Notes on Sixth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 3 October 1972, 1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 3, 1972
• Content Type: MFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
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SUBJECT: Notes on Sixth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 3 October 1972,
1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room
1. Present were:
Members:
Chairman
Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/IC
NSC Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Department Dr. Ray Cline
Mr. Seymour Weiss
Defense Department Dr. Albert Hall, ASD/I
Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, D/DIA
Brig. Gen. Richard Bresnahan, JCS
(representing Lt. Gen. Seith)
Justice Department Mr. Bernard A. Wells
(representing Mr. Maroney)
CIA Dr. Edward Proctor, D/DDI
Mr. John Huizenga, D/ONE
25X1A9A
Executive Secretary
Observers:
NSC Capt. George Pickett
State Department
2. Minutes of 6 July maeting.
Mr. Richard Curl
Dr. Cline asked that Item 2, "India-Pakistan Crisis Study" be
amended to add: "Several members expressed admiration for the quality
of the study and appreciation for the effort it represented." He also
asked the reference in Item 5 to written comments by "INR/State" on the
NSSM-69 evaluation be changed to "State." General Bresnahan asked that 25X1
the spelling of his name use s rather than "z."
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3. India-Pakistan Crisis Study.
The Chairman cited the comment in Para 2 of Mr. Marshall's
memorandum that the Working Group "is initiating an analysis of
lessons learned" and noted this was not yet underway, although such
an analysis would be undertaken on the basis of this and subsequent
crisis studies. The end product would be recommendation for changes
in procedures, products, etc., involving both producers and consumers
"if this is what we agree." He suggested that the minutes show
Mr. Marshall would be the focal point for developing the conclusions
which would arise out of the series of crisis studies. Admiral de Poix
and Dr. Cline endorsed this, and Mr. Marshall agreed.
The Chairman's proposed addition to Para 5 was distributed
and approved for inclusion in the memorandum.
Dr. Cline proposed to delete the third and fourth sentences
of the last Item in Para 6 b and substitute the following:
"Would it be useful to undertake rapid production
of national estimates during periods of crisis, supple-
menting existing relevant NIE's? If so, what should the
production process and format be?"
Mr. Huizenga questioned whether a distinction should be made
between NIE and SNIE publications, as the original wording of the
memorandum does.
Dr. Cline said that in any crisis there would already be
something on the record, and intelligence will be asked to update it.
Should this be undertaken on a quick reaction basis using the NIE
system -- this he considered the basic question. Admiral de Poix
saw the question as to whether the estimative reaction to a crisis
should take the SNIE form or some other format. Dr. Cline agreed,
saying that if something other than an SNIE is wanted, what should
be the format, the kind of coverage, etc. He considered the present
text of the memorandum was too cryptic.
The group agreed to accept Dr. Cline's proposed substitution.
Mr. Weiss proposed the last item of Para 4 c be amended
as follows:
"-- Differentiated types of products for the
two phases of contingencies er4ses of the India-Pakistan type;
a first phase ofcon:i n policy planning and option
generation, a second-p ase of crisis management."
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He said there was reason to believe the government soon
would be charged with more comprehensive contingency planning tasks.
The Chairman asked if that applied to the India-Pakistan area only,
and Mr. Weiss indicated it not be so limited. He emphasized he was
talking about two different aspects of contingencies -- one involving
contingency policy planning and one actual crisis management after
the crisis has arisen.
The group accepted Mr. Weiss' proposed amendment.
Dr. Hall said he considered the memorandum a good one and
he thought the proposed changes were good, adding that use of merely
the identifying initials should be avoided the first time reference
is made to something.
The Chairman said the minutes would reflect the memorandum
was approved, with the changes which had been agreed upon, and he
would forward it to the Chairman and members of the NSCIC.
4. On-going Studies.
Mr. Marshall commented on the status of the studies for which
he is responsible as follows:
NSSM-69: Much rework has been necessary because of extensive
comments and the departure of the person who had done the main part of
the work. Capt. Pickett has taken over the rewriting task and expects
to have a re-worked draft by 1 November.
Arab-Isaeli Ceasefire: He is trying to get the team to provide
him with an outline of the final report and a listing of the identified
issues. A draft is expected by mid-November.
Jordan/Fedayeen Civil War: He is meeting next week with the
task group for a progress report, but considers that of 25X1
CIA (group chairman) has the study well in hand and should have a draft
by 1 November.
Lamson 719: This has been difficult to get underway, but
materials are being assembled. The problem is getting personnel to
work on the project, and he has no estimate on a completion date.
Mr. Marshall said that although the participating organizations
were energized for the first two studies (India-Pakistan and NSSM-69),
there is an apparent slackening off and it is harder to get studies
moving. He indicated he plains to talk with officials responsible for
providing task group members, otherwise it may the be first of the year
before drafts are ready.
Admiral de Poix (commenting on the next item) said that DIA
felt new studies should be in series since it had few personnel qualified
to contribute meaningfully. He suggested Yugoslavia be studied first,
then Chile and then NSSM-108. The Chairman agreed these should not be
done concurrently.
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Dr. Proctor said he had a real problem concerning LAMSON 719
and suggested Mr. Marshall "talk around on this again." Dr. Hall asked
why, and Dr. Proctor said that only a very few intelligence personnel
were knowledgeable on LAMSON 719 -- perhaps only four or five in DDI --
and these were all deeply involved in SEA matters and could not be
broken loose. He said he would not be surprized if DIA were not in
the same position.
Admiral de Poix said DIA couldn't do the job without CIA support,
and he suggested Mr. Marshall.::draw up the terms of reference for the
study. Mr. Marshall responded that he thought he and General Bennett
had agreed on the terms of reference but that he could go back and make
this more explicit.
The Chairman suggested Mr. Marshall review the practicality
of the LAMSON 719 study, and'. if getting it underway is likely to be
indefinitely postponed the group might reconsider its sponsorship of
the study. Dr. Hall asked when Mr. Marshall had expected to complete
evaluation of LAMSON 719, and Mr. Marshall responded that no date had
ever been set. He noted that because of the pressures on Mr. Fiske of
DIA (task group chairman) and the inability to get help from CIA the
project never had really gotten underway. He agreed the best thing
would be to go around once again on all the problems.
Dr. Cline asked if this meant Dr. Proctor wanted to use only
personnel who had worked on the project in an evaluation of it, and
Dr. Proctor denied this, but said he was concerned about the time that
would be involved in obtaining the necessary information from the experts.
Admiral de Poix asked if DIA was up-to-date on inputs expected
from it on the crisis studies and Mr. Marshall said yes.
Dr. Hall reported on the status of the cruise missile study for
which he is responsible. The task group has had several meetings and
has distributed two questionnaires to users requesting assessment of
the products as to content and usefulness. Answers are due back "about
now" for review by the group, and it is planned the final report will
be available by the end of October.
5. Studies of Intelligence Production Proposed by Dr. Cline.
The Chairman expressed the hope the initiation of the studies
on Yugoslavia, Chile and NSSM-108 could be approved in principle and
that any expected problems wouTd'be raised.
Dr. Cline said he was not urging early production of these
studies but understood that the group felt a study on a political
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subject would be valuable since the studies already underway related
to military matters. He noted that Yugoslavia is no crisis today,
but will become such one day, and the study effort would provide
"something to chew on." In the Yugoslavia study he felt that an
investment in qualified outside scholars could well be used, and he
hoped it would be possible to obtain the comments and views of an
outside panel as well as from Foreign Service officers. This, he
commented, would be a new procedure in the activities of the Working
Group.
The Chairman said that "investment" was the key word, since
it would involve a cash outlay. Dr. Cline said that the minimum would
be to call in one or two qualified specialists to review the study draft
and comment, and he felt that $2,000 in consultants fees would cover
this.
When the Chairman asked if State's Office of External Research
could handle this Dr. Cline said that "a couple of thousand" would be
no problem, but "something fancier" would be.
The Chairman said he considered that outside consultants
would be valuable in this type study, and Mr. Marshall agreed. He
said he would like to "go forward" with the Yugoslav study and since
this would be a new type evaluation for examination by the group he
considered it would be useful to get "outsiders" to participate.
Dr. Cline asked Dr. Hall if there was any chance of obtaining
funds from his "dependencies"' -- and Dr. Hall said "we can look" but
if they were "dependencies" that meant they got their money from him.
Dr. Proctor said this was "worthwhile" and "we could find
the money collectively, since only a few thousand dollars would be
involved" -- which led Dr. Hall to respond that "it is easy to see who
has moneys" Dr. Hall added, however, that he also considered it would
be worthwhile.
Admiral de Poix asked if State had any particular experts
in mind, and Dr. Cline said they could be selected by name from RAND,
universities, etc. Dr. Hall said that if RAND was a source, OSD might
be able to help, but Dr. Cline noted that the Air Force is "sometimes
fussy" about using RAND on political problems.
The Chairman raised the question of timing, and Dr. Cline
said he is prepared to make Kenneth Kerst, an INR Soviet expert,
available immediately as chairman for the Yugoslav study. Dr. Proctor
said he had a man available and would like to get started
on Yugoslavia as soon as possible. Admiral de Poix said DIA was "prepared
to move."
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The Chairman wondered if that meant both Yugoslavia and Chile
studies could get underway. Dr. Proctor replied that Chile is urgent
now and Yugoslavia will be later, and he favored doing only the Yugoslavia
study since he has a man available for it. "This is one we may be able
to follow through on in real time, " he added.
Mr. Huizenga said the question is how does the community stand
now to cope with a serious crisis that may arise at any time. He noted
that Yugoslavia has not been an active problem, although there are a
large number of current items. A big appraisal was made last summer
in preparation for a NSSM, "but nothing happened, and you won't find
there has been a lot of intelligence support." He felt the focus
should be on how we stand, the quality of our product and our people.
He added that we have good information on_Yugoslavia, and good analysts,
but the upcoming questions are the kind that are difficult to answer in
advance since it is not easy to anticipate all of the situations which
could possibly arise in Yugoslavia.
Dr. Cline emphasized it was necessary to review what has been
done on Yugoslavia, since "this is a study of production." Mr. Huizenga
agreed but felt this could be summarized and focus put on the problem
areas.
Mr. Weiss said that truly detailed terms of reference must be
developed since some of the questions set forth in the State proposal
were not really pertinent to a careful definition of the approach which
was needed. Dr. Cline said the Working Group cannot write terms of
reference, but should appoint a team and put it to work.
Dr. Cline asked Mr. Marshall if he would "coach" the team,
and Mr. Marshall noted that in his memorandum commenting on the State
proposals he had recommended that Dr. Cline do this. Mr. Mars aE1 agreed,
however, to serve as overseer at start of the study and through agreement
on the terms of reference.
The Chairman suggested that action on Chile and NSSM-108 be
deferred until toward the end of the year. Admiral de Poix wondered
whether NSSM-108 shouldn't be discussed, and Dr. Proctor replied that
NSSM-108 was "an untypical wish-mash, too big, and no one really is doinq
anything about it."
Dr. Cline said the group shouldn't want to study "only what
works well", but Dr. Proctor said he did not expect to see another study
so broad in scope as NSSM-108. Admiral de Poix agreed that more of a
look should be given to the NSSM-108 topic before any decision was made
to do anything about it.
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Dr. Proctor said he would like to shelve the NSSM-108
project, but thought another look might be made in three or four
months.
The Chairman asked the group members who would be involved
in the project to reexamine the NSSM-108 proposal to see if they
agreed with the deferral proposed by Dr. Proctor.
The Chairman again raised the matter of the Chile Study.
Dr. Proctor agreed that such a study was important, but that he had
no manpower for it. Dr. Cline said he could staff it.
The Chairman said further consideration of the project would
be deferred pending a further review in December.
6. Manpower and Cost Trends in U.S. Intelligence Product in,
TY1966 - FY1973.
The Chairman opened discussion by commenting that if the
group accepted the study the minutes should so reflect, but that
he thought the focus of interest was the summary and recommendations
section.
Admiral de Poix said it struck him that "we are probably not
going to be successful in reallocation of resources, so rather than
look at that aspect:we should produce something which would give us
leverage that would result in the use of better techniques." He
considered the community would have to bear down on this aspect
because "the take is going to increase and other resources reduced."
He cited what is happening in the photo reconnaissance field as an
example.
The Chairman noted the study indicates either that analysts
will need to be relieved of responsibilities or resources would be
needed from somewhere.
Mr. Weiss said his 'reaction was that "this paper will leave
a policy maker cold because it doesn't tell him where to put his resources
and doesn't prove that you canLt still further reduce production resources.
The question is whether current resources are adequate and the paper
doesn't address this."
Dr. Proctor replied that the paper was meant only for background
use by the group, and was not meant to answer the questions Mr. Weiss
has raised.
Dr. Proctor said that his concern was with the numbers, which
are "off quite a bit" with respect to DDI/ONE. He said his overall cut
in 1969 - 1972 was only 2 1/2 percent, and the study numbers "are wrong".
His view was that statistical summaries should not be based on "slots"
but on "average employment."
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Dr. Cline said he had the same problem since "the study put
all of INR in production, and this is not true."
Dr. Proctor said he had no problem with the framework of the
study.
Mr. Marshall said that based on the study alone one could not
reach conclusions, and he considered some of the numbers "surprising."
25X1A9A Dr. Proctor said the DDI numbers went down because of a
decision to deemphasize the NIS program.
reported that all of the DOD figures came
from the published FYDIP, the CIA data from CIA/PPB and the State figures
were provided by INR.
Dr. Hall commented that he had checked and some of the DOD
figures were "off." He said "the FYDIP is not correct for some of this
data, but we can provide the proper figures."
Dr. Proctor queried whether the group wanted to use personnel
slots, average employment "or what" as basis for the tabulations, and
the Chairman said he thought "average employment" would be best. Dr. Cline
said he was not certain whether State could provide "average employment"
data for previous years, and he suggested that representatives of INR, DIA
and CIA meet with PRG/IC and reach agreement on definitions "so all the
figures can be used the same way."
Mr. Weiss asked how it was intended the product would be used.
He thought the study represented a good start "but how about the other
half?"
The Chairman said the present study was meant only as an
introduction, an inventory preparatory to looking at the second dimension,
and he would like views of the group on this.
Dr. Hall thought it would be useful to get a group together.
He said "I don't think I am aboard the summary and recommendations."
He felt the group should be charged with "pulling the meaning out of
the numbers." He proposed a group take the report, add a section which
discusses the implications of the data more deeply, and then decide on
recommendations.
The Chairman said this would involve getting into substantive
matters, and Dr. Hall agreed.
Mr. Marshall noted the study showed a large growth in Navy S&T
manpower and costs and he wondered whether this was "real or merely an
accounting shift."
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Dr. Proctor thought it would be well to annotate the
nature and reason for the changes -- what was added, what was given
up, etc. He noted there was a definitional problem and there would
have to be "some arbitrary standards, arbitrary accounting, etc." He
hoped the report would not become too detailed, but it should describe
the implications and meaning of the changes in resources but still
"avoid general budget justification statements."
Mr. Marshall noted the indicated per-man cost in General
Intelligence production had increased 73 percent in the period studied,
but per-man costs on S&T production were up only 35 percent, and he
wondered why the difference.
Mr. Weiss thought more attention should be given to the effects
of inflation, with greater use of "constant dollar" figures, and he
noted this had been done in only one of the tables.
The Chafrman said the consensus seemed to be that the study
should be a historical examination to trace what has happened, and
then see if this has resulted in a satisfactory situation. Mr. Weiss
agreed, noting that "this is the hard question that needs answering."
The Chairman said a group would be formed and charged with
correcting the numbers and tracking meaningful changes in numbers
and trends.
7. Survey of Current Intelligence Publications.
The Chairman opened: the discussion by reporting that the DCI
has had an active interest in current intelligence publications for a
long time, "has seen a lot of paper," and had raised the subject with the
Chairman about a month ago. When the DCI was told of the survey then
underway he asked to see a copy on its completion. After reading the
paper, the DCI had sent a mefmorandum requesting policy guidance to
Dr. Kissinger as Chairman of the NSCIC and a memorandum to the heads
of production organizations. The Kissinger memorandum, copies of which
went to other NSCIC members, requested confirmation that the present
scope and character of current intelligence coverage is in keeping with
today's U.S. security and policy interests. The memorandum to the
production chiefs asked that: they review the requirements on which their
current intelligence publications are based and examine the dissemination
of these products against "need to know" criteria.
The Chairman emphasized that the DCI's communications did not
indicate he felt things were "out of whack or in whack" -- he merely
wanted the situation looked at.
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Dr. Hall asked when the letter was sent to NSCIC members,
and Mr. Marshall replied "the 28th". (Mr. Marshall made no mention
that Dr. Kissinger had assigned him the action).
The Chairman noted the survey was "not exhaustive" and he
asked for comments and questions.
Admiral de Poix said that his reaction from reading the
DCI's letter to him was that the DCI "felt things are in good shape."
He added that his own feeling both from the letter and the survey
report was that "things are not in as bad condition as I might have
expected" because he had personally been concerned at "what is in
my book every morning."
Dr. Proctor asked "what is going to be done further with
this study?" He said his problem is with its structure -- "it takes
the 316 first, and then whittles away at it at the end." He would
have constructed it differently, making clear distinction between
raw and finished intelligence. He noted that State had turned in
only one report, but that State's field reporting -- such as the
WEEKAs used to be -- was much like many of the reports included in
the survey. He considered that manyof the reports used in the survey
were "raw intelligence" and he would not have included them.- He said
he would like to see the whole study restructured on a "finished intel-
ligence versus raw intelligence basis" since he considered that some of
the listed "current intelligence publications are not really that."
He said he would like to see clear distinction made between
"current intelligence publications which were national, those which
were departmental, and those which were for command needs. He also
considered that publications which appeared in multiple versions
should not be listed as separate items.
He felt that the total 316 was misleading. He had looked at
the CIA tab, which listed 27 items, and he considered there were only
10 which were really current -- of which two were purely internal --
and "the others are not really current intelligence publications.
I reported that producing organizations had
been asked to submit w at they looked upon as their current intelligence
publications, and that all of the submissions fitted within the JCS
definition of current intelligence.
Dr. Proctor said that the NSCIC definition should be used rather
than that in the JCS dictionary.
Dr. Hall said he would favor having the collating done by the
reviewers rather than by "those who turn it in."
Dr. Cline said that his operation didn't "fit what the others
do -- because we brief orally from cables "rather than prepare current
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intelligence publications. He felt, however, that "serious
definitional problems" exist in the survey.
Dr. Proctor commented that he did not mind looking at
his dissemination because, over time, there can be a tendency to
expand this beyond need-to-know limitations. He wondered whether
"a re-do of the study might undercut what the DCI is trying to do."
The Chairman said he did not consider it would.
Mr. Marshall noted that the Navy has many publications on
the list, and he thought "some notion of size might be useful."
Dr. Cline said he has some problem with the NSA listing
since NSA is not considered a "production organization" and he thought
the survey should include comments on "types of publication."
At this point the Chairman adjourned the meeting since
he and Dr. Hall had a 1600 hours appointment with the DCI.
Following the meeting Mr. Curl, INR/State, advised that
William Berry, special assistant to Dr. Cline, would be the INR
representative on the group which will revise the current intel-
ligence survey report, and John Thro will represent INR in the
reexamination of the study on "Manpower and Cost Trends in U.S.
Intelligence Production".
25X1A9A
I
Distribution:
Original - PRG subject (;filed NSCIC WG-2)
1 - Mr. Tweedy
1-
1 RG Chrono 25X1A9A
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71 .7,
executive secretary