DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN THE NEXT DECADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200070006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Dealing With South Africa
in- the Next Decade
ALA 83-10191X
December 1983
Copy 242
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Dealing With South Africa
in the Next Decade
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Ana ysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.F-
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, 25X1
Secret
ALA 83-10191X
December 1983
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Dealing With South Africa
in the Next Decade. 25X1
Key Judgments The struggle to maintain white rule in South Africa ensures, in our view,
Information available that Pretoria will follow domestic and foreign policies that are frequently
as of 15 November 1983 at odds with US interests in the region. Consequently, the United States
was used in this report.
will be confronted over the next decade with a persistent dilemma: how to
influence the behavior of this determined, self-reliant state without becom-
ing identified with those actions that the US opposes but is unable to
prevent.
South Africa in the Next 10 Years
Demographic trends have outpaced the government's efforts to divide and
co-opt segments of the black African majority. Despite a vigorous resettle-
ment program that since 1948 has sent millions of blacks to the tribally
based homelands, blacks comprise a growing majority in the government-
declared "white areas." Furthermore; we expect the black labor force to
continue to grow faster than the economy's ability to employ blacks.
Although greater than expected economic growth could permit living
conditions for blacks to continue to improve without affecting the well-
being of whites, redressing fundamental racially based inequities in South
Africa would mean a sharp drop in, the standard of living of South African
whites, a sacrifice we believe they would not make as long as they hold
power.
The basic structure of white supremacy in South Africa has changed
remarkably little since the 19th century, despite its elevation from practical
policy to. high ideology: The apartheid system is' administered through a
mass' of legislation-perhaps as many as 2,000 laws and regulations-that
governs race relations from the bedroom to the workplace.
Since the Afrikaner-dominated National Party took power in 1948, the
dynamics of maintaining white rule have caused a steady growth of the ab-
solute power of the state as well as the centralization of power within the
government. P. W. Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978 after
serving as Minister of Defense for 14 years, has created a new policymak-
ing apparatus in which military personnel predominate. The old centers of
power-the parliamentary and party caucuses and the state bureaucracy-
appear to have given way to a new generation of pragmatic "security
technocrats" who have modernized racial domination. Moreover, harsh
methods of control have been replaced by more sophisticated techniques of
riot control, subtler. employment of police and military power, and a
greater tolerance for semipolitical activity by nonwhites-as long as it
remains a safety valve for dissent.
Secret
ALA 83-1019I X
December 1983
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The government's strategy of reform has sought to co-opt Coloreds,
Indians, homeland leaders, and a limited number of urban blacks into a
nonwhite middle class that would act as a buffer against a black revolution.
In November 1983, South African whites approved by a 2-to-1 majority a
new constitutional structure designed to give Coloreds and Indians a
limited role in the political system through participation with whites in a
three-chambered Parliament and multiracial Cabinet. Although the consti-
tutional reform package also provides for a greatly strengthened executive
presidency that will help maintain white control, the Afrikaner-dominated
National Party split over the general issue of reform in 1982. Because we
believe that Botha will try to heal the wounds in the Afrikaner community
caused by the debate over the new constitution, it may be some time before
the government attempts to deal with the blacks, although some adjust-
ments that are characterized as reform are likely to occur.
South Africa's dealings with black majority regimes along its borders
appear to be governed by two general objectives: preventing attacks by
anti-South African insurgents and preempting any challenge to its regional
hegemony. Over the past few years, South Africa has become bolder and
more self-assured and ambitious in its use of coercion to achieve these
goals. Pretoria often appears to be trying to force its neighbors into dealing
in a less openly hostile manner with South Africa, and Pretoria's support
for insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique suggests that Pretoria may be
aiming to oust their leftist regimes and return these countries to buffer-
state status.
We believe this hawkish regional policy reflects the military's preeminent
role in Pretoria and its open fascination with an Israeli-like policy of acting
decisively and unilaterally in "doing what must be done." The relative
success of their tough policies may be blinding them to the limits of their
power and to the capabilities of the USSR to respond on behalf of the tar-
geted black regimes.
Dealing With South Africa
During the next 10 years, the relationship between the United States and
South Africa probably will expand-not to the degree that most South
Africans would like, but undoubtedly to a greater extent than many in the
United States will be comfortable with. Economic ties between the two
countries probably will continue to strengthen, although they are unlikely
to become critical to either party. Moreover, continued conflict in southern
Africa will create more opportunities for Soviet meddling and make it
easier for Pretoria to make common cause with the United States in an
anti-Communist campaign. In addition, the fundamental moral and racial
issues that underlie internal developments in South Africa will make them
of continued high interest to broad segments of American society.
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The success of US policy initiatives in southern Africa, in our judgment,
probably will require South African cooperation or, at least, acquiescence,
in as much as Pretoria will continue to dominate the region economically
and militarily for the next 10 years. Consequently, the United States will
find it difficult to avoid being seen by Pretoria's opponents as the
handmaiden of South African interests. Moreover, the leadership in
Pretoria, in our view, seeks to strengthen the identity of US and South Af-
rican interests by playing up the Soviet threat and seeking to make
common cause with Washington in an anti-Communist campaign. We
believe that this dynamic will continue for the next 10 years, making it dif-
ficult for Washington to disentangle its interest in opposing Soviet
adventurism from Pretoria's interest in maintaining white rule.
Pretoria's determined stance of self-sufficiency will continue, in our view,
to leave South Africa relatively unresponsive to US carrots and sticks. We
also expect the South Africans will continue to react with ambivalence
toward US initiatives to promote regional stability. Washington's interest
and engagement in southern African affairs will be welcomed by Pretoria
as long overdue acknowledgments of South Africa's importance to the
West. But Pretoria's skittishness about the reliability of Western commit-
ments-many white South Africans believed they were abandoned by the
United States when it did not support South Africa's intervention in the
Angolan civil war-will reinforce its avowed self-reliance and resistance to
infringement on its freedom of action in domestic and regional affairs.
Pressure from outsiders often seems to drive South Africans deeper into
their psychological laager-the circle of wagons formed by Afrikaner
settlers under attack by African warriors-and makes them defensive and
incapable of acknowledging error or of compromising. The South Africans
resist even the appearance of being pushed around, perhaps from a deep-
seated fear of the impact that it might have on South African blacks. Thus,
negotiations with the South Africans will continue to be facilitated if
allowances are made for their apparent need to save face.
In view of the fairly limited leverage the United States has and will
probably continue to have over Pretoria, the application of carrots and
sticks will be most effective, in our judgment, if it is done consistently: that
is, South Africa's cooperation is rewarded case by case and its recalci-
trance punished case by case. Our monitoring of South African attitudes
toward Western governments in general makes it plain that Pretoria
perceives it as weakness and vacillation if day-to-day dealings remain on a
business-as-usual basis after South Africa has been unresponsive to a high-
level demarche on a particular, issue.
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Pretoria's dominant role in the region and its strong economic links-to the
West make it easy for Pretoria's opponents to believe that the United
States is backing Pretoria against the interests of black South. Africans and
black Africa as 'a whole. Although the United States probably can never
completely escape being tarred by its relations with South Africa, US
firmness and consistency in dealing with Pretoria could, in our judgment,
mitigate considerably the negative consequences since antiapartheid critics
could at least correlate warming trends in US=South African bilateral
relations with "improvements" in South African behavior.
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Key Judgments
iii
The Setting
How the System Works
3
Maintaining White Rule
3
Violent Stasis or Violent Change?
7
Southern Africa's Superpower
7
The Increasingly Confident Use of Coercive Power
7
An Ambitious Agenda
11
Pax Pretoria or Regional Instability?
13
An Instability/ Reform Checklist
14
Strong Ties but Little Leverage
15
Linked in Opposition to Communism
16
"Radishes and Twigs"
Dealing With South Africa
The Importance of "Face"
Symbolism and Consistency
Avoiding Pretoria's Embrace
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Dealing With South Africa
in the Next Decade
Over the next 10 years, we expect increasing tension
and policy clashes in the relationship between South
Africa and the United States. The struggle to main-
tain white rule in South Africa ensures, in our view,
that Pretoria will follow domestic and foreign policies
that are frequently at odds with US interests in the
region. Consequently, US policymakers will be con-
fronted with a persistent dilemma: how to influence
the behavior of a determined, self-reliant state with-
out-becoming identified with those actions that the
US opposes but is unable to prevent.
This assessment is divided into two parts. Part one
examines the probable course of South Africa's politi-
cal system and regional relations during the next
decade. The second part considers the probable evolu-
tion of US-South African relations over the next 10
years, assesses South African perceptions of these
relations, and suggests a number of considerations to
be held in mind when dealing with Pretoria.
Part I: South Africa
in the Next 10 Years
The Setting
Demographic Trends and the "Black Problem. " For
the next decade, the growth in the relative size of the
black population and in black urbanization will make
it increasingly difficult for the white minority regime
to retain control. The black population-already 73.5
percent of the total-is growing rapidly while the
birth rates of all other population groups have
dropped sharply. The whites' struggle to maintain
power in the face of increasingly adverse racial ratios
is complicated further by their own limitations. Even
now, the segment of the white population able to run
the government, private enterprise, and other key
South African institutions is remarkably small. Only
2 percent of the whites were university graduates in
1970, compared with 17 percent in the United States
in 1980.
Mid-1983 Project for 2000
Population Trends Millionslpercent
Pretoria has tried to cope with the burgeoning black
population by relocating blacks into the 10 tribally
based homelands that South Africa has created out of
13 percent of its territory. This vigorous resettlement
program-since 1948 some 2.3 to 3.5 million blacks
have been removed from the "white areas" and sent to
the homelands-has succeeded in retarding the proc-
ess of black urbanization: between 1960 and 1980, the
proportion of blacks living in the homelands increased
from 40 to 50 percent. Nevertheless, 9 million blacks
now comprise 57 percent of the urban population and
we expect their number to continue expanding, even
in the face of the government "influx control" pro-
gram, at a minimum rate of 4 percent annually at
least until the year 2000. Thus, even if a tacit alliance
between whites, Coloreds and Indians should be
formed, blacks will still outnumber non-blacks in the
"white" urban areas by almost 2 to 1 in 1990, a
decisive failure for the "white homeland" envisioned
by apartheid theory.
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The Limitations of Economic Growth. South Africa's
gross domestic product is only about a third as large
as Canada's even though their populations are rough-
ly equal. South Africa's 4.7 million whites, however,
enjoy one of the highest living standards in the world
while most of the 26.2 million nonwhites lead lives of
grinding poverty. Roughly half of the 22.7 million
blacks engage in traditional agricultural practices in
rural homelands where conditions are similar to those
in the poorest African countries. Most of the other
blacks, along with most of the 3.5 million Asians and
Coloreds, provide cheap labor for the modern econo-
my. Government census statistics on occupational
categories indicate that the percentage of blacks
earning a respectable middle-class living is extremely
small, probably no more than 4 to 5 percent of the
black population.
Living conditions for many South African blacks,
nonetheless, improved significantly during the 1970s.
These improvements reflected an economic expan-
sion-fueled by a dramatic rise in the price of gold-
that averaged almost 4 percent annually, the related
growth in the size of the black urban population, and
government's efforts to improve conditions for urban
blacks as part of its policy of building a nonwhite
middle class. Black employment in mining, manufac-
turing, and other sectors of the modern economy grew
by 25 percent to 2.8 million workers between 1970
and 1981.' Real wages for blacks in these jobs grew
significantly faster than for whites, and the whites'
share of the national income dropped from 70 to 59
percent during the period.
Relative progress by blacks during the period of 1970-
81 has led many observers, as well as government
reformers, to argue that economic growth in South
Africa would make it possible to reduce significantly
racial inequities without affecting the well-being of
whites. Advocates of economically induced reform
believed that economic growth not only stimulated
reform-by increasing nonwhite participation in the
modern sector because there were not enough whites.
to meet the demand for skilled labor-but made
reform relatively painless, by permitting reallocation
' Approximately 4.5 million black workers, however, were unem-
ployed or working as subsistence farmers in the homelands, employ-
ees on white-owned farms, domestic servants and part-time workers
of government spending to meet black needs without
requiring sacrifices by the white population. The
economic recession that started in 1981 and the
prospect of stagnant economic performance during
the remainder of the 1980s have reduced prospects
that black living conditions would continue to improve
during the next decade as they did for the past
decade.
Even the economic expansion of the 1970s, however,
did not provide many answers to South Africa's
"black problem." The spread between the average
annual current income of whites and that of blacks
grew from $3,881 in 1970 to $9,500 in 1981. This gap
in absolute incomes probably will continue to widen
even if the ratio of white to black incomes falls
because of higher annual proportional increases in
black wages. Moreover, since we estimate South
African whites still control 94 percent of the country's
capital assets, the bulk of any gains from restored
economic growth probably will continue to flow to
whites.
Moreover, we believe-based on recent Embassy re-
porting and our own analysis-that approximately 30
percent of South Africa's black workers are unem-
ployed. Even if the mineral-based economy were to
grow at a rate of 5 percent annually between now and
the year 2000-considerably faster than we expect-
black unemployment would rise to at least 35 percent
because of the high rate of black population growth.
More violence can be expected in South Africa as
unemployment increases among black males in the
15-to-24 age group whose ranks are expanding at the
rate of 3 percent annually. Dissidents from this group
largely sustained the months of rioting that began in
Soweto in June 1976, and they probably have provid-
ed the bulk of recruits for anti-South African black
nationalist groups.
Massive sacrifices by the white population would be
required to reduce racial inequities significantly. A
government-commissioned study published in 1981
found that because of the vast disparities between the
white and nonwhite educational systems, Pretoria
25X1
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would need to earmark $5.5 billion annually-more
than 5 percent of its GNP-for an indefinite period to
bring the nonwhite systems up to par with the white
system. This is more than 11 times greater than the
$476 million budgeted for nonwhite education in
1982, which already represented a major increase in
government spending.
Likewise, clearing up the current housing shortage-
estimated by a South African research organization to
be about 600,000 units-and building the 150,000 to
200,000 units needed annually to keep up with black
population growth would require an annual capital
outlay of about $1.3 billion for construction alone,
almost half of what South Africa now spends for
defense. Expenditures of these magnitudes for hous-
ing and education alone would mean a sharp drop in
the standard of living of South Africa's whites, a
sacrifice we believe they would not make as long as
they hold power.
How the System Works
Survival Politics. Despite repeated predictions of
their inevitable demise, time does not appear to be
running out for South Africa's whites, at least in the
next 10 years. In our view, the South African govern-
ing elite, including its increasingly influential military
component, are no longer reeling from the shocks of
the mid-1970s-the collapse of white rule in Angola
and Mozambique and the urban black riots that
began in Soweto-and are instead embued with a
renewed self-confidence that borders on arrogance.
Encouraged by the economic and military weakness of
its neighbors and the relative quiescence of the black
population inside South Africa, Pretoria unabashedly
proclaims its determination to do whatever it deems
necessary for white survival: Prime Minister Botha
acknowledged freely in 1981 that the National Party
principle of "white self-determination" means "white
domination." Virtually all knowledgeable observers
believe that because of the luxuries and privileges
they enjoy and their fear of revenge from dispossessed
blacks, whites will cling tenaciously to power.
White politics in South Africa primarily reflect the
character of the dominant Afrikaners, a people whose
will to rule was born in rebellion against British
colonial rule in the early 1800s and forged in the
conquest of vastly more numerous black Africans.
Most Afrikaners to this day share the fierce independ-
ence characteristic of the newly liberated. Although
South Africa became independent in 1910, it was not
until the National Party victory in 1948 that the
Afrikaners seized control of South Africa from the
English-speaking minority, widely viewed by Afrika-
ners as the handmaidens of British capital. Although
Afrikaners make much of their European heritage,
Afrikaner politics, as one observer has noted, "are
African politics, and are about tribal survival, pride,
masculinity, and muddling through." Thus, Afrika-
ners are a remarkably cohesive group that permits
dissent only over the methods by which white rule is
preserved, not over whether white rule should be
maintained. As an ethnic group that achieved power
only after they achieved unity as a people, the Afrika-
ners have few illusions about the danger posed to
them by the numerically superior blacks.
Maintaining White Rule. The Afrikaners gave a
clear vision of their "native policy" when they first
trekked into the interior and settled in Natal in the
early 1800s. From the beginning the Afrikaners
sought to strike a balance between the need for labor
on their farms and the security requirements of a
small white settlement surrounded by masses of
Africans. Establishing the enduring South African
principle that only blacks performing some essential
economic service could reside in white areas, the
Volksraad (Assembly) of Natal decided in the 1830s
that no burgher could have more than five African
families on his farm. Most Africans were excluded
from white areas by assigning them to reserves or
drawing lines of demarcation they were forbidden to
cross. After the British annexed Natal in 1843, the
Afrikaners moved farther inland and gave formal
expression to their view that Africans were enemies,
so clearly alien in culture and habits that the idea of
assimilation was unthinkable. In the highveld repub-
lics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State,
racial discrimination was legalized with prohibitions
against interracial marriage and political rights for
blacks.
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The basic structure of white supremacy in South
Africa has changed remarkably little since the 19th
century, despite having become elevated from practi-
cal policy to high ideology. Black residence in white
South Africa is conditional on possession of a job and
a government-approved residence. A mass of legisla-
tion-it has been estimated that the apartheid system
has required some 2,000 laws and regulations for its
administration-governs race relations: influx control
and pass laws attempt to keep economically irrelevant
blacks in the homelands; race classification, mixed
marriages, immorality, and group areas acts are
designed to ensure the social and geographic separa-
tion of the races; and so forth. Although some blacks
are now recognized as permanent urban dwellers,
political rights are available only in the homelands.
Afrikaners still pursue "divide and rule" policies
toward the black majority by building client relation-
ships with the homeland leaders as a counter to the
urban blacks. The homelands serve not only as reposi-
tory for "surplus" blacks, but create a tension within
each tribal group between the urban haves and the
rural have-nots, a conflict that further fragments the
blacks politically.
The shape and character of the state and the regime,
however, have changed significantly. We believe that
the dynamics of maintaining white rule in the post-
World War II era have caused a steady growth in the
absolute power of the state as well as the centraliza-
tion of power within the government. Since taking
power in 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated National
Party has greatly strengthened the role of the govern-
ment, partly to provide employment for Afrikaners
unable to compete with English-speakers in the pri-
vate sector. We estimate that between 35 and 40
percent of economically active Afrikaners are em-
ployed in the public sector..
P. W. Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978
after serving as Minister of Defense for 14 years, has
created a new decisionmaking structure, centered
around the State Security Council, to rationalize and
integrate economic, social, and foreign policies so that
they better serve the ultimate goal of white survival.
The old centers of power-the parliamentary and
party caucuses and the state bureaucracy, which was
the archdefender of apartheid ideology-appear to
have given way to a new generation of pragmatic
Pretoria under Botha, in our view, has modernized
racial domination: harsh methods of control have been
replaced by more sophisticated techniques of riot
control, subtler employment of police and military
power, and a greater tolerance for semipolitical activi-
ty by nonwhites-as long as it remains a safety valve
for dissent and is not perceived as threatening to spark
revolution. Recently, in allowing a number of banning
orders to expire, the newly appointed police commis-
sioner argued that the damage to South Africa's
international image by the bannings outweighed the
security benefits and that, from a strictly professional
point of view, he did not need to ban these people to
control them. Thus the new "security technocrats" in
Pretoria have the same goal as the "apartheid ideo-
logues," namely the need to maintain white control.
They differ, however, over the means of maintaining
power, believing that it is better, in the words of
Police Commissioner Coetsee, to avoid "unnecessari-
ly" contentious actions or "counterproductive" brutal-
ity.
The Politics of Racial Reform. The struggle within
Afrikanerdom- between advocates of a verligte (en-
lightened or reformist) and a verkrampte (hardline or
conservative) strategy for dealing with the nonwhite
population has dominated South African politics over
the past several years. In the wake of the 1976 urban
black riots, Prime Minister. Vorster's government
allowed a limited relaxation of apartheid restrictions
in such areas as sports, urban home leaseholds by . ;
blacks, penalties for passbook violations, job discrimi-
nation and segregation of public facilities. Prime
Minister Botha's early verligte talk-he once admon-
ished whites that they must "adapt or die"-led many
observers to conclude that South Africa had finally
taken its first steps toward accommodating the black
majority. As the debate has intensified and spread
among Afrikaner elites, however, we believe it has
become clear that the quarrel is, not over long-term.
objectives; Afrikaners remain collectively committed
to maintaining white political dominance and protect-
ing their privileges and identity. Progressive.and
conservative Afrikaners alike rule out any one-man,
one-vote formula in a unitary state, believing that
whites would quickly lose regardless of any
guarantees.
"security technocrats."
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Figure 1
South African Decisionmaking Apparatus
Social Affairs
State Security
Councila
Fifteen
Interdepartmental
Committees
Note: Principal characteristics
-Primacy of the State Security Council: Revitalized by P. W. Botha in
1979, the SSC is now. the only regularly functioning locus of authority.
Most observers believe that its brief covers all matters of national
importance, but, at a minimum, it certainly passes on key military,
security, and foreign policy questions.
-Leading Role of Military officers head the Secretariat and reportedly have
been assigned to all 15 interdepartmental committees while DFAI person-
nel sit on seven. Press reports suggest that 75 percent of the Secretairat
staff are military personnel. More importantly, military thinking seems to
predominate South African decisionmaking, a reflection of Prime Minister
Botha's long tenure as Defense Minister.
The-government's strategy of reform has sought to co-
opt Coloreds, Indians, homeland leaders, and limited
numbers of urban blacks into a nonwhite middle class
that would act. as a buffer against a black revolution.
Economic Affairs
a Statutory members include Prime Minister P. W. Botha, Defense'Minister
Magnus Malan, Foreign Affairs Minister "Pik" Botha, Justice Minister H. J.
Coetsee, Police Commissioner Johann Coetsee. Head of National Intelligence
Service Neil Barnard, South African Defense Forces Chief Constant Viljoen,
Director General of Foreign Affairs Van Dalsen, and Director General of
Justice J. P. J. Coetzer. Ad hoc members include Minister of Constitutional
Development Chris Heunnis, Finance Minister Horwood, and Minister of
Corporation and Development P. J. G. Koornhof.
Formal line of authority
Informal line of authority
Although the government has extended limited auton-
omy to some black townships, its strategy for blacks
has been largely economic-namely, to create a
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"stake in the system" for those blacks allowed to stay
in the cities.' Black unions, whose members now
comprise about 7 to 8 percent of the black labor force,
can register and bargain collectively in industrial
councils that decide wage demands. With the excep-
tion of a few jobs in the mining industry, job restric-
tion regulations that formerly prohibited black entry
into most skilled occupations have been largely
abolished.
Daily mixing of blacks and whites in the commercial
centers of white cities is a fact of life in South Africa,
but the government plainly sees the potential dangers
certain economic trends pose to continued white rule.
The national commission on black labor stated in
1979 that:
Control over the rate of urbanization is, in the
light of circumstances in South Africa, an abso-
lutely essential social security measure. Even
though ... the abolition of such control would
lead to faster economic growth, the price to be
paid for it in terms of direct and indirect social
costs would be too high.
Black union activity-potentially the most dynamic
area of black political activity inside South Africa-is
monitored closely, and union leaders are promptly
arrested when the political overtones of union activity
become too strong. Afrikaners share their govern-
ment's determination to limit the impact of economic
integration: public opinion polls reveal that while two-
thirds of Afrikaners would approve the dropping of
many barriers to blacks in the economic sphere, only
20 percent are prepared to see mixed marriages
legalized or racial divisions ended in the schools or in
residential areas. Moreover, Afrikaners are almost
unanimously opposed to even limited power-sharing
arrangements with South African blacks.
' Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945
and its subsequent amendments lay down the conditions under
which a black is permitted to live and work in "white" South
Africa-rather than in the 13.7 percent of the country designated
as tribal homelands under the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act. In
essence, section 10 states that, to remain in a white area, a black
must have lived continuously in the area since birth, or lawfully for
at least 15 years, or worked for the same employer for 10 years, or
be the offspring under the age of 18 of a qualified resident, or have
permission from a labor bureau. If a person does not qualify, and
does not have a properly stamped pass book to prove it, he or she
can be "endorsed out" to the relevant tribal homeland within 71
hours. Failure to leave is a crime. In 1982, over 200,000 blacks-
one every two and a half minutes-were arrested for being
"illegally" in South Africa.
Most of the current debate over reform centers on the
provisions of the new constitutional structure that give
Coloreds and Indians a limited role in the political
system through participation with whites in a three-
chambered Parliament and multiracial Cabinet. Al-
though whites will maintain an absolute majority on
matters of "common concern," the separate nonwhite
chambers of Parliament will have more authority to
legislate on matters relating to the "communal af-
fairs" of the Coloreds and Indians. The prospect of
even this limited power sharing precipitated a split in
the National Party in 1982 when Andries Treurnicht,
then the leader of the party's right wing, resigned
from the Cabinet and along with 16 other National-
ists formed the Conservative Party-the first Afrika-
ner parliamentary opposition party in the 35 years
since the National Party came to power. The new
constitution also creates a strong executive president
who will have broad veto powers as well as authority
to assume total control during a national emergency.
To defuse rightwing criticism and allay misgivings
among his supporters, Prime Minister Botha promised
earlier this year to hold a referendum on the constitu-
tional reforms among white voters. Although the
white electorate approved the reform proposals by a
two-to-one majority, we believe that many Afrikaners
supported the government out of loyalty to.the Na-
tional Party and its leaders, rather than genuine
support for even the carefully limited modifications of
the political system. Although some Colored and
Indian political groups have cautiously supported
Botha's proposals, the majority of both racial groups
probably oppose them as they are now formulated.
Blacks see the reform as yet another trick designed to
fracture the nonwhite majority. Implementation of
the reforms-their defeat in the referendum probably
would have ended Botha's tenure as Prime Minister-
will confer near dictatorial powers on the state presi-
dent, making it easier for whites to mobilize during
crises, but make little progress in accommodating
black aspirations.
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Violent Stasis. or Violent Change? We believe an ,
escalation of violence is a certainty in South Africa,
but we do not believe the country is on the verge of
revolution. The government's security apparatus is too
effective; divisions among the whites do.not seriously
threaten the consensus on the necessity for white
political domination; and the black population is too
fragmented,.apathetic, and powerless. Maintaining
white, rule, however,. undoubtedly will involve more
violence since the security forces cannot prevent repe-
titions of incidents such as the car bombing in Pre-
toria earlier this year which claimed 19 lives and
injured over 200. But, unlike white colonialists
throughout Africa, the Afrikaners-the self-pro-
claimed "white tribe" of Africa-believe they have
nowhere to go and-show little inclination to relinquish
what they have, even in the face of growing violence.
Many white South Africans, in our judgment, fear
that even limited racial change will be the first step on
a long slippery slope of reform that will begin by
compromising white authority and end by destroying
it. The violent eruption of postindependence tribal
conflict in Zimbabwe and the perceived radicalization
of the new black government has reinforced verk-
rampte views about the dangers of black majority rule
and dismayed verligtes who may increasingly feel that
the chasm between the races has grown too wide to be
bridged by gradual reform. We believe that Prime
Minister Botha and his Afrikaner supporters may lose
their taste for further reform, and not move to
accommodate the black majority. Despite the politi-
cally courageous act of splitting Afrikanerdom, Botha
is not receiving much positive reinforcement: his ,
reform proposals has been at best halfheartedly sup-
ported by Afrikaners, treated with skepticism by. the
nonwhite population, condemned by many on the.
English-speaking left, and greeted with- little enthusi-
asm by most of the international community. More-
over, we believe that Botha will try to heal the wounds
in the Afrikaner community caused by the debate
over the constitutional proposals and thus, it may be
some._time before. the government attempts to deal
with the blacks,. although some adjustments that are,
characterized as reform are likely.. Although several
Colored and Indian leaders claim that they will use
their new parliamentary positions to advance the
cause of blacks, we do not expect much from their
efforts.
Southern Africa's Superpower
The Increasingly Confident Use of Coercive Power.
Underlying Pretoria's foreign policies is the same
fundamental objective that dominates its domestic
policies: the maintenance of white rule in South
Africa. Any threat to white rule from black Africa
was remote, however, until developments between.
1975 and 1980 made Pretoria's neighborhood far
more dangerous and hostile. This five-year period saw
friendly, white-controlled governments in key neigh-
boring states replaced by leftist black regimes, a
dramatic growth of the Communist presence in the
region, and a surge of black civil unrest and insurgent
activities inside South Africa. This created the specter
of what South Africa's white minority fears most-a
combination of internal revolt and external attack,
both Communist backed.
Despite its involvement in the Angolan civil war, its
occasional operations against insurgents of the South-
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in
southern Angola and southwestern Zambia, and its
military support for Rhodesia, Pretoria during this
traumatic half decade of change continued a policy
toward its black neighbors that emphasized coopera-
tion, coexistence, and economic interdependence. Es-
sential to Botha's `.`constellation of states" scheme,
which he unveiled in April 1979, was Pretoria's
calculation that the economic advantages of cooperat-
ing with South Africa would induce its neighbors to
join in a formalized regional detente.
Black states in the region almost immediately rejected
any political and security involvement with South 25X1
Africa and took steps to reduce their economic
dependence on Pretoria by forming their own counter-
grouping, the Southern African. Development Coordi-
nation Conference (SADCC). The failure of Pretoria's
constellation scheme was accompanied by what Pre-
toria viewed as an even more disturbing development
in neighboring Zimbabwe: the unexpected landslide
victory in February 1980 of Robert Mugabe, labeled a
"Marxist terrorist" by Pretoria. Mugabe's victory was
a profound shock to South Africa, bringing home to
whites of all walks of life the depth of their own
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historical predicament and hardening their outlook on
external and internal policy issues.
Maputo's exports go to Pretoria-while South Africa
sends only 5 to 6 percent of its goods to its neighbors
and is an important supplier of foodstuffs for the
region. South African rail lines are critical to the
regional network and represent an important source of
economic leverage. South African-backed insurgents
in Angola and Mozambique routinely attack alterna-
tive transportation routes and ensure that landlocked
countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe remain
the failure of
regional detente and the coming to power of the
vehemently antiapartheid Mugabe also seriously
weakened the position of moderates in Pretoria-
particularly careerists in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Information (DFAI)-and shifted influ-
ence to the more hawkish military careerists whom
Botha moved into key positions in the revamped
decisionmaking structure dominated by the State
Security Council.
The view that came to dominate in Pretoria after mid-
1980 was encapsulated recently by a South African
policy adviser who asserted that conflict between
South Africa and its neighbors is inevitable. The
adviser, whose views the US Embassy believes reflect
the thinking of senior officials, said that nearby black
regimes had to support anti-South African insurgent
organizations if only to maintain their credibility as
African leaders. Other officials have gone further,
suggesting that efforts by Pretoria to encourage re-
gional stability and to obtain its neighbors' good will
through economic inducements only risks strengthen-
ing fundamentally hostile regimes. Logic of this sort
plainly underlies Southern Africa's shift since 1980
toward a more pronounced reliance on coercive means
of influence over its neighbors.
Pretoria's tough attitude is supported by its over-
whelming power advantages in the region. South
Africa can mobilize over 400,000 men, almost double
the combined military strength of Pretoria's immedi-
ate neighbors. Moreover, unlike Rhodesia which re-
lied heavily on black troops, South African active
duty forces are 97 percent white. South Africa is
virtually self-sufficient in all but the most technologi-
cally advanced armaments, and now aggressively
promotes its weaponry on the international market.
Pretoria also dominates the regional economy, ac-
counting for over three quarters of the total GNP of
the area south of Zaire and Kenya. With the excep-
tion of Angola, Pretoria's neighbors are vulnerable.to
South African economic pressure: the black-ruled
states depend heavily on South African trade-a
quarter of Harare's exports and about 40 percent of
susceptible to South African squeeze tactics.
We believe that Pretoria is growing bolder and more
self-assured in its use of coercive power. Although the
military's preeminent institutional role in Pretoria
makes adoption of a hardnosed policy almost certain,
two events probably have contributed further to.Pre-
toria's assertiveness:
? In late August 1981, a South African mechanized
infantry force of 4,000 to 5,000 men invaded Ango-
la, killed about 1,000 Angolans, killed four and
captured one Soviet adviser, and created a buffer
zone in south-central Angola that it continues to
hold. The inability of Luanda's Soviet and Cuban
protectors to prevent this infringement of Angolan
sovereignty-as well as the lack of any effective
international pressure to withdraw-has demonstra-
bly led Pretoria to redefine the limits of its room to
maneuver in the region.
? The South Africans are ardent admirers of Israeli
tactics, and, as one South African strategist close to
the military has observed, the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in early 1982 may have changed South
African notions of the "rules of the game." Prime
Minister Botha has compared himself to former
Israeli leader Begin, depicting each as willing to do
whatever is necessary for his country's security
despite US disapproval.
The leadership in Pretoria also knows that an aggres-
sive regional policy plays well domestically. A recent
poll showed that 80 percent of the white population
supports military strikes into countries harboring
anti-South African insurgents; most whites even said
they would support government food embargoes
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Figure 2
South Africa: Regional Power Advantages
Angola
Estimated GDP (1980)
$3.9 billion
Total armed forces
33,500
Cuban military personnel
25,000-30,000
Combat troops
15,000-20,000
Soviet military personnel
1,200
Advisers
300-500
East German security advisers
200-600
SWAPO
Total forces
6,000-8,000
Estimated number active in Namibia
100-200
UNITA
Total forces
35,000
Armed regulars
15,000
Mostly armed guerrillas
20,000
Botswana
GNP (1981)
$0.6 billion
Total armed forces
3,200
Mozambique
Estimated GDP (1981)
$1.5 billion
Total armed forces
18,000-20,000
Soviet military personnel
500-800
Cuban military personnel
800-1,000
East European military personnel
50-180
Zimbabwean troops
2,000-3,000
Tanzanian military advisers
180
Namibia
South African military forces
10,000-20,000
During major operations
22,000 or more
Territorial forces
3,000
South Africa
GNP (1982)
$77.6 billion
Total active duty
93,500
Permanent force (approximate)
23,000
Draftees (appproximate)
60,500
Citizen Force (active reserve)
125,000
Army Commando (local home
175,000
defense force)
Tanzania
GDP (1981) $5.2 billion
Total armed forces 41,850
Soviet military advisers 130
Zambia
GDP (1981) $3.4 billion
Total armed forces 14,300
Soviet military advisers 50
Zimbabwe
GNP (1981) $5.4 billion
Total armed forces 41,500
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
500 Kilometers
56O Miles
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against such countries. After,.the Pretoria car bomb-
ing, the bloodiest incident in the African National
Congress's terrorist campaign, South African jets
attacked alleged ANC facilities in a suburb of Ma-
puto, Mozambique, a gesture of retribution largely for
internal consumption.
Although pressure from specific Western govern-
ments has sometimes caused Pretoria to modify its
coercive activities. in the region-for example, official
US representations probably led South Africa to stop
tightening the economic screws on Zimbabwe in late
1981-the overall record of South African actions
suggests that Western pressure has had little enduring
or fundamental effect in softening South Africa':s
policy toward its neighbors. The threat of an..expand-
ed Communist presence in :the region-such as more
Cuban combat forces in'Angola or Mozambique
also has done little to deter Pretoria. On the contrary,
we believe.that the military's fascination with an
Israeli-like policy of acting decisively and unilaterally
in "doing what must be done" has grown in recent
years. Senior military officers have frequently ex-
pressed their contempt for the "Vietnam syndrome"
that they believe had crippled US policy by making
Washington unwilling to use military force. They
have insisted that South Africans will. not make the
same mistake.
An Ambitious Agenda. Pretoria's overwhelming power
advantages, which are reinforced by-deeply ingrained
racial-attitudes of white superiority, cause most white
South Africans to have very demanding standards for
what they believe constitutes , proper neighborly be-
havior. At a minimum, South Africa's dealings. with
individual-black states appear to be governed by two
general objectives: attacking anti-South African in-.
surgents and preempting any challenges to its regional
hegemony. But as South Africans have perceived
fewer obstacles to their domination of the region and
have become more confident in their use of power, we
believe they have become more ambitious and pursue,
when .the opportunities present themselves, several ,
ancillary goals as well.
At the center of South African regional concerns is
the extent to which its neighbors provide support to
anti-South African insurgencies-the ANC,
SWAPO, and to the much-less-threatening Pan Afri-
canist Congress. Repeated public threats by. South
African political and military leaders that Pretoria
would employ -a "proactive"-or forward defense strat-
egy, which would include strikes against terrorist'
bases wherever they are found,.have been carried out:
The most notable examples have been the attack in
June 198,1 on ANC safehouses in Swaziland; the raid
in January 1982 on ANC facilities in the Maputo
area; the operation in. December 1982 against ANC.
personnel in Maseru, Lesotho; -the retaliatory airstrike
against Mozambique in May 1983; and-the sacking of
ANC offices in Maputo in October 1983. Even .
though all the neighboring states, except Angola,
restrict ANC military activity in their countries,
South Africa's anxieties about its black majority are
probably so severe that no neighboring black African
state-can escape Pretoria's suspicion that it is support-
ing ANC guerrillas, and all are therefore vulnerable
to South African retaliation in the wake of a serious
terrorist incident.
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Pretoria's increasing skepticism about the possibilities
of peaceful coexistence with neighboring black states
has led it to adopt a second major regional priority:
keeping its neighbors-particularly those it regards as
most hostile-weak, susceptible to South Africa's ? 25X1
economic.and military leverage, and distracted by.
their own internal conflicts. This short-term, power-
oriented strategy for survival is also compatible with
deeply rooted racial attitudes: encouraging any stable
and prosperous black-ruled state on its border would
challenge white South African contentions that "un-
civilized".black Africans need the guiding hand of
whites to survive in the modern world. Pretoria's .
policy of creating instability and. maintaining depend-
ency throughout the region-often -referred to by
observers as its "destabilization policy"-is evident in
the pattern of South African support for regional
insurgencies, its ready use of its economic and trans-
portation leverage, and its use-of covert action, such
as its probable involvement in the sabotage attack on
the. Zimbabwean Air Force in June 1982.
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In addition to satisfying its security concerns, Pretoria
also wants the neighboring black regimes to deal with
South Africa more "normally" or at least in a less
openly hostile manner in the public realm. Although
DFAI officials acknowledge that black African states
must indulge in anti-South African rhetoric, if only
for domestic political reasons, most white South
Africans, including several cabinet members, appear
sensitive to verbal and diplomatic slights from neigh-
boring countries. Senior officials frequently complain
to US officials that South Africa's neighbors do not
give South Africa respect commensurate with its
standing in the region. Pretoria was visibly irritated,
for example, when Zimbabwe did not invite Pretoria
to send a delegation to attend independence ceremo-
nies when Mugabe took power.
Pretoria's striving for what amounts to tacit diplomat-
ic relations with its neighbors appears to have become
stronger as well. It tried to exploit Zimbabwe's fuel
shortage in January 1983 and to force Harare to
negotiate at the ministerial level over a long-term
fuel-supply contract. In its recent dealing with its
neighbors on the ANC issue, South Africa has tried to
institute regular meetings between South African
security officials and their counterparts. In addition,
Pretoria reportedly suggested to Luanda-as part of
its proposal to trade cessation of hostilities and South
African withdrawal from its Angolan salient for the
removal of Cuban, Angolan, and SWAPO forces to
positions above the Mocamedes-Menongue defense
line-that a joint South African-Angolan commission
be created to monitor the resulting demilitarized zone
in Angola. Pretoria's evident desire for formalized
relations with its black neighboring states marks a
return to earlier visions of a regional entente-albeit
an entente now based primarily on South Africa's
coercive power rather than the inducements of cooper-
ation.
South African support for insurgent movements
against its neighbors now appears to be driven by
more far-reaching objectives. Pretoria probably began
with fairly limited objectives: aiding the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozam-
bique (RENAMO) provided South Africa with bar-
gaining chips against support for-SWAPO and the
ANC. Moreover, these guerrilla groups disrupted
Zimbabwe's and Zambia's transportation routes, and
helped keep Pretoria's most hostile neighbors, Angola
and Mozambique, enfeebled and distracted. South
Africa's low-level flirtation with Zimbabwean dissi-
dents probably stems from the same motivation.
Insurgent battlefield successes over the past year,
however, may have strengthened a growing belief in
Pretoria that the insurgents could ultimately achieve
military victories, leading some South African offi-
cials to envision the restoration of buffer states in
Angola and Mozambique.
Attempting to create puppet regimes on their
borders-including a new Ovamboland carved out of
southern Angola and northern Namibia, a partition
scheme sometimes raised by senior military officers-
would appear to be a dubious and expensive enter-
prise, one which risks greater Soviet and Cuban
involvement and probably would require massive
South African assistance.
Nevertheless, many in the South African leadership
appear bullish about the prospects of replacing hostile
Hardliners in Pretoria may persuade
more cautious colleagues to support an adventurist
policy of regional king making, particularly if the
regimes in Luanda and Maputo remain incapable of
containing the insurgents. At a minimum, Prime
Minister Jonathan's rule in Lesotho may be in jeop-
ardy. Pretoria has periodically slowed cross-border
commerce with Lesotho and stepped up its involve-
ment with anti-Jonathan insurgents to express its
unhappiness with the outspoken Lesothan Prime Min-
ister's overtures to the East and his purported leniency
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Even if South Africa stops short of trying to replace
hostile black regimes throughout the region, govern-
mental paralysis in the neighboring states, fueled by
South African-backed insurgencies, enables Pretoria
to take uncompromising positions on regional issues.
South African pressure on Lesotho forced Maseru in
August 1983 to announce that it would expel all
South African refugees residing there, even though
Pretoria was demanding action a ainst only those
involved with the ANC.
lunlike two years ago when
South African military leaders thought it would be
better militarily to get out of Namibia and defend
South Africa on the Orange River, South Africa's
creation of a buffer zone in southern Angola and
Savimbi's growing insurgency has led the military to
dig in its heels on Namibia and make the Rio Cunene
its first line of defense. Buoyed by the success of its
hardline approach, South Africa, in our view, now
appears willing to concede little of significance to its
neighbors, particularly on issues such as Namibia,
which have significant domestic political impact.
Pax Pretoria or Regional Instability? South African
enthusiasm for an assertive, no-nonsense regional
policy appears to be great, and we expect it to
continue. Buttressed by very strong support from the
white population, South African officials have been
expressing their regional goals in a significantly more
forceful manner. Traditional offers of nonaggression
pacts and economic assistance are no longer coupled
with statements committing South Africa to the
principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of
other countries, but are linked instead to strong
warnings to its neighbors that if they behave in an
intolerable manner, they will suffer the consequences.
The institutionalization of a hawkish, military point of
view in the South African decisionmaking apparatus
and the development-of a "survival state" mentality
within the country's white population make it likely
that South Africa will continue to expect the worst
from its black neighbors and to pursue policies toward
them that emphasize coercion over conciliation.
As a result, we believe that southern African affairs
will remain tumultuous. Pretoria will maintain mili-
tary pressure on the ANC and SWAPO while keeping
the main sponsors of these groups weak by supporting
such groups as UNITA and RENAMO. Any spectac-
ular terrorist attack inside South Africa probably will
trigger cross-border retaliation, in effect punishing
the independent black 'African states for the inability
of the region's security forces, both black and white,
to prevent violent expressions of antiapartheid senti-
ment by South African blacks. Despite the turmoil
caused by Pretoria's heavyhanded tactics, the political
makeup of southern Africa probably will continue
unchanged, even though it is an uneasy equilibrium
between a bullying South Africa and its weaker,
destabilized neighbors.
In our view, South Africa has over the past several 25X1
years provided ample evidence of its ability to foment
instability in the region. A major question for us,
however, is whether it can retain control of the
situations it has created. The relative success the
South Africans have had with their tough approach to
regional affairs could blind them to the limits of their
power and to the USSR's capabilities for responding
on behalf of black regimes in southern Africa. If
Pretoria, for example, should try to put RENAMO
into power, an embattled Machel might call in Cuban
combat troops to save his regime or, if he is deposed,
to lead a Soviet-backed insurgency against the new
RENAMO regime. In either event, the South Afri-
cans might expend so many resources on their region-
al adventures that they endanger internal security.
Moreover, the self-assurance of South African whites
might ebb quickly if white battlefield losses were to
surpass the modest levels associated with the Namib-
ian conflict (now 50 to 100 killed per year, far fewer
than those lost to motorcycle accidents in South
Africa).
On balance, we expect the South Africans to avoid
being drawn into an escalating cycle of internal and
regional violence. Pretoria's "security technocrats"
seem well aware of the twin dangers of provoking too
much superpower involvement in southern Africa-
the only real threat to South Africa's regional hege-
mony-or of drawing too heavily on the resources of
the white population. Prime Minister Botha has com-
plained that it is "big power" intervention that pre-
vents southern Africa from solving its problems.
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Furthermore, South Africa's military leaders realize
that terrorism succeeds by sapping the will to resist
and are trying to inculcate the proper attitude in
South African whites. The Army Chief of Staff has
warned in public statements that South Africa "must
prepare for a long war. The public must know this and
accept it and must not lose the will to exist."
Pretoria already has demonstrated considerable so-
phistication in the techniques of maintaining the
status quo--witness its policy toward Namibia since
United Nations Resolution 435 was passed in 1978 or
its handling of South African blacks since the Soweto
riots in 1976. While individual military officers or
commands may be tempted to stretch the limits of
their orders and engage in unauthorized activities,
such as probably occurred in the case of the coup
attempt in the Seychelles in 1981, the leadership's
awareness of the delicate requirements of maintaining
white rule, in our judgment, will prevent South Africa
from adventurist policies that ultimately prove to be
self-defeating.
of "yes" to several of the following questions should
warn the reader that the analysis provided above is off
the mark.
Because we believe that South Africa's adventurist
regional policies might backfire-causing Pretoria to
overextend, itself and weaken its ability to cope with
internal tension-our first set of indicators covers
regional affairs:
? Have South African-backed insurgencies come to
power in Angola or Mozambique? Are the South
Africans heavily involved in the dissident movement
in Zimbabwe? If pro-South African regimes have
appeared in the neighboring states, are substantial
South African forces stationed in those countries?
? Has the Soviet and Cuban presence in southern
Africa grown significantly? Are Cuban-or possibly
East European-forces directly engaging South Af-
rican troops in Angola or Mozambique? Have rela-
tively moderate countries such as Zimbabwe or
Zambia tilted more heavily toward Moscow?
An Instability/Reform Checklist
We believe the chance that regime-threatening politi-
cal instability will arise in South Africa over the next
decade is less than 1. in 10. We believe that the odds
are not much better that South African whites will
take significant steps toward accommodating the
black majority and relinquishing power. Despite the
low probability of either eventuality, many observers
are firmly convinced that the status quo cannot be
maintained. Some fervent critics of apartheid will
continue to predict imminent revolution-as they
have ever since the Sharpeville shooting and riots in
1960. Others will insist that a process of genuine
reform is already under way, and that the current
drive to accommodate-or, as most would argue, to
co-opt-the Indians and Coloreds will serve as a
model eventually acceptable to South African blacks.
We believe, however, that white rule in South Africa
will continue for the next 10 years, essentially un-
touched either by revolution or reform.
To highlight what we perceive as possible signals of
significant change in South Africa, we have drawn up
a checklist of instability and reform indicators for
developments in South Africa. None of these indica-
tors should be interpreted' in isolation, but an answer
? Has the hostility between Pretoria and its neighbor-
ing states edged toward open warfare? Are Pre-
toria's neighbors providing active military support
to the ANC? Has the character of its border
conflicts changed from one of sporadic clashes and
reprisal raids to one of more extended engagements
of attrition? Has the casualty rate for South Afri-
can whites increased beyond the modest levels now
associated with the Namibian conflict?
Signs that the forces of instability within South
Africa have become stronger and that South Africa
has entered a prerevolutionary phase would be indi-
cated by affirmative answers to the following:
? Has a largely unified, well-organized, and well-led
black opposition movement-for many observers, a
necessary prerequisite for a revolutionary turnover
in power-emerged in South Africa? Are emerging
black groups openly defying government efforts to
regulate their behavior?
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? Have the number and severity of violent incidents
multiplied? Are there instances of persistent rural
or urban instability that the government has been
unable to suppress? Has the ANC-or some other
externally based group-succeeded in establishing a
permanent insurgent presence inside South Africa?
? Are there more incidents of spontaneous or orches-
trated black protest such as civil disorders, strikes,
boycotts, or work stoppages? Do incidents in one
part of the country trigger similar outbursts else-
where? Has the crime rate soared?
? Are there indications that'white resistance is wear-
ing down? Are security-related white casualties
increasing? Are whites refusing induction in in-
creasing numbers? Have whites started to emigrate
in significant numbers? Are whites transferring
substantial amounts of capital outside the country?
Are the newly granted executive powers being mis-
used by the government? Are the security forces
becoming harsher and more capricious in their
efforts to suppress black political activity?
Because of the difficulty of differentiating between
the rhetoric of reform, "reform" aimed at co-opting.
segments of the nonwhite population, and genuine
measures of racial reform, our checklist on social
change in South Africa focuses on indications that
genuine change is under way:
? Are there significant changes in the apartheid
system, narrowly defined to include regulations
governing residential segregation, influx control,
race classification, and "petty" apartheid? Has the
government stopped implementing homeland
legislation and resettlement programs? Is the gov-
ernment taking significant steps to redress the ineq-
uities in government spending?
? Are existing government restrictions on black politi-
cal activity being dropped? Are black labor unions
allowed to expand their areas of activity without
suffering reprisals against their leaders? Are home-
land leaders like Zulu Chief Buthelezi permitted to
form local multiracial governments? Are new fo-
rums for genuine negotiations on power sharing
being created? Is Pretoria starting to talk with the
leaders.of externally based anti-South African in-
surgent groups? Has Pretoria released prominent
leaders such as the ANC's Nelson Mandela from
prison?
? Assuming that the constitutional proposal granting
limited political rights to Indians and Coloreds is
implemented, does Pretoria then move to provide
the same sort of accommodation of South African
blacks or at least to those with permanent urban
rights? Does Pretoria proceed to grant equal rights
to Indians and Coloreds by merging the three-
chambered Parliament into one legislative body
with all the racial groups voting on a common role?
? Has a new coalition party of Afrikaners and En-
glish-speakers emerged to-take the lead on reform
from the Afrikaner-based National Party? Has
Pretoria repealed the laws prohibiting multiracial
political parties and other forms of interracial politi-
cal cooperation? Are South African political exiles
granted amnesty and invited back into the country
to join the reform process?
Part Two: United States-South
African Relations
Strong Ties but Little Leverage
During the next 10 years, the relationship between the
United States and South Africa will probably ex-
pand-not to the degree that most South Africans
would like, but undoubtedly to an extent that many in
the United States will not be comfortable with. In the
absence of new restrictive US legislation, economic
ties between the two countries probably will continue
to strengthen. Moreover, continued conflict in south-
ern Africa will create more opportunities for Soviet
meddling and make it-easier for Pretoria to make'
common cause with the United States in an anti-
Communist campaign. In addition, the fundamental
moral and racial issues that underlie internal develop-
ments in South Africa will make them of continued
high interest to broad segments of American society.
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US concerns notwithstanding, we believe that Pre-
toria's determined stance of self-sufficiency leaves
South Africa relatively unresponsive to US carrots
and sticks.
Economic Links. The strategic minerals of interest to
the United States that are mined in South Africa are
chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum-
group metals. The first three are important to steel
production-particularly specialty steels for aircraft,
missile, and defense-related industries-and the space
program. The platinum-group metals are used in auto
emission control systems and chemical, petrochemi-
cal, and electrical industries. South African imports
provide from 30 (manganese) to 55 (vanadium) percent
of US consumption of these important minerals. In
addition, other commercially important minerals from
South Africa include gold, antimony, industrial dia-
monds, and asbestos.
South Africa strives to be the number-one supplier of
minerals to the West, and South African officials
frequently stress the stability of the country as com-
pared with other mineral-producing countries. The
fact that the Soviet Union is the major alternative
supplier of chromium, manganese, platinum, and va-
nadium also is frequently cited.
US stockpiles reduce vulnerability to stoppages in the
flow of South African minerals. West European coun-
tries and Japan, however, are just as reliant on South
Africa for their supplies of chromium, manganese,
and platinum, and more so for vanadium, but have
either inadequate or no stockpiles.
Pretoria, for its part, has moved to reduce its suscepti-
bility to possible oil embargoes, its only significant
resource vulnerability. South Africa has stockpiled
sufficient oil to meet at least two years' demand at
normal rates of consumption-and about five years
with rationing-and is the world's leader in oil-from-
coal technology. By the mid-1980s, South Africa's
abundant coal reserves should provide 40 to 50 per-
cent of the country's oil needs.
Pretoria is unlikely, however, to use its mineral
resources as weapons against the West, except in
response to extreme provocation. Pretoria has an
unblemished record in fulfilling contracts and supply-
ing minerals at market prices, and has never retaliat-
ed economically for the West's adherence to the arms
embargo against South Africa. Moreover, minerals
and mineral products, including gold, account for
more than 60 percent of the value of South African
exports, and mining alone accounts for 16 percent of
total employment.
The United States has long been one of South Africa's
largest trading partners, accounting, like Japan and
the United Kingdom, for 10 to 15 percent of Pre-
toria's trade over the past five years. As of 1981, US
direct investment in South Africa totaled $2.6 billion
and indirect investment in the form of bank loans,
stocks and other South African financial securities
was $3.7 billion. Nevertheless, South Africa accounts
for only 1 percent of US worldwide totals of invest-
ment and trade. Furthermore, US trade with black
Africa is approximately three times greater than that
with South Africa, largely reflecting US imports of
Nigerian oil.
For Pretoria also, bilateral economic relations are not
critical to the national economy. US direct investment
represents just 2 to 3 percent of South Africa's total
industrial plant, and US firms employ only 60,000 to
70,000 blacks, less than 1 percent of the labor force.
In summary, Pretoria's economic ties to the United
States are important, but not critical to either side.
However, the failure of the West European countries
and Japan to stockpile against possible supply inter-
ruptions creates a Western perception of economic
vulnerability. Pretoria, on the other hand, has consist-
ently sought economic self-sufficiency as a hedge
against sanctions and is prepared, economically and
psychologically, for a total trade embargo. Pretoria's
trading partners, in our judgment, are not.
Linked in Opposition to Communism. Political insta-
bility and armed conflict of the sort we believe will be
endemic to southern Africa will enhance Soviet and
Cuban opportunities to build their influence and
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undermine.that of the West, primarily through mili-
tary assistance to black states threatened by Pretoria.
The black African states view white minority rule in
Namibia and South Africa as the destabilizing dy-
namic in the region. Most black leaders have an
exaggerated notion of the degree of leverage Wash-
ington has over Pretoria and are often tempted to use
the United States as a scapegoat for regional prob-
lems.
Pretoria, on the other hand, views itself as an oasis of
stability in a continent awash with chaos. White
South Africans of.all walks of life maintain that
European colonial rule ended too soon, leaving black
Africans incapable of dealing with the political and
economic challenges of the 20th century. Insisting
that racism does not underlie their belief that black
Africans are "immature," South Africans argue that
"Africa is dying" without the civilizing influence of
white rule, and that independent black African states
have become impoverished and' chaotic "Marxist
states that are easy prey for. Communist adventurers.
South African leaders identify the Soviet Union as the
country's principal adversary. They see Moscow as -
taking advantage of every opportunity-from backing
anti-South African insurgents to arming hostile gov-,
ernments on its border-to strike at South Africa. By
derivation, Pretoria argues, the Soviets are attacking
the West-for whom continued South African domi-
nance of the region is described as "vital,". even. if the
West does not acknowledge it. Pretoria seeks to make
common cause with Washington in an anti-
Communist campaign, and has even claimed that the
regional roles .of the two countries are essentially, the
same-that South Africa promotes stability and dem-
ocratic forces against Communist subversion in south-
ern Africa in a manner similar to the US role in South
and Central America.
The United States has tried to limit Soviet opportuni-
ties in southern Africa by encouraging negotiated
solutions to regional problems and promoting detente
between South Africa and its neighbors. In our
judgment, the success of US policy initiatives in the
region will require South African cooperation or, at
least, acquiescence, since Pretoria will continue to
dominate the region economically and militarily for
the next 10 years. Consequently, the United States
will find it difficult to avoid being seen by Pretoria's
opponents as the handmaiden of South African inter-
Ironically, continued conflict in southern Africa
serves both Pretoria and Moscow because it contrib-
utes to a closer identification of black southern-Africa
with the USSR and of South Africa with the United 25X1
States. The leadership in Pretoria, in our view, plays
up the "Soviet menace" to strengthen the identity of
US and South African "strategic" interests and to
deflect Western attention from the apartheid issue.
We believe that this dynamic will continue for the
next 10 years, making it difficult for Washington to
'disentangle its interest in opposing Soviet adventurism
from Pretoria's interest in maintaining white rule.
"Radishes and Twigs." Pretoria's self-reliance and
growing self-confidence-Foreign Minister Botha
flatly asserted recently that "this is our region"- 25X1
renders South Africa, in our judgment, relatively
invulnerable to US leverage. In the absence of unex-
pected, regime-threatening developments-such as a
race. war inside South Africa or direct Soviet military
action against Pretoria-that might prompt white
leaders to seek US intervention, we expect South
Africa's fear of incurring US displeasure to only
marginally constrain its behavior. Unlike other "pari-
ah states" which depend on US security assistance,
Pretoria is not beholden to any other country for its
security, and, in our view, believes that it can better
tolerate, in the short run at least, an interruption of its
economic ties abroad than could its trading partners.
The ability of the United States to achieve far-
reaching objectives in southern Africa-particularly
if they touch on South African domestic affairs-will
for the most part remain limited. South African
whites bitterly resent suggestions from outsiders on
how to run their affairs, and this resistance will be
strengthened if pressure is applied for rapid, wholesale
changes. The experience of the late 1970s also leads
us to believe that heavy Western pressure to force the
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pace and scope of change could be counterproductive
from another standpoint-black expectations for
change can easily be raised unrealistically, with the
result that dashed hopes become part of the baggage
of black skepticism and suspicion of the West.
Dealing With South Africa
Ambivalence Toward the United States. Despite their
growing international isolation since the Afrikaners
came to power in 1948, white South Africans tend to
identify with the West, viewing themselves as the last
bastion of European or "civilized" values in Africa.
They emphasize their World War II contributions
and their continuing role as guardians of the impor-
tant Cape sea route and as suppliers of strategic
minerals. Afrikaners are especially drawn to Ameri-
cans and often argue that only historical circum-
stance-namely, the vast numbers of black Africans
versus the numerically inferior Indians on the Ameri-
can continent-caused US and South African paths
its avowed self-reliance and resistance to infringe-
ments on its freedom of action in domestic and
regional affairs.
Pretoria's caution with respect to US initiatives will
be further strengthened by'the widespread South
African perception that US policies can shift quickly
with the passing of each administration. South Africa,
for example, ignored for the most part the Carter
administration's pressure for internal reform, partially
because it believed that future administrations would
follow less idealistic policies toward South Africa. In
South Africa, where conflicting views are rarely
expressed by government officials, the perception that
Washington often speaks with many voices is often
taken as evidence of confusion and indecision, and an
invitation to procrastinate in the hope that unwanted
pressure from the United States will simply go away.
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to diverge.
This self-perceived bond to the West is' coupled to a
sense of betrayal, however, that gives the relationship
a "love-hate" aspect. White South Africans bitterly
resent US criticism of apartheid, often argue that
Americans should not view black South Africans as if
they were black Americans, and believe that Pre-
toria's role as an outpost for Western, Christian, and
democratic values is undervalued. Moreover, Pretoria
clearly is wary about entrusting vital South African
interests to the West: Defense Minister Malan has
remarked darkly that "South Africa has ample proof
that she could not rely on the West to assist her in any
conflict." Numerous white leaders have repeatedly
and strongly complained that they were abandoned by
the United States when it did not support South
Africa's intervention in the Angolan civil war. F_
Because most South Africans, in our view, feel simul-
taneously drawn to, and betrayed by, the United
States, South African attitudes toward US initiatives
to promote regional stability will be profoundly
schizophrenic. Washington's interest and engagement
in southern African affairs will be welcomed as long
overdue acknowledgments of South Africa's impor-
tance to the West. But Pretoria's skittishness about
the reliability of Western commitments will reinforce
The Importance of "Face. "Sharing in many ways the
nationalism of a newly liberated people, the Afrika-
ners are fiercely independent and bluntly reject US
advice on internal matters-Prime Minister Botha
recently dismissed a major policy statement by the
US Under Secretary of State as based on a "central
misconception." Pressure from outsiders often seems
to drive South Africans deeper into their psychologi-
cal laager-the circle of wagons formed by Afrikaner
settlers under attack by African warriors-and makes
them defensive and incapable of acknowledging error
or of compromising. The South Africans resist even
the appearance of being pushed around, perhaps from
a deep-seated fear of the impact that it might have on
South African blacks, and appear to place great stress
on being treated with the respect they believe is their
due as regionally powerful actors. Thus, negotiations
with South Africa will continue to be facilitated if
allowances are made for their apparent need to save
face.
The past pattern of South African behavior also leads
us to conclude that dealings with leaders in Pretoria
will be easier when they believe that their Western
opposites are as strong willed and forceful as the
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Afrikaners believe themselves to be. Informed observ-
ers have noted the apparent similarity between South
African and Soviet diplomats: both adamantly insist
on maximalist positions and often do not negotiate
seriously until convinced of their opposite's determi-
nation; offers to bargain and to compromise are often
seen as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to be
exploited rather than explored. We believe, therefore,
that before the South Africans will enter general
negotiations they need to develop personal respect for
those they are dealing with-that of one "man" for
another in South Africa's male-dominated society.
Symbolism and Consistency. Despite the ambivalence
at work in South African views toward the United
States, Pretoria nevertheless often appears anxious to
be accepted by the United States because of its
symbolic role as the leader of the West. Hence, US
agreement to what might otherwise be viewed as
insignificant steps-such as the provision of training
to South African coast guard members or the opening
of two honorary South African consulates in the
United States-often have been seized upon by the
South African press as indications that South Africa's
international isolation may be ending. On the other
hand, the international sport world's ostracism of
South Africa is felt deeply by South Africans in all
walks of life. Exploiting the South Africans' desire to
be accepted even in a symbolic sense represents, in our
judgment, one of Washington's few sources of lever-
age vis-a-vis Pretoria.
Dealing in this realm, however, is a delicate matter,
since withholding or withdrawing symbolic incentives
does not, by definition, harm the South Africans very
much. Because Pretoria seems fully aware, that US
carrots and sticks are fairly insubstantial, the greatest
mileage can be extracted from them, in our judgment,
if the South Africans believe they are being applied
consistently: that is, if South Africa's cooperative
behavior is rewarded case by case and its recalci-
trance punished case by case. Our monitoring of
South African attitudes toward Western governments
in general makes it plain that Pretoria perceives it as
weakness or vacillation if day-to-day dealings remain
on a business-as-usual basis after South Africa has
been unresponsive to a high-level demarche on a
particular issue.
Avoiding Pretoria's Embrace. Political issues in
southern Africa are to a great extent racial politics in
a life-or-death situation; neither white South African
nor black Africans appear to hold much hope for
compromise solutions. US efforts to seek meliorative
approaches, since the legitimacy of each side's posi-
tion is accepted for negotiating purposes, risks alien-
ation from those equally adamant in condemning
either white minority rule or black majority rule. This
appears to be an inescapable dilemma for US policy-
In contrast to the very modest official US presence in
southern Africa, the paramount reality for most black
Africans is the far more substantial private US
economic links to South Africa. US efforts to distance
itself symbolically from South Africa-which, inci-
dentally, undermine Washington's influence with Pre-
toria-probably will remain unconvincing to most of
Pretoria's opponents as long as US-South African
economic relations remain largely undisturbed. We
believe that Pretoria's understanding of this dynamic
underlies its policy of striving to be the West's
number-one supplier of critical minerals.
For the United States, therefore, avoiding the appear-
ance of tacit collusion with South Africa is far easier
said than done. Pretoria's dominant role in the region
and its strong economic links to the West make it easy
for antiapartheid critics-as well as white South
Africans-to believe that the United States is backing
Pretoria against the interests of black South Africans
and black Africa as a whole. In our view, the United
States probably can never completely escape being 25X1
tarred by its relations with South Africa. However,
firmness and consistency in dealing with Pretoria
could, in our judgment, mitigate considerably the
negative consequences, since Pretoria's opponents
could at least correlate warming trends in US-South
African bilateral relations with "improvements" in
South African behavior.
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