(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 161
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

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IAC-D-50/11 Priority National Intelligence Objectives in
the Field of International Communism
(18 Apr 1957)
IAC-D-50/11. 1 Priority National Intelligence Objectives
(4 June 1957)
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IAG-D-50/ 10. 2 Priority National Intelligence Objectives
(5 Aug 1957)
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IAC-D-50/7
IAC-D-50/8
IAC -D - 50 / 8
(Fir r t Revision)
IAC-D-50/8
(First;Revision -
F inal)
IAC-D-50/9
IAC-D-50/9. 1
IAC-D-50/ 10
IAC -D -50/ 10. 1
Criteria for Determining Priority National
Intelligence Objectives (16 Aug 1955)
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives (27 Dec 1955)
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives (21 Feb 1957)
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives (5 Mar 1957)
Possible Amendment of NSCID 4, Affecting
Also DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/5 (15 May 1956)
Draft Revision of NSCID No. 4 (21 June 1956)
Priority National Economic Intelligence
Objectives (15 Aug 1956)
Priority National Economic Intelligence
Objectives (21 Aug 1956)
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CONTENTS
IAC-D-46
IAC-D-47
IAC-D-49
IAC-D- 50
IAC-D-50/ 1
IAC-D-50/2
IAC-D-50/3
IAC-D-50/4
IAC-D- 50 / 5
IAC-D-50/5. 1
IAC-D-50/6
Proposed National Intelligence Estimates
(25 Mar 52)
Central Electronic Intercept Analysis Group
(14 Apr 52)
Proposed National Intelligence Estimate on
Probable Developments in French North Africa
and Spanish Morocco (21 Apr 52)
Critical National Intelligence Objectives with
Respect to Communist China (19 May 52)
Critical National Intelligence Objectives
(5 June 52)
Priority List of National Intelligence Objectives
D.CID4/Z (Second Revision) (5 Aug 53)
National Intelligence Objectives (30 Nov 54)
National Intelligence Objectives (10 Jan 55)
Review of Provisions for the Development and
Coordination of Specific Information Requirements
and Collection Tasks (20 Jan 55)
Paper on Intelligence Requirements and Collection
Tasks in Relation to Priority National Intelligence --
DCID 4/5 (11 June 1956)
Release to Overseas Activities of DCID 4/3
"Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives"
and DCID 4/4 "Priority National Intelligence'
Objectives" (29 Mar 55)
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IAC-D-50/ 11. 1
4 June 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y COMMITTEE
Priority National Intelligence Objectives
1. In accord with the IAC action of 7 May 1957 (IAC-M-288)
the-Board of National Estimates has reviewed the draft Priority
National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Com-
munism (IAC-D-50/11), The Board recommends that IAC-D-50/11
be approved subject to the deletion of the word particularly in
objectives a, 2 and b, 2 under First Priority Objectives.
2. The Board has also reviewed IAC-D-50/8 (Priority
National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives.) as directed
by the IAC (IAC-M-288) and finds no inconsistencies with DCID 4/6.
At such time as the EIC and the Board have completed their review
of the new draft Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives
(the revision of which had been planned by the EIC prior to this
recent IAG action), the three lists will be submitted together for
final review and approval by the IAC.
Secretary
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18 April 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the
Field of International Communism
The attached memorandum and draft "Priority National Intelli-
gence Objectives in the Field of International Communism," prepared
by the Committee on International Communism, will be placed on the
agenda of an early IAC meeting for appropriate action with respect
to the Committee's recommendation.
Secretary
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C IAC-D-50/ 11
0 18 April 1957
P
Y
MEMORANDUM
To : Secretary, IAC
From : Chairman, Committee on International
Communism
Subject : Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field
of International Communism
Reference : IAC-D-99/2, dated January 24, 1956; IAC-D-99/3,
dated July 17, 1,956
Pursuant to the terms of reference for the Committee on
International Communism (IAC-D-99/2) and in keeping with the
intention indicated in the Committee's interim report (IAC-D-99/3,
para. III. B. ), the Committee submits the attached list of "Priority
National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Corn-
munism." This list is based upon DCID 4/6 (approved by the IAC on
30 October 1956) and is designed to serve as a constitutional authori-
zation for collection and production rather than as a detailed
collection and production guide.
The Committee recommends that the IAC review and approve
the attached draft as the Priority National Intelligence Objectives in
the Field of International Communism.
The Committee is now considering the precise means to employ
this priority list and will submit its proposals to the IAC in the near
future.
Attachment:
List of Priority National Intelligence
Objectives in the Field of International
Communism
April 8, 1957
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P
Y
Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the
Field of International Communism
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Directive No. 4,
DCID 4/6 (approved by the IAC on October 30, 1956) established a
list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the
coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to
requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national
security policy.
2. In order to establish a list of priority national intelligence
objectives in the field of international Communism, the IAC Committee
on International Communism has derived the following intelligence ob-
jectives from DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be
revised when required by revision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical factors relating to international Communism requiring
priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between
two levels of priority within the general priority category.
4. The relevant DCID 4/6 objective is quoted first, followed by
an indented outline listing of the national intelligence requirements for
collection and production of intelligence material.
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1. First Priority Objectives*
a. "Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and
plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet
or satellite armed forces." (DCID 4/6, I. a. )
1. International Communist movement activities
indicating Soviet intentions with regard to hostilities.
2. Soviet plans for the use of the international
Communist movement -.in war or
preparation for war.
b. "Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, in-
tentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities
using Chinese Communist armed forces." (DCID 4/6, I. b.)
1. International Communist movement and Chinese
Communist Party activities indicating Chinese
Communist intentions with regard to hostilities.
2. Chinese Communist plans for the use of the Asian
Communist movement pavtieula-u in war or
preparation for war.
* First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate, and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the
US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them) which would occasion greatest benefit to the US.
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c. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear
attack on the United States or key U. S. overseas installations and for
defense against air (including missiles) attack." (DCID 4/6, I. c. )
1. Communist Party and international Communist
movement capabilities and plans to facilitate
Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or key
US overseas installations through sabotage.
d. "Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the US or
key US overseas installations." (DCID 4/6, I. d. )
1. International Communist movement activities indi-
cating Soviet plans and intentions for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
against the US or key US overseas installations.
2. Soviet plans to use. the international Communist
movement in the clandestine delivery of unconven-
tional weapons against the US or key US overseas
installations.
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II. Second Priority Objectives'
a. "Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of
action, including economic policies and actions, with particular refer-
ence to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries toward the Soviet
Bloc, to weaken and disrupt US and US-supported alliances, or to foment
antagonism among the Western powers and between these powers and the
rest of the free world." (DCID 4/6, II. b. )
1. International Communist movement activities, es-
pecially clandestine, including changes in "line" or
organization, and shifts in emphasis among target
groups which might reveal Soviet objectives and
policies with regard to:
(a)
Attracting non-Bloc countries;
(b) Weakening and disrupting US and US-supported
alliances;
(c) Fomenting antagonism among the Western powers;
(d) Promoting antagonism between the Western powers
and the rest of the world.
* Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.
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b. "Soviet (including Satellite) political strengths and weaknesses;
the actual locus of power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or
policy conflicts within the ruling groups; Soviet-Satellite relations with
particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the
strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police
control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in
the Soviet and Satellite populations." (DCID 4/6, II. c. )
1. Conflicts within the Satellite Communist parties.
2. Friction between the Soviet Communist Party and
those of the Satellites.
3. Soviet control of the Satellite Communist parties.
4. Influence and control of the local Communist party
within each Satellite.
5. Effect of Soviet Bloc friction on the international
Communist movement.
. C. "Major Chinese Communist international political objectives
and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed
to foment antagonism between the Western and Asian powers and to
extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.
(DCID 4/6, II. h. )
1. International Communist movement and Chinese
Communist Party activities indicating Chinese
Communist:
(a) International policies;
(b) Efforts to divide the Western and Asian powers;
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(c) Plans to extend Communism in Asia;
(d) Party relations with the overseas Chinese.
d. "Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree
of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom
of action, actual or potential strains on the relationship, and the process
of arriving at and coordinating joint policies." (DCID 4/6, II. j. )
1. Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and
that of the USSR.
2. Relations of the Chinese Communist Party with
Yugoslavia and Satellite parties.
3. Effects of Sino-Soviet relations on the international
Communist movement.
e. "The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese
Communist regime; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within
the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist
apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential
resistance in the population of mainland China. " (DCID 4/6, II. i. )
1. Strength, aims, organizations, finances, internal
condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Chinese
Communist Party.
2. Personal or policy conflicts within the Chinese Communist
Party.
3. Chinese Communist capabilities to support and influence
the international Communist movement.
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f. "Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts and capabilities to direct espionage
against the US from abroad, against US interests in foreign areas, and
against non-Bloc countries." (DCID 4/6, I1.x. )
1. Communist party and international Communist
movement espionage and sabotage activities,
organization, capabilities, plans, techniques,
and targets.
2. Communist espionage, infiltration and sabotage against
the US from abroad, against US interests in foreign
areas and against non-Bloc governments, armed
forces and military installations.
g. "The stability and policies of the Middle East Arab states,
Iran and Israel, with particular reference to oil concessions and in-
stallations, other commitments to the West and the Suez situations;
the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities; and vulnerabilities to Com-
munist propaganda and subversion, and Bloc political and economic
inducements." (DCID 4/6, II. q.)
1, Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal
condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the
Communist movement in the Middle East Arab
states, * Iran and Israel.
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and
the principalities and colonial or semicolonial areas on the Arabian
Peninsula littoral. "
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2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Communist
movement to infiltrate, influence, control, or
undermine the governments and ruling groups of
these state
condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the
Communist movement in Japan.
2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Japanese
Communist movement to influence Japanese policy
toward Communist China, the USSR, India, Southeast
Asia and Japanese rearmament.
i. "The stability and orientation of India, with particular
reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations
with Communist China and the USSR, its attitude toward developments
in Southeast Asia, and the progress of economic development."
(DCID 4/6, II. p. )
1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal
condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the
Indian Communist movement.
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2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Indian
Communist movement to influence India's policies
and especially Indian relations with Communist
China and the USSR, and its attitude toward develop-
ments in Southeast Asia.
j. "West German attitudes and policies toward the reunification
problem and Soviet proposals with respect thereto; rearmament and
the NATO alliance; tendencies toward the revival of ultranationalism
and militarism." (D'CID 4/6, 11. t. )
1. West German Communist Party, plans, policies and
capabilities to influence West German policy on
German reunification, rearmament and NATO, in-
cluding efforts to stimulate West German nationalism
and neutralism.
2. International Communist policy and activity regarding
proposals for German reunification, rearmament and
relations with NATO, especially as these activities
may indicate Soviet intentions.
k. "The military, political, and economic strengths and weak-
nesses of the North Korean regime, its political- and military
objectives and intentions, Chinese Communist military and political
intentions with respect thereto, and the relative degree of Soviet and
Chinese Communist influence, control, and economic activity in
North Korea." (DCID 4/6, II. m.)
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1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition,
appeal, orientation and vitality of the North Korean
Communist Party.
2. Chinese Communist Party relations with the North Korean
Communist Party and its policies toward North Korea.
3. Soviet Communist Party relations with the North Korean
Communist Party and its policies toward North Korea.
4. The relative influence of the Soviet and Chinese Communist
Parties in North Korea.
5. North Korean Communist plans and capabilities for
clandestine activity in South Korea and Japan, including
infiltration of their military establishments.
1. "The political and economic strengths and weaknesses and the
general military capabilities, of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its
relationships with the USSR and with Communist China, its political and
military objectives and intentions, and its capabilities and intentions for
clandestine and subversive activity in South Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia." (DCID 4/6, II. n. )
1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal
condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the
Viet Minh Communist Party.
2. Relations between the Viet Minh Communist Party and
the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and with the
international Communist movement.
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3. Viet Minh Communist plans and capabilities for clandestine
activity in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, including
infiltration of their military establishments.
rn. "The stability of US base rights overseas; factors affecting the
security of US military bases and installations in foreign areas. "
(DCID 4/6, II. v.)
1. International Communist movement actions and policies
affecting US base rights abroad; especially Communist
capabilities and efforts to influence public and official
opinion adversely to US possession of base rights;
Communist capabilities, plans and efforts to penetrate
and sabotage US military bases.
n. "Franco-German relations; France's will and ability to fulfill
its NATO commitments; French policy toward North Africa particularly
with respect to nationalist unrest in the area and Communist connections
therewith." (DCID 4/6, II. s. )
1. French Communist will and ability to obstruct fulfillment
of French NATO commitments.
2. Communist relations with North African nationalist
unrest and capabilities for affecting it.
3. French Communist aims and influence regarding French
policy toward North Africa.
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o. "The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities
(political, subversive and clandestine), vulnerabilities and tactics of
Communist parties and groups outside the Soviet Bloc and of interna-
tional Communist front organizations, particularly the international
role- of the Yugoslav Communist party and the political and paramilitary
capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in France and
Italy." (DCID 4/6, II. w. )
1. Strength, aims, organization, composition, internal
condition, interrelationship, appeal, propaganda, and
political, subversive and clandestine capabilities,
vulnerabilities and tactics of non-Bloc Communist
parties and groups everywhere and international
Communist front organizations.
2. Yugoslav Communist Party relations with the interna-
tional Communist movement, the Socialist parties and
the Socialist International, its role in the evolution of
Communist ideology.
3. Channels of communication used by the international
Communist movement and among Communist parties,
including that of the USSR; Communist finances;
machinery and techniques for policy and action coor-
dination; plans, intentions, ideological developments and
evolution; relations with the Socialists, extremist parties
and with trade union organizations.
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Priority National Intelligence Objectives
1. Attached is a draft statement of Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives, as approved by the Economic Intelligence
Committee, which is designed to supersede the previous statement
of such objectives approved by the IAC on 21 August 1956 (IAC-D-50/10,
as revised in IAC-D-50/10. 1). Pursuant to the direction of the IAC
(IAC-M-288, item 6) the Board "of National Estimates has reviewed
these draft objectives from the standpoint of their consistency with
the over-all Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/6) and
finds no inconsistencies.
2. As reported earlier (IAC-D-50/11. 2, 4 June), the Board,
on the basis of a similar review of the draft Priority National Intelli-
gence Objectives in the Field of International Communism (IAC-D-50/11)
and the Priority National Scientific and Technical Objectives
(IAC-D,50/8), recommended striking the word "particularly" from
paragraphs 1, a, 2 and I, b, 2 of the 19 April 1957 draft of IAC-D-50/11.
In other respects, the Board found no inconsistencies between those
two statements of objectives and DCID 4/6.
3. These three sets of objectives will therefore be submitteel
together for final IAC review and approval at an early IAC meeting.
Secretary
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PRIORITY NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/6 (DCID 4/6),
dated 30 October 1956, lists the priority national intelligence objectives
established pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and
production. DCID 4/6 covers military, political, scientific, technolog-
ical, and economic intelligence objectives on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
the Free World.
2. All economic intelligence objectives listed below are related to
DCID 1i/6 and as defined in that directive are deemed to be essential
elements of priority national intelligence objectives. In conformity to
the directive, distinction is made among three levels of priority within
the general priority category. Order of listing within these three
categories is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no signif-
icance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the
category.
This supersedes the previous statement of Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives, approved by the IAC on 21 August 1956
(IAC-D-50/l0 and the minor revision thereof in IAC-D-50/10.1).
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3. Foreign. activities covered in the priority national economic
intelligence objectives will be subject to continuing surveillance with-
in the framework of responsibility laid down in DCID 15/1. It is not
intended that the following list of objectives shall be a definitive or
limiting statement of responsibilities, but rather that these objectives
shall provide guidance for programming of economic intelligence collection
and production.
I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
a. "Soviet over-all ... intentions ... particularly with respect to
initiating hostilities ...."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis
will be placed on the recognition and analysis of economic indications of
Soviet preparations for initiating hostilities.
b. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear
attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for
"First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the UJS;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the
US." (Quoted material is taken directly from DCID 4/6.)
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defense against air (including missiles) attack."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis
will be placed on analysis of all economic factors relating to Soviet
production and production capabilities in the following fields:
1. Nuclear weapons;
2. Guided missiles and guided missile weapons systems;
3. Aircraft and related delivery systems;
4. Air defense systems; and
5. Long-range submarines.
II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
a. "The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including Satellite)
economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war;
the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development
programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic,
political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and
`Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and
(2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.'
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vulnerabilities of the Soviet .and Satellite internal communications
systems."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Assessment of the overall as well as the particular
economic capabilities of the Soviet and the European
Satellite economies in relation to their economic and
military programs;
2. Identification of economic developments which may
reflect changes in Soviet Bloc intentions, such as
shifts in priorities accorded to various sectors of
the economy (for example, the level of investment,
the relationship between light and heavy industry,
the volume and composition of defense expenditures,
the changes in the volume and character of foreign
trade, and the emphasis given consumer welfare); and
Analysis of those economic problems or weaknesses that
could modify or detract significantly from the future
growth of Soviet capabilities.
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b. "Soviet and Satellite ... technical strengths and weaknesses
substantially affecting Soviet military, economic ... capabilities ....'p
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward evaluation of the effect of techno-
logical developments in Soviet industry on production by war-supporting
industries.
co "Major Soviet international ... economic policies and actions,
with particular reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries
toward the Soviet Bloc ...."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward analysis of the nature and extent of
Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in the_Fre-e World, with particular
reference to expanded economic activities in underdeveloped countries by
various means such as trade, economic development programs, extension of
long-term capital credits, reorientation of trading relations, provision
of technical services, and export of military end items.
d. "... Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to
the character and degree of Soviet control ...."
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IAC-D-5010.2
30 July 1957
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and
terms of Soviet-Satellite and inter-Satellite foreign
trade and continuing review of trade policies among
these countries;
2. Appraisal of the extent of economic specialization
and integration within the Bloc; and
3. Analysis of the organization of Soviet control
mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses.
e. "Sing-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the ..."
stability of such relations.
Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction., and
terms of Sino-Soviet trade, credit arrangements, and
technical assistance;
2. Appraisal of the role of Sino-Soviet trade'in the
development program of Communist China; and
oho
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IAC-D-5010.2
30 July 1957
3. Analysis of the costs imposed on the USSR in meeting
the requirements of Communist China's economy.
f. "The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy;
plans for its development, and progress therein ... technological
strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities;
the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal
communications and communications with the USSR."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Assessment of the present capabilities and future
potential of agriculture in terms of its role in
supporting China's essential foreign trade, its
industrialization program, and its population growth;
2. Analysis of other key sectors of the economy, such as
transportation, upon which future industrial growth
and war potential depend; and
3. Evaluation of progress toward and prospects for China's
long-term industrialization objectives.
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IAC-D-5010.2
30 July 1957
g. "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean
regime ...."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, attempts
will be made to assess the degree of economic integration, particularly
in the heavy industry sector, of Manchuria and North Korea, the degree
of Soviet and Communist Chinese economic activity in North Korea, and
the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
h. "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses ... of the Viet
Minh regime ...."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention
will be directed primarily toward the degree of economic integration
with Communist China, including trade relationships, and the nature and
extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Free World
i. Economic conditions and trends M especially those which
relate to external viability, internal growth, defense capabilities, and
pressures for trade with
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 Ja
IAC-D-5010.2
30 July 1957
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Economic conditions and trends in India, particularly those
related to the progress of economic development, with special attention
to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and
extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.
k. Economic conditions and trends in the Middle East Arab states,
Iran and with particular attention to oil concessions and
installations, the Suez situation, and Bloc economic inducements.
1. Economic conditions and trends in Yugoslavia, with particular
attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature
and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.
III. THIRD PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
a. Economic conditions and trends in the Republic of Korea and
in Taiwan which have a bearing on the economic viability and defense
capabilities of those states.
ri d Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and
(2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US."
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IAC-D-5010.2
30 July 1957
b. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of Southeast
Asia, with particular attention to Bloc economic inducements to these
countries.
c. Economic conditions and trends in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Ceylon, particularly those related to prospects for economic growth,
with special attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.
d. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of
particularly with particular
reference to economic capabilities to fulfill defense commitments and
ability to maintain satisfactory levels of employment and rates of
growth.
e. Economic conditions and trends in Greece and Turkey, with
particular reference to prospects for economic stability and growth,
with attention to,economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.
Southeast Asian countries encompassed are Burma, Thailand, Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya,
and Singapore.
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IAC-D-50/10.2
30 July 1957
f. Economic conditions and trends in Iceland, with particular
reference to prospects for economic stability and growth, with attention
to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and
extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.
g. Economic conditions and trends in Africa, with special atten-
tion to vulnerabilities to anti-Western economic influences; the extent
and nature of these influences and the availability to the US of
strategic materials.
h. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of Latin
America, including the Caribbean countries and European dependencies,
with special attention to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela.# giving
particular emphasis to prospects for economic growth, economic relations
with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and the availability to the US of strategic
materials.
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IAC -D - 50/10. 1
21 August 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives
1. On 21 August the statement of Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives, which had been approved by the Economic Intelligence
Committee on 7 August 1956 and subsequently circulated to the IAC members
(IAC-D-50/10, 15 August 1956), was approved by the IAC, subject to the
amendment of the second sentences of paragraph 1.
2. Please substitute the attached page, dated 21 August, which
incorporates the amendment approved by the IAC, for page 1 of the state-
ment previously circulated (Attachment to IAC-D-50/10).
ecretary
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SECRET
 SECRET
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IAC-D-50/10. 1
21 August 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives
1. On 21 August the statement of Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives, which had been approved by the Economic Intelligence
Committee on 7 August 1956 and subsequently circulated to the IAC.members
(IAC-D-50/10, 15 August 1956), was approved by the IAC, subject to the
amendment of the second sentences of paragraph 1.
2. Please substitute the attached page, dated 21 August, which
incorporates the amendment approved by the IAC, for page 1 of the state-
ment previously circulated (Attachment to IAC-D-50/10).
ecretary
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SECRET
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S E-C-R -E-T
IA,C-D-5010.1
.21 August 1956
PRIORITY NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5, dated
18 October 1955, lists the priority national intelligence objectives
established pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tive No. 1i, as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection
and production. DCID 4/5 covers military, political, scientific,
technical, and economic intelligence objectives on the Sino-Soviet
Bloc and the Free World.
2. All economic intelligence objectives listed below are
related to DCID 4/5 and as defined in that directive are deemed to
be essential elements of priority national intelligence objectives.
In conformity to the directive, distinction is made among three levels
of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing
within these three categories is a matter of convenience in presen-
tation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority
of specific items within the category.
S -E -C -R-E -T
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 -'I
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IAC-D-50/ 10
15 August 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives
Reference: IAC-M-225, 10 January 1956, item 3
1. Attached is a statement of Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives, approved by the Economic Intelligence
Committee on 7 August 1956.
2. This statement was prepared to identify and expand the
economic aspects of DCID 4/5, "Priority National Intelligence
Objectives," for guidance to the agencies participating in the EIC,
in their economic intelligence activities.
3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC
meeting for appropriate action.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC -D -50/10.1
21 August 1956
PRIORITY NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5, dated
18 October 1955, lists the priority national intelligence objectives
established pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tive No. 4, as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection
and production. DCIU4/5 covers military, political, scientific,
technical, and economic intelligence objectives on the Sino-Soviet
Bloc and the Free World.
2. All economic intelligence objectives listed below are
related to DCID 4+/5 and as defined in that directive are deemed to
be essential elements of priority national intelligence objectives.
In conformity to the directive, distinction is made among three levels
of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing
within these three categories is a matter of convenience in presen-
tation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority
of specific items within the category.
S -E -C-R-E-T
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3. Foreign activities covered in the priority national
economic intelligence objectives will be subject to continuing
surveillance within the framework of responsibility laid down
by DCID 15/l. It is not intended.that the following list of
objectives shall be a definitive or limiting statement of
responsibilities, but rather that these objectives shall provide
guidance for programming:of economic intelligence collection and
production.
I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
a. "Soviet over-all ..., intentions, ..., particularly with
respect to initiating hostilities ..., and to disarmament ... ."
Under this priority national intelligence objective,
emphasis will be placed on the recognition and.analysis of economic
indications of Soviet preparations for initiating hostilities.or
for disarmament.
b. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for
nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations
and for defense against air attack."
"First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest
consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or
actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which
would occasion greatest benefit to the US." fquoted material
is taken directly from DCID 4/5]
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis
will be placed on analysis of all economic factors relating to Soviet
production and production capabilities in the following fields:
1. Nuclear weapons;
2. Guided missiles and guided missile weapons systems;
3. Aircraft and related delivery systems;
4. Air defense systems; and
5. Long-range submarines.
II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
Sino-Soviet Bloc
a. "The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including
Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to
support; a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of
current economic development programs. their implementation, and
their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength
of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the
Soviet and Satellite internal communications systems."
"Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will.
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have serious
consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or
actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which
could occasion great benefit to the US."
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Under.this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Assessment of the over-all as well as the particular
economic capabilities of the Soviet and the European
Satellite economies to support military and foreign
economic programs;
2. Identification of economic developments which may
reflect changes in Soviet Bloc intentions, such as
shifts in priorities accorded to various sectors of
the economy (for example, the level of investment,
the relationship between light and heavy industry,
the volume and composition of defense expenditures,
the changes in the volume and character of foreign
trade, and the emphasis given consumer welfare; and
3. Analysis of those economic problems or weaknesses that
could modify or detract significantly from the future
growth of Soviet capabilities.
b. "Soviet and Satellite ... technical strengths and weaknesses
substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, ... capabilities."
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Under this priority national intelligence objective,, efforts
will be directed primarily toward evaluation of the effect of
technological developments in Soviet industry on production by
war-supporting industries.
c. "Major Soviet international economic policies and actions,
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward analysis of the nature and extent
of Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in the Free World, with
particular reference to expanded economic activities in underdeveloped
countries by various means such as trade, economic development programs,
extension of long-term capital credits, reorientation of trading
relations, provision of technical services, and export of military
end items.
d. "..e Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to
the character and degree of Soviet control; ... ."
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and
terms of Soviet-Satellite and inter-Satellite foreign
trade and continuing review of trade policies among
these countries;
S-E-C-R-E-T
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S-E-C-R-E-T
2. Appraisal of the extent of economic specialization
and integration within the Bloc; and
3. Analysis of the organization of Soviet control
mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses.
e. "Sing-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the ..."
stability of such relations.
Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and
terms of Sino-Soviet trade, credit arrangements, and
technical assistance;
2. Appraisal of the role of Sino-Soviet trade in the
development program of Communist China; and
3. Analysis of the costs imposed on the USSR in meeting
the requirements. of Communist China's economy.
f. "The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy;
plans for its development, and progress therein; ... technological
strengths and weaknesses affecting, economic and military capabilities;
the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal
communications and communications with the USSR."
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S-E-C-R--E-T
Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts
will be directed primarily toward the following:
1. Assessment of the present capabilities: and future
potential of agriculture in terms. of its role in
supporting China's essential foreign trade, its
industrialization program, and its population
growth;
2. Analysis of key sectors of the economy, such as
transportation, upon which future industrial
growth and war potential depend, and
3. Evaluation of progress toward and prospects for
China's long-term industrialization objectives.
go "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses of the North
Korean regime, ... .11
Under this priority national intelligence objective, attempts
will be made to assess the degree of economic integration,. particularly
in the heavy industry sector, of Manchuria and North Korea, and the
nature and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
h. "The ...economic strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh
regime ... ."
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention
will be directed primarily toward the degree of economic integration
with Communist China, including trade relationships, and the nature
and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Free World
i. Economic conditions and trends in non-Communist Vietnam, Laos,
k. Economic conditions and trends in Yugoslavia, with particular
attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the
nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.
The EIC considers that the priority positions of all the Free
World countries indicated should be reconsidered in connection
with the next revision of DCID.4/5. For example, the under-
developed countries generally (III c) should probably be
included in the second priority category.
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III. THIRD PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
a. Economic conditions and trends in the Republic of Korea and
in Taiwan which have a bearing on the economic viability and defense
capabilities of those states.
b. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of Western
Europe, particularly France, West Germany, and Italy, with particular
reference to economic capabilities to fulfill defense commitments
and ability to maintain satisfactory levels of employment and rates
of growth.
c. Economic conditions and trends in the underdeveloped countries
(other than those indicated above), particularly,those related to
prospects for economic growth, with special attention to economic
relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and: extent of
economic assistance from the Bloc.
"Third riority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have harmful
consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or
actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which
could occasion substantial benefits to the US."
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IAC-D-50/9
15 May 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Possible Amendment of NSCID 4, Affecting Also
DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/5
1. Members of the President's Board of Consultants, in
discussion with representatives of CIA and NSC, have raised the
question concerning the operation of NSCID 4, particularly para-
graph 2 thereof, which provides that the Director shall select
priority matters "in collaboration with the other agencies concerned,
and under the guidance of the NSC Staff." The members of the
Board of Consultants have specifically suggested that this provision
may place an unrealistic responsibility on the Staff of the NSC, and
might be amended either to provide for guidance by the NSC itself,
or to remove the provision altogether.
2. Accordingly, the Director of Central Intelligence has
requested that the IAC have a preliminary discussion of this matter,
and it has been placed on the agenda for the IAG meeting scheduled
for 22 May 1956.
Secretary
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IAC-D-50/9. 1
21 June 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4
Pursuant to the direction of the IAC, the attached draft
revision of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4,
provisionally agreed to at the IAC meeting on 19 June, is circulated
for further consideration by IAC members before any proposed
revision is submitted to the NSC. This matter will be placed on
the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 26 June.
Secretary
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IAC-D-50/9. 1
21 June 1956
Draft Revision of
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4
National Intelligence Objectives
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 and for the purpose of providing intelligence
support for the preparation of studies required by the National Security
Council in the fulfillment of its duties, it is directed that:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with
the other agencies concerned, shall prepare a comprehensive outline
of national intelligence objectives applicable to foreign countries and
areas to serve as a guide for the coordinated collection and production
of National Intelligence,
2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with
the other agencies concerned, shall select from time to time and on
a current basis sections and items of such outline which have a priority
interest. These selections will be issued by the Director of Central
Intelligence to supply the desired priority guidance for the production
of National Intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency and for the
contributions to such production by other agencies concerned.
3, The Director of Central Intelligence shall formally report
such outline and selections to the NSC for information.
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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Attached is a statement, prepared jointly by the
Scientific Estimates Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee, of priority intelligence objectives in
the scientific and technical fields.
2. These have been prepared as an elaboration of the
more general objectives set forth in DCID 4/5, "Priority
National Intelligence Objectives, " dated 18 October 1955, and,
on approval, will be used by the members of these committees
to guide their intelligence efforts.
3. This paper will be placed on the agenda of an early
IAC meeting for IAC approval.
Secretary
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Priority National Scientific. and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Directive No. 4,
DCID 4/5 established a list of priority national intelligence objectives
as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and pro-
duction in response to requirements relating to the formulation and
execution of national security policy.
2. In order to establish a list of priority national scientific
and technical intelligence objectives, the Scientific Estimates
Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee--
each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the concurrence
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived the following
scientific and technical objectives from DCID 4/5. The statement
of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of
DCID 4/5.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors re-
quiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however,
between three levels of priority within the general priority category.
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Order of listing within these three groups has no significance with
respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
1. First Priority Objectives*
A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas instal-
lations (DCID 4/5, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed
on the scientific and technological aspects of Soviet work on:
1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and special
nuclear materials.
2. Non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and
warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic,
long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface,
and submarine-launched surface-to-surface types).
First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest
consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or
actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which would
occasion greatest benefit to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 a).
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5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor)
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-
range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear
delivery vehicles, and electronics countermeasures
systems.
B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc against air attack (DCID 4/5,
para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination
of scientific research and development on:
1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, rockets
and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
.3. Guided missiles including surface..to-air and air-to-
air types.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground
control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and
missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers
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and communications networks; and electronics counter-
measure systems.
7. Passive defensive measures.
C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clan-
destine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against
the US or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/5, para. I d).
Particular reference is made to detection of specific scientific and
technological accomplishments, such as the development of
specialized weapons and the solution of the peculiar problems in
packaging, transporting, and storing that will make, such delivery
feasible.
II. Second Priority Objectives*
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses affecting their military, economic, and political capa-
bilities (DCID 4/5, para. II e). The priority assigned to these
strengths and weaknesses applies, in the first instance, to the
detection of scientific and technological developments which could
Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have serious conse-
quences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of
foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion
great benefit to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 b).
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give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such
developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelli-
gence effort will be determined by the extent to which the develop-
ment affects US national security. In addition, second priority
coverage will be,given to the scientific and technological strengths
which are basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabili-
ties and to those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave
Soviet vulnerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be
placed on:
1. Research and development which are most likely
to lead to impcrL~nt technological advances
a. Basic scientific research undertaken, without
specific focus on any particular application
(for example, research in solid state physics,
cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature
physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and
catalysis).
b. Development of new applications of existing
scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites,
weather control, long'-range transmission of useful
Approved For Release 2001/12/gp P85S00362R000400070001-9
 Approved Fo Iease 2001/Ti W. 6I' -RDP85S00361 'R 0$(7 Mpg-9
27 December 1955
or destructive energy, means of influencing human
behavior, advanced communication systems, and
nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).
2. Technological developments which can affect significantly
the economic potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(For example, automation, methods of increasing
food supply, and solar and nuclear power. )
3. Technological developments which can affect significantly
the military potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(For example, biological and chemical warfare,
armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.)
4. The organization, control and status of science
5. Fields in which technological weaknesses may reflect
grave Sino-Soviet vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences
related to improved food supply, automatic data
processing system for air defense, and intercon-
tinental ballistic. missile defense. )
Approved For Release 2001/12/0
,#EEt-jP85S00362R000400070001-9
 Approved Fo lease 2001 AgB fA-RDP85S00361 &D%M64-9
27 December 1955
III. Third Priority Objectives*
In addition to the priority objectives outlined in paras. I and
II, above, it is recognized that scientific and technological develop-
ments may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have
such significance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain
third priority objectives (DCID 4/5, para. III) are stated below:
A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and develop-
ment; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such
materials for weapons or other purposes.
Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have harmful conse-
quences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of
foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion
substantial benefits to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 c).
-7-
Approved For Release 2001/12/ CGPP85S00362R000400070001-9
 Approved Fo Iease 2001/12/0 -W;-RDP85S00390C0004QAUAnO.'158/8
Z7. December 1955
AP proved by I AO
JAN 10 1956
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Directive No. 4,
DCID 4/5 established a list of priority national intelligence objectives
as a guide for the coordination of intelligence. collection and pro-
duction in response to requirements relating to the formulation and
execution of national security policy.
2. In order to establish a list of priority national scientific
and technical intelligence objectives, the Scientific Estimates
Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee--
each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the concurrence
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived the following
scientific and technical objectives from DCID 4/5. The statement
of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of
.DCID 4/5.
3. - By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors re.
quiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however,
between three levels of priority within the general priority category,
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: b $'CS00362R000400070001-9
 Approved For lease 2001/12/04 'Rb15S003500400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
27 December 1955.
Order of listing within these three groups has no significance with
respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
I. First= Priority Objectives*
A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas instal-
lations (DCID 4/ 5, para. I
). Particular emphasis will be placed
on the scientific and technological aspects. of Soviet work on:
1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and special
nuclear materials.
2. Non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and
warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic,
long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface,
and submarine-launched surface -to-sx}rface types).
First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit, the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest
consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or
actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which would
occasion greatest benefit to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 a).
Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :$f- PPS00362R000400070001-9
 Approved For tease 2001/12/04 : CLAWRET00362 00400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
27 December 1955
5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor)
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-
range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear
delivery vehicles, and electronics countermeasures
systems.
B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of -weapons systems requisite
for defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc against air attack (DCID 4/5,
para. ? I c). ,Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination
of scientific. research and development on:
1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, rockets
and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Guided missiles including surface-to-air and air-to-
air types.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground
control intercept, airborne, intercept, IFF, and
missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: ClSEo0362R000400070001-9
 Approved For lirrfease 2001/12/04 S& i a85S00362M00400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
27 December 1955
and communications networks; and electronics counter-
measure systems.
7., Passive defensive measures.
C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clan-
destine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against
the US or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/5, para. I d).
Particular reference is made to detection .of specific scientific and
technological accomplishments, such as the development of.
specialized weapons and the solution of the peculiar problems in
packaging, transporting, and storing that will make, such delivery
.feasible.
11. Second Priority Objectives'
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses affecting their military, economic, and political capa-
bilities (DCID 4/5, para. lI e). The priority assigned to these
strengths and weaknesses applies, in' the first instance, to the
detection of scientific and technological developments which could
Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have serious conse-
quences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of
foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion
great benefit to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 b).
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 Approved ForWease 2001/12/04: gE{,k$00362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
27 December 1955
give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such
developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelli-
gence effort will be determined by the extent to which the develop-
ment affects US national security. In addition, second priority
coverage will be -given to the scientific and technological strengths
which are basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabili-
ties and to those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave
Soviet vulnerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be
placed on:
1. Research and development which are most likely
to lead to important technological advances
a. Basic scientific research undertaken, without
specific focus on any particular application
(for example, research in solid state physics,
cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature
physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and
catalysis).
Development of new applications
of existing
scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites.
weather control, long-range transmission of useful
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: ?NE-iRS00362R000400070001-9
 Approved For%Oease 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S0036' 00400070001-9
irk
SECRET
IAC-D-50/8
27 December 1955
or destructive energy, means of influencing human
behavior, advanced communication systems. and
nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).
2. Technological developments which can affect nificantly
the economic potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(For example, automation, methods of increasing
food supply, and solar and nuclear power.)
3. Technological developments which can affect significantly
the military potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(F'or example, biological and chemical warfare,
armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.)
4. The organization, control and status of science
5.. Fields iri which technological weaknesses may reflect
,rave Sino-Soviet vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences
related to improved food supply, automatic data
processing system for air defense, and intercon-
tinental ballistic missile defense.)
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SECRET
 Approved For tease 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85SO036 400400070001-9
SECRET 1AC-D-50/8
27 December 1955
III. Third Priority Objectives
In addition to the priority objectives outlined in paras. I and
II, above, it is recognized that scientific and technological develop-
meats may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have
such significance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain
third priority objectives (DCID 4/5, para. III) are stated below:
A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and develop-
ment; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such
materials for weapons or other purposes.
Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those. which will
permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have harrgful conse-
quences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of
foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion
substantial benefits to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 c).
Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :.:CI .RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
SECRET
 AOW at
'!tel.,
to
An
th us
25X6
25X61
25X1A
. fed For Release 2001/12/04-`.-4 t P85S00362R000400070001-9
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
21 February 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Attached is a communication from the Chairmen of GMIC,
JAEIC and SEC, enclosing a joint statement by those committees of
"Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives,"
which they propose as a replacement for IAC-D-50/8 (approved by
the IAC 10 January 1956) in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National
Intelligence Objectives " (approved by the IAC 30 October 1956).
2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC
meeting for review and appropriate 'action.
Secretary
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000400070001-9
 Approved For Release 2001/~ CTA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
C IAC-D-50/8
MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
(Proposed Replacement of IAC-D-50/8,
same subject, approved by the IAC on
10 January 1956)
1. Transmitted herewith is subject statement, which (a) was
prepared jointly by the Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile
Intelligence Committee, each in its own sphere of responsibility,
and (b) is proposed to replace IAC-D-50/8 in the light of DCID 4/6,
"Priority National Intelligence Objectives," dated 30 October 1956,
2. We request that the Intelligence Advisory Committee
review the enclosure with a view to issuing it as an IAC document
to supersede IAC-D-50/8.
Lt. Colonel, USAF utiairman
Chairman Joint Atomic Energy
Guided Missile Intelligence Committee Intelligence Committee
/5/
Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee
Enclosure:
(As stated)
13 February 1957
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SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/tWc 4-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
(draft)
21 February 1957
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, paragraph 2. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
4/6 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence ob-
jectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and
production in response to requirements relating to the formulation
and execution of national security policy.
2. The Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee--each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived
the following scientific and technical intelligence objectives from
DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when
required by revision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors requiring
priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between
three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/4'. L"rA RX
DP85S00362R00040007000 -9
IAC-D-501/8
of listing within these three groups has no significance with respect
to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
1. First Priority Objectives
A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installa-
tions (DCID 4/6, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on
the scientific and technological aspects of Soviet work on:
1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and
special nuclear materials.
2. NQn-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and
warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion
therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic,
long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface,
submarine-launched surface-to-surface types, and
nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).
First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the
US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states(or
actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the
US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).
- 2 -
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SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/1 /"Cl'DP85S00362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5. Submarines (ir4uling nuclear propulsion therefor)
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-
range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear
delivery vehicles, and electronics (including com-
munications) countermeasures systems.
B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for defense against air (including missiles) attack (DCID 4/6, para.
I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of
scientific research and development on:
1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles,
rockets and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Guided missiles including surface-to-air and
air-to-air types.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000400070001-9
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/1Zlf4: -DP85S00362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground
control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and
missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers
and communications networks; and electronics
(including communications) countermeasure systems.
7. Passive defensive measures.
C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or
key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. I d). Particular
reference is made to detection of specific scientific and technological
accomplishments, such as the development of specialized weapons and
the solution of the peculiar problems in packaging, transporting, and
storing that will make such delivery feasible.
II. Second Priority Objectives'
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses substantially affecting their military, economic, and
Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US (DCID 4/6,
para. 3 b).
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 Approved For Release 2001/1 S P -RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
political capabilities, including the possibility of major technological
breakthroughs (DCID 4/6, para. II e and k). The priority assigned
to these strengths and weaknesses applies, in the first instance, to
the detection of scientific and technological developments which could
give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such
developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelligence
effort will be determined by the extent to which the development af-
fects US national security. In addition, second priority coverage
will be given to the scientific and technological strengths which are
basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabilities and to
those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave Soviet vul-
nerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be placed on:
1. Research and development which are most likely
to lead to significant technological advances
a. Basic scientific research undertaken without
specific focus on any particular application
(for example, research in solid state physics,
cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature
physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and
catalysis).
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000400070001-9
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/12/44Ct19 DX
P85SO0362R000400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
b. Development of new applications of existing
scientific knowledge (for example, earth
satellites, weather control, long-range trans-
mission of useful or destructive energy, means
of influencing human behavior, and advanced
communications systems).
2. Technological developments which can affect s ig-
nificantly the economic potential of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (For example, automation, methods
of increasing food supply, and solar and nuclear
power)
3. Technological developments which can affect
significantly the military potential of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (For example, biological and chemical
warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc. )
4. The organization, control and status of science
5. The quality and quantity of Soviet scientific and
technical manpower
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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
6. Fields in which technological weaknesses may
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences
related to improved food supply, automatic data
processing system for air defense, and inter-
continental ballistic missile defense)
III.. Third Priority Objectives'
In addition to the priority objectives outlines in paras. I and II,
above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments
may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such sig-
nificance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain third
priority objectives (DCID 4/6, para. III) are stated below.
Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them which could occasion substantial benefits to
the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 c)).
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IAC--D-50/8
First Revision
A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and
development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of
such materials for weapons or other purposes.
B. Significant scientific and technological developments in
hich affect directly the military and economic
potential.
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SECRET
 Approved For I@iease 2001/12/04tt P85S00362WO400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
F inal
5 March 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1, On 5 March the IAC approved, as amended, the statement
of "Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives
(IAC-D-50/8, First Revision, 21 February 1957), which had been
proposed as a replacement of IAC.-D-50/8 (approved by the IAC on
10 January 1956) in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelli-
gence Objectives" (approved by the IAC on 30 October 1956),
2. The attached statement of objectives, dated 5 March,
incorporates the revisions as approved by the IAC and therefore
supersedes IAC-D-50/8, dated 10 January 1956,
25X1A
Secretary
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 Approved For R *;ease 2001/12/0 P85S00362RA0400070001-9
RuAff.
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
Final
5 March 1957
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
4/6 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence ob-
jectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and
production in response to requirements relating to the formulation
and execution of national security policy.
2. The Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee--each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived
the following scientific and technical intelligence objectives from
DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when
required by revision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors requiring
priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between
three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order
Approved For Release 2001/11444 A-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9
 Approved For RG;ease 2001/1TI'O iA-RDP85SO0362ROO0400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957
of listing within these three groups has no significance with respect
to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
1. First Priority Objectives
A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installa-
tions (DCID 4/6, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on
the scientific and technological aspects of Soviet work on:
1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and
special nuclear materials.
2. Non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and
warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion
therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic,
long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface,
submarine-launched surface-to-surface types, and
nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).
First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the
US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states(or
actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the
US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).
- 2 -
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CR ET.
 Approved For Haase 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362Fi0400070001-9
SECRET,
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957
5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor)
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-
range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear
delivery vehicles, and electronics (including com-
munications) countermeasures systems.
B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for defense against air (including missiles) attack (DCID 4/6, para.
I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of
scientific research and development on:
1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles,
rockets and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Both surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
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 Approved For Base 2001/12/ d DP85S00362R 60400070001-9
IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
March 19 5 7
6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground
control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and
missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers
and communications networks; and electronics
(including communications) countermeasure systems.
7. Passive defensive measures.
C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or
key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. I d). Particular
reference is made to detection of specific scientific and technological
accomplishments, such as the development of specialized weapons and
the solution of the peculiar problems in packaging, transporting, and
storing that will make such delivery feasible,
II. Second Priority Objectives*
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses substantially affecting their military, economic, and
Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US (DCID 4/6,
para. 3 b).
Approved For Release 2001/12/04 F~85S00362R000400070001-9
 Approved For Rgjlease 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362W0400070001-9
IAC-.D- 50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957
political capabilities, including the possibility of major technological
breakthroughs (DCID 4/6, para. II e and k). The priority assigned
to these strengths and weaknesses applies, in the first instance, to
the detection of scientific and technological developments which could
give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such
developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelligence
effort will be determined by the extent to which the development af-
fects US national security. In addition, second priority coverage
will be given to the scientific and technological strengths which are
basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabilities and to
those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave Soviet vul-
nerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be placed on:
1. Research and development which are most likely
to lead to significant technological advances
a Basic scientific research undertaken without
specific focus on any particular application
(for example, research in solid state physics,
cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature
physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and
catalysisd.
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16 ET
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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957
b. Development of new applications of existing
scientific knowledge (for example, earth
satellites, weather control, long-range trans-
mission of useful or destructive energy, means
of influencing human behavior, and advanced
communications systems).
2. Technological developments which can affect si
ni#icantly the economic potential of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (For example, automation, methods
of increasing food supply, and solar and nuclear
power)
3. Technological developments which can affect
significantly the military potential of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (For example, biological and chemical
warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.
4. The, organization, control and status of science
5. The duality and quantity of Soviet scientific and
technical manpower
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5 March 19`7
6. Fields in which technological weaknesses may
reflect grave Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences
related to improved food supply, automatic data
processing system for air defense, and inter-
continental ballistic missile defense)
III. Third Priority Objectives*
In addition to the priority objectives outlines in paras. I and II,
above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments
may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such sig-
nificance as to affect US security, For that reason, certain third
priority objectives (DCID' 4/6, para. III) are stated below.
Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them which could occasion substantial benefits to
the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 c)),
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A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and
development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of
such materials for weapons or other purposes.
B. Significant scientific and technological developments in
hich affect directly the military and economic
potential.
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2 February 195
-016
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Attached is a communication from the Chairmen of GMIC,
JAEIC and SEC, enclosing a joint statement by those committees of
"Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives,"
which they propose as a replacement for IAC-D-50/8 (approved by
the IAC .10 January 1956) in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National
Intelligence Objectives " (approved by the IAC 30 October 1956).
2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC
meeting for review and appropriate activil.
Secretary
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Y
MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
(Proposed Replacement of IAC-D-50/8,
same subject, approved by the IAC on
10 January 1956)
1. Transmitted herewith is subject statement, which (a) was
prepared jointly by the Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile
Intelligence Committee, each in its own sphere of responsibility,
and (b)? is proposed to replace IAC-D-50/8 in the light of DCID 4/6,
"Priority National Intelligence Objectives, " dated 30 October 1956.
2. We request that the Intelligence Advisory Committee
review the enclosure with a view to issuing it as an IAC document
to supersede IAC-D-50/8.
/s/
/s/
it. C..oionel, USAk Chairman
Chairman Joint Atomic Energy
Guided Missile Intelligence Committee Intelligence Committee
Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee
Enclosure:
(As stated)
13 February 1957
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(T) raft)
21 February 1957
Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
4/6 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence ob-
jectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and
production in response to requirements relating to the formulation
and execution of national security policy.
2. The Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee--each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived
the following scientific and technical intelligence objectives from
DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when
required by revision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors requiring
priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between
three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order
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of listing within these three groups has no significance with respect
to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
1. First Priority Objectives
A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installa-
tions (DCID 4/6, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on
the scientific and technological aspects of Soviet work on:
1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheadp, and
special nuclear materials.
2. Non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and
warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion
therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic,
long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface,
submarine-launched surface-to-surface types, and
nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).
* First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the
US; and (Z) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states(or
actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the
US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).
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5. Submarines (ircluiing nuclear propulsion therefor)
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-
range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear
delivery vehicles, and electronics (including com-
munications) countermeasures systems.
B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite
for defense against air (including missiles) attack (DCID 4/6, para.
I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of
scientific research and development on:
1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles,
rockets and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Guided missiles including surface-to-air and
air-to-air types.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
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6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground
control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and
missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers
and communications networks; and electronics
(including communications) countermeasure systems.
7. Passive defensive measures.
C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or
key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. I d). Particular
reference is made to detection of specific scientific and technological
accomplishments, such as the development of specialized weapons and
the solution of the peculiar problems in packaging, transporting, and
storing that will make such delivery feasible.
II. Second Priority Objectives*
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses substantially affecting their military, economic, and
Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US (DCID 4/6,
para. 3 b).
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political capabilities, including the possibility of major technological
breakthroughs (DCID 4/6, para. II e and k). The priority assigned
to these strengths and weaknesses applies, in the first instance, to
the detection of scientific and technological developments which could
give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such
developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelligence
effort will be determined by the extent to which the development af-
fects US national security. In addition, second priority coverage
will be given to the scientific and technological strengths which are
basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabilities and to
those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave Soviet vul-
nerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be placed on:
1. Research and development which are most likely
to lead to significant technological advances
a. Basic scientific research undertaken without
specific focus on any particular application
(for example, research in solid state physics,
cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature
physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and
catalysis).
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b. Development of new applications of existing
scientific knowledge (for example, earth
satellites, weather control, long-range trans-
mission of useful or destructive energy, means
of influencing human behavior, and advanced
communications systems).
2. Technological developments which can affect sig-
nificantly the economic potential of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (For example, automation, methods
of increasing food supply, and solar and nuclear
power)
3. Technological developments which can affect
significantly the military potential of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (For example, biological and chemical
warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc. )
4. The organization, control and status of science
5. The quality and quantity of Soviet scientific and
technical manpower
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6. Fields in which technological weaknesses may
reflect grave Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences
related to improved food supply, automatic data
processing system for air defense, and inter-
continental ballistic missile defense)
III. Third Priority Objectives'
In addition to the priority objectives outlines in paras. I and II,
above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments
may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such sig-
nificance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain third
priority objectives (DCID 4/6, para. III) are stated below.
Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them which could occasion substantial benefits to
the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 c).).
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A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and
development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of
such materials for weapons or other purposes.
B. Significant scientific and technological developments in
hich affect directly the military and economic
potential.
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 AQ or
A /k
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CENTRALS INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IAC-D-50/7.cl
25 October 1956
r-EMO'ANDUNN. FOR TH , INTL1LIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Director of Central Intelligence Directive 4/6
Priority National Intelligence Objectives
1. The attached draft text of DCID 4/6 has been approved
by the IAC representatives.
2. This paper has boon placed on the agenda of the IAC
meeting scheduled for 10:15, Tuesday, 30 October.
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
25 October 1956
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/6
PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, paragaph 2, the following; list of priority national intelligence
objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligencE:
collection and production in response to requirements relating to the
formulation and execution of national security policy.
2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention
and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of
priority within the general priority category. Order of listing
within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation
and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of
specific items within the group.
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3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning,
this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It
will be reviewed annually, or on the request of any member of the IAC.
It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring
ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priorities
are establif$ed shall remain under continuing review. These critieria
were issued in IAC-D_5O/7, 16 August 1955, and define categories of
priority as follows:
a. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which
will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest conse -
qutnceas to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of
foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion
greatest benefit to the US.
b. Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which
will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences
for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign
states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit
to the US.
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c. Third Priority IntellifZence Objectives are those which
will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies
or actions of fcreiUn states which would have harmful consequences
to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of forein
states (or actions within then) which could occasion substantial
benefits to the US.
4.
DCID 4+/5 is hereby rescinded. 1
I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and
plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet
or Satellite armed forces. Lund to disarmament and arras inspection.
2J
b. Chinese Coma:iunist over-all politico-military strate--y,
intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities
using; Chinese Comiunist armed forces.
c. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear
attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for defense
against retaliatory fairr attack.
DCID 1+/5, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," was issued
10 October 1955.
Sections in brackets are recommended for deletion; underlined
sections are recommended as new additions.
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d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the
US or koy US overseas installations.
II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
The USSR and European Satellites
a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and
intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and
of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of CthJ NATO.
LB1oJ.
b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses
of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular
reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc co:,.lries toward the
Soviet Bloc, to weaken and disrupt ,fthe NATO alliance? US and US-
supported alliances, or to foment antagonism among /betweeJ the
Western powers and /Ksian powers7 between these powers and the
rest of the free world.
_L.
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C* Soviet (includinL Satellite) political strengths and
weaknesses: the actual locus of political power in the USSR; actual
or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling Groups;
Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character
and decree of Soviet control; the strenhs and weaknesses of the Soviet
and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffec-
tion and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.
d. The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (ircludina Satellite)
economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major
war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic develop-
ruent prograns, their ii.pler;entation, and their effect upon the economic,
political, and military stren[~th of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal communications
systems.
e. Soviet and. Satellite scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses substantially affecting, Soviet military, economic, and political
capabilities, including; the possibility of major technological break-
throughs.
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f. The general capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite
armed forces. The Far East (including South and Southeast Asia)
g. The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and
intentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and to the
situation in the Far East.
h. Major Chinese Communist international political objectives
and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed
to foment antagonism betwee;:. Western and Asian powers, and to extend
the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.
i. The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the
Chinese Communist regime: actual or potential porsonal or policy
conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the
Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual
disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland
China.
j-
Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree
of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom
of action,Land7 actual or potential strains on the relationship, and
the process of arriving at -and coordinating joint policies.
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k. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy;
plans for its development, and progress therein; scientific and
technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military
capabilities; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese
Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR.
1. The Lstren th, composition, disposition general capabilities
Land weaknessesT of the Chinese Communist armed forces. including
their strategic and teactical doctrine, their political reliability, aryl
their logistical support_T
M. The military, political, and economic strengths and
weaknesses of the North Korean regime, its political and military
objectives and intentions, Chinese Communist military and political
intentions with respect thereto, and the relative degree of Soviet
and Chinese Communist influence, LoET control, and economic activity
in North Korea.
n. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses, and
the general military capabilities, of the Viet Minh regime, the
nature of its LioliticalT relationships with. the USSR and
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with Communist China, its political and military objectives and
intentions, and its capabilities and intentions for clandestine
and subversive activity in South Vietnara, Laos, and Cambodia.
L3. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and
weaknesses of the Viet Minh armed forces, including the nature
and amount off the military aid received from Communist China and
3/
the USSR.
Cp. The political, economic, and military strengths and ,',
weaknesses of non-Commiunist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Lq. The reactions of the governments and peoples of South
and Southeast Asia to developments in Indochina and to the General
3/ Covered in revised paragraph II ra above.
J Downgrade to category III.
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threat of further Coiinunist aggrandizement in the region; strength
and cohesiveness of the SEATO alliance; Communist political and
5/
subversive capabilities in those countries
p. LFormer III cj The stability and orientation of India,
Lpolicy of the Indian governrueng with particular reference to its
position in the global balance of power, its relations with
Cumiunist China and the USSR, fi ndd its attitude toward developments
in Southeast Asia, and the progress of economic develo rarl ent_
J Downgrade to Category III.
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CForrzer sj The stability and policies of the Middle East
_ 6J
Arab L'leaG,xue~ states, Iran, and Israel, with particular reference to
d 1.. ~izcesa gas ta~~d installations, other co Atnents to the .West
the Suez situation; the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities
EMidd1c East defense p1Lm ; and both external and internal
Car.raumist influence and capabilities vulnerabilities to Corunist
propaganda and subversion, and Bloc political ana ec.onor is inducements.
Europe
tensions, to the increasing power of nuclear weapons, and to
increasing Soviet nuclear warfare capabiltbiec;the effect of
such reactions on the coherence and effectiveness of the NATO Alliance.
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen,
and the principalities and colonial or sernicolonial areas on
the Arabian Peninsula littoral.
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France's reaction
to Soviet proposals regarding Gerrianya; France's will and ability to
fulfill its NATO commitments; French policy toward North Africa parti-
cularly with respect-lo, nationalist unrest in the area French North
Africa, inciudina and Communist connections therewith. (and French
policy toward the area
u. (Former wJ The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav
government, its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the
strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses
of its armed forces.
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v. The stability of US base rights overseas; factors affecting
the security of US military bases and install.atior:s in i orei~n areas.
V. /Fouler xJ The stren;:th, cormposition, interrelationships,
ca))abilities (political, subversive) and clandestine), L7n0,7
and groups
vulnterat-Alities and tactics of Coc_munist parties/outside the Soviet
Bic and of internatinnal Coonunist front organizations, particularly
the political and
the international role of the Yugoslav Corz.:.unist party and/paramilitary
capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Couriunist parties in France
and Italy. /trends in global and local Coo munist party tactics)
X. Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts and capabilities for espionage: and
sabotage.
III. THI1) PRIORITY OBJECTIVES
Far East /the Near East, and Lfric J
a Political and economic stability of the South Korean
regime; ROTC objectives and intentions toward North Korea and the US.
b. Political and economic stability of the Chinese Nationalist
rc ;ir.a: with particular reference to L-n_a'J its objectives and intentions
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toward Coumunist China and the US and its ability to resist Coimiunist
pressures and inducements.
South and Southeast Asia
c. cForraer II pJ The political, economic, and l:ilitary
strengths and weaknesses of Cron-CowunisL7 the regimes in Vietnam,
Laos, and Car. bodia .
cl. CFormer II cl.J The stability reactions of the governments
Land people) of CSouth and Southeast Asia;/ reactions to Communist
China's developing power position (clevelopr.ients in Indochina) and to
the ;general threat of further Co;:i:iunist aggrandizement in the region;
strength and cohesiveness of the SEATO Alliance, of other regional
grouping;s, and of neutralist forces; Communist, political, and subversive
capabilities in those countries; and the area's vulnerability to Ploc
political and economic inducements.
s
e. CForiuer dJ The stability of the governments of Pakistan,
CIran, Af har:nistan, and Ceylon rPurrla] with particular reference to
Communist influence and capabilities.
Southeast Asian countries encompassed are Lurmo, Thailand, Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, the I'klrses, the Malay States,
and Singapore.
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h. The political and economic stability of Greece and Turkey.
r ~cri s - - rr~ww.r..~..
i. Fcr-cer 1j,'._7 The Cyprus issue, particularly its effect on the
defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, fnd on the Balkan Alliance and
on Greek and Turkish relations with eachmother,.NJATO,, and the US.
rrr r~r+ +rr.r rrr....rrrrn i v..r~..+~ w.r -.rrr+w.e..
j . L#'ormer ij Anti-American sentiment in Iceland and 67olitical
opposition t policies toward NATO he continued presence of the US-
manned NATO airbase at Keflavik ; also extent of Communist influence
grade union movemeng and stability of the economy.
rarrrrirra
14
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k. CForuer e_j The stability and policies of independent North
African states. Racial tensions Chatred and political unrest throw ho U
Cit Africa Ceouth of the SaharJ, with particular reference to areas
of L possible violent unrest militant nationalism and availability to the
US of strateaic materials; vulnerabilities to anti-Western econouic and
other influences and the extent and nature of these influences.
1. L Ferrier J j The dovelopuent of militant nationalism) in Latin
L :erica, including the Caarrihhear countries and European dependencies,
with particular respect to anti-US sentiment arid Cowunist exploitation
thereof; the availability to the US of strategic materials in Latin
.fmrierica.
U. CFormer kJ The stability and policy of the governments
of Brazil, Ar;entina, Cant Chile, and Venezuela.
General
/i. Ecorsonic conditions and trends in backward countries, particu-
larly as they affect vulnerabilities to Comunist propaganda on the one
hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other/
r.;. CForrrer T-,.7 Nora-Soviet nuclear energy research and develop-
went; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials
for weapons or other purposes.
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16 August 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
criteria for Determining
Priority National Intelligence Objectives
1. On 16 August the IAC approved the attached statement of criteria
to be used in determining the priority national intelligence objectives
based on the comprehensive objectives set forth in DCID l/3.
2. These criteria mill therefore be used in arriving at a revision
of the present list of priority objectives as set forth in DCLD 4/)4 and
in making subsegient semi-annual revisions.
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IAC-D-50/7
16 August 1955
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be directly
related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution
of national security policy. They should flow directly from the intel-
ligence mission as set forth by the NSC and are therefore merely more
detailed specifications of the intelligence required to fulfill that
mission. They should provide the basis for determining appropriate
research and collection requirements.
2. Most of the intelligence required in the formulation and
execution of national security policy will be the product of normal
intelligence collection and research, Priority National Intelligence
Objectives should be limited to those critical factors which require
special attention and effort.
3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning,
a statement of Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be
designed to remain valid over an extended period. It should therefore
exclude topics of urgent, but transitory, interest, which will require
and receive ad hoc treatment in any case.
4. Broad generalities are of little practical use as priority
guidance to collection and research. Priority National Intelligence
Objectives should therefore be specific enough to provide guidance for
planning the allocation of collection and research resources, but not
so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection re-
quirements.
5. Although all items in a statement of priority National Intel-
ligence Objectives should be worthy of special attention, it is obvious
that some will be of greater urgency or importance than others. Any
listing of such objectives must be based on an analysis of the iDrld
situation and US security interests and should be reviewed semi-annually.
The following criteria will serve as guidance for determining the relative
importance of Priority National Intelligence Objectives.
1. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which
will permit the US: (a) to anticipate and counter those
policies or actions of #breign states which would occasion
gravest consequences to the US; and (b) to stimulate poli-
cies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them)
which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.
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16 August 1955
II. Second Priority Intelligence objectives are those which
will permit the US: (a) to anticipate and counter those
policies or actions of foreign states which would have
serious consequences for the US; and (b) to stimulate
policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within
them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.
III. Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which
will permit the US: (a) to anticipate and counter those
policies or actions of foreign states which would have
_harmful consequences to the US; and (b) to stimulate
policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within
them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the
US.
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IAC-D-50/6
29 March 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Release to Overseas Activities of
DCID 4/3 "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives" and
DCID 4/4 "Priority National Intelligence Objectives"
1. This statement is issued in view of the interest manifested
by the several intelligence agencies in releasing DCID's 4/3 and 4/4
(titles as above) to their overseas activities.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence interposes no objection
to such release of these documents under applicable security
regulations. The same controls will be applicable to these documents
as are prescribed for National Intelligence as set forth in IAC-D-69/2,
22 June 1953. Each of the IAC agencies is therefore authorized to
send copies of these documents to its overseas intelligence activities
whenever it considers it desirable to do so.
3. Additional copies of these documents may be obtained
from the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
Secretary
IAC-D-50/6
29 March 1955
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11 June 1956
Paper on Intelligence Requirements and Collection Tasks in
Relation to Priority National Intelligence - DCID 4/5
1. The attached paper was submitted to the Director of
Central Intelligence by Special Assistant to the Director for Planning
and Coordination, in fulfillment of 25X1A
the assignment explained to the IAC in IAC-D-50/5, 20 January 1955.
In the preparation of this paper informal consultation was held by
office with those principally interested, Army, Navy,
Air Force and State, and the paper is designed to reflect the
various facts obtained in that consultation.
2. The Director has accepted this report and requested that
it be disseminated to the IAC members for their information. It will
not be placed on the agenda except at the request of a member of the
IAC.
Secretary
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0 11 June 1956
P
Y
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS A'TD COLLECTION TASKS IN
RELATION TO PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE --
DCID 4/5
25 May 1956
1. You requested that, in collaboration with representatives
of IAC agencies, I conduct a review of the existing provisions for the
development and coordination of information requirements and col-
lection tasks in conformity with established Priority National Intelligence
Objectives. This was explained to the IAC in IAC-D-50/5, 20 January
1955.
2. Description of the existing provisions:
a. Priority National Intelligence Objectives, as approved
by the IAC and noted by the NSC, authorize the fundamental
direction which the community's intelligence production and
collection efforts should take. They do not, however, serve
as the sole or exclusive guide to the work of either research
or collection offices, each of which devotes a portion of its
effort to meeting "departmental" intelligence needs. These
"departmental" intelligence needs coincide in many instances
with the needs expressed in the Priority National Intelligence
Objectives.
b. In the course of research to meet Priority National
Intelligence Objectives and departmental needs, research
offices ascertain gaps in available information which require
collection action to fill. Such research will in certain fields
be subject to some coordination: for atomic energy thru
JAEIC; for science and technology, SEC; for guided missiles,
GMIC; for economics, EIC; and for basic intelligence, NIS.
Such committees have in the past engaged in some coordina-
tion of requirements, most usefully in regard to those
requirements rating a high priority. Requirements thus
endorsed are translated into requests for collection action
by the agency responsible for the research.
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c. Available to all research offices are "Requirements
Officers" who serve as middlemen between research and
collection components. Their services are essential because
of the size and complexity of our intelligence system which
makes extensive direct individual contact between analysts
and collectors administratively unfeasible. - It is the function
of these Requirements Officers to insure (a) that Washington
resources have been exploited before requests are sent to the
field; (b) that the desired information is expressed in the form
most clearly understandable and usable by the collector(s);
and (c) that the request for information does not duplicate
other requests, It must be remembered that the research
officer is responsible for determining the substance of the
information desired. The Requirements Officer can con-
tribute thru,his understanding of research needs and
collection machinery and capabilities and can frequently
suggest other informational needs and other possible sources.
The need expressed by the analyst in turn depends upon the
research tasks to which he has been assigned. It should
also be noted that the "coordination" performed by these
Requirements Officers is essentially limited to requests
originating within their own research components.
d. The collection offices of the IAC agencies also
include "requirements" elements whose task it is to act as
a focal point in dealing with research components and further
to insure that any given requirement does not duplicate one
Requirements emanating from the research components of CIA, or
submitted from any part of the intelligence community to a CIA
collection facility are subject d to a further "coordination" by the
Office of Central Reference.'Whis office reviews the selection
made by the research office of the collector most appropriate to
obtain the desired information, makes a determination of the
collector to be requested to assume the responsibility and
insures that a request does not unprofitably duplicate other
requests already levied"
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11 June 1956
which has already been received and acted upon. They are
usually a part of the collecting offices reports machinery
which engages in a cyclical system of requirements, re-
ports, and evaluations. It should be noted that these officers
do not decide if collection will be undertaken. That is a
command decision of collection supervisors, depending upon
the capacity'to collect and his other responsibilities.
3. The above outline delineates the general procedure by which
the need of an analyst for information is transmitted to a collector
whose task it is to obtain the information. There are, of course,
exceptions and special interagency arrangements have been established
which permit decisions on priorities for collection as limited resources
might require: USCIB and IPC.
4. In considering the problem posed in IAC-D-50/5 in the light
of the procedures generally followed by the intelligence community as
outlined above, certain lines of inquiry are explored below:
a. A review of the existing provisions for the develop-
ment and coordination of information requirements in
conformity with Priority National Intelligence Objectives is
not concerned basically with the activities of requirements
officers attached either to research or to collection elements
since these officers do not have the primary responsibility
for determining the substance of requirements, or whether
collection will be undertaken. Rather, it is their task to
establish efficient and effective arrangements to those
collectors who may be able to meet the need expressed in
the requirements. Such a review, rather, must directly
involve the administration and management of research
components, since the substance of requirements stems
principally from the tasks assigned the research components
by their chiefs and the collection of information finally de-
pends on the inherent capabilities and the administration of
the collection facilities. In other words, the degree to which
requirements are "developed and coordinated" in conformity
with Priority National Intelligence Objectives depends upon
the degree to which the tasks undertaken by the research
components have been developed and coordinated in con-
formity with the Objectives.
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11 June 1956
b. In the present framework of the intelligence
community, collection tasks, developed in accordance
with the needs of the research components, are allocated
to collectors within certain areas of responsibility in
keeping with the NSCIDs (NSCID 2, 5, 7 etc.) and DCIDs.
The individual collection office, acting within the sphere
assigned to it by appropriate directives, endeavors to
meet the needs expressed to it by research offices trans-
lating requirements into requests for collection action by
the responsible agency. A review of the "development of
collection tasks" thus again leads back to a review of the
administration and direction given to research components,
from which derive the needs which collectors try to meet.
c. Collection offices do not and in the nature of things
cannot concentrate all their efforts, plan their activities,
and strive to build their resources toward meeting Priority
National Intelligence Objectives. Each collection facility has
been allocated a definite sphere of responsibility by NSCID,
and must operate within that sphere. External considera-
tions place definite limitations upon each collector. The
Department of State, for example, is responsible for overt.
collection overseas of political information. If requirements
stemming from research to meet Priority National Intelli-
gence Objectives were the primary or only factor governing
the allocation of the political reporting resources of the
Department, the distribution of overseas personnel of the
Foreign Service would be vastly different from what it
actually is. In reality, however, the Department's alloca -
tion of resources is dictated by such factors as the
limitation on the number of diplomatic personnel who can
be stationed at posts behind the Iron Curtain, limitations
on the useful information which such personnel are able to
collect, and by other demands for political information not
related to Priority National Intelligence Objectives. FI
provides an equally striking example of the same phenomenon.
A substantial portion of FI resources are necessarily al-
located to areas and activities which, though not directly
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11 June 1956
related to Priority National Intelligence Objectives
produce information of use in important research of
lower over-all priority.
5. The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the
allocation of effort within his collection resources to various tasks
is a command decision by the Chief of each collection facility, in
the light of all the factors affecting the capabilities and limitations
of the facility, as well as all of the requirements placed upon it.
6. Insofar as collectors are faced with competition for their
capabilities, they might well inquire of the originator of the require-
ments whether they are identifiable as supporting PNIOs and if so,
which PNIO. This procedure has, in fact, been applied thru the IPC
and to a certain extent the USCIB.
7. NSCIDs and other directives specify areas of responsibility
among collectors, either by subject area (NSCID 2, 10), or by method
of collection (NSCID 5, 7). NSCID 2 and DCID 2/1 provide a mechanism
for coordinating overt collection tasks overseas. With regard to the
coordinating responsibility assigned to Chiefs of Mission overseas by
DCID 2/1, the Department of State has, over the years, endeavored to
insure that coordination is effected thru procedures appropriate to
each post. As a result of these efforts, DCID 2/1 is now, in general,
being implemented in a reasonably satisfactory .manner. The IAC
agencies under the leadership of the Department of State have in the
last two years sent instructions to their representatives urging co-
ordination of collection requirements as received in the field in order
to obtain maximum benefit from the capabilities available. The
replies give evidence that the field is complying with those instructions.
I do not believe a further review of overseas coordination, as it
pertains to the problem at hand, is required. NSCID-5 places upon
the DCI responsibility for coordinating overt and covert collection
activity. This is accomplished for the DCI principally in the field
thru coordination between the representative at each post, and
the representatives of other agencies, and at headquarters by CIA
not accepting for clandestine collection by CIA requirements which
can be obtained thru overt means.
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8. At the outset of its Post Mortem experience the IAC requested
that the members prepare a single report on actions they had taken in
pursuance of a Post Mortem. This was done in the case of China--
SE 27 (for report see IAC-D-57/1). Thereafter and in lieu thereof,
the agencies have been asked in response to each Post Mortem to take
such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem
appropriate. It is presumed that "such action" initially means research
with requirements for collection following as necessary. While the
original procedure might be profitably reinstituted it would not be
responsive to the problem at hand inasmuch as the requirements
emerging from Post Mortems are not necessarily, and in many cases
are not, in line with PNIOs. Post Mortem review is only one of the
measures taken by research offices to initiate appropriate action to
fill gaps which become obvious in the course of research. The re-
establishment of the original Post Mortem procedure is not recommended
as a means of making collection more responsive to PNIOs.
9. There is a possibility that the IAC might establish a sub-
committee to, expand the PNIOs into an IAC approved requirements
list in an effort to insure that requirements are indeed responsive to
PNIOs. However, valid requirements cannot be developed in a
vacuum; they must relate to an actual research need. The subject
areas regarding which the IAC agencies can usefully coordinate their
research programs (and thus their requirements) in terms of PNIOs
have already been identified and subcommittees established, and
additional coordination can be directed by the IAC as needed. It is
believed unnecessary and unwise to try to effect "coordination" where
a major overlap of interests does not exist.
10. Each agency or research component thereof has stated that
its research program is responsive to PNIOs. Such programs will be
affected as changes occur in national problems as reflected by needs
of the NSC, its Planning Board, or individual operating agencies, as
well as by revisions of the PNIOs. A new IAC subcommittee either to
coordinate research programs over-all or to insure that research
programs are responsive to PNIOs is not recommended.
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11. Summary Conclusion: That no new provisions are required
for the development and coordination of information requirements and
collection tasks in conformity with DCID 4/5.
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination
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2gCUtivA Re3:stry
/4c ha
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IMV"W
60'3, p. 7
;A -D-50/3 listed 3a r 3
of the footnotes
by,
of fog categor'iop of priority inotead of threes the
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ory to owe between the preeont T TI wA to i n c-lnde
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25X1A
25X1A
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IAC-D-50/5
20 January 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Review of Provisions for the Development and
Coordination of Specific Information Requirements and
Collection Tasks
1. In order to insure that DCID4/4 "Priority National
Intelligence Objectives", approved by the IAC on 14 December 1954,
is fully effective, it is desirable to review the existing provisions
for the development and coordination of information requirements
and collection tasks in conformity with established priority national
intelligence objectives.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence has, therefore,
assigned Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and oor ination, to conduct such a review in
collaboration with the IAC agencies.
3. It is requested that you designate a representative to work
with him on this problem. The names of designees may be 25X1A
communicated to the Secretariat, Code 25X1A
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
cc: Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination
'3i/77o6,? ez Y 9-/)
25X1A
,a,/ts'Sv9 ,t-Q -P-)
.1-16 / 3 #/ 714613 Al .41 J
9lde /Y 1/ ~e2 6 7 J 1. ,/.(/JS -t-x. .)
qs 4F
,3,h6'6 j IAC-D-50/5 25X1A
1955
7.0 Januar
y
'
1
J. 34
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IAC-D-50/3
30 November 1954
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
National Intelligence Objectives
1. The attached paper has been prepared pursuant to the
action of the IAC on 4 August 1953. (IAC-M-115, paragraphs 7
and 8. )
2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IA.C
meeting scheduled for 7 December 1954.
Secretary
IAC-D-50/3
30 November 1954
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
33 November 1951
NATIONTA.L INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
THE PROBLEM
To review DCID4 /1 and DCID-L /2 (Second Revision)o in the light
of NSCID-., and to submit recommendations regarding their basic
revision. (IAC-11-115, L. August 1953, paragraphs 7 and 8.)
That DCID-L/1 and DCID-4/2 (Second Revision) be rescinded.
2., That the draft DCID-4/3 in Appendix A be approved as a
response to the first requirement of NSCID-1.
3. That the draft DCID-4/4 in Appendix B be approved as a
response to the second requirement in NSCID-4.
SECRET
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I~ That the current DCID on priority national 'intelligence
objectives be reviewed at least annually hereafter.
5. That the statement of criteria in Appendix d be approved
as guidance for such a review.
S ;CRET
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DRAFT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INT ;LLIGLL?CE DIRECTIVE No. 4/3
COMPREiENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No* 4, paragraph 1, the following comprehensive national intelligence
objectives, generall~y applicable to 4.1 foreign countries and areas,
are hereby established;
a. Basic descriptive data as outlined in NIS Standard
Instructions,
b, Social, economic, and political stability and trends of
development; susceptibility to foreign influence or
coercion; vulnerability to subversion?
c. Military capabilities and vulnerabilities, offensive
and defensive, including economic, scientific and
technical$, and psychological factors.
d. Capabilities to influence, coerce, or subvert other
governments and peoples; capabilities for espionage,
sabotage, and other clandestine operations in other countries.
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e. Foreign policy, including strategic concepts and
intentions; international alignment, with particular
reference to alignment with or against the US or
the USSR; disposition and intention to interfere
in the internal affairs of other states; preparation for
and intention to resort to armed action against other
states.
2. Priority national intelligence objectives, with reference
to specific countries and subjects, will be set forth in a separate
DCID.
3. DCID-4/1 "National Intelligence Objectives," 5 February 19L8,
is hereby rescinded.
-4 -
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APPENDIX B
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN'TELLIGENC'E DIRECTIVE No. 4/4
PRIORITY N TION.cL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. t, paragraph 2, the following list of priority
national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for
the coordination of intelligence collection &nd production in
response to requirements relating to the formulation and
execution of national security policy.
2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention
and effort. Distinction is made, however,. between three levels of
priority within the general priority category. Order of listing
within these three groups is a matter 'of convenience in presentation
and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of
specific items within the group.
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3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning,
this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period.
It will be reviewed at least annually. It is recognized that urgent
interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment.
4. DCID-4/2 is hereby rescinded.*
I. HIGHEST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES: Those of such critical importance
as to require a maximum intelligence effort.
a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and
plans, particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate
hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.
b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, in-
tentions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions
and plans to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed
forces.
*NOTE: DCID-4/2, "Priority List of Critical National Intelligence
Objectives," was issued 28 September 1950 and revised 12 June
1952 and 4 August 1953.
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c.* Soviet development, production, and employment of weapons
and other components of weapons systems requisite for nu-
clearn attack on the.United States and/or key US overseas
installations or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air
attack. Particular reference is made to the development,
production, and employment of nuclear weapons; aircraft,
guided missiles, and related base facilities; and electronic
components of air defense systems.
d. Soviet operational capabilities for the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; Soviet in-
tentions to deliver such an attack.
NOTE: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience
in presentation and has no significance with respect to the
relative priority of specific items within that category.
* The representatives of G-2, ONI', APOIN, and JIG consider this item
too restricted. They would amend it to cover all forms of attack
by deleting the words "nuclear" (in line 2) and "air" (in line 1+).
They would also raise item II(f) to Category I.
The State representative supports the text as it stands, but
considers that, if item II(f) is raised to Category I, item II(b)
should be also.
The Board considers that, if items II(b) and II(f) are raised
to Category I, items II(a), 11(c), II(d), and II(e) should be also.
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II. HIGH PRIORITY OBJECTIVES; Those of such high importance as to
warrant an intensive intelligence effort.
The USSR and European Satellites
a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and in-
tentions, of US and allied economic and political stability,
and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of
the NATO Bloc.
b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses
of action, including economic policies and actions, with
particular reference to courses designed to weaken and dis-
rupt the NATO alliance or to foment antagonism between
Western and Asian powers.
C. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus
of political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal
or policy conflicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite
relations, with particular reference to the character and
degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the
NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in
presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative
priority of specific items within that category.
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Soviet and satellite apparatus of police control; the ex-
tent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in
the Soviet and Satellite populations.
d. The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy,
with particular reference to its ability to support a
major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of
current economic development programs, their implementation,
and their effect upon the economic, political, and military
strength of the Soviet Bloc.
e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and
weaknesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.
f. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and
weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including
their strat Lric and tactical doctrine, their political reli-
ability, that r logistical support, and military production
and stockpi ing.
NOTE: cjAz4ar, of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience
in presentation and has no significane with respect to the re-
lative priority of specific items within that category.
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The Far East (including Southeast Asia)
g. The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and in-
tentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and
h. Major Chinese Communist international political objectives
and courses of action, with particular reference to courses
designed to foment antagonism between Western and Asian
powers and to extend the area of Communist influence-and
control in Asia.
i. The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the
Chinese Communist regime: actual or potential personal or
policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and
weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police
control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential
resistance in the population of mainland China.
NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience
in presentation and has no significance with respect to the rela-
tive priority of specific items within that category.
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J. Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the
degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of
Chinese Communist freedom of action, and actual or poten-
tial strains on the relationship.
k. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist
economy; plans for its development, and progress therein;
scientific and technological strengths and weaknesses
affecting economic and military capabilities; the capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal
communications and communications with the USSR.
1. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and
weaknesses of the Chinese Communist armed forces, including
their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political
reliability, and their logistical support.
M. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the
North Korean regime, and the relative degree of Soviet and
Chinese Communist influence or control in North Korea.
NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience
in presentation and has no significance with respect to the
r.-?.!hive priority of specific items within that category.
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ii. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and
weaknesses of the North Korean armed forces, including their
political reliability and their logistical support.
o. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the
Viet Minh regime, the nature of its political relationships
with the USSR and with Communist China, and its political
and military objectives.
The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and
weaknesses of the Viet Minh armed forces, including the
nature and amount of the military aid received from Communist
China and the USSR.
q. The Political, economic, and military strengths and weak-
nesses of non-Com-,:unist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
r. The reactions of the governments and peoples of South and
Southeast Asia to developments in Indochina and to the
general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region;
Coi_,unist political and subversive capabilities in those countries.
NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a natter of convenience
in pre: entation and has no significence with respect to the
relative priority of specific items within that category.
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NODE: Order of listing within Crtegory II is a matter of convenionee
in prsentation and has no significance with mspact to the
relative priority of specific items within that category.
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V. The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities
(political, subversive, and clandestine), and vulnerabilities
of major Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc and of
international Communist front organizations, particularly the
political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities
of the Communist parties in France and Italy; trends in
global and local Communist party tactics.
III. LOWER PRIORITY OBJECTIVES: Those of sufficient importance to
warrant priority in relation to normal coverage.
South Asia, the Near East, and Africa
a. The policy of the Indian Government, with particular re-
ference to its position in the global balance of power,
Ncyir^Or:.er of lis `zng within Category III is a matter of convenience
in presentnn.tior. and has no significance with respect to the
relative p_ iority of specific items within that category.
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its relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its
attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.
b. The stability of the Government of Iran, with particular
reference to Tudeh strength and capabilities.
C. Arab-Israeli relations, with particular reference to the
possibility of an outbreak of open warfare.
d. The stability and policy of the Egyptian Government, with
particular reference to developments relating to Middle
East defense plans, the Suez base, and the Sudan.
e. Nationalist unrest in French North Africa and Communist
connections therewith.
NOTE: order of listing within Category III is a matter of convenience
in presentation and has no significance with respect to the
relative priority of specific items within that category.
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h. The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav Government,
its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the
strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and
weaknesses of its armed forces.
in America
i. The development of railitant nationalism in Latin America,
and Communist exploitation of this trend.
J.
Economic conditions and trends in backward countries,
particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist
propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United
States and the West on the other.
k. Non-Soviet nuclear energy research and development; the pro-
relative priority of specific items within that category.
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duction of fissionable materials and the use of such materials
for weapons or other purposes.
order of listing within Category III is a matter of convenience
in presentation and has no significance with respect to the
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APPENDIX C
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLI{ENCE
OBE IVE
1. Priority national intelligence objectives should be
directly related to the. intelligence required in the formulation
and execution of national security policy. NSC 162/2, paragraph
lOa (which is reproduced in IAC-D.:55/7 ffina7, page 1), provides
general guidance in this respect. More specific guidance can be
obtained by analysis of the basic policy objectives set forth in NSC
162/2 and in other NSC documents, and by direct consultation with
the NSC Planning Board,
2. Most of the intelligence required in the formulation
and execution of national security policy will be the product of
normal intelligence collection and research. Priority national
intelligence objectives should be limited to those critical
factors which require special attention and effort.
3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning,
a statement of priority national intelligence objectives should be
designed to remain valid over an extended period. It should therefore
exclude topics of urgent current, but tra?asitoiy, interest, which
will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case.
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4. Broad generalities are of little practical use as priority
guidance to collection and research. Priority intelligence objectives
should therefore be reasonably specific. On the other hand,
it must be recognized that such objectives cannot serve as specific
collection requirements. The translation of priority national
intelligence objectives into spec4!ic information requirements requires
further analysis by research personnel; the translation of specific
information requirements into specific tasks of collection requires
further analysis by collection personnel.
5. By definition, all items in a statement of priority
national intelligence objectives should be worthy of special
attention, but it is obvious that some will be of greater urgency
or importance than others. Some means of indicating priority within
the gen,::ralpriority categor7 is therefore necessary, but care must be
exercised lest the system adopted should, in actual effect, deny priority
to a high priority objective. For exa,iiple, a highly schematic arrange-
ment based on country priorities would have the effect of giving a
low priority topic relating to a first priority country a higher priority
than a first priority topic relating to a lower priority country, which
\ might well not represent their true order of importance, This difficulty
can be avoided by recognizing levels of priority within the general
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priority category, with topics relating to a particular country entered
at any appropriate level, as in Appendix Be This system would require
the maximum exercise of judgment in relation to each item, but
nevertheless, for the reason given, is preferable to any rigidly
schematic system based, in the first instance, on country priorities.
6.. Recapitulation: Priority national intelligence objectives
should be:
a. Directly relate. to the intelligence required in the
formulation and execution of national security policy.
b. Limited to pressing substantive intelligence problems.
c. Designed to remain valid over an extended period.
d. Expressed in reasonably specific terms (but not as a
final formulation of specific collection requirements).
e, Stated in such a way as to indicate broad levels of
priority within the general priority category (but not
in so rigidly schematic a manner as to distort the
rel.itive priority of specific objectives).
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SECURITY INFORMATION
I A C - D - 5 0 / 2
5 August 1953
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives
DCID 4/2 (Second Revision)
At its meeting of 4 August 1953 (IAC-M-115) the IAC
approved a Second Revision of DCID 4/2. This revision,
attached as Tab A, introduces a new paragraph 3. Present
paragraphs 4 through 8 were formerly numbered 3 through 7.
Secretary
I A C - D - 5 0 / 2
5 August 1953
z ~mac.
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SECURITY INFORMATION To
IAC-D-50/2
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
NO. 4/2 (SECOND REVISION)
Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives
(Revised 8/4/53)
In accordance with DCID 4/1, paragraph 3, the following list
in order of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with
respect to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China)
is established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collec-
tion of information and to the production of intelligence concerning
Soviet and Satellite capabilities and intentions for:
1. taking direct military action against the Continental
United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and
Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas
peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;
3. conducting clandestine attack by mass destruction weapons
against the Continental United States, vital U. S. possessions, areas
peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;
4. interfering with U. S. strategic air attack;
5. interfering with U. S. movement of men and material by
water transport;
6. production and stockpiling, including location of instal-
lations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical
weapons and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;
7. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to
U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite
Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage
objectives ;
8. interfering with U. S. political, psychological and economic
courses of action for the achievement of critical U. S. aims and
objectives.
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IAC-D-50/1
5 June 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CRITICAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
In pursuance of the action of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee at its meeting of 22 May 1952 (IAC M-71), the
Interagency Priority Committee has prepared the attached
revision of DCID 4;2 and recommends its approval by the IAC.
Secretary
S-E-C-R-E=
IAC-D-50 1
5 June 1952
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SECRET IAC -D - 501
DCI' 4/2 5 June 1952
PROPOSED DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1i/2 (REVISED)
PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
Ad.dition.s are underlined; deletions in brackets)
In accordance with DCI li./l, paragraph 3, the following list in
order of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with
respect to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China) is
established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection
of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet
and Satellite capabilities and intentions for:
1. taking direct military action against the Continental
United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and
Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas
peripheral, to the Soviet Orb_ !.t Union r, and Western Europe;
3. interfering with U. S. strategic air attack;
l+. interfering with U. S. movelAent of men and material by
water transport;
5. production and stockpiling, including location of
installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons,
other critical weapons and equipment, and critical transpor-
tation equipment;
S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-50 1
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IAC-D-.50/1
5 June 1952
6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to
U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and
Satellite Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and
espionage objectives;
7. interfering with U. S, political, psychological, and
economic courses of action for the achievement of critical
U. S. aims and objectives.
WALTER B SMITH
Director of Central. Intelligence
SECPET
DCI 7+/2
S -E -C -R -E -T
TAC -n 50/
5 June 1952
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IAC-D -50
19 May 1952
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.
Joint Intelligence Committee
JICM-309-52
2 May 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR THE, CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Subject: Critical National Intelligence Objectives
with Respect to Communist China
In view of the increasing military strength of
Comtainist China, it is requested that the Intelligence Advisory
Committee prepare a priority list of critical national intelli-
gence objectives with respect to Communist China under the same
procedures as those used to establish DCI )4/2, 28 September 3.950.
/s
S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC -D-50
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7 TAB B
S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC -D - 50
19 May 1952
DEVELOPMENT OF DCID 4/2
1. DCID 4/2 was proposed initially in an Air Force request of
10 July 1950 that the IAC prepare a list of "Critical National. Intel-
ligence Objectives with respect to the USSR," giving the highest
possible priority to the Defense Department list which had been
approved by the JIC on 22 May 1950.
2. The Air Force felt that a National List was necessary "in
order to definitely focus the attention of the intelligence collec-
tion resources of all IAC agencies on the objectives which are
presently of highest priority and critical character with respect
to national. security." Their memorandum further stated,: "The
objectives, a collection effort is required beyond the limited
overt operations participated in by the service intelligence agencies,
1and beyond the authority of the purely military representation on
the United States Communications Intelligence Board which states
the priorities of the national commmunications intelligence effort."
3. The State Department and the overt collection units of CIA
felt that they were already doing what they could to collect this
information and that such a list would not help since such exact
priorities were not a problem to them. Their needs could be met by
establishing categories, by priority, of intelligence needs, and it
was unnecessary to rank the items in the first category. It is
believed that this comment also applied to the communications intel-
ligence effort. However, felt that a list of national intel-
ligence objectiv J_d give them a tool. with which to decide
pressing questions of priority between the several agencies.
4. After informal consultation the IAC agreed _b-_ut_ 21 July
that such a list should be developed. State, AEC, and F-BI submitted
their lists to CIA which combined. them. with its own lists and the JIC
paper and submitted a draft for consideration of IAC representatives
in mid-August 1950. The IAC members approved the final redraft by
memorandum on 28 September 1950.
5. In retrospect it is not thought that any of the collectors
have changed their views on the utility of DCID 4/2. considers 25X1D
it to be most useful to them. With the consent of IP i, has been
inter reted broadly to apply to the Soviet European Orbit and as appli-
cable s also applied it with respect to Communist China--thus
in fa ady giving military requests a priority over economic,
political, and other requirements.
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19 May 1950
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IAC-D-50
19 May 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CRITICAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA
1. The attached memorandum (TAB A) has been received
from the Secretary of the JIC.
2. The background of DCID 4/2 is briefly set forth for
information in TAB B.
Recommendation:
3. That if any formal action is desired, DCII) 4/2 be
amended, with appropriate modifications, to cover all of the
Soviet Orbit, including Communist China.
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-50
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IAC -D-49
21 April 1952
PROPOSED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
PROBABLE DEVELOPMEWS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND SPANISH MOROCCO
The following proposal is submitted by the National Estimates
Board for consideration of the IAC.
PROBLEM:
1. To initiate a National Intelligence Estimate on probable
developments in French North Africa and Spanish Morocco.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:
2. The State Department is preparing a draft NSC paper on
French North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and Libya. There is no
National Intelligence Estimate on this area.
DISCUSSION:
3. The current tension and outbreaks in Tunisia and earlier
outbreaks in Morocco are symptoms of the growing nationalism in
French North Africa which is creating increasingly serious problems
for France and potentially for the U. S. Growing friction between
the French and powerful local nationalist elements in the area may
lead to further outbreaks with serious repercussions, particularly
since the North African nationalists are being backed by the Arab-
Asian bloc in the U.N. Complications have also arisen as a result
of Spanish policy toward the Arabs, and recent developments regard-
ing Tangiers.
4+. The Board of National Estimates believes that the probable
future development of nationalism in the area, probable French and
Spanish ability to cope with this development, and the implications
for. U.S. interests are appropriate subjects for an early NIE. Such
an estimate would serve as essential background for NSC considerate
of the problem.
5. Although it is presently planned to include Libya in the
NSC paper, the Board believes that the NIE need only cover French
North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and Tangier. Not only is the Libyan
problem more closely akin to those of the Arab States and more
properly treated in that context but there is not the same need for
national intelligence backing on this area. !ffe -ate draftsmen
of the NSC paper have concurred informally with the omission of
Libya.
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IAC -D-4()
2:L April 1952
6. The Board believes that the estimate should have no fixed
time limit, but should look as far ahead as seems feasible. This
is consistent with the long terns nature of the draft NSC policies
which will be considered and with the general desirability of longer
range estimates.
7. Intelligence representatives of the Department of State,
upon whom the main estimative burden would fall, informally concur
in the desirability of this estimate. Since the tentative target
date for completion of the State draft NSC paper is 1 July, the
Board believes that the NIE should.meet the same deadline.
RECOMMENDATION:
3. That the DCI request the IAC to approve initiation of the
following estimate:
NI:f-69: Probable Developments in French and Spanish North
Africa.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
S -E -C -R-E -T
IAC. D 49
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IAC -D -47
14 April 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CENTRAL ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT ANALYSIS GROUP
The attached paper will be placed on the IAC Agenda
for Thursday, 21E April 1952, for consideration.
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
S -E-C -R-E -T
IAC D -1 7 -
14 April 1952
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IAC -D -47
14 April 1952
CENTRAL ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT ANALYSIS GROUP
1. There is a need to strengthen the present electronic (ECM)
intercept program by providing a suitable mechanism for prompt and
thorough exploitation of the available electronic intercept material
on an all source basis and of rapid feedback of evaluated intelligence
for guidance to the operational intercept activities.
2. The importance of electronic intercept as the most reliable
intelligence source for determining Soviet electronic capabilities is
recognized by all intelligence agencies. In this connection IAC sup-
port is needed for a program which will provide for more effective
exploitation of electronic intercept material.
3. The enclosure "Review of Electronic Intercept and Analysis
Activities" discusses the present methods of handling electronic inter-
cept information and points out the need for a centrally located group
to expedite this work.
4. It is recommended that the IAC lend its support to the immediate
establishment of a central electronic intercept analysis group in or
around Washington. It is suggested further, that the direct adminis-
trative responsibility for the organization and operation of such group
be assigned to the Navy, which has suitable space and available facil-
ities at the Naval Communication Annex.
5. Detailed recommendations are set forth on page ii..
S -E-C-R-E-T
IAC -D
14 April 1952
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IAC -D -~-7
14 April 1952
Review of Electronic Intercept Analysis
and Evaluation Activities
1. There has been much concern in the intelligence community
recently with attempts to estimate Soviet capabilities in air defense
as a key factor in the preparation of national estimates. The recent
intelligence from Korea makes the situation particularly urgent. Of
the information necessary to make a sound estimate of Soviet air defense
capabilities the greatest uncertainties concern the electronic systems
and particularly the components essential to early warning, ground con-
trol of interception (including both the radar and the communications
links), airborne radar interception, and possible infrared or other
passive means of interception. All of these electronic devices trans-
mit or receive electromagnetic waves as an essential to their basic
function. The electromagnetic radiations from enemy devices are sus-
ceptible to being received by proper receiving equipment and to sub-
sequent analysis revealing much valuable information concerning the
capabilities and limitations of the enemy's all-weather air defense.
2. Recognizing the potentialities for obtaining both strategic
and tactical intelligence through analysis of radio signals of this
type, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have initiated a number of collec-
tion activities variously called signal interception, Ferret operations,
etc., which are usually lumped together under the general term "ECM
intercept." These activities are now being utilized with some success
to determine the location and system characteristics of radar and
electronic navigation devices being employed in the Korean theater, in
the satellites, and along the borders of the USSR. ECM intercept is
a powerful weapon in penetrating the Iron Curtain and obtaining factual
scientific and technical intelligence.
3. This intercept information, when integrated with that obtained
from all other sources, can give a very complete picture of Soviet capa-
bilities for air defense. The need for such a picture is current and
continuing. For this reason the greatest help to the existing ECM pro-
gram would be in improving the collection, analysis, evaluation, and
distribution of the intercept material. This important phase of the
problem is suffering most acutely from lack of a concentrated and
unified effort for performing these functions with all the pertinent
information available from all sources. The problem, therefore, is to
strengthen the present ECM program and activities by providing a suit-
able mechanism for prompt and thorough exploitation of the available
intercept material on an all-source basis and of rapid feed-back of
guidance to the operational intercept activities.
S-E-?C-R-E-T
IC -D - E7
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IAC-D -47
14 April 1952
Facts Bearing on the Problem
4. At th conference on electronics intelligence in
March 1951, it was unanimously agreed that ECM intercept and analysis
promises the gre,est return of any form of electronics intelligence
and that immediate attention should be given to improving the methods
and utilization of this type of intelligence. A formal paper was pre-
pared and distributed to all participating service and civilian agencies
in the United States.
5. There is growing recognition within the Military Services and
CIA of the need for more effective processing and distribution of ECM
intercept materials on an all-source basis for operational and'planning
uses of all USA agencies and for adequate and timely support to all
collection efforts. So far this recognition has not been duly implemented.
6. There is good work being done by the Army, Navy and Air Force,
but the responsibility for the analysis of ECM intercept data is presently
subdivided between these agencies and the liaison suffers from geogra-
phical separation and other factors. There is much duplication of effort
and at the same time much material is not being included.
7. At the present time there is no permanent, centrally located
facility charged with the responsibility for the expeditious handling,
analysis, evaluation, collation and distribution of all the ECM intercept
material now being obtained by the several different collection activities.
There is no facility reeding evaluated and timely intelligence back to 25X1D
the collection groups for guidance in planning future operations.
9. There is at present a Joint Signal and Evaluations Analysis
Sub-Pane]. of the Joint Electronics Warfare Panel of the Joint Communi-
cations and Electronics Committee of the JCS which considers the inter-
cept material previously and separately analyzed and evaluated. At
intervals the Sub-Panel produces a summary for limited distribution.
S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC
-D -47
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The personnel of this group are service members representing operational,
research and development, and intelligence groups who work on the Sub-
Panel on a part time basis in addition to their normal full time labor-
atory or military responsibilities; consequently the group is not able
to process the ECM intercept material promptly and adequately. There is
no CIA participation in the activities of this Sub-Panel.
10. A Central Electronic Intercept Analysis Group be established in
Washington or in the area contiguous to Washington to be jointly supported
by the Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA. The functions of this group will be:
a. Analysis and collation of all. electronic intercept material.
received on an all-source basis;
b. Prompt dissemination of this intercept material to all
interested activities;
c. Preparation and dissemination through proper channels of
recommendations for the guidance of collection activities on a
world-wide basis; and
d. Establishment at this central location of a library and
repository of signal characteristics data, such information to
be cross-indexed for ready reference and to include all known
signal. emission information such as frequency, type of modulation,
location, spectra analysis, oscilloscope photographs, recording
of signals, etc.
11. The Central Electronic Intercept Analysis Group should be
established as a permanent full time working organization functioning
under the general direction of the Navy Department with participation
by Army, Air. Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Group
should be physically located within the immediate Washington area,
preferably at the Navy Communications Annex in close proximity to AFSA
It should have adequate representation from the three services and CIA
to accomplish its mission.
S -E -C -11-E -T
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Security Information
IAC -D -46
25 March 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PROPOSED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
ILLEGIB
The following proposals are submitted by the National Estimates
Board for consideration of the IAC.
PROBLEM
1. To initiate National Intelligence Estimates on the Argentine,
Chile, and Venezuela.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. No NIE has yet been written on these important Latin-American
countries.
re
gence, Departmen o a e an a epu y c g ,
t
S
have indicated that a need is felt for an evaluation of the effect of
current developments in those countries on the security interests of
the US.
3. Informal discussions between the Special Assistant, Intelli-
to/Tntel1i ence CTA ILLEGIB
t t d th n t Di
f
DISCUSSION
4. In Argentina, the deterioration of the economic situation
accompanied by an increase in President Peron's anti US propaganda,;,
may portend a situation that would adversely affect US interests in'
South America.
tions. The Chilean elections and the forces released in connection
with them are{possiblyjof importance to US security interests in the
area.
have always exploited their superior organization to draw full benefit ILLEGIB
from electoral periods. There are also candidates who are oriented
towards the anti-US line of Peron's personal press and radio organiza-
(America, has a general election scheduled for this year. The Communist
5. Chile, with one of thelargest Communist parties in Latin
6. Venezuela's oil and iron constitute a major asset for the
Western World in its struggle with the Soviet bloc. The protection
this asset must be a major objective in US cold-war strategy. The
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GC.~C o IAC-D-16
et 25 March 1952
11 C"
present military junta of Venezuela has powerfi~ enemies, and its
ability and willing ess'to support US policies, as weld as its pros-
pects, should be assessed.
RECOMMENDATION
7. That the IAC approve the initiation of the following estimates:
a. NIE-66: Probable Developments in Argentina. Priority:
High. Target date: 15 May. s
NIE-67: Probable Developments in Chile with Particular
Reference to the Implications of the Electoral
Period. Priority: Rou ine. Target date: 15 J
c. NIE-68: Probable Developments in Venezuela, with
Particular Reference to Factors Affecting the
Availabili y to the 7S o Strategic Materials.
Priority Routine. Target date: 1 July.
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
S -E-C -R-E -T
IAC
25 March 1952
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