THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES: A GLOBAL PRESENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of y R1'et~
Intelligence
L
The USSR and Its Allies:
A Global Presence
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 A Global Presence
The USSR and Its Allies:
International Security Issues Division, Office of
Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Communist
Secret
GI 83-10292
December 1983
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The USSR and Its Allies: I
A Global Presence~~ 25X1 `
Key Judgments The USSR and its allies have established a presence in strategically
Information available important areas of the world in an attempt to extend their influence and
as of 23 December 1983 concomitantly counter US and Western interests. At present:
was used in this report.
? The Soviets-as prominent military suppliers to Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia,
and the Yemens and with combat units in Afghanistan-maintain a
presence near major sources of Western oil, vital shipping lanes, and
strategic choke points, especially Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of
Hormuz.
? Warsaw Pact arms supply relationships with Zambia, Mozambique, and
Tanzania-as well as the Pact arms and Cuban troops in Angola and
Ethiopia-and Soviet and allied support of national liberation move-
ments in Namibia and South Africa place the Soviets and its allies in an
area that produces minerals considered of strategic importance to the
West and near shipping lanes around the Cape. of Good Hope.
The Soviet and East European military and economic presence in North
Africa-major arms agreements with the Libyans and Algerians and
more than 50,000 technicians in Libya-places the Soviets and their
allies near another vital shipping lane through the Mediterranean. In
addition, Libyan support of insurgents threatens moderate governments,
in the region.
? Access to air and naval facilities in Vietnam provides operational, support
for the Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea and places the
USSR near sea lanes used to supply oil to Japan and in a strategic
position along China's southern border.
? In Latin America, the USSR along with Cuba and other allies maintains
a presence with an arms supply effort to Nicaragua; arms agreements
with Peru; and encouragement of insurgent activity in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.
? And in Western Europe, the USSR and its East European allies not only
maintain a presence through a large official contingent of diplomatic,
commercial, and other representatives but also support-and in some
cases direct-local Communist parties. I
Secret
GI 83-10292
December 1983
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The USSR, without question, benefits from its presence and the presence
of its allies in these regions. In some cases, influence is wielded directly; in
others, the presence serves more as a visible reminder of Communist
interest in the region and facilitates support for disinformation and other
activities designed to influence public and official opinion. Moscow can
reap benefits even if its presence or that of its East European and Cuban
allies is minimal. For example, both Libya and North Korea act independ-
ently of Moscow, but their anti-West activities in support of leftist
government and national liberation movements generally support Soviet
objectives. Although Moscow cannot be tied directly to terrorist activities,
it has derived marginal benefit from the actions of various terrorist groups
in Europe and the,Middle East, insofar as the activities undermine
moderate governments.
The effectiveness of Communist efforts to penetrate and influence coun-
tries, however, depends on a number of sociopolitical factors. These include
local attitudes toward Communism, the strength and political attitudes of
the military, the strength of local religions, the degree of stability in the so-
ciety, and the prevailing attitudes of the country's leadership. To date,
gains in influence have mostly involved exploiting local rivalries and
keeping regions destabilized.
There are limits to the amount of influence a Soviet or allied presence
allows. For example, despite its position as a major arms supplier to Syria
and Iraq, the USSR has been unsuccessful in defusing Syrian battles with
the PLO or in directing Iraq on the conduct of the war with Iran. Also, the
ability of the Soviets to exploit their position in areas near strategic
materials or along sea lanes is constrained. Any move to interfere with
access to petroleum supplies or international sea lanes would invite a strong
Western response, and the structure of world mineral markets is such that
the impact of Soviet-sponsored supply disruptions could be minimized by
the use of stockpiled materials and substitution.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Presence Around the World 1
Official Presence 1
Military Transfers I
Economic Programs I
Training Programs 2
Treaties 3
Influence and Activities 3
Exerting Influence 3
Military Activity 5
Support to Insurgents and Terrorists 7
Economic Activity 8
Commercial Activities 8
An Assessment 9
Appendixes
A. Statistics on Presence in Non-Communist Countries of 13
Soviets and Their Allies
F_ s
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The USSR and Its Allies: back
A Global Presence picket
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Official Presence. The official presence of the USSR
and its allies abroad includes approximately 40,000
diplomats and trade, cultural, and news repre-
sentatives: 17,000 from the USSR, 21,000 from East-
ern Europe, and 1,600 from Cuba. Half of these
representatives are posted to developed countries and
half are stationed in the Third World. Overall there
has been a more than 50-percent increase in their
number during the last decade. In the Third World
the distribution is fairly even among Sub-Saharan
internal and external factors.
Presence Around the World
The USSR and its allies-primarily Eastern Europe
and Cuba-use a variety of methods and programs to
increase their presence and influence around the
world (see map). Although their presence has in-
creased in every region of the world, this has not
always translated into increased influence. This paper
examines how the Soviets and their allies try to use
official presence and military, economic, and training
programs to overtly and covertly influence the policies
of other nations, as well as the constraints imposed by
Military Transfers. Together, the USSR and Eastern
Europe make up the world's largest exporter of
military hardware (aircraft, land armaments, ships,
and missile equipment), providing weapons to more
than 40 LDCs. Since the beginning of the program in
1955, military agreements totaling $88 billion have
been signed with non-Communist Third World coun-
tries-$76 billion in the last decade. The USSR alone
earns up to $6 billion annually in hard currency from
military sales. In addition, Cuba and North Korea
have become increasingly important sources of mili-
tary supplies and services, mainly to Middle Eastern
and African states. The major buyers of Warsaw Pact
arms in recent years have been Libya, Syria, Iraq,
The rapid growth in Soviet and East European arms
transfers precipitated a sharp increase in the number
of Warsaw Pact military personnel assigned abroad,
mainly to train LDC armed forces and maintain
Soviet weaponry. The number of Warsaw Pact mili-
tary advisers in the Third World, now over 20,000,
has doubled in the last 10 years with the majority
stationed in the Middle East and North Africa. Cuba
also has some 40,000 military advisers and troops,
mostly in southern Africa. The Cubans are in the
process of augmenting their troop strength in Angola
while reducing that in Ethiopia. In Nicaragua the
number of Cuban military/security advisers has re- 25X1
Economic Programs. Warsaw Pact economic pro-
grams around the world are diverse, ranging from
economic assistance to the LDCs to a growing com-
mercial presence in the West. These programs have
enabled Moscow and its allies to earn hard currency,
tap LDC resources, acquire Western technology, and
use commercial operations as a cover for covert
activities.) 25X1
Like the military aid program, Communist economic
assistance is directed toward the LDCs. Warsaw Pact
economic and technical assistance-though smaller in!
value than the military program-has reached some 25X1
70 LDCs. Of the $36 billion in credits and grants
extended to the Third World since the program
began, nearly two-thirds have been provided during
the last decade. In addition, 40,000 Soviet civilian
technicians work in Third World countries, along with
75,000 East Europeans and 20,000 Cubans-mostly
in Africa and the Middle East. Ten years ago, there
were fewer than 20,000 Soviet, Cuban, and East
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The Soviets and East Europeans have also established
a network of more than 400 companies in Western
and Third World countries that, in addition to stand-
ard commercial activities, provide cover for intelli-'
gence officers, serve as conduits for covertly transfer-
ring funds to sympathetic domestic or international
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Figure 1
USSR and Other Warsaw Pact Nations:
Value of Military Agreements With
Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-82
Latin America
Sub-Sah:u,u Africa
East Asia and South Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Billion US S
Figure 2
USSR and Other Warsaw Pact Nations:
Value of Economic Aid Agreements With
Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-82
Latin America
0 Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and South Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Billion US S
5
Training Programs. Communist training programs
for the Third World are even more broadly based than
other efforts, reaching more than 100 countries. An
increasing number of students, military personnel,
and civilian technicians from LDCs are studying both
at home and abroad under Communist tutelage. We
estimate that there are now over 120,000 trainees
from non-Communist countries studying in Commu-
nist countries, a threefold increase in the last 10 years.
The number includes 85,000 academic students being
trained in Soviet and East European schools and an
estimated 27,000 students in Cuba. In addition, some
10,000 civilian personnel and military trainees attend-
ed training programs in the USSR and Eastern
Nearly half of the Third World students currently in
the USSR come from Afghanistan, Jordan, Ethiopia,
Madagascar, and Syria. Major recipients of East
European scholarships include Greece, Nigeria, Iraq,
and Mozambique, and a large share of the students in
Cuba are from Sub-Saharan Africa and Nicaragua.
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evret
Table I
Increase in Presence of Soviets and
Their Allies in Non-Communist LDCs
Warsaw Pact and Cuban
Personnel in LDCs
1972
1982
Change
Official presence
12,700
20,300
7,600
Military advisers and
technicians ?
9,860
61,180
51,320
LDC Personnel Trained in
Warsaw Pact Countries
(cumutative)
1955-72
1955-82
Change
Academic students
55,090
167,090
112,000
Military personnel
32,110
62,780
30,670
Technicians
23,070
63,820
40,750
Warsaw Pact Assistance Programs 1954-72
1954-82
Change
(billion US 5)
Economic aid extended to LDCs
12.9
35.9
23.0
Economic aid drawn by LDCs
5.9
115.9
10.0
Military agreements with LDCs
11.6
87.8
76.2
Military deliveries to LDCs
9.2
63.8
54.6
Treaties. The Soviets and their allies also pursue
opportunities to formalize their presence via treaties
and agreements:
? The USSR now has friendship treaties with 12
Third World countries; eight of these have been
signed since 1975. Most of the East European
countries have signed similar treaties with these
countries.
? Moscow has more than 80 civil aviation agreements
in effect with Western and Third World countries,
doubling Aeroflot's access in the last decade.
? Maritime agreements are in effect with more than
30 Western and Third World countries, compared
Influence and Activities
The expanding Communist presence around the world
has allowed Moscow and its allies to influence the.)
actions of other countries, to extend the Communist
Exerting Irtfluence. The USSR and its allies are wel 25X1
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positioned in several countries either to overtly or l
covertly influence the internal political scene, as well
as to influence the behavior of these countries in the
international arena. On the overt side, training prof
grams have provided opportunities to penetrate the
political, military, and technical establishments of
Third World countries by:
? Developing individuals whose future career paths
may place them at the levers of power in their
? Creating a network of individuals who have a
common training experience and who, in time, may
permeate the elites and power structure of,their
countries.
? Providing-especially through the military training
program-a means to place significant numbers of
Communists in target LDCs.
A number of graduates from Communist training
For example, alumni include a member of the ruling
Sandinista Directorate and several LDC cabinet min-
isters, ambassadors, and subcabinet directors. There
are also alumni in the insurgency movements in El I
Salvador and South Africa, and some of the bureauc-
racies and professions in key LDCs have many gradu-
ates of Soviet universities. Although such graduates
cannot be considered Soviet pawns, a number can be
counted on to interpret events with a pro-Soviet twist.
The increased presence of Communist officials over 11
seas has also facilitated covert influence operations
referred to by Moscow as active measures. These
activities.are, for the most part, carried out by the
KGB or similar intelligence entities of alliedicoun-
tries. Some 25 to 30 percent of the Communist official
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 overseas presence is KGB or other intelligence person-
nel using a variety of covers. Journalistic cover is
particularly prized by the KGB because it permits
Active measures, which are used by the Soviets and
their allies to weaken opponents and advance their
own interests, include:
? Supporting and guiding the activities of more than
70 nonruling Communist parties.
? Exploiting ties to international and local front
groups.
? Penetrating and trying to manipulate mass move-
ments, leftist parties, and labor and student
organizations.
? Influencing foreign media through controlled jour-
nalists, misleading articles, and forgeries.
? Operating clandestine radio stations (currently in-
volving the Soviet Union, East Germany, and
Cuba).
? Using agents of influence to manipulate private
channels of communication and exploit unwitting
contacts.F I
Using these programs and measures, the USSR has
had some success in garnering support for its position
in international forums. For example:
? On controversial UN votes such as the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow has been able
to line up more than a dozen votes from its Third
World clients.
? In a recent UN vote on chemical warfare, a major
East-West issue, besides its hardcore supporters-
such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria-Moscow had
the support of several other Third World countries
including Algeria, Tunisia, Guyana, and a number
The use of official presence to influence opinion was
especially evident after the Soviet shootdown of the
KAL airliner last summer. In addition to eliciting
support from their allies, the Soviets used their pres-
ence in non-Communist countries to blunt US criti-
cism of Soviet actions:
? To divert attention from Soviet involvement in the
incident, the Soviet Embassy in Bangladesh issued
press releases portraying the US Marine contingent
in Lebanon as "mass killers" of Lebanese Muslims,
according to the US Embassy there.
Although most countries reacted negatively to the
Soviet shootdown, Moscow was able to gain some
sympathy for its position. Western sanctions imposed
on Aeroflot were somewhat muted because the Soviet
Union still had access to its major international hubs
(Cairo, Bombay, Karachi, Shannon, Havana, and
In Western Europe a primary focus of Communist
activity recently has been exploitation of the West
European peace movement and the opposition to
deployment of new US missiles in Europe. The Sovi-
ets perceive the peace movement as the most effective
mass action since the end of World War II and have
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 attempted to influence its development and evolution
to fit their needs. In addition to urging the West
European Communist parties to participate in the
movement, they have used their allies-particularly
East Germany-and embassy and Novosti press agen-
cy personnel to provide covert assistance to organizers
of protest demonstrations:
? The West German and West Berlin Communist
parties have made the most significant inroads into
the movement, committing experienced workers,
financial resources, and printing presses. They have
taken key positions on coordinating committees of
the peace movement and have handled the logistics
for mass demonstrations.
? Soviet personnel of the Novosti press agency in Bern
recruited, organized, and financed "peace" demon-
strators for rallies and meetings in Switzerland
? According to the French Government, some of the
47 Soviets expelled in April 1983 were linked to
efforts to manipulate French public opinion through
the peace movement, the press, and the Franco-
Military Activity. The expansion of the Communist
military program has made a number of Third World
countries dependent on the East for military support.
In some cases, this dependency has provided the
Soviets with access to military and naval facilities in
key LDC regions:
? The Soviets are now the dominant supplier of
military equipment to 35 Third World countries,
twice the number of a decade ago. Most of these are
in the Middle East; at key locations in Sub-Saharan
Africa; or represent politically important clients,
such as India. The rapid growth in Soviet arms
sales, especially of more advanced weapon systems,
also has necessitated a similar increase in the
number of military advisers and technicians abroa
.
d
? Although the Soviet Navy minimizes its dependence
on overseas facilities by relying heavily on auxiliary,
ships, access to port facilities or sheltered anchorage
is a valuable peacetime convenience. The Soviet
Navy has access to some military or commercial
facilities in more than a dozen countries-Angola,
ducts ports of call at a number of other countries
such as Seychelles, Mauritius, India, Algeria, Sin-
gapore, Nigeria, Kampuchea, and Benin. ,
? Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft-which a 25X1
decade ago operated only out of Cuba, Egypt, and
Somalia-now routinely fly out of Cuba, Vietnam,
Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and occasionally
out of Syria and Libya.
Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mozambique,
South Yemen, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Greece,
Yugoslavia, and Vietnam-and occasionally;con-
? Soviet military transport aircraft are currently
based in seven Third World countries covering four
regions-Angola, Mozambique, and Madagascar in
Africa; South Yemen and Syria in the Middle East;
Afghanistan in South Asia; and Vietnam inlEast
Asia. The aircraft in Syria are configured for 25X1
electronics countermeasures (ECM). Ten years ago
transports were based only in Egypt and Syria. I
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The military supply relationship is considered to be of
primary importance in establishing influence because 25X1
it not only creates dependence but also provides direct
access to LDC power structures. A recent case of the
Soviets' using this relationship with a Third World
client to their advantage involved Algerian deliveries
of Soviet-supplied weapons to Nicaragua in 1981 and
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 Figure 3
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Type, 1974-82
Ilyd rograph is and space
Surface combatantsa
event support ships
Auxiliaries
0 General purpose submarines
Q Amphibious ships
SSBNS
Q Mine warfare ships
Ship-days
60,000
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i
Figure 4
Distant Deployments of Soviet
Naval Aircraft, 1976-82
1JSyria, IL-38 May and LJ Vietnam, TU-141 Be,, F
TU-16 Badger
Libya, IL-38 May Vietnam, TU-95 Bear D
O Ethiopia, IL-38 May Q Angola, TU-95 Bear D
South Yemen, IL-38 May Cuba, TU-95 Bear D
Aircraft-days in country
a The data for patrol combatants are
included in surface combatant category,
I
0
The increased access to military and naval facilities
around the world has enabled Moscow to be more
responsive to the needs of clients or potential clients
and to increase its out-of-area naval presence. For
example, access to air and naval facilities in South
Yemen played a key part in Soviet support to Ethio-
pia-facilitating the deployment of Cuban troops as
well as military equipment. Access to ship repair and
support facilities in Syria has facilitated Mediterra-
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The deployment of reconnaissance and other aircraft
to bases in the Middle East and Africa as well as
Vietnam and Cuba has provided the Soviets with an
improved capability to monitor US naval and shipping
activity in key regions of the world. For example, US
naval and shipping activities in the Arabian Sea and
southern Red Sea are routinely monitored by Soviet
naval reconnaissance flights out of Ethiopia and
South Yemen. In other areas, the Soviets have signifi-
cantly increased their monitoring capabilities in the
North Atlantic (from Cuba) and in the South China
Sea (from Vietnam). They also have repeatedly tried
to regain access for reconnaissance flights from Guin-
ea, which would further extend their capability to
monitor US traffic in the Atlantic from Africa.
Support to Insurgents and Terrorists. In addition to
government-to-government military transfers, the
USSR and its allies provide extensive support to
revolutionary movements. The Soviets, East Germans,
and Bulgarians provide arms, training, and advisers to
groups such as the South-West Africa People's Orga-
nization (SWAPO), the African National Congress
(ANC), and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). Libya has provided money, arms, and training
to a variety of Palestinian groups-particularly the
more radical elements-and has worked to subvert
moderate regimes in the region. Cuba has trained
revolutionaries from Africa and Latin America and is
a major force behind the Salvadoran and Guatemalan
insurgents. It not only provides training, financing,
and direction to the Salvadorans but is the chief
source of weapons and other important supplies.
Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, and the PLO have also
provided direct or indirect support to insurgents in the
Central America/Caribbean region
The Soviets, East Europeans, and Cubans tend to
avoid direct involvement in terrorist operations but
nevertheless provide haven, training, and other sup-
port to revolutionary groups that use violent tactics:
KINTEX purchases arms from international,
and resells them for hard currency.
? East Germany continues to provide support to revo
lutionary terrorist groups, including permission to
onerate from its territory.
Several of Moscow's more independent allies=includ-
ing North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Iraq-have be-
come directly involved in terrorist activities. North
Korean terrorism has been aimed mainly against
South Korea: Libya's participation in planning and
executing terrorist operations has ebbed and flowed,
although rarely has it ceased entirely. Qadhafi's most
recent phase of terrorist activism took place from
1979 to 1981. Syria uses terrorism not only as a tool
against Israel but also as a device to strengthen
Syrian influence in.the Middle East. Exploiting
dissension in the Palestinian movement, Syria' has
supported radical elements in conducting terrorist
operations against moderate Palestinians and neigh-
boring Arab states. Iraq, on the other hand, has
recently taken steps to reduce support of radical
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Although the USSR cannot be tied directly to terror-
ist activities conducted or supported by allies, it has
done virtually nothing to discourage revolutionary or
social violence, unless it has emanated from the right.
Arms produced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Po-
land, and Hungary have turned up among terrorist
supplies in Europe and the Middle East. Moreover,
Western weapons originally purchased by
KINTEX, a Bulgarian state-controlled import-ex-
port enterprise, have been discovered in the posses-
sion of Turkish terrorists, according to press reports.
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 In general, Moscow benefits politically from terrorism
that serves to undermine Western interests or the
Economic Activity. Moscow considers economic.aid a
useful tool for expanding influence in the Third
World, and its highly focused economic program has
been influential. The USSR accounts for less than
3 percent of international aid flows to non-Communist
LDCs, and only about $1 billion of all Soviet econom-
ic assistance, totaling some $23 billion for the 1954-82
period, has been grant aid-most of that going to
Marxist clients, such as Afghanistan and Ethiopia.
Nevertheless, the USSR initially gained entry into
Egypt, India, Syria, and a number of other countries
through its economic program, and these ties endure
even when other relationships wither. For example, in
Egypt, although political relations have been cool
since 1981, Soviet trade has recovered to about $700
million a year, and more than 100 technicians are
working on economic projects. In Morocco the USSR
pledged $2 billion in credits to exploit new phosphate
deposits, and in Nigeria the USSR broke into the
Western-dominated equipment. market with $1.2 bil-
lion in credits for a new steel mill. A Soviet technical
force of more than 5,000 personnel is now working on
the construction of the mill.I
Moscow apparently pursues political goals in some of
its trade practices as well. For example, although the
majority of Soviet sugar deals are transacted in
normal commercial fashion, reflecting primarily sup-
ply-and-demand conditions of the sugar market, some
seem to exhibit astute political timing by Moscow or a
convergence of political and economic interests. Dur-
ing the past nine years, Soviet sugar purchases from
Peru occurred only in 1975 and 1980, two years in
which there was a change in Peru's government. The
purchases may also have been linked with earlier
Soviet arms sales to Peru. Zimbabwe is another case
in point-the only recent Soviet sugar purchase oc-
curred in 1980, the first year of independence. Having
backed the losing faction in the civil war, Moscow
apparently felt the need to make a goodwill gesture
toward the Mugabe regime by trying to improve trade
relations. The only Soviet sugar purchase from Guy-
ana occurred in 1975, the same year that Moscow's
first resident diplomatic mission arrived in that coun-
try. The Soviets first purchased Nicaraguan sugar in
1980, just after the current leftist regime came to
Recently, Moscow has pressed for broad, long-term
cooperation agreements with all of its major LDC
clients to provide a firmer economic base for long-
term planning by client countries, while increasing the
USSR's assurance of a stable flow of raw materials-
such as crude oil from Iran and Syria, natural gas
from Afghanistan, bauxite from Guinea, and alumina
For the USSR and Eastern Europe the technical
services program has another advantage; it is one of
their most profitable undertakings in LDCs. About
two-thirds of the technical personnel work in Arab
and other countries that pay hard currency for
services. Cuba has also expanded its technical pres-
ence in the Third World as a quick and profitable way
to increase its influence abroad. Cuba now has techni-
cal contingents in over 25 LDCs and has substantially
increased its presence in Algeria and Libya, which 25X1
Commercial Activities. The 400 commercial compa-
nies established by the Soviets and East Europeans in
the West and the LDCs during the past decade have
proved valuable in providing the Communists access
to markets and to Western technology. Many of those
firms were commissioned to study local market condi-
tions, sell equipment, and service products. Subsidiar-
ies now not only provide exclusive marketing services
to Communist enterprises but also:
? Inform parent enterprises of competitive
developments.
? Undertake ambitious advertising and promotional
campaigns, such as hiring a New York firm to
promote Aeroflot service to the United States.
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Maintain the infrastructure (warehouses, support
facilities, dealer networks, and service centers) re-
quired for effective marketing and servicing of
equipment abroad. For example, Emec Trading,
Ltd., in Canada distributes and services Soviet
turbines, generators, electrical equipment, and
ships.
? Modify inappropriately styled or finished Soviet
equipment or consumer durables for more demand-
ing Western customers. The Belarus agricultural
and automotive companies in Canada and Denmark
and automotive distributors such as Scaldi-Volga in
Belgium modify equipment for Western use.
Soviet and East European parent organizations sup-
port these enterprises both by direct capital contribu-
tion and supplier credits
While these companies operate as commercial enter-
prises, they have frequently also been used for covert
activities:
Soviet firms have bought property near NATO
Headquarters in Brussels, at the Strait of Gibraltar,
and close to sensitive Norwegian military installa-
tions, thereby improving surveillance opportunities.
? Employees of Soviet firms in the Netherlands have
been expelled from country in well- -publicized
espionage cases,
The most flagrant example of illegal activity, by a
Communist firm involved a Polish company in the
United States. POLAMCO-a subsidiary of a Polish
Government corporation-is incorporated in Dela-I
ware and Illinois with a legitimate enterprise of trade
in machine tools. In a well-publicized case,
POLAMCO was shown to provide commercial cover
for Polish intelligence officers in the UnitediStates. 25X1
Marian Zacharski, a Polish intelligence officer under
cover as a vice president of POLAMCO; recruited a
radar specialist for the Hughes Aircraft Company)
who, during a three-year period, passed more thane 20
classified reports on advanced US weapon systems to
Zacharski in exchange for more than $100,000.
An Assessment
25X1
Increased Communist presence and activity, work to
Moscow's advantage in key world regions. In the
Middle East Soviet resupply of Syria following its
25X1
defeat by Israel in June 1982, especially the delivery
of Soviet-manned SA-5 surface-to-air and SS-21 sur-
face-to-surface missiles, has helped to maintain Soviet 1 political influence in the area. In Sub-Saharan Africa
resupply:now under way in Angola by the USSR and
Cuba may help shore up Communist influence in that -
country and signal Moscow's steadfastness to other
regional clients. In Latin America, especially in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean, Cuba and,1 to a lesser
extent, the USSR and Eastern Europe have influence
over the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and
over the insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala
through their steady supply of arms, training, and
advice. In Western Europe-although they] have not
prevented the deployment of US INF missiles-the
Communists have influenced the direction of the
peace movement in their favor, at times complicating
relations between the United States and its European
allies While the Soviets and East Europeans avoid
direct involvement in terrorist activities, they general-
ly serve Moscow's aim of undermining democratic 25X1
societies; such gains, however, must be weighed
against the damage that results from Western charges
of Soviet complicity in terrorism.25X1
I
25X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
Table 2
Communist Presence in Strategic Areas
Soviet
Friendship
Treaty
USSR
Major Arms
Supplier
Significant
Economic
Assistance
Soviet Access
to Military/
Commercial
Facilities
Strategic
Interest
Iraq
x
X
X
Near major source of Western oil
North Yemen
x
x
x
Adjacent to Bab el Mandeb choke
point
South Yemen
x
X
X
X
Adjacent to Bab el Mandeb choke
point
Syria
x
X
X
X
Near major source of Western oil
X
Near shipping lanes through the
Mediterranean
X
Near shipping lanes through the
Mediterranean
Morocco
Tunisia
Near shipping lanes through the
Mediterranean
Near shipping lanes and strategic
minerals
Near shipping lanes and strategic
minerals
Near shipping lanes in Atlantic
Ocean
Seychelles
X
Indian Ocean shipping lanes
Tanzania
X
Vietnam
x
X
X
X
South China Sea shipping lanes
North Korea
x
X
X
Shipping lanes near Japan and
South Korea
Nicaragua
x
X
Peru
x
X
Near shipping lanes and strategic
minerals
 I! I I 'd i
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I I JCC1CI
On balance, the Soviets have experienced more gains
than setbacks in increasing their presence and are in a
stronger position today to exert influence in key
regions than a decade ago. Moreover, it is to Mos-
cow's benefit to continue these activities if exploiting
local tensions contributes to continued instability in
specific regions, increasing the potential threat to
Western interests. In this regard, Moscow succeeds in
advancing a key aspect of its foreign, policy-keeping
Western interests uncertain and subject to disruption.
Although the Soviets and their allies have increased
their presence in strategically important areas, their
potential to exploit such positions is limited:
? Any move to disrupt petroleum supplies or to inter-
fere with international sea lanes would invite a
strong coordinated response from the West.
? Given the structure of the world mineral market,
any short-term supply disruptions would have little
impact because of reduced world demand resulting.
from the world economic slowdown, the availability
of stockpiled materials, and the ability to substitute
other materials.
? Despite progress in acquiring the use of naval and
military facilities abroad, Moscow's ability to pro-
ject power to distant areas is constrained by the lack
of a network of bases comparable to that of the
United States. Except in Communist countries, the
Soviets have not yet secured any permanent basing
In addition, internal political constraints in most
LDCs limit Moscow's ability to translate presence
into influence. The effectiveness of Communist efforts
to penetrate and influence a country depends on a
number of sociopolitical factors including local atti-
tudes toward Communism; the strength and political
attitudes of the military, often the major stabilizing
force in developing countries; the strength of local
religions (such as Islam in the Middle East and
Catholicism in Latin America, both of which are anti-
Communist); the degree of stability in the society; and
the prevailing attitudes of the country's leadership. To
date the Soviets have increased their aid and presence
in nearly all regions of the world-with emphasis on
the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa-but their
gains in influence have mainly resulted from eiploit-
ing local rivalries and keeping regions destabilized:
? In the Middle East, Syria and Iraq are two of
Moscow's. largest military clients, but both continue
to operate largely independently of Soviet interests.)
Syria, in its battles with the PLO and its policies
toward Israel, is influenced first by Pan-Arabist
tendencies and second by Moscow's desires. Iraq, in
its war with Iran, is demanding more Soviet weap- 125X1
onry while not adhering to Moscow's wishes regard-
ing the conduct of the war. In Libya-also one of
the largest recipients of Soviet arms-Moscow has
little control over Qadhafi's Islamic policies.
? In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviets, with thejhelp of
Cuba, have established strong footholds in Angola
and Ethiopia and have become predominant mili-
tary suppliers to Mozambique and Zambia. In
Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, however, rebel
activity continues to threaten the stability of the
regimes, while Zambia follows independent foreign
policies.
? In South Asia, although Soviet-Indian relations I.
have much improved, New Delhi still makes a point
of restraining the number of in-country Soviet per- I
sonnel. In the Indian Ocean, recent attempts by the
Soviets to increase their influence in Mauritius have
been unsuccessful.
? In Central America, Moscow is reluctant t openly
support the Sandinistas in Nicaragua with weapons
for fear of agitating the United States. Cuba and 25X1
Bulgaria have been more directly involved in the
military resupply effort, political proselytizing, and
development of a Communist infrastructure. The
recent US invasion of Grenada will probably temper
Soviet and Cuban support of other revolutionary I
movements in the region, at least in the short term.
Indeed, the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan and
incidents such as the shooting down of the KAL
airliner last summer have made a number of leaders,
particularly in the Third World, increasingly; wary of
Soviet motives and reluctant to sever ties to the West.
25X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 : CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
Appendix A-
Statistics on Presence in Non-Communist
Countries of Soviets and Their Allies
Table A-1
Latin America
Country Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs USSR/East Other Soviet Students and Trainees Pro-Soviet
(estimated number of persons) a European Aid Soviet Traded Studying in Warsaw Communist
Agreements b Agreements C (million Pact Countries Party
(million US $) US $) (est. number of Members d
persons)d
Official Official: Military Economic Military Economic Civil Mari- Military Academic
Of Technicians Technicians Air time and
Which Technical
Intelligence,
Total 2,455 720 3,255 6,100 710 1,575 2,823 45 9,080 160,650
Argentina 280 80 55 NA 10 X X 1,784 20 45,000
Belize .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20 NEGL
Bolivia 205 60 80 15 30 105 300
Brazil - 255 70 120 415 X 822 45 6,000
Chile 10 75 20,000
Colombia 135 35 70 5 10 28 2,390 12,000
Costa Rica 90 25. 5 .. .. .. .. 695 7,000
El Salvador
A French West Indies
825 5,000
825 500
70 800
75 4,000 A
 Table A-1
Latin America (continued)
Country
Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs USSR/East
(estimated number of persons) a European Aid
Agreements b
(million US $)
Other
Soviet
Agreements c
Soviet
Trade d
(million
US $)
Students and Trainees
Studying in Warsaw
Pact Countries
(est. number ci
persons) d
Pro-Soviet
Communist
Party
Members d
Official
Official:
Of
Which
Intelligence
Military Economic Military
Technicians Technicians
Economic
Civil
Air
Mari-
time
Military
Academic
and
Technical
Nicaragua
60
20
3,100 5,300 170
475
X
NA
NA
1,260
300
Panama
100
40
10 ..
5
ll
..
1,040
500
Note: An ellipsis (. .) indicates that we have no information and
presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to
Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not
add to totals shown.
a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the
intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence.
c Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.
c Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983; a
civil air agreement with Chile is currently suspended.
d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party
members do not include independent parties.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
Table A-2
Middle East and North Africa
Country Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs USSR/East Other Soviet Students and Trainees Pro-Soviet
(estimated number of persons) a European Aid Soviet Traded Studying in Warsaw Communist
Agreements b Agreements c (million Pact Countries Party
(million US $) US 8) (est. number at Members d
persons) d
Official
Official:
Of
Which
Intelligence
Military Economic
Technicians Technicians
Military
Economic
Civil
Air
Mari-
time
Military
-
Academic
and
Technical
Total
5,810
1,585
13,350
99,110
32,690
6,455
6,953
4,240
29,865
73,600
Middle East
4,450
1,200
9,685
32,210
18,730
3,670
4,564
1,240
24,625
70,000
Abu Dhabi
..
..
..
15
NEGL
..
..
..
..
..
Cyprus
255
70
30
5
X
68
1,385
12,000
Egypt
550
150
260
55
385
X
X
719
510
500
Greece
300
80
15
75
NA
X
X
4,000
33,500
Iran
1,135
300
250
3,435
495
X
1,057
50
205
NA
Iraq
240
65
1,100
17,500
7,455
X
X
1,372
180
3,075
2,000
Israel
20
5
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
1,500
Jordan
175
50
35
1,330 -
-225
X
- - 125 -
7,765
500
Kuwait
155
40
1,000
260
X
25
NEGL
Lebanon
485
130
55
5
X
30
890
15,000
North Yemen
420
115
1,200
300
1,160
120
X
47
600
2,090
NEGL
Oman
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
NEGL
South Yemen
NA
NA
1,100
2,950
785
150
X
101
110
1,335
NA
Syria
305
85
6,000
3,550
8,185
350
X
X
703
300
3,135
5,000
Turkey
410
110
..
1,800
2,660
X
342
..
10
NEGL
 Country
Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs
(estimated number of persons) ?
USSR/East
European Aid
Agreements b
(million US $)
Other
Soviet
Agreements
Soviet
Traded
(million
US $)
Students and Trainees
Studying in Warsaw
Pact Countries
(est. number of
persons) d
Pro-Soviet
Communist
Party
Members d
Official
- Official:
Of
Which
Intelligence
Military Economic
Technicians Technicians
Military
Economic
Civil
Air
Mari-
time
Military
Academic
and
Technical
North Africa
1,360
385
3,665 66,900
13,960
2,785
2,389
3,000
5,240
3,600
Algeria
280
90
1,515 11,790
3,405
630
X
X
246
460
2,525
500
Libya
175
50
2,150 52,400
10,505
X
X
1,859
2,540
660
NEGL
Mauritania
165
45
.. 40
..
NEGL
X
..
..
260
Morocco
410
110
2,120
50
2,135
X
X
269
900
3,000
Tunisia
330
90
490
20
X
15
885
100
West Sahara
..
..
.. 60
..
..
..
..
10
Note: An ellipsis (. .) indicates that we have no information and
presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to
Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not
add to totals shown.
Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the
intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence.
b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.
Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983.
d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party
members do not include independent parties.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 : CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
Table A-3
Sub-Saharan Africa
European Aid
Agreements b
(million US $)
Soviet
Agreements,
I lade c
(million
US $)
Official
Official:
Military
Economic
Military Economic
Civil
Mari-
Of
Which
Intelligence
Technicians Technicians
Air
time
Total
5,975
1,645
37,925
25,635
4,295
3,665
1,055
Angola
200
60
30,000
9,550
445
480
X
X
89
Benin
90
25
60
75
5
5
X
Burundi
215
60
30
55
35,
NEGL
X
Cameroon
365
100
30
NA
X
Cape Verde
15
5
NA
35
65
5
X
Central African
Republic
10
5
20
..
..
X
Equatorial Guinea
165
45
NA
IS
5
NEGL
X
Ethiopia
550
160
5,000
2,600
2,635
865
X
X
270
Gabon
55
15
15
..
NEGL
Ghana
265
50
75
NEGL
'55
X
6
Guinea
265
70
65
870
130
25
X
60
Guinea-Bissau
100
30
115
305
20
15
X
Ivory Coast
10
..
..
98
-Liberia- --
_ 40
- _10- __
_5._ .
_NEGL
_X_
Madagascar
255
80
NA
175
100
100
X
Malawi
..
..
..
..
..
..
studying in Warsaw s,ommumst
Pact Countries Party
(est. number of Members d
persons) d
Military Academic
and
Technical
525 34,780 5,000
125 1,775
405
30 465
130
NA 360
515
240
25 5,585
290
1,265
. 20 740
495
575
110
30 2,310
25
 Table A-3
Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)
Country
Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs USSR/East
(estimated number of persons) a European Aid
Agreements b
(million US $)
Other
Soviet
Agreements c
Soviet
Traded
(million
US $)
Students and Trainees
Studying in Warsaw
Pact Countries
(est. number of
persons) d
Pro-Soviet
Communist
Party
Members d
Official
Official:
Of
Which
Intelligence
Military Economic Military Economic
Technicians Technicians
Civil
Air
Mari-
time
Military
Academic
and
Technical
Mozambique
160
50
1,500
3,300 240
205
X
X
70
NA
4,595
Niger
110
30
25
NEGL
..
..
175
Sao Tome and
Principe
NEGL
Senegal
220
60
65 NA
X
350
1,000
Seychelles
175
50
10
25 10
X
X
20
Sierra Leone
85
25
10
35 NEOL
NEGL
X
13
415
Somalia
45
10
10 10
X
400
Sudan
165
45
25 5
55
X
13
1,670 "
1,500
Tanzania
160
45
NA
325 145
65
X
15
25
795
Togo
75
20
..
5 ..
..
..
..
465
Zambia
350
95
110
440 245
120
X
,
25
675
Zimbabwe
80
25
..
15
15
85
335
Note: An ellipsis (..) indicates that we have no information and . a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the
presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence. Military
Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not technicians include Cuban troops in Africa.
add to totals shown. b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.
Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983.
d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party
members do not include independent parties.
 Table A-4
East Asia and South Asia
European Aid Soviet trade 0 Stuaymg in Warsaw wmmuma
Agreements b Agreements c (million Pact Countries Party
(million US $) US $) (est. number of Members d
persons) d
Official Official: Military Economic Military Economic Civil Mari- Military Academic
Of Technicians Technicians Air time and
Which Technical
Intelligence
Total
6,035
1,625
2,350
7,175
8,665
3,030
5,414
185
14,590
174,500
East Asia
1,175
320
60
NEGL
210
658
25
.200
Burma
275
75
20
NEGL
180
X
14
Malaysia
120
30
Philippines
160
45
South Korea
..
..
South Asia
4,860
1,305
2,350
7,110
8,665
2,820
4,756
185
14,565 -
174,300
Afghanistan
415
115
2,000
3,900
2,230
1,105
X
953
150
10,910
15,000
Bangladesh
285
75
125
15
650
X. -
76
830
- 2,500
India
2,460
670
350
1,800
6,400
800
X
X
3,469
35
1,490
150,000
Maldives
..
..
..
..
30 -
Nepal
210
55
20
NEGL
NEGL
33
610
1,500
Pakistan
1,145
300
1,175
20
245
X
X
196
230
300
Sri Lanka
345
90
..
90
..
20
X
X
29
465
5,000
Note: An ellipsis (..) indicates that we have no information and
A presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to ft
Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not
add to totals shown.
? Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the
intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence. Military
technicians exclude Soviet troops in Afghanistan._
s Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82. ,
Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983; a
_ civil air agreement with Indonesia is currently suspended.
d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party
members do not include independent parties.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
Table A-5
Developed Countries
Country
Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs USSR/East
(estimated number of persons) a European Aid
Agreements b
(million US S)
Other
Soviet
Agreements c
Soviet Students and Trainees
Traded Studying in Warsaw
(million Pact Countries
US 8) (est. number of
persons)d
Pro-Soviet
Communist
Party
Members d
Official
Official:
Of
Which
Intelligence
Military Economic Military Economic
Technicians Technicians
Civil
Air
Mari- -
time
Military
Academic
and
Technical
Total
15,515
4,330
47,896
560
827,900
Australia
210
60
722
1,500
Austria
1,335
360
X
1,669
10
25,000
Belgium
480
130
X
X
2,214
15
Canada
730
210
X
1,930
15
2,500
Denmark
415
115
X
X
502
25
9,000
Finland
1,475
410
NEGL
X
X
7,422
125
47,000
France
2,240
620
X
X
4,823
500,000
Iceland
220
60
145
Ireland
60
15
109
500
Italy
1,380
390
X
5,580
20
Japan
1,000
275
X
5,082
NA
Luxembourg
65
20
X
322
600
Netherlands
200
55
X
X
2,570
20
New Zealand
140
40
328
300
Norway
300
85
X
X
228
10
500
Portugal
265
75
X
X
124
75
187,000
Spain
425
155
X
X
449 ..
50
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO283ROO0300080004-3
Table A-5
Developed Countries (continued)
VtFGII
,
-
uuJ,uy , ,a,u..
.............
Agreements b
(million US $)
Agreements
(million
US $)
Pact Countries
(est. number of
Party
Members d
persons) d
Official
Official:
Military Economic
Military Economic
Civil Mari-
Military Academic
Of
Technicians Technicians
Air time
and
Which
Technical
Intelligence
Sweden
550
150
X X
1,041
70
Switzerland
1,500
410
X
1,330
5,000
United Kingdom
1,050
290
X X
2,160
100
West Germany
1,475
405
X
9,146
.. 25
49,000
Note: An ellipsis (. .) indicates that we have no information and
presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to
Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not
add to totals shown.
a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the
intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence.
s Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.
Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983.
All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party
members do not include independent parties such as the Italian
Communist Party.
 Greenland
(Den.)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 : CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation or Defense Treaty with Soviet Union
Insurgent group receiving support (weapons, supplies, money, advisors, training, or safehaven
f )
From the soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact member
From Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan or South Yemen
Iceland
Overseas facilities used by Soviets:
Soviet military transport aircraft based in country
U Port of call Ship repair/support
? Airfield used by Soviet naval aircraft
Operating area of Soviet naval aircraft stationed abroad
Critical choke point
x Major strategic mineral producer I Major petroleum producer
Kuril Islands
(administered by
Soviet Union)
~administered by Soviet Union,
claimed by Japan
North
P a c I I i c
Ocean
' Dominican
HaitiRep. St. Christopher and Nevis
Jamaica Antigua and Barbuda
St. Lucia Dominica
Honduras
ragua
Suriname
French Guiana
Cape
Verde `, Senegal
The Gambiasnre,
UIflee
7
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Indonesia
Nauru
Papua Solomon
New Guinea Islands Tuvalu
Kiribati
Western
Samoa
Vanuatu
. Tonga
Australia
700943 (545038) 1-84
Grenada
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela 1 Guyana
C.A.R. -Central African Republic
F.R.G. -Federal Republic of Germany
G.D.R. -German Democratic Republic
P.D.R.Y.-People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
U.A.E. -United Arab Emirates
Y.A.R. -Yemen Arab Republic
The Soviet Union and Its Allies. A Global Presence
Combat troops from the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact member, Cuba, Vietnam, or North Korea
present; one or more of these countries is also a dominant supplier of military equipment
Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact member, Cuba, Vietnam, or North Korea dominant supplier
of military equipment
New
Zealand
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 : CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00283R000300080004-3
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