JIIRG REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100110006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 16, 1966
• Content Type: MF

Approved ' 99/09/25-:.-CIA-RDP G00105R000100110006-6
16 August 1966
25X1A9a
I ANDLW FOR:
BUBJBC" T : dl I RG Report
1. I have read through the papers that you left me
25X1Aga and feel that some points are made in thee. I
believe that memorandum speaks particularly
well to the matter scussed with you concerning the
desirability of a single manager. This memorandum will
give you some tentative comments concerning the memos
and the BURG report.
2. It does not appear to me that - has com- 25X1A9a
pletely made his case in his memorandum of 10 August.
One argument against his position can be that CO1 R has
become so involved in exploitation because there has been
no committee like COWSX. by this argument, COMEX would
only be taking over from CORM those functions more prop-
erly in the exploitation field, thus achieving a more
effective division of labor.
3. 1 commend for your attention paragraph 2 of
dim Brawll'a memorandum. A never ending problem has
been how to bring the intelligence analyst together with
the collector and the photo-interpreter. The JIIRG
report is no more successful in dealing with this than
most reports of this nature written by persons not in-
volved in intelligence production. Somewhere along the
line, explicit provision should be made on whatever
committee is established for representation from the
intelligence producing components of CIA and DIA. Para-
graph 4 of Brammell's memorandum is on the side of the
angels but can be disregarded so far as the present
exercise is concerned.
TCS 7237-66
icy # of
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85GO0105R000100110006-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100110006-6
4. There are several aspects of the JIIRG report
which suggest that it may have been conceived as a
vehicle to present certain first steps leading ultimately
to more sophisticated solutions. If this was in fact
one intent of the report, then the establishment of COMEX
and the choice of Option 2 could be construed as stages
leading toward some further solution. If that is so,
then from a political point of view it may be desirable
to buy the recommendations of the JIIRG report even
though they seem less than completely satisfactory to
me.
5. My most serious problem with the JIIRG report
lies in the degree to which it seems to represent
half-way solutions. I believe that the problem for
the community posed by the need for effective mission
preparation and efficient exploitation of US recon-
naissance resources is too big for committee management.
Tidwell to the contrary notwithstanding, the question
is not whether COMOR and EPIC working together can do
the job. I think it is demonstrated that they can not.
By the same token I do not believe that CQNZX working
with CO OR can do the job either. Sooner or later the
intelligence community is going to turn to a single
manager for all non-substantive aspects of the recon-
naissance problem. This manager would be responsible to
the Director, would report to USIB, and would have
authority to make decisions in the areas of targeting
and exploitation now covered by COMOR and the projected
COMEX.
6. I endorse the plan you mentioned to cost the
options discussed in the JIIRG report. I would be
interested to know whether over a 20-year period Option l
would be any more costly than Option 2. If it cost no
more, or if it cost only a little bit more, then I
believe that Option I should receive serious consideration.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100110006-6
 Approved Foc Release 199~~/DP85G00,105R000100110006-6
an le is iAL i"Ai- : QLE Channeis
Sooner or later the intelligence community is going
to centralime all basic support exploitation in the
national center created to serve the national intell-
igence authorities. Option 2 is clearly the easy way
out of the present problem. There is nothing in the
JIIRG report, however, to suggest that Option 2 is the
best approach over the long run. The creation of
central data bases in NPIC tells me that the authors
of the JIIRG recognise the desirability of centralizing
the results of basic support exploitation but cannot
bring themselves to support the Option that would
have that result.
7. Another feature of the JIIRG report that needs
further examination is the question of the manpower
implications of the various Options in terms of support
personnel. It appears to se that the report, as now
cast, takes the easy way out in limiting its focus to
photo-interpreters. From the standpoint of long-run
budgetary implications, the PI's are only part of the
costs, and the smaller part at that.
25X1A9a
Handle Via T
-46 I
a-Wo ~b
-
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85GO0105R000100110006-6