TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 19, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050003 ~7~ / ~ ~~ ` '
Confidential
T
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~Illllll~~iuiuuii~~~lllllll~
H
ENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
19 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 3)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordfnr.tion with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
ONOUP I
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . ... . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV, PRG Deprecate President's Troop Withdrawal Announcement .
1
Paris: U.S. "Obduracy," Support of Thieu Said to Block Peace .
3
Routine Moscow Propaganda Echoes Hanoi on Troop Withdrawal . .
5
PRC Reports Hanoi, Front Attacks on Withdrawal, U.S. Policies .
6
DRV Spokesman Protests U.S. Air Strikes, Attacks on Fishermen..
8
PRG, DRV Statements Protest Resettlement. of South Vietnamese .
9
Laos: Communist Media Hail Alleged Capture of Long Tieng . . .
11
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Discusses U.S. China Policy Through Proxy Comment . . .
15
JAPAN
Nixon-Sato Meeting Seen as Inconclusive by Moscow . . . . . . .
18
CHINA
Economic Propaganda Continues to Reflect-Moderate Line . . . .
20
Military Regions Pick Up Call to Learn from People . . . . .
21
Several Provincial Party Chiefs Still Not Appearing . . . . . .
22
PRC NUCLEAR TEST
USSR, European Allies Stress Radioactii.ity;.DRV.Ignores Test. .
23
KOREA
Kim Il-song Calls for Korean Peace Pact, Political.Talks . . .
26
SOUTH ASIA
Moscow Deplores U.S. Naval Presence in Indian. Ocean.. . . . . .
29
Peking Ignores Anderson Documents on Indian-Pakistani War . . .
30
Canal Issue Prompts Qualified Cuban Support for Torrijos . . .
31
(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL, HIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
USSR Assails U.S. Military Aid, "Secret Agreement" With Israel .
36
Moscow Launches Campaign. Against World Zionist Congress . . . .
39
AAPSO CONFERENCE
Cairo Gathering Restrained in Stance Toward-Absent Chinese . .
42
TOPIC IN BRIEF: Ghana Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY HIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 3972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 JANUARY 1972
Moscow (2753 items)
Peking (1468 items)
Indochina
(14%)
10%
Domestic Issues
(39%)
41%
China
(8X)
9%*
Indochina
(19%)
18%
(U.S. Air Raids
(10%)
6%]
[U.S. A-,lr Raids
(2%)
2%]
5th AAPSO Conference,
Cairo
(--)
8%
[Long Cheng
Battle
(--)
5%]
(Brezhnev
(--)
3%]
Chen I Death
(--)
9%
Greetings
PRC-Cyprus Diplomatic
(--)
5%
European Security
(1%)
3%
Relations
Indian-Pakistani
Conflict
(9%)
3%*
Indian-Pakistani
Conflict
(3%)
1%
Middle East
(2%)
2%
Nixon-Sato Meeting
(--)
1%
These statistics are based on the volcccast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the
Indian-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are included in the
figure on India-Pakistan and amount to 2% of total Moscow comment.
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CON' tDENTIAL PETS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
IN50CIIIMP
President Nixon's 13 January announcement to 1.eporters that
70,000 more U.S. troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam
during the three-month period February through April prompted
comment from Hanoi similar to that on his last two announcements,
in November and April 1971. Press comment came on the 15th in a
NHAN DAN Commentator article: It acknowledged that U.S. troops
strength will be down to 69,000 by next May but argued that the war
remains an American one since the United States continues to supply
money, weapons, and air and naval forces. The notion of maintainir.g
a residual force of U.S. troops in South Vietnam as long as the
POW's nave not been released is assailed in reaction to Secretary
Laird's press conference, held immediately after the President's
announcement, as well as in continued comment on the President's
2 January TV interview. Propagandists and the communist delegates
at the Paris talks reiterate that the two basic points of the PRG's
1 July peace proposal provide the correct way to end the war and
secure the release of prisoners.
Peking has not commented on the troop withdrawal announcement on
its own authority but has reported Vietnamese communist criticism,
including the NHAN DAN Commentator article. Routine Moscow comment
echoes Hanoi in assailing the VietnamizatLon policy and the
announced U.S. intention to maintain a residual force in South
Vietnam.
Communist propaganda claims new advances in the fightini in Laos,
particularly the alleged capture of Long Tieng on 12 January. The
exploit was praised in a flurry of high-level propaganda including
a Chou En-lai congratulatory message to Souphanouvong and a
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, as well as in editorials in
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. At the same time, the dispatch of
Thai troops to Laos is condemned in authoritative propaganda,
including an NLHS Central Committee statement supported by a
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and a NHAN DAN editorial.
Moscow, as usual, has reacted to the developments in Laos in a more
limited fashion, with only routine-level press comment and reportage.
DRV. PPG DEPRECATE PRESIDENTS TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT
Initial Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's announcement
of the next phase of U.S. troop withdrawal came from Hanoi radio on
the 14th, and the following day the media carried the NHAN DAN
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CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS
1.9 JANUARY 1.972
Commentator article and Front comment, including a statement
from the PRG spokesman in Paris.* The initial Hanoi broadcast
set the tone when it said that public pressure and setbacks in
Indochina had forced the President to make the announcement and
when it complained that he continues to refuse to set a deadline
for the withdrawal of all troops.
A lengthy Hanoi radio commentary broadcast later on the 14th
said that despite his response to public pressure, the President
"is an inveterate U.S. imperialist and has refused for three
years to withdraw all of the troops." It went on to say that
adherence to the Vietnamization policy was shown by Secretary
Laird's press conference following President Nixon's brief
announcement, as well as in the President's 2 January TV
interview.** It observed that Vietnamization is actually a way
of establishing "a lackey pro-U.S. regime" and prolonging the
war, though it claimed at the same tim- that Vietnamization is
"neeting with more arduous trials" than ever before throughout
Indochina.
The comment uniformly assails Secretary Laird's statement that
the United States will maintain a presence in South Vietnam
until the POW issue has been resolved, as well as his reiteration
of the point that air power will continue to be used to protect
U.S. troops. In connection with the latter point, the NdAN DAN
Commentator article took issue with Laird's statement that the
use of air power has decreased during the Nixon Administration.
* Hanoi has regularly responded to announcements of troop
withdrawals with NHAN DAN Commentator articles, and prior to his
7 April 1971 announcement there had additionally been high-level
official statements. Reaction to the President's 12 November
announcement is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 November, pages
1-4, and 24 November, pages 9-10.
** The 7 January NHAN DAN article on the President's TV interview,
which Hanoi radio in Mandarin attributed to "Commentator"
(discussed in the 12 January TRENDS, pages 3-5), appeared in the
press over the signature of Nguyen Huu Chinh. Chinh has
frequently commented on U.S. affairs and on the President. His
most recent previous article--on the foreign aid bill--is
discussed in the 10 November 1971 TRENDS, pages 21-22.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1971
Commentator, in the course of condemning the Nixon Administration
for "sabotaging" the Paris talks, claimed that "world public
opinion" had condemned the United States for not attending the
Paris sessions in December and for carrying out the sustained
air strikes against the DRV. Commentator and the statement by
the PRG spokesman in Pario again declared that the correct way
to end the war and secure the release of American prisoners is
the PRG's seven-point proposal, and both spelled out the demands
in points one and two.
FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH'S VNA on the 14th reported that DRV
THANKS FOR SUPPORT Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
on 10 January had sent letters of
thanks to the foreign ministers "of the fraternal socialist
countries" and others who had condemned the massive U.S. air
strikes against tt-s DRV and voiced support for the Vietnamese
people's struggle. (Trinh did not list the "fraternal" countries,
but TASS on the 14th reported that Foreign Minister Gromyko had
received a "letter of gratitude." Endorsement of DRV Foreign
Ministry protests over the air strikes had in fact come at the
level of government statements from the Soviet Union and some of
its European allies, though Peking had issued its statement at
the foreign ministry level.)
Presumably referring to the President's TV interview on the 2d,
Trinh said that "of late the President has declared that U.S.
involvement in Indochina will be ended, all U.S. troops withdrawn
and the bombing of North Vietnam stopped only after the release
of American prisoners." Trinh then went on to say routinely that
the path to a peaceful settlement lies in the PRG proposals.
PARIS: U.S. "OBDURACY." SUPPORT OF THIEU SAID TO BLOCK PEACE
At the 13 January Paris session, the Vietnamese communists also
routinely stressed the correctness of the PRG's peace initiative
as the way to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.
And PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien* made a special effort to
demonstrate that the Vietnamization policy and the maintenance of
the GVN were blocking progress at the talks.
* Tien was again substituting for PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh,
who has not been present since the 12 August session.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy--substituting for Xuan Thuy--
rebutted Ambassador Porter's contention at the previous session
that President Nixon preferred a negotiated settlement. Vy
said the President "has made it clear that from 25,000 to
30,000 U.S. troops will be stationed indefinitely in South
Vietnam, and the bombing of North Vietnam as well as South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would also go on. indefinitely"; he
added that the President's declaration that Vietnamization would
be continued means that the Thieu "clique" will be maintained in
power to prolong and expand the war.
The VNA account of the session noted that Tien stressed that so
long as the Nixon Administration refuses to withdraw all U.S.
troops and "retains" the Thieu "clique," the South Vietnam
problem will remain unsolved and the American militarymen
"including those captured during the Vietnam war" cannot return
to their families. The account also reflects the remerks of
Nguyen Minh Vy, who spoke in more detail and repeated the elaborated
demands of the rRG's 1 July proposal. VNA reports that Vy said a
peaceful settlement requires that "the United States put an end to
'Vietnamization' of the war, withdraw all troops, advisers, military
personnel, weapons, and war means as well as abolish bases in South
Vietnam and stop all activities of the U.S. air and naval forces in
both North and South Vietnam." VNA quotes Vy as saying further that
the United States must respect South Vietnam's right to self-
determination and "stop maintaining" the Thieu regime.
NY TINES QUERIES Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned
TO PHAM VAN DONG the New York TIMES' A. M. Rosenthal's
communication to Pham Van Dong in which he
asked whether Hanoi would negotiate on military withdrawal and
the release of prisoners separately from questions pertaining to
Vietnam's political future, and in which he posed a series of
questions to Dong on the precise meaning of Hanoi's various
demands regarding cessation of U.S. military involvement and
support of Thieu. VNA's service channel to Paris on the 15th
carried Rosenthal's questions along with a message from Ngo Dien,
head of the DRV Foreign Ministry's information and press department.
Ignoring Rosenthal's specific questions, Dien implied that point
one, on U.S. withdrawal and prisoner release, could not be
separated from point two on a political settlement in South
Vietnam: Dien said that the President, by raising at the same
time prisoner release and troop withdrawal "without renouncing
all commitment to and support for the Thieu regime," does not aim
at bringing the problem to a solution.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
ROUTINE MOSCOW PROPAGANDA ECHOES HANOI ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Moscow promptly reported that President Nixon had announced a
further withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam but did not
specify that the total during the next three months would
amount to 70,000. The initial TASS report, on the 13th, set
the tone when it pointed out that Secretary Laird at his press
conference reiterated the U.S. intention to keep a residual
force and to continue using its air force. TASS commented that
this probably implies new bombing raids on the DRV and added that
Laird's "clarification" of the President's remarks only confirmed
the U.S. intention of continuing aggression in Southeast Asia and
protracting the war in Vietnam. Moscow says Secretary Laird's
remarks indicate that the United States intends to continue the
aggression and to seek a "military solution" 1.n Vietnam.
A Shakov commentary broad-ast in English to South Asia on the
15th and a panelist in the Moscow domestic service roundtable
discussion on the 16th both commented on the "division of roles"
at the press conference, with the President acting as "peacemaker"
while Laird's comments "obliterated all this peacemaking." The
object, said the Moscow commentators, was to calm both doves and
hawks, the doves being told about the reduction of forces and the
hawks being assured that the United States is not thinking of a
complete withdrawal and still intends to bring about a "military
solution" in Vietnam.
A 16 January IZVESTIYA article by Babenko said that the President
and Secretary Laird were trying to reassure public opinion and
to "create the impression" that the Administration is inclined
to adopt a more "prudent line" on the Indochina question. But
the "Pentagon's hypocrisy" is obvious, said Babenko, withdrawing
"a certain number" of troops on the one hand while on the other
intensifying the bombings. Thus, he said, "American newspapers"
declare that the announcement of the forthcoming "slight
reduction" of U.S. troops does not mean an end of U.S. armed
interference in Indochina.
A 14 January Moscow domestic services commentary cited UPI for
the complaint that the President did not set a date for total
troop withdrawal, adding that both the President and Laird "made
excuses" fL.r retaining armed forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
The commentary did not mention POW's explicitly, but a report on
the press conferences published in PRAVDA on 16 January quoted
Laird as saying "we shall stay in Vietnam until the problem of
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
the U.S. prisoners of war is resolved." The domestic service
commentary said that Laird tried to convince the reporters that
the United States wculd get out of Vietnam, but that he did not
say when and failed to answer "direct questions" about the
expansion of the conflict in Cambodia and Laos and the
intensified air war. His statements on the "success" of
Vietnnmization, said the commentator, caut3ed "laughter" among
the reporters.
A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast.
Asia on the 16th, commenting on the press conference, concluded
that the threat of U.S. aggression in Vietnam is "still very
serious" and took the occasion again to attack China's "double-
faced policy" and "collusion" with the United States. The
commentary repeated the line th.t the President's belief that
Peking would not take any strong action encouraged him to carry
out the bombings against the DRV.
PRC REPORTS HANOI. FRONT ATTACKS ON WITHDRAWAL. U1S, POLICIES
While offering authoritative comment on Laoe, Peking has avoided
direct comment on Vietnam as such since the 8 January NCNA report
on President Nixon's 2 January TV interview. Peking has, however,
continued to provide a forum for Vietnamese communist statements
criticizing the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policies and calling
attention to the Paris conference as the focus for negotiations on
Vietnam. The President's 13 January announcement that 70,000
more troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 1 May was
acknowledged in NCNA accounts of the NHAN DAN Commentator article
and of a Liberation Radio commentary attacking the announcement.
Citing the NHAN DAN article as charging that the President was
forced to reduce troop strength in order to placate public opinion
but that the United States will continue its direct and indirect
prosecution of the war, NCNA quoted Commentator's conclusion that
this proves the "deceitfulness of Nixon's hocus-pocus about an
early end to the war." NCNA also quoted NHAN DAN's denunciation
of the President's "sabotage" of the Paris conference, along with
the article's assertion that the way to end the war and secure the
release of American prisoners is shown in the PRG's seven-point
program.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
After having departed from its usual practice by reporting the
6 January Paris session, Peking has not reported the proceedings
of the session on the 13th. However, on the 14th NCNA belatedly
reported the 4 January statements by the DRV and PRG spokesmen
at the Paris conference condemning President Nixon's remarks in
his 2 January TV interview for using U.S. POW's as a "pretext"
for escalating the war. NCNA cited their criticisms of the
Nixon Administration for refusing to engage in "serious
negotiations" at Paris and for opposing the seven-point proposal.
Other recent Peking pickups of Vietnamese comment similarly
publicize the communists' negotiating position and cite the POW
question in connection with the seven-point plan. A 15 January
NCNA report of DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's letter of gratitude
to "socialist countries" and others which condemned the U.S.
air strikes noted Trinh's charge that the attacks "revealed
more clearly the true features of the Nixon Administration"
and "further laid bare its peace swindles." NCNA quoted
Trinh's reference to the seven points as the basis for a peace
settlement and repatriation of American prisoners. Unlike
Moscow, Peking has not reported its specific receipt of a
message.
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CONIC I1)1;NTiAi. F11111 TRENU14
I!'r JANUARY 1972
DRV SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. AIR STRIKES# ATTACKS ON FISHERMEN
't'he URV Foreign Min.tNtry spokuvimtut .issued the second and third
protUNLN or the new yonr* against U.S. nets against the DRVs
A Statement on the 18th charged the United states with attacking
two tislsing bonts a-od one on the 19th denounced U.S. attnckN
tsga Inst Nghe An I'rov.in_c.
Giving sparse detail on the air strikes, the protest on the 19th
charged that U.S. planes in "flight after flight today
continuously attacked a heavily-populated area in Nghe An."
It said that the armed forces and people in the province,
"upholding their vigilance and :fighting well, brought down
two U.S. war planes and crippled a number of others." Earlier
on the 19th, Hanoi media had reported the downing of two F-4'e,
bringing Hanoi's total of downed planes to 3,431. On the 16th,
Hanoi had claimed that the people and armed forces of Quang
Binh downed art unmanned reconnaissance plane on the previous
day.
Using somewhat strong language for a spokesman-level protest
the statement on the 19th said that "following their frenzied
war escalation in the last days of December, this is an
extremely serious war act of the U.S. imperialists, grossly
encroaching upon the DRV's sovereignty and security, a new
crime against the Vietnamese people." It called the action a
"very insolent challenge" to world public opinion and said
that it "has further exposed the very obdurate and bellicose
aggressive nature of the Nixon Administration and its peace
hoax." In more routine language it sternly denounced the
"very serious war act" and demanded an end to all U.S. ac's
of encroachment upon the DRV's sovereignty and security.
ATTACKS ON The foreign ministry protest on 18 January
FISHERMEN atypically charged the United States with
attaching fishing boats. Occasional charges
of U.S. harassment of NoLth Vietnamese fishermen have been
lodged in the periodic DRV War Crimes communiques. The protest
"sternly condemned"the United Otates for sending "combat
vessels to attack the people's fishing boats in Nghe An Province,"
and claimed that on the 16th, two boats belonging to the people
of Dien Bich village, Dien Chau district, Nghe An, were sunk
* The first protest of 1972 was issued on 7 January. See the
12 January TRENDS, page 10.
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c;01411IDIT,141' IAI. 1111114 'illlUI,n
19 JANUARY 1972
while ,riahittg oft the Nglie An coa"t," It further charged that
nine people were killed and seven wounded and that the wounded
people were "detait5ed and interrogated before being released,"
The ataterlent cal.led the alleged action "a serious War act of
the U.S, imperiall.atn in international waters" and a "barbarous
crime against the Vietnamese people." It added that the
"pi.ratic maritime art has trampled on all principles on
freedom tti move in international waters.` The D14V Foreign
Ministry, it said "severely condemns this crimp" and "firmly
demands that the United States immediately end all of its
piratic sea act" against the DRV."
DRV, PRG STATEMENTS PROTEST RESETTLEMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE
The resettlement of some 1,300 South Vietnamese, which began on
5 January, from the northern province of Quang Tri to Phuoc
Tuy Province prompts a flurry of derogatory Vietnamese communist
propaganda highlighted by PRG and DRV Foreign Ministry statements
on the 17th and 19th respectively. The foreign ministry
protests do not spell out the details of the transfer, but
earlier propaganda, including LPA on 12 January and NIIAN DAN
on the 14th, noted that 273 families totaling 1,363 persons
have been flown to Phuoc Tuy Province. A llanoi radio
commentary on the 12th had said that according to Saigon and
Western sources the relocation was to consist of four phases:
the first began in December, the second will begin in February,
the third in Murch, and the fourth in June.*
* A document made public by the War Crimes Committee in South
Vietnam c 24 December--carried textually by LPA on 28 December--
on allied crimes in the past three years of "rural pacification"
included the passage that "recently, the U.S.-puppets began a
major migration plan aimed at removing about two or three million
people from the five northern provinces of South Vietnam to
provinces in Nam Bo and southern Truong Bo." It said that they
had been "forcing 2,000 families in 'strategic hamlets' of Gia An
and Gio Son, Quang Tri to migrate to eastern Nam Bo. What they
had done previously against separate hamlets, villages or
relatively small areas is now applied to entire provinces."
The resettlement plan was mentioned more briefly in earlier
communiques; issued by the DRV War Crimes Commission, including
that of 10 November.
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(:oNi1IIV4NTIAl, t'h111 tltl'Nlttt
19 JANIiARV 1'J;
The 1'1((; ho-pigo H1111atry ntatema!t-t charged that "thin wicked,
tanning PS'--pmp and PMttemely ruthless act of the U.11, clique
In aimed at averting total defeat" In Vietnamleatiutt and
ttanaforming the provinces juat mouth of the demilitarised
tone (r)MI, into a "white none no that the clique can catty out
itn de atrto ctIon and perpetual division of Vietnam." It
vtttiolically assailed thin "new heinous crime of Nixon find
Thieu" an "moore ruthless than those of fanctat Hit let, who
in corned brevet by mankind." The l)ItV Poteign Ministry
statement, calling it the "biggest migration plan over
tarried out," asserted that the aim of the resettlement was
to turn the provinces south of the DMZ "into a free fire
and bombing tone in an attempt to nave Vietnam fiat Ion" and
to counter the p)pular movement in South Vietnam which to
"neethingly opposing U.S. imperialism and the Nguyen Van
Thieu warlike and dictatorial regime." And it claimed that
the "mad and barbarous degree" of the relocation program
"has laid bare the deceitful arguments" of the Nixon
Admtnimtratton in saying that the United States is ending its
involvement in the war. Voicing full support for the PRG
statement, it echoed that statement in "strongly denouncing
and sternly condemning before ;public opinion at home and
abroad the schemes and criminal acts of the U.S.- hieu
clique." But only the PRG statement voiced the conviction
that world opinion "will promptly and severely condemn" the
relocation plan and "adopt positive measures--together with
the Vietnamese people--to stay the clique's bloodstained hands."
The resettlement alto come under attack from the PRG delegate
at the 13 January session of the Paris talks. Nguyen Van Tien,
in the course of an attack on allied policy, especially
pacification, said that "one of the most barbarous crimes"
being committed by the U.S. and Saigon authorities is the current
"deportattin" of the population in the northern provinces aimed
at "forcing over one million inhabitants" to leave their homes
for the "concentration camps" in the South zones. And Hanoi
meJia on the 15th reported that the acting head of the PRG
special representation in Hanoi, Nguyen Phu Soai, at a press
conference the previous day denouncing allied war "crimes"
committed during the three years of Vietnamization, "attracted
the journalists' special attention when he told of the U.S.-
puppets criminal plan to force tens of thousands of our
compatriots near the 17th parallel to go and live in concentra-
tion camps in Nam Bo."
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C)NrIUl!N'I'IAL 111111 'IIIIcN1111
1') JANUAIIY 1'112
LAOS: C(YNIST MLNA NAIL ALLtGrb CAP71JtL O1 LONG TICIVC
The alleged Capture of the Long Tieng base In northern Laos
on 12 January by common tat troops is praI.aed In a flurry of
high-level 11ektng and Ilanol propaganda including a congratulatory
message to Nouphanouvong from Chou l n-1 a i. and a 1'IiOI'LE' N DAILY
Commentator article on the 15th, and NiIAN DAN and QUAN 1101.
NIIAN DAN editorials on the 14th.
The 11athet Lao radio first reported the Long Tieng exploit on
the 13th when It said that "the Xiang Khouang armel forces and
people" had captured positiona on surrounding peaks and
finally "the airstrip and heart of Long Tieng" the day bafore.
The radio said that on that day the "banner of the Xiang
Khouang armed forces and people" flew over Long Tieng after
the Vang Pao and Thai defenders "fled helter-skelter."
Souphanouvong, in a telegram commanding the Xiang Khouang
armed forces and people on the 14th, praised the "unprecedented
victory," which he called "another severe setback" to the
implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in Laos. But he warned
that the United States continues to implement the Nixon
Doctrine and plans to dispatch more Thai troops to Laos, and
he called for heightened vigilance.
A Radio Pathet Lao commentary on the 14th asserted that the
recapture of the Sam Thorg-Long Tieng area was "indisputable,
legal, and responsive to the aspiration of the Lao people."
It repeated the claim made in Souphanouvong's 8 January
letter to the Lao King that the "whole of Xiang Khouang
Province" has been controlled by the NLHS and Patriotic
Neutralist Forces since 1961 and that the Sam Thong-Long Tieng
region was "illegally" captured by the United States and its
"henchmen" after the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements.
This argument is also echoed in Vietnamese communist comment
on the alleged fall of Long Tieng.
HANOI AND The NHAN DAN editorial on the i4th also called
FRONT MEDIA the capture of Long Tieng a defeat of the Nixon
Doctrine and said that the exploit underscores
the Lao Liberation Armed Forces' "rapid growth and outstanding
skill in engaging in coordinated combats." This victory, along
with other victories in northern and southern Laos earlier in
the year, said the editorial, proves that "the steadfast
offensive position of the Lao revolution has become increasingly
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(lt)NI'IUIcN'1'IAL I'11111 TitRNDli
19 JANUARY 191)
strong as the fight continues." The aituation in Long Tieng,
It added, "ham caused deep confusion to U.H, and Lao circles
in Vientiane, and creates a very difficult position for the
Nixon Adminlatration."
The QUAN Dot NIIAN DAN editorial, also on the 14th, praised the
battle an "a strategically significant dafer4t, militarily and
politically, for the Amarricans and their lackeys," and called
it "primarily a fatal blow to the Vang Pao rebel forces."
The Xleng Khouang armed forces and people, it said, "not only
recaptured an important area and a crucial operational aria
for consolidating the strategic Plain of Jarm area, but also
destroyed one of the Americans' biggest military bases In Laos,
wrecked an important part of the Americans' and their lackey'
force deployment system, and created a new military situation
that is favorable for the Lao people to develop their forces
and their victories." The victory, it concluded, is a "serious
setback for the Nixon Doctrine," and contributes to developing
"the common strategically offensive position of the peoples of
the three Ind-chinese countries."
A 1Lanoi domestic service commentary on the 16th brought up
the question of DRV security in connection with Long Mang
when it said that the base was, among other things, a key
point in the U.S. defense system in northern Laos and a
springboard from which the anomy could launch nibbling attacks
against the Plain of Jars and Xieng Khouang area and "threaten
the northwestern part of the DRV."5 It went on to may that
the base fell under "the most violent attack ever made by the
A Some DRV comment on the December fighting in the Plain of
Jars had also raised the question of a threat to the DRV. A
22 December NIIAN DAN article said that the Lao "victories" in
the Plain frustrated schemes by the "U.S. aggressors and their
lackeys" to "occupy the liberated areas on Laotian territory
bordering on the northern part of our country." DRV Defense
Minister Giap, in an 18 December speech marking the
anniversaries of Resistance Day and Army Day, had even more
emphatically asserted that the United States was bringing in
Thai troops to join the "special forces" and "rightist army"
in Laos in attacking "the liberated zone and threatening North
Vietnam." A 10 November statement by a DRV Foreign Ministry
bpokesman protesting intensified U.S. air operations in Laos
stated that the increased use of U.S. air power was part of a
scheme to widen the war in Laos and "directly threaten the
security of the DRV."
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CUNP 1I) EN'f IAI. P1i I S 'l UlrNI)tl
III JANUARV 1911
Lao Liberation Armed N(,rcee" and that thin is the "moat nerioun
setback for the U.N. nttategic design on the Lan battlefront.''
Along with dpfeata on the Ilolovenn Plateau, the d2featn in the
Plain of Jarn and Long Tt.eng "have violently shaken the entire
defenne system in Laos of the U.S.aggrennora and their henchmen,'
A Liberation Peens Agency commentary on the 1.4th went no fat
an to claim that the U.S. defeats In the Plain of Jara-Muong
S(.iot and !am Thong-Long Tieng areas, together with those
sustained in South Vietnam and Cambodia, "created a turning
point leading to the total collapse of the U.S. aggressors'
design" in Lava and the rent of Indochina. The victories,
it said, contribute to "a radical change of the battle
array in the whole of Indochina."
PEKING Chou En-14i'n congratulatory meanage to Souphanouvong*
on the 19th called the Long Tieng "victory" another
"heavy blow to the k xon Doctrine," adding that it is "of
great strategic significance and constitutes a new contribution
to the three Indochinese peoples' war against U.S. aggression
and for national salvation." He expressed the belief that
"in the present excellent revolutionary situation in Indochina,"
the Lao people, uniting with the Vietnamese and Cambodian
people, will win atilt greater victories.
El
The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article of the 15th praised the
"spectacular" victory an a "telling blow" to U.S. Imperialism,
the Lao rightist forces, and Thai troops, and as a "significant
contribution to the struggle of the three Indoohinese people."
The destruction of the Long Tieng base, it said, is "of great
significance to the consolidation of the liberated area in
upper Laos and the development of the war situation in the
whole of Laos," and proves the "raps,! growth and development"
of the Lao Patristic Armed Forces. The situation in all cf
Indochina is "excellen." now, it concluded.
MOSCOW Moscow's reaction is more limited and less authoritative,
as customary, with only a 15 January PRAVDA article
saying that the victory is "striking evidence of the upsurge" of
* Chou has not previously sent such a message on victories in
northern Laos, although on 29 March 1971 a message from Mao, Lin,
and Chou--addressed to the leaders of the NLHS, FUNK, NFLSV and
PRG, and DRV--had congratulated them on recent battlefiel(t
victo:ies, specifically during the Lam Son 719 campaign in
southern Laos and South Vietnam.
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(:0NV11) V,N7IAt, VNIN 14,14 14
1'I JANt,AUY 1'112
the Lao peopia's llbetation at toggle and A "gtave blow" to
American tllana to "Vietnamio;e" the war fit Indochina, t'UAVIA
alluded to this security intetestn of the t)1W when it "aid that
the Long Tteng Bane had l'"pn or significance for teronnaissance
IIIghta oust t.aoa and the I)tIV and wan the nerve center of the
"ystem for controlIIng Amar.tcan operations in "northern
Indochina." The "fa 11" of Long TIeng, t'RAVOA concluded, was
the Collapse of ohz of the military props of Washtfigton's
"fat -reachinA PO l.It IcaI plans, and not only in t,aos. The
militaty defeats of American Imperialism undermine Its political
plans in Indochina."
T441 TROOPS iligh-1sve1 communist propaganda Also excoriates
the dispatch of That troops to Laos in
implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, noting among other things
that Thai troops took part in the battle of Long Tieng. An
14LIIS Central Cr .iaittee statement of the 17th says that "many
more That battalions" were sent to Long hang after late 1971
Bangkok consultations between Souvanna Phouma and Thanom
Y,Ittikachon and a visit to Bangkok by General Abrams in early
January.
A 19 January MAN DAN editorial supports the NLHS statement
as well as a 15 January RGNU statement denouncing an alleged
plan to send That troops to Cambodia. NHAN DAN warns that
Thailand is making a mistake by allowing itself to be used
by the United States now that the Nixon Doctrine is "on the
verge of bankruptcy" and other U.S. allies havi begun to
"desert the sinking ship."
Peking also supports the NLHS and RGMU statements with another
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 18th. TASS reports
the NLt1S Central Committee statement on the Thai troops,
but there is no Soviet coranent.
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!;~J~1N 1 UJ;N'1 I AL
1q -
SIN 0-U, S. RELATIONS
Nnl 'iUl;Hfl4
19 JANUARY 191)
PEKING U15CU55L5 U.S. CHINA POLICY THOUGH PIM CC+ILNT
While critic1 ing 1'residpttt lilxon's position on Indochina and
giving extensive publicity to Vietnamese communist reaction,
Peking has not reacted directly to the President's recent
remarks regarding Taiwan and has not originated comment on
the Nixon-Sato San Clemente talks. Washington's China policy
has, however, been discussed In PAC mei;ia through the proxy
of Albanian and North Korean comment on the President's
2 January TV interview and his meeting with Sato.
Peking's differentiated reactions reflect its concern to
reassure Hanoi regarding the Implications of the President's
visit next month--particularly In calling attention to the
Vietnamese communists' negotiating position end focusing on
the Paris conference*--while approaching seneltive Sino-U.S.
Issues In a cautious and unprovocaUive manner. Thus, in an
evident effort to keep the atmosphere for the Peking summit
as propitious as possible, ('eking has avoided direct assessments
of the President's Chinn policy, choosing to air such issues
as Taiwan by means of selective accounts of comment from
communist allies.
Peking's first acknowledgment of the President's remarks on
China in his TV interview appeared in a 10 January NCNA account
of an Albanian article of the previous day attacking the
President's views across a wide range of issues. While toning
down the editorial's harsh personal invective against the
President, the i4C14A account picked up the editorial's denunciatton
of the President's China policy, including the charge that he
had reaffirmed "the notorious policy of hostility" toward the
PRC and again demonstrated a stubborn intent to pursue a "two-
Chinas policy." NCNA specifically cited the President's
assurances of continuing political and defense ties with Taiwan
as proof that the United States intends to prolong its
"occupation" of Taiwan as a "military base for aggression"
against the PRC. There was no reference to the President's
comments on his forthcoming visit to China.
* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS.
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CONNI111711'TlAI, , 1 , , ON
9 ,tA~itt~, 'Y 1411
Ppklog t-n tits I211, carried excerpts from a worth I?:otean editorial
of the t;revInue tiny detnoutir Iug the ti axon-Nato meeting on 6-1
January, marking the first reference to the talks to appear in
PIC medta.* 'T'hough muting the editorial's charges that the
United !;tntee anti Japan are "intensifying" aggression in Asia,
the t;hineee account repeated Pyongyang's strictures against the
N1xon doctrine, particularly the role allegedly being played by
Japanese militarism, and quoted the aditorial.'a attack on the
"Nixon and .-into cliques" for maintaining treaty ties with Taiwan
and persleting in efforts to keep the island independent of the
mainland.
Peking's avoidance of direct continent on the Nixon-Sato talks was
pointed up by NC1W,'e account of a 16 January banquet welcoming
visiting Japanese labor union representatives. While the Japanese
speaker at the banquet was quoted as attacking the joint statement
Issued In San Clemente, the Chinese speaker, Wang Kuo-chuan, did
not mention the talks. Wang made no comments on Sino-U.S.
relations. restricting himself to attacks on the Sato government's
policies on China and Taiwan. However, sensitive Sino-U.S.
Issues which Peking has been avoiding were reportedly discussed
by the highest-ranking Chinese official in attendance, Keng
Pinto, head of the CCP's international liaison department.
According to a Japanese press account, Keng discussed the
President's visit, saying the Taiwan question will be a major
subject and demanding that the United States withdraw its military
forces from Taiwan. Keng was quoted as charging that the
President is still plotting to create two Chinas. NCNA did
not report Keng's remarks, noting simply that he and other
Chinese officials had a conversation with the Japanese before
the banquet began.
?eking's most recent authoritative formulation of its position on
the Taiwan issue appeared in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial an
14 January hailing the establishment of diplomatic relations
* Reaction to the Nixon-Sato meeting is discussed in the Japan
section of the TRENDS. Peking's coverage of the President's
meetings with allied leaders prior to his Peking and Moscow trips
has not followed a regular pattern. The Chinese ignored his
sessions with Canada's Trudeau and the FRG's Brandt but commented
on the meetings with French President Pompidou and British Prime
Minister Heath. In the latter two cases Peking played up French
and British opposition to American policies.
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CONIt11)h;N11A1, 111111 TItIrNIM
19 ,IANIIAIUY 191)
With Cyprus, Call.itig the I..'I4C Uovernttlpnt "Lila aol.a 1.00011 governtnont
f@Ptaaanting the ent.tra Chine010 paopl0"--t'42king's optimum tarrna,
to which Cyprus acceded in the r0cognltlon agreement--Lila 0dl.totl.a.1
repeated i'ek.ing'a claim to Taiwan and 1-t01 objectionp to ouch
formu.lan nos "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments,"
the etatua of Taiwan remains to be determined, and an independent
Taiwan. These objections had also been reg.l.tater.ed in the Now
Year's tiny joint editorial, which want on to demand the withdrawal.
of U.S. troops from Taiwan and to make the stock avowal of a
determination to "liberate" the inland. The editorial. did not,
however, convey a sense of urgency or threat, expressing
confidence that "the day is bound to come" when Taiwan will
be liberated.
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CON1l ii1!NT IAL P1,11.11 'I'lll?NhU
19 JANUARY 1972
J A P A N
NIXON-SATO METING SEEN AS INCONCLUSIVE BY MOSCOW
Soviet commentators claim that the San Clemente talks between
President Nixon and Premier Sato failed to resolve the important
issues dividing the United States and Japan. Japan should move
to develop new ties with other areas 0 the world, it is argued.
('eking has not yet commented directly on the tnl.ku, although
NCNA has reported some foreign criticism. The Japan Communist
Party aliages that the communique revealed an intention to
strengthen "the Japan-U.S. military alliance."
MOSCOW On 9 January, Radio Moscow told its Japanese audience
that the Nixon-Sato talks failed to resolve "the
setiouo differences of opinion between the United States and
Japan." On the 8th. TASS reported that 'the only tangible
result is an exact data for the return of Okinawa seized by the
United States 27 years ago." TASS said the Japanese press
and public are increasingly demanding that the Japanese
Government "reject the policy of following in the wake of the
United States and insist on conducting an independent policy
answering the country's national intervats."
A reiterated argument is that Japan, facing a trade war with
the United States, must develop new ties, and particularly
economic ties, with other nations. A domestic service
commentary on the 15th specifically affirmed that 'economic
collaboration with the USSR is useful and necessary for Japan."
PEKING On 13 January NCNA released, without comment, an
11 January NODUNG SINMUN commentary on the talks.
Omitting those portions of the North Korean article which
specifically attacked President Nixon by name, NCNA carried
only the sections aimed primarily at Sato. It was asserted
that the recent talks were arranged by "the U.S. imperialists
and the Japanese militarists" in order to "strengthen their
collusion along the aggressive line of the Nixon Doctrine."
Sato was apecifically denounced for "his insistence on maintaining
the Japan-Chiang treaty" and "his ambition for territorial
expansion over Taiwan," as well as for "continuing to push
obdurately his ignominious policy of tailing after U.S.
imperialism."
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CONP iu1 NT1AL VOTS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1.972
The next day NCNA rul.ensud nn article from V.1,1111, I POPULLIT, the
Albanian UP organ, which portrayed the San Clumante joint
statement as further evidence of "Washington-Tokyo collaboration
for continued :implumantntion of the imperialist counterrevolutionary
policy in Asia." It was alleged that Japan's "special role in the
Nixon Doctrine" has revealed "the open expansionist plans of
Japanese militarism directed against the people of Asia, first of
all against the Chinese people."
On 17 January NCNA reported a speech by Makoto Ichikawa, chairman
of the general council of trade unions of Japan and head of a
trade union delegation now in Peking. Ichikawa charged that "the
Sato cabinet is becoming more and more isolated in Japan" and
claimed that the "Japan-U.S. Joint statement issued in San
Clemente has aroused growing indignation among the broad masses
of the Japanese people." lie asserted that the "fraud of the
agreement on the 'reversion' of Okinawa" will meet "with strong
resistance from the one million Okinawan people."
JAPAN CP AKAHATA, reacting promptly to the talks, carried
an 8 January statement by Koichiro Ueda, foreign
policy committee chairman of the central committee of the JCP,
who argued that the Sato-Nixon meeting was held "to work out
uniformity of purpose on the common strategy in the post-Okinawa
reversion agreement" and to "repave the route of the aggressive
strengthening of the Japan-U.S. military alliance." The
statement denounced the joint communique as a further indication
that "Japan is to share the more important wing of the Nixon
Doctrine," which is "nothing but a policy to let Asians fight
against Asians under the hegemony of the U.S." The Sato
Government was assailed for "subordinating" such "Japan-U.S.
confrontations and contradictions as the yen-dollar issue and
trade problems . . . to the Nixon Doctrine and the aggressive
strengthening of the Japan-U.S. military alliance."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
C H I N A
ECONOMIC PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO REFLECT MODERATE LINE
PRC propagandists are continuing to advance "party policies"
intended to promote balanced economic development while
providing sufficient material incentive to assure increased
production. While the thesis that local unite must furnish
their own funds for improvements and not rely on state aid
is still being pressed, commentators also affirm repeatedly
that individual incomes must rise in keeping with production
and that the plowing of profits back into improvements has
its limitations. As an article in HUPEH DAILY put it on
10 January, communes should increase collective funds, but
"they should not accumulate too much all at once."
Some provinces are indicating opposition to these moderate
policies. An INNER MONGOLIA DAILY editorial on 29 December
which thrust strongly at "left opportunist" policies aimed
at speeding the transition to communism criticized the idea
of "going beyond a policy." The editorial indicates that
some cadres have felt that it is all right to go to a higher
stage if their units are ready, and that to retreat to a
lower stage called for by party policy is "going backwards."
The cadres now being criticized strongly resemble those
formerly praised for having resisted "Liuist" efforts to
retreat to previous forms in the early 1960's. Cadres of
the Tachai model brigade have frequently been lauded for
resisting attempts to persuade them to retreat, and the
frequent policy twists and turns of recent years may have
convinced many cadres that their future careers may best
be served by resisting any retreat until there is more
leadership stability in the center.
Another aspect of the moderation evident now in Peking
policies is the increased attention to consumer desires by
commercial departments. On 5 December NCNA popularized a
new type of neighborhood store which aided shopping
convenience, and an article broadcast by Radio Peking on
6 January indicates further efforts to aid the consumer.
The 6 January article, implicitly overturning cultural
revolution shibboleths about stores stocking only
"proletarian" goods, notes that workers and peasants "want
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
not a few goods and services which have a touch of tradition."
The article warns commercial departments that the sale of
such goods, when requested by the people, should not be
discontinued "under the pretext that the goods serve only a
few bourgeois individuals." All such pretexts are "left in
form but right in essence," and commercial workers must
cease mouthing them.
During the cultural revolution commerce departments were
warned not to stock goods that serve the bourgeoisie, but
concentrate instead on necessities of life and goods required
for production. Cultural revolution propagandc. did, however,
foreshadow current moves to aid shopping convenience by
advocating longer hours of opening and special services for
the ill and the aged.
MILITARY REGIONS PICK UP CALL TO LEARN FROM PEOPLE
All of China's military regions except the Peking and Sinkiang
regions have issued circulars in line with the central State
Council-Military Commission circular on 3 January. This is
the circular that quoted Mao to the effect that the PLA must
learn from the people as well as the people learning from
the PLA. The new Mao directive, an expansion of the earlier
injunction that the people learn from the army, was first
surfaced in the joint New Year's Day editorial. Similar
circulars from a number of provincial military districts
have also been monitored, and it is possible that every
such district has issued a circular.
None of the military regional or district proclamations
monitored ',eve failed to mention the need to learn from the
people. Those issued prior to the release of the New Year's
editorial did not, however, always phrase it exactly as in
the Mao instruction.
Most provincial revolutionary committees have also issued
circulars for the "support the army" activities. In line with
previous practice, these are chiefly devoted to praise for the
PLA's achievements and injunctions to organize aid for
soldiers and their dependents. In general these circulars
avoid all reference to the recent problems of the PLA and do
not note that the PLA s now enjoined to learn from the people.
CONFIDENTIAL
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19 JANUA1tY 1972
Stnklnng, rrom whoMu military region no circular has boon
nwnltorad, (lid declare that the PLA muMt look to the people, in
a revolutionary committee directive broadcast on 2 January.
't'he Sinkiang directive, issued In advance of the central
ct.rcular and apparently based on the New Year's editorial,
also called on the military to "respect local unite."
SEVERAL PROVINCIAL PARTY CHIEFS STILL NOT APPEARING
Provincial turnouts for New Year's celebrations, "support
the army" gatherings, and various plenums and other meetings
have recently brought many of the provincial Chinese leaders
back into public view. However a number of party secretaries,
including five first secretaries, have made no appearances
since Lin's apparent fall in mid-September. In two
provinces, Kweichow and Kiangsi, no party secretaries have
appeared during this period, judging by monitored
broadcasts. The missing include Politburo members Hsu
Shih-yu and Hsieh Fu-chih. The latter is known to be in
very poor health, but his failure to send a wreath to
Chen Its funeral seems to indicate political problems as
well. In four oL''er provinces the first secretary has made
no appearances since October.
While it seems likely that some of the missing secretaries
have been purged, there are many precedents for leaders
dropping from sight only tc reappear with status apparently
unchanged. Others may return with lower status, as recently
occurred in Chekiang, where secretary Chen Li-yun, missing
since January of 1971 when the provincial party committee
was formed, reappeared at a "support the army" rally
according to the provincial radio on 7 January. Instead of
being listed among party leaders, as he was at last year's
rally when he followed the province chief, he was listed
much further down among military district officers.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONir 11)1,N'1' 1 Al.
PRC (NUCLEAR THPT
1111N 111141,11uto
11) JANUARY 191)
USSR. EUROPEAN ALLIES STRESS RADIOACTIVITY) DRV IGNORES TEST
Wh.tIc Peking mud In have refrained from In11owup comment on the
annou?-:r.munt of Lite I'IW'N 7 Jnnunry nutlenr tout, to I4Pepin;.
with, truatwnnt or Lite last two tout announcements in November. 1971
and October '969, Mogeow has NuNtnined Ito propnknnln nttoutiun
to Lite subject"-chiefly through tendentiouN r.epor.tittg, with streNs
on the effects of Lite radioactivity. Japanese reaction in high-
lighted in Soviet publicity for worldwide expressions or
"indignation."
Moscow's orthodox East European allins have followed its lend.
Romania, alone citing i4CNA rather than the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission as the source of its initial report on the test,
upheld Bucharest's neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict by
editing an anti-Soviet passage out of the NCNA announcement.
DRV media still have not been heard to mention thrl Chinese test--
the first one not to draw public North Vietnamese approbation.
SOVIET REACTION In reporting the Chinese test in advance of
the IICNA announcement and citing the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission as the source, Moscow followed the
precedent set at the time of the last test in November 1971.*
Its normal previous practice had been to wait for the WCNA
announcement, then to cite it briefly and with no followup to
speak of. The 8 January TASS report on the latest test also
followed the pattern of the initial TASS report in November in
noting Japanese concern over the effects of radioactive fallout--
thn theme now pursued in the continuing Soviet accounts of world
r;.sction.
Soviet media have publicized the formal protest by the Japanese
Foreign Ministry, and the coverage of Japanese reaction is
? typified by a 14 January TASS report that the Tokyo press "has
sounded the alarm that 'ashes of death' are again swirling over
Japan." TASS observer Kornilov on the 17th impugned Chou En-lai's
assurances to Japanese businessmen in December that Chinese tests
* The November test is discussed in the TRENDS for 24 November
1971, pages 31-32.
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19 IA1411APY 191i
were "harmless" and "( lean"i currently, Kurnltov ealtt, there
are "danger signals In the Japanese press about increased
radir,a(?t Ivity III a number (if (lenseIy populated tinrt.s of the
("nitt ry, 1(
The rut tent protngandn serves further to buttress Moscow 'n
allegations, pruminetlt since the confrontation In the U14
General Assembly III the fall, that the Chinese are vigorous
opponents of disarmament bent on strengthening their own
military capabilities. An IZVESTIYA dispatch carried by TASS
on the 14th noted that UN Secretary General Waldheim had
expressed regret over the detonation end had recalled UN
resolt.ItIons urging cessation of all nuclear tests in the
(atmosphere. The same dispatch cited a Bulgarian press c,om(';tent
to the effect that the partial test-ban treaty, "which has
already prevented the settling of strontium In our Lungs and
bones," is viewed by ('eking as "a scrap of paper."
Soviet broadcasts to Chinese listeners have pl.eyed up the
dangers of radioactivity. A Radio Moscow commentary in
Mandarin on the 10th said the latest test had "polluted the
atmosphere with harmful radioactive substances which may be
spread by the wind over a vast area" and which can "cause
death or illness." Radio Peace and Progress observed in a
Mandarin broadcast that medical experts, when discussing
causes of "the increasing incidence of cancer and leukemia"
In Asia, "often refer to tl,n nuclear tests in China."
LAST LUROPE Illustrative of the, East t;uropean propaganda
in the same vein, East Beri'n's I7EUES DEUTSCIILAND
followed up its 10 January report of the Japelese Foreign Ministry
protest with a succession of reports on increased radioactivity
in Japan and the Indignation of the Japanese press and people.
On the 12th NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reprinted a commentary from the
11 January PRAVDA by Igor Biryukov noting that the test took
place at the time Peking had indicated its intention to attend
the UJ--sponsored international environmental conference to be
held in Stockholm in June. Prague and Bratislava media, in reports
on plans for the June conference, noted that Peking has
accompanied its decision to send a deltgatiou to Stockholm with
a nuclear test that has "poisoned" the atmosphere.
All the Soviet bloc countries except Romania attributed initial
reports of the Chinese test to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
not NCNA. The Bucharest domestic serv'ie and SCINTEIA on the
10th carried a virtual text of the 9 January NCNA announcement,
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t,ttUP1111.1)'1IAI, PnIt; TN11,1J111;
19 :IAU1IANY 1912
-ntnua the polemical sentence to the effetl that the, l'NC
ce,nduc:tq Ita teata t(, break the "nuclear fl!nnopoly" and "nuclear
blackmail" of "the two superpowers."
ALHNIIA Tirana media predictably put) licifed the text of
Lite NOM announcement, f o i l owed by press comment
hailing the teat. HASIIKIMI on the Ilth called It another
blow at the "nuclear monopoly of the superpowers" and a further
step In building up Chinese defense. 71,111 1. Pt1PULLIT on the
I`sth defended the right of the PIIC and "revolutionary forces
everywhere" to possess nuclear weapons and assailed the
"imperialist-revtaiontst" agreements on disarmament, aimed
at "hindering the consolidation" of the PAC's defense
capability. As reviewed by ATA on the 15th and picked up by
NCNA the next day, however, this article (lid not specifically
mention Lite latest test.
NORTH VILTiNAM VLM and Hanoi radio have remained silent on the
test. Unlike the first nine announced Chinese
tests, the 10th one last November had not occasioned a
congratulatory meieage from the DRV leadership,, but Premier
Pham Van 1)ong, in speeches in Peking on 20 and 23 November,
had hailed the test and pointed to the PRC'a taptd advances
in the nuclear and space fields.
I4OPTI' KORLA Pyongyang radio reported the Chinese test on the
10th, citing NCNA, but there has been no further
monitored North Korean reference to it. Kim 11-song had sent
congratulatory messages to the Chinese leaders after aach of
the first three tests, after the September 1969 experiments,
and after the detonation in November 1971.
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19 1AU$;AHY 1911;
K0U#A
KIM I L-SONG CALLS FOR K N PLACE PACT # POL I T I CAL TALKS
in an interview with journalists of the Japanese newspaper YoMIUUI
on 10 January. Kim 11-song stressed the need for a "peace
agreement" between North and South Korea and called for North-South
"political. negotiations." Kim's formulations are phrased in such
a way as to suggest greater flexibility on Korean unification, N,ot
his calif for a pests pact and negotiations are not now and the
peace pact proposal is made contingent on U.S. troop withdrawal
from South Korea. His effort to project a more flexible position
may be intended to capitalise on the hopes aroused by the Red Cross
talks and to contrast a conciliatory Pyongyang approach with ROK
President Pak Chong-hut's 6 December d,claration of a state of
emergency.*
Pyongyang may also be seeking to adjust to the new atmosphere
arising out of 5ino-U.S. developments. Kim noted in the
interview that the Seoul rulers sewn frightened by "the rapid
change of the Internal and external situations to their
disadvantage."** He added that the situation has changed
from the time when the United States could determine affairs
in Korea and elsewhere.
Both the Pyongyang domestic radio and the KCNA international
service carried the Kim interview. North Korean media have not
reported any other o! the several recent interviews Kim has
granted the Jaranese press, including a 28 September ASAl1I
EVENING NEWS interview in which he suggested that Pyongyang might
be willing to abrogate its treaties with Moscow and Peking in
order to facilitate Korean reunification. It is possible that
Pyongyang's release of the 10 January interview may have been
* High-level Pyongyang re'ction to the ROK state of emergency is
discussed it the TRENDS of 15 December, pages 18-22.
** In another section of the interview, Kim alluded to President
Nixon's forthcoming Peking visit in observing that the President
has been "compelled to go on a tour o mendicant diplomacy with
his head lowered." In addition to Korean unification, the
interview covered international questions, Pyongyang's independent
line, and the six-year economic plan.
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19 .AWAY 1912
In toactlof/ tit speculation atvused by the Initial atmonty published
in YoNIUbt on the .11th to the effect that a peace pact could
precede the withdrawal of U.A. forces, the Pyongyang domestic
service broadcast the text of the interview on the 14th--the day
a longer versio:t appeared In YoMttl l.--and KCNA diaaetai.nated the
text on the next day.
PtACt PACT Both Pyongyang's text and the Japanese version
quote Kim as saying that the North Korean program
for peaceful reunification has not changed, recalling the
April 1.971 eight-point program, Kim's 6 August speech, avid his
New Year's address. Kim went on to aaaerti
In order to remove tension In Korea, It is necessary,
first of all, to reple,ta the Korean armistice
agreement with a peace agreement between the North
and south. We hold that a peace agreement should be
concluded between the North and South 11i,j YOMIURI
version inserts here the phrase "in which each will
declare that it will not attack the other"] and the
armed forces of North and South Korea be cut
drastically under the condition where the U.S.
Imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from
South Korea.
This formulation may have prompted speculation over whether
Pyongyang was off4ring a peace pact prior to a complete U.S.
troop withdrawal. Past North Korean statements nad asserted
emphatically that "first of all" U.S. forces must be withdrawn
before any further mvve4 toward unification could be. made.
Calls for a "peace pe.t" or "nonaggression pact" betweer. North
and South Korea after the withdrawal of U.S. troops were a
staple of Pyongyang propaganda for years. For example, a
letter from the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the
Fatherland sent in the name of Kim Il-song to Byungcholl Koh
in New York, reported by KCNA on 3 June 1970, reviewed North
Korean proposals on reunif icaticn--including proposals for a
peace pact--since the 1950's. A letter from this committee to
Youngjeung Kim, president of the Korean Affairs Institute
in Washington, D.C., reported by KCNA on 1 February 1971,
called for conclusion of a peace agreement after U.S. troop
withdrawal, but the proposal then dropped out of available
Pyongyang propaganda until a 7 December 1971 DPRK Foreign
Ministry statement denouncing the ROK's declaration of a state
of emergency.
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CoNMitANTiAI, P"I" 1'IihNbti
19 JANUARY 1912
flit, April 1971 eight-point program, which did not include the pu e
pact proposal, stressed that the first order of business was the
withdrawal of U.S. troops, after which the armed forces of North
and South Korea should be reduced to 100,000 or lass, the ROK
should abrogate its treaties with the United Stater and Japan,
and other North-South stops be taken. In now reviving the peace
pact proposal and seemingly downplaying the demand for U.S. trorip
withdrawal. Kim ties assumed a more conciliatory approach and in
effect invited the South Koreans to consider deepening contacts
with the North in a time of a declining U.S. presence in Asia.
This approach was foreshadoweu in the 7 December foreign
miniotry statement, which said that the D1?RK has consistently
called for "concluding a peace agreement between North and
South, reducing the armies and relaxing tension." In the next
sentence the statement added that the DPRK will continua to
rAert uftorts toward peaceful unification "after making all
foreign troops withdraw from South Korea."
POLITICAL TALKS After calling for the peace pact, Kim went
on in the interview to propose "North-South
political negotiations," expressing readiness to "have
negotiations with all political parties of South Korea including
the Democratic Republican Party, the New Democratic Party,
and the Nationalist Party." '"his appears to be an elaboration
of Kim's offer in his 6 August speech last year to have talks
with "all political parties including the Democratic Republican
Party, public organizations, and individual parsonages."
Adopting a conciliatory tone, Kim said in the interview that
he was willing to contact anyone who, "though he committed
crimes against the country and people, sincerely repents of
his past doings." In his New Year's address Kim more
specifically said that if the "South Korean rulers" renounce
their "treachery" he would "not ask about their past but will
peacefully settle the question of national reunification with
them."
In the past, as in the eight-point program, Pyongyang had not
gone beyond a vague proposal for a consultative meeting of
"all" political parties and public organizations of the North
and South to negotiate steps toward unification, and that
proposal was qualified by an expression of North Korean
willingness to talk only with "patriotic-minded new figures"
who would come to power sifter the withdrawal of U.S. troops
and the ouster of "traitor" Pak Chong-?hui.
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CUN1I.DINTIAI, lelRIS '11END1I
.19 JANUAIIY 1.972
S O U T 1 1 AS I A
MSOCOW DEPLORES U,S, NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN
Soviet comment has criticised U.S. naval activity in the Indian
Ocean no a source of tension and an attempt to put pressure on
the states in that area. Moscow has avoided, however, any dis-
cussion of grant-power naval rivalry, a theme which Poking sounded
in its reaction to the presence of a U.S. task force in the Indian
Ocean. The 'PASS account of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's year-
and press conference noted that she "stressed that the Indian
Ocean should be a zone of pence and that the Indian Government
would exert ovary effort to achieve this," but Moscow has not
further commented on the notion of a peace zone.
Articles in PRAVDA on 8 January and RED STAR on the 12th cited
the documents released by Jack Anderson to deplore the Pentagon
spokesman's announcement regarding U.S. Seventh Fleet patrols
in the Indian Ocean. Citing the documents as revealing that an
American task force had been deployed to the Bay of Bengal in order
to exert pressure on the Indian Government, PRAVDA decried what
it saw as a long-term policy of constant pressure on states in
the region in the manner of the Sixth Fleet in tho Mediterranean.
RED STAR note.' "ill-omened analogies" between events in the Bay
of Bengal and the Tonkin Gulf in condemning U.S. military opera-
tions in the Indian Ocban as a source of dangerous tension. An
18 January IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev introduced the factor
of Sino-American relations in assessing the U.S. moves. These
"new gambles," according to Kudryavtsev, are motivated by U.S.
failures in Indochina and South Asia and by the "present direction
of American-Chinese relations," which the commentator interprets
as showing that the United States does not have to f ear any
steps by Peking in defense of national liberation movements in
Asia.
NEW TIMES commentator D. Volskiy, writing in the weekly's second
issue for 1972, took note of indications. that Peking may seek to
exploit India's nationality problems. Citing Chou En-tai's
16 December statement that "the fall of Dacca . . . will lead
to endless strife," Volskiy observed- that thiswas "in the nature
of a directive to the appropriate Chinese services." According
to Volekiy, the Chinese warning that India "will reap the bitter
fruit which India itself has nurtured" means that "Peking evidently
intends to speculate on internal national and religious differences
in India and to encourage subversive activity there by extremist
elements."
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COW 1, DENTIAL 11118 TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
PEKING IGNORES AMERSON DOCIIIENTS ON INDIAN-PAKISTANI WAR
Poking has remained silent about the documents released by Jack
Anderson dealing with the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Reflecting
sensitivity on the matter., Peking's reaction to one development
related to the Anderson documents--State Department spokesman
Bray's 11 January remarks about an international consortium to
aid the Cambodian regime--avoided acknowledging the-.source of the
disclosure. An NCNA account simply noted. that Bray confirmed the
news "after it was disclosed by the U.S. press."
Peking has fallen silent on developments in.Bangladcsh after
previously having denounced the new regime as an Indian puppet.
The Chinese have not reported the release of Mujibur Rahman by
Pakistani President Bhutto and seem to be waiting for the dust
to settle in Bangladesh before reacting further.
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19 JANUARY 1972
PANA HA
CANAL ISSUE PROMPTS OWILIFIED CUBAN SUPPORT FOR TORRIJOS
Havana editorial comment and reportage marking the anniversary of
the January 1964 riots in the Panama Canal Zone, an occasion
virtually ignored by Cuba in recent years, registers a newly
cordial view of the Panamanian Government,and a revised assess-
ment of Panamanian military leader Torrijos on grounds of his
"anti-imperialist" struggle for recovery of Panamanian
sovereignty over the Zone. The new line, which. has been
developing since September, is in keeping with other moves
in the current evolution of Castro's foreign policy--his
extended visit to Chile, his dabbling in personal diplomacy
in Peru and Ecuador, and in general~ the -greater- flexibility
that has marked his approach to relations with Latin American
governments.
While Havana's new expressions of support.for the Panamanian
regime have until now been confined entirely-..to the canal issue,
the Cuban party organ's editorial on the.. anniversary of the
riots introduces references to "advances". An Panamanian domestic.
policy that accord with Castro's stated:.criteria..for Cuban
approval of Latin American regimes. Panama is still in a class
apart from such countries as Chile and Peru (and Bolivia before
the coup last August) in the Cuban triew. But the manifestations
of approval for the Torrijos' regime's actions square with
Castro's declaration on 26 July that Cuba, seeking "the develop-
ment of revolutionary processes" in Latin America, is favorably
disposed toward governments "with their. own. independent
criteria, . . . capable of defending their. national interests,
the resources of their countries, and of acting- independently
of Yankee imperialism."
On 2 December 1971, PRENSA LATINA cited. the ..weekly. BOHEMIA for
the suggestion that Panama was "seriously: studying:. the reestab-
lishment of relations with Cuba" and added thar."this is the
first mention published in Cuba" of the-.-possible-.resumption of
Cuban-Panamanian relations. Off icial- expressions. of.-support..
for the Panamanian regime on the canal issue?were- put on record
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CONI'IU1rN'I'I.AL 10111.8 THIrNUIJ
19 JANUARY 110172
in two Cuban-Soviet communiques during the some period, in
October and December, as well as in speeches by Castro and by
Cuban Labor Minister Jorge 11usquet.*
Except for thu references in the joint. communiques, Soviet propa-
ganda attention to Panama and to the canal..negotiations has been
virtually non?xistnnt. The only available Soviet commentary
since the 30 October communique, a 16 November domestic service
commentary, praised the "firmness" of Torrijos' government and
his consideration for "the will of the popular masses" in soaking
the return of the Canal Zama, adding Vv it,.the Panamanian position
indicates "not only the si. rengthening of the _progressive forces
in the country, but also `:l,e anti-imperialist movement throughout
the Latin American continent."
COMMUNIQUES, Along with standard ..rof stances to the govern-
CASTRO SPEECH ments of Chile and- Peru,. Panama-..was the only
other Latin- American. country.-.. mentioned in the
30 October Soviet-Cuban communique, issued ?at-.the conclusion. of
Kosygin's visit to Cuba. The same' three.. countries--with the
addition of Ecuador, prompt,ad by.Castro' s.early~ December stopover
in Guayaquil--were again singled out in. the.29..December communique
marking the conclusion of Cuban President. Dorticos' visit to the
Soviet Union. The October communique ..noted.that! .both..countries
"expressed sympathy with the striving..of.. the-..Panamanian people to
exercise full sovereignty over .the:.whole-..of ..their national
territory." In a similar but- milder...ref erence. to, the Panamanian
situation, the December communique noted simply. that the Soviet
and Cuban peoples "follow closely the..atruggle of the Panamanian
people in defense of their sovereignty."
Denouncing those who were seeking. to. create ..tension in Cuban-
Panamanian relations as.a..result-of the..Cuban..capture of two
Panamanian-flag ships in early December, Castro. on. 22. December.
spoke favorably of . the ".historic struggle''-.of the people of
* The last previous reference to.Panamain Soviet-Cuban .communi-
ques had appeared in the one issued -following- Castro's -visit. -to
the Soviet Union in January 1964--the month in-which the Canal
Zone riots occurred. That communique. condemned. the bloodshed in
the riots and the "encroachment'. on.. the..sovereignty!' .of Panama by
U. S. troops. It expressed support. for.. the. people..of . Panama. in
"their just demand" for sovereignty over. the canal and "their
right to a revision or their demand for abrogation" of the
"unequal agreements" on the Canal Zone area.
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CONFIDENTIAL V111-8 TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
"this uistar republic" in "dumanding sovereignty over . . . thuir.
Lerritory and the canal." Citing the "strong stulemuntu" by
I'nnmmnninn leaders "demanding sovereignty of that strip or
Panamanian territory," he declared that Cuba
has high esteem for the Panamanian people and line pro-
found sympathy for their demands for, sovereignty over
the canal. We support the Panamanian people in their
struggle. We support the Panamanian. .poop le's demands
and wu view their struggle with sympathy. We sympathize
with the attitude of the Panamanian Government in
demanding sovereignty over the canal.
Echoing Castro's declaration of support, Cuban Labor Minister
Jorg: Risquot, speaking on 2 January in Santiago, Chile, at the
celebration of the 50th anniversary of the?.Chilean Communist
Party, proclaimed that Cuba "supports. the. firm decision of the
Panamanian people and the position of the goverawent in. the
recovery of the nation's sovereignty over the Canal Zone, which
has been under Yankee occupation since 1903."
REPORTS ON Led off by a 28 September GRANMA.article accusing
NEGOTIATIONS U.S. legislators who oppose the return of the
Canal Zone to Panama of having a "colonialist
soul," Cuban media have keyed a succession of commentaries and
reports on Panama to the U.S.-Panamanian. canal negotiations, with
stress on Panama's efforts to regain sovereignty over its own
territory. PRENSA LATINA interviews with Panamanian Foreign
Minister Tack, distributed on 18 October and 13 January, portrayed
Panama's position as "reasonable"--the return to Panama of all
occupied territory in the Canal Zone. in..exchange for acceptance
of a limited period of time during which. the% United ..States may
continue dealing with interoceanic traffic--and depicted Tack as
optimistic on prospects for an agreement. The 13 January inter-
view quotes Tack as stating that Panama would be willing to place
the canal problem before the UN Security Council,..but only "as a
last resort."
Havana radio on 20 October had reported a.statement, of "the Union
of Panamanians in Cubd'which stressed that "the sovereignty of
Panama cannot be negotiated" and warned the Panamanian people "to
remain alert and prevent the insertion ..into -any. -agreement of
clauses which would deny them territorial integrity or sovereignty
from ocean to ocean and border to border."
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19 JANUARY 1972
THE 9 JANUARY Marked with substantial Cuban comment for the
ANNIVERSARY first time in recent years, this year's anni-
versary of the 9 January 1964 riots occasioned
n GRANMA editorial on the 8th, accompanied by a moderate volume
of other comment and reportage on observances.of the event.
Stressing the Panamanian people's "demand ..for.,the return of
sovereignty over the Canal Zone," the editorial declared that
"Panama is not alone," that its demand for sovereignty "is
supported by all progressive peoples and by all the socialist
countries, including Cuba," and that the. Cuban..revolution."has
offered and is offering its disinterested aid and militant soli-
darity to the anti-imperialist cause." Havana radio on the 11th
reported a student rally in the Cuban capital."in support-of the
struggle waged by the people of Panama against.the imperialist
government of the United States and in favor of their. independence
and sovereignty over the Panama Canal."
NEW VIEW OF The GRANMA editorial of the 8th illustrated the
TORRIJOS changed Cuban view of the Panamanian Government
and of Panamanian military leader Torrijos.
GRANMA observed that "events in..this fraternal -country" are
characterized by some "social, educational,, and agrarian
advances, a positive and realistic international policy, and
a demand for the return of sovereignty over the.Canal Zone"--
the first Cuban comment to praise the regime for. its domestic
policies. It added that "the masses and. government sectors
increasingly support the nationalist movement led by" Torrijos
and that "the struggle to regain possession of the Canal Zone
is more than a slogan; it is the supreme expression of the
freedom epitomized by the heroes of 9.January and..emphasized
by General Torrijos." The same view was conveyed in an 8 January
Havana radio interview with a Panamanian student leader, who
contended that "forces have emerged within-the.. current Panamanian
Government" and within the National Guard "which refuse to submit
to the policy of the oligarchy and to imperialist interests" and
which are waging "a patriotic struggle." A31 December Havana
radio commentary had noted that in the face of U.S. efforts
"to make the government of Torrijos knuckle under," Torrijos
"does not waste any opportunity to reaffirm his position" of
"no concessions." It quoted Torrijos as saying that "all this
will find us either standing up or dead, but never down on our
knees before the United States."
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.CONFIDENTIAL .FBIS TRENDS
?19 -JANUARY 1972
Cuban media had charged .in tl#e past that -the .CZA was .involved in
Torrijos' rise to power-An a.military coup-..on -11,-October .1i)68.
They viewed his military junta as yet -another group-.of "gorillas
in power," fully identified with..U.S. interests, and saw the
advent of his regime as presaging "greater -Yankee. meddling in
Latin American politics." Havana asserted in 1968 that the
"key" to the coup was that the United States- a certain
atmosphere of tranquility to get the new..canal.treaties signed"
and implied that Torrijos was handpicked .by the United .States
to accomplish that goal. In December-1969-..Havana radio -commented
that Torrijos, "following instructions from the .United States, is
prefabricating in Panama a 'representative democracy' which suits
the interests of the imperialists."
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(ONFIDENTIAL FlilS TRENDS
19 JANUARY 1972
MIDDLE EAST
USSR ASSAILS U,S1 MILITARY AID. "SECRET AGREEMENT' WITH ISRAEL
Low-key Soviet propaganda on the Middle East continues to assail
the United States for the decision on further Phantom deliveries
to Israel, and now seizes on the U.S. "admission" of "another
secret agreement" with Israel, the November memorandum of under-
standing on the production in Israel of U.S.-designed military
equipment. The American actions are uniformly characterized as
confirming U.S. support of Israel's "expansionist' policy" and
constituting further obstacles to a peaceful settlement in the
Middle East. Israel's recent incursions: into Lebanon are cited
by Shakhov in a foreign-language commentary on, the 14th as one
consequence of the U.S.-Israeli "military alliance," and a
commentary in Arabic on the 15th claims that Tel Aviv, "encouraged
by Washington," has started to carry out expansionist plans
against southern Lebanon.
Comment takes passing note of Jarring's renewed efforts to find
a political solution. Domestic service: commentator Ryzhikov on
the 13th, for example, observed that such efforts are "more than
timely," and Demchenko said in the 19 January PRAVDA that there
is a "realistic opportunity" for beginning to settle the crisis
and Jarring's mission "may facilitate this task." Moscow does
not raise the issue of any role by the Security Council permanent
members other than to denounce Peking's refusal. to participate
with the other powers in seeking a settlement.. There is no
further publicity for the Soviet proposals'for.a Mideast settle-
ment after a brief flurry of attention. highlighted-by .Primakov's
5 January PRAVDA article, seemingly only an exercise to recall
Moscow's past initiative and confirm its continuing validity.
U.S.-ISRAELI In addition to continuing complaints against
MEMORANDUM further U.S. Phantom deliveries *o Israel,
Moscow promptly exploits the 14 January New
York TIMES report, and State Department. confirmation, of the
1 November signing of a U.S.-Israeli memorandum:.of understanding
on the production in Israel of U.S.-designed-defense equipment.*
* In November Moscow had picked up. reports--emanating from an
11 November speech by Senator Dole--on the U.S.-Israeli memorandum,
charging that it coincided with stepped-up military preparations
by Israel.
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CON 10I1)V, N'1'IAL Ir1111U 'I'Ul?NI)11
11J 1ANUARY 19/l
Kepor. t.ing tli a TIMES story, TAUh on Lite 1.4th e 1 so c 1. ted the Utete
Department npokunmun an nnying the memorandum enV.lsahes the trana-
Cur or American LuCitnicetl data and technical. expertlae essential
for i lie manul'uctur.a of it number of types of weapons, It said he
"admitted" that the United h1tates took this step in Lite interest
or strengthening Israel's military potential. observing that the
State Department had confirmed resumption of U.S.-Inr.nell talks
on additional aircraft to Tel Aviv, a Shekhov foreign-language
commentary on the 14th asserted that "Nl:son ptasanted the matter
as though lie was reluctant, but was compelled under the pressure
of public opinion" to permit new arms supplies to Israel-. A
kyzhikov domestic service commentary on the 15th, declaring that
the Administration has decided to provide Israel with its own
base for the production of "heavy offensive weapons," warned
that a decision of this sort could so anger Arab public opinion
that the United States might lose what influence it still had
in Cairo and other Arab capitals.
The TASS-reviewed Uemchenko article in 1'KAVDA on the 19th, summing
up the "new American-Israeli collusion," concluded that the United
States has passed "from 'mediation' and 'quiet diplomacy' to overt
l.elp to Israel and stronger hostility" toward the Arabs.
f'o)Itical settlement, not "rearmament of the Israeli aggressor,"
is a guarantee for reestablishing peace, Demchenko declared.
Noting Egyptian reaction, TASS on the 18th reported the Egyptian
Government spokesman's statement characterizing the U.S.-Israeli
agreement as evidence of new U.S. hostility toward the Arabs.
TASS cited the Egyptian statement as saying "this change in the
U.S. Government policy" came after the secret agreement with
Israel on manufacture of American arms in Israel "with no
limitations being imposed on mutual commitments and responsi-
bility." On the 19th TASS reported Egyptian President as-Sadat
as telling an expanded meeting of the new Egyptian cabinet* the
previous day that the U.S. decision "to.establish a war industry"
in Israel is a dangerous new step, and that the United States
"has become one of the sides opposed to us."
* Moscow has given little attention to the formation of the new
Egyptian "confrontation cabinet" announced on the 17th. Congratu-
lations from Kosygin to new Prime Minister 'Aziz Sidqi and from
Gromyko to new Foreign Minister Murad Ghalib were reported by
TASS on the 18th.
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("I 114P 1I111,14T I Al, 1'11111 11t1;NIH1
111 JANUARY 1 v l J
P(141 P', Moat ow feIled to take mite of I4Q6retary Rogers'
11It)PaVIIW atknowledgmpnt, In respunse to a rluestioo in hip
5 January AI{t; Interview, that the balance of
fort as In the HIdd le Last has Hot pitiftttd in the Egyptians'
favor The TASS account on the fith said only that. "without
offering any weighty arguments," Secretary Rogers ",)usttflad"
the U S. deciplon to grant additional consignments of Phantoms
to Israel. And .!r, Arabic-language commentary on the ith,
touching on the Secretary's interview, also failed to mention
his remark, citing him only as saying that the United States
did not. want to leave an impression with the Arabs that it was
encouraging Israel to continue the aggression.
The omissions are the more noteworthy in view of TASS' treatment
of Egyptian ['resident ae-Sadat'p 13 January address to the
nation In which he made repeated references to Rogers' remark;
such Soviet evasiveness might reflect Egyptian arguments with
Moscow on the issue of military supplies. Thus while as-Sadat
attributed to Rogers the remark that the United States will
supply Israel with more Phantoms even though the balance of
power is in favor of Israel, 'LASS merely reported as-Sadat as
a4,ying that Secretary Rogers declared the United States would
have delivered t:.e planes to Israel "in any event."
AS-SADAT The TASS account of as-Sadat's address also ignored
ADDRESS his statement that "continuous earnant negotiations"
are taking place between Cairo and Moscow "at the
highest level." and his subsequent stress that the "decision in
this battle in our decision and not anybody else's." Nor did
it mention his decision in December to postpone the battle
because of the Indian-Pakistani conflict which "also became a
battle between the major powers which actually affects our battle."
Predictably, TASS did single out as-Sadat's reaffirmation of
Egyptian acceptance of Resolution 242 and.readiness to cooperate
with Jarring in achieving a peaceful settlement. (In keeping
with Moscow's continued portrayal of the Egyptians as seeking a
political solution, TASS on the 7th cited AL-ANRAM chief editor
ltaykal as "replying to those calling for military action" by
pointing out the importance of continued quzsts for a political
settlement.)
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L f 41 DENT IAI P111fi 1urNIi.1
114 JANIIAHY 1141'l.
5(NILt There is tits aubanquent publicity for the (Soviet
PROPOSALS proposals on a Middle East settlement following
the brief flurry of mentions in late December..
early January, which seemingly only served to remind the public,
both domestic and foreign, of this Soviet initiative after. its
tong absence from view. Aupecte of the plan were first briefly
recounted in a Maslov domestic service commentary on 18 December;
subsequently, t'rimakov discussed the plan In the domestic service
commentators' roundtable on the 19th, a few days later in a
foreign-language commentary, and, more fully, in the 5 January
t'RAVDA. Belyayev did make a passing reference to the Soviet
plan In the commentators' roundtable on 9 January, but with no
details. In this period, the only other available discussion
of the substance of the proposals came in an article by Uevatov
in NEW TIK;;S No. 52.
Atypically, the English-language edition of NEW TIMES has Usvatov
calling for Israeli withdrawal from "the sizeable part" of Arab
territory captured in the six-(!ay war. But the Russian-language
edition of the weekly, however, calls routinely for withdrawal
from "the extensive (obshirnikh] territories" seized by Israel.
Moscow has not boon known t:; hint at any territorial adjustment.
Calls for withdrawal from "all" occupied territory have been
common to elite statements and routine. propaganda, although
Moscow at times, without any apparent significance, simply urges
withdrawal from occupied territories, in the mp'aner of Security
Council Resolution 242.
MOSCOW LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN AGAINST WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS
Moscow mounts a new anti-Zionist effort to counter the 28th World
Zionist Congress which opened in Jerusalem on the 18th. But the
campaign so far shows no sign of assuming the proportions of past
anti-Zionist endeavors, such as those in May 1971 at the time of
the trial of the Leningrad hijacl'ers, in February 1971 during the
Brussels conference on Soviet Jewry, or in March 1970 when Moscow
incorporated an anti-Zionist campaign into its extensive protests
against "criminal" Israeli actions following Israel's 12 February
bombing of the UAR metal works at Abu Zabal.*
* The anti-Zionist material accounted for 4.6 percent of total
broadcast comment during the peak week of publicity on each of
these three occasions. The present campaign accounted for only
0.7 percent of total comment in the week ending 16 January. (See
the TRENDS of 4, 11, 18, and 25 March 1970 for discussions of
the anti-Zionist campaign at that time.)
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CONPtMMMSNT1AL IN1S 114tNDU
19 JANUARY 1912
The _drr@nt campaign wao inaugurated on 13 January with a public
meeting in Moscow which, as reported by TABS, adopted an open
letter to the public of all countries protesting "flionist crime,'
and the "no-called" World Zionist Congrasu in Israel. whose "chief
motive force" is anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. Speeches
by Soviet citizens at the meeting were summed up by 'PASS and
some were later singled out for individual publicity by the agency.
The open letter set the tone for letters to Moscow papers by
Soviet citizens supporting the protest meeting, denouncing
"Zionist slander" of the Soviet Union, and affirming the equal
rights and productive lives of Soviet Jews. but while 'PASS
reports letters in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, VECIIERNYAYA MOSKVA, and
SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, theta are no iddications that such tatters
have arpaared in the major papers. PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA
ROSSIYA, And TRUD nil carried proc:ast letters from "citizens
of Jewish nationality" during the March 1970 campaign, which
extended for some four weeks and was highlighted by a Moscow
press conference held by Soviet Jews,
Press attention to the congress is keynoted by a Bolshakov
article in the 16 January PRAVDA assailing international Zionism
for an "anti-Soviet campaign under the entirely false slogan of
'defending Soviet Jews' from the 'official anti-Semitism' which
allegedly exists in the Soviet Union." Bolshakov denounces
the "varied anti-Soviet measures" drawn up by Zionist organizations
in a number of capitalist countries, including those of the "most
active" organization, that of the American Zionists. He accuses
the Zionists of trying to "complicate Soviet-American relations"
and to create "anti-Soviet moods" in the United States and other
capitalist countries. And he alleges that these actions "have
the blessing of influential forces in U.S. ruling circles."
TASS press reviews on the 18th mention articles in other Moscow
papers "exposing the anti-Soviet aims" of the World Zionist Congress.
And TASS summarizes a Korneyev article in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA on the 18th charging that international Zionism is not
only a "reactionary racist-nationalistic ideology of the big Jewish
bourgeoisie" but also an "interconnected system of super-
monopolies." Korneyev claims that Zionism, military business, and
"the imperialist military" in the capitalist countries act
jointly in support of Israel's expansion, step up the arms
race, and aggravate international tension.
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c,ONI I UIN'I' I Al, 11111H '114ItN11S
19 JANIJAIRY 1.972
An JZVIt811YA article on 18th, as reviewed by 'PASS and in
Itnglish- linguaga broadcasts, linked the I4Chauar affair, -the
expulsion of U.S. Represdntative Schauer from the USSR on the
15th for alleged misconduct--with the Zionist congress. Tha
paper claimed that Congressman 3clleuar and hall, members of a
delegation visiting the USSR to study the education system,
had "triad to collect slanderous information to send to Israel
to the so-called World Zionist Congress,"
Concurrently, ~joscow continuer to underline the disenchantment
of Soviet Jews who emigrated to Israel and now desire to return,
'PASS on the llth reviews a LITERATURNAYA GAZE'CA report that lpttars
have been received by "competent Soviet organs" from over 1,500
Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who had left for Israel,
requesting permission to coma back. While Soviet propaganda in
recent monjths has guardedly and defensively acknowledged the
fact of itmigration to Israel, it insists that few Soviet Jewish
citizens wish to leave and that the USSR cannot "supply Israel with
soldiers."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONY I UItN'f I. At, lit I II '1'ItlEN0H
19 JANUARY 1911
- 142 -
AAPSJ CONFERENCE
CAIRO GATHERING RE$TRA,INED IN STANCE TOWARD ABSENT CHINESE
'ftie Influence of the absent People's Radublic of China was clearly
in evidence at the long-delayed fifth conference of the Afro-Asian
Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), hold in Cairo 10-13 January.
Vounded in 1957, AAI'SO's last conference had been held in Winneba,
Ghana, in May 1965 and was marked by bitter Sino-Soviet polemics.*
The Cairo conference, against the background of Paking'o newly
emerging role in international affairs, wad generally restrained.
Open attacks on the Chinese in Soviet comment on the gathering
went beyond what was said on the conference floor or in the
conference documents. Seeking in its propaganda to picture an
essentially harmonious gathering of Afro-Asian nations, grateful
for Soviet help and wary of the Chinese, Moscow glossed over ':he
single most contentious issue--the question of admission of the
new state of Bangladesh to AAPSO, which tita conference decided
to shelve for the time being in evident i.~.arenca to Chinese
sensibilities. Peking media so far have ignored the Cairo meet'.ng.
BANGLADESH ISSUE In daily accounts of the .onference proceedings,
including summaries of the delegates' speeches,
Moscow departed only once from its portrayal of a prevailing
atmosphere of harmony when TASS on the 12th reported "a debate" in
the organizational committee "on the question of admission of the
Bangladesh delegation to AAPSO." TASS added that "proceeding
from the interests of keseping the full unanimity of views of the
member organizations on this matter, the committee recommended that
the conference authorize the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat to finally
decide within one or two months" on the admission of Bangladesh.
* In the wake of the 1965 conference, KWANGMING DAILY said that
despite Soviet, Mongolian, and Indian opposition, the conferees had
decided to hold "the fifth" AAPSO conference in Peking in 1967. Moscow
media ignored this alleged decision and instead publicized Soviet support
at Winneba for Cuba's proposal to hold the "next" conference in Havana
with the participation of three continents. The "second Bandung"
Afro-Asian conference, scheduled for November 1965 in Algiers,
was postponed under the threat of a Chi?..tese boycott if the USSR
were invited.
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C(fl VIDINTIAI I'llill 'HWNUll
1'') JANUAIIY 1912
The !loviet accounts include(! no details or the delthwenti.ona that
led up to the eOft ntttee's decision against immed!:ate at1BllaA.l.on
of Bangladesh, which the Cairo MINA said resulted from a rioel
vote in which the Soviet delegation was in the minority. Nor did
Moscow mention that the I'akistani delegate walked out of the
conference on the 11th, in protest against the presence or the
Bangladesh delegate, despite strenuous efforts by the head of
the Arab Republic of Egypt delegation to persuade him to stay.
Predictably, Moscow also failed to mention the Bangladesh delegate's
expressed hope, reported by MINA, that "through Afro-Asian efforts
the Chinese leaders will change their stand regarding our country."
Moscow's pique over the failure of its efforts to get Bangladesh
admitted to AAI'SO may be mirrored in an article in the 18 January
PRAVDA by the paper's Lagos correspondent Zenovich. Chinese
propaganda, Zenovich says, "with its striving to please bc,th
nationalism and the leftist groups, disorients in some degree
certain groups in the African liberation movement and sows
discord" in this novement. As summarized in a TASS report, which
does not mention the Cairo conference, the article remarks that
"solidarity of Peking and Washiligton in the India-Pakistan
conflict had a sobering effect on those in Africa who were
taken in by the slogans of Maoist propaganda about Chinese support
for liberation struggles."
ATTACKS ON PEKING Conference delegates lavishly praised the
assistance given by the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries to national liberation movements but
did not go beyond veiled references to "imperialist" efforts to
split national liberation forces. Brezhnev's 9 January message
of greetings to the conference similarly warned against "imperialist"
efforts aimed at "splitting and weakening the unity of anti-
imperialist forces," and the chief Soviet delegate, Armenian
CP First Secretary Anton Kochinyan, confined himself to a plea
for strengthening "solidarity among all the forces of the world
revolutionary movement."
But comment on the conference in Mosr..w media was typified by
Soltan's remark, in a talk first broadcast to Africa, that
"the Peking leadership willingly helps" the imperialists, who
"place their faith essentially on dissension and splitting" of
the anti-imperialist force3. Soltan also mentioned "the Chinese
leadership's treason" against the liberation struggle. The
Moscow domestic service roundtable show on the 16th included
a charge of "betrayal" against the Peking leadership, with an
added thrust to the effect that "it is no coincidence that Mao
Tse-tung and his group" are kindly regarded in imperialist capitals.
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CONYIflI1TIAL I'lltH Tt11Mt)8
19 JANUAIIY 1972
A broadcnat to Mandarin over the purportedly unofficial Radio
fears and Programs on the 11th claimed that "many delegates"
of the "more than 70" Afro-Asian solidarity committees
rppraaantad at Cairo were "indignant over the Chinese leaders'
hoattle ntnnu toward the national liberation movements of the
peopten of vartoua countries."
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CUNT+1.1)INTIAt, 1'HIS '114I NI1i1
19 JANUARY 1972
TOPIC I;! BRIEF
GHANA CCIJP
Moscow media have been at pains to indicate a r.endineuu for normal
relations with the new military regime, headed by Colonel Ignatius
Kuti Achaampong, which took over in Ghana in a bloodless coup on
13 January during the absence in England of Premier Bueia. In a
succession of factual reports of the government change, carried in
Soviet media since early on the 13th, TASS an the 17th highlighted
Col. Achunmpong'a statement to foreign diplomats that day that
the now regime would adhere to "the principles of nonalinement and
positive neutrality," combat "colonial domination," reject the
"dialog" policy, and transfer power to a democratically elected
government "as soon as circumstances permit." The day before,
TASS had reported, also without comment, that the ruling National
Redemption Council would govern by decrees which have the force
of law.
Peking media have not so far mentioned the coup in Ghana, but
the .PRC's closest friend in Africa, Tanzania, has denounced it.
The Dar es Salaam daily NATIONALIST commented on the 14th that
the coup was merely one "imperialist master" taking over from
another, adding that any regime which started off with a summary
condemnation of the socialist program of former President Kwa'ne
Nkrumah was no good to Africa.
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