MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 214 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUILDING
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85S00362R000700040001-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
63
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
April 7, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 12, 1947
Content Type:
MIN
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ECR. T Co N~}. 18
TT..A. 9th -I Meetin ,
Ni TI OVAL INT~'LLI G7T?CE AUTH0RT TY
Minutes of P7eetin~; held in Room 214,
Deportment of State Building,
on II,ed de, 1~ ebx`ucr~ X94 at 11:00 m.
1.I BERS PRESr`NTT
Secretory of State Georg: 0. Marshall, in the Choir
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James'.FOxrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leaky,
Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
Director of Central Intelligence
ALSO PRES `TT
Assistant Secretary of v.'ar. Howard C. Petersen
Mr. ~`~illiQxn A. Eddy, Sped .l Assistant to the
Secret3x'y of State for Research and Inter igEnce
Mr. H. Freemen Matthews, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, U311-11
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Ccntxel Tn.telligcnce Group
SE' CRE!'Tj" RIAT
I~... :-, S. Acting Secretary
DOE review completed.
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'- ;~......,,~ F, C IT T
C OORDINJ TI ON OF IN Tl ,l q~ t Sr' J TI VI TIES RF'LA TITTG
TO FOREIGN ATOMIC .F1TF GY I ' TT'LL CT DT1V - OPP; TTS
./ ND ~'OT? 'TI1~LT TT'
SECR'TRY` P1'ATTERSOI\T gave a brief report on the present
status of N.I.J. y6. He stated that the Ltomia Energy Commission
desired to retain three people to go over information contained
in the files to be transfcrred to the Central Intelligence Group.
He said that these three people were to search these files for
information pertaining to uranium deposits and such information
was to be retained by the Commission. Scorctery Patterson sug-
gested that C.I.G.. take up the matter of the transfer of the
.personnel with Mr. Lilienthal.
Lftcr some discussion,
.THE 14~TIOTT.,L INTELLIGLTFICE AUTHORITY:
2,greed to the transfer of t 4o personnel
mentioned in N.I.1L. 6 and directed the
Dircotor of Central Intelligence to work
out the details with Mr. Lilienthal,
(Transfer subsequently completed an 18
February 1947)
#QFPORT BY TIIF DIRECTOR OF C.TETTRi L ITTTELLIGFTTCTE'
Lt Secretary Marshall's request, G 1TFR L V1,INTDFNBF-RG
stated that his last report was rather comprehensive in
pointing out the accomplishments ~.f C.1.G. since its inception.
However, this time he wished to report some of the difficulties
cncountcx+ed by C,I,G. He said that before taking up these
difficulties he wished to point out a few accomplishments
recently effected by C.I.G.
GFITFRLL ViFDFNBT_'RG said that when it was first agreed
that the C.I.G. take over the activities of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation iii. the South American field, there was some
doubt as to whether C.I.G. could ably accomplish this assign-
ment. He mentioned that he had received o. letter from
-1,mbossador Pauley which commended the smooth transfer of these
activities accomplished by the C.I.G, representative attached
to his staff. Gcr..er~ 1 Vandenberg also mentioned that Mr.
Dawson of the State Department had also stated that the
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C.I,G.'s representatives who had rep1:6bed the F,B.I. personnel.
were of a particularly high type. General Vandenberg brought
out the point .that C.I.G. had a roving mission to check these
newly assigned personnel in South LLmeri'ce and their reports
indicated that they were carrying out their functions in an 25X1
exemplary manner.
G7-YT-R6,L VI,NI?nIBFRG then gave a brief report on
GIIU ER.`,L V,1TDITTBI{ RG said the l
prior to a
trip to South ".merice, had consented to being briefed and
seemed enthusiastic regarding the method of collaboration pro-
posed by C.I.G. General Vandenberg went on to state that
had said he would be more then pleased to be briefed
by C.I,G. before any future trips that he might make and also
that he would make available any of his employees whom C.I.G.
might 'desire to brief prior to trips they might make,
GEIvTFR',L VNDF TBERG pointed out that C.T.G. was coor-
dinating the exploitation of documents collected in the Far Past
and that plans arc now being completed for similar exploitation
of documents from Europe,
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GENERAL VLNDLT?BERG stated he would now like to mention
some of the principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G.
in its operations. He said that what he believed to be essential
coordination to reduce duplication had been retarded by an un-
certainty as to the directive authority of the Director of
Control Intelligence. He said that the President specified that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall "flan for the coor-
dination of, such of the activities of the intelligence agencies
of the departments as relate to the national security and
rocommcnd to the National Intelligence Authority the establish-
ment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the
most effective accomplishment of the notional intelligence
mission." (Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 22 January 1946,
emphasis added)
G_T'T?;.ER4L V,.NDENBERG further stated that the National
Intelligence Authority specified that; "Recommendations approved
by this Authority will where practicable govern the intelligence
activities of the separate departments represented herein. The
members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be respon-
sible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed
within their respective departments." (NIL Directive No. 1,
par. 4)
GENERAL V ANDLTTBERG said that the National Intelligence
Authority specified that; "The Director of Central Intelligence
is hereby authorized and directed to
for this Authority in
coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the
national security to insure that the overall policies and ob-
jectives established by this authority are properly implemented
and executed, " (NIL Directive No < 5 t par. 3, emphasis added)
GNER,L VA NDINTBERG pointed out that it was the feeling
of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) that the current
interpretation of coordination was "by mutual agreement."
This placed the Director of Central Intelligence only in the
position of an executive secretary to the I.L.B. and that he
did not believe this was what was contomplated'by the N.I.L.
General Vandenberg then pointed out that in some instances it
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had taken six to eight months to get agreement on a paper.
He stated that in order to rectify this he recommended that
the Director of Central Intelligenoe be considered as having
authority similar to that given to the Joint Research and
Development board - "The Joint Research and Development Board
shall operate within its jurisdiction is an agency of the
Secretaries of War and Navy and the necessary authority is
hereby delegated by the Secretaries of Tor and Navy to the
Board so that its decisions; orders and directives shall be
considered as emanating from them and shall have full force
and effect as such," (JRDB 1/1, 6 Tune 1946, as amended 3
July 1946)
GHNERL V' NDLTBERG suggested that as an alternative
to the above recommendation that C,I.G. forward its implementing
dire-otives to the NA.". members for subsequent issuance from
their offices. However, such a practice would be cumbersome
and involve a great loss of time on the part of all concerned.
.d
GH17,7R,L VL, D 7BJ?RG stated that the production of
strategic and national policy intelligence had been hindered
further by an uncertainty among the agencies as to its de-
finition. In order to clarify this situation, C.I.G. had
developed the following definition, which he requested the
Y.I.L. approve: -
"Strategic and national policy intelligence
is that composite intelligence, interdcpcr-tmcntal in charac-
ter, which is required by the President and other high officers
and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect
to national planning and security in peace and in war and for
the advancement of broad notional policy. It is in that
political-economic-military area of concern to more than one
agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive
competenoe of any one dcpertmento?7
GE"T~TF,',L V+'AT?DENBERG stated it was his understanding that
those persons who developed the plan for the creation of a
Central Intelligence Group had in mind that the C.I.G. would
replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, so for, had
not token place, nor had any working relationship been achieved;
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further, that J.I.C. continues to have responsibilities paral-
.leling those of C.I.G., and until this is resolved, complete
coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national
intelligence mission can not be attained. General Vandenberg
recommended that J.1,C. be abolished, and that C.Z.G. provide
the necessary intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He
said, however, he believed. that some members of the J,C.S. had
stated that if this were done, it would lower the original
concept of a Central Intelligence Group. General Vandenberg
said it was difficult for him, in appearing before appropria-
tion committees, to defend C.I.G.'s request for funds since
he was constantly confronted with the question as to the amount
of overlap in intelligence.. It was his understanding tht_,t
one of the principal tasks expected of the Director of Central
Intelligence was the reduction of such overlap to an absolute
minimum.
G_T'TTER< L Vi,T?DTTTT3ERG stated he ,would also like to point
out that when C.I, G. went to the intelligence agencies of the
War and Navy Departacnts for information, there was constant
friction as to whether J.I.C. or C.I.G, should have priority.
In short, two agencies were asking for the some type of intelli-
gence but requested in a slightly different manner. This
duplication was unnecessary and occupied the time of personnel
which should be engaged in more pro ductive . intelligence
activities.
SECPTTLRY FORRF-STILL then asked whether he question
of dissolution of the J.I,C. and the assignment of its duties
to C.I.G. hod been taken up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
G1-DTER,L V.,XDFT\rBERG answered that he believed it had
through the I,4'4.B. members,
MR, EDDY stated that he thought that it was important
now to abolish J.I.C. and to have all interdepartmental intelli-
genoe under the C.I.G,
SFC RIFT
NMI' 9th i Meeting - 6
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after some discussion,
THE TT14TI OTT;;L INTELLIGENCE LUTHORI TY :
Q . ,";greed that while they believed that the
J.I.C. should be abolished and its functions
assumed by C.I.G., they desired to yvithhold
decision until such time as it had been dis-
cussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b.? Noted that ~:dmi..ral Leahy would take up
this matter with the Joint Chicfs of Staff,
kit Secretary Marshall's request, GFITT7z'AL V,TTD.ENBERG
then reread his first recommendation.
S7,'CRET',,RY P ,TTERSON stated that he saw no alternative
to the N.I.a. approving this recommendation. He added, however,
that a proviso should be inserted in the recommendation to
gllow any aggrieved agency to appeal to the N.T. through
that agency's respective Secretary.
GMTE ,,,L V,.ITD? TBE G said it was realized that each
agency has the inherent right to appeal through its respective
Secretary any objection to a specific directive.
II,DP?.ZII ,L LE-TIT stated that he recommended approval,
but that he was in agreement with Secretary Patterson's proviso.
SHCRET..RY P,.TTFRSOI\T r^ised the question as to whether
General Vandenberg's recommendation would involve C.I.G.
entering into the field of operational intelligence of the
agencies.
GTNER.:L V,NDT,-T BERG stated that this was not the intent.
MR. EDDY asked, if authority was delegated by the
to the Director of Central Intelligence that his
directives shell be considered as emanating from them, would
such authority be interpreted to allow the Director or Central
Intelligence to draft personnel from other agencies to perform
specific jobs.
GE.VITR,L VAITD_T'NBT'RG stated that C.I.G. had no intention
of interpreting this authority as indicated by Mr. 'Eddy.
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SECRFT,*,RY FI.TTERSON asked if C.T.G. was contemplating
recommending that some of the intelligence manuals now pub-
lished by the intelligencc agencies of the State, War end Navy
Deportments be discontinued.
G '1TI R,L V*:r"DE BERG stated he would like to have an
opportunity to look over these publications before answering
this question.
SFCRM'.RY FORREST.,LT, stated he believed that the proviso
to be added to General Vandenberg's recommendation under dis-
cussion should read along the following linest "Provided in
cases of objection to specific actions, any aggrieved agency
may have access to that egeno f's Secretary and through him to
the N.T.ti."
MR, EDDY stated he assumed that any directives,. before
being issucd by C.I.G.' would normally have had prior discussion
by the Intelligence; ,dvi sory Board,.
G TT,F IL,L Via,: DENBE G concurred.
THE N1: TI OTTLLL ITT TELLI GT~TTCE LL,UTHORI TY.
approved the recommendation that "The Director
of Central Intelligence shall operate within
his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries
of State, War and the Navy, and the necessary
authority is hereby dclcg,tcd by the Sccrctarids
of State, War and the Navy to the Director of
Central Intelligence so that his decisions,
orders and directives shall be considered as
emanating from them and shall have full force
and effect as suQb, provided any aggrieved
agency may have access to that agency's
Secretary and through him to the Lat Secretary Mershlall' a rcqucst j GnTT L V.',NDE1TDERG
then repeated his recommended definition of "Strategic and
notional policy intelligence."
J f ter some discussion, in which General Vandenberg
pointed out the reason why an approved definition of this term
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was needed,
THE NATIONAL INT.F.LL GE!WE AUTHORITY:
Approved the following definition; "Strategic
.and national policy intelligence is that com-
posite intelligence, interdepartmental in
character, which is required by the President
and other high officers and staffs to assist
them in determining policies with respect to
national planning and security in peace and
in war and for the advancement of broad
national policy.. It is in that political-
economic-military area of concern to more
than one agency, must be .objective, and
must transcend the exclusive competence
of any one department.''
SECRETARY MARSHALL stated that in a recent conversa-
tion Congressman Taber was concerned from a security stand-
point with reference to appropriations for intelligence
activities.. Secretary Marshall further stated that Mr.
Taber had said that it appeared to him that too many people
had to be consulted in considering such appropriations,.
Secretary Marshall went-on to state that he believed the
best way to maintain proper security was for the President
or the Secretary of State to control these funds, and that
a request should be made for a flat appropriation.
GFPIERAL VAITD17,1TBFRG stated he had appeared recently
before a joint committee, which he was told before appearance
would consist of four or five people. However, upon arrival
he found there were actually twenty-two people present. He
wont on to state a subsequent meeting had been called and he
would continue to be careful of the information presented.
However, he agreed that security of intelligence operations
could best be protected by funds which should be concealed
.and appropriated in a lump sum controlled by one 'person.
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CONFIDENTIAL
N.I.A. Ist Meeting
COPY NO. 29
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212,
Department of -State Buildin(=
y 5 February_1946,-at ..1:3O a.m.
on `I ues,da,;, ~ .r ~
MEMBERS PRESENT
Secretary of State James,F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral Sidney W, Souers,
Director of Central Intelligence
ALSO PRESENT
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Davidson Sommers, Wax Department,
Mr. Edward Hidalgo, Navy Department
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group
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CONFIDENTIAL
1. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(N.I.A. 1)
SECRETARY PATTERSON suggested deleting the word "Prior''
in the 8th line of page 3, in order to make it clear that
approval by the Authority was not required.
ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested that this might also be ac-
complished by substitution of the words "action by" for "prior
reference to". He also recommended that a period be placed
after "departments" in line 4, paragraph 7, page 4, and that
the remainder of the sentence be deleted.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:--
Agreed to the following amendments in N.I.A. 1:
a. Substitute "action by" for "prior reference to" in
line 8 of page 3.
b. Place a period after the word "departments" in line
4, paragraph 7 of page 4 and delete the remainder
of that sentence.
2. PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF f F'E CENT RAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
SECRETARY BYRNES asked what paragraph 2 a on page 1
contemplated as to foreign policy, He pointed out that he
is responsible for reporting to the President on matters of
foreign policy.
ADMIRAL SOUERS explained his understanding was that
the President wanted him only to go through the dispatch
traffic and make a digest of significant developments.
Admiral Souers emphasized that there was no intention that
he should interpreTthese dispatches or advise the President
on any matters of foreign policy. His report was intended
to be purely factual an `rogards the activities of the United
States in the field of foreign affairs.
SECRETARY BYRNES stressed the fact that it was his
function to furnish the President with information on which
to base conclusions.
ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his understanding that the
President wanted the information from all three departments
(State, War and Navy) summarized in order to keep him cur-
rently informed. Admiral Leahy pointed out that Secretary
Byrnes presents the viewpoint of the Depart= nt of State
while the President would like to receive si`nitecant informa-
tion available in all three departments in a single summary.
SECRETARY BYRNES pointed out that Admiral Scuers would
not be prosentin be viowpoinb of any single department.
Although the Central Intelligence Group would be composed of
personnel from all throe departments, Secretary Byrnes believes
that any man assigned to that Group must be responsible solely to Admiral Souors.
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CONFIDENTIAL
ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested that, in order to clarify the
meaning of paragraph 1E on page 3, it might bo reworded as
follows:
"Production of daily and weekly summaries of the
significant developments in the field of intelligence
and operations related to the national security and to
foreign events for the use of the Presdn, the members
of this Authority, and additional distribution shown in
Appendix 'C' ."
After further discussion,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:-
Agreed to defer final action on N.I.A. 1 and N.I.A. 2,
pending further study by. Secretary Byrnes.
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N.I.A. 2nd Meeting
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212
Department of State Building
on Friday, 8 February 19465 at 10:15 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,
Director of Central Intelligence
ALSO PRESENT
Mr. Alfred McCormack, Department of State
Mr. h. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Davidson Sommers, War Department
Capt. William R. Smedborg, USN
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S, Lay, Jr.., Central Intelligence Group
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1. PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE GROUP
(N.I.A, 2)
SECRETARY BYRNES stated that he had discussed the intent
of paragraph 4-a of the enclosure to N.I.A. 2 with the Press -
dent, who assured him that only factual statements were des__red.
Secretary Byrnes therefore suggested adding the words "cortaa_n-
ing factual statements" after the word '~su_i;maries".
ADMIRAL SOUERS questioned whether daily factual summaries
would not prove sufficient. He therefore recommended deletion
of the words "and weekly" in paragraph 1-
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Approved N.I.A. 2 subject to rewording of paragraph --a
of the enclosure thereto as follows: -_
Production of daily summaries containing factual
statements of the significant developments in the
field of intelligence and operations related to
the national security and to foreign events for
the use of the President, the members of this
Authority, and additional distribution shown in
Appendix 'C'."
2. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(N.I.A. 1)
ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested the ~'oljowing rewording of the
3rd and 4th sentences of paragraph 5 of the enclosure to
N.T.A. 1, which had boen suggested by Mr. McCormack's off:tc<
for budgetary reasons:
"As approved by this Authority and within the limits
of available appropriations, the necessary funds and
personnel will be made available to you by arrangement
between you and the appropriate Member of the Intelli.-
gence Advisors Board. You may determine the qualif.ca-
tions of personnel and the adequacy of individual candi-
dates."
ADMIRAL LEAHY thought .,hat the arrangements should be
made between Admiral Souers and the appropriate Department
through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board, rather
than between Admiral Souers and the appropriate member of that
Board.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Approved N.I.A. 1 subject to the following rewording
of the 3rd and 4th sentences of paragraph 5 of the
enclosure thereto;
"As approved by this Authority and within the li~l:;:ts
of available appropriations, the necessary funds and
personnel will be made available to you by arrange-
ment between you and the appropriate department
through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board.
You may determine the qualifications of personnel
and the adequacy of individual candidates."
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N.I.A. 3rd Meeting
2
COPY NO.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212,
Department of State Building
on Tuesday, 2 April 191+6, at 11:00 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
(NOTE: Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal
Representative of the President, subse-
quently approved the action taken at the
meeting.)
ALSO PRESENT
Mr. Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Edward Hidalgo, Navy Department
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1.. PROGRESS REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
At Secretary Byrnes' request, ADMIRAL SOUERS gave a brief'
report on the progress of organization of the Central Intel-
ligence Group, and noted some of the more important projects
now in progress. He invited attention to the fact that the
most urgent problem concerning the disposition of the Strategic.
Services Unit was covered by the paper for consideration at this
meeting. Admiral Souers also explained that further details
concerning current ;projects were available. in the weekly Status
Report which was distributed to the Authority.
2. POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
(N.I.A. 3)
SECRETARY PATTERSON suggested the following amendments:
a. The addition of a new paragraph to the proposed N.I.A.
Directive (page k) as follows :
"5.'The War Department shall retain the right to de-
termine what portion of War Department funds, personnel
and facilities can be made available to SSU by the War
Department."
b. Insert the words "within your capabilities" in the
second line of the third paragraph following the word
"service", and in the sixth line of the third paragraph
following the word "Live ilEble"
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Approved N.I.A. 3 subject to the above amendments
closure A thereto subsequently circulated as N.I.A. Directive
No,. 4) .
CONFIDENTIAL - 1
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p "mi l
COPY No. 28
SECRET
N.I.A. 4th Meeting
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212
Department of State Building
on Wednesday 17 July 19k6, at 10:30 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Acting Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal
Representative of the President
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence
ALSO PRESENT
Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of-State form ResearcStatd Intelligence
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Dep
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority
too Chance h ui:~~>. n
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1. REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRETARY BYRNES asked General Vandenberg to give the
members a report on present and future matters concerning the
Central Intelligence Group.
GENERAL VANDENBERG invited attention to the conclusions
contained in the "Progress Report On the Central Intelligence
Group" by Admiral Souers, former Director of Central Intelligence.
General Vandenberg explained that at the present time each
intelligence agency is working along the lines of primary
interest to its department. It is his belief that C.I.G. should.
find out what raw material received by one department is of
interest to the others. In order to do this, C.I.G. must be
in a position to see and screen all raw material received.
For example, as regards a given steel plant, State is studying
what products are made there and the rate of production. War.
Department, however, is interested in the construction and
physical details of the plant, the railroads serving it, and
other data required. for target information. State Department,
if it broadened the base of its studies, might well be able
to furnish at least part of that type of economic intelligence.
It is the job of C.I.G., therefore, to find out the needs of all
the departments and to meet them, either by recommending that
one department expand its activities or by performing the neces-
sary research in C.I.G. In order to do this, an adequate and
capable staff is urgently required in C.I.G. It is extremely
difficult administratively to procure the necessary personnel
.under the present arrangement. General Vandenberg therefore
feels that he must have his own funds and be able to hire
by
people. This means that C.I.G. must be set up as agency
enabling legislation.
SECRETARY BYRNES expressed the understanding that the
N.I.A. was intentionally established
avoid the necessity for an independent budget.
SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed, and explained that this was
designed to conceal, for security reasons, the amount of money
being. spent on central intelligence.
SECRETARY BYRNES thought that it would be difficult to
explain to Congress the need for intelligence funds without
jeopardizing security.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that such considerations should
be balanced against the added administrative difficulties
they caused. He expressed the belief that the important thing
was that the Central Intelligence Group should be an effective
and efficient organization.
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was always understood that
C.I.G. eventually would. broaden its scope. It was felt, however;
that the Departments initially could contribute sufficient funds
and personnel to get it started. He is about convinced that
N.T.A. should now attempt to get its own appropriations. These
appropriations, however, should be small, since the three
departments should continue to furnish the bulk of the necessary
f und. s .
SECRETARY PATTERSON thought that the administrative problem:.
could be worked out under the present arrangements.
SECRETARY BYRNES believed that the major problem was to
find a way for the departments to give C.T.G. the money it
needed.
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SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that he was perfectly willing
to direct Army Intelligence to furnish the necessary funds
to C.I.G. and then let, the Director. of Central Intelligence
pick his own personnel with those funds. He opposed. a separate
budget because he does not want to expose these intelligence
operations.
SECRETARY BYRNES agreed that we could not afford to make
such disclosures in this country..
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that each personnel action
must be handled at present by 100 people in each department.
This means that knowledge of C.T.G. personnel is exposed to
300 people in the three departments. He feels that handling
personnel actions within C.I.G. 'itself would improve security.
ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that it was undesirable that so many
people in the departments should have knowledge of C.I.G. He
felt that if each department gave C.I.G. funds, personnel actions
could be taken by C.I.G. itself without exposing them.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that this would still
require defending three separate appropriations acts before
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
DR. LANGER agreed that the funds would have to be defended
before the Congress in any case.
SECRETARY BYRNES recalled that members of Congress had.
offered to include the State Department intelligence budget under
such terms as "investigations abroad" or as an added amount
in any other budget account. He felt that since Congress was
apparently willing to do this, the funds might easily be hidden
in this manner within departmental budgets.
DR. LANGER thought that Admiral Leahy's suggestion would
be very effective. It might be possible to give N.Z.A. an
independent budget for the more overt activities, and hide
other funds in departmental appropriations. This would serve
as ideal cover for covert activities. Moreover, he believed
that an independent appropriation for C.T.G. would make General
Vandenberg more effective in supporting departmental intelli-
gence bud=gets.
ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that this problem must be approached
very carefully. He believed that no one was better qualified.
to advise N.I.A. on this than Secretary Byrnes. with his
Congressional background. Admiral Leahy stated that the Presi-?
dent authorized him to make it clear that the President con'
sidered the responsible agency in the present arrangement to
be the N.I.A. The President stated that the Director of
Central Intelligence is not responsible further than to carry.
out the directives of the N.I.A. Admiral Leahy said there were
some indications that the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Intelligence Advisory Board, might tend to assume
greater control over intelligence activities than was intended.
Admiral Leahy reiterated that the President holds the Cabinet
officers on N.I.A. primarily responsible for coordination of
intelligence activities.
SECRETARY SULLIVAN compared the Director of Central
Intelligence to an executive vice president who carries out
the instructions and policies of the N.I.A.
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ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that with regard to a bill to obtain
an independent budget and status for N.I.A., the President
considers it inadvisable to attempt to present such a bill
before the present Congress. The President feels that there is
not enough time for the N.I.A. to give this question sufficient
study. The President feels, however, that a bill might be
drafted and be under study by the N.I.A. with a view to the
possibility of presenting it to the next Congress. Admiral
Leahy stated that in the meantime he felt that General Vandenberg
should be given, so far as practicable, all the assistance chat
he requires.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that C.I.G. is not an agency
authorized to disburse funds. Therefore, even with funds from
the departments, it would require disbursing and authenticating
officers in all three departments, plus the necessary accounting
organization in C.I.G. He felt that this was requiring four
f is-cal operations where one should suffice.
ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, and SECRETARY BYRNES agreed,
that this might be taken care of by the wording of an appropria-
tions act.
DR, LANGER questioned this possibility unless C.I.G. was
given status as a disbursing agency.
SECRETARY BYRNES thought this status could be given the
agency by the President under the authority of the Emergency
Powers Act.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he understood that this
solution was decided against because it might indicate that
N.I.A. was a temporary expedient which would terminate with
the end of the President's war powers.
SECRETARY BYRNES was sure that it could be done by the
President under his reorganization authority and without
reference to the Emergency Powers Act. Secretary Byrnes under
took to talk with-the Bureau of the Budget on this matter and
report back to the N.I.A.
ADMIRAL LEAHY was convinced that C.I.G. must have funds
for which it, does not have to account in detail.
DR. LANGER questioned. whether General Vandenberg was not
more concerned over the cumbersome arrangement for handling
personnel actions in all three departments.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stressed the fact that without money
there could be no personnel actions. For example, he noted
that the State Department does not have sufficient funds to
pay personnel required for C.I.G. General Vandenberg agreed,
however,. that personnel actions were extremely difficult under
present arrangements. For example, it takes an average of
six weeks to obtain security clearance from the Departments,
and he does not feel that he should employ anyone without such
clearance. General Vandenberg stressed the fact that his
greatest interest was in getting C.I.G. into operation by what-
ever means possible. He felt that time was of the essence
during this critical period.
SECRETARY BYRNES believed that the only way at present to
avoid the administrative difficulties was to arrange to have
each department transfer the necessary funds to C.I.G.
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GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out the difficulty of obtaining
Department requested abou for N.I.A., only_________ 25X1
ted the need of the
i
a
is being made available. While he apprec
State Department for the other funds, this case exemplified the
fact that C.I.G. could never be certain of receiving the funds
which it requested and defended unless they were appropriated
directly to C.I.G.
DR. LANGER believed that this situation would not recur
in the future; but he did agree that State's contribution to
C.I.G. was not adequate. He did not see, however, how this 25X1
could be increased except through a deficiency bill.
SECRETARY SULLIVAN asked why additional funds might not
be secured from the President's emergency fund.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that total funds available to
C.I.G. for the fiscal year 1947 were hich left
a shortage for effective operations of He asked 25X1
whether it might be possible: to obtain permission co spend
available funds at an accelerated rate in anticipation of the
submission of the deficiency bill.
SECRETARY BYRNES thought that such permission could. not
be ocLalnea. nu JjUUOU U11c-yu
stated was that C.I.G. had
Dr.LANGER questioned whether any mechanism was to be 25X1
available for reviewing this proposed budget.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he had the details available.
He noted, however, L-hat comprehensive review meant that this
information must be widely disclosed to personnel in three
departments.
SECRETARY SULLIVAN felt that since the President's remarks
indicated that he held. N.I.A. responsible, they must know
the details regarding any C.I.G. budget request.
At Secretary Byrnes' request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then
made a brief report on C.T.G. activities. He noted that C.I.G.
was taking over Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and all
clandestine foreign intelligence activities. In addition,
however. C.I.G. is receiving daily requests to take over
functions now being done by various State, War and Navy Corn-
mittees. One example is the suggestion that C.I.G. centralize
the handling of codes and ciphers to improve their security.
Another example is the concern of the War Department about ex-
change of information with the British. The State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee has a subcommittee covering this exchaan e;
but it handles only about 20 or 30 percent of the information
actually exchanged. This subcommittee confines itself purely
to secret matters, whereas the Army Air Forces believe that
a central clearing house should. be established where the bar-
gaining value of this information may also be taken into account.
DR. LANGER pointed out that the SWNCC subcommittee deals
only with technical military information. He feels, however,
that the problem also involves such matters as the transfer
of non-military information and the declassification of material.
Unless these matters are centralized, each department will
continue, as at present, going its own way.
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GENERAL VANDENBERG reported that he has already set up an
Office of Special Operations. He has also established an Inter-
departmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, but only on a
skeleton basis because of his need for additional personnel.
SECRETARY PATTERSON felt that all of General Vandenberg's
present problems should-be solved if the Secretary of State
can obtain help from the Bureau of the Budget.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated his problems, briefly, were
that he needed money, the authority to spend it, and the
authority to.hire and fire.
SECRETARY BYRNES felt there were really two problems:
First, to find ways to handle the money now available, and second,
to get whatever additional funds are required. He thought it
would be difficult to get additional funds fifteen days after
the fiscal year had begun. He questioned whether present funds
should not be sufficient since the understanding was that C.I.G.
was primarily continuing functions which have been previously
performed.
GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that C.I.G. was now under--25X1
taking certain new functions and also expanding some existing
ones. In answer to questions General Vandenberg stated than
he proposed to have about people in secret intelligence
and a total of something less than in C.I.G. by the end (25X1
the- fiscal year.
DR. LANGER stated that he agreed with almost everything
that General Vandenberg had said, but that he was impressed with
the imposing size of the proposed organization. He thought
there should be a definite review of the program before a
request for an additional is approved.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that there is a clear need
for additional appropriations for intelligence in view of
changing conditions. During the war there were American forces
all over the world who were procuring information and intelli-
gence in connection with military operations. These operations
were not considered as intelligence activities, however, and
the funds required for them were not charged to intelligence.
These operations are now shrinking rapidly. It is necessary,
therefore, to have intelligence agents all over the world to
get the same information which during the war was handed to
intelligence-agencies on a silver platter.
SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed with this statement. He noted
that in each theater of operations G-2 activities were merely
a part of the Army's operations and were not considered to be
part of the intelligence organization directed from Washington.
GENERAL VANDENBERG then discussed briefly his proposed,
organization chart for the Central Intelligence Group. He noted
that there would be an Interdepartmental Coordinating and
Planning Staff to assist in the coordination of all intelligence
activities related to the national security. There would then
be four offices to conduct C.I.G. operations, namely, Special
Operations, Collection, Research and Evaluation, and. Dissemina-
tion.
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After further discussion,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
a. Noted General Vandenberg's report on the Central
Intelligence Group.
b. Noted that the Secretary of State would discuss with
the Bureau of the Budget the solution of the problems
mentioned by General Vandenberg, and would report back
to the Authority.
c. Noted. the organization of the Central Intelligence
Group which General Vandenberg was planning to put into
effect.
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TOP SECRET COPY I0'. 19
N.I.A. 5th Meeting
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2144,
Department of State Bui1 ing,
on Wedne ay, 7 August at 10;30 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in. the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal
Representative of the President
Colonel Donald H. Galloway, USA, representing
the Director of Central Intelligence
ALSO PRESENT
Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell
Assistant Se(,rotary of State Spruille Braden
Colonel Wiliam P. Eddy, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Colonel. Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
SECRETARIAT
Colonel Donald H. Galloway,. USA, acting for.
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
TOP SECRET
NIA. ,eting
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1. WITHDRAWAL OF F.B.I. REPRESENTATIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA
MR. RUSSELL stated that the Department of State was very
much concerned over the Intention of the Federal Bureau of Tnvesti--
gatlon to withdraw its representatives from Latin America prior
to the time that the personnel of the Central Intelligence Group
could properly replace them. He outlined the understanding of
the Department of State that the F.B.I. was obligated to remain
in Latin America until June 30, 1947, if necessary.
ADMIRAL LEAHY indicated that that was the understanding of
the National Intelligence Authority, and he was surprised to learn
that the F.B.I. was withdrawing its representatives from the
Dominican Republic and Costa Rica by Iugust 16. He inquired as
to whether or not General Vandenberg had been informed.
COLONEL GALLOWAY stated that General Vandenberg had been.
Informed and that-he had requested the Director of the F.B.I. to
reconsider his decision and to retain his personnel until the
C.I.G. representatives could adequately replace them. However,
Mr. Hoover had informed General Vandenberg that this was imprac-
ticable.
MR. BRADEN stated that he had made efforts to induce the
F.B.I. to keep its personnel in these two countries without
avail, and that he had also been informed, on August 6, that the
F.B.I. was contemplating withdrawing their personnel from Haiti,
El Salvador, and Tegucigalpa on 30 September.
COLONEL GALLOWAY informed the N.I.A. that the C.I.G., by
withdrawing an operative from a European post, was prepared to
send him immediately to Costa Rica to replace the F.B.I. agent
being withdrawn from that locality; that the Department of State
had been advised to this effect, and that the only thing that
was preventing the departure of this 0.1.0. operative was the
processing of his papers by the Department of State. 7.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Directed the representative of the Central Intelligence
Group to draft a letter, for the signature of the members
of the Authority, to the Attorney General, requesting him
to direct the F.B.I. to retain its personnel in the Latin
American ,countries to which presently assigned until C.T.G.
personnel could properly replace them. It was also desired
that a period of turnover be provided for so that the new
organization could be properly oriented and be given contacts
in each country.
The meeting adjourned at approximately 11:00 a.m.
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NIA 55 th Meeting
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i~ SECRET
N.I.A. 6th Meet ng
COPY NO. 19
(LIMNED DISTRIBUTION)
NATIONAL 'INTELLIGENCE AUTHOR _j_TY
M:_nutos of Mooting hold in Room 214,
Department of State Building,
on Wednesday, 21 August 1946-, at 11:00 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Acting Sk crotary of State Dean Ach.cson,' in the Chair.
Secrotar-r of liar Robert P. Pattorson
Secretary of the Nava, James Forrostal
Fleet Admiral William D. Loahy,
Personal Representative of the President.
General Ho,',Tt S. Vandenberg,
Director of Central. -.Fnt(1_ligcncc.
Assistant Sc-;c ?ot-!tcy of State, Will i-arii
Colon!l.. Will _am A. Eddy, Special Assistant
to the Sccrotarr of for Research
and Intoll:..genco
11'Ix. John D. Hiclalrson, Doea,rtment of State
Colonel. Charles W. McCar?'th , USA
C" piuar_n. Robert L. Dennison, USN
SECRETARIAT
Jam-.s S. Ley, Jr. , Secretary, N. I , .
IJ .IJ ~/d .fJ
NIA 6th Meet i.ng
Ghaaga isr Clair.
C ;
'-:; ~oaeaittad
Cass. Chaag114 to. TS U r
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1, COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN
ATOMIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES
(NIA. c)
SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that the present position is
that, desp:i_te the President's directive 'establishing N.I.A..
and its implementation, the Manhattan Engineer District under
General Groves has a small division collecting information on
fo.rUign activit`L os an the field of atorni..c nogg;,' . It recmc,d
to Secretary Patterson senseless to have this division isolated
w:'Lthou.t any connection with or rclationship to C .I. G. Ho stated
that ho had talked with General Groves about this pr. oblem.
Secretary Patterson believes that the N.I.A. will be carrying
out the Presidnt's ~diroctivo only i_f' this division is tra.ns-
fc:arred. 11e is not co.nco3rnod part:i.cular.?l-, as to where it is
transferred, although ho approves the proposed transfer to
C .I. G, This intelligence division has nothing to do with the
Manhattan Enrc i_nccr District oropor and therefore has nothing
to do with the Atomic Energ;r Cor.lm.ission. Even if it did, it
would still comp under the terms of the Prosident's d _r;,ctivc
to N.I.A. At the present time the intelligence on this subject
is lost and is not available to the a enc:~us r, presented on
N.I.A.
SECRETARY FORESTAL questioned whether it is intended to
deny t]" e use of this a.n:forraat?_on to the Atomic Energy Commission.
SECRETARY PATTERSON felt that the information involved
has nothins to do with ideas for :i.mprov _ng our own atomic
energy program since we are already so 'ar ahead of other
nat ions .
SECRETARY ACHESON' said that 1_o was troubled by this paper
and had spoken about it to the President who was not familiar
with it . Sc ere tar'? Acihoson said that he had been i.nf ormed
th~a.t -the Atomic Energy Commission would br almost nt_i.rc7_;
dependent on foreign sources of uranium ore. He under?stood
that j. `L-1 was one function of Genera. Groves' in c h i.gence ?;r'oup
to find out where uranium ore- is and how to get it to this
country; or to deny it to other_rs . The President oxprbsscd the
o?-)i:nion. that this paper might be all right but that, if it
%.s carried out before the Comm .ssion is established, it may
take away fro,,-,l there an importari i.i part of their act iv it:ic s . Tuuc
President C It that would be wiser' to lot the matter rest
until the Commission iLs stabl:i_shed,
SECRETARY PATTERSON o,:rnt: ci out that the transfer of
only a .%,.;w peop1.; here; and abroad is :i..nvolved. Their sole,
untries n
job :..s to watch what is go:ingg on in foreign J_
~~ t
Gh dove to . rri(;nt Ui:" a'tOr?1!_C e ne Thi pr sen`G pOS 1..t:i_On is
a.a:, d 'to d,-i'und and S_ocr,lt~,r-? Pau'U _ )n b:,lic;vod -that the N.I.A.
hov. tak