DEMARCHE ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400820001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 2005
• Content Type: MEMO

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United States Department of Site
Director of Bureau of Politico-Mi V,)' grain
1~,
War-ungton, D.(:. 20520
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September 22, 1981 \ VJ
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Demarche on Soviet Compliance with
the Biological Weapons Convention
ACDA Director Eugene V. Rostow will be making the
demarche to the Soviets, agreed at the September 17
meeting of the CBW Working Group, on compliance with
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The demarche
will be made to Soviet Minister-Counselor A.A.Bessmertnykh
here on Thursday, September 24. This demarche will be
followed up in Moscow by our Charge who will convey the
same points to an appropriate official at the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
US Demarche on Soviet compliance with the BWC
DISTRIBUTION: ,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. McMahon, Director, National Foreign Assessment
Center
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. DeLauer, Under Secretary for Defense Research
Mr. Perle, Assistant Secretary for Policy
Dr. Wade, Deputy Under Secretary for Research &
Engineering
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
, OvRAd;, Austin, JCS/J-5
State Dept. review completed
SECRET,SE SITIVE
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5
5
979/22/87
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
'NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MGen. Schweitzer
ARMS CQNTROI. AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. Turrentine
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Assistant Secretary for International
Mr. Abrams,
Organizations (10) for European
Mr. Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary
Affairs (EUR)
Mr. Michel, Deputy Legal Advisor (L) and
Mr. Cohen, Deputy Director for Intelligence
Research (INR)
Planning (S/'}
Mr, Wolfowitz, Director for policy
Ms. Lopez, Executive Secretariat (S/S-S)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- --BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEMAROH1~ ?
m
The United States .wish S to raise a problem of lextreme
importance for relations between the United ate and the
Soviet Union and for the future of arms control;- It concerns
Soviet compliance with the Biological Weaponkd Convention.
-- The United States and the Soviet Union have discussed one
aspect of this issue -- the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk --
repeatedly in the past, most recently when the US Charge in
Moscow talked with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
in June. The United States wishes, however, to raise the
issue of Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Con-
vention one more time in an attempt to resolve the problem.
-- The United States has strong reason to believe that the
Soviet Union is not in compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention. This concern is based in part on the outbreak of
anthrax in Sverdlovsk. It is based in part on the presence
in the Soviet Union of heavily secured military installations
which have features which suggest that their function is
related to biological weapons. It is also based on strong and
compelling evidence of the use of mycotoxins by'communist
forces in Southeast Asia.
-- With regard to the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk,
previous exchanges have served only to heighten the suspicion
that the outbreak was the result of Soviet activities incon-
sistent with the Biological Weapons Convention. The explanation
provided by the Soviet Government that the outbreak was due
to natural causes is inconsistent with information available
to the United States. Among the reasons for continuing concern
are reports that the inhalation form of anthrax was involved
and the large number of deaths.
-- Underlying US concern over the outbreak of anthrax is its
proximity to an unusual military facility known as Cantonment
19. Cantonment 19 includes animal pens, suggesting it is
engaged in tests on animals. It includes structures enclosed
in earthen revetments which appear suitable for the storage
of explosives. Certain areas have extraordinarily strict
security arrangements. The section within the Soviet military
which is responsible for chemical and biological programs is
known to be associated with a facility in Sverdlovsk. The
United States is aware of other facilities elsewhere in the
Soviet Union which have similar characteristics, suggesting
that they may be engaged in illicit biological warfare acti-
vities.
0
-- The Soviet Union has failed to take advantage of repeated
contacts on Sverdlovsk to provide information which might ally
our concern. Instead, the Soviet Government has denied that
the Biological Weapons Convention is involved and questioned
SEC'R#TSF'SITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
US seriousness in raising the issue. The United States
believes that the Biological Weapons Convention is involved
and has repeatedly raised the issue precisely because it is
serious about arms control and about the need to comply with
arms control agreements. The uncooperative reaction of the
Soviet Government is inconsistent with Article V of the
Biological Weapons Convention.
-- Now new information about the use of toxin weapons in
Southeast Asia has added an additional dimension to this
issue. Three lethal toxins have been identified in a sample
from Kampuchea -- substances whose use in war is clearly
prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules
of customary international law, and whose possession or manu-
facture for such purposes is prohibited under the Biological
Weapons onve ti-on?. .The symptoms 'produced,-lay? tl%~se toxins
are consistent with the biza re effects reported by eyewitnesses
and by victims of certain hal attacks in Kampuchea. They
are also consistent with the effects of attacks which have
been reported in Laos and Afghanistan.
-- It is well known that the Soviet Union is`upporting the
Vietnamese in their invasion of Kampuchea. Soviet personnel
have functioned in an advisory role on matters related to
chemical warfare there, and numerous reports directly link
the Soviet Union to attacks with lethal agents in Afghanistan,
Laos and Kampuchea. These tricothecene toxins do not occur
naturally in Southeast Asia. No known facilities in Southeast
Asia could produce the toxins in the quantities necessary to
cause the effects reported, although the Soviet Union could
produce them. Research projects concerning tricothecene
toxins have been identified at Warsaw Pact institutes previously
associated with chemical and biological weapons research.
-- The Soviet Government has clear obligations under the
Biological Weapons Convention. According to Article I, each
Party commits itself never to develop, produce,'stockpile or
otherwise acquire or retain biological agents or toxins for
hostile purposes.
-- Article III forbids Parties to transfer such biological
agents or toxins to any recipient or to assist or encourage
any State in their acquisition or manufacture.
-- Article V requires the Parties to consult and cooperate
in solving any problems which may arise with respect to the
Convention.
-- In accordance with Article V of the Biological Weapons
Convention, the United States requests a prompt meeting
involving technical experts from the Soviet Union and the
United States to examine these issues fully and to discuss
means by which these concerns might be allayed.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-- Specifically with regard to the use of toxins, the United
States expects that the Soviet Government will act so as to
prevent recurrence of these incidents. The United States also
expects that the Soviet Union will cooperate fully with the
UN investigation of chemical weapons use and that it will
strongly encourage the governments of Afghanistan, Laos and
Vietnam to cooperate fully as well.
-- The United States asks for a prompt and positive reply to
these requests. The possibility of resolving this matter
through bilateral diplomatic channels is almost exhausted,
and the United States is prepared to take its concerns to
other fora. The implications of a failure to resolve this
matter are extremely serious for the future of arms control,
as well as for US/Soviet relations.
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