STATEMENT OF WILLIAM CASEY, DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
13
14
15
16
17
18
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM CASEY, DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to give you my.
views on the Senate Resolution to support the establishment of
a National Historical Intelligence Museum. I am truly moved
by'this resolution's recognition of those Americans who have
worked and sacrificed, from the first days of our Republic, to
give our government the intelligence it has needed to prevail
in war and to-remain secure in peace.
CIA is a young organization, going back to only 1947, and
its World War II progenitor, OSS, goes back only another six
years--to 1941.- But American intelligence did not begin with
OSS or CIA. As the resolution notes, General George Washington
organized and relied upon a variety of intelligence activities
in-leading the 13 American colonies in the long war for indepen-
dence, whose happy ending 200 years ago we celebrate this year.
I have done some research and writing on the American
Revolution, and I claim that my first predecessor as Director
.of Central Intelligence was not Admiral Sidney Sours who was
appointed Director of Central Intelligence by President Truman,
but George Washington, who-appointed himself. How did
Washington's ragtag army, some 6000 or 8000 men for most of the
war defeat what was then the most powerful nation in the world.
Second only to Washington's qualities as a leader in this
SWI FM 23 IlApproved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
achievement were his natural aptitude as a director and
practitioner of intelligence and special operations and with
General Greene and his lieutenants in the South, as a master
of what we know today of guerrilla warfare.
The earliest predecessor of your Committee, Mr. Chairman,
was the Secret Committee created by the Continental Congress
for the covert procurement of arms in September of 1775, and
the Committee on Secret' Correspondence created two months later
for the purpose of corresponding with our firends in Great
Britain, in Ireland, and other parts of the world, notably our
adversaries as well as our firends in Europe.
But to these Committees, the Continental Congress appointed
its strongest members, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, Silas
Dean, John Day, Benjamin Harrison, Richard Henry Lee,. John
Dickerson, and under the authority of these Committees, Benjamin
Franklin and Silas Dean carried out the first American special
operations in arranging the clandestine acquisition and
financing in Europe and shipment to America of the weapons
needed to sustain the American Revolution. And to meet his
needs, his military needs as Commander in Chief over here,
Washington gradually developed a working intelligence network
and became his own intelligence chief.
The intelligence process consists. of three broad steps.
The identification and collection of information. The evaluatio
and analysis of that information, drawing inference and
SWI FORM 23 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
conclusions relating to necessary decisions. And thirdly the
dissimination to convey facts and.conclusions to the commanders
and.the policy makers needing them.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Washington himself
performed all of these functions. In his letters time and again
he specifies the plea for the kind of information he needs to
estimate the enemies plans and intentions. Most of the analysis
and interpretation of the facts collected for him took place
in his own mind, and his massive correspondence was a major
means of conveying relevant information to his commanders and
the Congress.
The special operations, intelligence activities and the
resulting deception which enabled Washington to keep his tiny
force alive and ultimately defeat the trained British army at
Yorktown were critical to winning our independence. And this
has continued down to this day, notably during World War II and
the reading of German messages, the deception which kept 15
German divisions away from the beachhead at Normandy, and the
development, and support of French resistance forces which
protected the flank of the Third and the Seventh American
Armies as they liberated France.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I take you briefly through this history
of intelligence related to our military and political challenge
because I believe it important to our national spirit that all
of this be remembered by our people. It is important to the
ssa FORM 23 11 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
future of the American intelligence community that the interest
and the understanding of young people be engaged at an early
age, and the challenge and the opportunity which these activitie
offered in the past as well as in the future. It is important
that the American public'recognize and understand the importance
of intelligence, and for this the public needs information and,
education about the role of intelligence in our nation's history
And as this resolution suggests, one highly important way'
of educating and informing the public would be to establish a
national museum where intelligence objects of historical interes
could be collected, preserved and exhibited to the public. And
I am grateful that all of you on this Committee have joined
your Chairman in sponsoring this resolution to establish a
museum that will commemorate the contribution of thousands of
men and women of American intelligence since 1775.
In inviting me to testify today, Mr. Chairman, you and
your. Vice Chairman asked my thoughts not only on the importance
of having such a museum, which I have just shared with you,
but also what might be included in it and how I think that such
a project might be carried, forward. Since the question of what
such a museum should contain depends to a considerable degree
on how it is set up, let me first comment on the kind of
institution that I believe is envisioned, and which I think
would be appropriate.
At the outset I would say that I am glad the movement to
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
establish a National Historical Intelligence Museum is a private
initiative. I think its advocates are right in wanting to creat
a public but not a governmental museum. I agree with those that
hold that it would probably not be appropriate for CIA, the
intelligence community as a whole, or the Federal government to
fund or administer such a museum. Such a museum should be
entirely free of the constraints of national security classifi-
cation. That is, all of its holdings should be. freely accessibl
to the public. It should also be independent in managing its
affairs, especially in deciding what and which to exhibit. For
these reasons, it should nto be an appendage or adjunct to CIA
or other organizations in the intelligence community, but
entirely-independent of-them.
Indeed, for such a museum to depend upon intelligence
agencies for funds, exhibits and direction, might encourage the
public to believe it was merely a government public relations
support. Having said all this, I can immediately add that CIA,
and I am sure other components of the intelligence community
as well, will be glad to support and cooperate with a National
Historical Intelligence Museum in every legitimate way that we
independent institution, albeit possibly.some degree of governme*
operation. Thus, I find myself in sympathy with the proponents
of this museum who believe that the'general public interest,
the functional requirements of intelligence work, and the
benefits of freedom from official constraints all argue for an
SSCI FORM 23 11 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
11
This brings me to the question of what should be included
in such a museum. Here Iwould focus primarily on what might
be expected to come from CIA and the intelligence community.
And I must say frankly that what CIA can contribute here will
almost certainly be quite limited. This is first because we
do-not have many objects or artifacts that could be exhibited
8
in a museum:' We mainly produce paper, and the release to the
9
public of some of our records is, I think, a separate issue
10
which is dealt with regularly'in other forums, arenas.
11
Beyond this, our need to protect our sources and menthods
12
means we must keep much of our material secret for very
13-
considerable lengths of time, sometimes long after the actual
14
substance of a report may be general knowledge. Within these
15
constraints, however, there are some things that we could offer
16
to such a museum. We have, for example, been able to release
17
U-2 photography to the John F. Kennedy Library for its documenta
18-
tion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We have.also given the
19
Smithsonian Institution related U-2 materials for exhibits there
20
We have shared with the public the results of applying advanced
21
photo interpretation techniques to World War II aerial photograp
h3
22
by releasing detailed analysis of Nazi death camps, and evidence
23
of the Soviet massacre at Katyn. While I am confident we can
24
continue to release this kind of intelligence material from time
25
to time, I would not want to mislead anyone into expecting us to
SSCI cRM 23 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
12
18
19
20
be a major source of exhibits with this projected Historical
Intelligence Museum.
Indeed, it seems to me that whil artifacts and intelligence
and other historical documents would be an essential component
of an intelligence museum, most oE_.the.presentation and most
context how intelligence contributed to desirable military and
political results. This.can be done largely with exhibits using
historical material and material available in the public record,
the product of scholars engaged in historical analysis.
I have in mind how Washington succeeded in getting the
British commander in New York to bring back forces from Virginia
to New York City by feinting an attack on New York as he and
General Rochambeau marched their forces through Westchester
of the interest would be created by exhibits showing in historic*
County and down through Jersey and down into Virginia. This
kind of a story can be told with legends on maps, accompanied
by actual messages and orders which are available from the
historical record.
The same kind of thing can be done with the deception which
kept 15 German divisions 100 miles north of Normandy. If they
could have been put into Normany they could have pushed our
forces back into the Channel. Also this applies to French
resistance to develop protection for General Patton's flank as
he raced up the route -- General Patch's flank as he raced up
the route of Napoleon from Mediterranean to Grenoble, and
SIG FORM 23 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
13
8
9
10
11
General Patton's flank as he raced from Brittany to Lorraine.
All this kind of thing can be-done with maps and reports and
messages supporting the maps which are publicly available.
I have seen this in actual practice, visiting intelligence
resistence museums which have been established and are
functioning at Oslo in Norway, in Copenhagen in Denmark and
in'Paris in France. I was'told in Norway just last week that
the resistance museum there still receives more visits than any
other tourist attraction in Norway, including the major Viking
ships and the Kon Tiki raft, which are the subject of dramatic
exhibits in Norway. But the resistance museum outdraws them.
Senator Hecht, in conclusion, I am grateful for the
opportunity to testify before you today and for the support all
of you have shown by joining our Chairman in sponsoring this
important resolution.
Senator Hecht (presiding). Thank you, very much, Mr.
Casey. And I want to say that our Chairman had to leave to
make sure there was an authorization bill passed for the
Intelligence Community.
Mr. Casey. -I'll happily excuse him for that.
Senator Hecht. Our next witness is Walter Pforzheimer.
Mr. Pforzheimer is an intelligence expert'and noted
collector of rare books, including those on intelligence. A
lawyer and Yale graduate, Mr. Pforzheimer has been in the
intelligence business since-December the 8th, 1942. He was the
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9
14
first legislative counsel for the CIA. From 1956 to 1974 he
served as curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection.
I understand he has brought items from his own collection, and
when you testify maybe you will want to speak about these
different items.
Mr. Pforzheimer.
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP85B00263R000300030018-9