TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 18, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIUUUiiiiiii~lllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
18 FEBRUARY 1971
(VOL. XX1I, NO. 7)
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This propaganda analyst; report is based ex-
(!iuslvely on material carried In communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains Information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18. sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
(.OUP I
[u~..d.d 6v... o.ro aNt~
do~..y.ad~.y d
d.dva~frar,vv ~
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONIf'LULIN'I'.LA1, :1.9 f'1;1.31tUARY 19(1.
FORLIGJ BZ01WCPST I1dF01TV\TIO J SERVICE
C0RRECTI0N
TO THE FJ3IS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA OF 18 FEBRUARY 1971
Page 6 , Itr?aj;rithh one, under the hcading "Hanoi Warns of Action
Agaln::L DR V; Thuy Also Sees '.P1;rcat to PIlC," line 14 should
rcr(d: x x x the Preoiderrt'c press conference in remarking that
%he (1.E,. QVL1. dc(;ij't; x x x.
STATSPEC
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CONFIDEN'TIAL FJ3J:S TRENDS
18 FE13I2UARY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Eventr3 Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
Communists Claim Success in Southern Laos, Quang Tri Province 1
DRV Army Paper, Front Radio Describe Allied "Setbacks" in Laos 3
Media Cite Evidence of American Bole in Laos Operation . . . . . 5
Cambodia: Major ARVN Losses Claimed in Single Week . . . . . . . 5
Hanoi Warns of Action Against DRV; Thuy Also Sees Threat to PRC . 6
D'3V Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes Against North Vietnam 9
Peking: Incursion Into Laos "A Grave Menace to China" . . . . . . 10
PRC Concludes "Supplementary" Aid Agreement With DRV . . . 13
Soviet Media Continue to Reflect Caution on Events in Laos . 14
Souphanouvong Asks Geneva Cochairmen to Stop Aggression . . ? ? . 18
Sihanouk Joint Statements With DRV, Pathet Lao Released . . . . 20
PLAF Anniversary: NFLSV, DRV Pledge Struggle Until Victory . . . 21
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Applauds UAR "InitiatJve," Deplores Israeli Stanca . . . . 24
ARMS CONTROL
Kosygin Hails Seabed Treaty, Urges SALT Agreement . . . . . . . . 28
POLAND-USSR
Price Rollback Follows Talks with Strikers; Soviet Aid Cited . . 31
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shelest Foe Appointed Ukrainian Agriculture Minister . . . 34
Russian Named as Second Secretary of Estonian Party . . . . . . . 36
Moscow Th.atcr Repertoires Cleaned Up for CPSU Congress . . . . . 37
Economist Revives Controversial Agricultural Issues . . . . . . . 37
Cadre Rectification Campaign Persists, with PLA Involved . . . . ItO
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 8 - 14 FEBRUARY 1971
Moscow (3807 items)
Peking (3178 items)
Indochina
(17%)
16%
Indochina
(47%)
64%
CPSU 24th Congress
(1%)
10%
[Sihanouk in DRV
(--)
7%]
in March
[PRC Government
(--)
5%]
Seabed Treaty
(--)
9%
State,i:ent, 12 Feb.
Luna 17 & Lunakhod
(3%)
6%
[DRV Economic
(--)
4%]
China
(5%)
4%
Delegation in PRC
Middle East
(1%)
3%
[PRC Foreign Ministry
(--)
3%]
Polish Party Plenum
(0.1%)
1%
Statement, 8 Feb.
Apollo 14
(0.1%)
1%
Domestic Issues
(20%)
15%
DPRK Army Day
(4%)
6%
PRC-Nigeria Relations
Established
(--)
5%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not. always
discussed In the body of ?.'a;e Trends. Some may have been covered in print issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor signif,'cance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
I N D 0 C H I N A
Following the 10 February PRG and DRV Government statements
protesting the launching of the allied operation in Laos,
routine Hanoi and Front propaganda pictures repeated setbacks
dealt the operation by attacks from the "Laotian patriotic armed
forces." Hanoi's continued warnings that the United. States may
also take new action against the DRV are climaxed by Xuan Thuy's
charge at the 18 February session that President Nixon's remarks
at his press conference the day before "showed that the United
States is leaving the door open for further acts of aggression
against the DRV."
Xuan Thuy's statement was also striking for the unique assertion
that China as well as the DRV is threatened by the operation in
Laos, the U.S. buildup near the DMZ, air strikes against the DRV,
and an increased number of carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. While
Thug's remark may simply be a response to the charge in the P'IC
Government statement of the 12th that the Laos incursion is 'e
grave menace to China," it is notable for being the first No:th
Vietnamese reference to the PRC's security interests and for its
timing in the wake of the President's reiteration of U.S.
assurances that there is no threat to China.
The PRC Government statement on the 12th has been followed by
extensive Peking propaganda, including reports of widespread
rallies reaffirming support for the Indochinese. But while the
statement links the PRC's security to military developments in
Indochina for the first time in recent years, it does not indicate
any :hr.nge in Peking's response: The statement and supporting
propaganda pledge in standard terms to provide "rear area" support
and express confidence that the Indochinese can cope with the
situation themselves.
Moscow continues to react with caution to the Laotian developments
and has not issued a formal protest against the allied action in
Laos. The first Soviet reaction to the President's press conference
is a highly selective TASS report which says his replies confirmed
that the United States was indeed the organizer of the intrusion
into Laos. TASS also says the President "made direct threats"
against the DRV, but it does not elaborate on the "threats" and
ignores the President's replies to questions speculating on a
possible AiiVN incursion into the DRV.
COMMUNISTS CLAIM SUCCESS IN SOUTHERN LAOS, QUANG TRI PROVINCE
LAOS Vietnamese and Laotian comraunitit media claim repeated successes
for the "Laotian patriotic armed forces" following the
8 February launching of the South Vietnamese operation Lam Son 719
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
into the southern Laotian province of Savannakhet. The propaganda
lists downings of allied aircraft, the "decimation" of landing
troops, and ambushes of ARVN columns. According to a 14 February
^ommunique (labeled No. 1) of the command of the Lao "liberation
army," carried. by Lao and Vietnamese media that day, the
insurgents in Savannakhet reportedly "put out of action" more
than !: O0 U.S. and Saigon troops, including two battalions and
five comri,'ies; shot down 89 aircraft, mostly helicopters; and
destroyed more than 50 vehicles, half of them tanks and armored
cars.
The communique refers to specific actions only on the 10th and
13th, claimi.g, for example, that 42 helicopters were downed on
the 10th. Ulied aircraft losses in the Laos operation were
reportedly brought to 92 on the 14th, according to a 16 February
VNA report which clauned, among other things, that more than 100
Saigon paratroopers were wiped out and a helicopter and three
tanks destroyed when "the enemy was moving from Ban Dong to
Chaki . . . in an attempt to loosen the patriots' encirclement."
The same VNA report describes action against Laotian Government
forces at the western end of Highway 9, claiming that on the
11th a battalion of the Vientiane army's mobile regiment "v'as
virtually annihilated, with some 200 troops killed or wounded"
when they "pushed out from Savannakhet town" and "tried to
recapture Phalane.''
Saigon's claims that the ARVN had taken up positions in the town
of Tchepone on 10 February were directly denied in an article in
the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th. Ridiculing
Western press reports that troops were in the town and repairing
air strips, the Hanoi paper said that on the contrary, "after a
week of armed incursion into Laos, the Saigon and U.S. troops
are still pinned down in the border area and are being fiercely
intercepted at Ban Dong."
QUANG TRI Han.) and Front media also report attacks in the
South Vietnamese province of Quang Tri against
allied forces supporting the Laotian operation. Daily reports
cite attacks on allied positions near the border and on convoys
along Highway 9, as well as the shelling of the operations
headquarters of the I Corps area in Dong Ha.
Propaganda on the 15th included statistics on attacks from
30 January to 14 February egainst allied forces massing along
Highway 9 to move into Laos. The communists claim to have killed
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
or wounded more than 600 U.S. and Saigon troops, shot down or
destroyed 26 aircraft on the grdund, and destroyed or damaged
95 military vehicles, including 38 tanks.
DRV ARMY PAPER, FRONT RADIO DESCRIBE ALLIED SETBACKS IN LAOS
HANOI Following the 10 February DRV Government statement,
the DRV army paper QUAN DOI THAN DAN becomes the major
vehicle for Hanoi comment on the operations in Laos, with an
editorial on the llt h and articles on the 12th, 14th, 15th,
and 16th. There is no known comment in NHAN DAN on the action
in Laos, although the party paper discussed Cambodian action
in an editoria,. on the 13th. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial,
endorsing the government statement, hailed alleged insurgent
achievements throughout Indochina and went on to single out
action along Highway 9. It claimed, among other things, that
"a whole string of enemy logistics and fire bases, link-up
points, and headquarters" along Highway 9 from Dong Ha to Khe
Sanh have been assaulted by artillery or infantry, causing "a
sharp increase in U.S. casualties" and having "the effect of a
pair of pincers on the enemy both from behind and in front."
In its article on the 12th the army paper stressed the importance
of downing and destroying allied planes and military vehicles,
noting that in southern Laos and northern South Vietnam there are
"few lines of communications" and "the large enemy force must
rely on aircraft, vehicles, and artillery to serve their combat
requirements to transport troops and supplies, to bring in
reinforcements, and to clear territory." The article held
that the attacks on planes and vehicles will weaken the allies
and force them to thin out to protect communications lines,
creai;ing "an opportunity for our armed forces to destroy the
enemy troops in big chunks."
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 14th praised the "Laotian
liberation armed forces" for their attacks on South Vietnamese
troops, noting that the GVN forces in Laos are its "most
seasoned mobile and strategic reserve forces" and that "to
attack and frighten them is tantamount to shaking the entire
system of the puppet armed forces and to accelerating their
decline and disintegration."
On the 16th the ..rmy paper claimed that the allied move into
Laos has met "great obstacles" in its first phase and cited
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
comment 1'rom APP that the allies were :surprised by the. strength
of enemy ground fire and that their tr:>ops had progressed at
a snail's pace. Also on the 16th, Hanoi broadcast excerpts
of what appears to be the same AF'P dispatch, noting low morale
among U.S. pilots flying into Laos and reporting that South
Vietnamese troops have refused to land in Laos. The AFP
dispatch, dated the 14th, reported that there had been no
vehicles moving down Highway 9 since the 10th.
THE FRONT Liberation Radio commentaries maintain that the
allied operation in Laos was undertaken because.
of the allies' defeated pzisition and that it will surely fail..
The radio particularly praises anti-aircraft. efforts in Quang
Tri and Lacs. In a broadcast on the 11th, it also alleged
that allied morale has been depressed by difficulties in
supply, weather, and terrain and by high losses In aircraft
which are essential to movement and supply. Asserting that
the situation has caused "the U.S.-puppet ringleaders" to admit
that "their operation has progressed very slowly," the radio
said that "the traitor Nguyen Cao Ky vociferously warned that
this operation must be urgent throughout" and must be definitive
"if it is not to be another Dien Bien Phu battle.."
Several Liberation Radio commentaries appeal to South Vietnamese
troops to revolt or desert rather than be sent on operations
into Laos or Cambodia. A -xmmentary on the 11th, for example,
stressed alleged ARVN Lases in 'he Laos campaign and charged.
that President Nixon has "covered up or distorted the facts by
claiming that the operation in southern Laos has met no
resistance in order to deceive the Saigon puppet troops and
have them die in place of the Americans.' Like other Front
comment, the broadcast decried the rationale for the Laos
operation as aimed at prDtecting the lives of American service-
men and aiding Vietriamization. A F'rcnt radio broadcast on the
13th, commenting in a similar vein, claimed that "a great
number of puppet troops sent to Laos refused to advance, so
that the puppet commanders in Saigon complained" of the slow
progress of the operation.
An LPA commentary on the 16th noted that the operation is also
"allegedly" aimed at "cutting 3ff the supply line of the
liberation forces" but did nit specify that the "forces" are
Vietnamese. Available Liberation Radio comment does not raise
the question of supply lines.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
MEDIA CITE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN ROLE IN LAOS OPERATION
Communist reports on the fighting in Laos have referred vaguely
to action. involving U.S. and Saigon forces, suggesting the
presence of American ground forces in Laos. At least.one
report, a 12 February VNA account of fighting south of Highway 9
on the preceding day, specifically claimed that six American
bodies were found "among the enemy corpses"* but added no
comment. On the other hand, comment was interjected in a
13 February VNA roundup of "evidence" in Western press reports
of U.S. ground forces participating in Laotian operations:
VNA went on to observe that "much breath has been wasted by
both the White House and the Pentagon to deny the physical
involvement of the United States in the brazen aggression in
Laos."
A Hanoi radio Vietnamese-language broadcast to the South on the
15th ridiculed U.S. statements crediting the South Vietnamese
with the initiative for the Laotian operation and denials.that
U.S. infantry or advisers are involved in the Laotian fighting.
Like VNA, the radio pointed to Western news reports for evidence
of U.S. involvement. It quoted UPI for the statement that the
final decision to invade Laos was made by President Nixon and
conveyed to President Thieu by Ambassador Berger on 3 February.
The question of the nature of the U.S. role has also been
brought up in reports of Congressional criticism of the operation.
For example, VNA on the 16th cited Senator Hart as charging the
Administration with trying to obscure the.role of American troops
in Laos. Other critical remarks reported include those by
Senators McGovern, Javits, and Percy.
CAMBODIA: MAJOR ARVN LOSSES CLAIMED IN SINGLE WEEK
Insurgent "victories" in combat against the South Vietnamese
sweep in the Cambodian provinces of Kompong Cham and Snoul are
hailed on 17 February in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a
NHAN DAN article. VNA's account of the editorial indicates that
* VNA claimed that the six American bodies were found following
action in which a Laotian "liberation army" unit "repelled 10
attacks launched by Saigon p'.;ppet troops in the Phu Co Boc and Tam
Luong areas (south of Highway 9), knocking out a ranger company."
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-6-
it reviews several engagements in which major losses. were. .
allegedly inflicted on the South Vietnamese. The army paper
claims that in action against the ARVN during the week
4-11 February the Cambodian "liberation army" put out of action
more than 1,800 Saigon troops, wiped out two battalions,
"heavily decimated" five others, and "trounced three armored.
squadrons." In addition, it alleges, 150 military vehicles
were destroyed, including more than 120 armored cars, and
three aircraft were shot down in the Chup and Snout rubber
plantation areas.
The "brilliant victories" of the "Cambodian. patriots" are held
by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN to be a "timely and violent blow" to the
allies "at the moment when they are committing a massive
invasion in southern Laos." The editorial also claims that.
these "victories" in the Chup and Snoul areas "testify to a
further enhancement" of the Cambodian forces' "capacity for
fighting big battles."
HANOI WARNS OF ACTION AGAINST DRV; THUY ALSO SEES THREAT TO PRC
During the past two weeks, Hanoi elite and routine propaganda
surrounding the operation in Laos has repeatedly warned of further
U.S. "escalation," including new "military adventures" against
the DRV. Such warnings were included in the 5 February DRV
Foreign Ministry statement, in the DRV Government statement of
the 10th, and in the statements at the Paris talks. But new
dimensions were added to these warnings by DRV delegate Xuan Thuy
at the Paris session on the 18th when he also referred to the
PRC's security interests. According to the VNA account, he said
that the President's remarks at his press conference on the 17th.
"showed that.the United States is leaving the door open for
further acts of aggression against North Vietnam." Judging from
the VNA account, PRG Foreign Minister Nine. Binh did not mention
the President's press conference remark that "the U.S. evil
design to prepare for a new military adventure against the DRV"
is shown by such actions as the incursion into Laos and the
stepped-up bombing of "many places" in North Vietnam from 13 to
16 February.
VNA does not acknowledge Thuy's specific reference to Ivy's and
Thieu's.remarks on an invasion of the North, but the account says
Thuy pointed out that "one cannot but come to the conclusion.that
the United States will again stage the comedy of letting its
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
agents take action while giving only 'concurrence and suppor.t.
Hanoi reacted. unusually promptly to the President's press
conference--with a radio commentary at 0430 GMT on the 18th--
but referred only vaguely to the President's "insolent
arguments and threats against the North," However, Liberation
Radio comment broadcast a half hour later charged that the
President "threatened to bomb North Vietnam and added that he
approved of the plan to use the Saigon puppet army in a new
military adventure against North Vietnam." Earlier Hanoi
broadcasts on the 12th, 13th, and 14th, however, had cited
remarks by both Ky and Thieu as evidence of planned aggression
against the North.
TFREAT TO PRC Xuan Thuy's raising of the question of PRO
security in the fashion that he did is
unprecedented. The VNA account reports him as saying: "The
current large-scale U.S. operation in Laos, together with the
concentration of big ground forces close to the 17th parallel.,
repeated air raids between Vinh Linh and Nghe An in recent days,
and the increased number of aircraft carriers in the Tonkin
Gulf, are threatening the DRV and also tie People's Republic
of China. All this threatens to expand the war to new regions."
While Tbuy's remark may be in part a response to the PRC Government
statement which linked Chinese security to military developments
in Indochina, it is notably different from propaganda in the 1965
period when DRV media, in responding to PRC statements, merely
used the Chinese formula "aggression against Vietnam is aggression
against China."* Moreover, Thuy's remark goes beyond the PRC
Government statement in describing the threat to China: The
Chinese statement had said only that the incursion in Laos is
a "grave menace to China." But Thuy lists the whole series of'
the U.S. "threatening" moves against the DRV. It also seems
unlikely, if Hanoi were simply responding to the Chinese state-
ment, that it would have waited six days. Thuy's remark seems
* Hanoi propaganda during 1965 for the most part merely echoed.
the Chinese stand. But a unique July 1965 article by DRV
Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh not only advanced the idea of a threat to
China but said-the PRC would become directly involved in case
of an invasion of the.DRV. The article maintained that U.S.
use of nuclear weapons would provoke a response in kind from
North Vietnam's 'socialist neighbors:'
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FLBRi'ARY 1971
notable not only for being the first North Vietamese reference
to Chinas neeurity interests but for its timing in the wake of
the President's reiteration of U.S. assurances that there is no
threat to China.
DRV VIGILANCE Hanoi warnings of possible new adventurous.acts
have been accomps.nied by calls for vigilance
reminiscent of those following the November massive U.S. air strikes
against the DRV and the prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay. A
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 13th, broadcast in excerpts by
Hanoi radio's domestic service, prefaces a call for a step-up..
in military tasks with a catalog of U.S. "provocations"--including
the "Laos adventure," the consiltQlt "sabotage" of the North,.and
the training of "U.S.-puppet paratroops, marines, commandos, and
scouts for new military actions."
The editorial expresses resolve to "organize our firepower network"
to destroy U.S. aircraft and commando ships and to "root.out.in
time, encircle, and annihilate . . . clandestinely-infiltrated spy
and commando groups before they carry out their evil actions." It
warns that if "the Americans and their lackeys carry out.the
insane scheme of invading the North," the people of the DRV will
develop "the invincible power of people's war and annihilate" all
enemy troops. It also says "we are accelerating the task of .
maintaining security and order with a determination to prevent
reactionary elements from engaging in disruptive activities."
A flurry of items in DRV media from the 7th to the 14th. reported
the combat-readiness of military forces in the North, mainly.in
the three southern provinces of Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, and Nghe
An and in the Vinh Linh area.
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 pprove
CON PLUI;N'l'IAli P'I311") 'I'ItENDia
1.8 Fli;I3ltllAl;Y 19'(1.
DRV SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
Ilanoi continues its routine proteut:.ti n,.-rninut U.S. otr:iken in
the northern part of the l)MZ with bliV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statements--currently on,! on it February and
a second on the 16th. Alleged. attacks by U.S. ships,
aircraft, and artillery against "the seacoast of Quang
Binh Province and the northern part of the I)MZ" are
protested by the spokesman on 11 February. The protest
charges that "between the night of 10 February and the
dawn of 11 February" U.S. ships violated 1)RV territorial
waters and "fired at fishing boats of the population
along the seacoast of Quang Binh Province, killing and
wounding a number of civilians." It further charges
that U.S. aircraft including B-52n bombed Iluong Lap
village and used artillery fire from the southern side
of the DMZ against Vinh Son and Vi.nh Giang villages, also
on the 10th. Echoing other recent protests, this one
stresses that "these villages are north of the 17th
garal'.el in the DMZ."
A second foreign ministry spokesman's protest, on. the 16th,*
scores the United States for "sending aircraft to bomb and
strafe Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces and the northern
part of the DMZ." The statement says that from 13 to 16
February consecutively, U.S. aircraft "bombed and strafed
a number of areas in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces" and
also Huong Lap village. Both protests "strongly denounced
and sternly condemned these acts of war" by the United
States and "firmly" demanded an end to all encroachments
upon DRV sr'iereignty and security.
Hanoi radio on 18 February announces that the people and
armed forces of Nghe An Province downed an unmanned U.S.
reconnaissance pl.ane--the first such claim since
6 December--bringing Hanoi's total of U.S. planes
downed to 3,372.
* The charges in this protest probably correspond with the
announcement by the U.S. Command in Saigon on the 17th of
strikes in the DRV for three consecutive days. The strikes
were said to be against antiaircraft missile sites and for
"protective reaction" reasons.
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CUNI1DEN'i'IA1, I11i;; 'I'I11:Niri;
1.8 F'F;N1tI)AHY 1'1! I
PEKING: INCURSION INTO LAOS "A GRAVE MENACE TO CHINA"
GOVERNMENT 'i'hr. I'It( (;r,vcrnmc?rlt, nirntcinr-lit, ,n for .l;'th--peNF;erl
STATEMENT t .) uLrttcrn"ft,s Itcsucd by :JthrrnoUit ,Jul nt,ly with then
Dl'V I'r?r-si(loll t find with the Pent het. t'riare
,iouphunouvong rt)?+.,cr ;;ihrtnc,trlt'u rect n$ trip to Nt rth VIrt,stun--for
Lhc Cirut time in recr fit, yeses 1 Inktr Ch I nrt'n i;e'curi ty to lilt] I Lary
developments In Inclc)chIrit . CIcllrniff. (hat, "U.,7. irnper tLI tum'tt
r,tggr?ctsuion rlNrl.intL I,rrttts I.; ,.tItto ,l t.;rtLvc tarn ter, t' the
statement warns that "the (;)I i...cr.e pool, I c Itltr' ly wi 1 1 not re-
ruttn indit'rercnt to it!" 'I'll(, f; Fobru:try f ,reign rnintt;try ntatcmrnt
had called the Incursion I ate Ln, is ":t grave pr c v ;rat ion" not, only
against the Indochinese pcOItlea but, a I';u agrtirlnt, the (hlner?e ruscl
people of the whole world--a formulation also used in the I'RC
Government statement or 4 May 1970 protcstIri the Incursion into
Cambodia. But prior to the 1,' February utatcment., Peking had not
directly expr?er3ued concern over it threat to the I'I(C'n security
from the fighting in Indochina.
The statement does not,, however, indicate a change in 1'eking'_s
response to Indochinese dcveloprnc.nts. It pi.edges in standard
term: that the Chini-e provide "a powerful bricking" as it rear
area and that, they will "take all effective measures to give
all-out support and assistance" to to Jndochincse peoples.
Expressing confidence that the three peoples of Indochina will
be able to cope with the situation, the statement claims that
the latest meetings of their leaders will further mobilize the
Indochinese peoples to "persevere in the protracted war of resirs-
tance."
A 14 Februery PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial f-)l1ewing up the government
statement addresses itself to Washington's denial that, the Laos
operation poses a threat to China. "The new war venture of U.S.
imperialism in Laos definitely poses a grave threat to China,"
according to the editorial, which adds it warning that the Chinese
"will never allow U.S. imperialism to expand at will the war in
Laos and the whole of Indochina." This elaboration on the qucs-
* In 1965, when the Chinese expressed concern that the Vietnam
conflict might escalate into another Korea-type war, PRC state-
ments declared that aggression against the DRV "means aggression
against China" and warned that the war might spread to China. At
that time Peking publicly offered to send volunteers to fight along-
side the Vietnamese. This approach, with its more Interventionist
overtones, was abando?ed it favor of an emphasis on self-reliant pro-
tracted warfare, though as late as 22 July 1966 Liu Shao-chi issued
a statement saying aggression against Vietnam is aggression against
China and threatening ", joint blows" by the Vietnamese and the Chinese
against the United States.
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C1 :11 1'1;;i?i'il1 FI!1:: 'i'I?i:;ii+:
11', Fi:Nll}UA1lY 1'071
t.I Oll ('i t,hn I it( 'rl ^1'1)1'1 t,y Illt.nl?ni
I. I t P.F?^'' lat. 1 killrr.'fi
rnnt. 1'nltr't, nil mfly n rlnr) i r?:nn'i 1+nt h t '' Ill) (In rr:rnl'n I I, F. ''ntfltfloil
1 ill,rt'rfl to W I I'll t.110 111'ir rrll l tlr r' fill,I tO fl i r?lltl l ) t r: r n: -r'; n OVn i'
'ill nXIMM, I Mn !ti' Y.hr' ''t11'1'nnt i'nrat j toll 1 fl 1,a"f? t hill mi f,hl, 1.ilYr'at?ntl
t11n l'li('1ii hn1'rlni'r .s
liftIiInr: l)rF:i1111Itw it l'nkIliH, ('11 t1)n 1Ilth fill (I F:1?1?na'lilip 1,r) nt?hnr
Major t'it,i('FU 11r)Vr' dr'-tmnt,iif'rl tlln Chitlr-'n i'In'IH,n tO rlrt, it. t.hn
i'rftt' ltrlfir' 1'r+i' t?h!' In')t"'hinns:^. A 1'nrtlt'l'^nt. rnfrrtln, Flrr.t. sntill'1-
c(I by 1.1 lie:lrn-Hier) r)t. rt 1;' lnl,YUar;; han'It;nt i'nr 111- i1liV nrnnn^i(
lrlnf,.'tt i O f i , c'x r n r , n , ( : h t i l n . l r ? } . n r ' t b t t i ! l t l ' n t c t '' itlfl i I O1ir
111t.n1'llrit? I (`n!l I l::t, 'l'1' rl:: 1tn f l t t inf. t h^ H.1 nr)t. ?n!li t)rnrl 1 t1 r:t11`i,!,1't.
of the F, rr+rlt, fr('n t. '1 the' ant,f -ti.. } 1'111-:H:I ftknr at, t hn
rat 1hrlV(' i -,-it !111+`1.n(I af: 1;j: ?:ari''t1:' fnr: Of tornnr'lnt n
r1('t IOn in i'r('(I 1rr i 'n l n n1lltl,nr't. t h" 11l'i'?"h l nn::n . 'illllr: , at, it
1 Fr'1)ruary rrlIly in Kut)r?inr? '?;plt!)1 r'f Yunn!ln 1'Jr,vinrn h"r'lnr-
inF; ball:1to It. W!l:: I r!'tl'lly ann-)un! n'i t hat +h'- !irli ly v('Iufi 'tf rarF:n
hftn(11r(I by thn 1:unmi1JF: r!i11-4 fly a'I iinir:f?rrtt (,it Wnrkr'r:: nVnr !)in
p ?rcr 11 i- few (ir) y :: r'x -' inrl t ,!It it, .r ri:)11'l 1`r loin thrtt, I )ir' Wnr%nr::
cx;'rnn:'cr1 thci r pint r?rrlinrit I in '' W!rk ,:t i 1 1 har'Irr a1l'I 1'y rlnn,lr
iluppOrt t.hr t.hrn(` I'( C`I' 1 r r: ('f
;.;I::li Iit rlyto ri Y,ill imirF: rit,rrI"'rt !'n rriI i''. in ro ntir'n bordr,r-
inF: LrLO1 !ln'i Virt.ilu qu)r'(I I'nflf:!int: rl;: HnflH:illr In 1?n 111, to it F:rrrtt.
t)U.'aprr har.n,,.,: t. rr('('nt, nnnurll n( ('tied wail niF:ned oil
(, Oct.ol)r 1'~70 . A:: i f to u11dr r:;,.u'!? 1'r-king's, policy or providing:
rr'rt;? nrr rt 1,-;, i inK in !'r,1r'r r(,r t.h(' iir'rth Virt.orunr,:c rind
t hc'I ._1 1 1e:= 11 1.1 t iiri r C w)i ; tl t1ir? 1(,nf, run, IJC'Iiit's announcement.
rn 1") 1'?rl(ru11ry n(>t.r':: t.hnt, thr, nr:rrrmr11+ i;: nit rd tit incrrrininp the
rc(momir 1111(1 dr`rrn': ::4!'('n('t11 r:, t1)( V1r'i:flrn!`:)r lit th!'ir ((prat.rrt('t-
n
c,l war (lf;nin::t ti)r' (tlitrd :;t (it r: -_';; 1u Lr(1 r111?icctiVr hriving.
bec'ri ridd(',i t : IT mi lnr :or,linp, in lru:t C) 't (Iwr': ruin(uncrmrnt.
AL it 1:' Cr`tlrurlry l,rtl)'lurt- wr`IC(';:)inp, !hr' N:'1 r'(,11(,tr1iC dc1 '_rition,
hcndr,l by I,r 11hn1111 ir:i;i, I,i I1:-1r11-nirn rrni:;r'(I !-It(, VictnrLncae for
htiving "Sr:i::c l n (,f ntr?rilr
-gfr stniuco'u 1-i February CB Interview, In
which he remarked that Jarring It free to take tai much
initiative ti he wishes; accordingly, Moscow hat; n.1 no Ignored
a UAH Foreign Mini;:,,ry officiai'ts remark, reported by Cairo
on the 15th, that Sisco'u Interview is being studied carefully
because of Its "po:Itiv' factors." President Nixon 'ii remarks
on the Middle Eant at his 17 February pre,nu conference are not
mentioned In TASi;' 18 Fcbruury account. of the press conference.
JARRING'S While Moscow htus cxpret:sed no views of its own
INITIATIVE or, Ambauundor Jarring's initiative, it commentary
in Arabic on 16 February reported it 'I?crust rui
stating that Jarring was carrying out hf.u trash In accordance
with authoriz ition in the fiovember 1967 Security Council
resolution. The broadcast explained that U Tlirnt made the
statement because It,rucl and the United Staten w'1rc necking
to "distort the nature and significance" of .Jarring's
mediation, while the Arab countries were trying "in a
practical and Positive wtty to consolidate" Jarring'"
task. And TASS on the 17th noted French approval of
Jarring's actions.
Moscow complains of Israel's "obstructive" stand as
displayed both in Its "cold reception" of Cairo's
"peaceful initiative" and in its reaction to the Jarring
memorandum. TASS on 15 February quoted UPI as saying
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T-1 iivi ?/ hr)'l t (irn^1 'i -vn I hn ;:Jr'm rtlnltlrl "n I h^ I'rnt^x1 t,hrit,
ift- I.Inr-, if: "fl1 Ir'F:^'l I'/ I,) rt"t nJl ly fir: it t^'l l nt.r,J?'rr ?IT,}, ti:
ctrl, t.rnt r(I? I-, 'I t r
ti -I tikn 1?J?nl; rt i 11'1 t,h^ I?Ith, ,i'A:
r'Ilnrj ('ttl?r+ 1'1` r"j'!rtf vlli"I1 t)1'n,l Ilrtyrin r) f: rnvorlfig
r r' If, I. (?11 111^ (''r' ritrl,inm 11, I',1'rt 1 rl it rl'/(, ?rll. ip it I, fiimj'iy hn iir'it r'in(I A i ri^f i,"rr,y rlni
('n the' 1}it.i) iil}^1'j't'rt: i'1(-arl'f: ,:t?rtt.rm^nt In th^ 1nr'^f:(+}, t.hr'
(,t: 'lrty rt' it rr'.in!'t, i)tl (~f .itlrrl lit:':, rrrll'r'ilI,
r'(,n'!jt ItInr: r'(i' it rt'?^rllI .:nt.t.Irt-,, n 1." ttn'1 '1 n r? l it t r ,? I'll it I,
ir:i'r-^ i:: , " nl.IJ1:1J)E: i" tnfl,n,jr, thr' Irrili'f: nrlr?n liiii.int,Ivr
full tr j1;'n'ln tjln .inrri11K mif:r:i(,n.
TA:;:; ()n t.hr' I )1 1, h hrt'1 fit t.1' j l,tit?nrI t.'~ ;.h^ ('.it i r() AI.-Alll(N, t,h^
vi "w t.hrtt, .1111-7?i11J;'1; 1 r'oj'r>:: it Is rtr(' rl ;t.ri?;.,i.- ..,.,...1_1_ It
`
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(?' :iI 1=ii'i'lA;i.
l It 3 I;itl?l1Al y i `)'l i
'i'I1^ ::^rr)n'i i A:~:; n''''r))Nlt, n I r:_ j,i `'l;e)i 'ii, r)} het' j,!)i nt.t: f.llr)t. !1''rl
tlr rt. j rn1) 1?n ,i rt'}.nrj I n t.1)r' f I rt: t. r J nn nr;
ltnl)}.Inl ly ('Oilt,nlnrrl In
t.hr' iln'?V7:;Wj',Y,r f1n'i ('n 11?" dnf' 1' ili: r)f tj)n i lltrl'v i nW . 1 t.
(infill)t i 'n f n1 Wit,llf1t'n%nI" frf)m
::fir'., rl:. tinfill ifit: -1 -11,1 i'.-11 I'ny!)nd f11-Arir:11 Ol) t,ile 11tH
I'nt71 n::)r l n nn'I i 1 1) t nfl 111 j+lerlH:e that, On ('e t.1) I f: t,rljcr' i
j') ri'?n, t,j)n t IAIH W i 1 1 {?un Yflnt nr' frr?rrl')~r ')f i nt?e rant i nnrll
nrl:ri Pat I r,n thrr)uph t,)." Ti rrin :;trr;I t,:;, WI I I nr)t, ob,lnrt, to
tj)r' r: 1, ti! Ic1nInh; ? 1 rill Itit ?rl)f;t.I('nrli f)l)t:nrvnr f')rc^ tit iliri .)
fti;1i-: ilriykh, tul'l wi I I , rr I( ,n?: t hr' ('nti;:n-fj re ,;. rnnl7ent..
linj'cfit.ifl' I11n::n r)ltit fl 'I':c fr)'r?i 1)-
i ~ j'j'i
) H: Ianp.llnF;r (~Om:;ent.'-r'Y
on thr 17t.11 illsO j:uhli i;' hart. of n::-:;ndrlt.'n t'rj)Iy to thr
rjurr: t i (.,n Of w1vit. Ili- t1AIl w(,u l d hr j,rr'j,ru?ed tc) put I n a
pr, ri(?n t ?nt
.t ity. 7'he fni rly nxt cn i yr lvl::::ape aj)j)ear;, in th"
il'r;W;;Wi':I''I; 'Jrr::IOn bl,i, is !'ut )I W1: t.O Only t,WO st'n'i,rnr'r!; In
l.'rr. rc ' : : . Wit hollt. : t 111r, t.hrit :1;:-;.t)fllit. ufi:l nS;Y,ccj about it
rrar'r t.rcrit.y, 'j'::upj)i rcl)ort.;; t.hc I1AII Pr'r::idrnt, tit; ,riyinp
that i f 1:> rrin I W I t.hclz ~lW:: fr.,m thr tnrr I t.or t rt; I n nrrordnncc
With t.11r ,-curl 1-y Counc! I rcr,olut ic:n, t.hr inviolrihi l i ty rind
j'U l i t-irrll ill(I-p'nd nie' ')f rill In t.hc rirca, InrludI ig;
l:;rn"I, wi 11 be gurrrultrrd, turd "Wr' 1:oirmnly 1)lcdpr thIs
T:-,o; pi 'll::u t.rd;c:: n jt.e of ri::-;;ndnt ':; plcdgr, on freedom of
11'vigrit. Ion, rcmrirkinr? that the UA11 t:nyt; that .hips or all
(ountri"::, includinH; I:;raiI, Will be able to nrlvlurit.n
frnrIy through the :;art ('anrlt turd the' '1'Irrul :; t.raIt. lie
doe:; not mrnt.i'_ln ru:-;;ncL1L': cone'ludlnr`: condition that for
till of thi:: to trikc j-lace, there mu:;t be it ,1u:;t nolUtIon
to the 1'rilr:;tinI ur j,roblcm. (In ('riiro't: version, au-O-ndat
ropl ied to the rjucc,tion on a percc trerlty by saying only
that the Sc?curl'~.y Counci I re::olutiron is cletir and complete
turd thrlt the 1'a1V:)tini:n l r?oj lr':: rip.ht:; arc the core of
the problem.
T:oj pi prnl:u-;; aa-Sadat'_; ; tatementu in thr interview a;,
rcprc:;cnting a concrete program for a politictf.l settlement
and odd:; that the UAit President did not overlook any of
the essen'.ial aspects of the ;'fiddle East crisis. An
examination of the U,1it position, 'I'soppi tiny;, leads to
the concluoion that reestablishment of peace is "entirely
feasible"; Israel and the United :;triter must understand,
he adds, that they cannot indefinitely thwart a political
settlement.
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t'r)1iViIii?:;uI'iAI, FJtT:; '17t}:1Jir;;
III 1?' I?;ItItttAltY 1071
LILLYAYI:.V 111 r; 1) i. r'hrnrlt;y rlrimr'n t i r,r'rv i rr rommr'ntnry, , I'RAVi)A' n
COty?4_N1 11r'1ynyr'7 trim; it:t'trnl to t.n:;k fret' urging pnnrn hnforr, thr, wit.h1rnwnl rind border rlurnt,lonn arc' solved.
Iir,lyayr'v rirgu"'I t,hrtt, pence will rmr'rgr, in the procnrln of
normal! riI Ion of r''Intionn, when It, would hr, ponnibin "not,
.juttt, t,rr nI ntr, hut, t.'1 1tl trr," the right, of each country in the
Middle' I',nr:t,, I rluolI g Inrar'1, to pr'7U'", lnrlepr'ndrnt nxit;t.n:n'ri
and trrritorinl Intr-g;rity. ('barging inrnrl with using closure
of the ('fulfil ft.; it mr'rurr. of putt,irig prennure on the, IUAH rind
with nr'r'klrig for Itr;r'if the right. Lo unr Int.nrnnt.Ionril wnt,erwrlyt:
III t,hr area, Br?Iyr4Yr'v avid the ttAN "long, ago" ntnted lt,n
rendinr:::; to ril low I,a;:nnge of li;rar'I i shilm through the Tirrui
I;Lrnit, nnrl the ;ur. ('rural, provIded It;rnrl flit(( withdrawn
its troop:; from all occupied Arab Innclr, and :;-Avon the
Pnlrnt.1nian refugee Ifroblrm on n ,Jurt baniu. F:lr,rwhere In
the art i r l e , citing lenient:; of itenolut, i on ;?11;1, he commented
that "it. will be poc::;thlr to do n lot for the volution of the
complex problem" of the l'alestinitin refup,een if till clnunr_n
of the' rruulutIon art' implemented in good faith.
Arguing for adoption of the IUAB :,uggc.:tion regarding reopening
of the canal ru; a first step toward implementation of Resolution
Belynycv complained of Mr:;. M.'ir't; "refusal to consider it
seriously." He rlairnrd that I:;rnrI 's runhitioils are supported
by continur.n~ U.:;. mi litary aid, and he strens;ed that there is
no mi lltri y oiiition for the ididdlc Fa:;; crisis--"only a Political
solution."
Following Belyayr-v''; relatively mild criticism of Israel, Moscow
domestic sorvi.'r corrrrent ator Byzhikov n the 10th, deploring
Inraei's: unwillingnr-c;: to give a positive mn,,;wer to the (JAR,
rioted that "tht"rc were quite a few" in the -ommittee which
drew up the Israrll reply "who favored a positive rulswer" to
the EFyptiru; propo;sril. Both Belyayev and Ry hikov underlined
the losses sustained by many countries, due to the canal closure.
And Byzhikcov--referring to demands; raised by the Persian Gulf
members of the Orgart:zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) In the recent Teheran negotiation.; with the oil companies--
offered the additional argument that the opening of the canal
would c:ls o benefit those Western oil companies having no tanker
fleets )f their own. Funds available to the oil companies from
reduced transport coats after the opening of Suez, he said,
would enable them to satisfy the demands of the oil-exporting
countries and still maintain their own profits at roughly the
present level.
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1;c)11FII)1:N'1'IAt, i:lttl; 'ri E?i1),,
18 1F i?;1t11tiAitY 1971
ARMS CONTROL
KOSYGIN HAILS SEABED TREATY, URGES SALT AGREEMENT
Premier Konygin, npenking tit the 11 February nigning in Moscow
of the nrnbed arms control treaty, chnrncter1zed e(nic ilia ion of
the trrnty rus "n positive act in international nffnirn" and
"the first mn,)or ntep along the road of full demilitarization
of the nrnbed." Keynoting themen echoed in Moncow'n moderate
volume of propngnndn* surrounding the treaty n.igning ceremonies,
Ko:sygin viewed the nenbed treaty an one of ncveral.steps in
"the pernintent struggle against the arms race" and specifically
alluded to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT): "in
stated more than once before, we would welcome an agreement
in the field of limiting strategic armaments."
Immediately following thin reference to SALT, Konygin stressed
that concluding international arms control agreements is "not
an easy job," and he noted that "there were *c:.:, dii ficultics
and divergencies in the positions of the parties" to the seabed
negotiations. But "experience shown," he said, that "a road
to the reaching of an understanding can be found," and the
Soviet Government "will stint no effort to find solutions to
pressing problems connected with an end to the arms race and
with dist- awent." He also observed that experience demonstrates
that "it in much more difficult to check the arms race where
it is already underway than to prevent itn development in new
environments."
CENTRAL PRESS Soviet central press comment on the treaty's
ON SEABED TREATY sign'.ficance stressed particularly Kosygin's
points that it is but one step in a necessary
series of arms control measures and that obstacles to agreement can
be overcome if there is good will and realism on both sides. TASS
commentator Kornilov on 1.0 February, calliz'g the treaty "a
milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament," said
* Propaganda surrounding the seabed treaty signing accounted
for about nine percent of Moscow's total radio propaganda last
week. This volume is slightly larger than the seven percent
devoted to the 1 July 1968 signing of the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty and the six percent generated by the 27 January 1967 signing
of the treaty banning nuclear weapons from earth orbits and outer
space.
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CON VI1rh,11'I'IA1. 1.111.111 'T'HEM):;
18 1??1?.HHUAiti 19-(1
t,hnt, Lhr wc,rl'I hul:rr; Lhr-1, It, "wl I1 br' f'ollnwrd by other ntcprt
to fitd rffr-i?t,lvr wnyt: for IirniLrtLirn or thn r,colr' or the rtrmn
rnrr, and hr der I nrrd ;.-t' t, Lhr nNrecmrnt. "c lertrly r;hown that
rte t i n" ; and h ,loi ttt.ly in Lhe in cr rain or di r;rttinrunrnt Lhr_ rttnLen crul
overcome rtny obntnclrr;?" ;;imllrtrly, It 1; Fcbru-trv I'IiAVDA
editorial., rrpor'ted by 'I'A:;;; tuid on mor;cow r,tdio'n domentic
rurd intnrnnt.ional hrondrnrtt?:.:, nffirmc-d that "ngrcrmrnti can
be renrhecl I f t.hc! nova. ;ar?y r?rn l i nm !. -, cI inpl rtyed In the
nppronch to :olvlrtg problems concerning the InLcrruts of
prttcr and :''c'ur'l ty of rtl I t:tat,rt; ?"
Both Lhc 1'HAViA vditorIrtl rurd a 1? i"cbrtiary I'LVEG'1'IYA rtrtic'lc
stressed thrtt the tl;;:;H wi l 1 conLinur' to work for 'trm, control
measures, inclur',ing specIfi "ally "1 iquidation of foreign
military on other peoplen' territories," the creation
of nuclear-frrc zonc:;, the cndinN of underground nuclear
tenLu, and the banninf; of nuclear, c.hrmieal, fund bacteriological
weapon;;. Both said that the Soviet. Union "would welcome tut
agreement on strategic firm amen to IImlttition." The IZVESTIYA
article also mare Lhc? point that "radical measures in
die;armrtment, spe !Ificrtl.ly nuclear disarmament, can be
achieved only if till the nuclear power;; take part in them."
SALT In the wake of the 3 1?'cbruary PitAVDA article on SALT
and I'LVEGTIYA's 6 February dispatch from Washington
criticizing U.S. delegation head Gerard Smith,* a 10 February
LITE1tAltY GA:,L?I"I'E article by UOVO;JTI political commentator
Gerttsimov implied that the United States is two-faced with
resp'?ct to the on-going 3AL:I' negotiations; characteristically,
the blame is placed on the influence of the military-industrial
complex on Wa_;hington. Taking a poke tit "the Western press"
for conducting "a broad and open discussion" about SALT
although the ttaku tire uppo;;ed to be "of a closed nature,"
Gerasimov discinimed any intention of discussing "what
constitutes the terms of reference" of the U.S. and Soviet
delegations, preferring to examine the Western press comment
on the talks.
Stressing the importance of the "Self-evident principle of
the identical security of the Side:; and the nonadmission of
one-Sided advantages," Gerasimov contended that while
"officially the United States is for the talks and for an
See the 'T'RENDS of 10 February, pages 22-24, for a discussion
of these departures from past Soviet propaganda practice on SALT.
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I l)1 r1'[A1, 111[,3
18 1?'I;[31zUARY 19'(1.
ngreemr~nt ," it, Cact. "Ltle oppone.ntn oC ?ut nNreement. i'rerltlr_nL.ly
prevril I there." 11e cited a number or act; or the. Nixon
Aclmi n i ti trnt 1. on--Lhe further development of the ;3rtfegurtrd A13M
nyntem, it return to thr_ "from a po;ILion of utrongth" policy,
a quest for utr:Lrg[c supremacy, curd the "resurrection of the
threat of' plruintrig for a ftrut tit.rike"--in ,ui efrcrt to allow
thrtt the aim of the mil.lt-try-industrial complex In "to use the
Lrtlkt; In order to justify the rtrmu race." lie nald that
recommendntionn by U. 0'. press orgruut and. of?lcials about
"hol.dinp the talku 'from a ponit.lon of strength" were
"clcr_rly intended to ruin them." He concluded with the
pro-forma statement that the :3ovlet Union would "welcome
it rcactonable agreement in the field of strategic armu
limitation," emphasizing that "rcasonnble" meanu tin agreement
"which in not. one-sided" and which "would meet the Interests
of all peoples."
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COO t1)1:1'1'IA1, F111ti 1I'1t1E:N1);S
113 F F:111MA Y 1971
POLAND-USSR
PRICE ROLLBACK FOLLOWS TALKS WITFI STRIKERS; SOVIET AID CITED
Concern a.tbout; the mood or the populace was registered in the
Gierek regime's 15 February announcement of its decision to
revoke the 13 December rood price increases only hours after
Premier Jaroszewicz and other lcadcrn had returncc: from talks
with the striking textile workers in Lodz, Poland's second
largest city. In prior statements the regime had insisted that
it watt economically unfeasible to cancel the price rises. Now,
announcing the party-government decision in a radio/TV speech
on the evening crf ,,he 15th, Jaroszewicz said the move had proved
possible "through utilization of fraternal aic: granted by the
Soviet Union" and in the light of prospects for increased pig
and cattle production. Annulment of the December decision, he
said, would be effective 1 March.
Jaroszewicz prefaced the announcement with disccuraging remarks
on the prospects for wage increases, indicating that the regime
has been fighting a rearguard action on that issue as well.
Echoing remarks he had made to the Lodz strikers on the 14th, he
told the nationwide audience that "a further increase of the
wage fund and social allowances . . . would not be possible now
because this wculd lead to an unbalancing of the market and the
economy." Jaroszewicz said the "daring step" of annulling the
price increases must be compensated for by increased production
efforts, and he called again for "calm and order and discipline."
Appeals for discipline had pervaded regime statements during
much of January but had largely disappeared from the propaganda
during and following the visit by Gierek and Jaroszewicz to the
coastal cities of Szczecin and Gdansk on 24-25 January.
WARSAW COMMENT The factor of Soviet aid was highlighted in
ON SOVIET ROLE a TRYBUNA LUDU commentary on the price
rollback, reviewed by P.1P on 17 February.
The party daily said "the fraternal assistance of the Soviet
Union, which has given us a hand at the most difficult moments,"
had made the price decision possible; "Poland has got a credit."
It went on to say that "this provides an answer to the question
which many of us were putting: was it possible to take this
decision earlier?" and to answer "No, it was rot."
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(;OUP DI?N'11 A1 11tI;3 'I'HEN1. 3
18 141i:1110 "' Y 1971
An unattributed commentary In the Warsaw domr.utlc aiervic c early
on the 16th was more exp.li(It in stating that the price roll-
back had been considered "fur a long time" and wan planned for
"a later time," but that "It was possible to speed It up by the
earlier completion of the talks with the bovict Union, which
understood the difficult economic situation of our country and
gave us aid by granting us long-term creditu." This commentary
noted candidly that "Poland has not had any economic reserves
and continues to have none." It is "no o' cret," the broadcast
added, "that productivity in Poland is ore of thL- lowest among
the European socialist countries"--25 percent lower than that of
the GDR and USSR and nearly 50 percent lower than that of "the
developed Western countries." Huth commentaries echoed the call
for "discipline."
TREATMENT IN TASS on the 16th omitted the reference to Soviet
SOVIET MEDIA aid in an otherwise fairly Full report of
Jaroozewicz' radio/TV speech. But a 15 February
TASS report of the Politburo/Council of Ministers Presidium
meeting at which the price decision was taken did mention "the
credit assistance obtained from the Soviet Union in recent days."
The report of the meeting also noted that further wage increases
were judged impossible.
Soviet media had carried extensive coverage of the 6-7 February
eighth plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, which further
downgraded Gomulka and other leaders, reviewed the causes of
the December riots, and spelled out the new economic program.
A fairly lengthy TASS report of Gierek's plenum report of the
7th, carried after a three-day delay in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA,
included most of the PZPR First Secretary's main points, with
the notable exception of his enumeration of the totals of those
killed and wounded in the coastal disturbances. There has been
no monitored Soviet report of the 11-15 February strike of
textile workers in Lodz.
LODZ STRIKE PAP on the 17th reported a dispatch from Lodz
SITUATION in +hat day's government daily, ZYCIE WARSZAWY,
stressing the "particular appreciation" for
the price decision on the part of the Lodz textile worker s--
prE.dominantly women--whose "family budgets were seriously
affected by the December food price rises." The dispatch
contained the first claim in official media that the Lodz
strikers had gone back to work. It said that on Monday, the
15th, the strikers discussed the speeches made to them the
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CONFI1)I N''IAI? rill:) 'I'HEND;,
10 1' 1'13Jit1A1tY 1.97].
previous day by Premier Jaronzewicz, trade union head Kruczck,
and other leaders and that "in an overwhelming majority of
factoricn It wan realized that the time for discussion was over
and it was high time to gr*, down to honest work."
ZYCIE WABf ZAWY reported that "at midnight on Monday" the
machines at the Marchlewski factory resumed opr_raticn and that
on Tuesday morning "intense work was going on in all the
departments" of that factory, with a slmilnr situation
prevailing ".in other Lodz works." But it noted that "a few
groups" In the Obroncow Pokoju works were still staying away
from work on Tuesday afternoon. It pointed out that "their
postulates are being considered by special commissions,"
adding that "these postulates cannot and should not cause
work stoppages."
Although Western news sources reported that the Lodz strike
began on the 11th, the Warsaw radio'c report of the arrival of
Jaroszewicz, Kruczek, Szydlak, and Tejchma in that city on the
loth said only that thr;r were there for "a discussion of the
current situation of the workers in the textile enterprises in
Lodz." On the morning of the 15th PAP carried the first indica-
tion in Warsaw media that a strike was under way, reporting that
the visiting leaders' meeting with the workers was "in connection
with work stoppages that had occurred in several factories" in
Lodz. The PAP report said Jaroszewicz admonished the Lodz
workers: "Do not allow anybody to infringe upon and to weaken
the link between the new party leadership and the working people,
which is now growing stronger," and "do not allow anybody to
disturb political and economic life, to weaken social discipline."
The Lodz strike has produced new political casualties. PAP
reported late on the 16th that a meeting of the Lodz PZPR
committee that day had "accepted the resignation of Jozef
Spychalski from the position of first secretary" of that body
and "recalled" two party committee secretaries from their posts.
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 311 -
U S S R I NTE RNA L AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1971
SHELEST FOE APPOINTED UKRAINIAN AGRICULTURE MINISTER
On 1 February RADYANSKA UKRAINA announced the appointment of
P. L. Pogrcbnyak as Ukrainian agriculture minister, succeeding
P. Ye. 1)oroshenko, who is retiring on pension at 63. The
appointment of Pogrebny ak, longtime Dnepropetrovsk agricultural
supervisor and apparent protege of Ukrainian Premier V. V.
Shcherbitskiy, appears to mark a defeat for Ukrainian First
Secretary Shelest In a long struggle with the rival Dnepropetrovsk
group over this post. This appointment follows on the heels of
oth:r apparent personnel setbacks for Shelest, such as the
naming of Dnepropetrovsk. city first secretary A. A. Ulanov as
Ukrainian cadre chief in the fall of 1970 and the July 1970
appointment of outsider V. V. Fedorchuk to replace longtime
KGB chief V. F. Nikitchenko, ana it suggests that Shelest's
power in the Ukraine is under challenge.
Pogrebnyak was deputy chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast
executive committee from at least mid-1966 until 1970, working
under Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary A. F. Vatchenko and
probably under Vatcher;k o's predecessor, present Ukrainian
Premier Shcherbitskiy, and supervising the Dnepropetrovsk
oblast agricultural administration. He was appointed
Ukrainian first deputy agriculture minister in October 1970
shortly after Shelest had sharply criticized the Dnepropetrovsk
agricultural leaders at the July 1970 Ukrainian Central
Committee plenum.
The conflict over the post of agriculture minister appears to
date back to the revelations of disastrous agricultural
failures in early 1970. A 31 March 1970 Ukrainian Central
Committee plenum heard Shcherbitskiy report on the "serious
shortcomings" in livestock raising (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 1 April).
Speakers at the plenum delivered "sharp criticism" of republic
agricultural organs and their leadership methods, and the
agriculture ministry officials were singled out for showing
"little initiative and persistence" in tackling agricultural
tasks. Significantly, these criticisms were published in
RURAL LIFE on 3 April but not in the Ukrainian press. At the
end of the plenum Chernigov First Secretary N. M. Borisenko
was elected Central Committee agriculture secretary. After
the plenum a new head of the Central Committee agriculture
section was named (former deputy head V. I. Fedan--first
identified on 13 May 1970).
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1977
Agriculture Minister Doroshenko also appeared slated for removal,
as indicated by his failure to be reelected to the Supreme Soviet
in early June 1970. But foroshenko's removal appears to have
been delayed by a struggle over the naming of his successor. The
Dnepropetrovsk group, headed by Premier Shcherbitskiy and oblast
First Secretary Vatchenko, was presumably advancing Dnepropetrovsk
deputy executive committee chairman Pogrebnyak. At the same time,
they were successfully advancing Ulanov as a candidate to succeed
Central Committee cadres chief V. M. Tsybulko, who was removed in
April; Ulanov's appointment was made public in October--as was
Pogrebnyak's appointment as first deputy agriculture minister.
Pogrebnyak's appointment was apparently delayed by revelations
of shortcomings in his leadership of Dnepropetrovsk agriculture.
RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 30 June carried an article attacking short-
comings in farms in Dnepropetrovsk's Nikopol rayon and criticizing
Dnepropetrovsk oblast agricultural administration chief M. I.
Pistunov, Pogrebnyak's subordinate, for downplaying the short-
comings. On 14 August RADYANSKA UKRAINA reported Dnepropetrovsk's
response: in a noncommittal reply oblast agriculture secretary
M. T. Ivakhnenko said in e':,'.ect only that the obkom and agricultural
administration had discussed the article.
The 30 June article served, nonetheless, as a basis for a sharp
attack on the Dnepropetrovsk leadership by Shelest at the July
Ukrainian Central Committee plenum. Describing the sorry record
of Nikopol rayon farms, Shelest singled out the oblast leadership
("Can one call this effective, skilled and demanding leadership?")
and described the agricultural situation in Dnepropetrovsk as
"political failure in work" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 July--see
FBIS TRENDS for 5 August 1970, pp 34-35)?? In reaction to Shelest's
criticism, the Dnepropetrovsk agricultural administration was
duly criticized at a Dnepropetrovsk obkom plenum (RADYANSKA
UKRAINA, 30 July).
But despite Shelest's attack, Pogrebnyak soon was advanced--
although not to the rank of minister. He was first identified
as a deputy minister on 23 October and then as first deputy
minister on 30 October (RADYANSKA UKRAINA). H'.s predecessor,
M. V. Kuzmenko, was last identified as first :~eputy minister
on 11 September (PRAVDA UKRAINY). Pogrebnyak.'s appointment
as first deputy minister was clearly a compromise: Now, only
three months later, he has replaced Doroshenko as minister,
apparently over Shelest's opposition.
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18 FEI3IWARY 1971
- 36 -
RUSSIAN NAMED AS SECOND SECRETARY OF ESTONIAN PARTY
An Important Moscow cadre official has been named second
secretary of the Estonian party organization. On 12 February
PRAVDA an,)unced the election of K. V. Lebedev, head of a
sector o_ the Central Committee's party organizational work
section, as Estonian second secretary. Lebedev replaces
A. P. Vader, who Is transferred to the post of chairman of
the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Although Lebedev Is of Russian nationality, he is no stranger
to Estonian affairs. As head of the cadre section's sector
for the Baltic and Belorussia, he has supervised Estonian
activities for the past 10 years, regularly visiting the
Baltic republics and often. serving on the working presidium
of their party congresses.
Apart from its encroachment on Estonian First Secretary Kebin's
close-knit Estonian group, Lebedev's appointment may affect
Estonian nationality sensitivities. Unlike Latvia and
Lithuania, which have had a steady stream of Russian second
secretaries except for a brief period immediately after
Stalin's death, Estonia has not had a Russian second
secretary since 1953. Estonian national pride may well
be ruffled by the sudden change in this situation. No
recent revelation of shortcomings would account for the
change; a change mighc more logically have occurred when,
in January 1967, the CPSU Central Committee censured Estonia
for serious mistakes in cadre work, but at that time no shift
in the Estonian leadership resulted.
The 10-11 February Estonian reshuffle does not otherwise appear
to have weakened Kebin. In addition to Vader's demotion, secretary
L. N. Lentsman was demoted to trade union chairman and trade union
chairman P. P. Neyerot was demoted to deputy chairman of the
people's control committee (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 11 February).
Lentsman has long been in decline, however; he was demoted from
second secretary to ideology secretary in January 1964 to make
room for Vader. V. I. Vyalyas, who as Tallin first secretary
has worked closely with Kebin for the last 10 years, was
promoted to Central Commit';ee secretary.
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 CON V.1 [)ENT [Al1 F131f3) 'PR ENDS
18 1'! hRUAItY 1971
MOSCOW THEATER REPERTOIRES CLEANED UP i`OK CPSU CONGRESS
In preparation for the 214th party congress scheduled to convene
on 30 March, Moscow authorities are purging Moscow theaters and
movie houses of ideologically unsuitable productions. This w?
made clear by a 6 February MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA article by
A. K. Melnichenko, the Moscow executive committee's new deputy
chairman for cultural affairs. He reported that the executive
committee has adopted a decision "On Measures to Prepare the
City for Holding the 21)th CPSU Congress in Moscow" and that
"the main attention is now being devoted to improving the
repertoire of theaters, movie houses, and concert organizations."
"The current repertoire is being freed of outmoded and
Ideologically and artistically imperfect productions,"
Melnichenko dorlared, and "the main place in the repertoire . . .
will be occupied by plays and concert programs reflecting
the revolutionary transformation in the life of the Soviet
people and telling of our contemporaries." Melnichenko also
said that "patriotic plays of past years are being revived"
while dramatists and composers are being helped to create
suitable new works.
At a 2 February meeting of the Moscow executive committee on
the progress of' preparations for the congress, city cultural
administration chief B.V. Pokarzhevskiy and film administration
chief T.A. Lomasova criticized the tardiness of Moscow theaters
in revising their March-April repertoire to include more works
"about the labor victories of the Soviet people" (MOSKOVSKAYA
PRAVDA, 3 February). Also in preparation for the congress, a
special public review commission has been viewing films
currently playing in Moscow movie houses. The commission met
on 4 February to discuss its findings with Melnichenko and
other Moscow cultural officials and propose "measures to
eliminate shortcomings in the work of movie houses"
(MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 5 February).
ECONOMIST REVIVES CONTROVERSIAL AGRICULTURAL ISSUES
Proposals for radical reforms in Soviet agricultural institutions
and practices continue to be circulated publicly even though they
clearly lack official sanction. For example, an article in the
initial 1971 issue of ECONOMIC SERIES, a relatively new publication
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1'(.111 1)IINTIAI, FBI:;
'I'Itl; iir;;
114 I'I';1t111APY Ili'()
ur thr' II:;:;it IrrtaiaiIut.ron, serious problems were
npprtrently cnu:;ed by local leaders who felt that they were
riding the correct wave by doing fur't.her than the center indicated
in confiscating private plots and redistributing income. The
liunrin c(lit.ori:al uppo:;ed the notion that "so long as the orienta-
tion is correct, don't worry about, going a bit too far." Cadres
who "carry out their own extremely harmful policy, . . . always
thinking thrit they themselves arc in the right," were warned
that if' they do not correct, i.' ncelves they will "take a great
fall."
The agricultural policy put, forward for Hunan, in line with
central pronDuncementF, during the past couple of years, is
relatively moderate: egalitarianism in wages is wrong, private
plc,',s and sideline occupations are permitted within strict rules,
peasant incomes are to be increased, and the team is to remain
, the basic unit of production and cannot be forced to distribute
income on a brigade basis.
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