duties. ? 2. Active Blockade. In addition to assets needed to support passive block- ade, two additional divisions of DUs and two divisions of PlFs would be re- quired. Air cover of US intercept and inspection operations can probably be tasked to Yankee Team carrier. COMMand Structure Experience gained in Market Time operations suggests the need for a sin- gle over-all authority to exercise com- mand and control of any full-blown blockade effort. Given the potential sensitive, political problems il'aising in the carrying out of any blockale, and the need for immediate, high-level response to developing situations, it is suggested that the command and control clement in charge of blockade operations he di- Potential Problenn In addition to the international politi- cal problems discussed elsewhere in this rnernorandmn, certain operational prob- lems arising out of any blockade, can be. foreseen. These include: detonation of mines by ships carrying permissible cargo, with resulting international corn- plication. . . . As we have discovered from Market Time ops, Hainan Island will play a crucial role in any attempts to evade a blockade. Accordingly, any blockade line and intelligence collection program will have to be -designed to insure maximum detection of tram- shipments from Hainan. . . . Coastal traffic between China and NVN will probably be best countered via a pas- sive barrier in the Mon Cay: vicinity on the NV1N/Chicom border, .Active operations in this area will be. difficult to carry out and subject to substantial risk of active interference from NVI,I or Chic.om naval forces. Probable impact of and international repercussions from full-blown blockade operation lie outside scope of request. e, ? \ t72): :;`) ,17:'[.i71 I "i (-2' d L. it r _ , ; C.; (...) CZ:-;1.1"k17);,LLi,?,C ?i? iq ? Summary of draft memorandum "Protracted Conflict and American Historical and Societal Chola. cter," from the Committee of Historians and Cultural Anthro- pologi.sts, prepared by Professor Daniel Doorstin of tile Dept. of History, Univer- sity of Chicago, to President John F. Kennedy, June 30, 1963. In accordance with your request of May 30, 1963 the full Committee met June 7-12 in Chicago to review the problem of protracted conflict in the context of American historical expe- rience and from the perspective of cur- rent. societal values. These conferences and a review of relevant data issued in the following tentative conclusions. 1. In the abstract, a prolonged con- flict in Vietnam, characterized, when necessary, by increasing pressure upon the enemy applied in. minimal incre- ments, would appear both rational and prudent. It would appear to. avoid the extremes of both defeat and largescale, possibly nuclear, warfare. 2. However, serious objections to such a course exist on the grounds of the American historical experience as that has shaped the habits and expecta- tions of Americans at the present time. Some of the basic points are: a) American sod ety is achievement- oriented. The American expects his ef- forts to issue in definite, even measur- able results. When his efforts fail to pro- duce such results he becomes embit- tered and, often, irrational. (See Ap- pendix A: Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Cultural Goals and Institutional Norms"; also, Merton and Rossi, "Ref- "AlT)CrieD31 soc=cty aci,leve- Dlei).01`ee, 7 The f`kiDeriCt171 expects his e;ioyts to issue definite, eve-.t measprabic re- SEALS. When. his effoYts fail to procilice such resulL:3 he be- comes embitieved and, often, irration L" erence Group Theory and Social Mo- bility.") 11 should be pointed out that the expectation of definite and/of me.a- surable results does not exist in societies where a different conditioning has pre- vailed. In such non-achievement ad- opted societies, the individual is often content to go from day to clay for long' periods of time sustained by other kinds of values built into the culture. b) American society is "progressive" in the sense that effort is expected to produce not only tangible results but a general improvement in the over-all state of affairs. When such improve- ment is not forthcoming, dysfunction- lug, both individual and systemic, is likely to result. (See Appendix B: John A. Clausen, "The Sociology of Mental Illness"; Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior.") c) American society is individualistic and .contractual in significant respects. This means that the individual is less content. to subordinate his own satisfac- tions for the good of the larger social Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 etrint frv;i11,4 Approved For Pase 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499"000090001-6 entity than he is in other. seccictics, and in other socio-cultural contexts, makes 1815, the PelOpOiiriCSTaIl War and many this reluctance increases exponentially little provision for "stalemate"; and fur- other earlier conflicts, not to mention in the absence of the ycwards noted in then that the mass American sporting the most pertinent of all, the war that a and. b. (See Appendix C: William 3. heroes. are the. "Enock.--out" puncher, the has been waged by Vietnamese against Goode, "The Sociology of the Family"; "home run" hitter, and the professional each other, the Japanese, the 1..)xlsch Georg Shun:tel., "Conflict and the Struc- quarterback who "throws the long. and the Americans for IN: last half- of the Group.") 'fhe failure of the bomb." IIe persuaded the other confer- century). The American wars have gsoup to -produce such expected re- ces that these were important clues to been characterized by the concentrated wards characteristically results in re- American cultural emotional patterns, application of power and the 'sudden bellicms behavior directed at the group, c) In contrast to other cultures, "breakthrough." The American military as well as the "de-legitimizing," of said Americans exhibit a very high boredom services arc a reflection of the larger group. coefficient. This is related to tbe time American society and its ethos, and d) The factor of time pervades factor discussed above. Several confer-- nothing in the historical experience of American socio-cultural ,value systems ees felt that a "protracted conflict" either would 'seem to make it easily to an. unprecedented degree. (See Ap-- would, among other effects, produce adaptable to protracted .conflict. (See pendix D: II. Werner, et al., "Rhythmic widespread boredom, apathy etc. Pro- Appendix Ft R. A., Katzell, "Contrast- Activity and the Perception of Time"; lessor McLuhan -made the point that ing Systems of Work Organization"; J. A. )T)yal and '1'. A. Holland, "Dis- television, even the televised news, is Robert M. Gagne, "Military Training crimination Reaction Time as a Joint from oneperspective entertainment. No and Priimcpl cl Learning"; also Mil- Function of Manifest Anxiety and In- telligence"; and H. C. I. Duijker and N. H. Frijda, "National Character and National Stereotypes.") in all areas of his daily life, Professor Mead noted, the American is conditioned to an environ- ment of speed, to a high degree of auto- maticity and to efficiency in a wide va- riety of social and economic relations. This produces "impatience" when tinse expectations are not satisfied.. (See Ap- pendix E: P. E. Medd, "Schizotaxia, Sehizotypy and Schizophrenia.") Pro- fessor Cottrell observed the relationship between time in American life generally and time as a factor in mass American entertainment, as in professional foot- ball, hockey, boxing, etc., where the clock is a key element in the total ex- perience. Professor Cottrell pointed out that American sport, relative to sports audience, he. said, would tolerate the same show night after night indefinitely. f) American society is increasingly technological. The American lives in an environment where technological power is characteristically brought to bear to achieve specific results in a short period of lime. 'This conditions his expecta- tions generally. It is worth noting that the young?I.e., those who would bear most of thc burden of the war----are pre- cisely the segment. of the population. most conditioned by the post-World War II environment of technological efficiency. 3. The, wars fought by the United States since 'the industrial revolution have been relatively short (contrast the Thirty Years War, the Hundred Years War, the extended conflict between England and France between 1688; and a-D3zA [3,4 LeCs.d.`Mit,32.-; [di Eirco ton Jensen,. " iVe Reaction to Air Force.") 4. The "Report of the Subcom- mittee, on Southeast. Asia" emphasized the contrast between the American and Vietnamese socio-culthral context, viz. whereas the prevailing value structure in America is negative as regards pro- tracted conflict, the prevailing value structure in Southeast Asia is positive. 1, the case of each factor, a) through I), the Vietnamese is better adapted to this kind of warfare than the American. 5. Conclusion: It was the conclusion of the Committee that on these -and other grounds specified at length in the Report that from a social-anthropologi- cal-historical perspective the waging of a protracted conflict in Vietnam is con-- tra:indicated. _ l4on-Adpist- 'Ci ainiog in the c:l:lh -(--j%n (1.j) rf 'Orracc (6' Li c,-; .!';')Eir.A C) tJc Handwritten note by Secretary of State summarizing the results of a high-level departmental meeting at which the advisability of seeking a decloration of war had been discussed, dated Feb. 10, 1965. The following reasons pro and con were adduced during- the meeting: a) Deel. of war against NLF (The National Liberation Front created, by Hanoi as time ostensibly South Vietnam-. ese framework for the North Vietnam- ese effort) is out of question; it would elevate that entity to the dignity of a state and would preclude any ultimate political success of our action. b) Dcel. of war on North Vietnam unadvisable because of the mixture of Southern subversive and Northern mili- tary and paramilitary operations; also because of consistent denial of Hanoi that. its troops are operating in the South. c) Precedent of Korea as all 1111de-- dared war. (1) For a short terns effort, "Ponkin Rcs. is Sufficient, decl. of war would become desirable only if war were to last for years. In view of sharp actions proposed by joint Chiefs, including ac- tive blockade, cutting No Chi Minh Trail, and exerting diplomatic and eco- nomic pressures on SU, one must an- ticipate rapid attrition of aggressive potential of DRV by File 1966, and conclusion of overt military operations. After that only mopping up operations. c) Commitment of US troops by Pres. without declaration has ample precedents (over 100 times?). 1) Dech conjures up prospect of use of atomic weapons which we do not want even to suggest. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS Approved For Meese 2001/11/08_: CIA-RDP84-004990141000090001-6 22 JUL 1971 The article that follows is part of The .Planning of the Vietnam ? War, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington; including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.*. In: their introduction to the study, the authors write: "In early 1970, Marcus Raskin con- ceived the. idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster hap- pened by analyzing the planning of the War.. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on 'finding out who did the actual plan- ning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a trOops into South Viet- , nam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create ,millions of refugees in, the area. "Ralph Stavins, assisted by (anta Plan. John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, ? and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this studY. A Mong those interviewed were many .Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the ,national security bureaticracy, and offi- cial, military and civilian, who carried: out the policy in the field in Vietnam. "A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, .including informal lminutes of meetings, 'as well as por- tions of the official documentary ree- lord now known as the "Pentagon Papers." Our information is drawn not, only from the Department of Defense,. but also from the White House, the Department of State, .and the Central Intelligence Agency." The study is being,published in two? The first, which includes the, article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in' .May, 1972. .? ? I *The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or-fellows, Ii L. Stavins There has been an increasing dis- position within official circles and the army to question Diem's abili- ty to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of? his .reli- ance on virtual one-man rule, his ? tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls. At the end of March, '1961, the CIA .circulated a National Intelligence Esti; mate on the situation in South Viet- nam. This paper advised Kennedy that' Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of disContent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems Were closely connected. Of- the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted: ? Local recruits and sympathetic or, intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the coun- tryside.. For example, more- than one-half of the entire rural region .south and .southwest of Saigon; as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed, by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Sai- gon and has recently begun to .move closer in the city. The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be support- ing them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule: The CIA.referred to the attempted coup .against Diem that had - been led by , . . General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to. overthrow Diem would. originate with the army and- the non-Communist opposition. The -Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed mid sub- versive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more 'likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non- Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials an.d oPpositionists and army elenients, broadq: than those involved in the November attempt. In view of the broadly based Opposi- tion to Diem's regime and his virtual -reliance. on one-man rule, it was unlike- ly that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform Was conceived as widening the political . base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to,. or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter- insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had. become painfully clear to Washington that reform . was not the .path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy palled upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw. up the. victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to: a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.. b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or econom- ic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country. ?Ant nu ed Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 The GilpatrieTAM9YeedFIDMI8r113081131s0L. ta!khe-RGDePne84-0049411A01.000090001-6 va Accords have placed inhibitions upon free world action' while at the same time placing no restric- tions, upon the Communists, Am- bassador Nolting should be in- structed to enter into preliminary discussions with Diem regarding the possibility of a defensive secur- ity alliance despite ?the ? inconsis- tency of such actions with the Geneva Accords. This action would be- based on the' premise that such an under- taking is justified in international law as representing a refusal to be bound by the Accords in a degree and .manner beyond that which the other 'partyto the 'Accordshas shown a ?willingness to honor. Communist violations, therefore, justify the establishment of the security arrangement herein recom- mended. Concurrently, Defense should study the military advisa- bility of _committing ? US forces in Vietnam. ? This was the explanation that would be given to the American public: Communist violations of the Accords justified the bilateral treaty and the. Gilpatric organized an Interdepart- mental Task Force with representatives from State,. Defense, CIA, the Inter-. national Cooperation Agency, the US I Information Agency, and the 'Office of the President, with Brigadier General Edward Lansdale as operations officer. Their .report was to be completed in one week. The final version, "A Program of ,Action to Prevent Communist Domina- tion of South Vietnam," was sub- mitted to Kennedy on' May 6. The 'victory plans recommended by the Gilpatric Task. Force called for the use of 'US ground troops and a bilateral treaty, between the US and the GVN. Both proposals stood in direct viola- tion of the Geneva Accords, but were required because "it is essential that President Diem's full confidence in and communication with the Unita States be restored promptly." Diem suspected that . the United .States was wavering ir4 its commitment to ? the GVN on several grounds, some rational, such as the negotiations fdr a Laotian settlement, others irrational, such as his belief that the U,S had' played a role in the attempted coup of November, 1960. But it was 'Diem's .suspicions, not the justification for them, that .compelled Washington to give serious consideration to using o old troops and to signing a treaty the GVN, even though Diem's e,....ies were demonstrably ? bankrupt and the suggested remedies violated international law. The feeling w'as be- ginning to take hold. in Washington that if the US took over the jdb, Diem's policies would not matter. This belief was to be reinforced during the crisis in the fall -of 1961, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk recom- mended that the United States simply .take over the machinery of government in the South, should ground troops be introduced into the combat theater.. Circumventing international law Was viewed by the Kennedy Administration as a problem far less significant than that .of building support for a bankrupt GVN. Nevertheless, the question ex- ercised the minds of officials in Wash- aington. In his report to Kennedy, Gilpatric, for example, advanced the following argument to meet the charge that the United States was flouting the law: use of US 'ground forces. But would this explanation also, convince official Washington of the need to deploy troops? Indeed not. In the same re- port; Gilpatric informed Kennedy why US troops were . needed in Vietnam. "US forces are required," Gilpatric wrote, "to provide, maximum psycho- logical impact in deterrence of further Communist aggression from North Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union." .They would alsO serve an additional purpose: "to provide significant mili- tary resistance to i)otential North Viet- nam Communist and/or Chinese Com- munist action" (italics added). The US public was to be told that Washington had a legal right to deploy troops in response to actual Com- munist transgressions, while privately Washington would decide to act be- cause of "potential" Communist ac- tion. Of course, "further". aggressions from .China or the Soviet Union could hardly be equated with past violations, especially since neither country had set foot in South Vietnam. Indeed, Russia had sponsored the two Vietnams for 'membership in the United Nations as late as 1959. "Further" aggressions .from the North', such as reactivating the guerrilla apparatus in the South, an apparatus manned by Southern cadres and fed by Southern peasants, were Hanoi's delayed response to the initial -Approved For jos. w Ito g-IapEil44ri9ci494Reio1 moo 90tion*so n that he did not want foreign troops on Vietnamese._ rcnntinued collusion with Washington, had refused to consult with the North or hold elections in the South, as required by the Geneva Accords. Thus, Washington's ploying combat troops dicta the explanation that would be given to the presk and' to Congress. Washington had decided that the way to manipulate international law was to fool the American people. On' May 11, President Kennedy, after reviewing the findings of the Gilpatric Task Force, issued:a National Security Action Memorandum which 'contained several important decisions on Vietnam. Such memoranda, written by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, were -used to convey Presidential orders to all the agencies that were to, carry them out, or needed to know about them. The NSAM of May 11 stated: - reason for de- directly contra- 1. The US objective is to prevent Communist domination of South , Vietnam. 2. A further increase in GVN forces frOm 170,600 to 206,000 is to be assumed. ? 3. Defense Department is directed to ;of the size and composition .of US forces in the event that such forces are committed to Vietnam. 4. The United States will . seek to increase the confidence of Diem. 5. The Ambassador should begin nego- tiations for a bilateral arrangement. with Vietnam. . 6, The program for .covert action is approved. ? ? Gilpatric asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff their opinion on the desirability of deploying ? US forces td Vietnam. They recommended ? immediate de- ployment of 'a sufficient number to achieve the objectives set fdrth in the Gilpatric report. To set the ma- chinery in motion, the Joint Chiefs added, Diem should."be encouraged to request that the 'United States fulfill its. SEATO obligations.... Upon receipt' of this request, suitable forces could be immediately deployed." Vice President Johnson was dis- patched to Vietnam to shore up Diem's confidence in the US commit- ment by. "encouraging" him to request US ground troops. Referring to Diem. as, "the Winston Churchill of the 'Orient," Johnson asked him to make this request. But much to Washington's 'soil, except in the event of overt - aggression. Moreover, he pointed outr' the presence of UApprOyedaccoil contravene and nullify the Geneva Accords. The. semblance of legality could be preserved, he added, if Ameri- can troops were channeled, as "ad- visers," through the Military Assistance .Advisory Group (MAAG), which had been in South Vietnam since the - mid-Fifties. . After Johnson's visit, Diem sent a letter to President Kennedy expressing ., gratitude for Johnson's offer of assis- tance. "I was most. deeply gratified by this gracious gesture . by your dis- tinguished Vice President,, particularly as we have not. become accustomed to being asked for our own views as to our needs," he wrote, concluding with the reminder that "we can count. on the material support from your great country which will be so essential to achieving final victory." Material sup- port, not US troops, would be fur- nished by Washington; otherwise Diem .would?make himself even more vulner- able to the Communist charge' that he was a colonialist. ? During the summer Of 1961, When :the situation in Indochina deteriorated, Diem. changed his mind and requested a treaty and troops from the United ..States. On October I,. the recently appointed Ambassador Nolting .re- ported that Diem wanted a bilateral defense treaty with the US; on the , thirteenth, Diem requested ground _troops. These requests coincided With the conclusion of Defense Departmen?t- and JCS studies, both of which advised the President to dispatch US troops tb. Vietnam, as wolf as with the announce- ment of . a forthcoming "fact-finding mission" to Vietnam by two White House advisers, General. Maxwell Tay- lor and Walt W. Rostow. Having determined that the Viet Chiefs, or the use of nuclear weapons, as , hewmovement was local in origin, a cola aaplated by Admiral Felt, the ThefaNilbnigkiglAtIRPRMAP4a9MAN090?M76 of the Pacific, that 11,000 .US combat troops and forces (CINCPAC), was left undecided. 11,800 support troops be deployed to ? Vietnam for the purpose of sealing the border against any possible future infiltration. from the North. But, the Department added, these troops would be insufficient to establish an anti- Communist government in the. South. "The ultimate force requirements [for that purpose] cannot be estimated with any precision," the Departinent stated.. "Three divisions would be a guess." ? The Joints Chiefs of Staff, in their reply to Gilpatric, reasoned that the North would rely -still .further.? upon a_ policy of infiltration if SEATO and US troops were deployed in the South.' The Joint Chiefs speculated that it would be uncharacteristic of the North to respond with an overt invasion of the South, but in the event that it did, the US would have to send in three divisions. If China . threw its weight into .the struggle, then six US divisions, or a total: of 205,000 men, would be required, and the use of nuclear weapons would become a distinct pos- sibility. ? The CIA took the Viet Cong threat less seriously than the Defense Depart- ment did, and identified the non- Communist (perhaps, one should say anti-Communist) South as. the im- mediate danger to Diem. The agency wrote: ? The Defense Departnient's study of the Viet Cong movement produced the discovery that the men and material originated in the South, not the North. The Department found that although the level of infiltration from the North was increasing, the "vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local origin." If Hanoi was not furnishing the troops, Was it at least furnishing the supplies? "There is little evidence of major 'supplies from . outside sources," the Defense Department study found, d"most arms being captured or stolen from GVN forces or from the French . during the Indochina war." The NOrth had given moral support to the insur- gents, but little else. Aprirdved1Ftdar United States do? Most immediate threat to Diem is not ? a military takeover by the Communists but the mounting danger of an internal coup by disgruntled military and civilian . members of the government who are critical of Diem's leadership. These critics hold that. Diem's ? heavy hand in all operations of the government is not only hampering the anti-Communist military effort but is steadily alienating the popu- lace. Should a SEATO task force be dispatched to Vietnam as an alternative to US troops?one of the contingency plans circulating in Washington at the time?the CIA, like the Joint Chiefs, discounted the likelihood of a Northern invasion. Hanoi's strategy, the CIA believed, would be "to play upon, possible SEATO weariness over main- taining substantial forces." Once this weariness became evident, "the Asian members would soon become disen- h td d 1 k the US c an e an oo to to something to lessen the burden and to solve theaproblem." Whether this some- discussed the Taylor-Rostow mis- Rojwoo iguecimogipc?at7904919Rooti btionetrimil6 Vice President Thuan, speaking for President Diem, do f the CIA -analysis was correct, the US faced the possibility of a major war on the Asian mainland for the purpose of defending the narrow. base of the Diem regime against its own people. Even the anti-Communist opposition in the South was rapidly being trans- muted into part . of a Communist monolith, located either in Moscow or Peking.' Nevertheless, some advisers began to argue for war. William Bundy, ,who had' recently changed positions from the CIA's . Far East expert to Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Defense Department, echoed Walt Rostow's be- , lief that the fall of 1961 was the "now or never" period for the US.. If America acted promptly and aggressive- ly, Bundy argued, there was a .70 percent chance that it would "clean up the situation." There was a 30 percent chance that "we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of war." Having weighed the options, Bundy .concluded that a -pre-emptive strike was advisable, and recommended "early. _and:. hard-hitting operations." a t The Taylor-Rostow Mission On October 1 1 , 1 961 , President Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam. Its purpose was to examine the feasibility of dispatching US troops; Kennedy specifically recom- mended that the mission look into the question of trop requirements. One option would be to send fewer US combat troops than the 22,800 identi- fied in the, Defense Department plan, but enough to "establish a US presence in Vietnam." A second dispensed with US combat forces entirely, and envi- sioned a stepped-up version of what is now called the "Vietnarnizatiori" pro- gram. According to this plan, the United States woUld increase its train- ing of Vietnamese units and furnish more US equipment, "particularly heli- copters. and other light aircraft, trucks, and other ground support transport." Two days after Kennedy announced the Taylor-Rostow mission, Diem, who had heretofore refused to "request" US combat troops, met with Ambas- sador Nolting and asked that the US government provide South Vietnam with the aid that had been secretly when s ground troops, as favored by the Joint etlrutitUed requested an additional squadron ^assumption that tactical nuclear weal)- ^eted to have great military signif- AD-6 fighter bombAPPrg yediEl3t ReIRASCgOSO aim :rpAraoR444(149 WNW, oPtctoP 91911TP ran the risk, as - contract pilots for ?helicopters, trans- we can anticipate requests being made port planes to be used for non-cOmbat. for their use if action expands into a operations, and US, combat units to. , Phase 4 situation." (Phase 4 involved a be introduced into South Vietnam as North VietnameSe and Chinese invasion combat-:trainer units. of the South.) _ . . D. Once in Vietnam, Taylor and Ros- iem had changed his mind.. Orig- tow explored ways of introducing US inally ashamed to be dependent upon a ground troops. They had decided that US presence and 'afraid .to scuttle the Diem needed them to preserve his rule, Geneva Accordsn. he set aside these but they also recognized that such a considerations once it became - clear course would damage America's image that a neutral Laos was about to as a peacekeeper. The general and the - emerge from the negotiations then professor wondered how the United under way. According to Diem, a States could go to war while appearing 'neutral Laos would be useful to .the to preserve the peace. While they were Communists. They could then cross pondering this 'question, Vietnam was the western border at will, infiltrate suddenly struck by a deluge. It was as - into the South, and crush him. The if God had wrought a miracle. Amer- terrain in Laos was more difficult to lean . soldiers, acting on humanitarian defend, and the Communists were impulses, could be dispatched to save . strong enough there to strike a final Vietnam not from the Viet Cong, but blow. Laos, he argued, had been used to from the floods. McGarr, the Chief of trap the Americans into conceding . iV1, , AAG, stated that Taylor favored South Vietnam. - "moving in US military personnel for Having enticed the Americans. into a humanitarian purposes with subscqnent settlement that made it look as if the . retention if desirable." He added, Americans had lost nothing, the Com- "This is an excellent opportunity to munists could concentrate all of their minimize adverse publicity." " . energies on seizing South Vietnam.. To counter this strategy, Diem wanted laylor himself viewed the. flood some immediate assurance that the US relief task 'force more ambitiously: It would remain committed to the South. would be the most efficient way to Such assurance would require a bilateral deal -.With world opinion, assuage. treaty- and the presence of US combat troops. Only this 'would dissuade the North from pursuing a militant. policy and convince thoiie elements in the that were still loyal to Diem that i..aotian settlement was not the death warrant for the GVN. The Kennedy Administration had discovered that it was impossible' to avoid war. The 'only question was where and when. If Laos was not settled quickly, the US would have to pour in troops, with small chance of success. But to negotiate a neutral Laos meant that US troops would have to be deployed to South Vietnam, thus increasing the likelihood of a direct confrontation. Washington had painted itself into a corner?either war it Laos now or nwar in Vietnam in, the future. -Kennedy chose the latter. r-r1 he Taylor-Rostow mission stopped at Hawaii on the way to Vietnam and .discussions were held with Admiral Felt, head of CINCPAC. Rostow asked about contingency plans in the event that open warfare broke out with the North. One .question in particular con- cerned the use of nuclear weapons. Felt replied, "Plans AppitametiofiCtIlRe Taylor ;put it, of "escalating into a major war in Asia." Even if this danger did not .materialize, the initial commit- ment would make it "difficult to resist the pressure to ? reinforce." Once the bloodof a single American- soldier had' been spilled the President would assume the role of 'Commander-in-Chief and would be obliged to discharge his constitutional duty to protect -the troops in the field. ? This' obligation' ritad'e it ??likly" that troops Would be removed and far more likely that. additional troops would be 'sent over. The technical device of a built-in 'exit might be suPc..rseded by the political reality of a built-in escala- tion. And with the DRV and the Viet. Cong committed to a policy of attri- tion, the United States would then be locked into a long struggle at the edge of the Communist world.. Such 'a struggle would take place, unfortunately, at a time , when "the strategic reserve of the US forces is presently so weak that we can ill afford any detachment of forces." Taylor, in effect, told Kennedy to dispatch a few thousand combat troops which could not. turn the tide of 'Military battle, ,which invited a major war, provoked an. indefinite and indecisive conflict, and Diem's fears, . and- allay Kennedy's". depleted the US reserve. Why should reservations. World opinion would be Kennedy do ? this? Because, as Taylor. swayed by humanitarian . Considera--_ said, "I do not believe that our program tions. The colonial stain would not unduly tarnish Diem's image because without it." the flood relief program clearly was - The symbolic- gestnte of stationing a not intended to "take over the respon- few thousand US troops would save sibility for the security of the. coun-' South Vietnam., Taylor argued, because try." Finally, and perhaps most im-? it would inform the, Communists of portant, Taylor's plan contained ? a the "seriousness of the US intent to built-in_excuse to withdraw--:a feature resist" and would raise the "national ? intended to overcome. Kennedy's objec- morale" of the South. Taylor predicted tions. The President, it was well that the North would back down if the known, .believed that 'it was far more United States exhibited a fixed resolve difficult to remove troops. than to to defend the South. That resolve had introduce them. Taylor wrote to Ken- to be conveyed in the form of 'a clear nedy, -"As the task is a specific one, message to Hanoi that the United we can extricate our troops when it is States would take offensive action done if we so desire. Alternatively, we 'against the North if it did not stop can phase them into other activities if supporting the Viet Cong. A small task we wish to remain longer." force, was a harbinger of greater devas- Having invented a scheme that tation. The North would desist once it 'understood this message because, in Taylor's 'word's, "North Vietnam is. extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi' to lay off South Vietnam." to save South- Vietnam will succeed would enable the leaders in Saigon and Washington -to placate their ? respective constituencies, Taylol. then turned his attention from his preoccupation' with politics to the military consequences. He recommended that the President deploy 8,000 ground troops, and acknowledged that most of them., .14AikIlk.kggio,;;;;9 eVoilEdn' yatuYktnhar-sti, 9R0010000909114 4 The small task force, along witl. 'other forms of? USAPPr6b16961rEctrn not only would alarm Hanoi, but in the South it would "reverse the pros- ant downward trend, stimulate an offensive spirit and build up. morale." As Rostow commented to Diem at this time, "That secret of turning point is offensive4iction." he purposes of_ discouraging the North and encouraging the South be: came the strategy that was to be relied upon thfoughout the Vietnam war.. The same arguments that were ad- vanced for .the first time in 1961 were repeated in 1965 when Washington made the decision to embark on Operation Rolling Thunder. By the summer of 1965, however, lifting Southern.. morale was no longer viewed as necessary to win the war. The decision to send in the first 500,000 combat troops was justified solely by the need to convince the Corninunists that the United States was serious. The strategy has remained surpris- ingly constant, guiding American pol- icy f?r The better part of a decade: The sarchitects of the strategy, Taylor. and Rostow, did not envision the small task force of .8,000 men as the ."final word." It was 'simply- the first lesson they planned for the leadership in Hanoi. By its major premise?that Hanoi wodld back down only if it knew the United States was prepared to attack North -Vietnam directly?the strategy entailed a built-in escalation. Events : had to follow in a monotonous but "natural order: increase the, size. of US support troops in the South;: institute covert operations against the North; threaten to bomb the North; bomb the North; pour US combat troops into the South as rapidly as possible; invade Cambodia; invade Laos ... invade the North? destroy the North? etc.. The strategy required not only that the United States make it known that it would ,attack the North dirbctly, but also that the United States not oblit- erate the North. To threaten to de- stroy the Communist regime in Hanoi would risk, a direct encounter .with China or Russia, a risk that the national security managers' wished to avoid. They did not want to fight a nuclear war. They wanted to fight a safe war. The, strategy therefore de- manded a combination- of escalation and moderation. I America would exercise its power in a deliberate and calculated manner in `Hanoi" here is to be taken literally: 4, elaSere2OCklititOeriliclArBER841-00499NR010.6W090tRYicl6 mean that US advisers would, in effect, become Indochina, was to become a target. - One could say that US strategy was to ' kill the people while preserving the. Hanoi government. Once surrounded by . devastation, isolated, 'and aban- doned by her socialist allies, Russia .and China, Hanoi would be left with no choice but to submit to a "mod- erate" but triumphant America. Although the Creation of the task force was its most far-reaching recom- mendation, the Taylor-Rostow report urged the President to adopt a number of other measures. These were mainly of a military and administrative. nature. The report recommended that the personnel in the Military Assistance Advisory Group mission be. increased from 1,103 to 2,612. Moreover, US ?aircraft, consisting of several helicopter companies, and US crews for supporting or operational miSsions were to be .introduced no later than mid-November. The combat troops, .the increase in the size of MAAG, and the use of US aircraft and crews were all violations of. the limits on troops and armaments set by the Geneva Accords. The Interna- tional Security Agency, reviewing the legality of these recommendations, noted -that the additions to MAAG, although a violation of international law, could not easily be proved: discus- sions between the International Control Commission, which was charged with enforcing the Geneva Accords, and the Embassy could be extended for months, during which time the value of the increase in MAAG's size would be realized. The use of OS helicopters was of a. more serious nature, requiring some. groundwork to pacify Congress and the press. But combat .troops could not so easily be disguised. Their only justifica- tion would be their subsequent success, not prior propaganda, and the Interna- tional Security .Agency viewed them with deep. skepticism.- It predicted that the North would respond by infil- trating 15,000 men, which would in turn require three US divisions to offset them. Thus an indefinite war of attrition would be ensured. The "Limited Partnership" The administrative recommendations of Taylor and Rostow were designed to place a number of Americans on four specific levels of the South Viet- . narnese bureaucracy. First Americans cabinet officers in the Diem govern- ment. Next, "a joint US-Vietnamese Military Survey, down to the provincial level, in each of three corps areas" would engage in a number of ...tasks, including . intelligence, command and control, the build-up of reserves for offensive purposes, and mediation between the military commander and the province chief. The other two. functions ,would . be border control operations and "intimate. liaison with the Vietnamese- Central Intelligence organizations." The ostensible purpose of giving Americans critical roles in government' was that "Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Viet- namese." Taylor designated these administrative changes as representing a "shift from US advice to liinited partnership." The concept of "limited partnership," in fact, meant that the .GVN had been negligent in reforming itself in the past, and suggested that the only, way to reform the GVN in the future would be for the US to take- it over. With US ground' troops in the field, US aircraft controlling the skies,. and US civilian personnel administering the cities and provinces, Vietnam would be reformed. Only Washington's own people could fulfill Washington's ?wishes. ? .. The administrative changes Meant that the national security managers had decided that the most effective mech- .anism for processing reforms through the GVN was for America to take over the government. They were also begin- ning to understand that the surest way to take over a client state .was to introduce ground troops who. would ultimately become jesponsible for the defense of the country. Under such circumstances, the native leader. no longer serves as a puppet but rather, in ,the manager's words,' as a "platform" upon which the American military and administrative personnel would be able to operate. Reduced from a leader to a 0100- nu e d order tohold Hanoippt 1000090001-6ove99R00 s o e o number of Americans in key minis- platform, the local ruit acticlibietease1200414114-,-; 0 v: CIAARDP38414004900120P09,00alt6came to mean ? state is robbed of the Tast. vestiges of Diem lacked the image that would ;, turning the reins of government over his -.political 'life. His value to the qualify him to receive American : to the Americans. Once Americans . mother country is no longer measured ground troops. In a discussion of "the , took ?Ver.,. they could manipulate the by the speed and economy with which famous problem of Diem as an admin- concepts . of warfare and welfare he is able to bring about the changes istrator and politician," ' Taylor sug- according to their own priorities. The 'suggested by Washington. (the core of gested three choices that were available battle between. these concepts would .. his' bargaining power). , . to Washington. . be waged within the American estab- Since the local leader is no longer The first was to "remove him in lishment, with the pacifiers making the source of change, he is not favor of. a military dictatorship which feeble attempts to reform the military. expected to do anything; he is merely would 'give dominance to the military Reform ultimately came to moon less expected not to undo anything. The chain of command." The second was indiscriminate 'killing instead of greater mother country is less interested in to "remove him in favor of a figure of citizen participation. Finally, , the re- gaining than in not losing. That desir- mote dilute power who would delegate port . defined the qualities of the ideal able feature ? of leadership, charisma, authority to act in both military and leader that America would ...nccd .in gives, way to banality. The worth of . 'civilian leaders." It was this option Vietnam after it I stationed its troops in the leader is now measured by the that foreshadowed the need for a lodal the field and its bureaucrats in office? number of followers he .does not lose, leader who could retain a . rapidly qualities that were to be found 'even- the number of riots that do not occur, diminishing . constituency, so that the tually in the middling 'leadership of the number. of battles that are not. largest number of US troops could be Thieu. fought. The leader's role in his own coun- try is purely custodial. His task is to hold things together. To the degree. . that he performs this function, he has built the platform upon which the troops from the mother country may enter. His obligation to the mother country is to serve as.? the official greeter of the foreign troops. He is a janitor at home and a master . of .ceremonies abroad. The problem with Diem was that he was unable to play a custodial role at home or a ceremonial one abroad. By -1961, he was beginning -to lose his folloWers faster than the United States could. increase its. personnel in Viet- nam. Were this- inverse ratio to con- tinue, the 'moment would come when there would be no platform for Amer- ican troops to walk on. But tlis was not clearly 'perceived in Washington' in 1961. When it did 'become obvious in 1963, Diem was dispensed with. Whereas Ambassador Durbrow had toyed with . the idea of eliminating Diem because he was not .a reformer, the. Kennedy circle would remove him because. he had been abandoned by the last of the faithful. Diem's failure to ,reform 'would be the alibi for, not the .- cause of, his downfall. .. - What was obvious .in 1961 was that . . _ , Kennedy was alarmed about Diem's public image in America. From . the .point of view .of the President of. the United States, the local leader 'must. be palatable to Ihe American people if American troops are to be ordered to Vietnam. One explanation for 'Ken-, nedy's decision to veto the recom- mendation of all of his senior advisers sent. Once the need became apparent, the second choice was axiomatic. Washington would then require some- one to perform custodial. services in Vietnam and- act as an official greeter for American troops, roles played by General Khanh in 1964 and .General. Thieu after 1965. . In 1961, however, Taylor opted for the third choice. Be wished to retain Diem in. order "to bring about a series of de faCto administrative changes via persuasion at -high levels using the US presence to force the Vietnamese to get their house in order in one area after another." In considering the first two choices, Taylor raised the prospect of a coup, but rejected it because "it would be dangerous for us to engineer a coup under present tense circum- stances, since' it is by no means certain that we could control its consequences and . potentialities . for Communist exploitation." In other words, the United States had not yet taken over enough of Vietnam to ?guarantee ?the irrelevance of the new leader. 'he. Taylor-Rostow report had a profound influence on Washington's policy toward Vietnam. The report fashioned the: strategy of combined .escalation and moderation. By estab- lishing the principle of "limited part-. nership," a euphemism for American' control, it resolved the conflict be- tween the need for efficient prosecu- tion of the war and the need for administrativereform. The previous aim of reform had been to broaden the base of the government to include elements of the loyal oppositiOn. The. new focus was on the pace at which The Recommendations of McNamara and Rusk While the Taylor-Rostow report was circulating in, Washington, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk were writing their own recommendations for Vietnam policy. McNamara picked . up the ?thread of Taylor's strategic analysis and Rusk pondered the need for an American seizure of the Vietnamese bureaucracy. Rusk believed the President should carefully weigh the decision to send in US troops against. Diem's unwillingness to "give. us something worth support- ing." Diem's failure to trust his own commanders and his obstinate refusal to broaden the base of government made it unlikely' that a "handful of American troops can have decisive influence." Rusk . noted the vital im- portance that US policy ,attached ? to Southeast Asia, but he cautioned against "committing American prestige to a losing horse." Hks recommenda- tions,. however, also presumed a seizure of the internal bureaucracy, the process described by Taylor as "limited part- nership." Rusk directed the State Department to. draw up a list of m expectations "fro Diem our assis- tance forces us to assume de facto 'direction of South Vietnamese affairs " While Rusk was elaborating on Tay- lor's report from the civil side, McNamara accelerated the recom- mendations from the military side. He accepted the strategy recommended by Taylor, but criticized him for not putting enough muscle. behind that strategy. In -McNamara's -view; the -8,000-man task force would help Diem but would -not convince the other 1 i Lt . American troops entered the eld d e ? trooktis_ete Called from Approved For Releaten20011114/211tsCIARDP8401100b0014 oscow, cipmg, or Hanoi) that we _government. OVIctintlOci 6 mean business. Moreover, it probablYStelic bFsts Ta_vlar _reap a mpp?47 64blreettti will not tip the scalAPPRVg191.W .soneelS, fh, during dis-. cussions wit t. resi ent-elect, Eisen- would be almost ?certain to get increas- . to. be led to -accept a gradual involve- hewer told him, "It is imperative that ingly mired down in an inconclusive ment. McNamara, on the other hand, Laos be defended. The United. States believed that America would ? much should accept this task with. our allies, more likely support a firm hand. if we could persuade them, and alone Taylor either eschewed war alto- if we .could . not. Our unilateral. inter- gether by projecting ,such logical ventioh would be our last desperate incompatibilities as a bold strategy and hope in the event we were unable to a quiescent task force, or equivocated prevail 'upon the Other signatories to by never pulling out or pushing in. McNamara, just recovering from his Kennedy's advisers wholeheartedly personal revulsion at' the possibility of, supported .Eisenhower's position, but 'a nuclear holocaust over Berlin, seemed had to wait for Johnson to apply it "to to be willing to prosecute a large Vietnam, not Laos. Kennedy himself, Conventional war. In view of the in 1961, seemed to be more impressed "advanced .state of US technology, such, with the arguments advanced by the a war, if carried on for years, could British and French arnbassadOrs than produce effects amounting to nuclear devastation. struggle." Since the aim of' the strategy was to make the enemy know that the United States would attack directly if it did not disengage itself from the Southern struggle, McNamara concluded: ... the other side can be. con- vinced we mean business only if we accompany ?the initial force introduction by a clear warning commitment to the full objective ? stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Con will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam. McNamara presumed that the other side .would attack, not withdraw, in spite of the presence of US troops and a clear statement of intent. The US would then reply with 205,000 men, or six divisions. Public opinion in America, McNamara. believed, "will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually." Wnat is striking about the recom- mendations by the Secretary of State :and the Secretary of Defense is that each, . within his particular domain, weiit beyond the suggestions made by 'General Taylor. Whereas Taylor spoke of a limited partnership between the GVN .and the United States govern- ment, Rusk operated ori the assump- tion of a "de facto direction of South Vietnamese affairs." With respect to military policy, boldly conceived a strategy that could well lead to genocide, but he was rather. timid in applying He wanted to avoid the impression that ? the US would send its troops into actual combat, and urged the flood relief idea upon the President as a cover to preserve a peaceful image. McNamara, however, not only was willing .to embrace the need for 8,600 combat troops, but seemed to be devising a pre-emptive strategy by calling on a second-strike capability of six divisions as a response to the . Northern invasion that would be .touched off by the initial force. . 'While Taylor saw the flood relief -task force as a humanitarian cover to avoid _as a Kennedy's Decision ' In spite of the agreement among his senior advisers that ground troops. should be dispatched, Kennedy refused. He could have cited many reasons to support his decision. One was that the introduction of US combat forces in Vietnam would cripple the discussions for a negotiated settlement in Laos. Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador, had told Rus'Ic on November 7 that "the introduction of US troops would not only complicate the situation, but make it impossible to get anywhere on Laos." A week later, Ambassador Alphand of France told Rusk that further escalation would undermine the Geneva negotia- tions and compound the risk of "mass intervention" by the Soviet Union. Alphand also reminded the Secretary of "difficulties for the West of fighting .in Vietnam." Rusk, however, took this to -mean that Europe and America Might have to part ways. Rusk explained that. it "would be difficult for US opinion and friendly countries to accept a repeti- tion of Laos in Vietnam:'Southeast Asia, he concluded, was "more impor- tant to" the United States than to Europe." Indeed, "if the loss of South- east Asia was at stake, and Europeans did not agree with our policies, there might have to be a divergence." usk's attitude demonstrates a fun- damental shift in the direction of American foreign policy. Hereafter the national security managers, except for a larger war, McNamara viewed it George Ball, were to reject the need way to provoke the North into for a multilateral response and .affirm that tance .of a peaceful APPretlietd3FORRe lesset200f41 dik-F12615841W499R0010000900 - counseled the President on the impor- first sign of this shift occurred on larger war: Taylor, moreover, the will to proceed alone in Asia. The .6cAt rued ? with Eisenhower's position .or with Rusk's acceptance of it. Kennedy, it could be argued, was yet to be persuaded that US foreign policy was destined to go it alone in Asia. In addition to shattering the Laotian settlement, the dispatch of troops to Vietnam at a time when the Berlin crisis could again erupt increased Ken- nedy's "expressed concern over a two- front war." This- does not Mean, however, that Kennedy was willing to preside over the liquidation Of- the fledgling American Empfte in South- east Asia. The fear of.a two-front.war, according to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wOulcl have to be weighed against the fear "that an American retreat in Asia might upset the whole world balance." Other factors must be considered to explain Kennedy's veto of combat troops. One way to understand the President's motives is to recall the decision he made and try to discover what light they shed on decisions that he did not make. We do know, for example, that Kennedy sent .troops to Vietnam, referring to them as support troops, though their combat role was extensive. Therefore, we can conclude that Kennedy saw the need to disguise their combat function. We also know that the number sent during his admin- istration ultimately doubled the initial: figure .of 8,000 recommended by Tay- lor and Rostow. Therefore, Kennedy saw the need to introduce them into . Vietnam gradually instead of at one stroke. Finally, we know that Kennedy began a campaign of covert activities against North Vietnam-Ta campaign that .marked the switch to ? direct offensive actions but was disguised so that Washington could publicly dis- avow its own role. 2 7.7 IN,..ennedy's policyA towaset Vika then, was to accelera pe c war wti pTvea r 61.9"1509*Ptiit% torate were the dispatch o' ,igorAr.ik fi e erlA9s2Ailti gA941:aRftE rf 97:Mas ,.orts o a. lie c denying that he was doing it. His policy was to prosecute a private war. He was willing to go it alone in Asia, but not to admit it. He disregarded the counsel of his advisers only. to the extent that they preferred a public war. ?? The President,. clearly, did not be- lieve that the American people would support him in his decision to eScalate the level of combat. This does not mean that Kennedy. thought the Amer- ican, people would have been opposed to a war in Indochina under any circumstances. It simply means, that in 1961 the American public would not support a war whose ostensible pur- pose was to preserve the Diem regime. The war would be repulsive because the, leader was odious. In 1963, when the ?self-iminolation of protesting Bud- dhist monks became a daily event, Diem's image abroad deteriorated and became incompatible with the Amer- ican. presence. ? The American people could resign themselves to an indefinite . war, but not when the character of the regime, personified by Diem, Nhu, and Madame Nhu, was so obnoxious. Wash- ington concluded that Diem would' have to be eliminated before the' war could. be escalated. While Dien was too repellent to be ?given 'American combat troops, he was :'not pliable enough to accept American bureaucrats. Rusk, as we have seen, presumed that America would under- take a ."de facto direction of South , Vietnamese; affairs." The Taylor- Rostow report had anticipated- -a "limited .partnership" - between ? the GVN and the United States .govern- ment. Diem quickly dashed these hopes.. Vice President Thuan told Ambassador Nolting that Diem's "atti-. tude seerred to be that the United States was asking great concessions of GVN in the realm of its sovereignty, in exchange for little additional help." When Notting pressed Diem directly on the need for a close partnership, Diem informed him that "Vietnam_ did, not want to be a.protectorate." By word and deed, Diem demon- strated that.he would no more broaden his decision-making councils to include Americans than he would do so to inclUde other Vietnamese. To turn over the internal bureaucracy to the Amer- icans, Diem had told Ambassador Kenneth Young, would "give a mono- poly on . nationalism to the Coin- munists." The only conditions under dum, Kennedy cljAwnsteolo*AlleggAie.cd rPVVIRRE- Re IgPsAc2M111 %;,?.w.fik-Fagro. y 499R0 woo.9ogg;!,- which Diem would a nu ecr the .combined non-Communist certain that the Americans .would people of the GVN against a Com- openly 'defend him, then he could munist takeover." Kennedy admon- ished the.' ambassador: ? afford to come out openly as their puppet. But Washington would. not openly defend Diem because he did not seem worth defending in public. In these circumstances Kennedy made the decision ,not to send in combat troops, or rather, to fight a Private war. In a National Security Council Action Memorandum on Viet- nam, NSAM .111, Kennedy, observing widespread- criticism of Diem's regime, stated that US support would be conditional upon whether real reforms were instituted by.Diem. The President said: Rightly or wrongly his regime is widely criticized abroad and in the US, and if we are to give our substantial support, we must be able to point to real administra- tive, political, and social reforms and a real effort to 'widen it's base that will give maximum confidence to the American people, as well as to world opinion that our efforts are not directed towards the sup- port of an unpopular or ineffective regime, but rather towards sup- porting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GVN against a Communist take- over. In the next clause of the NSAM, however, Kennedy made the decision to send ..US troops and informed the American ambassador that these troops should be seen as the equivalent of combat forces. It is anticipated that one of the . first questions President Diem will ? raise with you after your presenta- tion of the above joint proposals will be that. of introducing US combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions we already have in mind involve a substantial number of US military personnel for operatic:if-1dt duties in Vietnam, and that we believe that these forces. performing crucial missions can greatly increase the capacity of GVN forces to win their war against the Viet Cong: . US firepower and US troops would be immediately sent to Vietnam without the necessity for any "real administra- tive, political, and social . reforms." What was desirable was that Diem's image be improved. In the next clause of the memoran- You should inform Diem that, in. our minds, the concept of the' joint undertaking envisages a much closer relationship than the present, ',one of acting in an advisory capacity only. We would expect to share in the decision-making pro- cesses in the political, economic and military' fields as they affected the Security situation. Reform, .to Kennedy, ultimately meant that Diem. needed an attractive image in America, and that Washington needed to seize the bureaucratic chinery in Vietnam. If neither forthcoming, . Diem would be mated, and a "genuine and puppet put in his place. II ma- was dim- real" The private war required dispatching US. ,combat troops to ? Vietnam to perform "operational duties" and with- holding that .fact from the American public. The 'troops were put under the jurisdiction of the newly 'organized Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), but their. combat role was disguised. The public was told that US personnel would only "advise" ? the South Vietnamese army. , Another component of the private:. war was the initiation of covert activ- ities. Begun 'in ? the spring of 1961, only six weeks after John F. Kennedy had assumed the Presidency, these con- tinued without interruption up to the launching of Operation Rolling Thun- der in February, ? 1965, the beginning of the overt war by Lyndon Johnson. In March, 1961., Kennedy instructed. the?national security agencies to "make every possible effort to launch guerrilla ,operations in Viet-Minh territorY at the. earliest possible time." He directed the Secretary of. Defense and the Director of the CIA to furnish plans for covert programs near-term periods." against the North both in the and in the "longer future Two months later, Kennedy approved the program for covert ac- tions that had been proposed by the Vietnam Task Force, a group working out of the State Department, then . under the leadership of Sterling Cot- trell. Cottrell had accompanied Taylor and Rostow on their mission to Viet- nam in the fall of 1961 and had urged 8 the President not to introduce combati- ? troops into the SoutlAftxpltbaiediftr 1961 he recommended that the Pres- ident use South Vietnamese troops for commando raids and sabotage in North' Vietnam and Laos.' . The President agreed. One hundred days after he was elected President, he ordered agents to be sent into North Vietnam who were to be resupplied by- Vietnamese civilian mercenary air crews. Special GVN forces were mean- - while to infiltrate into' Southeast Laos to locate and attack Communist bases, and other teams trained by the Special Forces were to be used for sabotage and light harassment inside North Viet- nam. Finally, Kennedy ordered flights over 'North Vietnam to drop leaflets. ' Two days after Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow mission and before the mission arrived in Vietnam, th-t President ordered guerrilla ground action, "including the use of US advisers if necessary against Communist. , aerial resupply missions in the vicinity . of Tchepone, Laos." In December, immediately after he shelved Taylor's proposal to deploy 8,000 combat -troops in the South, Kennedy adopted a CIA-sponsored program to recruit South VietnEimese personnel for the purpose of "forming an underwater demolition team to operate in strategic maritime areas of North Vietnam." . jy the end of 1961, the private war consisted of covert operations directed against North Vietnam and Laos, and the concealed use of US air and ground combat personnel against the 'Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Each element of the private war increased in tempo and .intensity 'throughout 1962 and 1963. By the time Kennedy was assassinated, the United States had 16,500 troops in South Vietnam pm- tending they were not fighting, and the Special Forces were executing' a host of covert programs in North Vietnam and Laos. , During its thirty-three months,. in . office, ' the Kennedy Administration managed and directed an illicit war. By sending an additional :1,000 troops to .Vietnam in '1961, Kennedy broke through the MAAG ceiling and violated the Geneva Accords. Speaking to Rusk at a National Security Council meeting November, .1961; Kennedy defined the Presidential manner proper to breaching international laws: "Why do The Accords, of course, had been M(,rg,e Bundy. The chairman of the alse2011111.1/08ut ClIA-RDINSA-00349114,90110NOROMe6rge Bundy,. who . . conceal violations?and the developing had been given his choice between the war?from the American public was chairing new. That the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, .and attempted coups in various parts of the world had also been covert enterprises does not diminish the special significance of the Vietnam under- taking. Here, for the first time, covert activity no longer crystallized into. a ,single event, as with the Bay. of Pigs. In Vietnam, the "black stuff" became _ the usual way of doing business;. the war itself Was .covert. Nor does it suffice to say that, the U-2 flights were stretched Out through time. The pur- pose of these flights was spying; they were repetitions of a single act; and they were placed under the jurisdiction of the CIA, an agency restricted to covert, acts. In. Vietnam, several covert programs were put together to create a pattern of warfare, not spying, and these programs were instituted and managed by the government. Room 303 , In 1962 and 1563,. two agencies in Washington managed the Vietnam war?the 303 Committee and the Special - Group Counter-Insurgency (SGCI). The 303 Committee, taking its name ,from the room number at the Execu- tive Office Building where it met once a week, came into being as a direct 'consequence of the egregious blunder- ing at the _Bay of Pigs in the spring of '1961. Kennedy, appalled by the mili- tary incompetence shown by the fiasco . and embarrassed by the public image it 'created, was determined to make sure 'that the covert activities of the CIA did not contradict US foreign policy ? and that :they- were not . beyond the capabilities of the military. ? . Thereafter, CIA programs had to be cleared in advance. This was the task of the 303 Committee, whose jurisdic- tion came to inclimle every important covert program conducted anywhere in the world, including Vietnam. The 'membership of the committee in-- ished and exploited; ? that eluded the Deputy Secretary of .De- tribes; rather than landed . peasants, fense, the Deputy Undersecretary. of. could be made into warriors and be State for Political Affairs, the Deputy moved ' more, easily from one assign- ment to another. As warriors, the Montagnards took their orders directly from the CIA, in return for which they were liberally paid and autonomy from the GVN. Special Group Counter- Insurgency and the 303 'Committee. To the extent that Vietnam was a covert war in 1962 and 1963, the 303 Committee managed the war. It did this by approving and revising the . programs that defined American covert participation in the war. At least four major programs were authorized and supervised by the 303 Committee,? Operation Farmhand, the training of the Montagnards, DeSoto patrols, and 34a operations. Operation Farmhand was the first - covert program approved by the .303 . Committee for Vietnam. Under this program, South Vietnamese personnel were airlifted into North Vietnam in the' spring of 1961, to "commit sabo- tage, spy and harass the enemy." Trained by the army's Special Forces, who were themselves detached and put under the control . of the CIA, the commandos were invariably 'arrested as soon as they landed in the North. In many, instances, personnel would have to be conscripted to accept an assign- ment. Frequently, they would show up drunk or fail to 'appear at all. In the 'field, the program was a total failure, but, 'strategically, it informed the North that direct measures would, be taken against it.. ihe second major program author- ized by the 303 Committee .was the training of the Montagnards in South Vietnam, who had managed to preserve their ethnic identity over the centuries. These local tribesmen, whose loyalty never extended beyond their Own clan, were as opposed to, the encroachments of the GVN as they 'were to the 'solicitations of the Viet -Conga Because - they inhabited an area that bordered an infiltration route from North to South, the CIA believed that they.. could be trained as a force of warriors . to be used ,in attacks against the Viet Cong. The CIA felt that the bonds among ethnic minorities could be easily nour- nomadic Director of Intelligence of the CIA, and , the Special Assistant to . the President -for National Security Affairs, During we take onus, say we are going to the Kennedy years, these offices were break the Geneva Accords? Why .not held, respectively, by Roswell Gilpatric, remain silent? Don't say this our- U. Alexis Johnson, Richard Helms, and neither' consented 'to nor ,selves!" Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00111300090001-6 continued promised The GVN complied Approved Foftlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049n01000090001-6 oping effective and loyal armies Within 1964. CINCPAC plan 34a, drawn up in the fall of 1953 as an annex to the entire CINPAC plan for Southeast Asia, was the covert plan directed against the North. It consisted of two parts: psychological operations and hit-and- run attacks. The latter included amphib- ious raids by the Vietnamese in areas "south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security." This was subse- quently expanded to include the use of 'Swift torpedo boats to shell the Northern mainland and kidnap North- ern personnel. Plan 34a, too, was assigned by the 303 Committee Joint Chiefs for implementation. ' The Special Group for Counter-Insurgency By the end of 1963, 30,000 local tribesmen had been armed and trained. The Special Forces carried out this work for the CIA. Eventually, the Montagnards were formed into units known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). They. were used for . various types of operations, and were noted primarily for their bravery, bru- tality, and terrorism. CIDG., units were , used to repress the Southern peasantry as well as for armed incursions into the North. As soon as the program showed some success, the ,MACV, attempting to break the autonomy of the Special Forces, removed the program from the CIA and placed it Under its own jurisdiction. ? CIA training of the Montagnards in South Vietnam had its counterpart among the Meo tribesmen in Laos. The Meo, too, were a local clan whose latent warrior tendencies and antipathy toward central rule? were carefully ? nurtured by the CIA. By training and :paying the Montagnards and Meo 'tribesmen, the CA, in effect, created a feree of warriors directly under its The conflict between the .1oCal? tribesmen and the central govern- ment, fostered by the CIA, ran parallel to a larger conflict among American officials?a conflict between the Special Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Just as the local tribesmen were promised their autonomy from the ,central government by the CIA, so the Special Forces had been established as an autonomous force, to take their commancg directly from the President,. circumventing the Joint Chiefs. As ?the Indochina .war proceeded, the local tribesmen Were eventually reduced to subservience by the central govern- ment, arid the Special Forces were taken over by the Joint Chiefs. The "guerrillas" within the client stqte and the 'guerrillas" within the American imperial state were broken and absorbed? by the client and imperial government, respectively. But to develop a 'guerrilla force within the imperial power, an idea originated by the CIA, is a structural -.change that may prefigure the imperial 1.111y of the future. For the conflict between the Special Forces and the Joint Chiefs, on the one hand, and the . its client states. -Neither the Royal Laotian Army nor the ARVN has been able to hold its own against the people's army, the Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao. It was as 'a direct result of this difficulty that the CIA attempted to build armies of local tribesmen. These guerrilla armies were an aston- ishing success when .compared to the regular armies of South Vietnam and Laos. When the Joint Chiefs set out to break the autonomy .of the Special Forces, they Were fortuitously putting under. their command a guerrilla army. of local tribesmen which they were able to use as the new imperial army. With this one stroke the Joint. Chiefs resolved some of the difficulties of relying both upon a client army and upon troops conscripted in the US. Neither American boys nor South Vietnamese boys wished to fight in a people's war. What could be better cannon fodder to use against the People . than a pre:People, that is, clansmen? The courage of the local tribes and the technology of the imperial power were combined to do battle with large numbers of Asian 'people and the guerrilla organizations they were supporting. rr ihe third program begun by. the 303 Committee was the use 'of DeSoto patrols. Originated in 1962 and approved by the President, this pro- gram authorized US destroyers to operate along the border of mainland China and the North Vietnamese main- land, to listen to the "military and civil activity of tile Asian Communist bloc." In addition to -listening, the patrols were ordered to stimulate the radar of the enemy so that the position . and type of radar could be identified. After the DeSoto patrols were approved by -Kennedy. and the detailed policy for using them was formulated by the 303_ Committee, the program was submitted for implementation to the Joint Chiefs, who tho'n put the. pro- gram under the jurisdiction of the Joint Center for Intelligence at their headquarters in Washington. The Ops Center, as it was called, dreW up the tentative schedules and forwarded them to C1NCPAC in Hawaii. CINCPAC selected the precise 'dates for tile DeSoto patrols and sent orders to local tribesmen and the central govern7. the Seventh Fleet. Copies of these ment, on the other, reflects a larger orders were also sent to MACV il conflict between the client state and the- Saigon. The question of who selected imperial power. The United States has and. kept track of the DeSioatrols ? to the The second agency in Washington that managed the private war between 1961 and I963 was the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (SOC). Organized in response to Khrttshchev's speech on wars of national liberation, the SGCI was created by President Kennedy in NSAM 1-24, issued in late 1961,? The SG,CI, like the 303 Committee, met once a week.. In fact,??? its members included those on the 303 Committee, or their delegates, and met in Room 303 at The Executive Office Building imme- diately after the Committee adjourned its meetings. Members of the 303 Committee would complete their 'dis- cussions, sign the orders for the covert _ programs, and then call the SGC1 to order, in additional deputies, and turn their attention to the problems of counterinsurgen0'. 1\ evertheless, there., were substantial differences between the 303 Com- mittee and the SGCI. The 303 Com- mittee managed the covert operations of the United ? States government in every area of the world. The programs themselves generally originated. with the CIA, although other agencies of. government, such. as the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the State Department, did submit proposals, many of which were put into operation. The only requirement for a 303 hearing Was that the program be significant and covert: When a program was put into operation, it generally used the services of the Special Forces. The SGCI, on the contrary, never managed 'covert operations,- had only a limited relation to the CIA, and did n84-P,049rOblitlIP0k9ti s encountered grave dAlitinzWeict-Skre.Pec,19P?R gc19114 11,4?,?fficiAp 'Oree.S. t deal exClusively with the of the Special the Gulf of Tonkin incident-of August, 10 overt programs of the 6proyAafntr RAktaw ?fACW13(041,; cl#APPA4-004 in any nation 'around . the ?globe that7'Fuilt the. hamlets in total disregard of RAPQM?A9APP04, since, they show the information guiding official, . was deemed to be threatened .. by the oil blot theory. Instead 'of seemingWashington during the private war as insurgency. These programs were under .one hamlet before proceeding to the, l well as the. reaction to that informa-- the special jurisdiction of the several next, -Nhu was interested in increasing' tion. . ? ' - national security agencies, including ' the number of hamlets, with the result The Viet Cong . the Defense Department, AID, the : that none was secure. When 'Diem was.' State Department, USIA, and the CIA assassinated in 1963, thousands of The year ? 1962 has been referred The purposes of SGCI were to . coor- strategic hamlets collapsed overnig,ht to as the optimistic period in Vietnam. dinate . the overseas programs of. the 3): The ARVN was to be built into a The insurgency was. coming. under national security 'agencies, ' eliminate powerful army that could take the control,- and McNamara' was persuaded duplication of effort, and ensure that offensive against the Viet Cong and that the US had. turned the Corner in those programs relating to counter- regain the territory then held by the Vietnam and . that AmeriCan boys insurgency were completed. The SGCI Communists. The ARVN, trained by would be returning home. On May 3, ? supervised the overseas program's of MACV and working in conjunction 1962, Sterling Cottrell reported to the each of the national security agencies. with . the strategic hamlet' program Special Group that ' .the . US had A counterinsurgency doctrine ..tech- under the charismatic leadership. of "reached - the _bottom's in. Vietnam. nically known as "The Overseas In- Diem, would, it was anticipated, ex- .Cottrell, it should be recalled, was the lanai Defense Policy ? of the USA" tend the .national sovereignty of the' head of the Vietnam Task Force, had - was. written in 1962. President Ken- GVN throughout South Vietnam. i ? accompanied Taylor and Rostow on,. nedy adopted it as the official policy The national, security agencies of the their mission to Vietnam, . and had i of the US government in NSAM 182. US government devoted, all their opposed their advice on the question . The main premise of the docirine. was efforts to this strategic plan. ? Their of ground. troOps'. He supported a , that the counterinsurgents should help programs were supervised by the SGCI low-keyed approach to Vietnam and. themselves, but a saving clause was and their projects - were completed clearly had a stake in the continuation added to the doctrine instructing: under the direction of a-- special of the current Vietnam policy. . "Where necessary, _ introduce US agency, which ostensibly possessed a . General Lyman Lemnitier; the chair- troops."' . blueprint of victory. : . man of the Joint Chiefs, reported ,on Thus the 303 Committee was largely' The countries under the jurisdiction May 1'1, 1962, that the defense build-up responsible for the unofficial policy of of the SGCI included Vietnam, Laos, was going well. The military seemed the US government toward Vietnam, Thailand, ,Iran, and a ? half-dozen Latin unanimous in believing that US policies during . the private war?the covert: American countries. Vietnam and Laos were having .benign effects. On May 31, activities in North Vietnam and Laos,' were it the top. of the list. By, the end'. Cottrell informed the SGCI Group that and the disguised .use of US combat of 1962, entire meetings were devoted the CNN was increasing the-number of .troops within. South Vietnam. The to Vietnam alone. The SGCI mainly 'strategic hamlets at an ,`ambitious and SGCI, on the other hand, was in uncontrolled rate." reviewed weekly reports furnished by Chargb of the Official policy?the policy the :Vietnam Task Force. In time, On June 20, however, John McCone, that was re. ported in the, press and however, these reports, prepared . by director of the -CIA, warned that the .otherwise made known to the Amer- Sterling Cottrell and Ben, Wood, were Viet COng were beginning to fight in ;lean public. . ? considered ' too meager: and other larger. units. They were using heavier .. . ? . . The, official . policy consisted of a national. security agencies, such as, the weapons, he, added,. to wipe out stra-- ? Pentagon, AID, and the CIA, began to tegie hamlets before help could arrive. strategic plan ,which, consistent with suppI y supplementary reports on On. November 5., the Task Force told the counterinsurgency doctrine, called Vietnam. . . . the Group that Viet Cong forces Were. upon the GVN to defend itself, to win? The reports, 'whether from the Task as strong as ever. They were -able .to . its own war, and to employ Americans Force or the other national security recruit many new ..pet'sonnel, even .. as teachers. There were three parts to agencies, were discussed at the opening though, their morale had begun to slip. ' . the plan: of each meeting. Then, e5(pert wit- Cottrell added that the "situation was 1) The US government officially nesses who had just returned 'from Still in balance." accepted Diem as the premier of South Vietnam would . brief the Special In 1963,' ;the US tried again , to Vietnam, and all aid was, channeled Group. Some of._ the Witnesses who document its charge that the Viet through him., regularly appeared before the SGCI. Cong were being aided by. heavy 2) The strategic hamlet program was were John Richardson, the CIA station infiltration from. the 'North. 'One taI: ? devised. as the principal means Of chief in Vietnam; General Victor Km- .confronting the Special Group was to defending the South against further lak; the Special Assistant for Counter- determine the accuracy of the charge, -.encroachments by the Viet Cong. Insurgency and Special Activities On January 17, 1963, the Task Force Strategic hamlets were supposed to (SACS-A); . William Jorden, a former decided -that infiltration was less seri- help organize the rural peasants .into New York Times reporter and the larger territorial . units in order to cora IC nu e d author of the two white papers on increase their capacity- to defend 'them- -? Vietnam; Ted Sarong, the Australian selves and .to weed out Viet Cong,. - attach?Robert Thompson, the British As envisioned by the planners, the - - expat on counterinsurgency and mov- ?hamlets were to expand like an oil ? ina force' behind the strategic. hamlet: blot, dense in the center,' blurred at ''' - doctrine; and one Walton, an ex-marine the perimeter. Ideally, a second hamlet - , and-head of the police safety division in -would not be built until the first was Vietnam:. , satisfactorily organizio30151.-na 1,-eLletelifiSeagnaiisliVatliCItUFIDR84-00-499R001000090001-6 defensible. Diem's brother, Nhu; was - 11 ous than had plained that in 'supplies were ished to the Viet Cong in tin ; the, insurgents had little need L., dependent upon :the North for either. Taylor, com- plying with "higher" orders, said it was important , to get information on Northern infiltration - and authorized William Jorden to go to Vietnam ,to study the question thoroughly. Wash- ington was becoming embarrassed over the fact- that it was increasingly- corn- Mitting. itself to intervention in a civil War. , On April 5, 1963; a famous meeting of .the Special, Group was ??held, in which Jorden, after spending . three 'months in Vietnam, reported that "we are unable to document and develop .any hard evidence of infiltration 'after October 1, 1962." Evidence prior to that date strongly indicated the. ab- se.= of infiltration, At the same meeting, Robert Thompson attempted to counter Jorden's pessimistic ap- praisal of Viet Cong gctivity by fore- casting that "US forces are adequate. By the end of the year, troops can ' begin to be withdrawn." AState Department representative on the Special Group summed up in one sentence the observations of the ; US army officers who returned .from Vietnam in 1962: "If free elections were to be held in 'South Vietnam in 1962, lb o would get.70 percent or the popular vote." Because of Ho's popu- . ? larity, he added, wholesale supplies in the South and ready recruitment of ' personnel were available to the Viet Cong. Only a trickle of supplies jn addition to the original covert apparatus had been furnished by the North. The State Department official pointed , out that all insurgents receive some outside help. "There has never been a ease of an isolated- insurgency. Not even the US War of Independence was an isolated insurgency." This same official was one of the authors of the counterinsurgency doc- trine of the US government.- He .contrasted the. doctrine of the Corn- -munist Party with that of the US on the question of the necessity of out- side help for an insurgency, noting that, - Communist doctrine ... emphasizes the fact that the insurgency should be homegrown, and that major communist powers, especially China, do not pour in that e Viet Gong -were actively LAppxo.ved For-"ReleA?g 2g030,1t98 a'ss.PIARPf114-04. 0,000.09.00101p6pulation and .ierit and local enables the insurgents, to retain .their own 'independence so that they can sustain themselves over - ? the long haul.. Communist Party doctrine stands in radical contrast to the US doctrine of counter- insurgency, :which demands Inas- - sive support by us and which turns , the counter-insurgents into our dependents, sapping their morale and capacity to fight. He supported this comparison, with evidence accumulated by the Spe-, cial Group showing that all weapons captured from the Viet Cong by the US during the period of the private war were either homemade or had been previously captured. from the GVN/USA. "Throughout this time," he said, "no one had ever found one Chinese rifle or one Soviet weapon used by a VC." He concluded that the weight of evidence and doctrine proved that. "the massive aggression theory was completely phony.". ? Approved For that they fought with dedicated spirit- and great effectiveness. It should not have been difficult for Forrestal and , Kennedy to see that the rural popula- tion cooperated "from conviction" be- cause in fact it made up the Viet Cong. In 19'62, Michael Forrestal, a senior member of the National Security Council and a close friend of President Kennedy, confirmed these charges. Re- turning from a long viSit to Vietnam, Forrestal and' Roger Hilsman wrote a report to the President that ,stated that the Viet Cong had ."increased their regular forces from 18,000 to 23,000 over this past year." During this period the government of Vietnam had claimed that 20,000 Viet Cong were killed in action and 4,000 wounded. "No one really knows," Forrestal wrote, "how many of the 20,000 'Viet ?Cong' killed last year were only inno- cent, or at least 'persuadable,' vil- lagers." ? ? ? Forrestal told Kennedy that "the vast bulk of both recruits and stqlplies come: from' inside South Vietnam it- Self." At the "very least," Forrestal concluded, De.foliatioi? The 'Special Group devoted part of its attention to some of the programs conducted in the field. As early as 1961, the defoliation .program, called Operation Hades and sub- sequently accorded the euphemism Operation Ranchhand-, was ? granted Presidential approval. Limited at first as an experimental measure, it soon became an exercise in wholesale crop' destruction. The expanded program received strong financial and political support. 'Discussions of Operation ? Ranchhand in Washington were instruc- tive, especially since they showed the bureaucrats' lack of 'any concern what- ever for the consequences of their decisions. Indeed, what was most strik- ing about the discussions of the de- foliation program at the Special Group meetings - was the absence,:of inquiry into the nature of the program. No limits on the defoliation program were ,,ever established; no results ex- amined, no damage surveyed. ,Concern, about the program focused on the single question of whether the South Vietnamese military had given their consent. Apparently, if the GVN recommended the program and the ARVN consented , to it, bureaucratic responsibility in Washington was be- , lieyed to have ceased. the figures on Viet Cong strength imply a continuing flow of recruits and supplies from these same vil- lages and indicate that a substan- tial proportion of the population is still cooperating with the enemy, although it is impossible to tell how much of this cooperation stems from fear and how much. from conviction. Still, Forrestal emphasized that "the Viet Cong continue to' be aggressive 1 The program was the brain-child of ARPA, the Pentagon's Advanced Re- search Projects Agency, and was placed under the command of the US Chemical Corps. It was approved by the highest bureaucrats in Washington, including Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Michael Forrestal, and Richard Helms, along with a host of their deputies. But .after they had approved the defoliation program, these men ignored the forced migration, sterility, and hunger that followed in its wake. Such consequences were left to the concern of the GVN. The policymakers in Washington re- moved-every vestige of personal respon- sibility from their shoulders and laid it and extremely effective." It would, at the door of the GVN officials. seem that he had answered his own, Thus, Washington was able both to uestion. Like many other officials and and evade V-rgiNgligAlieCIAAPEgi TuVr?rMil'AIM?? tioY 'Nem. Maxwell the war at this time, he had discovered Taylor summed up the -coneerri for Operation Ranchhand in these words: 12 "We used it for cropAPP2YPAIFsNI9r i n2001/11/0p: CIPARRP81-e0049 41 140100 0000 esses were o ten ntunicate( by state apparatus irect?y- 6u nde- r President foliage. It was only useful along the his ferocity: When William 'Jordn; Kennedy i every highways. It was not at all criminal. It the author of two white papers on n Washington, but effort was made to duplicate ,this was simply ineffective. The entire pro- Vietnam, testified about infiltration pattern in the field. When Kennedy gram was irrelevant." Defoliation was from . the North, for example, he was assumed. the Presidency, one of the indeed irrelevant to Washington, but it excused prematurely in order to avofd problems plaguing American oreign was not irrelevant to the peasants who further embarrassment at Robert Ken- f policy was fact that each agency .in had to migrate, the women who be- nedy's hands. Another witness, re- . the field acted as if if were a self- came. sterile, the children who were minded that .the President's brother , was simply trying to get ,the facts, contained system, staking a claim made hungry. against the Pentagon for its ?own replied that Kennedy was "guilty of ' resources, moving from one part of the Kennedy in Control over-kill," Kennedy's function, it globe .t. next according to its seems, was to instill some fear into the o. the ' , _ assessment of where th action was, Although the bureaucracy in Wash- agencies?to persuade them that they e , insulating itself from above, _ington was not concerned with the were being watched closely by the . and extending its imperial writ. below. fruits of its labor in Vietnam, the President and should act - accordingly. President was ? greatly concerned with The armed services offered the prime his capacity to command the bureauc- racy in Washington. In his quest for 'Defenders of the Kennedy Admin- wild; but the civil agencies in the field, .control, he introduced four structural istration contend that the purpose of including the CIA, State, USIA, and others, also made their own rules and changes in the office ? of the Presi- these exertions was to keep America dency?the Special Group. Counter- .out of an unnecessary war in Southeast circumvented all attempts at direction .Insurgency,. the 303 Committee.; the' ?:\sia. The .Kennedys, it is .suggested, from above. :Country Team, and the . Green Berets.' believeil that the only way to avoid a The CIA, for 'example, was assigned 'Country of these Were fashioned to . meet deepening and perhaps irreversible a ? percentage of all shipping to specific defects in the execution of commitment to Vietnam was to expose nam, set up its Own network of . - foreign policy, and in this sense may ? the inflated statements offered., by ict so nol i?iv-1 1nm idirectca tion schannel fibackeld ' toa nN(V1 -ahs ha 11 'he viewed as ad hoc measures. But an officials who wished to draw the ington. , Laos . simply, became -. corn- extraordinary pattern emerga when nation into a wider war. But these petitive turf for the several agencies. the four are grouped together?an ex- rationalizations do 'hot hold up when it Each moved in with personnel and .Pansion of the war-making powers of is recalled ,that the purpose of the material, then sought a 'program first 'the Executive to a degree neve i- before SGCI in general, and Robert Kennedy's to justify its presence and second. to contemplated in the history - of the purpose in particular, was to centralize expand its domain. Aircraft stationed Aepublic. For the first time, total in the hands of . the President control. In Korea were forwarded to Vietnam command over the 'several ?national of a national state security machinery , on Air Force orders which had not security agencies was concentrated in which was increasingly committed to been cleared at higher levels, and when . , the office of the President:? war in Southeast Mia. such clearance became necessary,. The SGCI was a special agency The CIA had displayed' its power to dummy committees were created at 'created .by "Kennedy to . supervise the make foreign policy at the Bay of Pigs, the Pentagon to clear automatically programs of the national security, forcing the President to assume respon- any material requested. So far as the agencies. Kennedy, seleCted Maxwell sibility for events he had not initiated. agencies in the. field were concerned, ' Taylor, then occupying a special office. . and could not control.. After. Cuba, questions of state were politically un- in the White House 'as the PreSiderit's Kennedy fired Allen Dulles and real. The sole reality was the national military adviser, to be chairman of the appointed John McCone as director ,of ...., economy, which was viewed as -an 'SGCI,and the President's brother, the CIA, perhaps because McCone was infinite source of supply. Robert Kennedy, to be co-chairman. , considered more manageable: At the The state apparatus was thus central-, same time, he created the ? 303 Corn- ,....., ? ized by appointing a chairman and , a mittee to break the CIA's independent The origin of Operation kanchhand - co-chairman whom the President -per-. nower and place the agency under.his under .the .expert guidance of William sonally . trusted and who would report own management. From that time on, Codell offers -a classic example. ARPA directly to him. the CIA had, to clear each of its appropriated surplus funds to' begin the . ?- Taylor acted as a broker among the programs in.. advance .and report defoliation program, and .then, in order various power blocs to ensure that the directly to McGeorge Bundy, the chair-S to justify an .increased budget,..by? agencies- responded to the President's man of the 303 Committee and the passed the original guidelines and ex- bidding. Robert Kennedy was . con- Special Assistant to the President for Panded the program. Much ,as feudal'- . sidered the moving force behind the National Security Affairs: Bundy, Max- warlords had waged w.ar against each, SGCI. He attended every meeting and, well Taylor, and Robert Kennedy were other within fledgling nations, so the by his personal tactics, 'managed to trusted lieutenants who todk their modern ' agencies looked upon each. ?transform them into courtroom spec- orders directly from the President and other as rivals and tried to grab power .tacles. Officers of the agencies pre- were placed in charge- of special agencies and resources within the fledgling -sented their findings from a 'witness to Centralize command in -the natidnal empire. ? ' - chair, and Kennedy would zealously security apparatus on the' President's To cope with this problem, Ken- and relentlessly cross-examine 'each''behalf. nedy, in 1961, gave US ambassadors witness. .. Not only were the 303 Committee , . full power to control the . national Approved For RekelaStee200011110eneCIA3RDP0401)499R001000090001-6 . ootrit 1 nu ect 1 3 security agencies in tAt) V6IdifoidAteratlit20-ilillOgis. 4' AiRDP84-100492ftiQ.Q0M99116the Chiefs. The the agencies were their programs with.and.be supervised is anticipating just rapidly Special Forces,Sp such a counterinsurgency as a cover - to 'gain . by the ambassadors -to the countries in challenge by. the Chiefs and is pre-. control over part of the plans for, which they were operating. Together paring his own defense. The policies of covert 'operations, then expanded it to they were called the "Country Team," the. Chiefs, -moreover, invariably extend include conventional warfare, which with the ambassador as captain, who, the zone of combat until victory .is the military was organized to ptirsue. received his anthority - directly from achieved The Chiefs also depart from In this ,respect, there was an implicit, Kennedy and reported directly to him.. civilian leaders in being willing to wage accord between the military and civil, Just as Kennedy had hoped. to bring nuclear' war, if that is considered ian leadership._ the national security agencies in _Wash- necessary to avoid defeat.- ington under the command and control Every one of Secretary McNamara's of the SGC1, so he relied upon' the . famous visits to Vietnam was a guided concept ' of the Country Team to But '.if a war can .be presented as a tour carefully 'stage-managed by the ', achieve the same control in the field, police action, . or can proceed . under Joint Chiefs. McNamara would stop off cover as a private matter, then the at Hawaii and pick up a briefing book, '. The Joint Chiefs power of the Chiefs can be sharply prepared by Krulak, which contained limited. Thus Kennedy had an obvious ? ? . stake brilliant charts and graphs displaying , But the Joint Chiefs of Staff?in in keeping the ? progress of the war. McNamara ng the war private. But contrast to the oiler national security he was not passive. During the period. would scan the book to obtain the ,agencies?have independent Support of the private war Kennedy set about, information he needed for press con- both in Congress and in the country, building the elite corps of the Green ferences to be held in Saigon. After Working through ..the chairmen ' of key Berets. In Kennedy, Sorenson wrote: the trip, the information would be Congressional committees, the Chiefs converted into 'a hard-cover volume have .automatic access to one branch of But the President's pride: was still containing references .to McNamara's government to articulate the proposals the Armyrecent findings in Vietnam,. but again growing to a level some five .or six times as large as when he took . they deem ? important, -. regardless of written by Krulak. 'Phis book would whether they have the support of the office, although still small. both in then be. handed to the President President or his senior advisers. Once total numbers. and in relation to ?as the final report. The book had been 'these proposals are made public; the the need for more. The President written in advance of the trip just as -Chiefs can count .on the right-wing directed?again over the opposition the trip itself had been planned in -constituency in the country to support of 1.6p generals?that the Special advance. . them. Since the Chiefs formulate, ex- Forces wear Green Berets as a press, and then 'personify the national mark of distinction. required to clear accord with those of the military or he military first employed the conCept of With counterinsurgency - in their 'interest on any issue concerning Kennedy wanted to carry on the pockets, the management. of some of national security, they rival the Presi- Vietnam war' exclusively through .the the covert operations well in hand, and dent's claim to sovereignty. By virtue Special Forces, which would enable McNamara under close scrutiny and of their support in Congress, their him to seize command of the national partly under their guidance, the Joint political constituency, and their claim military apparatus. He seems to have Chiefs turned their attention to the upon the flag, the Chiefs, unlike other had a vision of the Green Berets as a thorny problem of the Special :Forces. government groups, can even charge Praetorian Guard, an elite army Under the supervision of the CIA, the the President with treason. Because -of directly under the command and con- Special Forces had been successful in their formidable power, the President trot of the President.. The Green Berets training the Montagnards. In 1964, . must respond to any proposal they. put represented Kennedy's attempt to curb OperatiOn Switchback was approved in "forward. ? the power of the Chiefs and institu- Washington to break up the autOnomy The President, of course, can coin- tiOnalize the military ?directly under of Special Forces, remove them from mand his own resources to persuade the Presidency. the CIA's direction, and plaCe them the Chiefs to champion his causes. But 'Edward Lansdale., a devout believer under the command of MACV. he must always bargain with them and in the Special Forces .and in the In one stroke, the Joint Chiefs grant them- certain concessions if they' concept of counterinsurgency, was picked up control of both the Special oppose him Or if he needs their public quietly assigned an. -office under Forces and the local tribesmen. The _ support. Once the state embarks on McNamara in 1961 and given the .state had spread its power over the war, this uneasy balance between the power to keep Vietnam Under Presi- ancient tribes of Indochina and its own President and the Chiefs gradually tips dential control. This was a mistake, elite warriors. The central state appa- on the side of the. Chiefs. The Joint The Joint Chiefs immediately perceived ratus was concentrated in the hands of Chiefs of Staff, -not the Commander- Lansdale as a potential threat and they the Chiefs and the, .President. The rest in-Chief, are presumed to know how to set up their own counterinsurgency Of the national security machinery manage a. war.' The President who agency by creating a Special Assistant received its orders from their combined opposes their programs lays. himself for Counter-Insurgency and Special command. The question left open?and open to the charge that he is playing Activities (SACSA). Victor Krulak, the Still unanswered?was whether the with 'American lives. . . first "SACSA," a former Marine Corps war on the grounds that he is pro- Thus, when the President expands a general and an astute politician who was -referred to as "the brute," under- aorit i riu tecting the lives of US troops in the cut Lansdale .at 'every turn until Lans- 9U field he either has, in effect, borr2wed_ A 6A iv sttivii i ? AcchYggutgryKel g /04.:'-i?eCIVRoP8400499R001000090001-6 the Chiefs' argument t' , Once he gained control over Krulak was able to restore ? 14 Approved FoSeelease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004AN601000090001-6 Chiefs and the Commander-in-Chief would share that immense power equally, or whether one would make a claim against the Other: Centralization Of the state bureauc- racy?except for the Joint Chiefs? directly .under the command and con- trol of the President greatly enhanced the power. of the President. The effects ? of this transfer of power were pro- found. Through the .303 Committee and the mobilization of the - Green Berets, the President dould now make ?the decisions on matters of espionage and military ?strategy. To. the extent that: he has control over the CIA and shares the power of the military, lie?is in effect both a superspy and a field marshal. Tlie time and energy he is normally expected to devote to his duties as Chief Executive are now absorbed by these new offices. How much time Kennedy actually devoted to supervising covert activities and :personally managing the activities of the Special Forces remains unclear, but it is certain they made large claims on his working day. ? Though the' 303 Committee and the Special Group successfully centralized the powerful government agencies under the Executive, the Green Berets and. the Country Team-were much less !effective in centralizing the field opera- tions. Nevertheless, the concept of centralizing the...state apparatus was adVanced by Kennedy and the reality almost measured up to that concept. During the. thirty-three months Of his Presidency, Kennedy was creating the elements of a totalitarian state strucfure which carried on a private war: The fact that the ? war was private meant that it was not the Main preoccupation of the nation, but rather the chief task of the Executive; that it was conducted not in the interests of the nation, but in the interests of the. state. Indeed, one could now say that it was conducted 'against the interests , of the nation, because it destroyed' the. orderly processes of government., Would Kennedy Have Withdrawn? - American national security was never 4t. stake. Through the Special Group, Kennedy knew well that there was no serious infiltration from the North, not any Chinese or Soviet support for thc Southern struggle. Kennedy knew therefore that the .war in South Viet- nam was a civil war. How was Arner-' ican national security threatened by the outcome of their civil, war? The likely impact of a Viet Cong victory on the international interests of the United States was never Systematically studied during the Kennedy years, notwithstanding the casual talk about dominoes. .Whenever that issue was raised; the CIA fudged its assesiment. For example, if South Vietnam went Communist, the CIA suggested, South- east Asia ,would be demoralized and this demoralization might even spread to India. But what is demoralization? How is it measured? How are its consequences, determined for national security? Does demoralization cause a nation to switch sides or does it cause it to attach. itself ever more closely to the mother country? Would a Viet Cong victory have created a revolution in Thailand? In India? In Cambodia? In Japan? According to INR, the intelligence branch of the State Department, "there was no serious analysis of what we could expect throughout Southeast Asia if we failed to support South Vietnam." The state was not in the least interested in determining whether ?the national security was at stake. One steady feature of US policy in South- east Asia Was the failure to consider why we should be there. Only in 1969 did the intelligence community attenipt a detailed study of the conse- quences if South Vietnam were to become a Communist nation. Accord- ing to INR, this estimate, prepared by the CIA and only recently made public, concluded: . We would lose Laos immediately. Sihanouk -would preserve Cam- bodia by a straddling effort. All of Southeast Asia would reniain just as it is at least for another .generation. Thailand, in particular, would continue to maintain close relations with the US and would seek additional support. Simul- taneously, Thailand would make overtures and move toward China . and the Soviet Union. It would simply take aid from both sides to preserve its independence. North Vietnam would consume. itself in Laos and South Vietnam. Only Laos would definitely follow into. ? the Communist orbit. This estimate suggests that if the United States were defeated in open warfare by a "fourth rate 'nation," there would be no international con- sequences to .US interests.. Is it not then reasonable to assume that if the United States had not fought andnhad not been defeated; its stock of .good will' might have risen? The principal effect of American intervention is the carnage-' and devastation of Southeast Asia. ? ihe events of the early .1960s strongly suggest, however, that had John F. Kennedy lived, he would not? have pulled out of Southeast Asia. He would more likely .have taken any steps necessary to .avoid an ignomin- ious .defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong. In a nationwide interview. on NBC television two months before his assassination, when asked whether the US was likely to reduce its aid to Vietnam; Kennedy replied: I don't think we think that would ?. be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it isopossible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a 'situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly, in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World, War II, where- China, was lost?a weak government became increasingly unable .to control events. We don't want that. What. I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, beCause they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like-the Government in Sai- gon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw. . A week earlier in another nationwide interview with Walter Cronkite, Ken- nedy said: But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. -That would be a great mistake.... We took all this7-made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure; We also have to Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090904* nu el participate?vie may not like it?in ' 'To speak of air strike is to evoke preA.-"for wirw.ny type of war, at the defense of Asia'Approved.For' e ' atseatial bt lt08dze,likiRDP44100,0?rw099chRyumilie6. Not only did - Kennedy would not withdraw, but Hiroshima. Brush-fire?war, on the other the brush-:fire and conventional capa- he was troubled by the prospect .bf hand, is described by the rhetoric of bilities make giant strides in a period public disapproval of his decision. To limited hostilities, pacification of in- of peace, but the nation's strategic and stay in Vietnam without arousing pub- -surgents, and nation building. To talk tactical nuclear capabilities were . shill- . li'e- opposition, he waged the war as of a "surgical air strike," then, tends lady expanded. 'Strategic nuclear Privately as possible. to blur the distinction between con- weapons were increased 100 percent, ventional and brush-fire warfare. It and tactical. weapons ?60 percent. The The "Brush-Fire Wart" . implies that friend can be distinguished capacity .to fight any type of war was from foe when seen from the air and called the doctrine of "flexible re- The counterargument to this inter- that conventional weapons can be used pretation of Kennedy's Vietnam policy , selectively to wage. brush-fire war. It Not only was a conventional war advances the premise that Vietnam.:was suggests a lower leVel of violence than anticipated and recommended within ,an . example of a new concept' Of conventional warfare, a means of pro- the state, but Kennedy hiniself authoi,- carefully limited action in 'support of tecting our friends while destroying ized the first use or heavy firepower local allies ,which was officially .and our enemies. . when he sent the newly armed heli- publicly described as "brush-fire war.". When asked to comment on the copters to Vietnam in.. 1962. The Congress openly debated this policy feasibility of using "surgical air strikes" MAAG mission', moreover, had trained and appropriated'huge sums of money ? within the limits of brush-fire war, the ARVN to prosecute a conventional in support of it. The war, then, was a McGeorge Bundy .called the question, war. Would the Americans, when need public, not a private, matter. Under "naive." "Professors know that bombs :-beckoned and opportunity knocked, Kennedy, American manpower in Viet-.. kill people," he said. Yet such naivete , renounce their own training, firepower, pain never exceeded 16,000, a figure. clearly within the bounds of. a brush- helped to preserve an appearance of ' and private urgings? fire war. . innocence, permitting, the decision-. The United States proceeded one ? step at -a time, and Kennedy took the - The problem with this argument is makers to believe that the.y had not . first giant step. If the Viet Cong could that there was only a handful 1 vl 1 o embarked on a course of systematic not be defeated at a lower level. of seriously propounde6 the brush-fire deception.. . violence, why not proceed to the next , .war doctrine in the highest councils of The type of. ordnance financed dur- *the state. Roger, Hilsman and Robert level? That was the precise purpose of jug the Kennedy period also encour- ? flexible response. Kennedy, as we have Thompson come to mind as official's aged the policy-makers to blur the ? seen, publicly stated that he would not closely associated with . a counter- distinction between the two types of , 1 o witnraw..His policy clearly was one insurgency strategy. for Vietnam; .but war. Preparations for both conven- of gradual escalation which set the us the dominant positions in the Kennedy tional warfare , and brush-fire war -on the course followed by Johnson, Administration were held by exponents simultaneously made dramatic ad- and, in revised form, by Nixon. As of conventional war, whose recOm- vances. -Within two years there was a Maxwell Taylor said when he was mendations were withheld from 1 the 600 percent increase in counter- asked what Kennedy would have done . public. Walt Rost9w, who publicly insurgency forces and a 45 percent in Vietnam had he lived: "Far be it from enunciated the doctrine of brushl.fire increase in the number of combat- me to read the mind, of a dead man, war in behalf of the Administration in ready Army . divisions. Hence .the but let me just say this, Kennedy was 1961, was privately recommending managers were equipping the state to0 "offensive action" and aerial strikes . not a loser." fight either kind of war. This produced against 't he Northern mainland, an element of doubt and ambiguity McNamara, also, called for _ 'public over which kind of war the US was support of brush-fire wars and simul- fighting and would continue to fight.- taneously .urged privatelY that the US 'Since a brush-fire war signified a lower ? be .fully - prepared to use 260,000 level of involvement and could be troops in a conventional war. The prosecuted without interfering with the public statements of the Kennedy normal business of everyday, life, the Administration invited public support security managers could point to the for a brush-fire war, -but the private counterinsurgency. preparations as con- , recommendations presupposed the use sistent .with Kennedy's Vietnam' policy.: of heavy firepower. The capability of carrying both kinds of defense could be cited as justifier:- This does- not necessarily mean that tion for both the public .rhetoric and the officials were. deliberately deceiving the 'private recommendafions. ? the public. To some extent, they were also deceiving themselves. The ,con- v. s, tradiction betWeen their public rhetoric What becomes -.clear when one and their private 'recommendations was examines the over-all changes intro- blurred, at the time, both by their duced by Kennedy's managers at the language and by the kinds of military pentagon is that. they decided- to technology available to them. It became fashionable in the early 1960s, for example, tAfilAVerdirtir Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 gical air strikes," a phrase coined by Walt Rostow. Aerial warfare is, of 1 6 )16,1).121114434 51J1,1 Approved Fo*lease 2001/filibeVtlAVDP84-0049t114001000090001-6 (A-}r- RIP kj" V j11(4,1.) ?,Z).?f2:1,1) described as radical consei.va- live. I. 4 ,. ? 6 6:1 . - ',..? r% ,_ 9 7.'F' Referring to the secret docu- : ./.-. afing,i,8 oeereg., k.p-.(fia ;LUPUS nyelit h, Mi.. Buckley said: I? "'Me idea arose at an editorial meeting two weeks ago. We were discussing the Pentagon papers as released and the fact they were ideologically tenden- ficulty was not that the Penta- thus. , gon and the CIA gave LIU bad I, in fact, initiated the idea. advice, but that J.,BJ didn't take I: said, 'Hey, team, what do you ; Mr. Buckley said the don- '' d ' .e." think about this--?' We were ' ments were composed by editors , - remarking on the point Maxwell N... '? y i (1 -Taylor made that the papers the hoax came after suspicion were fraf,,,mentary, arose when several persons list- "Created- Them" ed as authors of the printed; "We reasoned that others at documents could not. recalll that time saw what was actually writing them. One flatly denied; happening and gave appropriate New York tilt,--With a broadpers, or something like them,! grin, William F. Buckley, Jr., must have been written. There- editor, revealed yesterday that publication in his National Re- view of so-called secret Vietnam documents was a hoax. fore, one concludes that the dif- of the magazine "ex mhilo"? out of nothing. Intended Pm-pose Cited The intended purpose, Mr. Buckley told a news conference, was to demonstrate in regard to the earlier Pentagon -papers authorship credited to his name, advice to the government. We "that the Pentagon and the CIA Not The First Put-On then created them. That step .are not composed of incomp& , was easy for National .Review ? , It was not the first put-oneditors: would be widely accepted as l , ; tents . ... that, forged_ documents i ; staged by the 45-year-old Mr.! Mr. Buckley said he had a : ; genuine provided their content Buckley, brother of New Yor.k's; hand in composing the false -doe- ! ,was inherently plausible . . . conservative Senator James L luments, but would not say who ? i 1 that the 'challenge in Southeast, Buckley. In 1965, William Buck-!on the magazine's staff wrote Asia was an aspect of the global ley ran unsuccessfully for mayor' what. , challenge to the West, not alef New York, stringing together On July 16, Mr. Buckley went local affair." llong and little-known words, but on, the magazine mailed 6,000 Later, Mr. Buckley told a re-:slimming up by saying that if letters "to our closest friends ;elected he would "demand a re- and supporters of National Re- porter at his Manhattan apart- view advising them of what we meat: ' count.'' "Jf the advice given in the Mr. Buckley founded the Na- were doing." - Several subscribers have been magazine had ben followed,!tional Review in 1951 to further his political outlook, which he contacted but Said they had not we wouldn't be in Vietnam to- ? received such a letter. day. The point is that the pa- "Invited Discovery" "We mentioned a lot of people we didn't have to mention," Mr. Buckley said. -"In that sense, we invited discovery. We couldn't have been surprised if within ?-twO hours after it appeared it had been called a hoax. We were more surprised than anybody at -reading . . . that not even Dean Rusk had been able to deity what was printed." Asked if the magazine _planned any future capers, .Mr; ? Buckley replied: "Maybe we should re- veal the -deliberations of the ? Central Committee of the Peo- ple's Republic of China after the meeting with Kissinger" In his news conference, Mr. Buckley said: "Co-operation from government officials was neither given- nor sought." ?"Those who will Want to ques- tion the methods we used in order to make our demonstration may proceed to do so," Mr. Buckley's news conference state- Anent said. "We 'admit that we proceeded in something of an ethical vaccurn. . Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 iiICTCI POCT Appr9ved Forllidlease 2001/190 MIAMP84-0049014.01000090001-6 By Don Oberdorfer WatThitigton Ptast Stair Writer NEW 'YORK, July Buckley would not say ham F. Buckley Jr. said today whether he has any evidence that the top secret" govern- that such a recommendation! --including former Secretary. ment documents on the Viet- Was actually made by the Joint. of State Dean Rusk, former! Chiefs of Staff or anyone else nam war published in his ? Secretary of State Dean Ache- magazine,a high position in the Amer- National son, and Prof. Frank Trager-- Review, lean government. ? - -- ? - were unable to say Tuesday were a hoax designed "to dem- "It inconc.civable to me night whether the documents onstrate . . that forged docu- that there is nobody in the attributed to them were gen- ii:tont:8 would be widely ac. Pentagon, CIA or White House nine, ? , who has the same analytical (Toted as genuine provided ? . Few if any of the officials ? powers as a. junior editor of their centent wa.s inherently National Review. We were pro- or agencies namedin the docul ments had seen copies of the plausible." posing these things seven A subsidiary purpose, the years ago," he said. National Review, which could not be found on newsstands ill National. Review editor told a The conservative editor, col- Washington Tuesday. news conference, was to prove umnist and television person- . When copies did become that it was "Plausible" that ality was smiling, joking and available in government, of- American officials had recom- obviously enjoying the lime- ficials began to say they could mended massive escalation in light of an airport press con- vict:11am, as favored by the ference to announce the hoax conservative magazine, i.after flying in from the West - Among other things, the ; Coast. :false documents "showed" i Buckley said the documents, that high-ranking U. S. offi-i which took up 14 pages of the icials twice recommended use current issue of the National of nuclear weapons in Victd Review, were composed last I nam in 1964-5. Headlined "The week in the magazine's offices. Secret Papers They Didn't Be said the idea for the hoax !Publish," the documents had issue sprang "full-blown in my ; been described by the maga, mind" and added dryly it was ,zine yesterday as "fragments" "an arduous challenge" to I from extensive files made emulate bureaucratic prose. ' available to it by an unnamed Those who will want to !informant. question the methods we used Buckley was asked today if in order to make our ! demon- stration may 'proceed to -do it served any useful purpose so," said Buckley, facing three for. American news cervices to tell the public and the world camera crews and about 10 on the basis of false doeu- reporters. "We admit that we ments that the U. S. govern- ' proceeded in somewhat of an ment had seriously considered ethical vacuum. using nuclear weapons in Viet- i '"I'he New York Times has nam. instructed us that it .is per- "it seems to me quite dear miscible to traffic in stolen that the fact we have ?lidera. documents. But they have not yet instructed- us on whether arms suggests that. they ought it is permissible to traffic in to be used under certain cir- forged documents," he said. cumstances," he replied. Buckley maintained that the "If it could be demonstrated of the -Smithsonian's National Museum of History and Tech- nology, told newsmen this morning that he had n o written the document ascribed to him by the National Re.; v I e w. Repeated efforts to reach Boorstin Tuesday night, before publication of news articles on the magazine dis- closures,. were unsuccessful.. But -several of those named as authors of fake documents failure of government agencies that in 1965 a demonstration and former high officials to' challenge the auth of drop [of 'nuclear weapons] out- enticity the !National Review papers side of Haiphong might save -was evidence of their "plans- the lives of 43,000 Americans, ibility" as mere paraphrases I would suggest that it Was a of documents which do exist. reasonable suggestion for the There were denials before Joint Chiefs to make." ? the Buckley news. conference. Prof. Daniel Booratin, director. not find such documents in their files, but they indicated they were planning extensive searches. The Washington Post got an advance copy of the National Review on Tuesday from the office of the editor's brother, Sen. James L. Buckley (C- N.Y.). Attached was a calling card from the senator's press secretary, Leonard Saffir. He had written on it, "A journa,- . . listi - coup. Messrs. Buckley and Rusher (National Review publisher William A. Rusher) deserve Pulitzer Prizes." Yesterday, Saffir said that he had thought the documents were genuine and that his boss did not know anything about it since he was away- in Cali- fornia. Asked what he thought the hoax proved, Saffir "Maybe it highlights the gullie bility of the press. Maybe it proves the press should be more probing." At the press conference here, William Buckley ap- peared unconcerned about the potential impact of the hoax, on the credibility of his jour- nal, which claims 115,000 cir- culation. He said the "plausi- ble" hoax enhances. the Na- tional Review's reputation for. analysis. !Buckley maintained his magazine's "larger purposes" excused its publication of cone cocted documents at least as much as the "larger purposes" of major newspapers- excused the publication of authentic documents about decision- in the Vietnam war. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 I3EW YOM REVIEW OF BOOKS Approved FdlitRelease 2001/1&?8 )8i-A-146P84-0049411k001000090001-6 -Oanato Domitrigo: Ti.ha Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution by Jerome Slater, with a Foreword by Hans J. Morgenthau. Harper & Row, 254 pp., $7.95 Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo by Jose A. Moreno. University of Pittsburgh, 226 pp., $8.95 Norman Gall We know.that many who are now in revolt do not seek a Communist tyranny. We think it's tragic in- deed that their high motives have been misused by a small band of conspirators, who receive ? their directions from abroad. To those who fight only for liberty and justice and progress, I want to join, in .... appealing to you tonight to ' abWel your arms 'ana tdacsure you that there is nothing to fear. Tlie' road is.o.pen tci 'You to shire ? in building a Dominican Democ- racy and' we 'irt America .are ready and anxious and willing to help y9u. ? ?Lyndon B. Johnson__ May 2, 1965 President -Johnson's military inter- vention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was as momentous as it was cruel and politically mistaken. We can. see it, along with our enlargement of the Vietnam war in the same year, as part of a disastrous expansion of the powers of the American Presidency and of its sense of "global responsi- bilities." When a force of 23,000 US troops landed in Santo Domingo in May to reverse the course of the Santo Domingo civil war they served to rescue a repressive military establish- ment from an apparently successful 'popular revolt thatwas trying to restore constitutional r,ule. We can now see that the high priority the US gave to social progress in Latin America, an idea implicit in the Alliance for Pfogress, has been replaced by what ?appears to be an expanding and recur- rent pattern of control by terror. nta3s aft 91'onzooma ? -Professor Jerome Slater's ? political study of the 1965 intervention and the eighteen-month US military occupation that followed is derived from his use, on a not-for-attribution basis, of "a great number of papers, memoirs, and documents which are not now in the public domain," as well as off-the- record interviews with US and 'OAS officials. However, all this new material adds little or no support to the official rationale for-the intervention?that the Dominican Republic was at the brink of a possible Communist takeover. Instead it provides further evidence of double-dealing and cruelty after the US troops were sent in. Because he relies so much on classi- fied official documents, and because of his otherwise limited knowledge of Dominican affairs, Slater tends at times to bend over backward to give credence and legitimacy to the official US view in a number of, at best, highly doubtful instances. Nevertheless, he concludes that although "there was some risk that out of an uncontrollable revolu- tionary upheaval Castroite forces might emerge victorious ... the risk was not yet sufficiently great to justify the predictably enormous political and moral costs that the intervention en- tailed." The effect of the intervention was to restore to power, in Santo Domingo the political apparatchiks of the long and brutal dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-61). Of the costs Slater writes at the end of his book: the steadily worsening political terrorism ... has recently [19701 reached crisis proportions. Scarcely a day goes by without a political murder, a "suicide" of a jailed political prisoner, the disappear- ance of a political activist, or, at the very least, a case of police harassment of the political opposi- tion. Most of the victims are Communists or Castroitc radicals, PRD activists [of ex-President Juan Bosch's Partido Revolu- cionario Dordnicano], or former constitutionAtists, although re- cently even anti-Balaguerists on the right have been attacked: While there has been a rise in leftist counter-terror, with ma- chine-gunnings of isolated police and soldiers increasingly common, the main culprits appear to be unregenerates in the police and, to a lesser extent, the armed forces. It is not clear what [President Joaquin] Balaguer's role is in this, but although he has condemned what he calls the "uncontrollable forces" behind the violence and on several occasions has shaken up the police leadership, there is a growing feeling among moderate Dominicans that he is encouraging the rightist terrorism or, at best, has been inadequate in his re- sponse to it. In recent years there have been more political murders in the Dominican Republic than in any comparable period during ?Trujillo's dictatorship, with the sole exception of the reign of terror that followed the swiftly crushed invasion from Cuba in 1959, organized by Fidel Castro.' The Santo ? Domingo newspaper El Nacional last December 30 filled a page and a half of newsprint with the 'details of 186 political murders and thirty dis- appearances during 1970.2 The Domin- ican terror resembles the current wave of political killings in Guatemala (see my "Slaughter in Guatemala,' NYR, May 20, 1971) in that the paramilitary death squads are organized by the armed forces and police, which in both cases over the years have been given heavy US material and advisory sup- port. The death squads themselves are, partly composed of defectors from revolutionary political factions. . The political terrorism in Santo' Domingo, however, seems now to be directed not so much against well- known politicians, as is the case in Guatemala. Rather it is used to control the Santo Domingo ell M population. which was the main force that 'de- feated the Dominican military in the 1965 revolution. In the proliferating ramshackle slums and squatter srttIe- ments that spread nonhward from the ancient churches and plazas of down- town Santo Domingm, there is con- tinual patrolling by uniformed military and police units, as yell as b) p6;r\-- clothes agents on motor scooters. Each barrio has been infiltnted by govern- ' ment intelligence orgalizations. (Mor- Approved?For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 acztTrinpri, over, many N5.113401erd Fispae4ifse 2001/11/08 : CIPe-aipFg3f3NR agents, like Haiti's. Ton-Ton Macoutes.) A Since much of the killing seems to be _ done almost capricipusly by these patrols,3 the effect of' the terror has been an undeclared, al-night curfew in the slums. ? On a recent visit to Santo Domingo I found that, owing to the general fear of assassination, heavily populated slum areas of the old rebel zone, whose intense street life in the past resembled New York's Forty-second Street or Tokyo's Yoshiwara district, were virtually deserted after 8 PM. Although these killings have aroused little in the way of active popular resistance,, a twenty-fonr-hour general strike was called last November. The outlying barrio of Los Minas--a heavily PRD slum which was invaded by squatters after the Trujillo assassination in 1961 and which today has more than 100,000 inhabitants?was shut down after six residents of the barrio were murdered within a week. Accord- ing to one feeble old man in the barrio who was questioned by a reporter at, .the time, "The situation had gotten so bad in Los Minas that the men felt compelled to stay at home and send the women out to find the .day's sustenance, because their Jives were not worth a piece of rotten'fruit.;'4 The night before Los Minas was shut down, President Balaguer, a crafty and tenacious political maneuverer who was Trujillo's last puppet president, told a press conference at the National Palace that the strike at Los Minas ... is illogical and absurd because what the citizenry should do is associate itself with the authorities to counteract the ter- rorism. As I have said many times, this is a fight in which all sectors of society should participate. For if an exact version of each deed could reach me and the Govern- ment, one could establish respon- sibility more easily and the Government could punish these acts of terror. I have denounced the irregu- larities inside the police, and I ?have confided to many persons the purification of the police.s So far this has not been achieved and I completely agree with the editorial in today's [newspaper] / utin Diario about this: the imperious need to purify the police, so that its services are efficient and to end these criminal acts that6 are filling the country with blood. Approve-a For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 RIMPBRA-80 2 According to secret Dominican government documents I obtained while investigating the political terror in Santo Domingo, the intelligence and security -apparatus of the Balaguer regime has been making use of Cuban exiles. One typewritten memorandum under the letterhead of the National Police says [see photocopy on opposite page]: Very courteously, you are informed that you should have ready a group of five men, since on the 25th of this month it was agreed to stage a simulated attack 'on the Royal Bank of Canada to discredit the movements of the left, which have been gaining strength in recent months. J. I says that the personnel selected for this purpose should be Cubans. The uniforms that will be used will be supplied by Lieutenant Cedano. Another memorandum, written under the letterhead Presidencia. de. la Republica and dated April 22, 1970, gave these instructions: Very courteously, it is communicated that you should send Agent, M.10 to the Airport of the Americas at 6 a.m. to await the arrival of ',the personnel of Cuban nationality that will carry out this service under your supervision. Another memorandum, indrked "Confidential" and dated July 29 1970 says: Very respectfully I communicate that the mernhers ot t));.-, body - (CUBANS) have instructions as well as the arms tly-Py v:ill tn.e ih their work. At the same time 1 intorm you that P. 17 wished to eturri to Miami as soon as he performs the service. This should be discussed with J. 1 since it could bring. problems ,n that the peison mentioned ,,as disagreements with the other men. Political assassimwtiens continued same date Perez Aybar also wrote ' steadily for four years after ,1966, when, with US occupation forces still in the. country, Balaguer, was elected to his first four-year term. In 1970, during Balaguer's campaign for re- election, the terror sharply increased. A great many voters_ abstained from this election after the Dominican con- stitution had been changed to allow. Balaguer to run for a second consecu- tive term. Then, in the last six months of 1970, after Balaguer had begun his second term of office, new plans for police action were circulated among the intelligence and security agencies of the Dominican government, which are honeycombed .with officers of Trujillo's old secret police, the SIM (Servicio de Inteligencia Militar). These plans were the basis for the most sustained and enveloping system of terror since the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship. The head of . the Department of Intelligence at the National Palace is Manuel A. Perez Sosa, former chief of the SIM. On August 2, 1970, Perez 'Sosa received a letter of resignation from one of his subordinates, Miguel A. Perez Aybar, who explained that "I have taken this step so as not to lend myself to the events that I understand will occur and will do great injury to the Supreme Government." On the ? Balaguer that "I have decided to resign because I am your ..friend and because the plans of the Department of Intel- ligence are disastrous for your labor of Government, and I do not wish to be an accomplice to the murder of men who are going to be assassinated without any cause." A. few months ago a new kind of terrorist organization was organized by the police.,Known as La Banda, it is made up mainly of former members of the Maoist Movindento Popular DOMill- icano (MPD), the most militant party of the Dominican left, which last year tried to form a United Front of all political factions?including dissidents on the extreme right?to oppose Bala- guer's re-election. The MPD is said to have carried out the kidnapping, in March, 1970, of Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, the US air attach?n Santo Domingo, by the "Unified Andre- election Command." Crowley was exchanged within sixty hours for twenty Dominican political prisoners, the most prominent of whom was the MPD Secretary-General Maxhniliano Gomez, who were flown into exile. Since then most of the principal MPD leaders have been gunned down by the police, and Gomez himself died of gas poisoning last month in Brussels under mysterious circumstances. Ap_proved F Meanwhile, many MFD 7ouths have been arrested and pressured into join- ing the police terrorist bands. On April 20, 1971, six youths who said they were members .of a terrorist organiza- tion called Joventucl Dcmocratica .Refoitnista Anticornunista were grant- ed political asylum in the Mexican embassy. in Santo Domingo. All but one of them were age eighteen or younger. Before taking refuge in the embassy they issued a statement to the ' press saYing that they had been re- cruited by the police after they were arrested and accused of "a series of deeds that we did not commit." They identified the leader of the terrorist bands as Police Lt. Oscar Nunez Pena, who. they said was a bodyguard or Gen. Perez y Perez, the police chief. "In this way," the youths said, "they (the police] want to get their hooks into many revolutionary militants." They said the police told them that "this is a declared war against the Communists. The bainis will be organ- ized in all the barrios of the capital and what has been done so far is an experiment to acclimatize public because he had been ordered by Police opinion." According to their state- Lt. Nunez pan to kill Felix Albur- rnent, the group was given three querque, the PRD Secretary-General of Thompson machine guns and a car to the taxi drivers' union UNACHOSIN, carry out its assignment in the "April and Radhames Gomez, the managing Plan" which was drafted by the --- editor of El Nacional. Before obtaining police.' ,asylum Sierra y Sierra had lived in a On June 7, another member of La squatter settlernent called Katanga, next to Los Minas. One of his last acts Banda, Fernando Aquino Mateo, also as a member of La Banda, he said, was known as Sierra y Sierra, obtained to arrest Juan Almonte, the. PRD asylum in the Mexican embassy. Before leader of Los Minas, under orders of a he entered he embassy Sierra y Sierra police sergeant who said that' "if said in an interview that he had been - . nobody sees us take him prisoner, we jailed several times after fighting on should kill him."8 084-CIA-RDP-84-00468,1004-000090001-6 yirjr.'"N k ? - ? e 49-1-e--40 11.11113PI SCA 110111NICAN4 pouciA NACIONAL SART? D011000, D. N. Al r 00.? Aounto s 'Plante relacionado al Banco The Roy.al Dark Of. Canada. Siuy tortensento, a* le infOima quo debe Rd. toner lioto un personal do 5 boubron, yo quo on rouninn calobrada. en to- ca 25 dol. present. Eta, co acord6 realitar VD siaulado atrao0 al The Royal Bone% Of. canada, este, nodida so acordo para poder doss- croditnr los sovisiontoa do itquieria, los cualea *sten tomando - fuersaa en lois Ultimos mom. . Dice J.1 tuo el personal seloccioando part+ cot& fin deben aer Cubanos. Los unifnroes nue sorAn utilicados le oortin suministrado por el Teniento Cedano. the constitutionalist side in the 1965 revolution, and had been beaten up in jail so many times that he finally agreed to become a .trustee at La Victoria prison, where, he said, he beat and tortured other inmates. He also said he witnessed the death by beating of Oliver Daniel Mendez Guzman, twenty, whom Police Chief Perez y Perez said had escaped from jail on May 5. The dead youth was taken from jail in a sack by a police colonel, Sierra y Sierra recalled, "I imagine that they threw him into the sea, because I have not read in the press that his body appeared anywhere." He explained that he had joined La Banda after his release from jail, May 19, and had sought diplomatic asylum Almonte had recently made a series of accusations of corruption in the operations of the national lottery, and had won an election held by the union of lottery ticket sellers?certified by the Labor Ministry. He had, however, been stopped at gunpoint by the old union leadership from taking over the union headquarters. In an interview shortly before his arrest, Almonte told me: "The violence in these barrios is such that even police sergeants and corporals have been killed for having become too close to the PRD. We will have a revolution soon more violent than before. Last time [in 19651 we routed the army' in twenty-four-hours, and when it happens again' it will take less time." According to the testimony of the , youths who obtained asylum in the Mexican embassy, the police agents who organized La Banda were also involved in one of the most sordid ipolitical crimes in recent Dominican history, the kidnap-murder of Santiago Manuel Hernandez, nineteen, a former MPD member also known as Manga who had been sought by the police for several weeks. Young Hernandez was shot and critically, wounded inside his father's slum shack by two police undercover .s&e.-qts on March 26. Two weeks later; oic-Easter Sunday, the day before he was to undergo surgery, he was kidnapped from his hospital bed by police agents and was found dead the next morning in a roadside cane- field near the town of San Pedro de Macoris, some forty miles away. ? ? As described to me in interviews by his mother and his parish priest, a Cuban Jesuit named Tomas Marrero, the convalescence of Manga was a lurid nightmare that moved inexorably toward death. His mother, Sra. Mer- Cedes Hernandez de Frias, told me that when her critically wounded son was brought to the Hospital Padre Bellini Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Nt-NrT el in downtown SantoDoAi3prov:etiRdrNiiidiellSergee'l )411VO&Ifenkc-ftPt40049ffigetPtiegOioggf Thus the could be found for a transfusion, since the local blood banks said tney nan. no bloc for a wounded man until they got a police order to supply it. The emergency operatiOn to prolong the life of ? Mangi. was performed?with police in, the- operating room?by re- cycling the blood hemorrhaging from the patients body into a bottle and injecting it back into him. After his recovery, police guards were sta- tioned with machine guns inside the 'ward, and forbade the boy to speak ? with anyone. According to his mother, Hernandez was visited every day by two police plainclOthesmen who stood at the foot of the hospital bed and asked how he was getting on; she said her son whispered to her after one of these visits that they were the two men who shot him on March 26. Late each night ? the police would turn on all the lights in the ward and search the boy's bed, on one occasion disconnecting the rubber tube through which noxious fluids were being drained from his body. Wheii Father Marrero, who was taking turns with members of the family in all-night bedside vigils, pro- tested to the policemen, the priest was ? barred from the hospital from then on. . A few days later the boy's mother overheard the police guards say, "We're going to lynch this dog." At 7 PM, on April 11, four men entered the hospital ward with stock- ings over their heads and handkerchiefs :covering their faces. They announced- that "we are from the party and we have come to liberate you," but the boy said, "I have no party," and pleaded with his mother not to let him go. As the men were leaving the ward with her son, the mother saw that beneath their hospital smocks they wore gray police trousers and black police boots. A few days after the boy's body was found, President Bala- guer attributed the murder to "a struggle between two organizations of the extreme Left."9 The story of Manga's death was first told to me by Father Marrero, whom I have known since the 1965 revolution, having slept in his church in the rebel zone while interviewing some of the people who fought on the constitution- alist side. Ile was one of some twenty Cuban and Spanish Jesuits who came to the Dominican Republic from Cuba in 1961?after nationalization that year di Th ad originally started as a means of self-protec- tion and an expression of solidar7 ity among members of informal groups, became the most powerful instrument -in the hands of the rebels. By the end of May there were in the city 117 commando posts in which 5,000 men lived,. ate, and slept together.... On one hand, informal groups of people from the barrio, groups of friends and relatives from the community, or gangs of "tigers" [teen-age street gangs] evolved .into commandos such as San Miguel, Pedro Mena, Pichirilo, and Barahona. On the other hand some formal organizations [political parties and labor unions] already. operating ? in public life whose leaders decided to combine their memberships with other individ- uals formed such commandos as San Uizaro, Poasi, and Argentina. Both kinds of groups Were numer- ouS, and both were relevant to-the revolution. The first kind relied heavily on the organizational abilities of the leader, particularly on his charisma and machismo [manliness' and bravery]. The second kind relied heavily on the organizational structure of the parent organization. This description, I think, should help to place. the Santo Domingo revolt of 1965 'alongside the Paris Commune of 1871 in the world's revolutionary traditions. Both were urban, popular uprisings that were sustained by civil- ian militia until they were crushed by foreign troops. Both were involved in the turbulent process of peasant migra- tion to the cities that made Paris in the nineteenth century and Santo Domingo since Trujillo's assassination in 1961 into centers of social revolu- tion. Moreno writes very well of the quarrels, ? the hunger, the demoraliza- tion as the months of negotiation dragged on: under the US military occupation. But his book tends to' lapse into sociological jargon toward the end, and it?is regrettable that he did not instead simply let the Domini- cans speak for themselves. I can testify that many of them not only can tell what the revolution was about with eloquence. and clarity, but can also do justice to the incandescent inner life of the Santo Domingo slums. able work in leading the agglornamerzto of the Dominican church, drafting the principal church documents, organizing cooperatives, literacy . campaigns, peasant leagues, and the new Catholic University Mater et Magistra in. Santi- ago, and earning the enmity of right- wing elements of Dominican society. During the revolution I met another Cuban Jesuit, Jose Moreno, author of Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo, who was working with Father Marrero at the. San Miguel Church, running an improvised medical clinic and distributing surplus food. The food was sent by the .Americans across the cease-fire lines, while nego- tiations were dragging on, but in barely sufficient quantities to avoid panic and starvation among what became essen- tially a captive population. Jose Moreno has since left the priesthood and is now .teaching soci- ology at the University. of Pittsburgh's Center for Latin American Studies. His, account -of life inside the rebel zone during the 1965 civil war?he was doing field research for his doctorate in sociology at Cornell when the revolution broke out?is written with more intimate knowledge and greater precision than any other study of the insurrection I have seen. Moreno's is the first, objective, detailed, and plau- sible analysis-available anywhere of the real Castroitc-Communist strength in the constitutionalist camp. He shows that their forces were limited to a few well-armed and well-disciplined co- mandos of resistance fighters con- trolled by the Communist Party and the Castroite June 14th Movement. But these were only a few groups among a great many others. As Moreno describes the process: A training school was set up in which navy frogmen was, the civilians in urban guerrilla tactics. To maintain the moraje of the rebel organization, [Col. RarnOn] Montes Arache [the frogmen's commander and the rebel defense minister] and other officers agreed to let the civilians organize them- selves into commando [neighbor- hood militia] units. Montes Arache realized that his job was to coordinate these units scattered all over the . city and to give them leadership together with logistic (fod of the Jesuit Colegio Belen in Havana, 'ti rue where Fidel Castro stAtiplreveldtrilir Release 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 ' Professor Slater writes that ."the realk10,61 Jam.11 ? explanation" for - theApprovicleEpgiRl!edsRlutimit /yo 1.11.,-.,, - 4 vitagritila tb.e terror is the 5 Jo 4?,p,1 o ileac ?7410 giii lei% ....6 was the [US] embassy's playing on --,:ein. ?tin? contra z ego aim at Yutting it out." ' Spanish that sounds, like a Mississippi One flaw 'of Professor Slater's book the Communist theme, compounded drawl. Life stops at midday when he is that he treats the 1965 intervention by the almost universal disdain and speaks on the radio, the slow, seduc- as an isolated episode with virtually no distrust for . Bosch throughout the US tive indignation of his voice blasting reference to the history of pS involve- Government." I think this is true but into the street from every shack. In a ment in Dominican affairs:- President there are deeper explanations. that are recent radio speech Bosch asked: Grant's efforts to annex Santo relevant ,both to the continuing polit- 'kat terror in Sant.? - Domingo and to Why do you think there are armed. Domingo, which were blocked by social conditions throughout Latin bands punishing the poor barrios Congress; the US Marine occupation of America. . ? . ' of the capital? Why are there so 1916-24; the US receivership of 'Sinn Domingo -is one of the ex- many political murders, so many Dominican customs ' duties from spies, so many political prisoners, 1905-1940, when Trujillo .arranged for .treme examples -of the creation of a so many abuses? It is for the same final payment of the foreign debt, one huge sub-proletariat . overnight. Its reason that the country has had a of his proudest 'achievements. Nor does population (now. 800,000) has . more, large commercial deficit in recent - he mention the CIA role in the than . doubled .' in - the decade since years. It is because the country assassination of .Triijillo,14 and the US Trujillo's death... It is -a particularly does not produce enough, for all military and -diplomatic-maneuvering to , grave .case of the influx to the cities in Dominicans to live at least .with dismantle the Trujillo political appa- e-eontemporary? Latin America. And it enough food, and besides this differs .frOm. ? European peasant migra- what is produced is badly distri- ratus (twice US warships were sent into buted. A few have much, others Dominican coastal waters to block tionsItt itli.e ,era ?lithe Paris Commune have enough to live on but the attempts to restore the dictatorship) In ..04-* important- viays.' Fit-St, the great majority don't even have and to establish the provisional regime European .urbanization process. pro- where to fall dead, that held the 1962 elections in which Ce.eded at a somewhat slower pace than. Bosch won by a large majority. in . Latin America today and was sus- The economic problems of these A major. element of the US presence ?tamed by a much Iiigher degree - of people 'are immense, almost immeasur- in Santo Domingo since the fall of industrial ernploym-ent.10 Secondly, able. A survey of one marginal barrio Trujillo has been the intimate relation- there was in Europe nothing approach- by Santo Domingo's Urban Planning ship of US advisers with the Domin- ing Latin America's urban squatter Office found that only 16 percent of jean military and police.15 After the problem that tends to divide cities into employable family heads had regular intervention of: 1965, these advisory distinct 'asphalt and marginal .areas.11 work, 44 percent survived by' occa- missions expanded enormously. In If the demands, of those who are sional odd jobs, called chirripa, while 1967 and 1968 the Dominican Repub- moving into the cities for food, jobs, r.:40 percent were totally unemployed, lie, with a population of only. four .and housing are in no way satisfied, Of those working full.or part-time, 93 Million, had the largest AID Public they become 'dangerous to the regime: :percent earned less than $100 Safety (sic) or poiice. assistance pro- only terror and force will control 'monthly." Survival under these condi- gram of any country outside Vietnam. ? them. ' ? ? !tions is partly in the cash economy, The, second and third largest programs . The tattered country people who 'partly through barter, but probably were respectively in Brazil (with 90 I came to Santo Domingo have built .most important, through elaborate and million people) and Guatemala, the flimsy; 'clapboard shacks that sprawl :highly codified exchanges Of personal two. other Latin American nations away from the city's center along both favors, like tribal or - communal ens- where, major outbreaks of right-wing banks of the Ozama River and under tom ? in many rural subsistence ccon- terror, ,by paramilitary death squads i the Duarte Bridge. In 1965, thousands omies. have occurred in recent years.. . of the slum dwellers, using Molotov 1 . ? - ?cocktails and small arms captured from 'Six years after the revolution, Santo One of the most interesting clocu- the police, defeated elite tank and Domingo is still .divided into two ments to appear recently on the Amer- infantry units at this bridge in one of enemy camps: the slums of the old lean presence in Santo Domingo was the episodes that demoralized the rebel zone, and the comfortable resi-- the transcript of a taped interview with, Dominican military and led to the US dential neighborhoods surrounding the . David Fairchild,: who served with AID intervention.' 2 This humiliation has American embassy. I talked to an old : in the Dominican Republic for eight- generated in the Dominican ? armed ?and - wise . Trujillista politician who ?-eon months in 1966-67. The interview forces ,and police an obsessive hatred these days rocks on his porch a few deals mainly, with the frustrations and and fear of the shack settlements and blocks from the embassy. "In the old complexities of administering the vast the dense, fetid warrens, called patios, days, when a fire broke out in a sugar US aid program to stabilize the Bala- of ardboard and palm-bark huts which 'cane field, the way to fight it was to .guer regime. Fairchild has this to say are squeezed behind the facade of ,start another fire, called a counter-fire, about the AID .Public Safety program: the pastel-colored wood-and-concrete ..' [contrafitego]. In 1965 a big fire houses. in -the 'interior of each city ! called the' revolution broke out in block in the parte alta of Santo Domingo. The people in these slums have kept 'a blind and stubborn faith in their oomii nue8? Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 There were six positions in the Public Safety DivisAPPrgVeciEby which were CIA officials. They were CIA 'employees. They =reit' paid by AID ? because there was no - way of keeping.. the accounting separate without exposing them. Their location there was unknown to other mernbers of Public Safety. I had to become familiar - with this because one of my jobs - was getting the positions and the budgets straightened out. They worked with .the police. There were only six of them out of 20 ... they were in intelligence, communications, management -training here are the figures: in fiscal '67, there were IS [AID Public Safety officers]; in fiscal. '68, there were 18, of which six,_ one-third, were CIA.1 6 The 1965 ?intervention, and, all the desperate, Byzantine machinations that have followed in order to justify it, .not only compounded the raw and ;mounting tragedy of the Dominican people, but achieved the very opposite of its ?stated ends. Slater writes, cor- rectly; that "Communist, or, at least,. radical, and extremist strength in the Dominican Republic is far higher today than it was in April 1965, in good part because of the intervention." Beyond this, the political regime :that is the creature of the intervention has proved to be a revival of the era of Trujillo, with the apprentices sitting in the sorcerer's chair and practicing his brutal powers. President Balagner, who was placed in power by US troops and US money, - pleaded in a speech at a dinner of the. 'American, Chamber of Commerce in Santo Domingo for an increase in the republic's quota for sugar exports to the US: "We depend," he said, "in full measure on the political and economic . collaboration of . the Fatherland of ? Washington and Lincoln, and We can- not allow ourselves the luxury; taken by other countries of Latin America, of siltking off the so-called yoke of North American imperialism to accept others that are, indeed, igno- "minious."17 But the Dominican sugar quota is being cut by Congress, Bala- guer is running out of money, and his military and political support is begin- ning to desert him. t is a, pity that . the PRD hes 2001/1110V dlAuR1316841/004991t01000090001-6 mystique than a workable political formula for ruling the Dominican Re- public. Juan Bosch remains a popular leader and a man of high principles, but his erratic character makes it doubtful that he can provide the steady leadership that ,the Dominican people need. Still, if political terror continues - it will lead to a popular explosion more violent than that :of 1965. citurtInueU Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 11 refer to Trujillo'0,Aiii.61.virr people and thus efertide- Min this comparison the 1936 daughter of some 19,000 Haitian squatters to stop the illegal migrations Haiti to the Dominican Republic., By far the best source on the Trujillo regime is Robert D. Ciassweller's excellent biography, Trujillo: The Life aad Times of a Caribbean Dictator (Macmillan, 1966). 2See "Van 216 Maros," El Nacional, December 30, 1970. The writer of this summary told me that after the edition went to press four more political killings occurred in tit final thirty-six hours of 1970, brining the death/ disappearance total to 190. 1 3For example, on.?Miy 16, a fifteen- 'year-old tailor's apprentice,. Belardino Beras Ortega, who hid arrived from . the provinces only thee months be- fore, was detained Ly a navy street patrol on ? the Duarte Bridge for not having a license plate on his bike, and was capriciously tipown over the bridge to his death bt the patrol. See "Piden a Balaguer se 1rzvestigue Muerte Joven," El Nacional, Kay 22, 1971. 4See Miguel Jose Torres, "Transcurre ? sin. Mcidentes PawActividades Los Minas," El Caribe, Santo. Domingo, November 20, 1970. 5 There have been eight different national police chiefs in the. first five years of Balaguer's rule. In what waS described as a major step to purge the police, Balaguer last January named his Defense Minister, Gen. Enrique Perez y Perez, as his newest police chief, but the paramilitary violence has ? con- tinued. ? 6See "Admite Ineficacia," El Caribe, November 19, 1971. . , -'See "Miembrbs de Banda Solicitan' Asflo,"-El Nacional, April 20, 1971. 8See ."Revelan Trama," El Nacional, June 7, 1971, and "Bosch Ye Escan- dalo Denunciada Trama," El Nacional, ? June 8, 1971. On page 13 of the June 7 edition, a letter from the warden of La' Victoria prison to Lt. Nunez is photographically reproduced, saying that Sierra y Sierra "was a prisoner and squeezed the communists very hard and now they. are persecuting him in the capital ... so I hope you will give-him protection for me." eafte 2d)01/14/48r1 CDIARDR8440849 inato de Manga, Nacional, April 14, 1971. The same edition carried a statement by National Police Chief ' Perez y Perez that the. killing was done by PACOREDO (Partido Comunista de la Republica Dominicana) which is said to be controlled .by police infiltrators. '?See "The Poor World's Cities." a survey, The Economist, December 6, 1969, p. 5.6. See ? Richard M. Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbaniza- tion'," Latin American Research Review, Fall, 1965, p. 56. 12 Slater writes that "the last detach- ment of surrendering Caseos Blancos [riot police), 'having been told they ? were facing a Communist rebellion, pleaded for their lives by crying, 'Viva Fidel! Viva el Comunistno! Viva &nla car arrived fdRY1fluffhil"flio`fiY the Mexican embas- sy. Inside the. ear he found a loyalist colonel and a CIA agent who took him at gunpoint to San Isidro [the big air' force base outside Santo Domingo]. There he found the US official who had led him into the trap, as .well as US air attach?IA. Col Thomas B.] Fishburn, surrounded by Dominican generals. ? He was forced to read over ? the. radio an. appeal asking the. rebels to . surrender their weapons." ? . ? - .16From "US -AID in the Dominican Republic: An Inside View," in NACLA Newsletter, Vol. IV, Na. 7, New 'lark-Berkeley: North American Con-- gress on Latin America, November, 1970. The AID Public Safety program regularly sends its officers 'first to Vietnam before sending them else:- where in the world, which means that nearly all US military and police Cuba!' " One of the 'many ironies of the revolution was that Col. Francisco Caarnano; the rebel military chieftain, had served until a few months before as chief of the police riot squad. Antonio Imbert, the last surviving killer of Trujillo, had been supplying arms to Castroite groups over the years and had actually offered his services to the rebels before being named head of an anti-Communist junta by the US occupation forces. See my article "US Aides Confirm Imbert Aided Reds," Washington Post, June 17, 1965. '3Sec Fernando A. Santana, .Barrios il,farginados de Santo Domingo: Una Realidad para- Actuar. Study presented to the United Nations Conference on Squatter Settlements, .Medellin, Colorn- bia,TelaruarY,1970,:p. 3.. 14See my "How Trujillo Died," The New Republic, April 13, 1963. In his book Barrios in Revolt, Jos? Moreno illustrates how this relationship functioned in the early days of the 1965 revolution, before US military. intervention: "Antonio Martinez Fran- cisco, a rich businessman, was the Secretary-General of Bosch's PRD when the revolutidn broke out. As a moderate, he sought mediation from the US embassy when the fighting started to get out of hand. His plea .went unheard by US officials. On April 28, Martinez sought political asylum in the Mexican embassy, where he re- ceived a phone call from Arthur Breisky., Second Secretary at the ? US embassy, who asked him to come to the embassy to discuss important prob- lems with [Ambassador] .1,7.T. Bennett. ? advisers in Latin America shaped to some extent by nam experience. However, Safety programs in the Republic and Brazil have back in the laSt two years. have been their Viet- the Public Dominican been cut "The speech is printed in Listin Diario, May ,),,- 971... ? , Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 , um= zusx Approved Farr Release 2001//11J/08UL ? CIA-RDP84-00494114001000090001-6 2 197/ Congress Turns to the CIA ? Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the Central Intelligence Agency. This is understand- able, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great?or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo. The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which Is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained?for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American demo- cratic system alike. So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais In Laos) and to impose on the agency the same limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has for- bidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The 'advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions Involve making war and ensuring the security of Arnericaas, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot tee how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control. Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA ex- penditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. He -argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on Intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critic's might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens would not have the fine instrument required for analysis. In the House, ? Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry, of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unen- forceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo?is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress. Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from re- garding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be dis- tributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot. To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts? perhaps a bit too readily?that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts ?and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew . .." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already, left the station. The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive prerogative in foreign policymaking ? to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will become a vehicle for debating them in depth?and in public, too. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 .1*;4';.14".14_101341 ?13A Approved Fort, Release 41/1X111819t1A-RDP84-0049941001000090001-6 any in Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant f Secrets' :Some Want Information, But House Voted To Keep Status Quo By GENE NMI Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington ? Does Congress really want to know everything ?the United States government ..does? . On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.. Resolution Rejected In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 118, a reso- lution asking the State Depart- ment for documents related to U.S. bombing and CIA opera- tions in Laos. ? Representative Joe D. Wag- gonner, Jr., (D., La.) said dur- ing the debate: "There are some things that some people in this country had better not know1 for the security and future well- being of this country. Therefore, they [the administration] must keep some information from me ond they must keep some infor- mation from you for the benefit of the future security of this . country. It is better that infor- mation as a rule be overclassi- fiecl than underelassified." Mr. Wa .gonr r also ex- pressed a widely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leak- ing some of it to the New York Times or some other whistle blower." The debate underscored a tac- it assumption long held in Con- gress that the country is better .served if legiejators?except for . a select few?are not told of everything the United States has I done or is currently doing in the. field of foreign affairs. Being Challenged This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuc- cessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information on Laos. But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Coop- er (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress reg- ular ACCOSS to all intelligeece reports and analyse re for the executive briP6,9Ni@ ?CIA. Senate sources indicate that senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during these intelligence briefings. One I source said he has never heard 1a question pertaining to the so- called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations. "For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did you lose in your clandestine service last year?' Maybe we should ask it, but we never have." But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agen- cy's activities. As Mr. Mahon, the Appropria- tions chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are. He said he was opposed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give it [CIA information] to every .member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York SENATOR COOPER RICHARD HELMS Seeks more disclosures Knotos all the secrets ? Mr. Cooper is one of the most Leverett Saltonstall, a Massa- highly regarded members of the .chusetts Republican, was quoted I Senate, and this is a factor of recently as saying when he was some importance in its club-like la member of the Senate: '"They iatmosphere in which the success lithe CIAI do things I'd just as I or failure of a bill can hinge on lsoon not know about." who its sponsor is. I Richard Helms, Director of , I But Senator Cooper?a senior 'Central Intelligence, at least ! once a year gives separate intel- ligence briefings to small groups within the Armed Services and j Appropriations committees in beth houses of Congress and i even to the full Senate Foreign I Relations Committee, even 1; I though it does not have direct 1 jui is iction over the agency. The annual briefings, accord- 1 ing to congressional sources, consist of "around-the-world" assessments of the United States' military and intelligence posture. Other special briefings might deal with such topics as deployment and strength of Saviet nuclear missiles. George H. Mahon (D., Texas), chairman of the House Appro- priations Committee, and F. Ed- ward Hebert (D., La.), chair- man of the House Armed Serv- ices Committee, said, as did : Senate sources, that Mr. Helms has never refused to answer a question during these briefings. j member :of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee?must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over the CIA. , And even without national secu- rity considerations, congression- 1 instinctively re- sist encroachment upon their areas of competence. The last time an attempt was !made to break the. Armed Serv- ices Committee's lock on the :CIA was in 1966, when then Sen- ator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) made a comparatively modest proposal to create a spe- cial CIA committee, made up of representatives of Armed Serv- ices, Appropriations and the Foreign Relations committees. The late Senator Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), then chair- man of the Armed Services Committee, blocked the bill from coming to a floor vote on a d 1 emiecuveiy killing the measure. The Cooper. bill is not likely to get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdic- tional problems, most members; of Congress appear to be ambi- britReleatseb(2111121.1t/Icl /OS: much.I crets ? th ? " ;Times." Chairman Hebert of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything. "I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not bitching about it." On the other side of the issue, critics of the present system say that congress had deliberately remained ignorant to avoid re, sponsibility. Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said dur- ing the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involve- ment in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation We feared that more knowledge would mean more responsibility for us." Others argued that the infor- mation the House was seeking was already well known to the Mr. Hebert said there as only one exception, when he Me structed Mr. helms not to an-' swer a question put to him by a member of his panel. "I took it on my own responsi- kb . )9eli ?iej4044din ? enemy so it could not be with- held for national security rea- sons. As the House vote indicat- ed. they represented a minority view. For the moment, at least, the House does not want to sharergt y0Q900autive branch se- ? what e question was ? -------Approved-PorilWelease?200-111-1/08T CIA-IRDP84=004439R601-000090001-43--- - RADIO -TV M ON ITO RING SEVC EE, INC. 3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W. -:- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016 -:- 244-8682 PROGRAM: DATE: ,Anc Na"S STATION OR NETWORK: Anc VIP2VXSION T7r:%.7 0 6:F .*11? PMSMNTIAL CEYAJ, IJOULYi LIMIT CIA's OP'KftAMNS HaRY KaASOTM: Polo,1 HcClcskv, the RoDublicnn congres5- man from. Cal:11o7miay who 07:-.0005 tho.alvaniotation's Viet '&n e,nnounc,ed fe?mally tolay that wAYI Ninon net yea-s. DaoJgo tc end the Viet Nan War conclitioned only on tIke reloo of Anon-:17.can MC?7.2 on that from ABC's Bill Wo.ze2;2; .An Lc_s (LM CCU') BILL Ti: Thoyo's no dm2fot that McC16z1:c7 is mn.in:iy C0'( 't' about ending tIv...) blqt todrly. he Tcvoalod that othe,T majo d:1.2ferences uith no Nixon cd:.ilnistratioyA, (TILT44 CLXP) PAUL McCLOSUY: This .111:;.1 Kot bet-.1 snglo We soek in addit:Ion to ondin2 tho to tz-TAth in g(,tvorn- meat; to nc,baevo a re,tun to tA-1...:,1 17J.stoTir... Ropubli.an ;-qoTF,1 dt- it to racial islmos :ather tha pmsent?sothoy'n sttgy; an a on of -juJicia:i i-,...e,oDeRdenco and e7:cellonfzo. We ulll secik to end CIA involvoment in the intonml a-ffai73 of other. natiuns9 and to nnit that a7's cporatAom; to the field of intolligonc* gathoFing. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 NEW NOM(' Mily,-trotrro, Approved ForVitlease 2001/11/68 : CIA2RDP84-00499a801000090001-6 V JUL 1971 EXPOSE THE CIA? Several attacks en-- the Central Intelligence Agency (Richard Helms, direc or) began Wednesday in the Senate. Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA funds he reported in one line of the federal budget, instead of being masked as for decades past other budget items. Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force. the CIA to Nrnish Congress inn.- laxly with intelligence informa- tion hitherto given only to the government's Executive branch. The Cooper proposal, it seems almost needless to say, got friend- ly comments from Democratic Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.), Mike Mansfield (Mont.), and Stuart Symington (Mo.). Sen. Clifford P. Can (R-N.J.) promised to introduce ? bills to forbid the CIA to sneak money to Thailand. for Thai troops fighting in Laos. Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not to have learned in all the years -of the agency's existence: The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult, dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effec- tive. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective in the future as it has been in the past, then Cod help the Richard Helms Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 LOU13 ,CC;6_ Approved Foitalitefease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049041,001000090001-6 t) JUL 197/ 11 1-1 113 (1)-1;(t [1 11 I J C1 a U In senate By RICHARD DUDMAN Chief Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch WASHINGTON, July 8 Sen- ator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, has obtained strong bipartisan backing for a proposal to require the Central Intelligence Agency to report to 'Congress as well as to the Ex- ecutive Branch. Cooper, a moderate opponent of the Vietnam War and of the antiballistic missile system, in- troduced his proposalyesterday as an amendment to the Nation- al Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of De- f ens e, the National Security Council and the CIA. Senators Stuart Symington (D e m.), Missouri, J. William Fulbright (D e m.), Arkansas, and Jacob K. J-a vits (Rep.), New York, announced t.h e i r support for the measure on the Scea Le -Hem:. Fulbrigilt spoke Of holding hearings on the propos- al. Symington, chairman of a for- ? eign relations subcommittee on overseas commitments, told of difficulties he ?had had in ob- taining full information about secret U.S. military prepara- tions and operations abroad, in- cluding the clandestine warfare being conducted in Laos. Symington noted that he was a member of the Foreign Rela- tions, Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. He said that his best information had been obtained from the last of these, attributing that fact to a requirement in the Atomic Energy Act that the Atomic En- ergy Commission keen Con- gress' "'fully and currently" in- formed. Cooper used that phrase in his proposed amendment on the CIA. An aid said that Cooper had found CIA information gen-. erally reliable on such matters as Soviet military preparedness and the Indochina War but had noted that it was rendered only in response to specific ques-, tons. Under his amendment, the CIA wbuld have to take the ini- tiative in sending Congress its 'analyses of problems of foreign. policy and national security. The aid said that Cooperhad been considering such a plea- sure for several years. Be said the publication of the Pentagon papers had demonstrated once more the value of CIA reports a n d probably had broadened ? support in Congress for a re- quirement to make them availa- ble. In a Senate speech, Cooper proposed that the CIA be re- quired to make regular and special reports to the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees and to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Additional special reports could be requested by the commit- tees. Any member of Congress or designated member of his staff would have access to the infor- mation. All such persons would be subject to security require- ments such as those in the Ex- ecutive Branch. Cooper said that the best in- formation should be available to the Executive and Legisla- tive branches as a basis for na- tional decisions involving "vast amounts of money, the deploy- ment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in corn- -bat, and binding commitments to foreign nations." Two other Senators offered proposals relating to the CIA. George S. McGovern (Dern.), South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency ap- pear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds now are concealed in other items in the budget. Three bills were introduced by Senator Cliff ord P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, to limit covert use of funds and mili- tary equipment. by the CIA for Approved For Release 2001/11/08 fielding foreign troops in Loas o r elsewhere- without specific approval by Congress. Case said they were designed ?"to place some outside control 'oh what has been the free- wheeling operation of the Exec- utive Branch in carrying on for- eign policy and even waging foreign wars." Meanwhile, .the House reject- ed a proposal that the Adminis- tration be required to tell I what the military and CIA were I doing in Laos. By a vote of 261 to 118, mem- bers tabled ? and thus killed -- a resolution introduced by Rep- resentative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep.), California, that would have ordered the Secretary of State to furnish the House with the policy guidelines given. to the U.S. ambassador in Laos. . The ambassador has responsi- bility for overseeing the clan- destine -military operations in Laos aimed at assisting the roy- al Laotian government in its struggle with the Pathet Lao. William B. Macomber Jr., deputy under secretary of state, -clashed yesterday with Mc-! Closkey over whether the De- ? partment of State was directing; U.S. bombing attacks in Laos. Macomber denied the allega- tion and suggested that if Mc- Closkey wanted to pursue the issue he ought to invite an East Asia expert from the State De- partment to testify. Tb e exchange occurred ? as Macomber testified bef o re a House foreign affairs subcom- mittee on ways to improve de- classification o f Government records by the State Depart- ment. Macomber said 10 to 12 years' retention ought to be ad- equate to protect Government secrets while not being so long as to c410444,0 :kJa6?06fio 00090001-6 -----Apprpvett-FaNielease-2001-111108-:-Cbst-RBP8*-0049SEPOI000f3.90001-6-----T----------- RAolo -Tv MONITORING .S.;ERVIC, INC. 3400 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W. -:- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016 -:- 244-8602 PROGRAM: TOMWITNESS MWS STATION OR NETWORK: -.? DATE: JULY 8, WTOP TELEVISION TIME: 6:00 PM E51 , r r7.1 7" re,. 7 T, SENATOR. PLANS Lh6AbLAAIOA AO ,,,,Ak.Kk.ASA-2, covt2on OP CIA CkROLYN LEWIS: Senator STningten released a memo fron the Pentagon which declares that efforts by Congress to set a money limit on U. S. military aid to Lao5 would de 051 the President's authority.as Coaidaandel' in Chief. Visibly annoyed., Sylaington remirlded the executives that under the Constitution, it is Congress that has the power to raise and support arios ymington 's complaints of secrecy surrounding some Alc,:orican lit ary opo ens abroad w:3re echoed by other senators. George McGovern charge.s that ARlerioan rood ;or -Peace Programs have been secretly pr the Chinese Government on Taiwan to buy votes to keep its seat in the United Nations. Senator PrOXMiTO made -Nblic forerly classified country by country figures on AT,erican military ass5?stance. ProNmire calls the classification unjustified and proses to challenge such action in the future. Senator Clifford. Case plans to introdnee legislation to increase congressional control over the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency is now involved in a secret war in Laos for which Congress has not specifically appropriated money. All this adds up to a brewing battle in Congress over secrecy in government. This is Ca'Palyn Lewis. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Goa V7VP*1"-- NW1yQJc f; JUL, 19;1 ei PAT,Einspn5fere.f.TirIftv5A5 ? much better position to make judgments from a much more inforn-,ed and ?broader perspec- tive than is now possible," he said. By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM Sptclal to The New York Timely WASHINGTON, July 7 -- John Sherman Cooper of Ken- tucky, one of the most in- fluential Senators on foreign policy matters, introduced legislation today that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to give detailed intelli- gence- information to Congress regularly. Mr. COoper, a Republican, said that Congress needed this Senator Cooper, an aide said, had been considering the legis- lation for three years but dis- closures in the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in Vietnam had now provided an impetus. ? The aide referred specifical- ly to C.I.A. analyses during the - kind of evaluation and analysis, Johnson Administration that now available only to the ex- full-scale bombing of North ecutive branch, to participate Vietnam would not be effective in the. formation of foreign Meanwhile, the House re- jected a series of resolutions demanding that the Nixon Ad- ministration provide Congress with i additional information on United States operations in Laos. , Two other Senators also of- fered proposals relating to the C.I.A. 1 Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, sug- gested that exilenditures and appropriations for the intelli- gence agency appear as a single-line item in the budget. Agency funds are now con- cealed in other items In the budget. ? Senator Clifford P. Case,. Re- publican of New Jersey, said he would offer measures that would prohibit such C.I.A. activ- ites as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos. Senator Cooper emphasized in a Senate speech that his proposal was not aimed at any C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but was ? "concerned only with the end result ? the facts and analyses of facts." "Congress would be in a in halting infiltration or break- ing the will of Hanoi. ? Senator Cooper's proposal was supported on the floor by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Demo- crat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Mis- souri, the only Senator belong- ing to both the Foreign Rela- tions and Armed_ Services Com- mittees. Mr. Symington said that it was "no secret that we on various committees have not been entirely satisfied with ,the. intelligence information- we have obtained. ? -"If the proper committees are not acquainted with what we're doing," Mr. Symington went on, "how we can func- tion properly?" ? Because Senator Cooper is so influential, it seemed likel that his proposal would bdthe subject of hearings and, per- haps, floor debate this year. A measure of the respect said his views came from Mike Mansfield of Montana, the ma- jority leader. "Anything John Cooper says would be given the most serious consideration by me," Mr. Mansfield said. Regular Reports Asked - Senator Cooper's proposal would require the .C.I.A.tomake regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. The agency would also be re- quired to make special reports in response to inquires by these committees. Mr. Cooper said that the agency would have to decide for itself what information id present to hte committees, but he specified that the data wont? have to he "full and current." There are now "oversight". .committees in the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Com- mittes, that review the C.I.A. budget and operations. But .these committees are not con- cerned with the substance of ? he information the agency Approved Ftpungelease 2001/11/08 :-CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 In the Irouse debate today,. _ Ithe majo!' fight came over a ??f:reaolntiort of inquiry? seeking 0 0 documents dealing with opera- tions of the United States mili- tary and the C.I.A. in Laos from 1564 to the present The resolution, which was sponsored by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., .Repub- lican of California, was set aside by. a vote of 261 to 118. Critics of the measure con- tended that the information was too sensitive to be given to Congress. Following this vote, the House, without debate, set 0e016ortg1.es,s aside resolutions seeking in- formation on bombing opera- tions in northern Laos and on the Phoenix program, which is designed to neutralize the ef- fect of underground Vietcong operations. The House also set aside a resolution seeking an- other set of the Pentagon papers that the Administration, made available to Congress last week. The supporters of the resOlu= tion were, for the most part, Democrats opposed to, the wa.rp. Approved Forllitlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049g1t101000090001-6 CHICAGO, ILL. SUN-TIMES M - 536,108 S - 709,123 '3UL. 8 1911 By Thomas t3. Ross --Sun-Times BUICEILI WASDINGTON ? Legislation was in- troduced in the Senate Wednesday to require the Central Intelligence Agency to limit its covert operations, supply its estimates to Congress and disclose how it spends its mon- ey. Thebills reflected the two-fold reaction in Congress to the disclosures of the top-secret Pentagon history of the Vietnam War: praise for the CIA's 20-year record of sound assess- ments and concern with its clandestine maneuverings. None of the bills is likely to receive the approval of President Nixon. Since the CIA was created in 1947, a succession of Demo- cratic and Republican -Presidents h ave treated the agency as their private source of Information and a vehicle Jor performing - "dirty tricks" outside the knowledge of Con- gress and the people. Ever since the United States became in- volved in Vietnam hr 1950, the CIA has pro- duced intelligence estimates that would have been embarrassing to the incumbent Presi- dent if they had been made available to the opposition party or leaked to the public. For example, as The Sun-Times disclosed. June 20, the CIA provided an estimate in 1969 that Mr. Nixon could have withdrawn imme- diately from Vietnam and "all of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation." Similar CIA estimates, -.revealed by The Sun-Times- and other newspapers, showed that Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 13. Johnson were consistently warned that the Saigon regime lacked broad popular support and that deeper U.S. involvement would be risky; 0 1 \ ? / to. ; But the Pentagon papers also disclosed that, while the CIA's intelligence division was sounding the alarm, its plans division was conducting clandestine raids in North Viet- nam and plctting first for and then against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Legislation introduced by Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) would limit such operations and the use of covert funds and military equipment to support them without specific approval by Congress. Case said his proposal is designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even. waging foreign wars." Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), only de- eared presidential contender, offered the bill to require disclosure of the CIA's budget and prevent its money from being concealed in appropriations for other agencies. It is reliably estimated that the CIA spends $1 billion a year. An additional $4 billion re- portedly is spent by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the code-making and code-breaking National Security Agency, and the various . military units that run the spy satellite pro- gram. Sen. John .Sherman Cooper (R-Ky ) in- troduced. the bill to amend the National Se- curity Act of 1947 so that the CIA would be required to supply its intelligence estimates to the House and Senate committees dealing with foreign affairs and the armed services. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved 110117, llUllS ASKS ? no SITS SECRETS Calls for Nahie's Of All Those With Authority to Handle ? Classified Documents By JOHN IIF.RBERS special' to The New York TIrn. ? SAN CLEMENTE, Calif., July 7?The White libuSe said to . day that it :had ordered the compilation of a list of all persons who, have authority to see top-secret documents. Gerald L. Warren, assistant White House press secretary, said in response to questions that a confidential memoran- dum signed by Brig. Gen, Alex- ander M. Haig Jr., 'Deputy As- sistant to the President for Na- tional Security, had gone to departments and agencies di- recting them to compile lists of those having top-secret clear- ance... Mr. Warren said the memo- randum, issued June 30, was part of a rel., iew of the process of classification and declassi- fication ordered by President Nikon on Jan. 15. He was vague about the de tails of the memorandum, who ekistence was diSclosed today in The Washington Post. But other officials said it was part of an Administration effort to reduce the number of se-, curity.clearannes both in and out of Government., Pentagon Is Complying In Washington, 'a spokesman' said' that the Department ? of Defense was compiling its list The 'spokesman said Secretary Defense Melvin R. Laird had ordered the stepabout three days ago:- ? ? :?The memorandum set this coming Sunday as a deadline for compilation or the lists, but it was considered doubtful that the departments . could comply that quickly. Because of unclear regulations about secu- rity clearances, there was some doubt about the ability of the agencies to compile compre-' hensive lists at all. NEVI YORK TIMES For)T6.1ease 2001/1001PCW-RDP84-004991,801000090001-6 ThereVere indications that no one in the Government knows bow many persons have security Clearance and that Mr. Nixon is trying to put- the entire dis- puted matter of classified docu? merits under central control for the first time., - Various laws and regulations apply in departments and agen- cies dealing with sensitive mat- ters. Estimates of the number of those with ? some authority to see top-secret documents run as high as many thousands. Members of the armed forces the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House, the State De: partment, the Justice Depart- ment, defense contractors and consultants are heavily involved in security matters. About the time the White House memorandum Was drafted, . Mr. Laird ordered tightened security at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, Calif., which conducts defense research on a contract basis. Daniel Ellsberg, a former Rand employe and Pentagon official, is under indictment for alleged misuse of top-secret documents and has said publicly he passed copies of a study of the Vietnam war to news- papers. Documents published by The New York Times and other papers carried top-secret clas- 23tion. 'Immediate Reductions' The Haig memorandum sa s in part that "each responsible department and agency" must inititate at once "a review and screening of each top-secret and compartmented clearance presently held by individuals with a view to effecting imme- diate reductions of all clear- ances which cannot be demon- Strated to meet the requirement of strict need to know." ?. Mr. Nixon arrived at the summer White House here last night for a two-week stay, ac- companied by Secretary of State :William P. Rogers; the director. of Central Intelligence, Richard .Helms; General Haig and other, officials. .He con- ferred at length with Mr. Helms about the latter's. recent trip to: the Middle East. The Pentagon spokesman, Brig. Gen. Daniel James Jr., said that as of April, 1971 803 ,in the defense establishment had authority to classify material as top secret, But the department was unable to say how many had access to top-secret mate The list of 803 began with the Secretary of Defense and went through 12 categories of de- scending rank, ?. The last category was: "com- manders and deputy or vice commanders and chiefs of staff of major. field ad fleet com- mands, forces or activities, as designated by the chiefs, of the military services or the com- manders of the unified and spe- cified commands concerned. On Capitol Hill, William B. Macomber Jr., deputy Under Secretary of State for Adminis- tration, told a House Govern, ment Operations subcommittee that the State Department now classified as secret 200,000 doc- uments a year. Ile said the av- erage over the last 20 years had been about 100,000 a year, Mr. Macomber conceded, un- der questioning, that too many documents were classified, and remained classified for exces- sive periods. Asked if the State Depart- ment had requested that the Justice Department seek in- junctions against The New York' Times and other newspapers to halt publication of the Penta- gon study, Mr: Macomber said it had not. But said that' the State Department concurred with the Justice Department be- cause of "deep concern" over disclosure of some of the ma- terial. Asked if a substantial por- tion of the Pentagon study could be declassified without harming national security, he replied: "Some of it." He said that only about 10 to 15 per cent of the material in the 47-volume study should re; main classified on the ground of national security. - ? Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6 Approved ForStelease 4.9ffilliiikAW-RDP84-0049?1110101000090001-6 14 JULY 1971 ti , f P.1 t, e / r . [77) 7i p Tivi) 'J LI/ LI U./ t :1 /7".,! , The secret Pentago papers .on .U.S. involvement in Vietnam are ..not so secret any tno;re. Portions of them have been discised by the New York, Times; The Boston Globe; The Washington Post; The St. Louis Post-Dispatch; Knight News- papers; The Los. Angeles Times; The .Chicago Sun-Times; The Christian Science :Vonitor and The. Associated Press, and read to news- - .men by Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska). The fo!loitt? by APs. Pulit:.;er Price zvinner. Peter Arnett reviews the highlights of the Pen- tagon papers, chronologically front he end of World War II to 1968, the last year of the study. - By PETER ARNETT Aszociatcd press Writer The deliberations leading to critical American decisions on Vietnam are being systematically disclosed by publi- cation of vast portions of the Pentagon 'papers. ? The documents, memos-, conference statements and situation analyses which make up the papers pinpoint the high- lights of this country's Vietnam commit- ment with a detail never before avail- able to the American public. ? While the gene-ral thrust of Ameri- can policy had been reported over the years in ..on-the-scene stories from Southeast Asia and Washington, from. congressional debates, leaks and official statements, the specific details of deci- sion-ranking were not known until the papers were made available to newspa- pers around the country and to con- gressmen. HERE ARE SOME of the, main points of the Pentagon papers as 'dis- closed through various sources: Orioius of the War: tiOI4-Yroi-ed (1945.61) * 6 ' . The United States ignored eight di- AFTER HEADING a military mis- meet appeals for aid froApOPCC46Ctr Rreceetel004/1f/D8MCWIROP84-00499R001000090001-6 in the first five months following World lor in October 1961 advised Kennedy to -War II. Underlying the American refus- al to deal with Ho was the uncertainty about helping a leader known to be a Communist. T,he Truman Administration adopted the "domino principle" after the Nation- al Security Council was told early in 1950 that ". ..the. neighboring coun- tries ?of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domi- nation if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then. be in grave hazard." President Eisenhower was told by the joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954 that the Geneva Accords endinfr, the French In- dochina war' permitted America "only limited influence" in the affairs 'of the fledgling South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs said assisting Vietnam "was oa risk not worth the gamble" and recom- mended that the aid earmarked for Sai- gon bring a greater return if de- voted to the support of military forces in other nations." Secretary of State Dulles successful- ly urged the commitment of relatively small American forces to stabilize the Saigon regime and keep the Commu- nists out. order an 8,000-man American task force to Vietnam. A month later Defense Secretary McNamara. told Kennedy that the Tay- lor program should be adopted "only on the understanding that it will be fol- lowed up with more troops as needed, and with a willingness to attack Viet- nam:" . . Throe days later McNamara reVersed his. position and no ground troops were sent:, but "Kennedy's priorities produced a broad commitment to Vietnam's de- fense, giving priority to military aspects of the war over political reforms." ? . INCREASINGLY optimistic reports of progress led to McNarnarii's laying ' plans in July 1932 to pull' baCk all American ground forces in Vietnam over a five-year period. The intelligence and reporting sys- tem for Vietnam during that period "must bear a- principal 'respobsibility for the Unfounded optimism of U.S. policy," an 'optimism and assessment inaccuracy uncorrected until IVIcNamara, in a re-- port to Johnson in December 1963, wrote: "The situation is very disturbing. Current trends unless. reversed in the next two to three months will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to ....a Cominunist-controiled state." brier ic at n i.rd en t Widened (1961.63). The Kennedy Administration trans- formed the "limited risk gamble" under- taken by Eisenhower into "an unlimited commitment," with Kennedy secretly ordering 400 Special Forces troops and 100 ether military advisers into Vietnam in the spring of 1961. In May of that year, he also 'approved programs for co- vert action in North .Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Kennedy sent Vice President John- son to Saigon to discuss with President Diem the possibility of sending in Amer- ican combat troops and signing a bilat- 'eral treaty. Diem was not then interest- ed but later in 1961 asked for both. ? President Kennedy knew and ap- proved plans for the military coup that overthrew President Diem, the United States early giving its support to a group of army generals bent on remov- ing the Vietnamese president. By sup- porting the coup the United States inad- vertently deepened its involvement, never seriously. considering an alterna- tive policy even though at least two ad- ministration officials in 1963 recom- mended disengagement Direct United Rates havo1venle,r4.1 (1964). The Johnson Administration decided in January 1964 to step up American in- ethatInueet F RDP84-0049"1000090001-6 proving correct the intelligence commu- nity assessment' that the measures would not cause Hanoi to cease its sup- port of the Viet Cong insurgency in the South. ? American Marine battalions ordered to Vietnam to protect the Da Nang air- field were secretly placed in an offen- sive role on April 1, 1965, with Johnson ordering that the new mission "will per- mit their more active use and that "the actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practical but in ways that should minimize the appearance of sud- den changes in policy.", McNamara told Johnson that by his ? . projections the United 'States might have 400,000 men in Vietnam by the end of 1966, and might have to raise the total to more than 600,000 by the end of 1967. At this time, the McNamara memo 'reflected a major change in American thinking: it could not get by with rein- forcements for the South Vietnamezie army and would have to take over the :major share of ground fighting itself. volvement VieLnairOP.M69q)pFe9i tion plan 3,IA that included South Vlet- namese commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast to destroy rail and highway bridges, parachuting of sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the North, and kidnaping of North Vietnamese to obtain informa- tion. In March, McNamara proposed South Vietnamese raids- into Laos plus air attacks against North Vietnamese military and industrial targets flown by South Vietnamese but backed by an American squadron,. In May 1964, :Johnson received a plan from William Bundy, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern af-- fairs, suggesting increasing pressure on North Vietnam, culminating in full-scale bombing by U.S. planes. . In ? June in a Honolulu meeting. Mc- Namara raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons 'at' some point if Chi- nese. forces entered the ground fighting. Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, openly argued that American commanders be given this op- tion The Gulf of Tonkin incidents in Au- gust may have been provoked by Ameri- can destroyers patrolling near the scene of South Vietnamese clandestine at- tacks ?against North Vietnamese shore installations, attacks which the ?Ameri- can ships were aware of. The U.S. air reprisals after the- Tonkin incident were' an jrnportant threshold in the war, crossed with virtually no domestic criti- cism." At a White House strategy meeting in September, there was a ?general con- sensus that air strikes against the North Vietnamese were necessary early in .1065, but "tactical considerations" me- qliired delay, particularly because Johnson was "presenting himself as a candidate of reason and restraint" in the presidential elections. hir V/77 ? Spite -onIrvis Bombing .Stat s (1965) Johnson resisted repeated urgings to bomb the North until February 1965, when strong guerrilla attacks against American positions at Pleiku led to the inauguration of the bombing campaign with the code name "Rolling Thunder." ? Johnson received warnings from the ',CIA that the planned bombing attacks would not achieve their purpose. The tactics of grandualism in the air attacks against the North. enabled the North Vietnamese to grow accustomed to the raids. The bombing was tcpproveldE ily ineffective within a few months, Tease 2001/11/08 : CIA- 11? , 01113.bail tn War ,Iny c2,2,,e,c2 Ad n--znes (1966.67). American military chieftains consis- tently told their civilian superiors that victory could be achieved only by oorn- mitting 500,000 to one million troops for a period of from ,five to 10 years. The civilians, however, tended to dis- regard the estimates and to search for quicker, less costly solutions to the war. U.S. military leaders also were con- stantly pressuring . Johnson to expand the ground war from South Vietnam into Laos and Cambodia during 1966 and 1967, including serious discussion about using Americans to invade North Vietnam in force. But Johnson, McNa- mara and other top civilians in the gov- ernment steadily resisted these requests from the generals. Johnson did allow bambini), and the covert use of force in. Laos and Cambodia. The Johnson Administration strate; gists had little' expectation that the bombing pauses in 1965 and 1966-would produce peace talks, but did believe the pauses would help placate domestic and world opinion. THEY ALSO argued that North Viet- namese refusal of the-tough American demands for peace talks would be a jus- tification for an escalation of the war. ? One memo described the lulls as "ratchets." This would produce "one more turn of the screw"Io?c)n-leald orcReleas*20CblalAR;k6ikil the inside administration::: argument at the time. McNamara began giving Johnson in- creasingly bleak estimates of the war progress from 1966 on, telling him he was "disappo?Med" in pacification and. that he saw "no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon." Both men were publicly sneaking confidently at the time of progress being made in the American military escalation. ? MeNAMAIZA WAS so disappointed with the military effort by 1067 that he Proposed to :Johnson in May of that year that the United States persuade Saigon to seek an accommodation wfila the Viet Cong, exploring a ceasefire and negotiating "with the non-Communist South Vietnamese who are under the Viet Cong banner". and if necessary ac- cepting their individual participation in the government. McNamara was fighting constantly with his generals over the war effort from 1966 onwards. McNamara was fighting constantly With his generals over the war effort from 1966 onwards. - ? The last major decision in the rapid building of American forces was decd-. Cd in July 1967, with "Program V" pro- viding for an eventual force level of" 525,000 Americans. At this time the U.S. military high command in Saigon again began lookityg to the South Viet- namese Army as the instrument to win the wet. Earlier advisory efforts with the Vietnamese had failed, but with the upper level for American forces already determined, the generals had no choice. VioL,r,naization. Policy lder (1.96 0e) IS O s1; .11, President Johnson turned down Pen- tagon requests for more troops after the, 1968 Communist Tet offensive swept into a score of ?Vietnamese, cities and towns. He announced a partial end to the bombing halt, a move that prompted the State Department to send word to its allies that it probably would fail and that full-scale resumption of the air war was -possible at any time. The move was successful. Johnson decided later that year to proceed with a policy of Vietnamization similar to that later followed by President NiKon, 4-00499R00100009000Winuea (711. 4-1 Li 'Nsir wreved ???? a, e ri - \?)). 0 ..1.,Lt. 0 7/irD7'7"i'l} ij w AsiiING-TON ? (UPI) Pfesi- 'dent Harry S. Truman_ made the first crucial step toward U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1950, approving shipment of $10 million in military goods ? to the French in Indochina, The Washington Post said Saturday in a dispatch based on the Pentagon papers. While the facts of the Roosevelt and? -: Truman involvement in Indochina -gen- erally are well known, The Post said, the Pentagon report includes documen- tation that sheds new light, on the U.S. reaction to the fall of mainland China. When Chinese Communist troops -reached the borders of Indochina, The Post said, the NVional Security Council 6 - - 1 /11(11V ,4,0049 V ' , fl t.A/ 11. "The advice added itp to. a rislh. of itucZear ai)ocalyp:?c. no molter lethich cozzrf,e he (LB,1 ) took." issued a paper calling for preparation of a program of "all practicable measures designed to protect U.S. security inter- ests- in Indochina," The United States at the same time announced its recognition of the regime of Vietnamese Emperor' Bao Dai. The step of providing $10 million for the French in Indochina soon was fol- lowed by approval of the concept of fur- nishing an American- Military Assis- 06/%9.6,911s j? ? Lance Advisory Group, the, newspaper said. In.another article, the Post said Pres- ident Lyndon Johnson was given con-. flicting advice in 1964 that left him to ?? inake a decision of a "cataclysmic na- ? ture.". On the one hand, Johnson was 'told that if the United States failed to use its power in Vietnam it could end up in a nuclear war. ? Other advisers .told , him, however, that he could trigger a , nuclear war if he. did intervene massive- ly. - 'The advice added up to a risk of nuclear apocalypse no matter which course he took,." The Post said. -11 T.17) ."?" ?0 ? (1 A ? -0 '70 A-1)_,.0 11--