Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 5, 2010
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 26, 1983
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2.pdf815.35 KB
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Directorate of ! j bItK HLL Review Terrorism 26 May 1983 GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983 Copy 4 4 0, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 .5X1 Secret Terrorism 25X1 Review F 7 Chile: C hange i n MIR Ta ctics 25X1 (ALA) 9 Red Brig (ocq ades: S till Ac tive 25X1 11 Special EURA Analysis : Righ tist Terrorism in Italy 25X1 ) ( Chronol ogy Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 ~X1 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret Chile: Change in MIR Tactics The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) remains the most violence-prone opposition group in Chile, but heavy personnel losses last month and the apparently growing cohesion of Chile's other, nonvio- lent leftist political organizations have caused MIR leaders to reevaluate their group's structure and tactics. According to Chilean security forces, the MIR plans to halt military operations at least tempo- rarily and concentrate on recruitment, public rela- tions, and inciting revolutionary peasant activity in southern Chile. We doubt that the MIR will com- pletely suspend military operations but believe that it will scale them back in coming months as the group attempts to recover from its recent setbacks and weighs the option of closer cooperation with the Chilean Communist Party (PCCH). The MIR, founded at the University of Concepcion in 1965, suffered major losses at the hands of govern- ment forces in the mid-1970s, and most of its leader- ship fled the country. Since 1976 the MIR has been rebuilding, and it tried to recapture public attention and support in March and April of this year by significantly increasing the bombing of water, electri- cal, subway, and railroad facilities. Twenty-six bomb- ings took place during March and April, and security forces deactivated another 11 devices, including 40 kilos of plastic explosives found in an abandoned car parked next to the presidential palace. We believe that the increase in low-risk bombings could indicate the MIR's declining capability to carry out more sophisticated terrorist activities. Instead of generating support for the MIR, these attempts have drawn media criticism and strong counterattacks from police and carabinero intelli- gence units. Security forces killed two MIR members in April, arrested several others-including a political-military chief-and seized arms caches. The strong police response prompted domestic MIR leaders to move headquarters units out of the capital to provincial cities, and to focus on promoting a revolutionary 25X1 peasant movement in southern Chile. The MIR was heavily involved in rural activism during the Allende regime, and southern Chile's high unemployment and farm foreclosure rates make it an attractive area for MIR organizing efforts. 25X1 The MIR's recent setbacks and its concerns over competition from the other leftist groups may have improved chances for a closer alliance between the MIR and the Chilean Communist Party. We believe that MIR leaders have been concerned for some time that the organization's image and position in Chile are declining and that other leftist groups are drawing away actual or potential MIR supporters. Coopera- tion between the PCCH and the MIR has been blocked in the past by disagreements over the latter's use of violence, but the weakened state of the MIR might make it more willing now to compromise on questions of strategy. 25X1 Based on the MIR's history, we believe its shift away from terrorist activity is only temporary. The MIR's previous foreign supporters-including Cuba, Nicara- gua, East Germany, and Libya-will probably pro- vide more training and funding in order to restore the group's military capability. The French Government, which has assisted MIR activists to escape from Chile recently indi- cated its intention to concentrate on relations with 25X1 more moderate Chilean opposition groups. We be- lieve, however, that the chill in Franco-Chilean rela- tions in the wake of recent French criticism of Secret GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Chilean police tactics may result in resumption of limited French assistance to MlRistas fleeing Chile, while still maintaining a policy of official support for 25X1 moderate groups. 25X1 Secret 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Red Brigades: Still Active Several operations by the Red Brigades (BR) in April and May illustrate that, despite Italian counterterror- ism successes, reorganization efforts have enabled columns to remain active: ? An arson attack on a NATO warehouse in Vincenza on 11 April was claimed by the 11 April BR column and a self-styled Communist group. ? Bomb attacks on carabinieri stations in Pistoia Province on 30 April and 4 May were claimed by the 11 April BR column. ? The shooting of a Rome professor on 4 May was claimed by the BR militarist party subgroup, the Partito Communista Combattente. ? A safehouse in Rome belonging to the Red Brigades affiliate group, Armed Proletarian Power (AAP), was discovered on 11 May. The safehouse contained material linking the group to the murder of a prison guard in January 1983. ? Manifestos appeared on factory buildings in Flor- ence in early May, indicating the formation of a new Tuscany BR column, the Umberto Catabiani Brigade "Andrea." The banners said the column opposed the militarization of Italy within NATO. ? In early May, four low-level BR support activists were arrested in Turin while attempting to rebuild the Piedmont BR column. ? Two members of the BR Partito Della Guerrigla-a name the AAP has used in the past-were arrested for an attempted post office robbery in Rome on 17 May. It is clear that the Brigades are far from recovering fully from police successes; several of the BR attacks have shown inexperience, inefficiency, and outright ineptness. Some of the arrested members appear to be new recruits. The accidental discovery of the Rome safehouse by police, moreover, has damaged the Rome column. Material seized at the safehouse has resulted in murder charges against several Rome column members for the January slaying of a prison guard. The abortive robbery and ensuing protracted hostage-barricade situation conducted by the fugitive group on 17 May resulted in the arrest of one perpetrator and the eventual surrender of two other terrorists. The shooting of an unarmed Rome profes- sor on 4 May at pointblank range only resulted in minor flesh wounds. 25X1 Although no evidence has surfaced indicating new BR plans to attack US or NATO targets, the manifestos in Tuscany suggest a possible threat to NATO facili- ties, particularly in view of the former Tuscany column's plans to attack NATO installations in the area. Italian police reported that the widow of Um- berto Catabiani: has recently gone underground and is active within the BR structure, perhaps as a leader. Police also speculate that the 11 April BR column and the Tuscany column are trying to create the appear= ance of many new columns forming nd of a steady regrouping of the BR organization.a 25X1 Information regarding the extent and resurgence in Italy of the group's operational capabilities is conflict- ing. We expect the level of threat to US, NATO, and Italian installations, presently not high, to increase during the next several weeks. We suspect the recent rise in BR activity is intended to coincide with Italian national elections scheduled for 26-27 June. The BR wants to press its claim as the "armed party" and as a credible factor in Italy. We believe attacks will be markedly less well executed and less lethal compared to BR operations of the pre-Dozier era. Secret GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret Special Analysis Rightist Terrorism in Italy Rightist political violence in Italy has a long history government for nearly 40 years. Rightist terrorists dating back to the 19th century and to Mussolini's frequently hit public gathering places where they can Black Shirts in the early 1920s. Relatively quiescent create mayhem. Other favorite but more specific after World War II, rightist terrorists reappeared targets include leftist politicians, students, and jour- who have acted against dramatically on the Italian national scene in Decem- nalists, as well as magistrates rightists. 25X1 ber 1969 when they bombed Milan's National Agri- cultural Bank, killing 16 people and injuring nearly terrorists have also carried out several bank 100. As with Mussolini's fascists prior to their arrival Rightist robberies, primarily to help finance their operations. in power, the new groups, in our judgment, have The same motive-combined with a desire to develop sought to create an atmosphere of tension designed to another socially disruptive activity-may explain make the government appear impotent and thus pro- rightist involvement in the narcotics trade. According yoke popular demands for a restoration of law and to US Embassy officials in Rome, Pierluigi Pagliai, order. In the few pronouncements of rightist terror- wanted for complicity in the 1980 Bologna railway fists, this "strategy of tension" has singled out various station bombing, was involved in large-scale narcotics segments of Italian society, particularly the PCI and activities in Bolivia when he was captured there in supporters of democratic government, for their "be- trayal" of the Italian people. October 1982. 25X1 A recent exhaustive study, Mauro Galleni's Report on Terrorist Groups It is difficult to classify rightist terrorists in Italy as Terrorism,' claims that rightist terrorists were respon- Police reports seldom sible for 68 percent of the 4,290 terrorist incidents members of a particular group. recorded in Italy between 1969 and 1980. Galleni identify captured rightists by organization, and some of the-leading rightist terrorists in Italy have been credits rightists with 87 percent of incidents involving The most multiple deaths and 49 percent of the total loss of life.2 named in association withseveral groups. prominent rightist terrorist is Stefano Delle Chiaie, still at large, who is suspected by police of participat- in major terrorist events from the 1969 Milan The rightists tend to strike in leftist strongholds such ing bank bombing to the Bologna train station massacre as Bologna, which has had a Communist municipal in 1980. Elio Massagrande and Pierluigi Concutelli Galleni is a PCI official, but it should be noted that the PCI . are other names prominent in the annals of rightist terrorism. Their multiple associations lead us to sus- are somewhat skeptical about some of his statistics, we find credible pect that they use different labels to create the his thesis that rightist tirrorists are as active as those on the left.= Most t causing multiple deaths involve bombings. Of the impression actually - the of case 25X1 178 persons killed by rightist terrorists between 1969 and 1980, 13, greater numbers and power than is were killed by bombs, 85 in the Bologna incident alone. Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret Italy: Rightwing Terrorist Groups/Organizations Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari) Third Position (Terza Posizione) Popular Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Popolare Rivoluzionario) Black Order (Ordine Nero) New Order (Ordine Nuovo) AN National Vanguard (Avanguardia Nazionale) MAR Armed Revolutionary Movement (Movimento API Armato Rivoluzionario) Compass Card (Rosa dei Venti) National Front (Fronte Nazionale) Mussolini Action Squads (Squadre d'Azione Mussolini) The Phoenix (La Fenice) Tolfa Brigands (Briganti della Tolfa) Italians' Protection Association (Associazione Protezione Italiani) AF Aryan Brotherhood (Fratellanza Ariana) GdI Executioners of Italy (Giustizieri d'Italia) MFR Fascist Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Fascisti Rivoluzionari) Popular Revolutionary Opposition (Opposizione Popolare Rivoluzionaria) South Tyrolean Homeland League (Suedtiroler Heimatbund) New Order members, and in 1972 three of its mem- bers-Franco Freda, Giovanni Ventura, and Guido Giannettini-were indicted for the Milan attack. The trial and appeals of the case continued until 1982, ending in acquittal of the accused. In April 1973, New Order attempted to bomb a Rome-Turin express train. The resultant police investigation provided suf- ficient evidence to bring about the legal dissolution of the organization in November of that year. The Italian security services reportedly believe that New Order continued to exist as an underground organization, but an established American scholar claims that some New Order members reorganized under the name Black Order. The scholar alleges that Giancarlo Rognoni is the director of Black Order and that the group has also co-opted members from such other organizations as the National Vanguard, the People's Struggle, and The Phoenix. In any case, Italian authorities in late 1974 charged members of Black Order with two major attacks. The first oc- curred in May 1974 when a bomb exploded in a public square in Brescia, causing multiple deaths and injuries. The second came in August of that year when an express train was blown up between Florence and Bologna, again with multiple deaths and injuries. Although Black Order has continued to strike public targets, it has never again surpassed the damage attributed to it in 1974. Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), in our judg- ment, is now the most dangerous rightist terrorist group in Italy. Its origins are unknown, but press sources believe it to be an outgrowth of Black Order or of the merger of several smaller organizations. Although NAR's first reported attack did not occur until 1977, Galleni credits them with some 119 attacks by 1980-a larger number of incidents than attributed to any other rightist terrorist group for the whole 1969-80 period. Unlike most rightist groups, NAR claims responsibility for some of its attacks. If Italian police and security service assumptions are correct, however, it did not claim its most spectacular accomplishment, the 1980 bombing of the Bologna According to Galleni, at least four of the 11 terrorist attacks between 1969 and 1980 resulting in multiple deaths were perpetrated by New Order and its appar- ent successor, Black Order. New Order's origins are obscure. Scholars and Italian security services believe that Giuseppe "Pino" Rauti and Clemente Graziani founded it, probably in the early 1950s, as a paramili- tary organization consciously modeled after Nazi groups. One journalistic account asserts that the group may have had as many as 2,500 members in the 1960s, but we regard that as exaggerated; The group's first major attack was the 1969 Milan bombing. Initial police investigations focused on left- ists, but subsequent acts led to the arrest of several Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret station; with 85 killed and 200 maimed, this attack was the most deadly European terrorist event of the postwar period. NAR has also targeted magistrates on several occa- sions, killing some who pronounced sentences against rightist terrorists. It murdered Rome magistrate Mario Amato in 1980, for instance, apparently be- cause he had uncovered incriminating evidence on two NAR members. In October 1982, NAR claimed responsibility for an armed bank robbery and an attack on a police station in Rome. We do not know the size of NAR's membership, but the number of incidents claimed by the organization and the known members arrested indicate that the group remains large enough to be dangerous Press reports, as well as Galleni, mention some groups about whom we know nothing beyond their names and the dates of some of their actions. Examples are the Mussolini Action Squads, reported by Galleni to have made at least 70 attacks in Milan between 1969 and 1980. Two others, the Tolfa Brigands and Popular Revolutionary Opposition, each have at least a dozen actions to their credit since 1979, mainly in Rome. Small groups that appear only intermittently are also characteristic of the Italian rightist terrorist scene. Galleni cites at least 50 such organizations. Although most Italian rightist terrorist groups are nationally oriented neofascists, a significant exception is the South Tyrolean Homeland League (SHB). During the 1960s these Germanic separatists bombed railroad stations, power lines, and bridges and also attacked Italian police officials, principally in the northern Provinces of Trent and Bolzano. Only minor incidents have occurred since 1980, although local dissatisfaction with Rome's unfulfilled promises for ethnic Germans in the South Tyrol could lead to more incidents in the future. Political Party and Government Links One respected Italian journalist asserts that rightist terrorism requires a "propitious ideological terrain." In part this is provided by the reaction to the Italian Communist Party, Europe's largest Communist party and Italy's second-largest votewinner since World Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31 War II..The party's electoral success and fascism's traditional militance and violence against Commu- nists make the PCI an obvious focal point for rightist reaction.F___1 25X1 Propitious terrain is also provided by the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), which probably has important links to rightist terrorists. Founded in 1946, the MSI has consistently remained Italy's fourth- largest party. It regularly wins at least 5 percent of the votes in national elections and peaked at 9 percent in 1972. The party has always insisted that it is a responsible organization working for its goals through legitimate democratic processes. The MSI has empha- sized its democratic bona fides under the leadership of Giorgio Almirante, party secretary since 1969, but we believe that Almirante may have tried to.create a legalistic facade behind which he and other MSI members have tolerated or aided rightist terrorism. 25X1 There is considerable evidence that some MSI mem- bers either engage in rightist terrorism or are in, close contact with those who do. The founder of New Order, Rauti, for example, is a leading MSI member.' In addition, the MSI-unlike Italy's respectable con- servative parties-claims that any measure is admissi- ble in the fight against Communism. Italian courts, in fact, have convicted MSI activists of political violence against individuals as well as the offices of several political parties. They have also closed at least one section of the party for harboring criminal elements. 25X1 Potentially more serious than the MSI connection, in our judgment, are scattered indications of links be- tween rightist terrorists and members of Italian secu- rity services and police forces. Press comments , , abound, alleging that the government turns a blind -eye to rightist crime or, worse, is its accomplice. The ' Rauti reportedly formed New Order because he differed with MSI policies under then secretary Arturo Michelini. When Almir- ante became MSI secretary in 1969, Rauti brought New Order back into association with the party. Rauti was elected to the Chamber of Deputies on the MSI ticket in 1972 and has twice been CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 cloud of speculation and allegation about Italian security service involvement with rightist terrorism began with press reports of a suspected coup plot in June-July 1964. The leading figure implicated in the scheme was Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo, head of the now disbanded Armed Forces Information Service (SIFAR), who was subsequently elected a senator on the MSI ticket. The parliamentary commission that investigated the case filed a split report. The majority found no evidence of coup plotting, but a dissenting multiparty minority found evidence of illegal activity by SIFAR while it was headed by De Lorenzo.4 F In a more serious incident, Prince Junio Valerio Borghese and 75 codefendants were indicted and tried for plotting a coup in 1970. Borghese, a former naval officer, received Italy's highest military award in World War II and later founded a rightist organiza- tion called National Front. The trial ended in 1978- several years after Borghese's death by natural causes-with the conviction of 46 of the defendants for conspiracy and participation in a subversive orga- nization. Among those charged but acquitted were Gen. Vito Miceli, a former head of the Defense Information Service (SID) and an MSI party official. Embassy officials in Rome have noted considerable public cynicism at the contrast between the strict judicial treatment of leftist terrorists-such as those involved in the kidnaping of Brigadier General Dozi- er-and the outcome of rightist cases. The principal defendants in the 1969 Milan bank bombing were not convicted until 1978 and ultimately were acquitted on appeal in 1982. The defendants in the Brescia bomb- ing case were also acquitted, and no one has yet been tried for the Bologna bombing. Pagliai died in No- vember 1982 as a result of wounds suffered in his capture in Bolivia, but Delle Chiaie, who was report- edly with him, eluded capture. The Defense Information Service (SID) replaced SIFAR in a ~eorQanizat.on that took place following the De Lorenzo incident. Guido Giannettini, indicted in the Milan bank case, had been an undercover agent for SID.' His arrest and ultimate acquittal therefore inspired considerable press speculation about SID involvement either in the planning of the bombing or its subsequent handling by police and judicial authorities. 25X1 Serious questions have arisen in the public mind on links between fascist organizations and Licio Gelli, founder of the illegal P-2 Masonic Lodge whose discovery caused the fall of the Forlani government in 1981.6 A former head of Italy's domestic security service (SISDE), who was fired for his reputed P-2 membership, has admitted that Gelli was once a paid informer for that agency. Press speculation has ar- gued that Gelli was actually the instigator of the Bologna station bombing, claiming that he chose Delle Chiaie to plan the attack to create a "hot summer" atmosphere to divert attention from the lodge's financial schemes. It is perhaps impossible to determine the facts of Gelli's or others' involvement in rightist terrorism. Nevertheless, we believe the intense press insinuations of such relationships, and of security service connec- tions to other incidents, have added to public distrust of the government as well as of the motives and interests of the parties, especially the dominant Chris- tian Democrats. Thus, each subsequent scandal or "revelation" feeds the public's suspicions of rightist terrorists and the interests with which they might be connected. The result, in any event, is considerable ' Giannettini was a journalist for the MSI national newspaper. The publication in the early 1970s of his name and those of other New Order members affiliated with the party led Almirante to denounce New Order publicly. Despite that effort to dissociate the party from known terrorists, Rauti has continued to sit in parliament as an MSI deputy.0 6 The P-2 lodge was discovered in early 1981. Its membership list implicated many leading Italian politicians and public figures in allegedly subversive activities. P-2 is also believed to have been involved in covering up several major scandals over the past decade. Gelli, who fled Italy in 1981, was captured by Swiss authorities in September 1982 and is now awaiting extradition. He is wanted not only for his illicit lodge activities but also in connection with various financial scandals accompanying the collapse of Italy's largest Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret harm to the reputation of Italian security services, according to the US Embassy. International Connections Only scattered evidence exists on international sup- port for Italian rightist terrorists. Several captured terrorists have claimed in published interviews that some of their cohorts were trained at PLO facilities in Lebanon, but those assertions are not confirmed. In one instance, a repentant rightist told of being trained by Phalangists in Lebanon. Italian security service officials believe that there has been some contact between Italian rightist terrorists and similar or sym- pathetic groups in Spain, West Germany, and France. such help appears to be only intermittent. a New Forces training camp in the Pyrenees-but West German security services have no confirmed reports of collaboration between West German and Italian rightist terrorists but are investigating the alleged involvement of one West German citizen in the Bologna station bombing. Italian police also claim evidence of contacts between the Italian rightist ter- rorist Marco Affatigato and a French police official, Paul-Louis Durand, who is known to be active in extremist circles and thought to have been in Bologna immediately prior to the explosion. There is no evi- dence, however, of collaboration between French and Italian rightists in either the planning or execution of the Bologna bombing. After the banning of New Order, five Italian rightist terrorists took refuge in Spain and were subsequently reported to have been in contact with Spanish counterparts. There is substan- tial evidence of Italian terrorist assistance to Spanish groups-such as the sighting of Italian neofascists in Outlook In Italy, only the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei has recently shown a capacity for sustained action. Re- porting for the final months of 1982 shows that Italian authorities have stepped up arrests of rightist terrorists, possibly in response to public pressures. Because much rightist terrorist activity occurs in response to leftist activity-creating a kind of circular terrorism-recent police successes in reducing Red Brigades cadres may also persuade the right tempo- rarily to assume a low profile. As long as the PCI remains an important political force, however, rightist terrorists will retain their old motive for terrorist action. Their threat will be all the more worrisome if they receive assistance from the Italian Social Move- ment and from sympathetic police and security offi- cials. 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret Statistical Overview Total, 632 Of which: US targets, 294 Category of InlernaIional I'errorisl Incidents, I982-83,by Month 30 20 0 J A S 0 N D J F M A M J 1982 1983 i I Total 73 90 49 57 42 46 55 58 71 69 22 632 Barricade, hostage ? Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received. bBreak.ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret Chronology This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received.F___1 25X1 purchases. 25X1 1 March 1983 Belgium: Onkruit Demonstration In Louvina, 30 members and sympathizers of the antimilitarist organization, Onkruit, staged a demonstration at a Belgian military base, protesting weapons 13 April 1983 Spain: Narcotics Connection to Basque Terrorists In Guipuzcoa Province, Basque police discovered approximately 7 metric tons of cannabis valued at $1.3 million. Police speculate that the Basque terrorists are losing public support for their kidnapings, bank robberies are becoming too risky, and the terrorists may now be financing their activities through narcotics trafficking.) 25X1 abandoned car parked next to the presidential palace contained 40 kilograms of plastic explosive. Details of the incident are being closely held within the Chilean Government. 25X1 23 April 1983 West Germany: Discovery of Incendiary Bombs Twenty incendiary bombs that ignite on impact were found near the Baden- Wurttemberg railroad line, which is used solely for transport of US military weapons. German authorities have had several reports that anti-NATO and anti- US militants plan to conduct unspecified operations against the US "bomb trains." We suspect this attack may be linked to a West German antimilitarist group, Krieg dem Krieg (War Against War), which was observing and photographing military trains in August and September of 1982 shortly before a US freight train was the target of a bomb attack on 29 September 1982.1 25X1 30 April 1983 Spain: Assassination Claim by GRAPO In La Coruna, the First of October Antifascist Revolutionary Group (GRAPO) has claimed responsibility for the killing of a Civil Guardsman. We believe that this attack-coupled with the 19 April killing of a police officer-indicates that GRAPO has reestablished its capability to conduct terrorist attacks in Spain. GRAPO's anti-US/anti-NATO orientation also indicates the possibility that GRAPO may target US interests. 25X1 Chilean police recently discovered that an 25X1 Secret GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Late April 1983 Peru: Aggressive Army Policy Peruvian Army leaders informed President Belaunde that they intend to take a more active role in the counterterrorist campaign in Ayacucho and are adopting a "no prisoners" policy; however, we have seen no evidence that such a policy is ac- tually in effect. The President reportedly asked that the Army make every effort to respect human lives and rights. in our estimation, indirect endorsement of this activity. Honduras: Terrorist Leader Captured Honduran authorities arrested Efrain Duarte, leader of the terrorist group Popular Revolutionary Forces-Lorenzo Zelaya that was responsible for the 1980 and 1981 machinegun attacks against the US Embassy, the 1981 ambush of a US mobile training team, and bombings of several US-owned businesses and their Honduran subsidiaries. Early May 1983 Honduras: Terrorists Declare War Honduran revolutionary groups followed up their public announcement of creating a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board with a declaration of "popular revolutionary war" against the Honduran Government. Official Cuban and Nicaraguan radio stations have broadcast the announcements, thereby providing, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret military facilities 25X1 6 May 1983 West Germany: Possible RAF.Targeting of US Installations During the investigation following the arrest of Red Army Faction (RAF) member Gisela Dutzi, West German police found a map, showing 21 US military installations in the Mannheim area. The map-believed stolen by Dutzi when she worked at the US military base at Mannheim in 1979-80-was in the possession of Peter Winter, with whom Dutzi resided prior to her arrest. Winter claimed he was given the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with instructions to check out the installations to determine.if the map was still accurate. West. .German authorities presume the RAF has some operational interest in US 25X1 12 May 1983 United States: Flight 236 Now Boarding for Havana A Capitol Airlines flight en route from San Juan to Miami with 248 persons aboard was hijacked to Cuba by an unidentified black woman brandishing a flare ..pistol. The hijacker was taken into custody by Cuban officials, and the passengers, after stocking up on cigars and rum, continued on to Miami. The same Capitol flight was hijacked on 1 May.F----] 25X1 8-13 May 1983 Italy: Formation of New Red Brigades Column In Florence, manifestos appeared announcing the formation of a new Tuscany Red Brigades (BR) column, named for former Tuscany column leader Umberto Catabiani who was killed on 24. May 1982.in a shootout with police. The BR mani- fests mention the planned militarization of Italy as the southern "flank" of NATO..We note the previous Tuscany column had planned to attack Camp Darby in 1982, and we suspect the resuscitated Tuscany column may also target the installation, especially during the time frame of the anniversary of Catabiani's death. 25X1 13, May 1983 Afghanistan: Split in Al Zulfigar? A Pakistani newspaper. reported an armed clash between two factions of Al Zulfiqar in Kabul. This is the first indication we. have had of a split in the group. 25X1 woman. A search conducted by Marines and local guards had negative results Philippines: Bomb Threat to US Embassy A bomb threat was phoned in to. the US Embassy in. Manila by an unidentified Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret 15 May 1983 Spain: Arrest of Spanish Rightwing Terrorists In Valladolid, seven members of the rightwing October 28 Armed Group were arrested by police for two murders in January 1983. The group is named after the date of the 1982 Socialist general election victory in Spain. 16 May 1983 Italy: Arrest of Italian Terrorists In Turin, four members of the Red Brigades (BR) were arrested during an antiterrorism operation. Italian police indicated that the arrested men were attempting to reorganize the Turin BR column, which was broken up by Italian authorities in 1982. responsibility for the latest device, and investigation is continuing. and US installations in London earlier this year. No group has yet claimed 17 May 1983 United Kingdom: Discovery of Incendiary Device In London, an incendiary device was mailed to a private business firm but was opened without ignition. The device was similar to seven devices claimed by the Scottish National Liberation Army, the Makhnos Anarchist Army, the Second of April Group, and the Wat Tyler People's Liberation Army sent to Soviet, British, carrier in as many weeks 19 May 1983 United States: Eastern Airlines Flight Hijacked An Eastern Airlines flight en route from Miami to New York with 132 persons aboard was hijacked to Cuba by a Spanish-speaking male claiming to have a bomb. Upon arrival in Havana, the hijacker was taken into custody, and the plane and passengers returned to Miami. The incident was the third hijacking of a US Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret 20 May 1983 South Africa: Explosion at South African Air Force Headquarters A car bomb exploded adjacent to the headquarters of the South African Air Force in central Pretoria, killing 18 and injuring 217. The African National Congress has claimed credit. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2 Secret Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2