MINUTES OF 18 NOVEMBER 1983 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: LONG-RANGE PLANNING: (1) CLANDESTINE TECHNICAL COLLECTION SENSORS AND (2) CIA EXTERNAL ANALYSIS PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000500720002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC review completed.
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EXCOM 83- D/6
9 December 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Minutes of 18 November 1983 Executive Committee
Meeting.: Long-Range Planning: (1) Clandestine
Technical Collection Sensors and (2) CIA
External Analysis Program
1. The Executive Committee met on 18 November 1983 to
discuss a paper titled "Clandestine Technical Collection
Sensors," prepared by the DDS&T, and to discuss a DDI paper
titled "CIA External Analysis Program." Both papers were topics
identified for further EXCOM study by the 1982 CIA Long-Range
Plan. chaired the session; participants
include essrs. Fitzwater DDA); Stein (DDO); Hineman (DDS&T);
Gates (DDI); Taylor (IG). Childs (Comntrnller)
Clandestine Technical Collection
2. opened the meeting by pointing out that in
1979 former DDCI Carlucci established a Clandestine Technical
Collection Panel (CTCP) to monitor Agency sensor activities. The
panel has not been useful because it was not kept informed about
sensor operations. Ke suggested that a revived CTCP could work,
or some other mechanism, such as a new organizational entity,
could assume its role.
3. Mr. Hineman, while reviewing the executive summary for
the clandestine sensors study, noted that a study group had
reviewed past sensor operational failures, as well as successes,
and when drafting its paper had reached several conclusions.
Foremost, successful operations were planned from the beginning
and then executed with the full participation of technical,
intelligence and operations officers. Failures occurred when
insufficient attention was given to the collection requirement,
group's recommendation that a new entity be created and staffed
by DI, DS&T, and DO employees and that it have program
responsibility for sensors. Whether the entity would be
25X1
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therefore, he supported the study
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program office in the S&T or a staff, Mr. Hineman said he was not
yet prepared to make a suggestion. He agreed to do so if the
Committee agreed that a new organizational entity was required.
He concluded by saying it is time to abolish the CTCP.
4. Mr. Stein agreed with the foregoing conclusion about the
CTCP and suggested that consideration be given to creating.a
small staff in the. DS&T composed of officers from the three
concerned directorates. It would bring together, as required, a
team of technical and requirements people under the aegis of DO
and DI specialists familiar with operating in the target area.
The group would define collection requirements, develop the
sensor package, and conduct the operation under the direction of
senior DO management.
5.I tasked who would be in overall charge of the
operation. Mr. Hineman said that the person who runs the staff
would be in charge. Mr. Taylor noted the present precedent of
shifting responsibility for sensor operations from the technical
officers to operational officers as the activity is moved toward
emplacement in the field. He emphasized that someone has to be
nominally in charge.
6. Mr. Gates said he was attracted to the small entity
approach: creation of a new unit is a good solution for it
offers flexibility, establishes a permanent cadre with an
institutional memory, and permits regular funding, which so far
has been hit-or-miss. nterjected that he assumed he
was hearing that covert co ec ion systems are worthwhile and
that certain collection could not be accomplished by other
means. Mr. Gates continued by noting that there has been a chain
of collection successes using sensors. A capability is being
which have broad target applications. They involve technical and
operational activities which only CIA can accomplish. Mr. Childs
referred to remarks and suggested that it would be 25X1
useful to assemble a group to look at technical intelligence gaps
which could be satisfied clandestinely. Mr. Gates responded that
gaps were addressed in a paper on collection requirements which .
had been prepared and was on his desk for approval. The new unit
would need guidance and he has under preparation a study of
collection requirements. The study, however, does not address
non-CIA clandestine technical collection programs. He concluded
by noting that it would be necessary to size the sensor program
and integrate its resource requirements into the budget process,
as well as fit it in with other Agency sensor projects.
7. Mr. Fitzwater agreed with the concept of a small unit in
the DS&T. The DI should prepare requirements, DS&T should build
the sensor, and the DO should take over the operation.
8. Mr. Taylor said he had read the entire sensor study but
.did not see much forward thinking. The study and executive
summary talked about operations which succeeded or failed because
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Mr. Taylor said he agreed with Mr-. Stein's small entity concept,
and was against a "big clanking institutionalized" sensor
office. Whatever is created, it will stand or fall on the
working arrangements between directorate specialists; in any
case, senior management attention will still be required and
senior levels will need to focus on sharing S&T knowledge.
Mr-.' Taylor concluded by observing that no other agency can
conduct clandestine sensor operations overseas without the DO
being involved, and the Agency ought to assert its charter for
clandestine operations.
. 9.I tended the discussion by concluding that there
are requirements for clandestine sensor operations which cannot
be filled by anyone else or by other techniques, the operations
are technically and operationally viable. A central staff--
probably in the DSbtT--is required; and a regular funding is
needed. asked Mr. Hineman to prepare a proposal, with
DI assistance, and coordinate it with the other Deputy
Directors. The proposal would then go to the Executive
Committee.
External Analysis Program
10. Mr. Gates referred the Executive Committee to the
analysis program paper distributed to the members and said he had
already accepted or planned to accept most of the study's
recommendations. He noted that external analysis was essential
.for the DI which has limited expertise in certain areas. He
foresaw a growing need for outside assistance on technical
subjects. There had been some criticism of external analysis in
the HPSCI, but HPSCI criticism of external analysis had been
aimed foremost at the Department of Defense, while DI discussions
with the Committee generally went well. It was agreed that the
external analysis study was well done, and that its findings were
appropriate, whereupon the Executive Director adjourned. the
meeting.
cc: DDCI
IG
Comptroller
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1-DDA
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