TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 5, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~I
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
5 APRIL 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 14)
0875R000300050014-5
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18. sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP l
Eulud.d from awanrelic
dernprd(np end
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dedeviihaliee
CONFIDENTIAL,
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 APRIL 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV, Front Hail Achievements in "Big Offensive" South of DMZ .
1
Hanoi Protests Air Strikes Over DRV, Claims Two B-52's Downed .
4
DRV Foreign Minister Scores Paris "Sabotage," Lauds Diplomacy .
7
PRC Foreign Ministry Assails U.S. Suspension of Paris Talks . .
10
Peking Reports "Fierce Attacks" Launched in South Vietnam . . .
12
USSR Routinely Notes Paris Talks Suspension, Military Actions .
13
CEMA-EEC
Brezhnev Remarks on Cooperation Draw Cautious Followup . . . .
17
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
Media Reticent on Grechko Visit to Belgrade . . . . ... . . . .
21
Yugoslav Official Hails Outcome of Economic Talks . . . . . . .
21
ITALIAN CP CONGRESS
International Issues Overshadowed by Domestic Politics. . . . .
23
CHINA
Hsieh Funeral Sheds Little Light on Leadership Picture . . . .
31
"Rehabilitated" Chao Tzu-yang Returns to Provincial Bailiwick .
32
Crackdown on Young Ukrainian Writers Meets Resistance . . . . .
34
Agriculture Ministry Shifts Hint Possible Reorganization . . .
36
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
North Vietnam Concludes Series of Annual Aid Agreements
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
5 APRIL 1972
Moscow (2742 items)
Peking (1392 items)
AUCCTU 15th Congress
(47%)
13%
Domestic Issues
(31%)
34%
[Brezhnev Speech
(26%)
8%]
[Hsieh !'u-chih's
(--)
5%]
CPSU 24th Congress
(--)
12%
Death
Anniversary
Indochina
(35%)
30%
China
(4%)
5%
[Paris Talks
(--)
12%]
Middle East
(5%)
4%
Suspension
Venus 8 Launching
(--)
4%
[FUNK Anniversary
(23%)
8%]
Indochina
(7%)
3%
[POW Week in U.S.
(--)
5%]
[Paris Talks
(--)
1%]
[DRV National
(--)
3%]
Suspension
Finnish CP Congress
(--)
2%
Assembly Session
Maltese Prime Minister
(--)
4%
Polish Elections
(0.1%)
2%
in PRC
Egyptian Government
(3%)
3%
Delegation in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic inc international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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5 APRIL 1972
INDOCHINA
Hanoi and Front media waited until 3 April to acknowledge the
massive scope of the communist offensive below the. demilitarized
zone (DMZ) which began on 30 March. Reviewing the first five
days of the "big offensive," the media claimed that 6,500 allied
troops had been put out of action. Editorials published in the
Hanoi press on 4 April acclaim "victories" in the fighting in
Quang Tri and maintain that the communists are in a new
advantageous position. Press articles in the papers on the 5th
stress that the"disintegratiod'of Saigon's armed forces
demonstrates failure of the Vietnamization policy.
A 5 April editorial in NHAN DAN assails the United States for
brandishing the threat of "massive retaliatory air strikes"
against the DRV in the face of the "powerful attacks" of the
"People's Liberation Armed Forces." Recent U.S. air strikes
have prompted a flurry of protests at the routine level of the
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. And Hanoi claims to have downed
two B-52's, one on 2 April and one on the 4th.
Hanoi and the Front have continued to assail the 23 March U.S.
action in indefinitely suspending the weekly Paris session.
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his diplomatic report to
the DRV National Assembly session, complained that barely two
months after it had announced the "so-called" eight-point peace
plan, the Nixon Administration "brazenly declared the indefinite
suspension" of the Paris talks.
Peking issued a foreign ministry statement on 31 March denouncing
the U.S. suspension of the Paris talks and containing he first
official Chinese attack on the Nixon Administration by name-since
the. President's trip. But while sharpening its criticism of the
United.States, Peking did not take the occasion to reaffirm its
support for the Vietnam war effort. Peking's coverage of.the
communist offensive in Vietnam has consisted of NCNA reports on the
"fierce attacks" launched 'y the communists and accounts of the
4 April Hanoi editorials.
Moscow continues to denounce the United States' suspension of its
participation in the weekly Paris talks with minimal routine comment
and, unlike Peking, has issued no official statement. Moscow has
publicized the current communist offensive chiefly in news reports,
with scant comment at the routine level.
DRV, FRONT HAIL ACHIEVEMENTS IN "BIG OFFENSIVE" SOUTH OF DMZ
Hanoi and Front media initially referred to the fighting in Quang
Tri only in cryptic battle reports, beginning on 31 March, which
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noted that many positions were being attacked. The extent of
the fighting was first acknowledged on 3 April in a lengthy
report on the action since 30 March which labeled the attacks
a "big offensive" and tallied alleged allied losses in the
first five days. This report, carried in both Hanoi and Front
media, claimed that nearly 5,500 allied troops were "wiped out"
and more than 1,000 captured; it said 13 positions were razed,
45 aircraft shot down or destroyed, and 100 tanks or armored
cars captured or destroyed.*
The 3 April report on the fighting noted that the offensive
was launched against positions along Highways 9 and 1 and that
it began with heavy artillery attacks, followed by "simultaneous
and powerful assaults" on many positions by infantry and
armored units. Five ARVN brigades, regiments, and armored
squadrons were listed as having been put out of action or
"decimated." Most notably, the report claimed that on 2 April
"the bulk" of the 56th Regiment of the ARVN 3d Division,
including the commander and deputy commander and many officers,
"revolted and crossed over to the people."
The report on the fighting also said that there was a "people's
uprising," that many militia units and all the popular defense
forces defected, and that 100,000 people in "concentration
camps"--presumably refugee camps--"rose up to eize control."
A 4 April.Front commentary, which describes the Quang Tri
"victories" as "strategically significant," claims that the.
"uprising" of the people in the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area "has
become a sharp offensive prong which caused the disintegration
of the bulk of the enemy local military strength, including
dozens of 'civil guard' companies and hundreds of 'popular
defense' platoons." The commentary, carried by LPA and
Liberation Radio, alleges that "tens of thousands" of people
in Cam Lo and Gio Linh districts rose up simultaneously,
surrounded -enemy posts, smashed the enemy coercive machine,"
called cn Saigon troops to revolt, and joined the PLAF.
* During the Lar.+ Son 719 operation last year the communist
tally of alleged allied troop losses topped 6,500 only after
about a month of fighting. Total allied troop losses in the
Lam Son.operation in Laos and South Vietnam, according to the
communist figures, amounted to almost 23,000 men. At the time
of the nationwide Tet offensive in 1968, the crmm'mists
claimed to have "wiped out" 50,000 allied troops in the first
six days of attacks.
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NMAN DAN's 4 April editorial hails achievements in the fighting
in.South.Vietnam and echoes recent Hanoi discussions of the
military.situation* in its optimistic assertion that "the balance
of forces has now changed; we are strong while the enemy is
.weak. We have the initiative while he is on the defensive.
We. are. on the upswing while he is declining." The QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN editorial of the 4th suggests the attacks to date are
an opening stage of an offensive when it praises the "great,
initial victories" on the Tri-Thien battlefront.
IMPACT ON ARVN, Hanoi and Front propaganda uniformly portrays
VIETNAMIZATION the Quang Tri offensive as a major blow to
Vietnamization and claims that the fighting
demonstrates the inability of the ARVN to perform as the
backbone-of Vietnamization. Sarcastical?.y alluding to President
Nixon's.24..March press conference, the 4 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial--as carried by VNA--asserts that the South Vietnamese
lines "have not only 'bent.' as Nixon has had the foresight
to predict; they have, in fact, been broken through and smashed
by chunks." Hanoi radio reported the editorial as claiming that
the.ARVN 3d Division was "routed," and the VNA press review--
.but no other available version--says the editorial also observes
that the ARVN is "disintegrating even faster than it did in
southern Laos last year."
The alleged defection of the 3d Division's 56th.Regiment is
highlighted throughout Hanoi and Front comment on the.fighting
.and is characterized in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial as
"unprecedented." The "disintegration" of the ARVN is-discussed
in 5 April-articles in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,
.with.the army paper again stressing the significance of the
56th Regiment's "antiwar action" and explaining that although
such.actions have occurred in the past, there has never-been
.one.involving.so many officers and men. The example of the
56th Regiment. is alio cited in a 4 April appeal for defections,
issued by the Tri-Thien front PLAF cotnnand and broadcast by
* Claims that the communists' military position had improved
were made by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and other
leaders.in.speeches at the 20-25 March meeting of the DRV
National Assembly, and this theme was the focus of a 24 March
article.by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor)
which. stressed the importance of using the.regular forces to
launch major attacks. See the 29 March TRENDS, pages 8-11.
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Liberation Radio, which claims that "compatriots and patriotic
troops in all places are rising and coordinating with the
liberation armed forces in annihilating the enemy and liberating
the country."
Several commentaries recall the PRG's 10-point statement of
policies toward elements associated with the Saigon government,
released on 25 January, which reiterated the communists'
long-standing policy of welcoming defectors.* The .5 April
NHAN DAN col.amentary on the ARVN reaffirms many of the points
in the PRG's statement and maintains that these policies have
:'exerted a deep and broad influence on the majority of the
Saigon army men and all strata of our people in the South."
It claims that, as a result, some 70,000 military personnel
have deserted in Nam Bo (the southern part of South Vietnam)
and some 40,000 in central Trung Bo (the northern portion
.of the country.) In urging further defections, NHAN DAN
stresses the unity of interests among Vietnamese, even asserting
that. the "majority" of people in the Saigon army and
administration are "men of conscience" who "know more clearly
than. anyone the U.S.-Thieu clique's barbarous crimes and the
rottenness of its barbarous regime." This line was anticipated
last December in a speech on the NFLSV anniversary by Front
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who maintained that "among the
Vietnamese people, except for a handful of warlike and dictatorial
people.in the Thieu clique, everything can oe discussed and
settled-on the basis of national concord, so that the war may
soon be ended and peace restored . . . ."
HANOI PROTESTS AIR STRIKES OVER DRV. CLAIMS TWO B-52'S DOWNED
Recent U.S. strikes in the demilitarized zone have been protested
in a series of statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman.
But judging from the VNA account, the attacks were not mentioned
in-the 5 April NHAN DAY editorial, which decried the notion that
U.S. bombing of the North might be renewed in retaliation for
the communist offensive in South Vietnam. The editorial, which
also. dismissed as "an illusion" the possibility that air power
can "stall the march" of the "resistance," came on the heels of
a 4 April Hanoi report citing Westerr press speculation about
retaliatory air strikes.
* The 10-point statement is discussed in the 2 February TRENDS,
pages 21-23.
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The latest of the foreign ministry spokesman's protests, on
.4 April,.charged that on 2-3 April U.S. planes struck "a
number.of populated areas in Vinh Linh special zone" and that
..U.S. warships shelled several villages "north of the 17th
.parallel." The statement reiterated the claim, first made
in a Hanoi radio broadcast on 2 April, that a B-52 had been
downed over Vinh Linh that day. On the 5th Hanoi claimed that
another B-52 had been downed the preceding day over the same
area. These, along with three. planes said to be downed on
1 April-over Vinh Linh, brought Hanoi's tally of U.S. planes
downed over. the North to 3,451. VNA on the 5th also carried
a detailed account of the alleged 2 April B-52 downing,
describing. the use of radar to track the plane and of missiles
to shoot it down.*
The 4 April foreign ministry spokesman's protest used somec?ihat
stronger-language than other recent protests when it said that
the Vietnamese people "are determined to punish-the U.S.
imperialists. properly" and "crush all their military adventures."
The spokesman added. that the foreign ministry "sternly condemns
these grave acts" and "resolutely demands that the United States
immediately-and definitely stop all acts of encroachment on
DRV sovereignty and security."
Earlier.foreign ministry-spokesman's statements---on 2 April,
31 March, and 24 March--also focused-on alleged strikes in the
DMZ but. condemned them as "acts of war" and did not characterize
them. as."grave" as the protest on the 4th did. The 2 April
protest.condemned U.S. air and naval strikes on that day.
against."Vinh Tan and Vinh Giang villages inside the DMZ on.
.DRV territory." The statement on 31 March denounced "recent
acts of war of the U.S." from 27 to 30 March, charging that
U.S. artillery south of the DMZ and warship off the coast had
fired on.several.villages north of the 17th parallel. And the
spokesman on the 24th charged that U.S. artillery south of the
* Hanoi has claimed to have downed B-52's on seven occasions
prior to the current period, but this is the first time it has
directly attributed a downing to the use of missiles. The
last such alleged dow,iing, on 17 March 1971, was said to have
been the result of "multilevel and widespread antial.rcraft
fire." (See the TRENDS of 24 March 1971, page 12.) All-of
Hanoi's claims to have downed B-52's have been dented by U.S.
spokesmen.
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DMZ had shelled Vinh Son, Vinh Thanh, and Vinh Giang villages
"inside.tbe DMZ on DRV territory." It also claimed 1.hat U.S.
planes "attacked a number of places in Quang Binh Province on
23 March."
U.S. action against the North prompted comment from-the military
paper.QUAN.DOI NHAN DAN. and. from Hanoi radio in addition to.
the standard protests. A QUAN DOI NUAN DAN commentary on.the
3d, setting the tee of the comment, charged..that.the U.S.
"frenzied.war acts" are intended to "pressure" the armed forces,
"dampen" their fighting spirit, -raise the "sagging ..morale" of
the "mercenaries" in the South, and improve the-battlefield.
situation to allow Vietnamizacion to proceed. -Charging the
"Nixon clique" with.being as "stubborn and bellicose as. ever,"
the paper also condemned the United States f.,r "sabotaging the
Paris conference" and said the "Nixon clique" is "clamoring for
a massive retaliatory air strike" against the North. The
commentary.concluded with the stock warning.that.''the more
stubbornly the-Nixon clique expands the aggressive war and the
more-frenziedly it embarks on its military adventures, the.more
humiliating-setbacks it will suffer, and finally it will be
totally defeated."
Propaganda on the U.S. strikes uniformly praised the Vinh Linh
people and . armed forces for "heightening their vigilance" to
fight.well and be combat-ready, and.an editorial in QUAN DOI
NHAN.DANon.l April was.devoted.to lauding the-forces in.the
southern part of the DRV--the 4th Military Region--as the "steel
net of the North." The editorial asserted that "the offensive
position of our army and people is at present undergoing new
developments" and added that "the 4th Military Regio:- is bringing.
its strength to the service of the front and is also ready to
defeat all the U.S. aggressors' acts of war."
AIR FORCE ANNIVERSARY The seventh anniversary of Vietnam
People's Air Force (VPAF) Tradition
Day was observed on 3 April in Hanoi radio broadcasts summarizing
the VPAF's achievements and current activities. The.anniversary
comment recalled "the first-feat of arms" of the.VPAF, on
3 April 1965, when two'U.S. planes were downed by MIG's over
North Vietnam. The occasion has been noted over the years in a
variety of ways. Editorials commemorated the event in 1966,
1968, 1969, and 1970.
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DRV FOREIGN MINISTER SCORES PARIS "SABOTAGE," LAUDS DIPLOMACY
Hanoi radio on 30 and 31 March broadcast in installments Foreign
Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's diplomatic report at the second
session of the DRV's Fourth National Assembly, held from 20 to
25 March. While the media reported that Premier Pham Van Dong
delivered his political report to the session on the 20th,* the
date of Trinh's report has never been specified. After assailing
the U.S. Vietnamization policy, Trinh said that the United States
"had remained very stubborn" at the Paris talks. In the course
of reviewing communist initiatives for a peace settlement since
the 8 May 1969 10-point proposal, he said cryptically that the
diplomatic offensive was continued in 1971 when on 26 June the
DRV "put forth its nine-point solution and on 1 July the PRG put
forth its seven-point solution." In subsequently castigating the
President for "unilaterally publicizing the contents" of private
U.S.-DRV meetings, he did not directly acknowledge that-the nine-
point proposal was involved.
Trinh prefaced his reference to private U.S.-DRV meetings with a
reiteration of Hanoi's line that the important thing is the
substance of negotiations, not the forum, and that the DRV had
acceded to the U.S. request for private meetings with the PRG's
"complete agreement." The foreign minister claimed to see "more
proof of the Nixon Administration's stubbornness and perfidy" in
the scenario since 25 January. Condemning the revelations about
the private talks, Trinh said that while the President announced
the U.S. "so-called" eight-point peace plan, "barely two months
later the Administration brazenly declared an indefinite
suspension of the Paris talks." In language similar to that of
the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of 28 March, he said "these
acts undermine talks between the United States and the DRV" and
added: "yet the President said he intended to move the talks
off dead center."
At the same time that Hanoi was publicizing Trinh's speech, other
DRV comment continued to castigate the U.S. delegation's
announcement at the 23 March Paris session that it would agree
to meet when there was an indication that serious negotiations
could take place. The media reported that Xuan Thuy and Mme.
Binh met separately with French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann,
on 30 and 31 March respectively. The VNA accounts of both meetings
* See the TRENDS of 29 March 1972, pages 5-7.
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cited the communist leaders as "condemning" the President's
decision and reported Schumann as having expressed his regret
at the suspension of the talks. The report on the meeting with
Xuan Thuy--carried by VNA on the 31st--additionally quoted
Schumann as saying that "current events continue to substantiate
General de Gaulle's speech made in Phnom Penh [on 1 September
1966], and that is the reason why the French Government is
pursuing and will pursue the application of the principles
enunciated in that speech."
VNA and LPA on 5 April reported the proposals made the day
before by both the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris that the
148th session be held on the 6th "at the usual time." Vietnamese
communist media have not been heard to report that Ambassador
Porter is in the United States for consultations.
TRINH ON BIG In his diplomatic report to the National
POWER RELATIONS Assembly, Trinh was critical of U.S. policy
and the President in broad terms as well as
in the specific context of negotiations. Thus, he said that "all
the deceptive statements and perfidious maneuvers of President
Nixon cannot conceal tr.e aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism."
And he repeated the stock line that "U.S. imperialism has been
and remains the number one and most dangerous enemy of all
nations." There was no indication that these remarks were made
with the President's recent China visit in mind, and Trinh in
fact seemed to profess satisfaction with the present situation.
Declaring that "we are very glad to see that our international
activities in 1971 achieved great results in every respect,"
he said:
The U.S. imperialists have tried to split the socialist
countries and separate our country from them to escape
their difficulties and serve Vietnamization and the Nixon
Doctrine in Indochina. Although the international
situation is complex, the socialist countries continued
to support our people's policies, their objectives and
their determination to fight, to support the PRG's seven-
point solution and the two key problems that were
clarified, and have given our people great, valuable,
and effective military and economic assistance so that
we can completely defeat the U.S. aggressors and restore
and develop the economy of the socialist North.
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In it Later passage Trinh did refer to the Nixon Administration's
"perfldlouH" political activities and diplomatic maneuvers in
order to carry out its scheme to weaken Indochinese solidarity
and "to limit the support and assistance given by the socialist
camp. . . ." He went on to declare that "our motto" is to
perotut in the line of independence and self-reliance of the
party and state and "unceasingly strengthen solidarity with the
Sovli't Union, China and the other socialist countries. . , 01 White Trinh was circumspect about the relations among the big
powers, Front propaganda as late as 31 March continued to quote,
without attribution, from the Sino-U.S. communique and from the
President's speeches in China.* Moreover, an article in the
March issue of HOC TAP--which of course would have been written
betoro Trinh's speech--paralleled earlier Hanoi press comment,
beginning on 3 March, in its Jibes at Sino-U.S. relations. Trinh's
report now is similar in tone to his major article in the October
Issue of HOC TAP. The article had seemed to point up the fact
that the bRV leaders had made a decision to end their vitriolic
July-August propaganda diatribe against Peking, It contained
pointed references to the "correct" nature of the DRV's
diplomatic line, but it stressed that the continued aid and
support from the "brotherly socialist countries" was a "heavy
blow" at U.S. attempts "to sow discord between our country and
the brotherly courtries."
* Ar, explicit mention of the President's China trip appeared in
a 23 March Hanoi broadcast in English for American servicemen in
South Vietnam. Presenting excerpts of a purported interview with
a POW, Captain James Dickerson Cutter, the broadcast quoted
Cutter as saying "I was hoping with the peace talks and with
Nixon's--President Nixon's visit to China . . . possibly the war
would be over." The only known explicit reference to the
President's trip in Hanoi domestic media was in the November
issue of a journal of the Propaganda and Training Department,
THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS.) Also in November, an
English-language Front transmission had cited an American's
reference to the visit.
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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSAILS U1S1 SUS!!NSION OF PARIS TALKS
Reacting to the U.S. suspension of the Paris Vietnam talks,
Peking Issued a foreign ministry statement on 31 March containing
the first official attack on the Nixon Administration by name
since the President's China visit and questioning Washington's
interest in a negotiated settlement. But while sharpening its
criticism of the United States, Peking did not take the occasion
to reaffirm its support for the Vietnam war effort as such.
The Chinese statement, seconding foreign ministry statements
issued by the DRV and the PRG on 28 and 29 March respectively,
represents the third official criticism of Washington's Indochina
policies since the President's visit to Peking. On 16 March a
PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman seconded the Sihanouk government's
condemnation of Saigon's military operation in Cambodia, and on
the 10th a PRC Foreign Ministry statement supported a DRV
denunciation of U.S. air strikes. The 31 March statement was
accompanied on the same day by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article, also pegged to suspension of the Paris talks. The
question of a Vietnam settlement also figured in a Commentator
article on the 30th and a companion NCNA report dated the 29th
deriding the U.S. "National Week of Concern" for prisoners of
war. Peking's most recent previous statement on a Vietnam
settlement had been the 4 February PRC Government statement in
support of the PRG's 2 February statement rejecting President
Nixon's eight-point proposal and elaborating on its own seven-
point plan.*
The current Chinese statement contains elements critical of
Washington not present in the 10 and 16 March statements. Thus,
it questions U.S. professions of interest in a peace settlement,
complaining that although the United States has "tiresomely
boasted" about its desire for a negotiated settlement, "its
deeds are totally different from its words." The statement does
not attack the President's eight-point proposal, as had a
19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement denouncing U.S. air
* The latter plan, first announced on 1 July 1971, had been
endorsed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial three days later, Peking's
first such prompt endorsement of a Vietnam peace proposal.
Earlier Vietnamese initiatives had been acknowledged only belatedly
by Peking, and the first Chinese endorsement of proposals dating
back to May 1969 did not come until December 1970.
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strikes on the eve of the President's visit, but it chides the
United States for having "refused to accept" the PRG's
seven points and having "obstinately insisted upon its
truculent terms which virtually demand that the Vietnamese
people accept a compromise and surrender." The statement
criticizes the United States for stepping up Vietnamization,
a point omitted in the 10 March statement but appearing in the
one of 19 February.
The statement makes Peking's first official attack on the
Administration by name since the President's visit when,,*charges
that "the Nixon Government" has "brazenly and unilaterally
declared the indefinite suspension of the Paris talks, thus
laying bare the falsehood of so-called readiness of the United
States to hold 'serious' discussions." The statement concludes
with demands that the United States "stop its war of aggression
in all its forms," end the Vietnamization program, stop
"sabotaging" the Paris talks, and "honestly accept" the PRG's
seven points and elaboration of its "two key points." But
though the Chinese statement expresses "resolute support"
for the 28 and 29 March Vietnamese communist statements--citing
them as reiterating the communists' stand on a Vietnam settle-
ment and expressing a determination to pursue the war until
complete victory--it offers no explicit Chinese pledge of
support for the war effort. Peking'e other recent statements
on Vietnam, including the 4 February government statement on
the peace proposals as well as statements pegged to military
actions, have reaffirmed Chinese support for the war. The
4 February statement, like the one on 31 March, said the United
States has bought to gain at the conference table what it could
not achieve on the battlefield, but the earlier statement had
gone on to reiterate Peking's commitment to the war effort in
forceful terms, calling this "an unshakable established policy"
and "an unshirkable internationalist duty."
The 31 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Com-*.;:ntator article, unlike the
foreign ministry statement, did not name the Nixon Administration
in attacking "U.S. imperialism" for its "truculent and
unreasonable move" of suspending the Paris talks. Charging
that the United States has resorted to "various devices" in the
talks to reject the communist side's "reasonable proposals" and
has tried to hinder the talks while pressing Vietnamization and
stepping up the bombing, Commentator concluded by supporting the
PRG's seven points and elaboration as "the correct way to solve
the Vietnam question."
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The 30 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the U.S.
weak of concern for POW's derided the observance as a "trick"
to deceive world opinion and dampen the antiwar protest at
home. Asserting that the POW question is "only part of the
Vietnam question," Commentator said that the "correct way to
solve the Vietnam question, the POW question included," is
the PRG's seven points and elaboration. If the U.S.
Government really wants to settle the Vietnam conflict,
according to Commentator, it must conduct "serious
negotiations" with the PRG and DRV and "give serious
consideration to and accept the reasonable and logical
proposals" of the PRG.
The companion NCNA report of the POW week, unlike the
Commentator article, mentioned the President and members
of the Administration by name and made a rare reference to
the U.S. presidential elections--a subject on which the
Chinese have been silent. NCNA scorned the observance of the
week as a "sheer political fraud" designed to delude the
public, adding that this cannot enlist "popular support for
Nixon in the coming presidential elections."
PEKING REPORTS "FIERCE ATTACKS" IAUNCHED IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Apart from a brief reference to the first day of attacks in an
NCNA dispatch on 1 April, Peking's coverage of the communist
offensive in South Vietnam has consisted of an NCNA report on
the 4th and pickups of Vietnamese communist comment and
reportage on the same day. The 4 April NCNA report said the
PLAF had launched "fierce attacks" in Quang Tri Province and
"badly battered" the enemy, compelling him to "retreat
helter-skelter." NCNA noted that the United States conducted
"wanton bombings" in support of the Saigon troops and
threatened retaliatory air strikes against the DRV. The report
cited the Western press as having described the current
offensive as the "supreme test" of the Vietnamization policy.
Also on the 4th, NCNA carried an account of the NHAN DAN and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the offensive and disseminated
a detailed report of the fighting through the 3d based on LPA.
The report ended by noting that the fighting "is still going
on." NCNA also carried a brief report attributed to VNA on the
alleged downing of a B-52 in the Vinh Linh area.
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USSR ROUTINELY NOTES PARIS TALKS SUSPENSION, MILITARY ACTIONS
M1.ni.ma.1., routine Moscow comment continues to denounce the United
Slates' suspension of :Lts participation :In the weekly Paris talks
and to claim that tho action demonstrates U.S. intent to seek a
"military HoiutIon" In Indochina. Commentaries assailing the
suspension in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on 29 March were restricted
mainly to citations of critical foreign press reactions and
highlighted the "week of concern for POW's" observed in the
United States In connection with the suspension at Paris. PRAVI)A
briefly played the theme of Sino-U.,. collusion when It observed
that the U.S. act of "sabotage" was undertaken moon after.
President Nixon's visit to the PRC. On the 30th TASS mentioned
that Ambassador. Porter had left Paris for. "consultations" at
home.
TASS as usual promptly summarized the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry
statements on the suspension, issued respectively on 28 and
29 March. But unlike Peking, Moscow did not issue an official
statement of its own. While it has not been Moscow's normal
past practice to issue official statements on developments
relating to the Paris talks, the USSR did issue a government
statement on the PRG's 2 February elaboration.* Some kind of
authcrltative Moscow response to the U.S. move in Paris might
have been expected in that the DRV Foreign Ministry atatemeant of
the 28th Included an appeal to the governments and peo,les in
the "fraternal socialist countries, peace- and just ice-1,v1'g
countries, the American and world people" to "condemn the sabotage
of the Paris talks." This passage was notably absent from TASS'
28 March summary of the DRV statement, published in PRAVDA on the
30th.
* Moscow's official support of the 2 February PRG statement--
denouncing President Nixon's eight-point peace plan and "elatoraaing"
on its own seven-point proposal--came belatedly in the 11 February
Soviet Government statement. Moscow endorsed the PRG's seven-point
proposal, announced by Mme. Binh at the 1 July Paris session,
with only a PRAVDA editorial on the Sth. The Soviet Government
statement came at a time when there were indications of strain in
Soviet-DRV relations. The day it reported the statement, TASS
also reported that Kosygin had received the DRV ambassador for
talks in an atmosphere of friendship and "comradely frankness," a
characterization reflecting failure to achieve an accord. The TASS
report appeared in PRAVDA the next day, but Hanoi media never
reported the meeting.
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Mwweow'H fi,iluro to Issue a supporting statement was made the
more conspicuous by TASS' acknowledgment, in a 31 March report
of French Foroign Minloter Schumann'e meeting with Mme. Binh,
that Schumann had promised French help in getting the talks
ranumed. And VNA Implicitly recognized the absence of Soviet
official reaction when it noted, in the 5 April press review,
that the URV press reported protests raised against "Nixon's
Nnbotage of the Paris conference" by the "public" in the Soviet
Union, Poland, and Bulgaria.
COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE Moscow media began citing VNA reports of
IN SOUTH VIETNAM heavy fighting in the northern provinces
of South Vietnam as early.as 31 March.
By 2 April, the media were picturing an "onslaught" by the
"patriots." TASS reported on the 4th that a "large-scale
offensive" by the "patriots," mainly in the northern provinces,
had caused "panic" among the Saigon troops, adding that Thieu
had gone to the front to "boost the morale of his troops" and
that the United States had intensified air strikes or, the
"liberated areas" of Scuth Vietnam. Other Moscow reports have
noted that the Saigon troops are getting support from American
aircraft, including B-52's.
On 4 April TASS reported that President Nixon met with Secretaries
Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moorer and that Kissinger called a
meeting of the "Special Action Group." TASS did not acknowledge
that the meetings were held to discuss the new communist
offensive, merely saying that the participants "discussed
the situation in Vietnam." TASS briefly quoted White House
press spokesman Ziegler as saying that the United States "left
oper. its options" as to the course of action it might follow.
"Local observers," it said, link the "aggravation of the situation
in Vietnam" with the U.S. "sabotage" of the Paris talks and with
the escalation of the air raids in Indochina. A report from
PRAVDA's Washington correspondent on the consultations among the
U.S. officials, carried in the Moscow domestic service on 5 April,
said It was felt in the U.S. capital that the "present major
successes" of the South Vientamese patriots had placed the
Vietnamization plan "in real jcopardy." The correspondent said
the decisions adopted during the high-level U.S. conferences had
been kept secret, but he added that "the Washington press no
longer mentions the scaling down of the war."
A Moscow radio commentary in English on 3 April did not mention
the offensive in South Vietnam when it charged that the United
States has embarked on a "new stage" in its air war against the
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DRV, using the "full strength of its bomber force" against the
northern part of the DMZ and the southern provinces of the DRV.
The commentary noted the use of B-52's, the convergence of four
aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the dispatch of
additional squadrons to American bases in South Vietnam. It
cited "circles close to General Abrams' headquarters" as
indicating that "it is planned to escalate the war even further."
The commentator assessed this as an element in Washington's
attempts to achieve a "military victory" in Vietnam, another
element of which was the attempt to "torpedo" the Paris talks
by refusing to take part in them.
SOVIET AID The issue of Suviet aid has not been highlighted
in Moscow's comment on the current military action.*
The only available explicit reference to Soviet aid in comment on
the offensive in South Vietnam came in a 3 April commentary by
Penchenko, widely broadcast in foreign languages, which said that
the Indochinese peoples' struggle "is always supported by the
Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community"
and recalled that the participants in the Warsaw Pact Political
Consultative Committee meeting in Prague last January had confirmed
their pledge to continue giving "all necessary aid" to the
Indochinese peoples. The commentary asserted that "our people
see it as the fulfillment of their internationalist duty."
A 3 April Moscow commentary in English on the suspension of the
Paris talks and intensified U.S. bombing--not mentioning the
current offensive--noted in a similar vein that the Soviet people
consider it "their internationalist duty" to help the Indochinese.
And the 29 March IZVESTIYA article condemning U.S. suspension of
participation in the Paris talks rt_alled Brezhnev'sassertion,
in his 20 March AUCCTU congress speech, that the USSR considers
aid to the Indochinese peoples to be its "international duty."
* In remarks which may take an added significance in retrospect,
in the light of recent developments, Podgornyy declared in a speech
at the 4 October 1971 rally during his Hanoi visit that "the
modern arms and modern war materials in the skillful hands of the
heroic combatants of the VPA, of the Vietnamese patriots, play an
important role in delivering thunder blows at the aggressors."
Podgornyy declared in the same speech that "the liberation
movement of the Indochinese peoples has been so successful that
the future victory is already in sight, and the day of victory
is not far off."
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TASS on the 3d briefly reported the downing of the B-52 claimed
by Hanoi on 2 April, but Moscow omitted this claim `rom summaries
of the 4 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and
there has been no Soviet comment on the alleged downing. When
Hanoi claimed for the first time that it had downed a B-52, in
September 1967, some Moscow comment had linked the exploit with
Soviet air-defense assistance.
The matter of Soviet aid was raised in a brief 3 April Moscow
domestic service report of the Hanoi observance of DRV Air
Force Day, the anniversary of the day in 1965 when the first
military aircraft manned by Vietnamese took off to intercept
U.S. planes. Moscow radio's Hanoi correspondent reported that
a DRV pilot, in an interview on the anniversary, praised the
"Soviet-made MIG's" and expressed gratitude for Soviet solidarity.
Over the years Moscow has periodically publicized its supply
of military aircraft to the DRV and its training of DRV pilots.
The Soviet military delegation led ky Marshal Batitskiy which
had paid a "friendship" visit to the DRV on the eve of the
offensive, a visit well publicized by Hanoi, was virtually
ignored in Moscow media. PRAVDA and RED STAR on 28 March
published S'ASS' report, transmitted the previous day, which
briefly cited the DRV Defense Ministry's announcement of the
delegation's arrival in the DRV. Soviet media are not known
to have reported the delegation's departure from Hanoi,
reported by VNA on the 28th, but RED STAR on the 29th carried a
summary of the NHAN DAN editorial greetir the delegation.
Like Hanoi's other publicity for the visit, the editorial
was couched in platitudes and generalities, essentially
devoid of substance, and contained the usual expression of
gratitude for Soviet economic and military aid.
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5 APRIL. 19,.e
CEMA-EEC
BREZHNEV REMARKS ON COOPERATION DRAW CAUTIOUS FOLLWWUP
Brezhnev's watershed remarks in his trade union speech of
20 March on the Common Market ab part of "the actually existing
situation in Western Europe" have been followed up cautiously
and in low key in the media of the Soviet Union and its East
European allies. Routine-level Soviet radio commentaries
have ignored the subject. But the importance of Brezhnev's
remarks was pointed up for readers of PRAVDA in a 23 March
article by the paper's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov, reviewed
by TASS but not broadcast by Radio Moscow. Hungary's Premier
Fock indicated upon his return home from a trip to Moscow that
the EEC and the Common Market had been among the subjects of
his talks with Brezhnev, and the Prague agricultural daily
expanded at some length on the desirabi)ity of expanded trade
between members of the two economic groupings. Bucharest's
predictably cautious reaction has conveyed obvious satisfaction
at the Soviet leader's remarks.
ZHUC')V IN PRAVDA Zhukov's PRAVDA article expounded on "the
need for developing economic relations on
an equal footing between socialist and capitalist countries,"
picking up the thrust of Brezhnev's statement that "our relations
with the participants" in the EEC will depend on the extent to
which they, in turn, will "recognize the realities in the
socialist part of Europe" and the interests of the CEMA member
states in p-rticular. Brezhnev added: "We are for equality in
economic relations and against discrimination." Zhukov declared:
The USSR's position on "mutually advantageous trade" between
countries of opposing systems "remains unchanged," a point
"mentioned" by Brezhnev in the trade union congress speech.
Zhukov was at same pains to portray the situation as one in
which the Western economic partners are the petitioners and
the CEMA countries are responsive and receptive, but firm in
their resolve to uphold their interests. Thus the article
devoted considerable s, ace to development of an analogy between
the situation in 1922, when financial crises allegedly forced
the Western capitalist countries to negotiate for the first
time with the Soviet Union, and the "dollar crisis" situation
;.oday which "is forcing the capitalists to make another 'dramatic
review' of the restrictions on economic ties with thc. USSR and
the other socialist countries." Such tra('e, Zhukov reiterated,
must be on an equal basis, free of "discriminatory" practices.
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CONlr I DENT I At, tell IN 'I'lI4NUN
'i A1110 1, I, 1972
LASS (114 I)IMJI)I Hruzlinwv'a 20 March remarks burn u:rmarku of
an effort to ruussure anti cncourngu tle IIrIIntIt-
Scheel cunt It itm In West Germany during ilia Bttndestog dtabate over
ratification of thu I'KG's Moscow and WarHHw trtant Iwss 'T'hus the
Scivlut Iund-rr prufnced tits runutrks in mutual recognition of
realities with it dunlttl of the cl',nrgu--ralnr_d by Bonn opponuntti
of rut I l teat ion of the trtint ics--that Moscow's 1Suropunn policy
was aimed at i.tndurminIng Lite I;I;C. Pr'Jlctnbly, Soviet mud En on
the 21st gavo prompt publicity to Brandt's reactive continent to
the effect. that the Common Market "must, for itp part, take into
account thy' Interests of the CEMA member states"--I direct. pickup
of language used by Brezhnev.
BUDAPEST Hungary, which over the post year tens evinced
special interest to expanding its trade with
Western Europe, seemed notably receptive to Brezhnev's remarks.
The party dally NEPSZABADSAG, reviewing the Soviet lender's
speech on 21 March, characterized hid statements on the Common
Market and CEMA no an admonition to the West to "abandon the
policy of division and seek out openings for cooperation with
the economic organization of the whole socialist community."
Hungarian Premier Pock, in an airport statement on the :.9th on
his return from Momr ow, noted that his talks with Brezhnev had
dealt with "the joint interests of the socialist countries,
CEMA, the EEC, and other quertions." Budapest out not Moscow
media reported this statement, and the formal joint communique
on the talks did not mention eccnomic relations.
PRAGUE The most detailed discussion in the media so
far has come from Prague--in an article in the
agricultural daily Z EMEDELSKE NOVINY of 30 March by Jan Celak,
which carried forward the theme of Brezhnev's remarks without
specifically mentioning his speech. Where the Soviet leader had
carefully confined himself to broaching the possibility of
relations between the "participants" and "members" of the two
economic grcupings, Celak saw prospects for the development of
trade relations "of CEKA as a whole" as well as of Czechoslovakia
In particular with the developed capitalist countries.
The CEMA countries' "main" trading partners, Celak said, were the
European capitalist states "and the two great integrated economic
groupings: the EEC and EFTA." He cited the Soviet Union, the
GDR, and Czechoslovakia as the leaders in trade with the
capitalist countries, "while Polish trade with the capitalist
countries grew somewhat more slowly, and Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Romania expanded" such trade relations "more rapidly." Celak
viewed the possibilities for further trade development as limited
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only by such "remnants of the cold war" as trade embargoes and
discriminatory customs barriers aimed at "isolating the socialist
world," noting approvingly at the same time that "part of the
EEC state's have already eased important restrictions" on certain
goods from the socialist countries.
The Bratislava PRAVDA on the 24th1 in a commentary on the EEC
session in Brussels, noted that Brezhnev's proposal had met with
considerable response at that meeting. And on the 28th CTK
reported Prof. Bedrich Svestka, chairman of the Czechoslovak
Committee for European Security, as remarking in general terms
at a Prague meeting that "when discussing the problems of
economic cooperation in Europe, we will strive for 'rulen of
decent behavior' in international economic relations and equality
in antra-European trade."
BUCHAREST Romanian media picked up Brezhnev's remarks with
clear enthusiasm but predictable caution. There
had been no public Bucharest acknowledgment of Romania's
application to the EEC, three weeks prior to Brezhnev's speech,
for special consideration as a developing country that could
export goods to Common Market countries without paying duty.
The party ,-3rgan SCINTEIA on 26 March, noting world attention
to Brezhnev's statement that the USSR was by no means ignoring
the existence of the EEC in Europe, went on to endorse the
notion that the EEC "is a European reality and must be taken into
account in any realistic policy." Staying carefully within
Brezhnev's terms of reference but injecting a characteristically
Romanian flavor, the paper added that this
of course presupposes that the members of this group will
take into account the interests of nonmember countries,
that they will renounce restrictions and discriminatory
practices in relations with other countries, and that they
will create favorable conditions for extensive trade on an
equal base and with respect for national sovereignty and
mutual advantage among all nations on the European continent
regardless of their sociopolitical systems.
In the same international chronicle, prefaced by the customary
assurance of consistent Romanian concern for strengthening
cooperation and friendship with the socialist states, SCINTEIA
reported the U.S. visit of a delegation of the Romanian Economic
Council led by Manea Manescu and its reception by President Nixon.
The trip, the article said, was "in keeping with the requirements
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of progress in the present world detente" and in harmony with
Romania's policy of developing "relations of cooperation in
varicus fields with all the states of the world, regardless
of social systems, based on equal rights and mutual advantage."
BACKGROUND ON Pronouncements by the CEMA summit meetings
CEMA'S POSITION in the post-Khrushchev era have contained at
the most only brief, general passages on the
subject of trade relations with the capitalist countries. The
voluminous, long-range integration program adopted by the 25th
CEMA session in Bucharest in July 1971 included a brief statement
to the effect that the CEMA countries, in line with peaceful
coexistence, would "continue to develop eccnomic, scientific,
and technical ties with other countries, irrespective of their
social and state systems," with special attention to st.:h
cooperation with the developing countries. The communique on
that session stated that the CEMA member states would continue
expanding economic and scientific-technical ties with the
developing countries "and with the developed capitalist states."
The last top-level Soviet policy statement on the Common Market
dates back to Khrushchev's article in the September 1962 issue
of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, which stressed the need
for economic integration of the socialist countries under CEMA
to counter alleged invidious Western designs against the bloc.
Khrushchev refrained from any suggestion of rapptoche-nent
between the EEC and CEMA, instead drawing on the communique of
the June 1962 CEMA summit meeting in Moscow which proposed the
formation of a worldwide international trade organization
outside the two groupings. However, while granting the
desirability of economic cooperation with the capitalist
countries, '.hrushchev emphasized that "the imperialists are
particularly bent on pooling their forces," an aim which in
his view had to be countered by integration of the socialist
economies.
The June 1962 meeting's proposal was reiterated at the July
1963 CEMA summit--the last to be held before Khrushchev's
downfall. The subject was dropped thereafter, and the CEMA
summit meeting in 1966, the first in the post-Khrushchev
period, said nothing at all about trade with the capitalist
world.
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- 21 -
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
MEDIA RETICENT ON GRECHKO VISIT TO BELGRADE
Judging by the reticence of Soviet and Yugoslav media, Soviet
Defense Minister Grechko's 27 March - 1 April visit to
Yugoslavia appears to have achieved minimal results. TASS and
TANJUG, in brief reports 'arried respectively in PRAVDA and in
the Belgrade BORBA and POLITIKA, note merely that Grechko was
received by Tito at Brioni and had "a friendly conversation" with
him. In the pattern of earlier, cryptic reports on the Soviet
delegation's activities, neither TASS nor TANJUG provide any hint
of topics discussed at the meeting--which may have been purely
ceremonial--or of Grechko's talks with Yugoslav military officials.
Following the meeting with Tito, the Soviet delegation was feted
at a reception hosted by Soviet Ambassador Stepakov and attended
by Grechko's Yugoslav counterpart, Ljubicic, as well as by Marko
Nikezic, Serbian party chief and League Presidium member.
A brief TANJUG report on Grechko's departure on 1 April states
that the Soviet delegation visited Skopje and Dubrovnik in
addition to Belgrade and inspected some units of the Yugoslav
army. TASS reports the Soviet delegation's return to Moscow
tersely: "USSR Defense Minister Grechko has returned from
Belgrade to Moscow today. He was on an official visit of friend-
ship to Yugoslavia."
The reticence on the part of both Soviet and Yugoslav media
appears against the background of Western press speculation that
the Soviet Union might use the visit to revive a request for
the use of Yugoslav ports for its Mediterranean fleet and for
overflight privileges--speculation the Yugoslavs seemed anxious
to lay to rest. In a broadcast on the day Grechko arrived, Radio
Zagreb's chief political commentator, Milika Sundic, vehemently
denied that Grechko would make any demands for base privileges.
YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL HAILS OUTCOME OF ECONOMIC TALKS
Following the 27 March - 3 April Moscow session of the Soviet-
Yugoslav committee for economic cooperation, TANJUG reported
Yugoslav delegation head Mirjana Krstinic as hailing the
"successful" outcome of the talks which she said had imptoved
prospects for "long-term economic cooperation" between the
two countries. The official communique on the committee session,
signed by Krstinic and Soviet Deputy Premier Nuvikov, made no
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CONFIDENTIAL Flits TKIINfl L
5 APRIL .191J
mention of Soviet credits for the Yugoslavs and generally uvuul.1ei1
specifics. But Kretinic, in comments to Yugoslav correspondonta
in Moscow, said that "in the next three months Yugosluv and
Soviet government delegations will draw up concrete pr.oposala
for mutual delivery of raw materials as well an for the develop-
ment of credits for specific branches of the Yugoslav economy."
But she added that such credits--for the machine-construction,
power generation and supply, and ferrous and nonferrous metallusKY
industries--would not go into effect "until after 1975."
In effect underscoring the redirection of Yugoslavia's trade
toward the Soviet bloc in the past year, Kretinic said that trade
between the two countries reached 600 million dollars in 1971, a
20-percent increase over 1970. She added optimistically that the
two sides envisage a record total trade of four billion dollars
during the 1971-75 period. In the area of industrial cooperation,
she said the two sides agreed that such cooperation would begin
with the building of several leather factories and one furniture
factory by Yugoslav construction enterprises and would also
include the construction of two hotels on the Black Sea, She
made no mention of Soviet construction projects in Yugoslavia.
According to an accord reached in principle, she said, there
would be a 2.5-percent annual increase in the number of Soviet
tourists traveling to Yugoslavia, bringing the total to 100,000
by 1975.
J
According to the official communique on the committee session,
as reported by TASS and TANJUG, the two sides decided to eotablls?t
a permanent commission for cooperation in machine-building and a
number of unspecified "working groups" for economic branches.
The communique also noted that the two sides examined a "broad
field of problems in the sphere of trade expansion and economic
cooperation." TASS reported that Premier Kosygin received
Kretinic on the 3d and that their talks on "tht: furt0er develop-
ment of trade and economic cooperation passed in a warm and
friendly atmosphere."
CONFIDENTIAL
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c;c)NFFII)IrN'I'IAI, F'BI:S 'T'RENDS
5 APRIL 1.972
- 23 -
I CAI IAN CP CONGRESS
1144 t l()PAL ISSUES ONERFRAI)OWED BY DOMESTIC POLITICS
1ho ollvlalvp undercurrents In the international communist
*svpmont were clearly overshadowed by domestic political concerns
oil flip 11th Italian Communist Party (PCI) Congress, held in Milan
11--11 March.* llsing the congress as a platform to launch their
Ampalan for the 7-8 May parliamentary elections, called by
hrpalllont. Leone on 28 February, the Italian communist leaders
amuRht repeatedly to emphasize the PCI's readiness to enter into
a rfIiltlon government of the left as a fully independent,
rpat,"nalblp national party free of foreign control, capable of
bringing about a "democratic change" in Italian politics. Led by
newly elected General Secretary Berlinguer in his keynote address
"n the 13th, the PCI lenders sought to portray the party to the
Italian electorate an a viable alternative to the "swing to the
tight." With that end in view, they endeavored to keep the
congrvan focused on dommatic politics and to mute contentious
I"aupa In the International movement.
Thin preoccupation with domestic concerns was reflected in the
"mall number of foreign speakers at the congress. Only eight
'If some 50 foreign delegations were permitted to address the
Assembinge: Soviet Politburo member Grishin, the North Vietnan
and NfLSV delegates, French CP Politburo member Billoux, East
German Politburo member Axen, and the Yugoslav, Chilean, and
Spanish communist parties' representatives.
While Berlinguer presented a guarded statement of PCI views on
International issues, Soviet Politburo member Grishin weighed
In with a strong attack on the Chinese. Other Soviet bloc
representatives were more restrained on the China issue in their
congress speeches, although the Bulgarian delegate strongly
denounced the PRC leaders in a speech outside the congress hall.
Materials on the congress, including texts of speeches by
foreign as well as Italian delegates, are compiled in supplements
to the Latin America and West Europe FBIS DAILY REPORT entitled
"13th Italian Communist Party Congress," 3 April 1972 (No. 65,
Supplement 9) and 6 April 1972 (No. 68, Supplement.11).
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 APRIL 1972
BERLINGUER ON Where the 12th PCI Congress in February 1969
FOREIGN AFFAIRS was dominated by the PCI's condemnation of the
August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the
ex post facto Soviet justification in the guise of the "Brezhnev
doctrine," Berlinguer's keynote address--published in L'UNITA on
the 14th--set the pattern for the 13th congress by only briefly
and cautiously broaching the PCI's positions on foreign affairs.
Berlinguer used President Nixon's trip to Peking as an opening
for discussing PCI relations with the Chinese, asserting that the
visit was an "historically important defeat" for "U.S. imperialism"
and that the United States was now "seeking a relationship based
on negotiations." Pointing out that the Peking talks resulted in
a recognition of the principles of pLaceful coexistence, Berlinguer
repeated the PCI assessment of the Sino-U.S. talks as being
"positive" not only for inter-state relations but also
for the workers movement:
The fact that the Chinese comrades have again launched
the principles formulated at the Bandung conference
could objectively create certain conditions for a resump-
tion of normal relations in the socialist world and in
the international workers movement. This is a fundamental
prerequisite for the unity of the anti-imperialist forces,
in order to insure peace and also in order to give China
the role which it deserves in international life. Events
will show to what extent things will actually move in
that direction.
Charging that President Nixon hopes to use "the division between the
socialist countries, particularly that of the Sino-Soviet dispute,"
in the "interests" of the United States, Berlinguer went on to say
that a "new situation" has developed in international life which in
pa t explains the "torment of the socialist world and of the workers
and liberation movement." The PCI's "critical thinking on the
problems of socialism and the revolutionary struggle on an inter-
national scale," he said, are part of the reality that "socialism
is not an abstract model but an historical process." He continued:
This is the reason why our Judgments, even when they are
of a critical nature, are i.-..ver those of someone who remains
outside the battle. This Iii the reason for our tenacious
effort to contribute to the effort to overcome the divi-
sions in the international communist movement by pursuing
the line of unity in diversity--a line which stems from the
complexity and vastness of tasks facing the revolutionary
forces, the variety of their experiences, and hence the
need for full independence.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONPIDEN'CIAL 10118 TRENDS
5 APRIL 1972
Returning to international issues at the conclusion of 1-.I.10 report,
Berlinguer again made a careful rostatomont of PCI. views on r.ula-
tions with the international movement, reauserting the I'Ci stand
on different roads to socialism and on the Czechoslovak invasion
without directly repudiating the "Brezhnev doctrine":
Every one of our choices, every one of our prospects is
born in the full independence of our party, tested in all-
out battles and in all our political formulations. Our
principled positions supporting the full independence of
every communist party and every socialist state have been
and remain clear. These are the positions which inspired
our judgment of the Czechoslovak events in 1968 and subse-
quently. There are people who ask us, however, to prove
our independence by breaking our solidarity with the
socialist countries and the entire international workers
and revolutionary movement. We do not pursue this path,
and we never will.
Reiterating this point in categorical terms, Berlinguer said that
"nothing good for the world could come from a deepening of the
differences which separate the major socialist states; nothing good
would come to our country from the reopening of a spiral of hos-
tility toward the USSR and the European socialist states." And
this statement in turn prefa,:ed what could be read as an expression
of a desire to reestablish relations with the CCP:
When our criticism is raised, it is the criticism of those
who want to contribute positively to the development of
socialism and the unity of the international workers and
revolutionary movement. Our criticisms of a number of
political and ideological positions of the Chinese com-
rades have sprung and continue to spring from this:
Axplicit and firm criticisms, but never inspired by a
desire for excommunication or separation.
The Chinese party had been invited to the PCI congress but did not reply
to the invitation, according to Prague radio on 4 April. ?But the Abanigi party
p u b l i c l y rejected an invitation a d in a vitriolic ZERI I POPULLIT?editorial con-
demned the "revisionist" PCI.* Chinese media have not publicized
the Albanian rejection and have contipicuously ignored the PCI congress.
* See the TRENDS of 16 February, pages 48-49. See also FBIS
Special Report No. 305 of 7 March, "Spanish Communists Reestablish
Ties with Peking; Background and Ramifications," pages 12-13.
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11IN 1111 NI IAI, volt; 11141011(:
APN11 114 1,
Nago1111II I'1,1 toll I II y Inwa111 Wont riotrlllp a1NI flip 1I01m,11 "ofkof
Hot IIlikrlat an4ofIPei f1141 1110 11gIIall 4nvou?,1ata atO "a I Oslo
Fill n1-aall lot 4" ant madO a ahO( tat plod (n flip Wool P,/lt op 4t1
1 "In11111111al pat f loo anI wntketa otja11I/.nl Intla to "rfhotaf O In sur l-
n Way as (14 I Inglly nfIiievp Inntlnllr-I,a rnllahnlAtlon liefvpotl
I lip I if 1 4 aq "f I lip Vitt npOnn Wit Ir I fit r I ass: pt 4-mt-t v ( notrl I tin f I rill
oil Illit Iti1 lvpq, 41141 1111tInfe a oyafomaf i4 quOat (nt a flow 0,014llrrn
aI1Ip will) all fot.ea nr the loft, pAtti(u1Arly with flip patf foq
wIII) WItI1Ii it fnngf4foi1'a1110 nimbot nr flip workoro fir Wesf rutopo
Iflplot If y thamapIvpa.'f Thp 1'4-I It I t a I Komi) 1sit Inn ApptrlVpd by flip
r.ingtoaa, puhliaho,I in 1, 'tINITA nn rho 1At h, aI. at oil t. hat a "dow-r--
( rat If t li ngp" 11) the flat Inn Knvprnmpnt would mean "a ( offalfmo1/1
within tha l;uroppgn V.((-nt-m1( (,flpfsninlty In order to dplsnctatine
II, dpfpnd Malign national InteteaIm, and Open It to cixnppratir-n
wlih aII 4ounttlpq, and nctlf-n tr nvptcosfe th0 Opposing military
1-1 uf a " French CI' ll'CV) POI ithuro member Ili 11oum, In him congroon
appp4 ll a4 publ ighpd In I.'UNITA on the 16th, said cautiously '-nly
that broth tllp I'f;I and the 1'CV "nto aware of tl-e noevl feet contpttoil
nf.tion by the cornianimt parties in th4 Eutopean capitalist (frln-
tri(a "
TI?f_AIMLNT 114 13RAVo A PRAVDA nn 15 Match carried a long sumasari
of Nerlinguer's report which tevealp(1 Sovir-t
gensltivltiva nn issues of flip International *ovamont by oalmmi"n
and digtortion of his remarks. The account included Set'inguot's
statetnpnl that the United States wants to use the Sitio-Soviot split
In its own intetvat.a but omitted film rematka on the PCI'a critical
stand toward other parties. PRAVDA quoted Nerlfnguer's tenarks on
the independence of the PC[ and all (om unlat parties slid film mtata-
ment that the PC1 wou1 never renounce Its soiidarlty with the
socialist countries. Notably, however, it excise'' derllnguer'm
reference to the Czechoslovak events of 1968 and also omitted life
statement about the need to prevent the reopening of hostility
between the PCI and the socialist countries.
Accounts of 8erlinguer's report, as of the congress In general, In
the central press of Moscow's hardlining bloc allies were similarly
incomplete and one-sided, without exception ignoring the thrust of
his br',ef comments on the international movement. With the excep-
tion of Prague, none of the orthodox allies published any commen-
taries on the congress. Romanian and Yugoslav media, however, cltpwi
the passages on the autonomy of the PCI and Its right to make
"critical" judgments of other parties.
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+,,Itririls"1iA1 tai 7atu1,~
Ara11 7
-i%i'?~+1'? '?~'f l , ~r 7i,c i Y'?I yclc jest n at lives 11th ?"rr4'teae waa
a~airr Ic?1 i?y 1', I}1L,rr, rkavri,ci , Vilrf r,t i:t I
wi.r? ,t., a c ?rr il.c oc. nnr) ,lac,' ! t}>o rvrtaee a 1', I 'Owing to ht Icf
7a iaw c$Itrr 1N, }1, r, ~:tiahirv Ia?-n,ho'l irrtr? a dorwrrr, is
+ f, n ,.f ?t ii,t arwl lc! 1 . ,IN1,.?r t.rnle,u, qwl ant il?at f r alorrwante" arwl
1 1.0 v, erllt+lei alaw.anfe" VIfh1-r tha ,.riwa-f4v1e4 ewvorwonl
aaitcrof irrf a ?rrrc,rt IF.circ ?( this 4"wlof 1an ttgo l /.coat alp}
y. ,-r,alo, f.c ea1,1 11,0 r r'+I ??atta, has ,tact e12nif f. a-rr o tr? lira
elt?.: yic 1,? elicngI1,01r IF,c i,1o?I,III aI 'Intfq ??f tiro fta#atnal
}at Iice n a r-In, 1&4 i'44r*tat Io-r$nltt 1,aaia arc,) t? r,yn-d}natr
cff tte irr ti,c 1.10, ,?41?aI tri,atr? ..
raif ialir; r-1lohin 4cn,*an,c4 this artivfft ,f the *Plitt Iafa,
atlr,,arla tF.c },r0aanf (b$V *a Iaado-eIN }1,' fret ice r" I I I V
of got 'Iirq, 1lrc '-040 r, thr. IrwI}an e.+hr'ntl"ant qn,1 this Inite.,i
uat },?ne, addIrrs that thin r;r',I I( IV I@ Inf I Ir f Ind rA,haeidarat,I hat u,
w,f niv ft?,c }nfcroat ,?f the Chlnaa. 1,orNple I'mot IV I* f) on 1'?o
ant Ita Iov,?,ItI"naII tw?wor+,anf' awl that fh0 "anti-r.r'"Vio$left of the
r rT laa,la-a ie ru,-o Pharr ;ref a t+tn1 wo .! 'rwrlo 0-(hirwato talgtI -no
Jker?oat lr+, ti,o 1?t,? f-tu.a .'-vial f all f +t ..n'F-tw-I *n4 ft }onrllt tales
f},?;ne IatvoaTN tho Iat am +h-naee rarr,rlae. he avr+vev) th0 rlf.i''e
d0tart::ir.'t1,.n t,? rnira 1V etc=t{i?t)0 41" fi-.a facfo, Ie'*,al Of 01no
1i?.0 ,?,IIaIIN Itl,?n ,?f Pisa Mat*lot --I?anirrict dr?r"t;na t-?Ir this chlraeo
la44ata. ?
,'r, r r 'l i'r I IclatI ,-ro. r_t tohln a01,i tho-t oto "It -*4090r* I"
*vat ir??rtosairq octant" 4 rr4 ate b?atad r*n -t4arr1eln-I.Onlniem,
r t , I a t a t 1 4 r , ir,tc.tr,ati?nalian,. it r#4 the rtInrIrla r,f &,4al}tr.
irulorar-rlcyrrc, n.Illtant er Ii4aritr. arr,l Irrvaltr f' r*yt itaat rrvetturn
r a,tea ,f IIi?et at}n.. the tr`1II"ll rorrlo 1T0,t ah i' skaent frristi $l?.;a
f, tunr1a vae arrr n.art I n r f r,r??t .? tatfatonra Ir, rrthat p*t 1$ 0*
intorrwI affair a. ;'1?.a rT I rar,tr4; Craglb;ttoe tu0ttat0 t0 t",0
"riatoea ale,. n.a.r;o 3 rlaa f,t ..;t cat of irlar 7r'aIr al rrllal'.,r14t r?r,
f??otvoor, 041atr,47 fart list ??
+ r~efm0ort In? rr t ho rC I'a rlr,rypat Ir r? I I rT. t;ai?,In r*id04 a"
et.arifIr arm",?taonu0trt f I N a l`cI ptof ta1D fret ti?,O rr,a,Ittft .IerfI', --
a r.tr?,gt;m tlcntoui t -ward ..tot tt~iet~ Oathar than taronlgtIrNati'
rrIncIrlaIt . lit atatovl 1f:otc3s' that tlo0 rCi "hat ach+ia~a4 dofIfvlte
? At tl?,r th rcI ;?rrr+.stoto In ItrF,a Win rr!pt ilv d Ice dlasalaaauto
vith t'.! PCI attitri o r,,n COerhr,alr,v";a by ?*s4$r,g fait the fltaf
that a tertatar+tat i.c0 ,f loaaot .tatifts--C7?GT- L.'rvttal 1C.'e"B,Ittoo
~.ectata?T rr-'fyrvttiatV-r. l'roa.d r,f tro C i''n dspatt'w'tvt tatgM,t4tlbla
fr't tolatlr?fva vith nr,nttvll'vi cct+' ar+Ift i+attlet1-
cxw 1 iirw I Al,
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5
(trurfl/$. In9 rnf,: (al,olr;:
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f A f' ~ f };, IV ?l (VV 1 {>c of 0 fttf3IA ataillof 0,:., t I 'low,r++ l at l+ 1+rn11 HIV
fort,
aowl Icl I iar q,l ,ctrt wf iaa
Rcr Ilnkrrct In his + 1'0 1 tv(, a,idtoi~e ++n iha 17th 1$. IW toJoao) tatwl
(al ac al.e,.flgtl r In five r."-.wtywrftvtet Ito) 1411 lasso tliaI f.tIa1,1rr?0
aIN ao, i, . ' .>a t i t rtt arl o "at awo of of wot.41 "IV 111 f lip ltwiohon'lanr o o
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Jf+rt'?,'r/A.f :vr11-r-A 11 lira -1aIatat0 "( fF.4o Vital, 1)04%2 l+wak (rw1r+'trrlof
fait! /(1'(7 vas ?ho Irwraat tankIwig ,I tho
for 11,?:, -cl+taac. tat 1.100, (onttal ('wrNsittao qay c1 isfran. ilia
I wiy ararloo Iof IC. P the 4ta,+>trl vlrl'}? t+,ntintfoe to ottta.4,at0
t c l a f ( ' rye }, of wa an t i`( 1 afwl 1 1 . 4 0 , T( 7 "n 1}vo 1eo*90 4 1 $
ito
r l' r+ it r'ar (v"a3? CO 'Palot ("no wofe at!a? 0!Itatorl $rrot pf f-t I
It.c ??ngtcaa wttly I'D al tact an.) o+!Iy+rla".n ?f Italian IYsftlist iIata,
Irr' yr,g a Ft I 16hov.1,at? ft'wu (Vol -r"?aI"?naklo atwl vllh tho torr',ttIT
in tl?,a Waat "?f now, of toaf If of avrj+'vI to ",f thc. "rtatrfe ortlnt- Iv'
'fa'I,,- a i-','af/ *0',rt fy f"tr oa.
131' ar, was n"1 atu rrt tf,o fr'faItn rats; lolotatoa vies' a+idtPoe wl tl,o
r,gtcaa, }..,ft hia noaaato woo rlfl?IIaI,w} In I ?ImIIA alntllt v11h t};o
rNO te rI a't,falli 4 aIiwota4 at 1-.0 ,"n;Tooff t1'uIIA "Ir th,o 1(,fI,
Tlcfa,a.$ tfroc IOP arl',"aI,wra1r ?noetoto Vi t}?. a afgo twluont f" tho affart
t 1,4l 1 1,o rr I,t it+' it to ' f "lntatnat 1'...401 ia+r" n'.4t "In ;,r ar orf a
li*ata~rx, F,ft cvor+ rtf+wf*wl d1wottonraa awt an arl't"a,h v'.l
is f. t ?a a tt.aiaarfa" otwl that tho r(l vas /halo("to psrh) iahinrs
Il,c rjri lc lotafo?a I,athattn 101!1 off on oit1,toatlltn of }ia rotts??a
}, ~:,I r.C ?}.1.l"t a'1rzc.r,*,' lira ,ir.. rhr:I }'.416 t}'.rr?aP 1Y,.tl1 i'+t4a, }?.rt
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I?t' ar. a u,caaato Jr., 'Ia-ai float tha .1 fI-, CT17 r noose "f }lay 171--
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t,? tF.a , , rptoaa ar,5 had t" iaeaat?ln'so tc t I1?,b t-,tctPoo l"n.a1 TfaIt
a--
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w:'tf ,..rr.,.t,gr,iat lcvaa:"nittt c nrcaaata 41st3 to54rtocl
tn1"nrr~?ad tF,e Woototr, tor."tta ab,".4.411 t ,o r%ttent aft^ito of f"?that
i9,rF?re~ ?LIj''?ttatt.
A t w a 7 1p i n 7 -twl i "to t lra l :t It, . t ei,r t t ad 1'r! 11111 T11AYn, tail wn
of ;,r rtoleeui "t1,- ftatetnal aatietrrt-r ".f tlvo "r+r%let ?'ni"rr-
a f,n, he*4e4 I.?r
# n 1 i t ltti t o tsaiwbo t *41 /'teas $ e t 10"" r n r M , w h i t ed t I o
T-*v for. ) to 1 ?ehtu*ty for an "nff it 1*1 ftiendship vieff .'? On
the Rib. V1%A tepnttrd the elit"I * of -sate+arents off Hags.!'.
nr?n-tef+tnd ?I3itaty *11 to V1e10.*0, nn )rn4-tet* 1n4tys with-+f
Intotetf to VietnaN. vnd nn Innd? w1rhanie and payMentt fns 39~) ?"
it *)on tepntted that the ?$futee of the *eennd craffistenro of
the Vlotnasr-l'.niaty rrtsMloginn for econr1ic. tr-chnical, And
ar iontif is crwipetoti"n were signed by Le Th*nh light and V1co
l't,slot 1s10* iehot; the Vietlose-14yn40ty cvar-iesion had 'ttron set
up at tho tine of the eiSnitn of lost Test's tt4t.essnts. III
l*tnt*ty 1971. and held Its fittt w?etint at that tis..
V11A'* description of the agtettasents signed during the ?oKh
delegatir.n's visit ve* substantially repeated Its the joint
cc+muntque. reported by V%A on the 9th, and in $udspest
reports of the sigolo& of the atteaantmts ?'-A the joint
coasiunique--published in 111PS7AIiADSAb on the 9th and 10th.
respectively.
in various speeches and Interviews. Hun;arian spoketrrsn
elaborated to sow extent on the nature of Hungarian aid.
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art!
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vat -Ae???*od a MM'"; a& t.' Al &A that to $h. t?set I6,N!?tw
k*4 ?a?a? th- T*W -%as*tr trstet'si?. sowtflnt?hwd ptewl+trt?.
?+s?nsa.o? ?*41 ttdaAtti?T *M?410. ?c.4 ror#toT r1ifff4bmNi by +!ittwo
J I...o ;..,,.,*-tot+r ?todtt ?*teeauent? .. U. *lad', rlt&A a*? t3.?
f t?at 0 *4I fvtvto tlt"a*fr*n ofi,-ruyait ? 14 tn. the TY .
to, ov%t
7b69
oat . ?Ith+w#h $he v ?t. +s.+t lr ,w.vvt to h?ao 4n" ?- in
i..?t >?o?t'? 44teo'?,.et. ?1*t..d erg ) 1 ys"votx 1911 vltieer,
is i~A**}, a*ha carted R,,Pd?Pe?t. v? 4.or. ,be4 by VU ??
y^? #.r?tt~,s "c , r.rvoir ?twl **h$.,; Aid." $ntete?t-ft,. tr+cr*-tlta
T,? r, ?. c r ., hro y . ?( t era t i f i r ? trd t e r hn t r A 1 r 4-~sj~s t A t 1 riA .? r41
ti''4a c. F.??*c The NMrr*A-1An n.v ?*.nrs did nr*t Ptrnv$dc
rti,a it r4l f 4atstt. b',t atIit?fv .14 we* orbnonwledoed hs
1 ? ,a Fotaot ?t tt-o ?ibnlto 'ntewnns who" he Ptr+s1*.4 A11
to?I-+rothla nt11tAtM. err-M-01 . And dIplam t1t a?.1it tawe.?.
Th. bf'4?nisn-10V ?jte~nt* vete eige d on IF, T't,trh
datitt the ;-17 atcb visit to thr, DIV of a
RoWinl$n G-etttsent economic dely* tivn led by Vic? Ptesi.t
(.he-,t.he badale?cv. boti? Hanoi and Bucharest sedf? repotted
that the Aste>psents covered Nowanha's "ecntt 1c and ?$lit?ry
aid tra Vietnam for 1472. ?oade e*cNanne and p?1?eats between
the two countries cot 1972. sad the establishment of a
com1*si n for eccno?1c. ?cient.f :c . and tecbnlc?l cooperation."
The joint k-wm,nlwe inr luded ? *tailor description of the
a$ r evsen t a.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5
rr1~r;JtLis"t I At iAl~ 7ACU:
Aral; 3a7;
3b u, ~arwitai lh7( ,hrt lrta th0
eat rt.ei 'a of , ",44 woto algrto~i -n
matt t' ae~? t f e 0?war.4*" r?,~+,aifVi-ont 0, ,..n,tif;~ dalatat $in All
1.p ae4,.laa,,, 4,.j j. atdc? net,) #1,;1o eaiaarraMa ,nwarad
.,,,. 0Of?rrwlei~70 01111ett -,14 Oro; t,e1wla 6tr01tert00 ecwl pav*010
f,,t 1971 t'uA ale,, vin t0,1 twos On etta0+rant ,.n I,?ena flit 1071
van al0naul, vhi;0 a bgf,hsroat tap,.rt tofottovd 161410 tonota111v
t,. an a?wt,wat, eataawrant Ries 1067, h,?th atdoa havo
a,rrt,00040a.4 that Ilia enra,el eat0ewtonta 1n, 1,00 Military as
vra l l a? a, ?-+t,e+rl, a t4
A.. t 4lA A llaV r_,Wartw66nt a, "s'vsI, dolata$ in la,I ht, t71r0
Minlater "( r"falgn Ttada uthioar P. 1-tf, vi.:twl
Alt.anta ft,+w *7 tn. )4 11-ai.1Sar and alma?f attoaaDn1o (vin the
114 vht,h TIT*"* 4oartihPI as ,imp? lrra -11100f It 'fa aid" to Ilia
T1 V fret 1071 and 2,1-1a atrharoa and Iavuanta. V)iA'a mallet
dae,tflit fnn e1orIf#0vd "a,nn,vaIf - a14. Tho last ontatal aid
attooAront with Alf onto WOO 0112n+4 In dtannt In (lrtobot 1910
by AttV oinlatot of ilia i`taw1et'a tiff i,v Ttnn Htnt lair and rho
Alhanlan aahasaadnr . At rnrdina to VILA. It ptovldovd for
"lint;-taf.itr4 er~:uvWlr aid" flit 1971. Tha hoed of a ARV Pro" u1i
dalatatto" visitina Thane had aignod an agtooriant. on aid Lf
1ErYvarihat 1969. and tho toapor t iva embsoosAnto elgnod In 1967
.
and 1944. ioo Thanh light attnod the aa-oowante In Titans In 1964
r'!I-,A V%A topnt t avi on 1 lanrfaty that "a;to4MOnt on Cwbs's
ernnrvsir a$4 to Vlotnaw for 1972" and "other dnrt,MOnts
nn go,vda e>rr hanao and pavnont e" were atoned in 10 Aec Pahet
In llerane by viett int IDIV Vlro N1niefot of Tntolgn Trade %Rtivon
chanh and rho t.rban fntolgn t-ado antatof. teat yost'a
aatopoont on fi,bs's "nr+n-rofnnd 0"Inuslir 414 to Vietnam and
a ptntornl on avr.de axrhanao" for 1971 wee aIKned In Nanod on
20 ta',isty 1971 by the ARV Nlnlatot of Totolgn Trade and a
vteltInS (-when vivo iminlatot of 'rotalgn trade. Slatlar
agt,+osonts had hewn ol*ned alternately in Havana and Hanoi In
t cvI n-o vests.
W7-r,,ryLIA On 1 January VILA ropottod that V-11tburo ,ember and
Viro Prc' Icr Nguyen Duy TrInh received the Mongolian
ambnonador to thank the Mongolian Gcnfernwent for "the economic
aid granted to the ARV in 1972." and on the snot day VNA reported
A NUN DAN article thanking Mongolia for It. "non-refund economic
aid to Vietnam in 1972." There is no available report of when.
vhere, or by whoa the agreement was signed. Similar reports of
Vietnamese gratitude vert the only reports available in January
1971, although the assistance then was described as also including
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5
I IVM$ 111CWI 1Al I 10P1111C
A1'~'1 t"!)
,*%i11taty aid '? Itad.+ a*toow,onta void $ha ,only a,i,0111V
al.a, If $. a1 IT taiwttod itr 1040 , 1bs,11, alwl 1061. 1,411 111 1;*1p
,Of** WNAU IiA11 a1a? f-tairoof a ")afoot m NnNtjtnIIa'a pi ntw+iwIi
aftd 001111atit a161 (n VIa#To* ** /ol4nt10417 htOwteht (tIm Pt Oft lat
Tdadolthal by a H44n4141 tan ft iorwlahiit 40 10K0 t fc+/r 1 a Thatch
Il*hi vlaitod K%V*10 fs it) 11144 a-w1 of*ttaf so" a*,o Pnt (.4t
??n "n tofsttwlahlo 1wAtot 1af aid ??
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050014-5