Notes on Fifth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 6 July 1972, 1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 7, 1972
• Content Type: MFR

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7 July 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Notes on Fifth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 6 July 1972,
1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room
1.
Present were:
Members:
Chairman
Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/IC
NSC
Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Department
Dr.
Ray Cline
Mr.
Seymour Weiss
Defense Department
Dr.
Albert Hall, ASD/I
Lt.
Gen. Donald Bennett, D/DIA
Brig. Gen. Richard Breznahan, JCS
(representing Lt. Gen. Seith)
Justice Department
Mr. Bernard A. Wells
(representing Mr. Maroney)
CIA -
Mr. Paul Walsh
25X1A9a
Executive Secretary
representing Dr. Proctor, DDI)
representing John Huizenga, D/ONE)
Observers:
NSC Capt. George Pickett
State Department Mr. Richard Curl
Mr. Curtis Jones
25X1A9a
2. Minutes of 13 June meeting. Approved without comment.
3. Evaluation of intelligence inputs to NSSM-69. The Chairman
noted that all written comments (from State, JCS, CIA and DIA) had
been provided to Mr. Marshall, who replied that work on the
reexamination of the NSSM-69 study would begin after 10 July, when
Mr. Fisher (the primary author) returns from vacation.
*NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File*
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4. India-Pakistan Crisis Study.
The Chairman invited comments. Mr. Marshall said he had
no "lead-off" statement, and Mr. Weiss opened the discussion by
saying that, reading the paper from the viewpoint of the policy maker,
he was bothered by the handling of "intentions." They are not constant
and change over time so to talk of them as if they were static was
erroneous. He said that it is in the field of intentions that he gets
least satisfaction from the intelligence community. He recognized it is
the "toughest area" and that "noise in the intelligence background is
a problem" but intelligence should "try to sift it out." He said he
would be interested in knowing what the community thought of the adequacy
of its sources of information, and thought the study should have examined
this, 25X1A9a
said the CCPC study on South Asia, now nearing
completion, addresses this and is to be added as Annex 10 to the India-
Pakistan study.
General Bennett cited a 1964 political/military war game
in which Mr. Weiss had participated. The problem was Southeast Asia
and teams represented North Vietnam, China and the USSR. Although
all participants spoke English and had the same background, they
"demonstrated an inability to get a 'signal' through to the other side"
and it was not possible to identify intentions.
Mr. Weiss agreed that we don't know how to divine intentions,
and General Bennett rated his success at "zero."
Mr. Walsh said he considered the paper was overly harsh on
intelligence with respect to intentions. Recognizing that it is a
difficult analytic area, he did not consider the errors were as great
as the study indicated.
Dr. Hall agreed that intentions should not be regarded as fixed;
even our own change substantially. He considered the problem also posed
opportunities, particularly in cases where something could be done in
response to identification of intentions by intelligence. Recognizing
that intentions in October may be different from those in April, he
wondered whether we had understood the actual intent of the Indians
early in the crisis period and had expressed it as clearly as we could.
He noted the purpose of the study is to enable us to do better, so we
should try in the area of intentions.
Mr. Weiss asked how we could have done better, and the Chairman
replied that if the information had been available we would have used
it, but that sometimes analysis was faulty.
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25X1A9a
said that the extent to which Mrs. Ghandi was making
the decisions herself was critical, so he couldn't understand the
criticism that more attention should be given to what other forces
were affecting the decisions.
Mr. Marshall considered the tendency had been to treat intentions as
unchanging and there was no evidence that the problem of forecasting
how intentions might change on the basis of events was addressed in those
terms. He expressed surprise that any single person could so domin x1X4
Mr. Walsh said that forecasting is a very ticklish thing, and he
felt that intelligence had a good record for timely reporting as
things unfolded.
The Chairman noted that "objectives" was the word usually used
rather than intentions.
Dr. Cline said that projecting intentions was not the real
problem posed in the India-Pakistan study. "That is a generic problem."
The question from this study is "whether we conveyed to our principals a
measured, carefully considered analysis of the period." He considered
that too much was provided the WSAG, and the only formal papers were
prepared early in the crisis. He didn't express this as harsh
criticism of intelligence, but he felt that it "raises the question as
to whether we gave good guidance as to what was happening -- there
probably was overkill, too much reported, and too little inter-agency
consultation."
Mr. Walsh said that the analysts in all the agencies were working
pretty closely together, and Dr. Cline agreed but he noted that, although
the "appreciations of analysts were about the same, too much was being
communicated to the top."
The Chairman raised two points: first, since there possibly was a
clogging of the channels, should there be a traffic cop; and, second,
if there is an important message for the principals, it should be
highlighted and not left subliminal. He considered both of these
points were brought out in the draft memorandum for the NSCIC which
had been sent to the members for comment.
Dr. Cline considered that if stress was put on the problem of inten-
tions "we get away from the main value of this paper which is to find out
if we made the most of what we knew."
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The Chairman said it would be useful if recurrent themes could be
identified as the group conducts other studies. He expected there
probably would be only a few "lessons" and "they should come in clusters."
General Bennett explained that DIA intentionally avoided the use
of the term "intentions" and he preferred to talk of "near term
objectives or possible courses of action" and sharpen these as much
as possible. He considered the analysts had moved closely together
during the crisis but he did not think this was true prior to the crisis
"when I was told DIA was more of a hawk than CIA." As to the "clogging
of the channels," he felt that rather than this being the problem the
real difficulty arose because in DOD there were so many spokesmen.
He noted that four different: officers represented the JCS Chairman on
WSAG at various times and not all of them had a full background. He
felt that achieving a common understanding was difficult because the
principals did not have a common background. "The problem was more one
of empty pipes than clogging." He asked about the "intelligence voice"
by which the WSAG is served. He did not consider this "intelligence
voice" should be a part of the WSAG, but felt that each WSAG session
should start with a presentation of an "intelligence environment".
In the India-Pakistan crisis, he believed it would have been helpful
if CIA, DIA, and State had gotten together before each WSAG session to
develop this "intelligence environment."
Mr. Walsh said this was the DCI responsibility, and even if other
CIA men represented him, they presented the "same line." He considered
it a "departmental role" to keep their principals up to speed.
General Bennett said he recognized the DCI role but he was thinking
only of "a five minute presentation on which we all had coordinated -
and the present system doesn't provide this."
Dr. Cline said that he had difficulty even finding out what was
presented at the WSAG sessions.
General Bennett added that what he was suggesting was "only another
way of presenting intelligence without demanding that those at the table
already have a full background."
Dr. Hall said the India-Pakistan study was "one of the best I have
seen" and part of its usefulness'"is immersing us in it." He said
the most important thing he had derived from the paper was the
problem of communication when there is an opportunity for policy
action. He saw the objective as one of finding how "we can do a better
job of communicating what is going on so, if there is action needed,
it can be taken." He considered the time for the intelligence warning
was months ahead of the actual crisis, and he felt that "the determination
of India to solve the problem was not conveyed."
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The Chairman said the India-Pakistan situation was "something
unique" in that the policy levels of government were "set in concrete"
and this situation was not one which intelligence might have been able
to change.
Mr. Weiss agreed, but he wondered if a clear intelligence
message might have made a difference. He saw the policy makers as
being faced with unacceptable alternatives and being reluctant to
accept any of them.
Both the Chairman and Dr. Cline agreed there were still lessons
to be learned by intelligence from the crisis period, but Mr. Walsh
commented that if the policy makers "had made up their minds and were
doings A% we knew nothing about, then we were playing a charade."
wondered "who do we mean when we talk of communication
with policy makers?" He said that during the crisis period he attended
a series of Foreign Policy Council meetings along with several "third-level
policy makers" and it was his impression there were no doubts in their
minds as to what the intelligence community thought. He saw no evidence
of a communications failure at that level.
The Chairman said the communications problem is with top policy
levels where the participants have no time to read papers.
Dr. Cline noted that the WSAG is a finite group of people, and
he saw the problem as being caused by a proliferation of reporting,
with no single channel by which to assure answers to the hard questions
got up to the top level. He felt "the deficiency is a lack of a
systematic way to emphasize the key points in such a way as to elicit a
reaction from the top level." He said that interface at the top level
always seems faulty, and the problem is how to give these leaders a
more finite expression of the key points in the intelligence picture.
Mr. Walsh said that one of the problems is that when Mr. Kissinger
is briefed by the DCI, he feels he has the current picture, but because
some of the material is so sensitive it is necessary to get Mr. Kissinger's
permission to let DOD and State know about it.
Dr. Cline said he felt that the principals were not aware of any
disagreements that may have existed in the intelligence community.
Mr. Walsh replied that the DCI, in his role as intelligence
advisor to the President, does not have to coordinate his material with
others--but he does. He considered the thesis in the paper was that
all intelligence agencies are equal, so that "what is coordinated is
good--but this may not be true."
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Gen. Bennett said that all he wanted was that disagreements
be highlighted when they exist.
Mr. Walsh said that in the India-Pakistan situation the
differences were not significant, but in the Vietnam situation,
where there are differences, he knew that the DCI carefully indicated
them.
Dr. Cline felt Mr. Walsh was over-stating the DCI role since the
NSCIDs strongly indicate the need for coordination, adding"CIA intelligence
is not necessarily national intelligence."
The Chairman brought attention of the group back to his proposed
memorandum for the NSCIC on the India-Pakistan study and Dr. Cline
said he had some changes to suggest.
Dr. Cline also proposed' that less attention be devoted to content
of the study and more to the impact the group wanted it to have on the
NSCIC principals. He thought it should be made clear to the principals
that the Working Group was recommending they read only the 35-page study
and not the annexes. He also urged that an oral presentation be given
to the NSCIC on the "big issues," perhaps by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Jones.
Dr. Cline said the function of the Working Group was to generate
action inputs to the NSCIC. To highlight the issues, a short paper
should be sent forward, He felt that additional studies probably
would bring out the same issues, so the NSCIC should be asked to look
at the issues brought out by the present study.
Dr. Hall supported Dr. Cline, and said the group should take into
account the possibility the NSCIC might not meet, so the memorandum
sent forward should clearly highlight the issues. He thought it would
be useful to have the study briefed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Responding to a question from the Chairman, Mr. Marshall said
he thought a NSCIC meeting could be arranged.
Mr. Marshall also said he would like to see the draft memorandum
revised to come down harder on what the group felt were the major
issues, which should be written up "in a more forceful way."
Again responding to a query from the Chairman, Mr. Marshall agreed
to redraft the proposed transmittal memorandum, but indicated he would
like to explore the issues with various members of the group. Dr. Cline
said the task was primarily one of filling out the draft already prepared.
He handed out proposed INR/State revisions of Paragraphs 6 and 7.
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5. Follow-on Crisis Studies
25X1A2g
The Chairman proposed the group authorize start of studies
on the three topics submitted by Mr. Marshall, the Arab-Israeli
ceasefire (August 1970), the Jordan/Fedayeen Civil War (September 1970),
ater
Dr. Hall said he had discussed the
topic with
25X1A2g
the JCS Chairman, who requested that such
be handled very
carefully because of
On the basis of 25X1X4
this discussion, Dr. Hall said he considered intelligence aspects
could be covered, but it would have to be carefully done
.
.._II: wcIII Icl.b I I uLcua I.IIGtL. t.IIC ut.tlt: f' SGUU
fed into Washington and how the national intplli
15x] )c4g
25X1X4
He felt the study would have to be limited strictly to
intelligence matters and not involve operational factors. He proposed
the study be limited to Washington level actions on the ground that
going beyond this would require getting into areas "where others are
more competent."
The Chairman said it would be very difficult to avoid treating
intelligence actions which occurred in the field.
Mr. Walsh added that he was not certain we could separate
intelligence from operations,, since questions of ARVN capabilities were
involved. Dr. Hall responded that this was not the kind of problem
which gave the JCS Chairman concern.
25X1A2g Mr. Walsh also said that the analysts who would work on
were already "up to their necks in Southeast Asia work"
an Gen. Bennett indicated C'IA was in the same situation.
The Chairman said that work on the two Middle East studies
would be a "full bag" and Mr. Marshall agreed, but he added he would
like to proceed with developing terms of reference for the LAMSON 719
study.
25X1A2g
The Chairman suggested Mr. Marshall meet with DIA and CIA to
talk about how the effort could be best approached.
Mr. Walsh then suggested the Middle East studies be done
sequentially rather than simultaneously, but Mr. Marshall said he would
like to consider doing them together.
The Chairman asked Mr. Marshall to deal directly with the
producing agencies on this matter.
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6. Other Production Studies
The Chairman noted that at the 13 June meeting Dr. Cline's
proposal for a study of Libya and his suggested study outline had
not been discussed. He added that no new proposals had been submitted
since the 13 June session, but he understood Dr. Hall was prepared to
discuss one.
Dr. Hall proposed a study be made of the cruise missile
problem, but wondered whether it should be done by DOD or the Working
Group. "I am prepared to go either way," he said. A draft memorandum
has been prepared in ASD/I, looking at the problem from the viewpoint
of the consumer. Dr. Hall said the objective would be to look at what
has been produced, how well the products satisfied the consumers, what
action has resulted from the intelligence inputs, and what the results
have been. The approach would be to assemble products turned out over
the past two or three years;, look at the means by which user priorities
are fed back to the intelligence producers, and examine whether future
consumer needs are being anticipated.
Mr. Marshall said he hoped it would be sponsored by the
Working Group. The Chairman said he considered it should be under the
group's auspices and Mr. Marshall could manage it.
Dr. Hall replied, however, that "we thought of doing it
in-house because the DOD is dominant in this area."
The Chairman said that, while the consumers were largely
military, all agencies of the community were involved in preparing
intelligence inputs, and the! production and collection tasks were
shared. He favored having the study done under aegis of the Working
Group.
Mr. Walsh noted the CCPC study of April 1972 would be of value
to the study.
Dr. Hall said the group should regard each study in its "own
light" and manage each one separately. He proposed the cruise missile
study should be run out of his own office.
The Chairman indicated his vote would be for a "non-departmental"
chairman, and when asked by Gen. Bennett what he meant, the Chairman
explained that if a study were to be made of a political problem, he
would not recommend that a State Department representative direct it.
Mr. Marshall said he was "not volunteering" to take over the
cruise missile study, and Mr. Walsh expressed the feeling that the
chairman should be someone who knew the problem so as to "avoid wheel
spinning."
8
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Dr. Hall said that in his view chairing the study in his
office would not "involve users or producers directly."
Dr. Cline considered it proper to select the department which
is most involved to provide the chairman, but that others should
participate in an inter-agency appraoch. He favored a DOD representative
as chairman for this study.
The Chairman expressed the agreement of the group and told
Dr. Hall he had responsibility for the study.
Dr. Hall said he would request participation, with ASD/I,
of DDR&E, DIA, CIA, and Navy as a user of the product.
Dr. Cline said he would like to send a representative to see
what the group was going to do "since there are policy aspects
involved," and Dr. Hall agreed.
Dr. Cline said he saw no need to discuss the paper he had submitted
on Libya, but he stressed that the group should "think of production
as a process, in which the actual papers are only the top of the iceberg."
The Chairman reported that IC/PRG had prepared a "Draft Study
OUtline for Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Production on a Selected
Problem." The draft was handed out to the members for their
consideration, but was not discussed further.
7. Other business: MBFFR
General Breznahan asked that the group reconsider MBFR (Mutual
Balanced Force Reduction) as a study topic needing a hard look by
the intelligence community.
The Chairman noted that in previous discussion of the topic,
it had been decided that an intelligence interface on MBFR would not be
timely and would not serve to clarify the MBFR problem.
Mr. Marshall felt the group should keep MBFR open as a follow-
on to the NSSM-69 study, adding that "the capacity bottleneck is not
my time."
Mr. Walsh said that two NSSMs and an item before the
Verification Panel would be involved.
Mr. Marshall thought it would be worthwhile for the group to
formulate "what we would try to get at" relating to MBFR.
Dr. Hall recommended wrapping up the NSSM-69 study first.
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Mr. Weiss said the Verification Panel already has talked about
MBFR and "how good our intelligence is is going to be a major topic."
General Breznahan commented that the Joint Staff felt such
an intelligence study would be beneficial.
Mr. Walsh asked that the group keep in mind that the DDI
is "in the business of producing intelligence, and not looking
backward all the time."
General Bennett said he would like to see a study on how
intelligence is used and not how good intelligence is.
Discussion ended when the Chairman noted it was 4 p.m.
and time to adjourn. He said the timing of the next meeting probably
would depend on how long it took to revise NSSM-69 on the basis
of comments which had been submitted.
8. After close of the meeting, General Braznahan reported
that Lt. General Louis T. Seith, who has replaced Vice Admiral
Weinel as J-5, Joint Staff, also will replace Admiral Weinel as
the NSCIC Working Group representati2XgfAW JCS Chairman.
Distribution:
orig - PRG subject (filed NSCIC WG-2)
1 -15X 1fhj1
1-
1 - PRG chrono
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