CHINA: CLEANSING THE PARTY-RECTIFICATION AND REFORM IN THE 1980S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000100020003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intglligence_.
Secret
EA 83-10150
September 1983
Copy 3 7 7
China: Cleansing the Party
Rectification and Reform
in the 1980s
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China: Cleansing the Party
Rectification and Reform
in the 1980s
Division, OEA
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China
Secret
EA 83-10150
September 1983
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China: Cleansing the Party-
Rectification and Reform
in the 1980s_~
Secret
Summary This paper examines the problems of the Chinese Communist Party and
Information available the remedies Beijing proposes to set its house in order. It provides a
as of 28 August 1983 benchmark for later assessments of China's progress in making the party a
was used in this report.
more effective instrument of leadership. How Beijing handles its party
problems will to an important extent determine China's prospects for
leadership-and foreign and domestic policy-continuity during this
decade.
This winter the Chinese Communist Party begins a three-year rectification
campaign that will pass judgment on each of the party's 40 million
members. Deng Xiaoping sees the campaign as a way to purge opponents
of his program, help party General Secretary Hu Yaobang (his chosen
successor) consolidate his power, instill an ideological unity conducive to
Deng's program, and refurbish the party's tarnished image. Hu will oversee
the drive, and an orderly, successful campaign would help establish his
leadership credentials in the public mind.
Specifically targeted for removal are party members who participated in
the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, who are corrupt, or who have
consistently resisted Deng's political and economic reforms.
estimates of the number to be expelled, ranging
from 2 to 15 percent of the party membership. We estimate that the figure
will fall in the middle ranges, between 2 million and 4 million.
Deng has made extensive preparations for the campaign, creating special
organs to run it and staffing them with close associates. The leadership,
moreover, is determined that this campaign will not interfere with priority
economic tasks as past ones have. As a result, we believe this campaign will
be orderly and that excesses and violence will be rare.
Despite Deng's preparations, we believe the rectification will encounter
major problems that will complicate its implementation and limit its
effectiveness. In particular, entrenched provincial factions will compete to
control the campaign in their area, seeking to purge rivals and protect
members without regard to Beijing's guidelines. Independent of formal
factions is the tendency of officials at all levels to form patron-client
relationships with the people above and below them. This guarantees that
any cadre targeted by the campaign has a network of associates to turn to
for help in slowing, if not defeating, the process.
Secret
EA 83-10150
September 1983
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Beijing must also contend with officials who seek to push the campaign be-
yond the limits set by Beijing. Many individuals will have private agendas
and will see the rectification as an opportunity to settle old scores from the
Cultural Revolution. They may also be inclined to use methods Beijing has
outlawed-physical or mental abuse and public humiliation-that could
spark incidents and disrupt production. In addition, the sheer magnitude of
the campaign will severely task Beijing's ability to monitor and direct it.
In this respect, the rectification will do little to improve the party's
standing in the eyes of the people. Articles in the Chinese media and
conversations with the Chinese themselves indicate that most see the party
as a benevolent association interested only in preserving the privileges of its
members. Nor do we expect the rectification to reform measurably the
workstyle of party officials. Imperious behavior, abuse of position, and the
importance of patron-client relationships will be as prevalent as ever.
We do not believe that these probable failings of the campaign will pose
grave problems for the regime. Some party elders have warned of a "Polish
situation" in China unless the party is cleansed, but, in our opinion, the lev-
el of popular disenchantment is not nearly that serious.
Preoccupation with the purity of the party and revolutionary ideals may in
fact be a declining concern, because the party is in transition from older
revolutionaries, who seem to care most about these issues, to post-1949
bureaucrats. In any case, we believe the rectification will advance Deng's
most important aims-removing footdraggers and leftist opponents of
Deng's line, improving Hu's succession prospects, and imposing an ideolog-
ical uniformity based on Deng's ideas. To the degree the rectification
achieves these ends, it will advance the transition to a new generation that
has different priorities.
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Summary
iii
The State of the Party ...
1
... and Its Consequences
2
Preparations
5
Scope
7
The Party's Standing 12
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Camera Press
Hu Yaobang ... born 1915 in Hunan Province ... Deng Xiaoping's
political heir and potentially the greatest beneficiary of a success-
ful party rectification ... formed association with Deng during
1930s ... Deng-Hu connection endured through simultaneous dis-
missals from office during Cultural Revolution and in
1976... since June 1981 Hu the party's nominal leader ... rectdl-
cation drive provides Hu with opportunity to emerge from Deng's
shadow as leader in own right while eliminating many of those who
have reservations about Hu's eventual party primacy ... responsi-
bility for running campaign reportedly devolved to closest junior
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Secret
China: Cleansing the Party-
Rectification and Reform
in the 1980s
Introduction
In its fourth decade of rule, the Chinese Communist
Party has declared itself to be in a state of crisis.' The
party's difficulties do not directly threaten its exist-
ence or challenge its thorough penetration of Chinese
society. In our view, however, the party does face an
accumulation of interrelated problems in personnel,
motivation, and public confidence that, taken togeth-
er, impair its ability to direct China's modernization
effortl
The party has traditionally responded to internal
troubles through what it terms "rectification," a
process that in the broadest sense embraces reindoc-
trination, disciplinary sanctions, and organizational
measures-structural reform, recruitment, and purge
of the membership.' During the long years of his rule,
Mao initiated frequent rectification drives to rid the
party of attitudes and behavior that fell short of his
visionary standards. The first and perhaps most suc-
cessful, the Yanan Rectification Movement of 1942-
44, has set the standard for subsequent campaigns.
Mao, who exercised almost total control over the
Yanan rectification, used it to promote his own ideas
against those of rival factions and to consolidate his
power within the party. "Mao Zedong Thought"
assumed an unchallengeable authority and was used
to indoctrinate the thousands of new members who
joined the party in the late 1930s and early 1940s but
who had not been truly assimilated into its ranks.
' Allowing for the hyperbole that often marks propaganda, the
imagery of crisis has characterized media discussions of the party
since Deng's ascendancy in 1978. For example, Politburo Standing
Committee member Chen Yun, second only to Deng Xiaoping in
prestige, has called the correction of party shortcomings "a matter
of life or death" for the party. See appendix A for a sampling of
leaders' statements on the party crisis.
Although this paper draws on the full ran a of intelligence
it primarily relies on
analysis of Chinese propaganda. Except where expressly stated, our
attribution of attitudes to the Chinese leadership is based on our
reading of important speeches, editorials, and press commentary.
Rectification" -z engdun ("to correct" or "put in order")
zuofeng ("workstyle"), but more commonly contracted simply to
zhengfeng-is a usage uniquely Chinese. Mao apparently coined
the term in his speech of February 1942 that inaugurated the
Careful recruitment, disciplinary measures, and purge
of unreliable members helped the party attain the
organizational cohesiveness that contributed to vic-
tory over the Nationalists.
Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies believe the
party now requires similar medicine. Since the Third
Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December
1978, the reformers have repeatedly attempted to
organize their own systematic test of loyalty and
ideological rectitude. After repeated delays, their
rectification drive will begin later this year. Harking
back to Yanan, Deng and company expect a
partywide rectification to produce for them the same
payoff as the Yanan movement yielded for Mao:
political and ideological uniformity beneath a single
standard.
Motivations and Goals
The State of the Party ... Deng and his reform allies
consistently tout the party as indispensable to China's
modernization. Yet the clear impression left by their
statements is that, in their judgment, the party does
not measure up to the task. In speeches and private
statements, Deng and others have-correctly, in our
view-pinpointed the party's major problems:
? It is dominated by elderly, increasingly inactive
men-the average age on the Politburo is 73-of
relatively unsophisticated, mostly peasant, origins.'
Despite bureaucratic streamlining last year and the
lure of lucrative pensions, many have resisted pres-
sure to retire voluntarily and instead are preoccu-
pied with preserving their positions and perquisites.
This situation exists at every administrative level.
' The 12th Party Congress substantially lowered the average age of
the Central Committee, but largely by adding a contingent of 25X1
relatively younger members to the list of alternate, nonvoting 2:)A I
members. The average age of full Central Committee members LOA-1
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? Training and ideological indoctrination under Mao
inculcated a world view that in many ways is at
variance with the modernization plans of the leader-
ship. Half or more of the party's 40 million mem-
bers were admitted during the Cultural Revolution
era when requirements were slackened and virtually
the sole criterion for membership was commitment
to Mao's radically egalitarian ideas.
? The "leadership workstyle" of senior cadres is fre-
quently out of step with current requirements for
collegiality and consultation and is ill suited to the
needs of the modernization program. Party officials,
while not required to master technical information,
must now demonstrate a sensitivity to technical
problems and a willingness to defer to professional
opinion. Longtime administrators habitually lead in
an imperious manner, seem suspicious of expertise,
and often place political or personal considerations
ahead of the goals of their organizations.
? China's opening to the world has spurred a dramatic
rise in the incidence of corruption by officias.
party members
ave een invo ve in more than 40 percent of all
cases uncovered. In our judgment, this may be a
conservative estimate; although party members rep-
resent only 4 percent of China's population, they
have far greater opportunities to manipulate the
system and better means to avoid incrimination.
... and Its Consequences. The sad state of the party's
membership-too often aged, inflexible, imperious,
and corrupt-has aggravated other problems that
together seriously impair the party's ability to provide
the leadership Deng's goals require. Authoritative
statements by party leaders and commentary in the
official media leave the impression, which is re-
inforced by conversations with the Chinese, that there
are two related areas of concern.
A Crisis of Confidence. Beijing recognizes that the
wild swings of policy under Mao that culminated in
the Cultural Revolution have cost it the support of
broad segments of Chinese society. The purge of Hua
Guofeng, Deng's preoccupation with the succession,
and continued vacillation on fundamental issues re-
inforce the impression that little has actually changed
with the reformers in charge. Many Chinese believe
that the party no longer has the vision, intelligence,
and honesty needed to govern 1 billion people. Al-
though it is difficult to measure the disaffection, its
prominence as a propaganda theme and the reports of
knowledgeable observers suggests that it is a signifi-
cant problem within and outside of the party.
We believe expanded economic relations with Japan,
Hong Kong, and the West have added to the problem.
Some Chinese are surprised by the wealth of the
capitalist economies and have come to view Commu-
nism as a system that has many of the disadvantages
and few of the advantages of capitalism. This is
compounded by the heightened sensitivity among
Chinese to the privileged lives of party officials and
their families and to abuses of their advantages.
Recognizing the situation, Beijing lectures incessantly
on the "superiority of the socialist system" and the
indispensability of the Communist Party. In his ad-
dress to the 12th Party Congress, for example, Gener-
al Secretary Hu Yaobang devoted a long passage to
contesting the view of some Chinese that Communism
is but "a dim illusion" that had not been tested in
practice. He maintained that "there is Communism
everywhere in our daily life" and warned critics that
failure to affirm the party's contributions amounted
to "a grave error.'
Ideological Drift. The death of Mao Zedong-howev-
er inconsistent and mercurial were his proclamations
near the end-created uncertainty about what consti-
tutes dogma and what is heresy. Although the "Reso-
lution of Questions of Party History" approved by the
Sixth Plenum of the 11th Congress in June 1981
attempted to make Mao's ideas fit China's reform
program, Mao's intellectual legacy has become in-
creasingly irrelevant to present concerns.
Since initiation of the reform program at the Third
Plenum, the official media have featured a running
affirmation that Deng's policies are indeed socialist in
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Cartoons reprinted in China's
English-language publications
satirize cadre corruption and
shortcomings in official work-
Is Everybody Busy:'
- Ye Chunyang
This cartoon criticizes over-
staffed organizations and ineffec-
tive work. (The words on the
envelope are "urgent dispatch.")
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nature. The continuing stream of pronouncements-
each purportedly authoritative-indicate to us, how-
ever, widespread skepticism and a concern by the
reformers that their pragmatically framed policies
still lack a sufficient ideological basis.
Four Goals. This assessment of the party has shaped
Deng's stated goals for the rectification:
? Inculcate thoroughly in the minds of party members
the thinking underlying China's reform policies,
thereby filling the ideological void left by Mao's
death and reevaluation.
? Promote reform goals by finally purging or cowing
"leftists" who rose to power during the Cultural
Revolution era.
? Repair the party's image by promoting the achieve-
ments of Chinese Communism and rejuvenating its
membership-adding younger, better educated peo-
ple and eliminating the more corrupt and incompe-
tent.
Deng has a fourth goal of equal or greater impor-
tance-advancing the succession prospects of his pro-
tege, Hu Yaobang. Hu has made great strides in
building a power base in the party and government,
but, if Deng died today, we believe Hu could still face
a challenge from other members of the leadership."
The rectification provides Hu and Deng with an
opportunity to strengthen their grip on the party
bureaucracy, particularly at the lowest levels where
their influence is weakest. Organs charged with over-
seeing the campaign are led by officials who have
close ties to Hu.
A successful campaign is important to Hu in another
sense. He has labored in Deng's shadow and many
Chinese do not see him as a leader in his own right.
Moreover, some of the policies Hu has been associated
with in the past-the new minority policy and the
policy toward intellectuals, for instance-have gener-
ally been Tess successful than Beijing anticipated. Hu
is overseeing the rectification drive, and an orderly,
effective campaign would help establish his leadership
credentials in the public mind.
Wide World m
Rectification triumverate: (left to right) Chen
Yun, Deng Mapping, and Hu Yaobang confer
during the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Party
Framework for Rectification
In a sense, China has experienced an ongoing rectifi-
cation since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central
Committee in 1978.5 Beijing at one time or another
has chastised "leftists," "bourgeois liberals," crimi-
nals among officialdom, and ideologically slack party
members. None of these efforts, however, has been
integrated, systematic, or pursued with much vigor.
The rectification campaign formally endorsed at the
12th Party Congress in September 1982 is meant to
be just that: comprehensive and vigorous. Hu an-
nounced that it will last three years and involve a
thorough, systematic review of all 40 million party
' Often the term "rectification" is not used to refer to a given
campaign, but the effect remains the same. The "Three Anti,"
"Five Anti," and "Anti-Rightist" campaigns of the 1950s, the
Socialist Education Campaign and the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution of the 1960s, and the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize
Confucius" campaign and the purge of Gang of Four supporters in
the 1970s were all rectification drives. Some were repeatedly
identified as such, others were not.
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members "in stages by groups." Each will be evaluat-
ed for his adherence to the party line laid down at the
Third Plenum-that is, Deng's programs-and those
who pass muster will be recertified as party members.
Preparations. Beijing has been laying the groundwork
since the Third Plenum. Preparations include:
? Reestablishment at the plenum of a party Discipline
Inspection Commission, which will play a major role
in the rectification drive.
? Approval at the Fifth Plenum in February 1980 of
"Guiding Principles of Inner Party Life," which
establish standards of behavior for party members.6
? Publication, following the Sixth Plenum in June
1981, of a "Resolution on Questions of Party Histo-
ry" that officially criticized Mao and his policies
and established an authoritative interpretation of
the party's actions since 1949.
? Initiation of a nationwide campaign against eco-
nomic crimes in 1982-identified as one of two
priorities for the year-that targeted corrupt
officials.
? A massive bureaucratic reorganization begun in
1982 of China's three major institutions-party,
state, and military-to improve their efficiency and
install new leadership teams committed to the re-
form agenda and to rectification goals.
? Promulgation at the 12th Party Congress of a new
party constitution containing explicit passages on
the duties of members and on disciplinary
procedures.6
? Establishment following the panty congress of pilot
rectification projects in selected organizations and
localities in each of China's provincial level
administrations.
? Publication and intensive propagandization of
"Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" and the writ-
ings of Chen Yun, who is closely associated with the
drive to reform party workstyle.
Eastfoto
Chen Yun ... born 1905 in Jiangsu ... perhaps
the leading advocate of reform in party style and
work habits ... driving force in anticorruption
drive begun in 1981 and recently revived after
slowdown in activity ... member, Politburo
Standing Committee ... longtime leader in eco-
nomic policy whose ideas now in fashion ... in
1958, openly critical of Mao's disastrous Great
Leap Forward, career plummets ... disagree-
ments came into the open during Cultural Revo-
lution, Chen vehemently attacked for "opposing
Mao"... rehabilitated 1973, returned to Politbu-
ro 1977... since 1978 head of party's Discipline
Inspection Commission, a major participant in
coming rectification ... renowned for modest, un-
assuming lifestyle and unimpeachable devotion
Structures. We expect overall supervision of the recti-
fication will rest with H*
Hu Qili-a 225X1
ecretariat member an reportedly the General Sec-
retary's closest associate-will ersonall orchestrate
the campaign. Hu Qili
recently may have stepped down as head of the
Central Committee's General Office, which attends to
much of the party's day-to-day paperwork and main-
tains the party archives. We believe, however, that the 25X1
General Office-now reportedly led by another Hu
Yaobang confidant, Qiao Shi-is only one of several
departments in the central party bureaucracy that
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touted by some as eventua a party ...
reportedly has resigned as head ofparty s Gener-
al Office to devote full time to work as Secretari-
at member... studied mechanical engineering,
Beijing University ... a Communist Youth
League associate of Hu Yaobang during 1950s,
1960s ... purged early in 1967, rehabilitated
1972, given successively greater responsibil-
ities ... marked as major "comer" when appoint-
ed deputy mayor and party secretary of Tianjin
in 1980... reportedly in charge of running recti-
fication drive for Hu Yaobang ... speaks excel-
lent English.
will be deeply involved in the process. In our judg-
ment, Beijing will follow the practice of some provin-
cial trial rectification projects and establish an ad hoc
"rectification office" at the outset of the campaign.
Hu Qili may well direct its activities.
Other major bureaucratic participants will be:
? The Discipline Inspection Commission and its sub-
ordinates in every locality, which at the recent party
congress were granted expanded investigatory
powers.
? The Organization Department, which is the party's
central personnel office.
? The Propaganda Department, which will have spe-
cial responsibilities for preparing study materials
and framing explanations of policy.
Close associates of Deng or Hu direct each of these
organs, with the possible exception of the Organiza-
tion Department. Its director seems to be a career
bureaucrat, but two of his deputies are associates of
Hu.
In addition, the investigatory organs of the Ministry
of Public Security and the new Ministry of State
Security will become involved if criminal misconduct
is discovered. The rectification will also extend to the
People's Liberation Army, with the prominent partici-
pation of its General Political Department and its
Discipline Inspection Commission.
Guidelines. The final guidelines for the national
rectification will be promulgated at the Second Ple-
num of the 12th Congress, which is scheduled to
convene in October 1983. The basic contours of the
campaign, however, are already clear from the state-
ments of leaders, media commentary on pilot projects,
and the extensive propaganda on the rectification.
Beijing has taken great care to distinguish the coming
campaign from its antecedents conducted under Mao,
which featured public humiliation and physical and
mental abuse of the targets. Hu Yaobang especially
will want to eschew the use of terror-never as central
and systematic in China as in the Stalinist purges of
the 1930s-because it would be reminiscent of the
violent periods under Mao and would alienate many
moderate party members who are his principal base of
support.
In media discussions of experimental projects, Beijing
has sought to assure anxious party members that this
rectification will be tightly controlled and will avoid
the mass mobilization tactics that in the past fre-
quently got out of hand. Beijing has repeatedly
stressed the novelty-the "pioneering" aspect-of the
coming campaign, arguing that trial runs would be
unnecessary if Beijing merely intended to duplicate
past campaigns. The media have also emphasized that
the object is not to punish errant cadre but to educate
them to Deng's point of view. Mao's old precept from
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the Yanan rectification, "curing the sickness to save
the patient," is frequently invoked to characterize the
favored approach. Leniency will be the rule in han-
dling cases, according to Beijing, and cadres who have
opposed Deng's policies in the past are being told by
the media that it is not too late to confess and be
We believe that to minimize anxieties over the rectifi-
cation, most official or semiofficial estimates of the
reach of the purge-either on or off the record-tend
to underrepresent Beijing's intent. A less sanguine
estimate
10
suggested that to 15 percent of the 2f- ,
mem ership would be purged. Because of factors that 25X1
will reduce the effectiveness of the campaign (dis-
cussed elsewhere), we believe the total number re-
moved from the party will probably fall into the 5- to
10-percent range, approximately 2-4 million. The net
reduction in the size of the party will be smaller,
of course, because recruitment will accompany dis-
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saved.
Assurances of leniency notwithstanding, the most
important targets of rectification are already well
marked and are those who, for a variety of reasons,
are counted among the opponents of Deng's reforms.
Beijing has especially singled out the Cultural Revo-
lution activists-"beaters, smashers, and looters; fac-
tionalists; and those who rose through rebellion"-
whose past actions warrant severe treatment: purge
and perhaps imprisonment. Two other special targets
were named at the 12th Party Congress-people who
are guilty of corruption and those who, after years of
Beijing's efforts, persistently refuse to accept Deng's
reform policies.
Scope. All party members will submit to rectification
but relatively few will face disciplinary measures. Not
all who are found guilty of one or another deviation
will lose their party membership. Some will receive
reprimands, "reeducation," and another chance.' F_
We have only a thin basis from which to judge the
numbers of those to be purged from the party rolls.
Late last year a frequently reliable Hong Kong
publication quoted a leading discipline inspection
figure, who said that rectification would eliminate
some 2 million party members.
2 to 3 percent of the membership would
go, e tween-800,000 and 1 million. According to the
Chinese media, of 14,000 party members in Liaoning
Province's trial points, some 14 percent failed to
qualify after their initial review. After rectification-
including study, self-examination and criticism, and
testimonials of changed outlooks-that percentage
was reduced to 3.9.
'Reeducation in China generally involves rotation to a party-run
school for several months where the students read approved
works-in this case, the rectification syllabus including the works
of Deng, Chen Yun, and select party documents-and criticize
missals
Mechanics of Rectification
A Third Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, now
slated for December 1983, will mark the formal
opening of rectification activities. Although the party
has thus far sought to allow for slippage in starting-
the formal codification of rectification guidelines, for 25X1
example, is almost certainly a contentious process-
Hu Yaobang's mention of October and December
party plenums
indicates that the initial deadlines have been met. We
have no information on the timetable of the campaign,
other than it is to last three years and that its 25X1
conclusion will, according to Hu, coincide with the
party's 13th national congress.
We expect this campaign to unfold as similar large,
time-consuming campaigns have. At the outset, all
the major Chinese publications will run editorials,
news reports, and analytical commentary that discuss
the rectification in its various dimensions. Party
groups will be spurred to conscientious fulfillment of
the requirements levied by higher levels, typical
results at different administrative levels will be dis-
cussed, and almost certainly a particularly unrepen-
tant few will be held up publicly as negative examples.
By allowing three years for rectification work, Beijing
presumably hopes to integrate the campaign into the
normal rhythm of Chinese life and minimize the
disruptions it will cause in work units. There will
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Scenes from the Cultural Revo-
lution: although tactics such as
"dragging out" officials for
public humiliation, characteris-
tic of earlier rectification move-
ments, are banned from the
coming campaign, those who
once were dragged out have
scores they may try to settle.
Four prominent "counterrevolutionaries" are humiliated by a Red
Guard kangaroo court: (left to right) Yang Shangkun, Luo Ruiqing,
Lu Dingyi, and Peng Zhen. Placards indicate individual's surname.
Yang Shangkun, a close ally of Deng Xiaoping Lu Dingyi, China's propaganda chieftain until his
and now Secretary General of the party Military denunciation in 1966, here "rides the airplane"
Commission, forced to confess to errors, real and (zuo feiji) for his Red Guard accusers. (Photo-
almost certainly be cycles of increased or reduced
rectification work, with activity picking up, for exam-
ple, to meet deadlines in advance of major party
convocations. For each individual party member, the
end result of the rectification drive will be a judgment
on whether he or she qualifies for reregistration as a
member in good standing. We expect gala reregistra-
tion ceremonies replete with suitably solemn oaths
of rededication at appropriate intervals during the
campaign.
have participated in most of the experimental work in
the provinces, and their contributions have been wide-
ly and favorably touted. The broad use of work teams
demonstrates the determination of upper administra-
tive levels and has the advantage of awing status-
conscious local officials more readily into compliance.
They also have the damaging effect of overriding-
and consequently undercutting-the authority of local
officials.
Procedures. The rectification will be implemented
either routinely-through the local party bureauc-
racy-or through special work teams dispatched by
higher party authorities. Work teams from Beijing
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We expect those units that have completed the process
of bureaucratic reorganization-scheduled for com-
pletion at all levels next year-to take the lead in
rectification. Chinese media indicate that cadres will
be rotated into classes, where they will receive special
instruction on the texts that form the core curriculum
on the rectification syllabus: such items as the
"works" of Deng and Chen Yun, the documents of the
various plenary sessions, and the party constitution.
The campaign will probably begin simultaneously at
all levels; in our judgment, rectification of the higher
levels will not necessarily be a prerequisite for com-
mencement of activities at lower levels.
75 to 80 percent of all party members will
require "reeducation," and we believe study will
indeed be the main focus of the activities. As media
commentary suggests, at each level and in every
organization the contingent of party members will be
divided into groups that will be rotated into rectifica-
tion sessions. Most of the practical work-study, self-
criticism, criticism of one's peers-will be guided by
the grass-roots leadership in small party groups of 15
or so members.
Media commentary on the pilot rectification projects
indicates how the process is supposed to unfold within
the small groups. An April 1983 People's Daily piece
that commended the experience of a county in Anhui
stated local cadres responsible for the rectification
evaluated each party member according to the party
constitution and "six checks."' Afterward, written
self-appraisals by each party member formed the
basis for group discussion, criticism, and self-
criticism, which sought to reconcile the member's
initial evaluation with his self-appraisal. The mem-
ber's party branch then made a final appraisal to
determine whether the member qualified for recertifi-
cation or if additional remedial measures were
required.
"Check to see whether one's belief in Communism is firm,
whether one is maintaining political consistency with the Central
Committee, whether one is serving the people wholeheartedly,
whether one is taking the lead in completing the tasks handed down
from higher authorities, whether law and discipline are observed,
and whether one dares to struggle against unhealthy tendencies."
Disciplinary problems uncovered during the course of
the investigations will generally be disposed of by the
immediate party branch or the next higher level.
Severe cases-those involving possible expulsion from
the party-generally will be referred to the local
Discipline Inspection Commission at or above the
county level and may entail the weighing of criminal
charges. Moreover, Beijing is prepared to intervene
directly in particularly tough cases, as it did earlier
this year during the implementation of provincial
party and state reorganization.
Although Beijing seeks to create the impression that a
high level of impartiality will be observed with no
cases decided beforehand,
the process of labeling targets began
shortly after the 12th Party Congress. In one prov-
ince, for example, party organs were instructed to sort
members into three categories: those who should be
reregistered, those who should be encouraged not to
reregister, and those who would not be permitted to.
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Problems Ahead
Beijing's extensive preparations notwithstanding, the 25X1
planned rectification remains a task of staggering
magnitude. The Chinese Communist Party has 40
million members organized into more than 2 million
primary party organizations, each anxious to protect
his job and perquisites." Party membership is the
indispensable entree to the best China has to offer.
Loss of membership affects occupational prospects
and salary, living quarters, access to small luxuries,
educational opportunities for family members-in
short, virtually every important aspect of material life.
Party members facing rectification-and especially
those anticipating the ultimate sanction, dismissal-
can be expected to do everything within their power to
protect their "rice bowls." 25X1
' According to Article 30 of the party constitution, "Primary party
organizations are formed in factories, shops, schools, offices, city
neighborhoods, people's communes, cooperatives, farms, townships,
towns, companies of the People's Liberation Army, and other basic
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As the campaign unfolds, we believe Beijing will
encounter serious problems that will complicate im-
plementation of its guidelines and limit the effective-
ness of the rectification. We expect at least three
kinds of difficulties: local conditions that restrict
Beijing's reach, movement of the campaign in unin-
tended directions, and limits on the resources Beijing
-can expend on rectification goals
Constraints. Political factions constitute one of two
major obstacles to achieving rectification goals. Gen-
erally formed during the political warfare of the
Cultural Revolution, factions remain powerful in
some provinces-Guangxi and Fujian are two promi-
nent examples-and resist efforts to disrupt estab-
lished local patterns of political behavior.
We believe local factions will compete for control over
the rectification process and will seek to protect their
own members while directing criticism at rivals,
regardless of Beijing's guidelines. During the recent
government reorganization-another livelihood issue
inciting keen factional concern-entrenched factions
responded in typically protective fashion, attempting
to win places within the new government teams and
thereby protect their local standing.
The central leadership recognizes this danger and is
attempting to cope with it. The national press in
recent months has railed against factionalism, and
some of the more blatant factional leaders will be
prominent targets of the rectification drive. The
ongoing government reorganization at all levels has
changed the top leadership in most provinces, partly
to ensure that key leaders are in step with Beijing's
plans for party reform. As outsiders recently assigned,
however, the new leaders are at a disadvantage in
dealing with these strongly entrenched groups.
We believe that Beijing will have only limited success
in reducing the influence of local factions. We suspect
that in many cases Beijing will ultimately be forced to
resort to the time-tested practice of choosing among
local factions, co-opting the one group most in tune
with the reform program. The price will be some
watering down of campaign standards, and the time-
consuming process of forging the new local coalitions
will almost certainly delay other political initiatives-
Guanxi, or simple patron-client protectionism, is the
other great challenge to the campaign. Although
guanxi is the basic building block of factions, it more
routinely operates as the mundane exchange of per-
sonal favors on a 1-to-1 basis. Use of guanxi relations
to gain preferential treatment, whether for the pur-
chase of a special holiday food or for securing the
admission of a child to a prestigious university, is a
basic feature of both official and nonofficial Chinese
life. Local officials generally have reciprocal personal
relationships with senior cadre, and those who become
targets of the campaign will appeal to their mentors
for support.10
Official press commentary on the trial projects indi-
cates that Beijing recognizes the threat posed by
personal relationships among officials, and we believe
Beijing will have greater success here, where individ-
uals do not enjoy the thick cover of an entrenched
faction. Patrons will be hard pressed to protect client
officials who are clearly marked targets of rectifica-
tion, but they can slow the process and make things
difficult for campaign administrators.
Fear of retaliation often has a dampening effect on
enthusiasm for campaigns that call for officials to
candidly evaluate junior and senior associates by
political criteria, and, given the stakes in this one, we
believe officials may be more cautious than usual.
Cadre caution is a direct legacy of the Mao era, when
policies changed on a year-to-year basis, and those
who faithfully implemented one year's policies found
themselves accused of political crimes the next. We
believe that the experience of the Cultural Revolution
was so traumatic that rectification leaders can do
little to dispel the inherent paranoia of officials "twice
burned."
Vague guidelines or virtually any sign of political
disunity in Beijing will provide a pretext for lower
jurisdictions to slow the campaign and await direct
instructions from higher levels. Central directives are
10 The most well-known examples of personal protection during
politically dangerous times were under the aegis of the late Premier
Zhou Enlai, who, to judge from posthumous accounts, seems to
including the rectification.
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characteristically written in general terms to permit
some flexibility for dealing with local peculiarities.
We expect local cadres to seize on this customary
imprecision-as they often have in the past-to put
off hard decisions.
Zealots. While cadres attempting to slow the rectifi-
cation will be Beijing's main concern, it must also
control the overenthusiasm of those who would push
the drive beyond its intended limits. The party leader-
ship wants to prevent the rectification from interfer-
ing with priority tasks in the economy, research, and
other key areas. Previous campaigns under Mao
disrupted all aspects of Chinese life, causing enor-
mous economic losses and social tensions. Officials
will have to balance economic requirements with
conflicting political demands while maintaining work
force morale under stressful conditions.
Although the problem of excessive enthusiasm was
greater under Mao than under Deng, Beijing has
nevertheless felt compelled to repeatedly affirm the
requirement to run a "gentle and mild" rectification.
Important People's Daily commentary as well as trial
project reports prohibit rectification administrators
from working within "`leftist' conventions" estab-
lished under Mao. These involved such practices as
long and violent "struggle" sessions, physically abu-
sive public pillorying of errant individuals, and pun-
ishing entire families for the errors of a single
member
There is little doubt, however, that some officials have
private agendas and will attempt to use the rectifica-
tion to settle old political scores. This will raise the
stakes and the temperature of the campaign in some
areas and introduce more desperate methods on the
part of both accused and accusers. We do not expect,
however, the rioting and upheaval associated with the
Cultural Revolution, in part because the central lead-
ership is more unified now and there is no authorita-
tive voice-such as Mao's-willing to sanction such
behavior
Central Overload. The addition of rectification, with
its attendant problems and demands, to the already-
crowded agenda for 1983 may greatly increase the
workload for hard-pressed central organizations,
themselves under mandate to streamline. Because of
local resistance, we believe Beijing will be forced to
rely heavily on central work teams to accomplish its
goals. As happened when provincial governments and
party committees were reorganized earlier this year,
Beijing may not allow local officials to make major
decisions in any case. Central administrators may
insist that most difficult cases be referred to Beijing
for review and final disposition. Appeals from lower
levels will also clutter the process. Under these cir-
cumstances, rectification will be a serious drain on
central resources and energy, and Beijing's efforts to
control each aspect seems to us certain to decrease
efficiency and slow the process.
Prospects
Personnel. The problems Beijing will encounter en-
sure that the rectification will not be as thorough as
Deng might hope, but, in our judgment, Beijing will
succeed in removing the most blatant opponents of
Deng's program and in upgrading party ranks some-
what by removing some of the more corrupt and
incompetent cadres. Deng and his allies will thus
accomplish what they regard as the most important
goal of the campaign, the purge of the party's least
trustworthy members. We also believe the structures
and guidelines established by Beijing are sufficiently
strong to prevent the campaign from sparking social
disorder.
These personnel successes will assist Hu Yaobang in
imposing his own stamp on the party and will improve
his odds for inheriting Deng's place as first among
equals within the Chinese leadership. We believe
Deng and his allies will also make strides toward
cementing a new ideological orthodoxy based on ideas
of Deng and other party elders.
Ideological unity beneath a new standard may be
superficial, however. Party pronouncements on ideo-
logical issues indicate that Mao's egalitarian vision
still appeals to many Chinese and that the ideas of
Deng and his reformist associates remain controver-
sial. We believe the rectification is more likely to
silence ideological critics than eradicate them
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The Party's Standing. We do not believe that the
rectification alone will produce a substantial improve-
ment in the public image of the party. The party can
justifiably claim-without having had a rectifica-
tion-that life is now more agreeable for the vast
majority of Chinese than it was under Mao Zedong.
Yet, except for the more settled political climate in
China-which admittedly is a basic background con-
dition for all undertakings-Beijing has difficulty
convincing its populace of the party's indispensable
role in recent Chinese successes. Many of these
achievements-in agriculture, foreign trade, and edu-
cation, for example-are in areas where the party has
generally withdrawn its hand or has merely reversed
bankrupt and irrational policies it once endorsed. It is
difficult, for example, for the party to take credit for
the successive years of relatively good weather or for
the native industry of the average Chinese peasant-
key factors in recent economic growth.
These favorable developments, moreover, do little to
shake the basic impression of the party that, in our
judgment, is widely held among the populace. Articles
in the Chinese media and conversations with the
Chinese themselves indicate that many-and perhaps
most-Chinese tend to see the party as a benevolent
association interested only in preserving the privileges
and perquisites of its members and their friends. We
believe problems such as abuse of privilege, individual
corruption, and imperious leadership are seen by
many influential Chinese-and especially intellectu-
als and students-as ingrained and endemic to the
system.
By reducing some of the more egregious occurrences
of cadre malfeasance, bringing in some new blood and
fresh ideas, and obtaining a degree of ideological
consistency, the party may be able to convince the
Chinese of its determination to make a new start.
However, we judge a return to the pervasive sense of
trust and sacrifice that characterized the Chinese
mentality in the early 1950s is virtually impossible in
these more cynical times.
yond the reach of the campaign.
effectively through guanxi. Although "democratic
centralism" and collegial rule are fashionable terms in
the official media, the rectification will do little to
circumscribe the vast authority and influence of indi-
vidual party leaders. Abuse of power, imperiousness,
and the continued indispensability to the system of a
single authoritative leader-Deng, for now-are be-
A Declining Concern? The shortcomings of the cam-
paign are not serious failings, in our judgment, and do
not pose grave problems for the regime, at least in the
short run. Some party elders, most notably Chen Yun,
have warned repeatedly that unless the party is
cleansed a "Polish situation" could eventually develop
in China. There is always a strong element of hyper-
bole in such pronouncements, and, in our opinion, the
level of popular disenchantment is not nearly that
serious. Traditional cultural constraints, the generally
passive tenor of popular disenchantment with the
party, and the efficiency of the Chinese security
system together argue against the Polish scenario. An
inability to refurbish the party's image and to create a
more energetic and selfless cadre may slow the mod-
ernization effort but, in our view, will not derail it.
The party's concern about its image and revolutionary
heritage may be a declining one, for the regime is in a
period of transition. The days of the old revolu-
tionaries-Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and their
kind-who earlier were driven by their ideals to join
the revolution and who recall and seek a return to
"the Yanan spirit" are fast fading. They will eventu-
ally be replaced by the products of the system they
helped create, men and women born since 1949 who,
if current trends proceed unhindered, will be more in
the current Soviet and East European mold, gradu-
ates of the polytechnical institutes, and more con-
cerned with securing the perks of the present society
than advancing the revolution. These are the people to
whom the party is now most favorably disposed. To
the degree the rectification removes the leftists and
consolidates the influence of Hu, the campaign will
enhance their numbers and advance this transition.
Workstyle. We also expect the rectification to leave
the basic style of Chinese politics unchanged. Despite
reforms that ostensibly enlarge the authority of orga-
nizations, men remain more important than institu-
tions, and things will continue to get done more
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Appendix A
Leadership Comments on China's
Party Problem
"The decade of domestic turmoil (1966-76: the Cul-
tural Revolution) confounded the criteria of right and
wrong, good and evil, beauty and ugliness. It is much
more difficult to undo its grave spiritual consequences
than its material ones. For this and other reasons,
many serious problems concerning standards of social
conduct now exist in our country. The Central Com-
mittee of the party is determined to effect a funda-
mental turn for the better in standards of social
conduct in the next five years....
"The view that Communism is but a `dim illusion' and
that it `has not been tested in practice' is utterly
wrong. There is Communism everywhere in our daily
life, of which it forms an inseparable part....
"All the splendid successes of the party and the people
have been achieved precisely through the inspiring
example given by such a fine core of members of the
party. This is the principal aspect of our party, and
whoever fails to see it, or deliberately denies it, is
committing a grave error....
"(If we believe otherwise) we will not be able to
safeguard the socialist orientation of China's modern-
ization, and our socialist society will lose its ideals and
objectives, its spiritual motivation and fighting will,
lose the ability to resist the inroads of corrupt influ-
ences and even develop distortedly and degenerate.
Comrades, this is not just alarmist talk but a conclu-
sion drawn from present realities at home and
abroad."
Hu Yaobang
September 1982
"The workstyle of a ruling party is a matter of life
and death for the party."
Chen Yun
November 1979
strict demands for themselves and do not observe
party discipline and state law, if they violate the
party's principles, practice factionalism, seek special
privileges, secure advantages through pull or influ-
ence, indulge in extravagance and waste, feather their
nests at public expense, do not share weal and woe
with the masses, do not strive to be the first to bear
hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, do not follow
the decisions of the organization, do not accept super-
vision from the masses and even resort to retaliation
against those who criticize them, how can we expect
them to remold the general mood of society?"
Deng Xiaoping
March 1979
"Our party actually needs rectification at present.
This matter was put forth seven years ago and it has
not yet been settled. Quite a number of the 38 million
party members are not up to the mark."
Deng Xiaoping
February 1980
"The pressing issue before us is to restore the party's
fighting capabilities. The party should be a combat
force, the vanguard of the proletariat.... At present,
some of our party members are not qualified. Some of
the new members who joined our ranks when the
ultraleftist line held sway have never received any
party education. They cannot set an example for the
masses and are therefore not qualified. Some of our
old party members have measured up to the require-
ments for a long time. However, they cannot set an
example for the masses now and are therefore not so
qualified. We advocate the party spirit and oppose
factionalism. Some people desperately cling to their
faction. There are many people whose factional spirit
is higher than their party spirit, and among them are
some of our old party members."
Deng Xiaoping
January 1980
"In order to improve the general mood of society, it is
necessary first of all to improve the party's work-
style.... If the party shelves the opinions and inter-
ests of the masses and remains indifferent, how can it
expect the masses to have faith in and cherish its
leadership. If the party's leading cadres do not set
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Appendix B
Documents
Extracts from Guiding Principles for Inner-Party
Political Life (adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session of
the 11th Central Committee, February 1980):
After nationwide liberation (in October 1949) the
masses of party members in the main upheld the
party's fine traditions and workstyle.... However,
because some comrades became arrogant and compla-
cent as a result of the victory of the revolutionary
struggle and the position gained by the party as the
ruling party for the entire country, because of the
imperfect system of democratic centralism in the
party and state and because of the influence of the
ideology of the feudal and capitalist classes, such
unhealthy tendencies as being divorced from reality
and the masses, subjectivism, bureaucracy, making
arbitrary decisions, taking peremptory actions and
seeking privileges had developed. At the same time,
there were some shortcomings and mistakes in guid-
ing the inner-party struggle (between "correct" and
"incorrect" viewpoints), and normal inner-party polit-
ical life was impaired to a certain extent ...
(especially) during the Great Cultural Revolution....
In order to achieve the all-round revival and further
development of the party's fine traditions and work-
style, strengthen the party's democratic life, safe-
guard the party as a centralized and unified one,
strengthen party unity, consolidate party organization
and discipline, and enhance the party's fighting ca-
pacity, the Central Committee, in view of the present
condition of the party, hereby reiterates the following
guidelines for inner-party political life to the whole
party:
1. Adhere to the party's political and ideological
line.... (This is) the most fundamental guiding
principle.... In order to adhere to the correct politi-
cal and ideological lines, it is necessary to oppose
erroneous ideological tendencies. First, it is necessary
to oppose ossification of the mind and proceeding by
the book in everything we do (references to Mao)....
Second, it is essential to oppose and repudiate the
erroneous view and revisionist ideological trend of
negating the socialist road, the dictatorship of
the proletariat, party leadership, and Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (the "Four Funda-
mental Principles")....
2. Uphold collective leadership and oppose arbitrary
decisionmaking by a single person.... In deciding
matters within a party committee, it is essential to act
in strict accordance with the principle that the minor-
ity is subordinate to the majority.... The secretary or
the first secretary ... is not allowed to practice "what
I say goes" or a patriarchal system....
3. Safeguard the party's unity and centralized leader-
ship and strictly abide by party discipline.... It is
necessary to solemnly reiterate that "the individual is
subordinate to the organization, the minority to the
majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the
entire party to the Central Committee." ... Differing
views ... may be discussed within the party on proper
occasions. As for when and in what manner they
should be discussed in the press, this should be
decided by the party Central Committee (or, more
accurately, the Politburo or Secretariat).... But
under no circumstances must anyone be allowed to
express in the press or on the radio any views contrary
to the Central Committee's decisions, nor must any-
one be allowed to spread among the masses any views
contrary to the party's line, principles, policies, and
decisions....
4. Uphold party spirit and root out factionalism....
Organizing secret groups within the party is the crime
of splitting and subverting the party.... Although
there are now no overt factions within the party, some
cadres and party members ... still harbor factional-
ism and are even still carrying out factional
activities.... The "specter" of factionalism is still
there, and factionalists often resist implementation of
the party's principles and policies and higher level
decisions.... A Communist must play an exemplary
role among the masses, be the first to bear hardships
and the last to enjoy comforts....
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5. Speak the truth and match words with deeds.... A
Communist must be faithful and candid and never
hide his own mistakes and his own thinking and views
from the party organization....
6. Promote inner party democracy and take a correct
attitude toward dissenting views.... Say all you
know and say it without reserve. Those who made
wrong remarks or wrote erroneous articles owing to
their wrong understanding should not be regarded as
having violated party discipline, and disciplinary ac-
tions should not be taken against them as long as they
do not oppose the party's basic political stand, intrigue
and conspire, carry out factionalist and splittist activi-
ties among the masses, spread fallacies that run
counter to the party line, or betray the secrets of the
party and the state. It is necessary to strictly uphold
the principle of "three nots"-not seizing on others'
faults, not putting labels on people, and not using the
big stick (practices that characterized the Mao
era).... To oppose the opinion of a certain comrade is
not the same as opposing the comrade himself....
7. Protect the rights of party members against any
encroachment.... Party members have the right ...
at party meetings to criticize any party organization
or any individual.... Party organizations should wel-
come criticism and suggestions from the masses of
party members.... Party members have the right to
present-at party meetings or to higher organizations
up to the Central Committee-their statements, ap-
peals, accusations, and defense regarding the party
organizations' manner of handling them or other
persons.... Retaliation against the appealing party
and the accusers is not allowed....
8. Elections should fully embody the electors'
wishes.... The number of candidates shall be greater
than the number of delegates to be elected.... All
elections shall be held by secret ballot....
9. Struggle against erroneous tendencies, bad people,
and bad actions.... If Communist Party members
assume a liberal attitude of being worldly and playing
safe toward erroneous tendencies, bad people, and bad
actions and avoid them instead of stopping, contest-
ing, or denouncing them, then they have shirked their
fighting responsibility and have demonstrated a lack
of party spirit....
10. Treat correctly comrades who have made
mistakes.... In carrying out inner-party struggle our
party's fine tradition is to follow the principle of
"learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and
curing the sickness to save the patient." . . . As for
those comrades who have erred, we must historically
and comprehensively evaluate their contributions,
mistakes, rights and wrongs, and must not totally
repudiate their contributions just because of a mis-
take; nor should we continue to quibble over old
problems and mistakes that have already been investi-
gated and corrected.... It is impermissible to engage
in ruthless struggle or to deal merciless blows.... The
so-called drag out and struggle against is strictly
forbidden, as is physical humiliation and persecution
and inducing and coercing a person to make a confes-
sion....
11. Accept supervision by the party and the masses-
no one is allowed to seek privileges.... Leading
cadres at all levels are public servants.... Although it
is necessary to provide leaders with certain rational
conveniences and ensure their security according to
the necessity of work, violating the system to seek
special privileges is by no means permissible....
Everyone stands equal. before party discipline and
state laws.... Leading personnel are prohibited ...
from using their position and power to seek preference
for their family or relatives in such matters as enroll-
ment in schools, transferring from one school to
another, promotions, employment, and going
abroad....
12. Study hard and strive to be both Red and
Expert.... "Red" means possession of a firm, correct
political orientation and the upholding of the four
fundamental principles. "Expert" means to learn and
master a professional understanding of modernization
and to become a professional and good at one's work.
To become Expert does not necessarily mean one has
become Red, but to become Red one must be
Expert.... To be content with exercising vague lead-
ership in general terms, to be satisfied with being
laymen indefinitely, to be ignorant and incompetent,
to act in contradiction to objective laws or to give
arbitrary and impracticable direction will undoubted-
ly seriously harm modernization. Persons who act like
this should be removed from leading posts if they
cannot correct themselves through criticism and
education.
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Secret
Extracts from The Constitution of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (adopted by the 12th National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party, September 1982):
Duties of Party Members
Article 3. Party members must fulfill the following
duties:
(1) To conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism and
Mao Zedong Thought, essential knowledge concern-
ing the party, and the party's line, principles, policies,
and decisions; and acquire general, scientific, and
professional knowledge.
(2) To adhere to the principle that the interests of the
party and the people stand above everything, subordi-
nate their personal interests to the interests of the
party and the people, be the first to bear hardships
and the last to enjoy comforts, work selflessly for the
public interest, and absolutely never use public office
for personal gain or benefit themselves at the expense
of the public.
(3) To execute the party's decisions perseveringly,
accept any job and fulfill actively any task assigned
them by the party, conscientiously observe party
discipline and the laws of the state, rigorously guard
party and state secrets and staunchly defend the
interests of the party and the state.
(4) To uphold the party's solidarity and unity, to
firmly oppose factionalism and all factional organiza-
tions and small-group activities, and to oppose double-
dealing and scheming of any kind.
(5) To be loyal and honest with the party, to match
words with deeds and not to conceal their political
views or distort facts; to earnestly practice criticism
and self-criticism, to be bold in exposing and correct-
ing shortcomings and mistakes in work, backing good
people and good deeds and fighting against bad people
and bad deeds.
(6) To maintain close ties with the masses, propagate
the party's views among them, consult with them
when problems arise, listen to their views and de-
mands with an open mind and keep the party in-
formed of these in good time, help them raise their
political consciousness, and defend their legitimate
rights and interests.
(7) To play an exemplary vanguard role in production
and other work, study and social activities, take the
lead in maintaining public order, promote new social-
ist ways and customs, and advocate Communist
ethics.
(8) As required by the defense of the motherland and
the interests of the people, to step forward and fight
bravely in times of difficulty and danger, fearing
neither hardship nor death....
Duties of Party Cadres
Article 35. Leading party cadres at all levels must
perform in an exemplary way their duties as party
members prescribed in Article 3 of this Constitution
and must meet the following basic requirements:
(1) Have a fair grasp of the theories of Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the policies
based on them, and be able to adhere to the socialist
road, fight against the hostile forces disrupting social-
ism, and combat all erroneous tendencies inside and
outside the party.
(2) In their work as leaders, conduct earnest investiga-
tions and study, persistently proceed from reality, and
properly carry out the line, principles, and policies of
the party.
(3) Be fervently dedicated to the revolutionary cause
and imbued with a strong sense of political responsi-
bility, and be qualified for their leading posts in
organizational ability, general education, and voca-
tional knowledge.
(4) Have a democratic workstyle, maintain close ties
with the masses, correctly implement the party's mass
line, conscientiously accept criticism and super-
vision by the party and the masses, and combat
bureaucratism.
(5) Exercise their functions and powers in the proper
way, observe and uphold the rules and regulations of
the party and the state, and combat all acts of abusing
power and seeking personal gain.
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(6) Be good at uniting and working with a large
number of comrades, including those who hold differ-
ing opinions, while upholding the party's
principles....
Party Discipline
Article 38. A Communist Party member must consci-
entiously act within the bounds of party discipline.
Party organizations shall criticize, educate, or take
disciplinary measures against members who violate
party discipline....
Party members who violate the law and administra-
tive discipline shall be subject to administrative disci-
plinary action or legal action instituted by administra-
tive or judicial organs. Those who have seriously
violated criminal law shall be expelled from the party.
Article 39. There are five measures of party disci-
pline: warning, serious warning, removal from party
posts and proposals for removal from nonparty posts
to the organizations concerned, placing on probation
within the party, and expulsion from the party....
Disciplinary Procedures
Article 40. Any disciplinary measure against a party
member must be discussed and decided on at a
general membership meeting of the party branch
concerned, and reported to the primary party commit-
tee concerned for approval. If the case is relatively
important or complicated, or involves the expulsion of
a member, it shall be reported, on the merit of that
case, to a party commission for discipline inspection at
or above the county level for examination and approv-
al. Under special circumstances, a party committee or
a commission for discipline inspection at or above the
county level has the authority to decide directly on
disciplinary measures against a party member.
Any decision to remove a member or alternate mem-
ber of the Central Committee or a local committee at
any level from posts within the party, to place such a
person on probation within the party or to expel him
from the party must be taken by a two-thirds majority
vote at a plenary meeting of the party committee to
which he belongs. Such a disciplinary measure against
a member or alternate member of a local party
committee is subject to approval by the higher party
committees.
Members and alternate members of the Central Com-
mittee who have seriously violated criminal law shall
be expelled from the party on decision by the Political
Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee; mem-
bers and alternate members of local party committees
who have seriously violated criminal law shall be
expelled from the party on decisions by the standing
committees of the party committees at the corre-
sponding levels.
Article 41. When a party organization decides on a
disciplinary measure against a party member, it
should investigate and verify the facts in an objective
way. The party member in question must be informed
of the decision to be made and of the facts on which it
is based. He must be given a chance to account for
himself and speak in his own defense. If the member
does not accept the decision, he can appeal, and the
party organization concerned must promptly deal
with or forward his appeal, and must not withhold or
suppress it. Those who cling to erroneous views and
unjustifiable demands shall be educated by
criticism....
Discipline Inspection Organization
Article 43. The party Central Commission for Disci-
pline Inspection functions under the leadership of the
Central Committee of the party. Local commissions
for discipline inspection at all levels function under
the dual leadership of the party committees at the
corresponding levels and the next higher commissions
for discipline inspection.
... The question of whether a primary party commit-
tee should set up a commission for discipline inspec-
tion or simply appoint a discipline inspection commis-
sioner shall be determined by the next higher party
organization in the light of specific circumstances....
The party's Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection shall, when its work so requires, accredit
discipline inspection groups or commissioners to party
or state organs at the central level....
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Secret
Article 44. The main tasks of the central and local
commissions for discipline inspection are as follows: to
uphold the Constitution and the other important rules
and regulations of the party, to assist the respective
party committees in rectifying party style, and to
check up on the implementation of the line, principles,
policies, and decisions of the party.
The central and local commissions for discipline
inspection shall carry out constant education among
party members on their duty to observe party disci-
pline; they shall adopt decisions for the upholding of
party discipline, examine and deal with relatively
important or complicated cases of violation of the
Constitution and discipline of the party or laws and
decrees of the state by party organizations or party
members; decide on or cancel disciplinary measures
against party member involved in such cases; and deal
with complaints and appeals made by party members.
The central and local commissions for discipline
inspection should report to the party committees at
the corresponding levels on the results of their han-
dling of cases of special importance or complexity, as
well as on the problems encountered. Local commis-
sions for discipline inspection should also present such
reports to the higher commissions.
If the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
discovers any violation of party discipline by a mem-
ber of the Central Committee, it may report such an
offense to the Central Committee, and the Central
Committee must deal with the case promptly.
Article 45. Higher commissions for discipline inspec-
tion have the power to check up on the work of the
lower commissions and to approve or modify their
decisions on any case. If decisions so modified have
already been ratified by the party committees at the
corresponding level, the modification must be ap-
proved by the next higher party committee.
If a local commission for discipline inspection does not
agree with a decision made by the party committee at
the corresponding level in dealing with a case, it may
request the commission at the next higher level to
reexamine the case; if a local commission discovers
cases of violation of party discipline or the laws and
decrees of the state by the party committee at the
corresponding level or by its members, and if that
party committee fails to deal with them properly or at
all, the local commission has the right to appeal to the
higher commissions for assistance in dealing with
such cases.
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Secret
Secret
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