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July 26, 1972
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,~ '.~rSTATSREC 1 ~ ~*~,~ 4 ~q ~ t ~f:~~~~85T00875R1~(~~Ot~l~l~~0-7 26 JULY 1972 PEKING MARKS GENEVA ANNIVERSARIES CONDEMNS BOMBING OF DIKES For the ~aecond successive year, following a f ive-year absence of authori-.ative comment on the occasion, Peking has marked the 20 July anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreeme-~ts on Indochina with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial endorsing a negotiated settlement. As last, year's anniversary editorial came in tho wake of Peking's prompt endorsement of the PRG's seven-point peace plan, this year's has appeared at a time when Peking has been calling for an agreement that would enable the Vietnamese parties to reach an accommodation .Free of outside involvement. Consistent with this approach, the editorial focused on the issue of a coalition government ae the basis for a Vietnam settlement. At the same time the editorial again pledged Chinese rear area support for the communist war effort so long as the fighting continues. The editorial also took brief note of the 10th anniversary of the 23 July 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, an anniversary which was not mentioned in lust year's editoria:' and was last marked authoritatively on the fifth anniversary ii': 1967. In marking the two anniversaries, Peking has replayed statements from its Indochinese allies and reported a film show at the DRV embassy on the l9th which was attended by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. Also during this period Peking's increased attention to charges Chat U.S. planes are attacking North Vi~;tnam's dikes was highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 25th supporting DRV protests. However, while lending its voice to the condemnatio:~, Peking carefully limited the target of its criticism and avoided raising broader issues. VIETNAM SETTLEMENT This year's editorial on the Geneva anniversary was more carefully tailored in expressing support for the Vietnamese communists' negotiating position than was last year's offer of "firm and full support" for the PRG's seven points. Thus, in the only explicit endorse- ment of the PRG plan, the editorial observed that the plan "stands for" the formation of a tripartite coalition government and the subsequent election of a government in South Vietnam. ''This is completely reasonable and dust," the editorial stated. In this connection the editorial took issue with the U.S. position, rebuking Washington not only for refusing to cease its support for the Thieu government but also for spreading the "lie" that the communist aide seeks to establish a communist regime in South Vietnam. This shows, according to the editorial, that the United Staten is out to "obstruct a genuine solution'' and to Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIi'ENTIAL FBIS 't'RENDB 26 JULY 1972 "sabotage the peaceful reunification" of Vietnam. However, apart from the issue of a coalition government, the editorial did not criticize the U.S. negotiating approach. Similarly, NCNA's account of the NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary omitted passages disparaging President Nixon'e 8 May proposal and attacking "cunning political and diplomatic" mouse by the United States. In what may reflect Peking's emphasis on a settlement by the Vietna-~.eee themselves and its eenei:ivity concerning outside involvement, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial this year avoided striking the positive note thtt stood out in the 1971 editorial's praise ~f the Geneva agreemento ae "an important success." NCNA'? account of a North Korean article on the anniversary deleted a passage referring to the agreements as a "brilliant victory." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial concluded by reaffirming last year's pledge to provide "powerful backing" for the war effort and declared that the Chinese "will resolutely support" the fight to the end as their "bounden internationalist duty.'' However, Peking's reluctance to associate its own security interests with the Indochinese conflict was reflected in NCNA's failure to include in an account of an 18 July DRV "war crimes'' statement a charge that U.S. planes have. struck Chinese ships during attacks on the North. ALLEGED ATTACKS Weighing in with the first authoritative GN DIKES Chinese comment on the alleged bombing of North Vietnamese dikes, the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 25th supported recent DRV protests and "strongly" demanded that the United States immediately atop "such barbarous undertakings." But while feeling constrained to loin in the chorus of condemnation, the Chinese have limited their attack on this issue ,snd have stressed that the alleged bombing will not change the political and mi'itary situation. Thus, Commentator made the point that the alleged U.S. raids show not only the "brutality" but also the "feebleness" of the United States, and the article's concluding passage went to some length to express confidence that the North Vietnamese could not be intimidated and would persist in the fight. Consistent with this focus, the article did not raise the question of a settlement or mention Chinese aid. It also avoided an attack on the Nixon Administration by name, referring vaguely to attempts by "U.S. official circles" to "cover up the crimes." Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/O~ON~~-g~5T00875R00~~~0~,~~,~~~ 26 JULY 1972 In addition to replays of DRV charges, the Commentator article was preceded by dispatcher from an NCNA correspondent in Hanoi detailing eyewitness reports of the alleged bombings. Like Commentator, the correspondent expressed confidence that th~+ North Vietnamese could not be subdued. HANOI. FRONT CLAIM SIX:CESSES IN (~UAANG TRI. SCORE US~c Cf GAS Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to portray the Saigon counteroffensive in Quang Tri as a failure. LPA on the 22d maintained that in the first 23 days of the offensive--from 28 June to 20 July--some 9,500 allied troops were put out of action or captured, 81 aircraft downed or destroyed on the ground, and 120 vehicles wrv.:ked, more Chan half of which were tanks and armored care. Communist battle reports highlight fighting on 20 and 22 July when the PLAF allegedly killed or woundv.d nearly 500 troops; no mention ie made of thg current Saigon ass?,ult in Quang Tri city to capture the citadel. A 23 July NHAN DAN editorial claimed that President Nixon had ordered Saigon to launch the counteroffensive because the a111es needed a military victory to press their position at the Paris talks as well as to prevent the "disintegration of the puppet army." The paper said, however, that the allies' political ambitions are in sharp contradiction to their strength on the battlefield where they are encountering insurmountable problems. Commenting that the counteroffensiv~a, like the Vietnamization policy and the war itself, ie a mistake, the editorial said that the Saigon troops are being sent into a death trap. The alleged allied use of "toxic gas to massacre the people of Quang Tri" was protested in a 20 July statement by the committee on ~var crimes in South Vietram, reported by LPA on the 22d. It echoed complaints on this issue in PRG Foreign Ministry statements on 11 and 18 July,* but was more precise when it cited the use of CS gas, rather than referring generally to "toxic chemicals.' The statement cited several instances when chemicals were allegedly used and accused the allies of using "poison-gas bombs and shells to force the civilians out of their air-raid shelters" and then 'killing them with anti-personnel bombe and shells." * See the TRENDS of 12 July, pager 11-12, and 19 July, pages 16-17. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIUEN'f ZAL FBLS 'CftENUS 'L6 JULY 1972 USSR-EGYPT M06COW WWITEWASWES CAIRO OUSTER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL Acknowledging, a day after President as-Sadat's 18 July announcement, that Soviet military advisers were being returned from Egypt, Moscow has sought to present the action as a perfectly natural outgrowth of the "completion" of their mission, a move arrived at by mutual consultatiot- and signifying no change in either side's desire for continued friendship and cooperation. But Soviet sensitivity is betrayed in a resurgence of complaints, particularly in broadcasts for Arab audiences, about intrigues by "imperialists" and local "reactionaries" aimed at undermining Soviet-Egyptian friendship-- a theme also prominent in Moscow media at the times of the successive consultations now identified by ae-Sadat as landmarks in the exacr:bation of Soviet-Egyptian frictions. The withdrawal was formally acknowledged in a TASS communication, released late on the 19th, which claimed that the ~lecieiion was taken after "an exchange of opinions" between the two sides. Subsequent Moscow comment, both on the withdrawal and on the 20th anniversary of Egypt's revolution on 23 July, has hewed closely to the TASS announcement, couched in language that bears out as-Sadat's characterization of Egypt's "friend" as being "excessively cautious." Propagandists have reiterated TASS' assertion that the Soviet Union plans to continue developing and strengthening "in every way" its relations with Egypt based on the "strong foundation" of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. The pledge to continue to develop relations wAs notably absent, however, from the Soviet leaders' message of congratulations to as-Sadat on the revolution anniversary. The message did hail the two countries' relations, "consolidated" in the treaty, as an example of "true equality, full understanding, and fraternal solidarity," and it repledged f:,rm support for the Egyptian and other Arab peoples in their struggle to regain the occupied territories. But where last year's "warm" congratulations from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin l~sd assured Egypt it could always rely on Soviet "aid" as well as support, this year's "sincere" congratulations said nothing about aid. And where last year the military paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a congratulatory telegram from DefenAe Minister Grechko to his Egyptian counterpart, no mention of such a message has appeared in any Soviet media this year. Press and radio sources have Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENUB 26 JULY 1972 reported only the cable from the three tap leaders, Kosygin'e separate message to Prime Minister Sidqi, and Gromyko's congratulations to his Egyptian counterpart Ghalib. Articles marking the anniversary duly appeared in the Soviet central press, but Radio Moscow gave the anniversary far lees play than would normally be expected on the mayor decennial, observance. TASS ANNOUNCEMENT Setting the tone for subsequent reportage and comment, the TASS announcement noted Chat in response to Egypt's request for help in insuring its "defense potential," a "number" of Soviet military personnel had been "temporarily" stationed in Egypt to give friendly assistance "over a number of years" to help the Egyptian forces master Soviet military equipment. Now, it said, the military personnel had completed their mission; "with the awareness of this, after the exchange of opinions," the two sides deemed it expedient to bring back the personnel who had been in Egypt "for a limited period." TASS Chen underlined as-Sadat's assurance, in the 18 July speech, that the "measures taken now" would not affect Egyptian-Soviet friendship. It di4 not acknowledge that the measures included Egyptian takeover of military equipment and installations or that se-Sadat had called for talks with the Soviets. TASS stressed as-Sadat's high assessment of Soviet assistance and his desire for continued friendship. It was in this context that TASS pledged the Soviet Union to continue developing and strengthening its relations with Egypt on the basis of the treaty and in pursuit of the point struggle for "liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression." In a Cairo-datelined dispatch carries; shortly after the formal announcement on the withdrawal, TASS reported that in .his speech of the 18th as-Sadat emphasized the "great role" played by the Soviet Union in assisting Egypt. Quoting from his remarks on Moscow's military, political, and economic support, TASS brushed off--toward the close of the report--the fact that he "also made an announcement" about the windup of the Soviet military advisers' mission. The next day Moscow publicized an "official statement" issued by the Egyptian embassy in Moscow expressing gratitude for the assistance of "individuals--officers and soldiers--of the Soviet armed forces" who had accomplished their duties "efficiently and satisfactorily." The embassy statement said the Egyptian forces' Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFZDENTLAL FBIS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 development had enabled tr-em now to assume their national tasks themselves. Zt added, in an echo of as-Sadat's theme of independence, that Egypt would not allow others .to bear the brunt of i.ts fight and that the Egyptian people alone were responsibJz for undertaking the necessary tasks for their country's defense. Moscow of course has not revealed the time frame of as-Sadat's move; he said in his 24 July speech that the "resolutions" were issued on 8 July, and "I gave the friends nine days, to 17 Jul;, the day they should be implemented." Adding that "not a creature in the world had any indication unt11 16 July," as-Sadat claimed that the secrecy was maintained "out of care for our friends." The TASS announcement on the 19th said the Soviet personnel would "shortly return" home. On the 21st TASS reported that the Egyptian forces were giving a warm sendoff to the departing Soviet advisers, and on the 22d TASS welcomed home the "first group" of "military specialists" and reported an order issued by the defense minister praising their conduct in the discharge of their teaks. Acknowledgment of the presence of military "advisers" in Egypt has been infrequent in Soviet media. The one such statement at the elite level--by Kosygin in u 4 May .1970 cress conference in Moscow--got virtually no followup publicity. Asked at Chat time about Soviet pilots flying operational missions over Egypt, Kosygin replied, according to the Moscow domestic radio: "We have an agreement with the UAR Government to the effect that our military advisers are attached to the UAR troops. This is done with the object of combating .Israeli aggression, which again, in turn, is taking place only because of the great assistance frc:~ the United States, which is in fact delivering the necessary weapons and supplying and supporting the aggression Israel is waging against the UAR. The respective functions of our military advisers are being coordinated with the UAR Government." TREATMENT OF Broadcasts of the three top Soviet -leaders' ANNIVERSARY congratulatory message to as-Sadat accounted for the bulk of Radio Moscow's generally 1ow- key publicity for Egypt's revolution anniversary on the 23d. Moscow also reported, on 26 July, that as-Sadat's telegram in reply expressed "deep-felt gratitude" for the Soviet "sentiments" of support and solidarity as well as "high appreciation" of Soviet-Egyptian friendship based on mutual understanding, joint struggle, and fruitful cooperation. Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL F>;JS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 Moscow's Arabic-language service carried, among other things, the customary anniversary statement by the Egyptian.ambaesador in Moscow and an account of a ceremony held by the Soviet-Egyptian friendship Society in Moscow, as well as an interview with the society's chairman, Electricity and Power Minister Neporozhnyy. A broadcast in Arabic on the 21st noted that a Soviet-Egyptian "sports week" had begun in Egypt in connection with the anniversary, witr. the opening ceremony attended by Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov and--pointedly--"the Soviet .experts working on construction of industrial and agricultural projects in Egypt." Articles pegged to the anniversary appeared in PRAVDA, IZVISTIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 23d and in the July issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, signed to press 21 June. All the articles paid tribute to Nasir, and all made at leas t passing reference to as-Sadat. Each, discussing aspect., anu achievements of Egypt's domestic developments, called attention to Soviet assistance to Cairo in various fields, including the military. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's article referred to the "Soviet specialists' selfless labor" in construction of the Hulwan metallurgical complex, and it dwelt on how Egyptian prc~udices against Europeans turned to "respect and liking" once "Soviet man" appeared in Egypt. The opening of the anniversary session of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress on 24 July--rather than on the 23d, as is customary--was reported by TASS in a two-sentence item which noted cryptically that "the question of national unity at the present stage" was on the agenda. A brief Moscow domestic service report on the 24th mentioned that as-Sadat made a "long speech," and a later newscast that day disposed of the speech 1n the statement that the Egyptian president "summed up the results of Egypt's developments over the 20-year period and dwelled on the main tasks for the present period." It added only that he pointed out the deep social changeF that have taken place in the country and the considerable successes achieved in the development of the Egyptian economy, culture, education, and medical services. Monitored Soviet media have totally igr.ore~ his lengthy discourse on relations with the Soviet Union and tae United States. Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFLDENTIAL FBIS TRFNUS 26 J~ILY 1972 CW~R~ES [~F Moscow's insistent emphasis on continuing Soviet- "I(VTRIGI.'''," Egyptian friendship has been accom,~anied by repeated rejections of alleged attempts by "the imperialists" and their "agents" as well as by "Arab reaction" to disrupt that friendship. On the 20th a dispatch from Cairo correspondent Kudryavtsev, broadcast in Arabic, said AL AHRAM's political commentator had declared that any attempts to sow seeds of doubt as to the stability of Soviet-Egyptian friendehip.scrve only the Arabs' enemies. The paper's commentator--presumably chief editor Haykal--had in fact written on the 20th that "many people" had called for a serious discussion of Soviet-Arab relations, not wantinE to cast doubt on Chem but rather to preserve them; the commentator also said that the question of the advisers was not the corgi: of Arab-Soviet relations, and he explained !:hat the results of the Moscow summit conference "were the pointthat necessitated the 'objective pause "' in Soviet- Egyptian relations referred to by President as-Sadat. Soviet broadcasts in Arabic have continued almost daily since the 20th to impress on listeners the dangers of imperialist plots. A commentary on the 21st deplored "imperialist lies and provocations" in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel; it charged that when imperialists go to a country they never leave it, while in contrast the Soviet .staff which worked in Aswan had left Egypt "a long time ago." On the 24th, for its Arab audiences, Radio Moscow .accused Lsrael and "the imperialist powers behind it" of recently stepping up subversive activities against the Arabs in "several mayor directions," including the continued arming of Israel by the United States despite Arab protests. It also charged .the United States with trying to "divide patriotic forces in this or that Arab country" and to mobilize "internal reaction and the bourgeois elements." In what may have been a suggestion of Soviet concern lest Egypt's move set off a chain reaction among Moscow's other Arab clients, a iiudryavt,aev commentary in Arabic on the 20th claimed that imperialists and their "Israeli agents" were trying to deprive Egypt of its friends and allies by, among other things, consolidating the activity of reactionary forces in Egypt and ' "the other Arab countries." Similar overtones seemed.preseic in the IZVESTIYA anniversary article, by Klenov, which observed that while "Egypt has first place in our thoughts" on its 20th annlversary, "everything which has been said about it .also applies to the whole Acab world, primarily tI~e countries with Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/C~N~i~~~~5T00875R00~~~0~~~~7 26 JULY 1972 progressive regimes." Klenov observed that Syria's economic potential and "defense capability" were developing successfully in cooperation with the country's "natural ally, the Soviet Union," end added that Iraq's "anti-imperialist positions" had strengthensd.* Echoing the theme of the broadcasts in Arabic, the PRAVDA anniversary article by Demchenko complained of "speculation" by "enemies of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation" about .the return of the Soviet military personnel from Egypt. Demchenko also expressed concern that "in a number of Arab countries, including Egypt, rightist, reactionary forces who oppose the social transformations being pursued there are striving to step up their actions." A flurry of similar comment on "imperialist intrigues" against Soviet-Arab relations had appeared last fall, around the time of as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow; again last February, after his next visit; and still again in April,. .prior to his last talks in the USSR.** The theme cropped up again early this month: A Moscow broadcast in. Arabic on 3 July defended the May U.S.-Soviet summit--which as-Sadat indicated in hie 24 July speech was a sore point--and rejected "irresponsible allegations" in "some Arab newspapers" that the USSR had made "certain concessions" harmful to the national liberation movement. Broadcasts in Arabic on 5 and 6 July denounced propaganda by "hostile forces" seeking to misrepresent Arab-Soviet cooperation. The one on the 6th professed bewilderment and regret that "certain Arab journalists" were portraying Soviet aid to the Arabs as a "commercial deal in which each side seeks its own advantage"; undoubtedly responding to Egyptian arguments, the broadcast maintained that when the USSR provides "impartial aid to Egypt," it does not at all seek special advantages "or aims such as access to warm waters."*** PRAVRA on the 11th * Moscow gave no special emphasis to the 20 July ceremonial exchange of ratification documents on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty as a counter- balance to its Egyptian embarrassment; publicity for the occasion was less than half that given the same ceremony for the Soviet-Egyptian treaty ~~ year ago. ** Belgrade's POLITIKA recalled on 20 July that at the time of as-Sadat's Apri?. talks in Moscow it could have been deduced from articles in PRAVDA, I7,VESTIYA, and NOVOYE VREMYA that "the USSR was aware of some phenomenon in the Arab world which it did not like." *** A Budapest broadcast on the 25th noted that .Egyptian Minister of Statn., for Information az-Zayyat, in a 22 July press conference, affirmed that Soviet warships would continue to enjoy Egyptian port facilities. Neither the short TASS account nor the Cairo reports of the press conference mentioned this point. Approved For Release 2000/08/QSDD1]~i~~~T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 26 .DULY 1972 drew on Cairo's AL-JUl~41URIYAH for refutation of 1Qfalee .rumors" of alleged Soviet interests in Egypt and rejection of any analogy between the USSR and the United States as great powers. AIR INCIDENT The air incident on 24 July, when .Cairo cle:imed that it had downed one of four Israeli Phantoms in Egyptian airspace, was reported by Moscow radio in the usual fashion with a short factual account attributed to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY. The incident was brought up on the 25th in aforeign-language commentary by Shakhov which cited the alleged intrusion into "Egyptian airspace" as an example of Israeli provocations and claimed that "the crime did not go unpunished." Shakhov drew the standard propaganda conclusion that renewed Israeli provocations meant still another secret agreement with Washington for the dispatch of new arms. In an atypical and perhaps significant remark on .Israeli withdrawal, Shakhov reaffirmed the Soviet position on unconditional withdrawal on the basis of Resolution .242.. but went on to add that "of course, the ways and means of the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces can be the subject of discussion." PRC PLEASED AT CAIRO MO~fE: USSR RFJrCTS TO PEKING CANT Peking's obvious satisfaction over Moscow's discomfiture comes through in NCNA's reportage on the Egyptian action and in remarks by Chou En-lai. NCNA on the 20th reviewed in some detail the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report on as-Sadat's 18 July speech, concluding with the observation that Cairo citizens thronged the streets listening to broadcast reports of the president's speech and asking: "Indeed, what have the Russians really done for us?" An NCNA dispatch on the 21st quoted ASU First Secretary Mari for the remark that as-Sadat's decision to terminate the Soviet military mission was "one we're all looking forward to." Other NCNA reportage has under- scored Egyptian support for as-Sadat's "wise decisions," as well as approval from Libya and Lebanese?prese comment critical of the Soviet Union. Chou En-lai took the occasion of a 21 June farewell banquet in Peking hooted by visiting Yemeni Prime Minister al-'Apdi to obliquely congratulate the Egyptians: "We are glad to see that the Arab peoples' s'.ruggle in defense of independence and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 sovereignty and against the superpowers' control and interference is forging ahead." More r~~rthrightly, the congratulatory message from Chou and Tung s'i-wu on the Egyptian revolution anniversary referred specifically to as-Sadat's 18 July speech in which he "once again expressed the strong determination of the Egyptian Government and people to fight for justice." The Chinese Government and people, the message went on, firmly and consistently "support you in opposing the aggression committed by Israeli Zionism with the connivance and suppor~ of the superpowers." The sentiments of the message were echoed in a 23 July NCNA dispatch which noted that as-Sadat's speech had evoked warm support at home and "won the sympathy and support of the people of the world." On the same day, NCNA reported the Cairo weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWN as saying Char Egypt had requested "a certain type" of weapon from the Soviet Union, which accepted the request but demanded that the weapon's use be subject to Moscow's approval. NCNA quoted the paper as adding that Egypt found it difficult to accept such a condition and that consequently "this type of weapons did not arrive." The article wondered, sa:!d tJCNA, what use Soviet experts served if they belonged to a state that did not want to fight. On the 26th, an NCNA dispatch quoted liberally from passages in as-Sadat's 24 July speech "sternly condemning" the United States and detailing his differences with the Soviet Unian. SOVIET REJOINDER Moscow promptly set about countering Peking's gibes. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the 20th reported as-Sadat as having "emphatically" pointed out Chat the Soviet Union had played an important role in Egypt's struggle against U.S.-Israeli "aggression." Almost as an afterthought, the broadcast observed in passing that as-Sadat also said the Soviet advisers who had worked in Egypt at Cairo's request had completed their mission. On the 23d, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin maxked the Egyptian anniversary with the usual praise of Cairo's domestic progress achieved with Soviet assistance. Without mentioning the affair of the withdrawn advisers, the broadcast charged the Chinese leaderFhip with distorting the nature of Soviet-Arab relations and sawing seeds of distrust toward the Soviet Union "and the nature of its policy and assistance to the Arab countries." Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL, 21 - C O R R E C T I O N FBIS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 In the USSR-Egypt. sF:ction of the 19 July TRENDS, page 19, second paragraph, the last 'sentence should read: The apparently hastily arranged Sidgi visit was announced in Cairo on the 11th with MENA reporting Chat Sidqi had met twice the previous day with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 ROMANIA CEAUSESCU UPHOLDS ROMANIAN IImEPENDENCE. REJECTS "GtNERAL LAWS" The 19-21 July national conference of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was used by Nicolae Ceausescu as a forum to reassert Bucharest's independence vis-a-vis the "general laws" of socialist building propounded by Moscow. The maverick Romanian leader implicitly challenged the guidelines laid down at the June 1969 Moscow international cc,nF~.rence of communist parties by calling for a redefinition of "the principles and norms that should guide relations among all socialist countries." He reaffirmed his country's determination to mai~~tain gcod relations with "all" socia~ist countries, including Moec~w and its bloc allies as well as Peking and Tirana. While emphasizing Bucharest's economic ties with Mo...,ow, Ceausescu ca13_ed for an expansion of trade with tre West and the establishment of a Bslka:: organiza- tion to promote economic cooperation in the region. He strongly reiterated the need to reach international agreements guarantee- ing the equality, independence, and sovereignty of "all" states and went sn far as to call for the codification of such agreemen~s in international law. On domestic affairs, Ceausescu conveyed a picture of only modest economic gains since the 1969 party congress. He was chosen by the party conference co head a new "Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development" designed to supervise the newly formed coordinating councils in such fields as machine-building, finance, and banking. Although Ceausescu did not address himself directly to the subject of factionalism in `he party, as he had done in his 7 May 1971 speech on the 50th anniversary of the RCP, he made an unusual appeal for a personal vote of confidence: "From this forum of the national conference I wish to assure the party, the entire people, than sei f.zi~ as I am concerned I will devote my whole activity, my life, to j~~:hieving this goal, to the cause of socialism and communism and to the happy future of our entire r.gtion." To shore up party unity, he proposed the addition ~ the Central Committee of "20 to 30 party activists who are di.rectl.y employed in production" and "a greater number of women." Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : Cb~I~B~'T~IQ~75R00030(~;1~0i},'~i~1D8 26 JULY 1972 BLOC RELATIONS In hio treatment of foreign affairs, Ceausescu stressed the importance of Romania's close tied with the USSR and hie pet~.onal relations with the Soviet leaders. Ilo noted "the intensification of file exchange of experience between our country and the Soviet Union" and the "important role" played by tiie contacts with Drezhnev, Pougornyy, and Kosygin. Calling attention to the importanc? of the economic exchanges, he said: "I want to particularly noise that within the framework of our inter- national trade, the first place is occupied by the Soviet Union, whose share ie 25 percent." He added that "this requires our permanent concern with further Pxpanding our exchanges and cooperation in production with the USSR." Ceausescu'e affirmations of friendship with the USSR were matched b3? hie expansive remarks on Romania's good relations with other countries, including Albania, China, Israel, and the United States, anct by hie polemical statements on the need to develop "new" etar..dards to govern relations among communist parties and socialist states. While conceding that relations among "the 14 socialist countries"--a pointed formulation that includes China and Albania--must be based on the "single" philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Ceausescu went on to declare that "the mere assertion of the general principles is not sufficient for the creation of relations of a new type." The socialist states, he argued, require a "better definition" of the principles governing their relations, and they "mus'~ establish in more detail how these pr.inciplee should operate." The Romanian leader thus delivered a new tacit rebuke to Moscow's view that a "new" type of relations had been estab- lished in the socialist world and that "general laws" of social development were applicable to all socialist countries. In his speech to the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had authoritatively restated the thesis of the main document of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference on the "indivisibility" of national and international interests. And Soviet commentary has since consistently hewed to the 1969 conference formulation on the dialectical unity of national and international intere.a*_s and to the notions of "general laws" of socialism and of a "new" type of socialist international relations. As a counter to the Soviet view, Ceausescu repeatedly emphasized the need to develop "new production relations," "a new type of of nation," and "a new type of relations" between the socialist countries based on the overcoming of differences through conaul- tatioas and negotiations and "excluding any form of i,lterference." Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/OSIO~~`f~~85T00875F~tlb~360tl0-7 zb JuL~ 1972 Tho Romanian leader called for "a unity of a new type" among the world communist parties "which should in its turn start out from the dialectical-materialist outlook, from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and should be based on full equality among a1i parties and on the observance of the independence of each party." Ceausescu reasserted "rho right of. each party t~~ work out its political line in keeping with the concrete r:.ndit:ons" in which it operates, buttressing this assertion with a reference to the dissolution of the Comintern--a body which Moscow portrayed in a notably favorable light in recent comment commemorating the 90th birth anniversary of Bulgarian leader Georgl Dlmitrov. Ceausescu recalled "the appraisal made by the Communist International in 1943, when 1t decided to dissolve itself,' to the effect that "tho existence of a single leading center is no longer possible, and each party ~ bears the entire responsibility for the working out of revolutionary strategy and tactics." In a further slap at Moscow's traditional dominance in the movement, Ceausescu added that "nobody can hold the absolute truth" and "it is the duty of each party always to support what is new and what ie developing, r.o act in a conscious manner against the old, against all that is outdated and does not correspond any more to the demands of social life." SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT Presenting an updated review of Romania's views regarding a conference on European security and cooperation, Ceausescu repeated long- standing positions with typical Romanian colorations that stressed the independence and security of "ail" European states. After calling on the European countries to ar, understanding on equali~ , independence, and sovereignty of ull states and non- interference in internal affairs, he said that a "solemn pledge" to uphold these principles was "necessary" and that "nothing could ,justify their violation"--a clear refection of the notion that any socialist state could arrogate to itself the right to into:rvene in another's affairs in the cause of "proletarian internaL?ionaliem." As if to reinforce Romania's firm stand on this issue, he added that an agreement in "an appropriate juridical form is also required" whereby the European states would pledge themselves to refrain from the use or threat of force in relations with other states and in the "settlement of divergencies in existence or which might crop up." Ceausescu continued: "These pledgee should explicitly specify that any transgression ^f 'these rules Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CI~~~~1Q~A175R000300 FDI93 TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 by any state signifies a violation of the peoples' right to independence, of the United Nations . ." In a related vein, in a passage outlining Romania's views on Che United Nations, Ceausescu declared that the world organization "must also be more active" and that "it should not permit the viola- tion of thA sovereignty of a member state by other states for any reason whatsoever." He added that "any such act must be considered ae being incompatible with UN membership and should incur public condemnation and adequate measures." Ceausescu made no direct reference to the issue of force reduc- r~,ons in Europe, but he reiterated Bucharest's calla for "military disengagea.ant" and for "reducing and withdrawing troops on the territories of other states and of foreign military bases, including the reduction of national troops." And in a vaguely wordb~ passage expressing Romanian interest in force reductions, he said "it is also recessary to act eo as to create appropriate conditions for the liquidation of opposed military blocs ." Later, after stressing that international problems must be solved with the participation of the "small- and medium-sized" states and with the interests of those states in mind, Ceausescu declared that "any violation" of the principle of equality or interference in their internal affairs "shall be considered acts directed against peace and mankind." In a passage that drew strong applause from the assemblage, he proclaimed that "the sacred right of all countries to freedom and sovereignty should be recognized, ae well as their legitimate right to defend themselves with all means, including military means, against any violation of this right." In discusetng nuclear disarmament, Ceausescu seemed to offer proposals containing elements taken from both Soviet and Chinese proposals. He appealed to all states, "and first and foremost the big countries," to renounce the use or threat of force against other states, "i.ncluding the use of nuclear weapons and rockets"--a formula which coincides with the ChinesR call for a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step "to reach agreement on the non-use of nuclear s-eapons." Balancing this appeal with one drawn from the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference, Cea~ieescu also called for a "general conference on disarmament with the participation of all the peoples of the world " He said that the Geneva disarmament committee should imp?cove and extend its activities, which should then be "submitted to effective public control," and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08~~~~~85T00875R~B~~O~~~~~0-7 26 JULY 1972 that the committee should be "democratized"--a possible allusion to tha restricted membership of th? committee, particularly the absence of the French and the lack of Chinese representation on Ln calling for a meeting of Balkan representatives, Ceausescu reiterated the proposal to convert the Balkans into an atom-free zone--> notion also endorsed by the USSR on occasion in the past--;end a zone free of military bases. BAU(AN ORGANIlATION Ceausescu went beyond previous Bucharest pronouncements in calling for formalized cooperation among the countries of the Balkan region. He declared that "the time has come to pass over from general statements to concrete actions" in the 8alkane and that "it would be particularly useful to pass on to achieving closer economic collaboration by the ec:ting up of an organization for this purpose, which should help in intensifying exchanges and organizing cooperation in production." An unsigned commentary carried by AGERPRES on 14 September 1971 had said, in a discussion of European security, that "a11 the Balkan countries are duty-bound to take initiatives and actions with the objective of improving the climate in that zone" and that "large possibilities exist" for development of closer economic cooperation in the zone. MOSCOW GLASSES OVER SPEECH: PEKING REPORTS IT APPROVINGLY Ceausescu's proposal for a Balkan economic organization and his remarks on European security and disarmament were ignored in Moscow's brief coverage of hie speech. A Moscow domestic service report--attributed to a TASS correspondent but not carried in TASS' English and Russian international services--noted Ceausegcu's statem~::~t that 55 percent of Romania's trade is with CEMA and ~~ent on to sharpen Ceausescu's tribute to the Soviet Union: "The Soviet Union, he pointed out, which with its outstanding successes in many fields of activity has shown itself to be a giant force in the world today, is first and foremost in Chis respect. The corresponding passages in the text as broadcast by the Bucharest radio do not contain tr.~~ underlined portion, which the TASS correspondent lifted from another passage in which Ceausescu had balanced prates of the Soviet Union with praise for the PRC. A PRAWA Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FB.[S TRENDS 26 JULY 19;1 correspondent's report, published in the paper the same day, also singled out Ceaueescu'e call for expanded trade and cooperation with the USSR and hie remarks on meetings with the top Soviet ]sedate. Ceausebcu's remarks on relations with the Soviet Union were similarly emphasized in reports in the GDR'8 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, and Prague's CTK and RUDE P1WV0. East German, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak reports took note of the Romanian leader's endorsement of a conference on European security and cooperation, hie statements on Vietnam, and-- selectively--hie remarks on the Middle East,. but for the moat part focused on domestic affairs. Reports in Wareaw'e TRYBUNA LUDU on the 20th and 24th notably avoided any mention of the content of Ceausescu'8 remarks on foreign affairs. A report in Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the ~Oth was notably fuller that the other countries' accounts, including Ceausescu's references to "erroneous measures" in the economy, hie appeal for over~aoming "nationalist and chauvinist" manifestations'' at home, and hie call for "uni.ty and overcoming disagreements of a temporary nature" in relations between the socialist coun- tries. At the same time, Romania's independent course was implicitly attacked in an article on the third anniversary of the June 1969 Moscow conference written by Hungarian party Politburo member and secretary Komocsin for the August issue of the Soviet ,journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENP~YY MIR, reprinted in the July-August issue of the Budapest theoretical Monthly TARSADALMI SZEMLE. The appearance of the article in TARSADALMI SZEMLE was announced by the Hungarian Government orga;~, MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 21st, the last day of the Bucharest party conference. The article contained a thinly veiled warning to the Romanians: It observed that "lasting success cannot be achieved by proclaiming a sovereignty with nationalist content," a course which it alleged gains the approval of "the class enemy" and leads to "abandoning internationalism and the international workers movement." Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDEN'TTAL FBZS 'TRENDS 26 JULY ].912 PEKING COVERAGE Peking promptly reported Ceausescu's speech in an NCNA dispatch that included the Romanian leader's account of hie talks in the Far Eaet with Mao, Chou, Kim 11-songs and Le Duan but ignored all his refer- ences to other socialist countries including Albania. Consistent with Peking's eff orte to encourage East European independence vie-a-vie the Soviet Union, the report's main thrust highlighted Ceauseecu'8 defense of Romania's "independence and national eavereignty~" emphasizing hie call for an end ro "all inequality and national oppression" in relations among socialist countries. NCNA also cited approvingly the Romanian leader's support for the Vietnamese war effort, Sihanouk's Peking-backed Cambodian "government" which Moscow has not recognized, and Pyongyang's efforts toward Korean reunification. Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 2h JULY 1972 - 29 - COMMU~!IST RELATIONS PRAVDA PUBLICIZES SPANISH CP DELEGATION`S VISIT TO USSR In the first known direct reference to the Spanish Communist Party (PCE)--the "official" faction led by Dolores Ibarruri and Santiago Car,:: 1.o--to appear in Soviet media 1n more than a year, PRAVDA on 5 July published a brief report that a group of PCE "journalists" had toured the Soviet Union "for three weeks at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee" and had met with party, trade union, and youth organizations. No dates were cited. Neither the PRAVDA report nor similar reports in Moscow radio newscasts in Spanish and Portuguese carried any additional information on the delegation's visit. But the PCE's clandestine Radio Independent Spain (REI) noted on 15 June that the five-man delegation had arrived for "an information-gathering visit" and reported in broadcasts on 1 and 6 July that the delegation included Central Committee members Ramirez, Izcaray, and Melchor. REI said the delegation's account of the visit would appear in a forthcoming issue of the PCE Cheoretical journal NEUSTRA BANDERA. Th^ only reference to substantive issues discussed by the CPSU and the PCE visitors appeared in the clandestine radio's broadcast of 6 July, which said the delegation had noted the CPSU's "deep interest" in the situation in Spain and the struggle of the Spanish people and the PCE "against the Franco dictatorship." REI reported that "everywhere, stress was laid on the fraternity of Soviet and Spanish communists in the common struggle against imperialism." It added--in a statement which implied that the visit was a success--that the delegation "expressed .Lts appreciation to the CPSU Central Committee for the attention and courtesy it had received" and promised the CPSU "and all those who contributed to the fulf illment of the delegation's mission" to convey its impressions to the people and communists of Spain. The appearance of even the brief, undetailed report of the visit in PRAVDA, obscuring as it does the fact that PCE Central Committee figures were in the delegation, suggests a desire by t-~e Soviet Union to place its relations with the maverick, indep~:ndent-minded PCE on a firmer basis. Moscow has recently made clear its concern over the freewheeling behavior of such parties as the PCE and the small Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), with a PRAVDA Observer article in May CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 26 JULY 1912 evincing interest in resuming long-interrupted contacts with the CPN. Cool. CPSU relations with the PCE date back to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia ar.d could only have deteriorated further with PCE leader Carrillo's v~~?it to Peking last fall and Carrillo's public espousal of a Roam. ' ~r-type line on the desirability of cordial relations with "awl" parties. Moscow media have, of cour-;e, never mentione4 Carrillo's Peking trip. In the period since the Czechoslovak events, a splinter pro- Soviet faction of tt~e Spanish party has been organized under the leadership of General Enrique Lister, with apparent behind- the-scenes Soviet eupport.* That Moscow may now wish to move to mend its fences with the Carrillo-led faction of the party seemed indicated 1n a report appearing in the PCE organ MUNDO OBRERO of 10 June. According to this report a meeting hosted by the PCPs permanent representation in the USSR in Moscow on 29 April, to express solidari:; with the people of Spain, too'.t place in a "packed house" and was marked by "indescribable enthusiasm." Among those reportedly attending the meeting were Secretary of the PCE Committe~~ in the USSR Juan Avestaran, who outlined the PCE struggle 1n Spain, and Emilio Garcia, who praised the work of the illegal "workers' commissions" in Spain and personally pledged allegiance t~ the PCE Central Committee headed by Ibarruri and Carrillo. Moscow media did not publicize the meeting, but it could only have taken place with Soviet approval. The PCE's perms Went representation has remained in the USSR throughout the period of cool CPSU-PCE relations; Soviet media have carefully suppressed the continued in-fighting between this group and the Lister faction, whose existence Moscow has never acknowledged. In recent months, commenta,ies and reports on Spain in Soviet central media have discussed the internal Spanish situation in broad, general terms and have made only passing reference to the Spanish communist m~~vement. Moscow has noted the activities of the Spanish work"rs' commissions, linking them to Spanish communists among other opposition forces but not specifically to the PCE organization as such. The weekly NEW TIMES (No. 15, 7 April 1972), for example, published an interview with an unidentified representative of the workers' commissions to the Soviet trade union cc,~.gress in March which made no reference to the PCE. * See FBIS Special Report No. 305 of 7 March 1972, 'Spanish Communists Reestablish Relations with Peking: Background and Ramifications," for background on the split in the PCE. Approved For Release 2000/08/09'~~~~T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBLS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 JAPAN-CHINA-USSR PEKING FORTHCOINING. MOSCOW CAUTIOUS TpWARp TANAKA CABINET The 6 July election of Kakuei Tanaka as Japanese premier was greeted favorably by Peking and welcomed more .cautiously by Moscow. The Chinese lost no time in signaling their .readiness to deal with~the new government, with Chou En-lai noting on 9 July that thr Sato government-='which long remained hostile toward China"--had been "forced to step down" and .expressing "welcome" to the new cabinet's statement that "normalization of relations between China and Japan would be expedited." Chows approving acknowledgment of the change in Japanese government appeared 1n a mayor address hailing .trends .toward detente in Asia free of superpower control. The abrupt shift in Peking's posture toward Japan, previously a target of sustained polemical attack, has servP.d to bring Sino-Japanese relations into the pattern of Peking's moves to enhance its leverage against the two superpowers and to erode their influence. Peking's extensive publicity for the new Japanese .government, which has been free of critical comment, has included reports on activities by two Chinese officials in effect mark a step toward opening diplomatic relational or .at least convey Peking's interest in developing official contacts. Peking reported a reception in Tokyo on 20 July given by Fujiyama, an LDP member long associated with PRC-Japanese relations, in honor of the two Chinese officials, the new chief of the Chinese trade office and the leader. .of .a~Shangh$i dance troupe now in Japan. NCNA quoted Fu~iyama .as .hailing .the presence ~at the reception of new Foreign Minister Ohira as "an epoch-making event" which conferred added significance on .the gathering. The Chinese trade official, Hsiao Hsiang-chien, was quoted as expressing the readiness of his office to work for the normalization of PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations."at an early date." Speaking at another reception on the same day, also reported by NCNA, Hsiao echoed Chou's welcome .f or what he called Tanaka's "positive statements" on Sino-Japanese relations since taking office, noting that the premier .had. expressed an intention to realize diplomatic relations at .an early date. NCNA reported on 22 July that the two.Ghinese officials and Foreign Minister Ohira had a "friendly" .talk that day in which they expressed the hope that Sino-Japanese relations would be normalised as Boon as possible and agreed to hold talks again "if required." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 26 JULY 1972 In a show of flexib111ty, Peking has not been presaing.its three principles for establishing diplomatic relations-that the PRC ie the sole legitimate government of China, that Taiwan is part of China, and Chat the Japan-ROC treaty must be abrogated--while taking note of the Tanaka cabinet's professions of "full under- standing" of the three principles. NCNA'e account .of Tanaka'~o 19 July press conference juxtaposed hie statement that the China question is the biggest diplomatic question and that .the time 1s ripe for normalizing relations with his remark .that Taiwan represents $n important question which should be .settled. "together with such a big question as the normalization!!.of PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations. If unchallenged,. such an approach would circumvent the demand that Tokyo sever its formal ties with Taipei as a precondition for negotiating. relations with Peking. NCNA's account of the Tanaka cabinet's replies to opposition questions on 18 July included the assertion that the clauc~e on Taiwan in the U.S.-Japanese point declaration was a product of its bane and that the situation "underwent a tremendous change later on,'! resulting in a change in the "understanding" of the government. Peking's first reference to an i-~vitation to Tanaka to visit the PRC was contained i:i a 24 July NCNA dispatch reporting his speech that day at the first meeting of the LDP's council for- normalizing Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.. Tanaka was quoted as saying that "as to the vie it of the foreign minister and I to China, it should be decided" by the council... He was next quoted as saying he would hold talks with President Nixon next month and that he hoped to learn "the .U..S.. attitude and ideas on China." NGNA's report on Tanaka's J9 July press conference had quoted his statement that Tokyo would maintain the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. MOSCOW Soviet reaction to the Tanaka cabinet has .been one. of cautious welcome. Soviet media reported factually the formation of the new cabinet and a PRAVDA article. on 8 July "welcomed" a statement by Nakasone, one of the chief ministers in the new cabinet, that he supports "cooperation with .the Soviet Union." An IZVESTIYA commentary on S July observed. that only "time will show" the new government's approach but noted that Tanaka!s expressed desire for "closer ~~lations with the .Soviet Union" had been "favorably received by the Soviet.puhlic." Soviet caution was reflected in the TASS account .c Tanaka's frees conference on 1S July. TASS took note of his c~ll_ for concluding a peace treaty with the USSR but did not .report his remarks on the need to solve the northern territories issue. Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7