INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7
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RIPPUB
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T
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7
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December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 30, 1998
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30
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MF
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Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 TS No. 196650 MEMOPJ NDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT . Inspector General's Report on Foreign Intelligence Collection Rc(i- ir(,rr)cnts REFERENCE DDCI Memorandum, above Subject., dated 18 January 1967 1. In response to your request the subject report has been reviewed in detail by me and by all offices of this Directorate. The following comments respond to those conclusions and recom- mendations pertaining to the scientific and technological areas of interest. 2. This Directorate fully appreciates the depth of the problem involved and the need for a concerted effort toward solu- tion. In part, our views coincide with those in the report. In certain areas, however, this Directorate feels that the corrective procedures recommended will not result in the practical achieve- ment desired. We trust that our suggested modifications in the recommendations will prove to be constructive and complement the spirit of the report. Chapter 2 - The Problem of Priorities Recommendation #1 Concur. Recommendation #2 Concur. .. r r n 7 "7 ~Exc;aCc.utr?y.,~~aUc3 r~ aru r'cizs.iuc??an U Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R0001001.30030-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 TS No. 196650 Chapter 3 - Rccuiremerts for Collection b Human Sources Recommendation 1113 While we agree with the need to revamp the CPC process, We arc, nevcrtnelcss, concerned with the tone of rccon 111cndatlOn 3c. This reads, in part, as 'follows: "... all other normal oper- ations of the Clandestine Services' requirements system, except the development of requirements tailored to known reporting sources, until this is accomplished. " We believe that the type of review suggested here would be time-consuming, and we are herefore concerned about any approach which keeps an already bad situation static. It would seem that to accept a situation, even for a brief period, wherein requirements are tailored to known reporting sources is a step backward. We believe that improvement of the Clandestine Services collection effort requires concentration on requirements not being covered by existing reporting sources. Further, we feel that such a shift of emphasis is of immediate concern. With regard to manpower requirements for the IPC Secretariat, we believe that a careful examination of the appli- cation of automatic data processing to this problem area should be included with the study of such manpower needs. Recommendation #4 Concur. Recommendation ~r`5 While agreeing fully with the necessity for controlling requirements levied on any collection resource, it appears that this recommendation tends to treat the Clandestine Services too reverently. We believe the basic language of DCID 5/5 can be challenged. Why should the Plans Directorate collect certain information only when no other collection method could be used? I,'lith the tremendous cost and the processing problems associated with photographic collection and other technical means it appears that there are times when clandestine collection should be tried simply because it is easier, cheaper, and possibly quicker and more accurate. 1 VY~ fJuS./l.W { Approved For Release 2002/06/18: CIA-RDP85GO0105R0001001'30030-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 TS No. 196650 In short, we would oppose a scheme which gives any collector the right to reject unilaterally requirements on his collection system. Recommendation 76 Concur. DD/S&T would be happy to participate in a review of Form 986. Our concern about this recommendation is similar to that expressed with reference to recommendation '-5, above. The thrust, here seems to put emphasis again on collecting that which we already know how to collect rather than collecting what we really need. The practice of having analysts make queries prior to placement of a requirement is basically a good idea; however, it has been the experience of DD/S&T analysts that the Clandestine Services' policies and practices tend to deny dissemination of _ eaningful information concerning their current assets or col- lection capability. This is not an attempt to debate the need for sight security and need-to-know. . Nevertheless, we doubt t he practicality of this recommendation unless there is a significant change in the amount of information the collectors are willing to provide. Again, we express the concern that this concept would result in the further entrenchment of existing programs and a general lessening of attention to the establishment of new efforts to meet critical needs. Chanter 4 - Collection Guidance Recommendation ?r8 Non-concur. This Directorate cannot support imple- mentation of this recommendation, and we find little in the substance of the report that truly supports the need for any change in the existing relationship with CGS. Although we do Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 TS No, 196650 Gt under Stand how CGS exercises "S pervasion"over collection uida::CC W: thy.. the Intelligence Directorate, we arc not anxious iJ tG have a stall' element of another Directorate exert sun')ervision over DD S :; l areas of interest and responsibility. ills recom- acnd .t1J:. ap,)cars to be inconsistent With the impie nc 1. n Gi --- ter rccomll"eneations strengthening command t'C'S17C)i1 il)ii7tj at all revels in the requirements process, and tends to substitute stall supervision for command responsibility. We Continue to feel that there is a need for even closer contact between analysts and collectors, and are concerned over any co..ce~t that gives a staff element authority to broker require- me nts between thcn"i. Reccenrnend.ation 1#9 No comment. Recommendation ##10, "11, #12 It is difficult for this Directorate to understand the ration- ale of ti:e iG Report with regard to GIRL. Whereas the report identifies GIRL as "the most useful single method of collection guidance produced in the community" it would appear to be, on t,e contrary, one of the principal contributing factors in the "information explosion. " While GIRL might be quite useful in the political field, we believe that it has been singularly unpro- ductive in stimulating the collection of information in the scientific and technological fields of interest to this Directorate. Non-concur. Without much more careful study, we are not anxious to support a major effort toward the preparation of collection guidance documents. OSI has had long experience in this area and is particularly aware of the amount of analysts' time -required to do this job well. We believe the likely payoff from a major effort in this area is questionable, except perhaps in a very few carefully selected situations. Here again a much closer coupling between the analyst and the field collector seems to be the answer, and very often. Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : -CIA-RDP85GO0105R000100130030-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 . ~ t 7 'Y i..V i? the d rec; involvement of the analyst in exploitation of the source :.as 'Dec. the most productive approach. 25X1A cac:: separate collection mechanism. Our concern, again, is the :on-productive use of the analysts' time if we are to embark Non-concur. it seems doubtful that this Agency can fiord ;,e luxury of a separate collection guidance program for on a major cilort geared specifically to the 25X1A Recommendation 5 It would appear to be more desirable for the C ief, F.I to make 1.1.is type of information available directly to the offices concerned with intelligence production. We would not, of cour:;c, object to having this information go to the CGS but do not believe that CGS should attempt to serve as the only focal point for interaction with the FI Staff. Chap er 5 - Some Problems of Requirements Recommendation ir`l6 This recommendation raises the cuestion of division of responsibility between the CGS and the SPINT Staff. It would appear th at one group brokering the SIGINT account should be adecuate. This !Directorate has no strong feeling as to whether the CGS or the SPINT Staff should be.so charged. No comment. Recommendation #18, #19 No comment. i t.JD G E.ii~t L.. V Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85GO0105R000100130030-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 ~~cco: rnc.nciation 20 --CC t e subject of COMOR and SIG.I~T'I' Cornmitt.ce responsii~ib.il:y is curren'.ly under review, we recoir,iur.,ui that action on this rccon-uncndaiion ire dclerred. Recommendation ;r21, i;22 W0 believe that the spirit of these two recommendations is a rcac y JCiilg complied with through regular lnlormation exc.ranges between ELINT collectors and OS.:/r;V:SAC analysts. ~,Te have, however, no objection to this being done in a more ormal way. Chanter 6 - Recommendations for Overhead Imagery Concur, and suggest that the recently constituted DDI/DLSi T Pre-COMOR would be in an excellent position to immme:r.ert this recommendation. :antur o C - Res -Donsibilities of Management Concur, except that one statement in paragraph 2a. of the discussion causes us considerable concern. This relates to the s ipulation that the division chief certify that the informa- ~ion needed to fill a gap in national intelligence is not already available. " If interpreted literally, satisfaction of this require- :nert in many instances may never be possible or may take many ma : weeks of effort for almost any given question. In short, it would be necessary to interpret not already available" with considerable latitude. Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7 t1? . S v(l:. : I iirTli tt'.nC.~Ill 15 d ffiCU.i; to i.nd Spcc1Lc fault with this We would again like to note, however, that on to the requirements -problem, must rest with the of the Agency and not with any one stall r- ct.ng Dc,:~utyf l it ec o :or T CC _ :Jio Sclonco and Di S t