BRANDT-PERIE MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560046-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: March 27, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/18: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560046-8
POLICY
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Brandt-Perle Meeting (U)
(U) General
06224/81
Mr. Perle met with Gen Juergen Brandt, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces
on 25 March 1981. Also present for the discussion were MG Tandecki, LTC Groves
and MG Bowman. Two general subjects, US Forces Issues and arms control, were
discussed.
(C) US Forces Issues
Gen Bowman began by stating that we were looking for approval in principle of at
least Issue number two--the Master Restationing Plan. Brandt returned to Apel's
theme of the previous day--we should deal with the Foreign Ministry; we should
have dealt with them in the first place. The result of our using the "wrong
mailbox" was to hold up wartime Host Nation Support by two months. He expressed
his unease about a "Master" restationing plan and stressed the practical environmental
difficulties of moving twelve brigades. Gen Groves recounted the history of MRP and
stressed it was a 30 year plan, and we realized that we probably won't accomplish all,
but we have to start by meeting our most urgent needs. Mr. Perle asked about the
military efficacy of restationing. Gen Brandt stated that it would certainly be
militarily effective to transfer the Baumholder brigade east of the Rhine. When
asked if it would be appropriate to see the Chancellor on the issue he replied, in
principle yes, but one must realize that the Chancellor is not the Minister of
Coordination, the Foreign Minister is. He suggested, in an apparent extension of Apel's
remarks of the day before, that we have the Charge' approach the Foreign Ministry and
request bilateral, inter-agency talks. The MOD would participate.
Perle then turned the discussions to wartime HNS which Brandt agreed was MOD business.
Groves said he saw three things to be done: agree to the scope (all agreed that the
model already defines the scope), develop a time-phased plan for its execution, and
decide on a cost sharing formula. Brandt agreed and then opined that before he
approaches the Finance Ministry, he needs an annual price and to develop that he needs
to compute the cost of the whole project. He estimated that it would probably take
until June of 82 to develop the necessary data. Groves countered that we could agree
on a realistic annual funding target and implement from there. Brandt agreed that
that was a possibility, and said-Gen Heinz would probably call on Friday, 27 March,
to confirm this first meeting.
OSD Review completed
CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, EUR'& NATO AFFAIRS
DECLASSIFY ON: 27 Mar 87
4P
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OFFICE- OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OFD TENSE
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7 March 1981
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(C) Arms Control
Brandt stated that he was not sure whether they had ever made their position clear
on ERW. He had told Congressman Stratton that the ERW has a "gloomy" connotation,
and it is important that that connotation not be extended to LRTNF. We need to
get LRTNF. He personally doubted necessity for consultations once LRTNF is out of
the way. The US had never consulted when we introduced selectable yield weapons--we
just switched warheads. The same logic applies to binary weapons if they are re-
placed on essentially a one for one basis. Using an argument that he attributed
to Dr. We, because of the Humanitarian Law which requires that force be used in
proportion to its aim, we might have to introduce ERW to reduce collateral' damage.
Perle stated that his concern was, what was in 1979 pressure to start negotiations,
next year could become pressure for concessions. Brandt replied that Germany's
answer on the moratorium makes their feeling clear. Perle then stated that he was
working very hard to del ink LRTNF and SALT. He didn't wish to get in the position
where the Soviets could give ground in LRTNF to increase Allied pressure on the
US for SALT. Tandecki pointed out that such was not the previous administration's
view, but in any case we must insure some balance. Perle agreed that there should
be a bridge, but separate negotiation
RICHARD C. BOWMAN
Major General, USAF
Director, EUR & NATO Affairs
Approved For Release 2007/06/18: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560046-8